Security Attacks in mobile adhoc network

Security Attacks in Mobile Adhoc Networks

Muhammad Rizwan Akram

Department of Electronic and information Engineering

Huazhong University of Science and technology

Wuhan, China

[email protected]

Abstract Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are a type of wireless network that has no fixed infrastructure and wireless

nodes move arbitrarily. The MANETs are helpful in situations

such as emergency search and rescue operations, battlefields,

exhibitions, and conferences. Limited battery and low bandwidth

are some of the main constraints in a wireless network.

Moreover, nodes mobility causes network topology to change

frequently in MANETs. High control overhead is one of the main

reasons of low packet delivery ratio (PDR) for a multicast routing

protocol in MANETs. This paper attempts to highlights all the

security issues related to MANETs. We also analyzed the

problems in MANETs. Security issues are present at all layers

and being described briefly.

KeywordsMANETs; DoS;

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless mobile nodes, that group together for networking build an Ad hoc network. Such networks operate without any centralized control. Communication between nodes in such a network is dependent on the specific network characteristics. Lack of centralized administration together with the limited transmission capabilities of wireless devices makes it necessary for the nodes to cooperate with other nodes in transmitting the packets from source to destination. Thus each node contributes towards the network as a host as well as, a routing device for the purpose of forwarding network packets. This forms a cooperated communication path between the nodes that are not in direct transmission range of each other. This transmission is governed by Ad hoc routing protocols that allow the nodes to discover paths throughout the network to any other node by dynamically establishing routes among themselves.

In a Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET), a collection of mobile devices with wireless network interfaces that wish to communicate build a dynamic network without any central infrastructure or preplanned routing links. For this reason, a MANET is often referred to as an autonomous and infrastructure-less network with self-configuring and self-maintenance capabilities. Two kinds of transmission scenarios are formed in MANETs.

Firstly, the nodes that are in communication range of each other directly send and receive messages from each other.

Secondly, the nodes that are not within communication range of each other rely on other intermediate nodes for delivery of packets.

Thus intermediate nodes act to relay packets between some source and destination nodes, generating multi hop routes where every node also functions as a router. This induces the requirement of a high cooperation level between the nodes in a MANET environment.

Early researches focused on wireless channel access, communication and multi hop routing protocols for MANETs while assuming a friendly and cooperative network. As MANETs application and use increase, security and related issues have become a major concern in order to provide protected communication between nodes in a potentially hostile environment. Recent wireless research indicates that MANETs are prone to larger security problems than the conventional wired and wireless networks.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, discusses about the security problems in MANETs. Security goals of MANETs are presented in Section III. In next sections, security threats present in all layers of a typical network system are described briefly. Paper is concluded and some of the present and future research directions are discussed in the last section.

II. SECURITY PROBLEMS IN MANETS

MANETs are much more vulnerable to attack than wired

network [3]. This is because of following reasons:

A. Absence of Infrastructure

Ad hoc networks operate independently of any

infrastructure, which makes inapplicable any classical

solutions based on certification authorities and on line servers.

B. Limited physical security

Mobile wireless networks are generally more prone to

physical security threats than are fixed- cable nets. The

increased possibility of eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-

of-service attacks should be carefully considered. Existing link

security techniques are often applied within wireless networks

to reduce security threat.

C. Cooperative Algorithms

The routing algorithm of MANETs requires mutual trust

between nodes which violates the principles of network

security.

D. Restricted power Supply

Due to mobility of nodes in the ad hoc network, nodes will

reply on battery as their power supply method, the problem

that may be caused by restricted power supply is denial-of-

service attacks and selfish manner

E. Dynamically changing network topology

Nodes are free to move arbitrarily. The network topology

may change randomly and have no restriction on their distance

from other nodes. As a result of this random movement, the

whole topology is changing in an unpredictable manner, which

in turn gives rise to both directional as well as unidirectional

links between the nodes.

F. Lack of Centralized monitoring

Absence of any centralized monitoring makes the detection of attacks a very difficult problem because it is not easy to monitor the traffic in a highly and large scale ad hoc network [6]. It is rather common in the ad hoc network that benign failures such as transmission impairments and packet dropping.

G. Dynamic Topology

Since MANETs have a dynamic topology because the

nodes are ever changing this may weaken the relationship

among nodes.

H. Packet Loss

There are many reasons of packet loss problem in

MANETs. Packet loss may happen due to mobility of nodes,

bit rate error, due to interference.

I. No network boundary

Since MANETs have no network boundary because the

nodes are movable this may lead to increase in number of

attacks on them. Any node may enter the network and may

hinder the network communication.

J. Mobile Nodes

At times the mobile nature of nodes may even create

network error. Since nodes can freely join or leave a network

so it is easy for nodes to behave maliciously.

K. Scalability

Due to mobility of network the scale of the network is

changing all the time.

L. Variation in nodes

Each node has different transmission and receiving

capabilities. In addition each mobile node has different

software/hardware configurations which cause trouble in

operating in a network.

M. Security

It is one of the major issues in MANETs. All major

networking tasks such as routing and packet formatting are

done by nodes itself which are mobile. Any attacker can easily

attack on the network and can acquire the data.

N. Resource Availability

For MANETs providing secure communication in such a

challenging environment where the network is mobile and is

vulnerable to attacks requires various resources and

architectures.

III. SECURITY GOALS IN ADHOC NETWORKS

The goals of security mechanism of MANETs are similar to

that of other network [5]. Security is a great issue in network

especially in MANETs where security attacks can affect the

nodes limited resources and consume them or waste the time

before rote chain broke. Security is a vectored term of multi

systems, procedures and functions that works together to reach

certain level of security attributes. Table 2 below shows those

attributes.

A. Availability

The main goal of availability is to node will be available to

its users when expected, i.e. survivability of network services

despite denial of service attack. For example, on the physical

and media access control layers, an adversary could employ

jamming to interfere with communication on physical channel

while on network layer it could disrupt the routing protocol

and continuity of services of the network. Again, in higher

levels, an adversary could bring down high-level services such

as key management service, authentication service.

B. Confidentiality

The goal of confidentiality is to keeping information secret

from unauthorized user or nodes. In other words, ensures

payload data and header information is never disclosed to

unauthorized nodes. The standard approach for keeping

information confidential is to encrypt the data with a secret

key that only intended receivers possess, hence achieving

confidentiality.

C. Integrity

The goal of integrity is to message being transmitted is

never corrupted. Integrity guarantees the identity of the

messages when they are transmitted. Integrity can be

compromised mainly in two ways.

Malicious altering: - A message can be removed, replayed or

revised by an adversary with malicious goal.

Accidental altering:- , if the message is lost or its content is

changed due to some benign failures, which may be

transmission errors in communication or hardware errors such

as hard disk failure.

D. Authentication

The goal of authentication is too able to identify a user and to able to prevent impersonation. In infrastructure-based wireless network, it is possible to implement a central authority at a point such as base station or access point. But in MANETs, there is no central administration so it is difficult to authenticate an entity.

E. Non repudiation

The main goal of non-repudiation is to the origin of a message cannot deny having sent the message. This is useful when for detection and isolation of compromised nodes. When node P receives an erroneous message from Q, non-repudiation allows P to access Q using this message and to convince other nodes that Q is compromised.

F. Authorization

Authorization is a process in which an entity is issued a credential, which specifies the privileges and permissions it has and

cannot be falsified, by the certificate authority. Authorization is generally used to assign different access rights to different level of users.

IV. APPLICATION LAYER ATTACKS

Application-layer security issues will become the

most important issues in the network security. For example,

Gartner shows that 75% of the successful attacks happened on

the application-layer, and 80% of enterprises will become the

victims of application-layer attacks. Observed from the

network-layer, these attacks may not contain malicious

activity, and they don't always generate abnormal network

traffic. However, most of the existing intrusion detection

techniques detect attacks only from the network-layer. So

these techniques can't identify the application-layer attacks

effectively. Although some signature-based approaches can

identify some application-layer attacks, such as some anti-

virus techniques can identify some application-layer attacks,

these techniques detect application-layer attacks only from the

characteristics of the application-layer attacks. So these

techniques can only identify some known application-layer

attacks, they can't identify the unknown or novel application-

layer attacks effectively. Following are some application layer

attacks.

A. Repudiation attack

In the network layer, firewalls can be installed to keep packets in

or keep packets out. In the transport layer, entire connections can

be encrypted, end-to-end. But these solutions do not solve the

authentication or non-repudiation problems in general.

Repudiation refers to a denial of participation in all or part of the

communications [1]. For example, a selfish person could deny

conducting an operation on a credit card purchase, or deny any

on-line bank transaction, which is the prototypical repudiation

attack on a commercial system.

B. Data Corruption

In response to these defenses new Code Reuse Attacks

(CRAs) emerged that construct a malicious program by

stitching together carefully selected fragments of the existing

library code; these snippets are called gadgets. One example

of a CRA is the return-oriented programming (ROP) attack,

where each gadget ends with a return instruction to trigger the

execution of the next gadget pointed to by the next return

address on the stack. All the attacker has to do is to inject a

proper sequence of return addresses onto the stack to point to

the needed gadgets. ROP was shown to be Turing-complete on

a variety of platforms. Automated tools have been developed

that allow unsophisticated attackers to construct arbitrary

malicious programs using ROP [6].

Several defense mechanisms against ROP have been recently

proposed. Perhaps the simplest of these solutions are the ones

that utilize a shadow call/return stack, where the return

instructions are matched against the corresponding calls using

protected memory space. We assume that such an enforcement

of call-return pairs is already in place and therefore simple

ROP-based attacks are defeated.

Unfortunately, later a new form of CRA was developed that

does not rely on return instructions. In this jump oriented

programming (JOP) model, the attacker chains the gadgets

using a sequence of indirect jump instructions, rather than

return instructions. A special dispatcher gadget is used to

orchestrate the control flow among the gadgets. The jump

locations change based on the addresses popped off the stack

by the dispatcher gadget, and will ultimately result in the

execution of a system call [17].

V. TRANSPORT LAYER ATTACKS

TCP attacks are the major problem faced by Mobile

Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) due to its limited network and

host resources. Commonly, there are two types of Transport

Layer attacks 1) Session Hijacking 2) SYN Flooding. SYN

flooding attack occurs during the time of connection

establishment. Session hijacking occurs after TCP connection

is established. Through the observation of packets, attacker

gets knowledge about the sequence number. After getting the

knowledge of sequence number, attacker will start sending

packets with captured sequence number and hence continue

the session with server node.

A. Session Hijacking

Session hijack attacks are defined as taking over an active

TCP/IP communication session without their permission or

knowledge. When implemented successfully, attackers assume

the identity of the compromised user, enjoying the same

access to resources as the compromised user. Network

protocols like FTP, Telnet, and rlogin are especially attractive

to the attacker, because of the session oriented nature of their

connections and lack of implementation of any security during

login, authentication, or data transmission. In fact, data sent

using these protocols are sent in clear text which can be easily

be viewed by anyone monitoring the network. There are three

different types of session hijack attacks; active, passive, and

hybrid. The active attack is when the attacker hijacks a session

on the network. The attacker will silence one of the machines,

usually the client computer, and take over the client's position

in the communication exchange between the workstation and

the server. The active attack also allows the attacker to issue

commands on the network making it possible to create new

user accounts on the network, which can later be used to gain

access to the network without having to perform the session

hijack attack. Passive session hijack attacks are similar to the

active attack, but rather than removing the user from the

communication session, the attacker monitors the traffic

between the workstation and server [11].

B. SYN Flooding

It exploits the weakness in TCP specifications. In this attack,

an attacker sends a large number of spoofed SYN packets to

the victim server. Since the SYN request is spoofed, the victim

server never receives the final ACK packet from the client to

complete the 3-way handshake. Since the backlog queue of

victim server is of finite size, flooding of spoofed SYN

requests can easily exhaust the victim server's backlog queue,

causing all of new incoming legitimate SYN request to be

dropped.

VI. NETWORK LAYER ATTACKS

MANETs are based on open network architecture that allows

peer to peer connectivity between nodes. Link layer protocols

allow connectivity between neighboring nodes while the

network layer protocols extend connectivity to other nodes in

the network [2]. Network layer protocols greatly depend on

the cooperation among nodes for maintaining network routes

and delivery of packets from source to destination nodes. A

number of attacks are targeted at the network layer for the

purpose of disrupting network operations. Malicious nodes

can inject themselves in the network or use compromised

nodes that are already a part of the network to launch attacks

that interfere with network traffic. Such attacks can cause

significant delays in network, congestion and performance

degradation. Following is a detailed description of the network

layer attacks and their effects on MANETs.

A. Routing Discovery Attacks

The objective of these attacks is to cause deviation from the

standard routing discovery procedure by not following the

routing protocols specifications. Proactive routing protocols

are more vulnerable to these attacks since they keep the

routing information beforehand that can be readily exploited

in comparison to the demand driven protocols, which provide

routing information only when needed. Attacks at routing

discovery phase are further classified as:

Flooding Attacks: Flooding of routing messages, such as Hello, RREQ, Acknowledgement message

flooding are common attacks. These attacks can

cause considerable network congestion, routing

delays and denial of network services.

Routing Table Overflow: A malicious or compromised node can send false routing

information to the victim. The attacker tries to create

and advertise enough routes to other nodes in the

network that overflows victim's routing tables.

Routing Cache Poisoning: A malicious node that wants to poison routes to some other node broadcasts

spoofed packets with route going through itself to

that node. This causes the neighboring nodes

overhearing the packet transmission to add the

poisoned route to their own routing tables. Packets

sent through this poisoned route will go through the

malicious node.

Routing Loops: Malicious nodes in a network may receive network traffic and redirect it to other paths

of their own choice by suggesting that the new path is

the most optimal one. Such packets arrive back to the

malicious node in search of the actual optimal route

and can again be sent in routing loops causing delays

in packet delivery and network performance

degradation.

B. Routing Maintenance Attacks

MANETs make use of certain routing maintenance

capabilities that allow the self-organizing network to repair

damages and establish broken links. Attackers can take

advantage of this situation and generate false control messages

that can initiate resource expensive route maintenance and

repairing operations. False link broken messages can be

advertised by a malicious node to inform other nodes of

unavailability of an existing link.

C. Data Transmission Attacks

The purpose of data transmission attacks is to obstruct the

flow of information in the network. Malicious nodes do so by

not forwarding the data packets to their destinations, causing

delays in transmission or by not forwarding the packets at all .

Based on the attack, data packets may be dropped, replayed,

flooded or delayed. Attackers can change the content of the

data packets or inject packets in the network.

D. Wormhole attack

As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed,

security emerges as a central requirement. The wormhole

attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks which is particularly

challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible

even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts and even if

all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality.

In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at

one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly

selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there

into the network [14].

The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in

wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network

routing protocols and location-based wireless security

systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing

protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the

wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than

one or two hops, severely disrupting communication.

E. Blackhole attack

BLACKHOLE attack is one of the attacks in which

attacker node advertises itself as having a good route to the

destination and tries to attract traffic towards itself. Once a

source node receives the route advertised by attacker node, it

selects the same route for data transmission and starts sending

data packets. When attacker node receives traffic from source,

it drops all of received packets which it had to forward further.

Due to this, packet delivery ratio gets decreased and all

resources utilization is wasted [4].

F. Byzantine attack

Here, a compromised intermediate node or a set of

compromised intermediate nodes works in collusion and

carries out attacks such as creating routing loops, routing

packets on non-optimal paths, and selectively dropping

packets as in . Byzantine failures are hard to detect. The

network would seem to operate normally in the viewpoint of

nodes, though it may actually be exhibiting Byzantine

behavior [9].

Causes of Byzantines Failures

The Byzantine nodes in the selected active path set will

degrade the performance of the secure message transmission.

The malicious nodes may attack the transmission by 1) non

forwarding 2) traffic deviations and route modifications 3)

frequent route updates

G. Flooding attack

A malicious node, also called compromised node, can

sabotage the other nodes or even the whole network, by

launching a denial of service attack, by either dropping

packets or by flooding the network with a large number of

RREQs to invalid destinations in the network, thus jamming

the routes of communication. Flooding attack is one such type

of DoS attack, in which a compromised node floods the entire

network by sending a large number of fake RREQs to

nonexistent nodes in the network or by streaming large

volumes of useless DATA packets to the other nodes of the

network [12]. This results in network congestion, thus leading

to a Denial of Service.

H. Rushing Attack

Many demand-driven protocols such as ODMRP, MAODV,

and ADMR, which use the duplicate suppression mechanism

in their operations, are vulnerable to rushing attacks. When

source nodes flood the network with route discovery packets

in order to find routes to the destinations, each intermediate

node processes only the first non-duplicate packet and

discards any duplicate packets that arrive at a later time.

Rushing attackers, by skipping some of the routing processes,

can quickly forward these packets and be able to gain access

to the forwarding group.

VII. DATA LINK LAYER ATTACKS

The dependability and security aspects of a MANET,

including reliability and availability, are of great importance

for mission-critical and other information-sensitive

applications. As a major threat to MANET security, quite a

few Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been discovered and

discussed in the literature. According to their goals, DoS

attacks can be broadly classified into two classes: routing

disruption attacks and resource consumption attacks.

A. Disruption attack

A routing disruption attack attempts to cause legitimate data

packets to be routed in a dysfunctional way, whereas a

resource consumption attack injects packets into the network

to consume valuable network resources [7][8].

We divide routing disruption DoS attacks based on their

different levels of sophistication into three categories: outsider

attacks, insider attacks, and protocol-compliant attacks. In an

outsider attack, the attackers are assumed to have no

knowledge of the keys that are used to encrypt and

authenticate the data and routing control packets. Preventing

outside attackers from tampering with the data is

accomplished simply by encryption and authentication

schemes.

In an insider attack, the attacker has compromised or captured

a node, thus gaining access to encryption and authentication

keys. The primary method of detecting and mitigating insider

attacks is to monitor the packet forwarding behavior among

the nodes. Also, there are approaches that focus on thwarting

specific forms of insider attacks.

B. Traffic Analysis & Monitoring

Traffic Analysis is not necessarily an entirely passive activity.

It is perfectly feasible to engage in protocols, or seek to

provoke communication between nodes. Attackers may

employ techniques such as RF direction finding, traffic rate

analysis, and time-correlation monitoring. For example, by

timing analysis it can be revealed that two packets in and out

of an explicit forwarding node at time t and t+ are likely to be from the same packet flow [16]. Traffic analysis in ad hoc

networks may reveal:

The existence and location of nodes;

The communications network topology;

The roles played by nodes;

The current sources and destination of communications; and

The current location of specific individuals or functions (e.g. if the commander issues a daily briefing at

10am, traffic analysis may reveal a source geographic

location).

VIII. PHYSICAL LAYER ATTACKS

A. Jamming

Jamming is one sort of denial of service attacks in the wireless

communication, which disrupts the operation of physical or

link layers in legitimate nodes by transferring illegitimate

signals. Jamming is one of such availability attacks which can be easily carried out. It is defined as the intended

transmission of radio signals that disrupt legitimate

communication by decreasing signal to noise ratio. In this

form of attack, the attacker initially keeps monitoring the

wireless medium in order to determine the frequency at which

the destination node is receiving signals from the sender. It

then transmits signals on that frequency so that error-free

reception at the receiver is hindered. Frequency hopping

spread spectrum (FHSS) and direct sequence spread spectrum

(DSSS) are two commonly used techniques that overcome

jamming attacks.

B. Eavesdropping

Eavesdropping attack is the process of gathering information

by snooping on transmitted data on legitimate network.

Eavesdrop secretly overhear the transmission. However, the

information remains intact but privacy is compromised. This

attack is much easier for malicious node to carry on as

evaluate to wired network. Eavesdropping attack in MANET

shared the wireless medium, as wireless medium make it more

vulnerable for MANET malicious nodes can intercept the

shared wireless medium by using promiscuous mode which

allow a network device to intercept and read each network

packet that arrives.

IX. MULTI LAYER ATTACKS

A. Denial of service

In this attack malicious node floods irrelevant data to consume

network bandwidth or to consume the resources (e.g. power,

storage capacity or computation resource) of a particular node.

With fixed infrastructure networks, we can control denial of

service attack by using Round Robin Scheduling, but with mobile ad hoc networks, this approach has to be extended to

adapt to the lack of infrastructure, which requires the

identification of neighbor nodes by using cryptographic tools,

and cost is very high.

For example, consider the following Fig. Assume a shortest

path exists from X to Z and R and Z cannot hear each other,

that nodes Q and R cannot hear each other, and that Y is a

malicious node attempting a denial of service attack. Suppose

X wishes to communicate with Z and that X has an unexpired

route to Z in its route cache. Transmits a data packet toward Z

with the source route X --> P --> Q --> Y --> R --> S --> Z

contained in the packets header. When Y receives the packet, it can alter the source route in the packets header, such as deleting S from the source route. Consequently, when R

receives the altered packet, it attempts to forward the packet to

Z. Since Z cannot hear R, the transmission is unsuccessful.

B. Attacks using impersonation

These attacks are called spoofing since the malicious node

hides its real IP address or MAC addresses and uses another

one. As current ad-hoc routing protocols like AODV and DSR

do not authenticate source IP address, a malicious node can

launch many attacks by using spoofing. For example, a hacker

can create loops in the network to isolate a node from the

remainder of the network. To do this, the hacker just has to

take IP address of other node in the network and then use them

to announce new route (with smallest metric) to the others

nodes. By doing this, he can easily modify the network

topology as he wants.

C. Man in the Middle Attack

The network attributes of MANETs makes it very easy for an

attacker to place itself between the sender and the receiver and

spy any information exchanged between the two. This attack

leads to more sophisticated attacks such as impersonation.

X. SUMMARY

Security is one of the main concerns for system like MANETs

in which all the channel and individual nodes are exposed to

any malicious node equally. This paper attempts to illustrate a

number of security threats in MANETs. Moreover we tried to

highlight the effect of different constraints of MANETs. We

have presented the security goals that we require to achieve

while designing routing protocols for MANETs. We have

discussed layer wise security threats with respect to MANETs.

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