1 S e c urit y C ul t ure : a handbo o k f o r a c t ivis t s 2 8
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Security Culture:a handbook f or activists
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This handbook is the third edition of what we has been an evolving and
growing document dealing with security issues and canadian activism.We would like to say a big thanks to the Collective Opposing PoliceBrutality in Montreal for editing some of the text of the original pamphlet
and adding so many great examples to the Informants and Infiltratorssection. We have replicated many o f their changes in this edition.Thanksalso goes out to Eric Drooker whose artwork we used throughout this
pamphlet.
For more information or to make contributions to this document - please
email [email protected]
Third edition - prepared November 2001.
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5. ANYTHING YOU SAY TO THE POLICE MAY BEUSED AGAINST YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE. Onceyou've been arrested, you can't talk you way out of it.Don't try to engage cops in a dialogue or respond toaccusations.
6. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO REVEAL YOUR HIV STA-TUS TO THE POLICE OR JAIL PERSONNEL. Ifyou've been arrested you should refuse to take a bloodtest until you've been brought before a judge andhave a lawyer of your choice.
7. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO TELEPHONE A LAWYEROF YOUR CHOICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. Thismeans after you've been arrested, charged and bookedinto jail. This does not mean however, that you'll begiven the right to speak with you family and friends.This is left up to the discretion of the police involved inyour case.
8. LYING TO THE POLICE IS A CRIME.
9. IF YOU ARE NERVOUS ABOUT SIMPLY REFUS-ING TO TALK, YOU MAY FIND IT EASIER TO TELLTHEM TO CONTACT YOUR LAWYER. Once a lawyer
is involved, people will know more about your state i.e.charges, bail, court date, etc.
R ights
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Introduction:
Resistance has been on the rise for the past fewyears, with activists adopting more and more effective
tactics for fighting back. Our increased activity andeffectiveness has meant that the RCMP, FBI, and
local police have continued to escalate their activitiesagainst us. As well, the events of September 11th andensuing state hysteria are no small footnote to the
way that our radical and revolutionary movementshave and will be targeted by repressive state forces.
If we want our direct action movement to continue, itis imperative we start tightening our security and
taking ourselves more seriously. Now is the time toadopt a security culture. Good security is certainly the
strongest defense we have.
This is a handbook for the Canadian activist who is
interested in creating and maintaining securityawareness and culture in the radical movements. We
are always looking for contributions - so please feelfree to email [email protected] with any images ortext you think belong in a handbook such as this.
This is the third edition of this zine that we have putout in order to add and improve on the original text(thanks for the work of the Collective Opposing PoliceBrutality in Montreal for their help). There will be
future editions of this handbook so keep puttingforward suggestions to us.
We hope that you will put the material containedwithin to good use. Now more than ever is the time to
act!
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1. YOU DON'T HAVE TO TALK TO THE POLICE OR
INVESTIGATORS. You do not have to talk to them onthe street, if you've been arrested, or even if you're in jail. Do not talk about illegal actions with fellow “in-mates” in holding as they may be plants.
2. YOU DON'T HAVE TO LET CSIS OR THE POLICEINTO YOUR HOME OR OFFICE UNLESS THEYHAVE A SEARCH OR ARREST WARRANT. Demandto see the warrant. It must specificallydescribe theplace to be searched and things to be seized. It mustbe authorized by a judge and should bear a signature.
3. IF THE POLICE DO PRESENT A WARRANT, YOU
DO NOT HAVE TO TELL THEM ANYTHING OTHERTHAN YOU NAME, ADDRESS AND BIRTH DATE.Carefully observe the officers; you're in your ownhome you're not required to stay in one room. Youshould take written notes of what they do, theirnames, badge numbers, and what agency they'refrom. Have friends who are present act as witnesses.It's risky to let cops roam around alone in your place.
4. IF THE POLICE TRY TO QUESTION YOU OR TRYTO ENTER YOUR HOME WITHOUT A WARRANT,JUST SAY NO. The police are very skilled at getting
information from people, so attempting to outwit themis very risky. You can never tell how a seeminglyharmless bit of information can hurt you or someoneelse.
Your
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of the agent will accomplish aneffective neutralization. Bu t if theagent is no great threat to the
group's functioning, the agentstaying inside the group may be
useful for other purposes.
The group might decide thatthey prefer to keep the agent,
rather than risk not knowing whowould replace a known quantity.It the agent is not in a sensitive
position, can be monitored andisolated from important work, thegroup may want to keep such an
agent at a low organizationallevel. Or the agent might begiven tasks that seem to be
sensitive but are in reality notcrucial to the group. Under thecover of doing "sensitive" work,
false and semi-false informationabout the group can be relayedto the intelligence agencies that
the agent belongs to. Or per-haps certain information that isin fact true about the group can
be willfully discredited by crea-
tion of pseudo-events and/orfalse information. Remember
that when the intelligenceagencies have a great deal ofcontradictory information, it
decreases their ability to actdecisively against the group.
(d) What are the responsibilitiesto other groups of the group'sknowledge of an informer? I f the
group makes a decision to sever
connection with the agent it is
certainly the group's responsibil-ity to quietly contact leadershipin other groups to warn them
about the agent. Often public
exposure is done through thegroup's newspaper/newsletter/
journal; in this case, the newsarticle should be sent to a widevariety of groups. The more
pressing problem is the instancewhere there are only suspicionsbut not decisive evidence.
Experience has shown thatsuspicions are taken seriously
only when then is a politicalbond that exists betweenpersons with long movement
experience. People who havebeen in the movement a longtime, and who are known to
each other and trusted asdedicated movement people,can convey agent suspicions
that will get a favorable hearingor be readily believed. This "oldhands trust network" is relatively
independent of political point ofview; veteran leaders of rivalradical organizations can f reely
and easily exchange informationon matters of security.
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A CTIV ISM AND STATEREPRESSION
This pamphlet has essential
information for anyone asso-ciated w ith groups advocating
or using economic disruptionor sabotage, theft, arson, self-
defence from police or m oremilitant tactics. The advice
that followsalso applies to
anyone associated w ithgroups practising civil dis-obedience, especially since
people often work in severalgroups at the same time and
gossip travels freely betweenthem.
Even if you've never
expressed your politics bydoing property damage,
pitching cobblestones, or
getting arrested for civildisobedience; even if youthink you have nothing tohide, these guidelines arepresented here to enhanceyour personal safety as wellas the overall effectiveness ofour movements.
The simple reality is thatgovernments in industrializedcountries target groups that
advocate economic sabotageand groups that don’t, move-
ments that are militant andmovements that are m arkedlypacifist. The government'ssecurity machinery serves theelitist political and economicobjectives of capitalism. Thereare over 250 political prison-ers in Canada and the US thatcan testify to this from first-hand experience. By ado ptinga security culture, we can limit
or neutralize counter-intell-igence operations meant todisrupt our political organ-izing, be it mainstream orunderground.
Peasant-rebels; communards;liberationists; abolitionists;labour organizers; revolut-ionaries; from large uprisingschallenging the entire politicalstructure, to isolated environ-
mental and social struggles,people have constantly workedto create a better world. Theresponse of government hasalways been repression topreserve the status quo..
Historically, governmentsurveillance and harassmenthas increased relative to theascendancy of direct acti onmovements. Minimizing the
destructiveness of politicalrepression requires that we
What it is, why we need it
and how to implement it...
Security
Culture
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Assuming that the securitypeople within the group have
suspicions about a groupmember being an informer/ provocateur, it is useful for
security/leadership to resolvecertain questions both beforeand after the investigation:
(a) How badly do you want toknow whether the person is in
agent or not? Clearly, if theperson under suspicion isrelatively important to the
group's functioning, then leader-ship must know one way or theother. The more important the
person under suspicion is to thegroup, the more intensive theinvestigation. We may suggest
methods of investigation whichare unorthodox and from acertain point of view morally
indefensible. But the question isalways how badly the groupneeds to know. No group need
use all or any of the methods wedescribe. But under the condi-tion that the correct in formation
is a life-and-death matter for thegroup, certain drastic measures
may be justified.
(b) What will be done if the
information is inconclusive?Often there is not enoughevidence to confirm that some-
one is a police agent, but thereIS enough evidence to confirmcertain suspicions. A great deal
will depend upon what is at
stake with the person undersuspicion. In general, the
choices come down to1) labelling the person a securityrisk and acting accordingly;
2) doing nothing outwardly butcontinuing the investigation;3) isolating the person from
sensitive work but keeping himor her in the group;4) moving to a higher stage of
investigation.
(c) What will be done If the
person does turn out to be anagent? While common sensedictates that the person be
exposed and severed from thegroup, other act ions might beinitiated. If the presence of the
agent is a real threat to thegroup, then the agent should beneutralized in an effective
manner. Usually wide exposure
MOVING AGAINST INFORMERS:
CONSIDERATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
(Taken f rom PROTECTING OURSELVES FROM STATE REPRESSION:
A MANUAL FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVISTS. Published in 1984 bythe Anti-Repression Resource Team - Jackson, Mississippi)
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implement and promote asecurity culture within ourmovements.
SO WHAT IS A SECURITY
CULTURE?
It’s a culture where the peopleknow their rights and, moreimportantly, assert them. Thosewho belong to a security culture
also know what behaviourcompromises security and they
are quick to educate thosepeople who, out of ignorance,
forgetfulness, or personalweakness, partake in insecurebehaviour. This security con-sciousness becomes a culturewhen the group as a whole
makes security violationssocially unacceptable in thegroup.
Security culture is about morethan just targetting specific
behaviours in individuals suchas bragging, gossipping or lying.
It is also about checkingmovement behaviours and
practices as a whole to ensurethat our own oppressive
practices don’t feed intointelligence operations being
carried out against ourcommunity.
For example, racism or sexism
in the movement can help tospread division, make some
people more open to inf iltrators(those who feel marginalized bygroup practices), and createopenings that can be used by
state operatives. Obviously, our
movements have a lot of work todo before we address the bigger
questions - wha t’s importanthere is to recognize how
oppressive behaviours play intobad security culture overall.
(IN)SECURE PRA CTICES
Activists like to talk, wegenerally can spend hours andhours discussing theory, tactics,
and strategy. Mostly this isuseful in building our analysis
and our work, but in other casesthis can be dangerous.
WHAT NOT TO SAY
To begin with, there are certainthings that are inappropriate to
discuss. These things include:
> your involvement or someoneelse’s involvement with an
undergound group
> someone else’s desire to getinvolved with such a group
> asking others if they are a
member of an undergroundgroup
> your participation or someone
else’s participating in any actionthat was illegal
> someone else’s advocacy for
such actions
> your plans or someone else’splans for a future action
Essentially, it is a bad idea to
speak about an individual's
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are activist-friendly lawyers who can help us demand retractions andcorrections. Speak to the journalists involved, call them on theirsloppy, dishonest work, expose their hypocrisy, and complain to the
journalists' ethics body. We can not rely on capitalist, private-mediafor any kind of fairness.
It is valuable for us to learn more about the covert actions of the
police. There exists a long and documented history. Factual informa-tion about police covert activities also comes out as evidence pre-
sented in court. An important, too often neglected part of our strengthis our knowledge of, and our protection from, police action againstus.
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involvement (past, present orfuture) with illegal activities.
These are unacceptable topicsof discussion regardless of
whether it is rumor, speculationor personal knowledge.
Please note: this is not to say
that it is incorrect to speak aboutdirect action in general terms. Itis perfectly legal, secure anddesirable that people speak out
in support of mokeywrenchingand all forms of resistance. The
danger lies in linking individualactivists to specific actions or
groups.
THREE EXCEPTIONS
There are only three times that itis acceptable to speak aboutspecific actions and activistinvolvement.
The first situation would be if
you were planning an actionwith other members of your
small group (your “cell” or“affinity group”). However, these
discussions should never takeplace over the Internet (email),
phone line, through the mail, orin an activist's home or car, as
these places and forms ofcommunication are frequently
monitored. The only people whoshould7dear this discussion
would include those who areactively participating iXäthe
action. Anyone who is notinvolved does not need to knowand, therefore, should not know.The second exception occures
after an act ivist has been
arrested and brought to trial. If
s/he is found guilty, this activistcan freely speak of the actions
for which s/he was convicted.However, s/he must never give
information that would help theauthorities determine who else
participated in illegal activities.The third exception is for anony-
mous letters and interviews withthe media. This must be done
very carefully and withoutcompromising security. Advice
on secure communicationtechniques can be found at
http://security.tao.ca.
These are the only situationswhen it is appropriate to speak
about your own or someoneelse's involvement or intent tocommit illegal direct action.
SECURITY MEASURES
Veteran activists only allow aselect few to know about theirinvolvement with direct actiongroups. Those few consist of thecell members who they do theactions with AND NO ONEELSE!
The reason for these securityprecautions is obvious: if peopledon't know anything, they can'ttalk about it. When activists whodo not share the same seriousconsequences know who did anillegal direct action, they are farmore likely to talk after beingharassed and intimidate d by theauthorities, because they arenot the ones who will go to jail.
Even those people who aretrustworthy can often be t ricked
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COVERT ACT ION OTHER
THAN INFILTRAT ION
Covert (or "Special") Action
from police and secret service isalso done outside of the group,with or without infiltration. These
efforts include: intimidation and
harassment, blackmail andmanipulation, propaganda,
informing employers andsecurity checks, as well asphysical sabotage like theft and
arson.
Intimidation and harassment
can include visits from secretservice agents, calling you oryour partner by their first name
on the street, thefts whereobvious clues are left. Policewill try to b lackmail people if
they want to recruit or neutralizethem.
Police uses propaganda in anattempt to poison the atmos-phere and manipulate media
and public opinion. In Decem-ber 1971, when the FLQ wasnear its end and heavily infil-
trated, the RCMP issued a fa lseFLQ communiqué in the nameof the "Minerve" cell. The
communiqué adopted a hard-line position, denouncing theabandonment of terrorist act ion
by a well-known activist, PierreVallières, and urging the con-tinuation of armed struggle.
In Genoa, Italy, police played anactive covert role in trying to
discredit black bloc anarchists
during the July 2001 meeting of
the G8. Several reports revealthat Italian police masked asblack bloc members attacked
demonstrators and small shops.With a lack of public information,the police help manipulate
public discourse along the lines
of "how do legitimate demon-strators isolate activist thugs?"
Slanderous propaganda cantake the form of anonymous
letters, or rumours aimed at theactivist milieu. There are alsoexamples where police will
make uncorroborated, casualaccusations to journalists that,to use two examples, a person
is a drug dealer, or that at a
demonstration, a person aimeda handgun at an officer. It is
often for slanderous reasonsthat police charge activists with"weapons possession" for
having a penknife, or charges ofviolence like "assault."
The growth of the anti-globaliza-tion movement has been ac-companied by renewed anar-
chist-scare propaganda on thepart of authorities. Politiciansand police attempt to massage
public opinion, preparingpeople for a crack down, inorder to legitimate the use of
heavier methods of socialcontrol, exclusion andrepression.
Manipulative disinformationspread through the media needs
to be denounced as lies. There
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by the authorities into revealingdamaging and incriminating
information. It is safest for allcell members to keep their
involvement in the groupamongst themselves. The fewer
people who know, the lessevidence there is in the long
run.
SECURITY VIOLATING
BEHAV IOURS
In an attempt to impress others,activists may behave in ways
that compromise security. Somepeople do this frequently - theyare habitually gossiping andbragging. Some activists sayinappropriate things only when
they consume alcohol. Manyactivists make occasionalbreeches of security becausethere was a momentary
temptation to say something orhint at something that shouldn’t
have been said or implied. Inmost every situation, the desire
to be accepted is the rootcause.
Those people who tend to be
the greatest security risks arethose activists who have low
self-esteem and strongly desirethe approval of their peers.
Certainly it is natural to seekfriendship and recognition for
our efforts, but it is imperat ivethat we keep these desires in-
check so we do not jeopardizethe safety of other activists orourselves. People who placetheir desire for friendship over
the importance of the cause can
do serious damage to oursecurity.
The following are examples of
security-violating behaviours:
Lying: To impress others, liarsclaim to have done illega l
actions. Such lies not onlycompromise the person'ssecurity -- as cops will not takewhat is said as a lie-- but also
hinders solidarity and trust.
Gossiping: Some people thinkthey can win f riends because
they are privy to specialinformation. These gossips willtell others about who did whataction or, if they don't know whodid it, guess at who they think
did what actions or just spreadrumors about who did it.
This sort of talk is very dama-
ging. People need to rememberthat rumors are a ll that are
needed to instigate aninvestigation or even lay
charges.
Bragging: Some people whopartake in illegal direct action
might be tempted to brag aboutit to their friends. This not only
jeopardizes the bragger'ssecurity, but also that of the
other people involved with theaction (as they may be
suspected by association). Aswell the people who s/he told
can be charged as accessoriesafter the fact. An activist whobrags also sets a bad example.Indirect-Bragging: Indirect-
braggers are people who make
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It is your responsibility toinstruct these people on theimportance of security culture.
The other type of activist-informer is the person who
cracks under pressure andstarts talking to save his or
her own skin. Many activists getdrawn into situations they arenot able to handle, and someare so caught up in the "excite-
ment" that they either don'trealize what the consequencescan be, or they just don't think
they'll ever have to face them.
Keep in mind that the catego-
ries of "planted informer" and"activist-turned-informer" can,
and have been blurred. In 1970,during the height of the FLQ'sactivities, Carole de Vault - ayoung Parti Quebecois (PQ)
activist was drawn to the FLQ,but then became a paid policeagent. Her "activism" was with
the PQ; she disagreed with theheavier FLQ actions since itthreatened the "legitimate" work
of the PQ. Her involvementwith the FLQ was as a plantedpolice informer.
KNOW YOUR OWN L IM ITS
We have to know the possibleconsequences of every action
we take and be prepared todeal with them. There is noshame in not being able to do
an action because of responsi-bilities or circumstances that
make it impossible for you to do
jail time at this point in your life.
As long as capitalism and all ofits evils exist, there will beresistance. In other words, there
will be p lenty of great actions foryou to participate in when yourlife circumstances are more
favourable.
If others are dependent on you
for support, you aren't willing tolose your job, or drop out ofschool or ruin your future career,
DON'T DO THE ACTION. If youare addicted to an illicit drugand/or have a lengthy
criminal record, the cops willuse this to pressure you forinformation. If you don’t feel
capable of detoxing under
interrogation and brutality, ordoing a hell of a lot more time
than your comrades, DON’T DOTHE ACTION.
Make certain that you talk withothers in your affinity groupabout situations that make you
uncertain whether you shouldbe involved in particular actions,especially those that are at a
high risk of being criminalized.
Remember - there is no excuse
for turning in comrades to thepolice - and those activists thatdo effectively excommunicate
themselves from our move-ments. We must offer no legalor jail support to those activists
who turn in others for theirimpact on our movement is fa r-reaching and can have devas-
tating effects.
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a big p roduction on how theywant to remain anonymous,
avoid protests, and stay"underground." They might not
come out and say that they doillegal direct action, but they
make sure everyone within ear-shot knows they are up to
something.
They are no better thanbraggers, but they try to be
more sophisticated about it bypretending to maintain security.
However, if they were seriousabout security, they would just
make up a good excuse as towhy they are not as active, orwhy they can't make it to theprotest . Concealing sensitiveinformation from even trusted
comrades is far better than jeopardising underground work.
EDUCATE TO LIBERATE
The unfortunate truth is thereare some security-ignorant
people in the movement andothers who have possibly been
raised in a "scene" that thriveson bragging and gossiping. It
doesn't mean these people arebad, but it does mean they need
to inform themselves and learnabout personal and group
security. Even seasonedactivists make mistakes when
there is a general lack ofsecurity consciousness in our
groups.
And that's where those of youwho are reading this can help.
We must ALWAYS act to in form
persons whose behaviour
breaches security. If someoneyou know is bragging about
doing an action or spreadingsecurity-compromising gossip, it
is your responsibility to explainto her or him why that sort of
talk violates security and isinappropriate.
You should strive to share this
knowledge in a manner thatencourages the person' s
understanding and changes her/ his behaviour. It should be done
without damaging the person’spride. Show your sincere
interest in helping him/her tobecome a more effective
activist. Keep your humility andavoid presenting an attitude ofsuperiority. An insensitiveapproach can raise anindividual’s defences andprevent them from listening toand using the advice o ffered.The goal of addressing theseissues with others is to reduceinsecure behaviour, rather thanshowing how much moresecurity-conscious you are.
Share your concerns and
knowledge in private, so that theperson does not feel as if theyare being publicly humiliated .Addressing the person as soonas possible after the securityviolation increases effective-ness.
If each of us remains res-ponsible for discussing securityinformation with people who slipup, we can dramatically improve
security in our groups and
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fessed ideals and how they live?One of our strengths as activistsis our ideas and values, our
counterculture, our attitudestowards the dominant society.Our sincerity in discussing these
things is also a way of learningabout each other.
When planning for new actions,care must be taken concerningwho is approached. As little as
possible should be said aboutthe actual action plan until aperson’s political philosophy,
ideas about strategy, and levelsof risk they are willing to engagein have been discussed on an
abstract basis. If there is astrong basis for believing this
person might be interested inthe action, then the general ideaof an action can be run bythem. Only when they have
agreed to participate, do theycome to the group to discussaction details.
During the trials of activists,police often reveal the kinds of
information that they havegathered concerning our groupsand activities. Note what revela-
tions come out of these trials.What are the possible and likelysources of the information?
Speak to persons that havebeen arrested and interrogatedto see what they may have said
to the police, or discussed intheir jail cell.
Placing infiltrators in social
justice and revolutionary move-ments is an established prac-
tice. It was done to the BlackPanthers, AIM, the Front deLibération du Québec (FLQ),
and the peace/ anti-war/andanti-nuclear movements on alarge scale. Small groups, such
as affinity groups, or workinggroups of larger more open
organizations, need to beespecially careful with newmembers. Direct action organiz-ing is ideally done with
longstanding, t rusted membersof the activist community.
This doesn't mean that no oneelse should ever be a llowed intothese groups. On the contrary, if
our movement is to continue togrow, new people should be
welcome and recruited; we justneed to keep security in mindand exercise caution at alltimes.
TheUnwitting Informer
Possibly an even greater threatto our movements than the
covert operative is the activist-turned-informer, either unwit-
tingly or through coercion.
The unwitting informer is theactivist who can't keep his/her
mouth shut. If someone brags toyou about what they’ve done,make sure this person never
has any knowledge that canincriminate you, because sooneror later, the wrong person will
hear of it. These activists don'tmean to do harm, bu t their
bragging can be very damaging.
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activities. When peoplerecognise that lying, gossiping,
bragging, and inappropriatedebriefing damages both
themselves and others, thesebehaviours will soon end.
By developing a culture where
breaches of security are pointedout and discouraged, all sincereactivists will quickly understand.
DEALING WITH CHRONIC
SECURITY PROBLEMS
So what do we do with activists who repeatedly violate security precautions even after being informed several times?
Unfortunately for them, the bestthing to do is to cut them loose.Discuss the issue openly andask them to leave your meet-
ings, basecamps and organ-izations. With law enforcement
budgets on the increase, newanti-terrorist laws that call for
stiffer sentences for political
actions, and with courtshanding down long sentences
for political "crimes", the stakesare too high to allow chronic
security offenders to workamong us.
By creating a security culture,
we have an effective defenceagainst informers and agents
who try to infiltrate groups.Imagine an informer who, every
time they ask another activistabout their activities, receives
information about security. Itwould frustrate the informer's
work. When other activistsdiscovered that she/he
continued to violate securityprecautions after beingrepeatedly informed, therewould be grounds for isolatingthe person from our groups. Andthat would be one less informerfor us to deal with!
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posals. Infiltrators often need tobuild credibility; they may d o thisby claiming to have participated
in past actions.
Also, infiltrators will try to exploit
activist sensibilities regardingoppression and diversity. Intelli-
gence organizations will send insomeone who will pose as aperson experiencing the com-mon oppression of the particular
activist group. For example, inthe 1960's, the Weather Under-ground ("Weathermen" - a white
anti-imperialist armed strugglein the US) was infiltrated by an"ordinary Joe" informant with a
working class image. Black warveterans infiltrated the Black
Panther Party.
A fresh example of policeinfiltration and manipulation
tactics is that of Germinal, agroup targeted for arrest twodays prior to the April 2001 anti-
FTAA demonstrations in QuebecCity. Five months prior, thepolice set up a false transport
company and specificallypostered opportunities foremployment in the vicinity of a
Germinal member seekingemployment.
The trap worked. Tipped off byan initial informant, two under-cover cops worked for four
months in the group. Thisoperation resulted in the media-hyped "dismantlement" of
the group on the eve of the
summit. Seven Germinal mem-bers were arrested, 5 of whom
spent 41 days in preventivecustody, only to be released
under draconian bail conditions.
The police's covert action was in
part about dismantling thegroup, but it was also aboutcreating a media/propaganda
campaign to justify the police-state security for the summit.
BACKGROUND CHECKS -
AN ESSENT IAL TOOL
What are some ways of lookinginto the possibility that someoneis an informer? Firstly, unless
you have concrete reasons orevidence that someone is aninfiltrator, spreading rumours will
damage the movement. Ru-mours that you do hear ofshould be questioned and
traced back.
A person's background can be
looked into, especially activismthey claimed to have partici-pated in, in other places. Do
your contacts in those places
know of the person, their in-volvement? Did problems ever
come up? One importantadvantage of having links withfar away places is that it makes
it more difficult for informers tofabricate claims about theiractivities.
What are a person's means ofliving? Who are her or his
friends? What sorts of contradic-
tions exist between their pro-
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a brief primer on the
canadian statesecurity apparatus
Recent incidents of repressionagainst activists in BritishColumbia illuminate the need for
grassroots people to understandand practice movement security.Police monitoring, infiltration and
agent provocateurs are routinelyused by the state to collectinformation about our groups, or
specific individuals in them, andto subvert our activities.
For example, during the APEChearings, it was revealed thatover seventy groups and
individuals were monitoredbefore and during the APECmeetings in 1997. A paid
industry informant/disruptor wasidentified at a wilderness actioncamp in 1999. Provocateurs
also targeted some Vancouveractivists, trying to convince themto disclose information and as
well, to break the law.
The Canadian security
apparatus identifies a number ofour groups and activities as athreat to "national security".
People and organizations arewidely targeted; even avowedpacifists have been included in
surveillance and repressive
measures. According to theCanadian Security and
Intelligence Service's (CSIS)annual reports, activities
targeted in the late 1990sincluded: native resistance,environmental & animal rights
movements, anti-poverty, anti-globalization, anti policebrutality, anti-racist, anarchist
and communist groups.
With the rise in militant First
Nations' struggles; covert directaction against corporations; therenewed militancy and strength
of popular struggles; and themass-media's increasing focuson anarchists and anti-
globalization protests, there isalso a growing level of policesurveillance and repression.
The need for security in ourmovements is obvious -
however, it is incrediblyimportant that we don't fall intothe trap of using our awareness
of security issues to shut otherpeople out of our growingmovements.
One of the key aims of the FBI'sCounter-Intelligence Program
("COINTELPRO") operationsagainst the Black Panthers and
American Indian Movement(AIM) was to spread distrust and
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**The "novice" type: presents asomewhat more active role, butconfines themselves to less
prominent work. They don't takeinitiatives, but the work they dois valued. This helps them build
trust and credibility.
**The "super activist" type: theycome out of nowhere and all ofa sudden, they are everywhere.Whether it's a meeting, protest,
or an action, th is person will beright in the thick of it. Keep inmind however that this can
also be the mark of a newactivist, whose enthusiasm andcommitment is so strong that
she/he wants to fight the powerevery minute of the day.
It should be said that withseveral of these modus oper-andi, the behaviour is hard to
distinguish from a sincere newperson’s involvement. How dowe tell them apart? Well, a
planted infiltrator will ask a lot ofquestions about the direct actiongroups, individuals and illegal
activities. She/he may suggesttargets and volunteer to doreconnaissance as well as take
part in the action. Infiltratorsalso try to build profiles onindividuals, their beliefs, habits,
friends, and weaknesses. At thesame time, infiltrators will shieldtheir true selves from other
activists.
Anyone who asks a lot of
questions about direct actions
isn’t necessarily an infiltrator,but they ARE someone you
should be careful with. At thevery least, they need to beinformed about security issues.
New activists should understandthat direct action tactics can berisky (though some risks are
worth taking!) and that asking alot of questions endangers
people. If the person persists inasking questions, there is aproblem and appropriate meas-ures must be taken. Activists
who can't understand the needfor security should be shunnedand kept away from the move-
ment.
Some types o f infiltrators stay in
the background and offermaterial support, other inform-
ants may have nothing to dowith the group or action, butinitially heard certain plans andtipped off the police. Among the
more active types of in filtratorscan be a gregarious person thatquickly wins group trust. Some
infiltrators will attempt to gainkey forms of control, such as ofcommunications/ secretarial, or
finances. Other informants canuse charm and sex to getintimate with activists, to better
spy or potentially destabilizegroup dynamics.
Active infiltrators can also beprovocateurs specializing indisruptive tactics such as
sowing disorder and demoraliz-ing meetings or demos, height-ening conflicts whether they are
interpersonal or about action or
theory, o r pushing things furtherwith bravado and violent pro-
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paranoia so that these activistswould be reluctant to integratenew people into their struggles.
A security culture can exist in alarge movement; indeed, it is
one indication of a movement'sstrength. Arming ourselves with
knowledge about how thesystem works and works againstactivists is essential in buildingsecurity culture. The aim o f this
section is to give a brief rundown of the working of domesticintelligence in Canada. In this
way, we can better understandhow to avoid its traps.
AN OVERV IEW OFDOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATIONS
The Canadian Security andIntelligence Service (CSIS) isprobably the best known of the
"security" agencies that dealwith activist "threats". Itspredecessor was the Security
Service division of the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police,(RCMP-SS). In 1984, following
the MacDonald Commission on
the illegal activities of theRCMP, the civilian spy agency
CSIS took over RCMP spywork. That said, the RCMP didnot abandon its intelligence
gathering, it’s just that CSISspecifically gathers politicalintelligence.
The split f rom the RCMPallowed the new spy agency to
do legally what the Mountieshad been doing illegally. At the
operations level, the newagency was granted more lee-way in terms of public account-
ability than the Mounties hadever had.
CSIS carries out a wide range ofsurveillance activities. Since
they are not a law-enforcementagency and since their evidenceis not used in court, nothingstops them from contravening
the few regulations that doexist regarding privacy rights.For example, CSIS is not
required to inform people, as isRCMP, ninety days after awiretap (or bugging) is over.
Agents working for CSIS are
allowed, with "authorization", toenter people's homes to plantbugs, wiretap phones, open mailand look into health,
employment and governmentrecords without ever having totell a targeted individual what
they are doing. The informationthat they gather is used to buildprofiles and dossiers (files) on
individuals, organizations,networks, etc. This informationis also passed on to other wings
of the federal security systemwho are responsible for "law-enforcement", and will then
obtain whatever warrants arenecessary for legal surveillance(to be brought into court as
evidence).
The National Security Invest-
igation Service (NSIS) is the
primary law-enforcement wing inCanada. The NSIS is a section
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everything you ever wanted to knowabout inf ormers and
inf iltrators
Infiltrators seek information on most radical groups. The return of
mass mobilizations and radical actions in anti-globalization, anti-poverty, anti-racism and anti-police brutality demonstrations, as wellas declarations to continue struggling in the streets and underground
has drawn attention from the state's secret police. More infiltrators willbe sent into our ranks to try to bribe, entice or manipulate individuals.The extent to which
they are able to infiltrate our groups depends on our seriousness andresponsibility in learning about, promoting, and working within asecurity culture.
Radical movements can learn to better identify covert enemies in our
projects. Once identified, appropriate action is needed to undo,contain, or remove the danger.
This section is intended to arm you with information on how to spot
and deal with informers, infiltrators, and provocateurs in our ranks.
WHO IS AN INFORMER?
There are actually two kinds ofinformers. The deliberate
informer is an undercover agenton the payroll of government orindustry. The second type is theactivist-turned-informer. Both
kinds try to infiltrate our ranksand are equally dangerous toour movements.
Let's d iscuss the deliberateinformers first. They are often
difficult to identify. Informers can
be of any age and any profile,but they do have a few discern-
ible methods or operation, or
“modus operandi”. These are:
**The "hang around" type: they
are persons who regularly showat meetings and actions butgenerally don't get involved.
They collect documents, listento conversations and note who'swho. This observation role is
relatively inactive.
**The "sleeper" type: is similar
to the "hang around" modusoperandi, except that theirabsorption of information is
used to activate their role at alater date.
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of the Royal Canadian MountedPolice (RCMP). Most majorcities across the country have
an NSIS office including Van-couver, Edmonton, Montreal,Ottawa, and Toronto. The NSIS
maintains a computer databaseon activists, immigrants and so
called "terrorists" which ishoused in Ottawa.
It is believed that the Vancouver
NSIS employs between 12 and18 members. Within NSIS thereare several sub-groups called
Team 1, Team 2, Team 3 - etc.that h ave different investigativetargets.
They employ informants,
infiltrators, personal physicalsurveillance, electronicsurveillance including phoneand room "bugs" and other
means of investigation andresearch.
The RCMP/NSIS also haveother resources at their disposalduring counter-insurgency
operations. "Special O" is ateam of surveillance specialiststhat may be called upon.
"Special I" is a penetration teamwhose specialty is to break intohomes, vehicles and other
properties for investigativepurposes. They are the team,which among other things,
installs listening devices,photographs building interiors,etc.
In a long-running case based inVancouver, all of these methods
of surveillance were usedagainst several Vancouveractivists. During the Vancouver
investigation, house and vehiclebugs were located by sometargeted individuals. The bugs
had large battery packsattached to facilitate less
frequent battery changes. TheNSIS also visited severalactivists across Canada in anattempt to question them
regarding the individuals underinvestigation.
THE GO LD EN RU L E OF
SI L ENCE
It needs to be stressed throughout our movements that
no one is under any legal obligation to provide to the police anymore information than one's own name, address and
birth date, and this only if one is under arrest. That is it! Saying
anything more jeopardizes security. Even answering seem-
ingly insignificant questions can assist the police in developing
personality profiles on a range of activists. It may not be
"evidence" but it is used to give police "leads" on other suspects
and construct intent during legal proceedings. The only principled response to police questioning when under arrest is to say nothing more than your name,birth date and address. If questioned further you can simply say "I have nothing to say (except in the presence of my
lawyer".
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The Communications SecurityEstablishment (CSE) is anagency of the National Defence
/ War department, which hasbeen long clouded in secrecy.
They collect and processtelephone, fax and computer
communications of foreignstates, corporations andindividuals. The federalgovernment uses the
intelligence gleaned from thedata to support troops abroad,catch "terrorists" and "further
Canada's economic goals"(what that means is up to them).
Although the CSE is nottechnically allowed to collect the
communications of Canadiancitizens, it is known to be apartner in the Echelon project -a multinational monitoring
operation which sees CSE andcounterpart agencies in theUnited States, Britain, Australia
and New Zealand shareintercepted communications ofinterest with one another,
effectively creating a globalsurveillance web.
The Terrorist Extremist Section(TES Unit) is British Columbia'santi-terrorist u nit. A joint
Vancouver/Victoria PoliceDepartment/RCMP unit calledthe Organized Crime Agency
(formerly the Coordinated LawEnforcement Unit - CLEU), it isbelieved that the this unit
employs two or three members
only.
Most activists will be initimatelyfamiliar with their local policeforces. Be aware that cops do
not only show up in blueuniforms - but rou tinely practicecrowd infiltration and carry out
surveillance and investigativeactivities either alone or jointly
with the RCMP depending onthe type of case. Watch for themon demonstrations - as they liketo come along and take photo-
graphs and video for the record -and they often appear in crowdsas “fellow demonstrators”.
THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY MODEL
Most Western nation-statesfollow a model of counter-insurgency developed by a
British intelligence expert named
Kitson who wrote, Low Intensity Operations , after much fieldwork in the colonies. He broke
down movement developmentinto three stages:
The Preparatory Phase: iswhen the movement is small,tends to focus on education,
publishing and groundwork.
The Non-Violent Phase: is
when the movement takes onmore of a mass character. Largedemonstrations are the norm.
In the Insurgency Phase: themovement has taken on a
popular character. Perhaps a
more assertive, guerrillacomponent has emerged.
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Kitson advises that the primary work of the intelligence agency shouldoccur during the preparatory phase. At this time the movements are
most vu lnerable. They have not experienced a h igh degree ofrepression. They consider talk of security as mere paranoia. As theyare not breaking laws they believe that it is safe to organize completely
openly. The intelligence agency is therefore able to exploit theseconditions and develop detailed dossiers on a wide range of people.
The information will be extremely valuable to them later on.
Important historical revolutionary activities and groups began as small,serious-minded projects that grew in spite of surveillance and
repression. It is therefore important to practice security at all po ints inthe movement's development. State agents gather more than just"hard evidence;" they are interested in knowing about radicals' beliefs
as well.
Police try to control with fear; don't be intimidated. Remember - If an
agent comes knockin', do no talkin'.