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Secure Mobile Networks

Jun 02, 2018

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    1

    Securing Mobile Networks

    An Enabling Technology for

    National and InternationalSecurity and Beyond

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    2

    Goals for November 6th Highlight Mobile Networking Technology

    Emphasizing National and International

    Security today due to time limitations. Discuss security policy

    Enabling shared infrastructure (whenreasonable)

    Next Steps (Afternoon Session)

    Other Items (Afternoon Session)

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    3

    Todays Audience Big Picture People

    Policy Makers

    Media

    Code Writers

    Implementers

    Please, dont be afraid to ask questions.

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    Neah Bay / Mobile Router Project

    Clevelan

    d

    Detroit

    Foreign-Agent

    Foreign-Agent

    Somewhere, USAForeign-Agent

    Home-Agent

    Anywhere, USA

    Internet

    Neah BayOutside of wireless LAN range,

    connected to FA via

    Globalstar.

    Neah BayConnected to FA via

    wireless LAN at Cleveland

    harbor

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    5

    Why NASA/USCG/Industry Real world deployment issues can only be

    addressed in an operational network.

    USCG has immediate needs, thereforewillingness to work the problem.

    USCG has military network requirements.

    USCG is large enough network to force us to

    investigate full scale deployment issues USCG is small enough to work with.

    NASA has same network issues regardingmobility, security, network management and

    scalability.

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    6

    Mobile-Router Advantages Share wireless and network resources with

    other organizations $$$ savings

    Set and forget No onsite expertise required

    However, you still have to engineer the network

    Continuous Connectivity (May or may not be important to your

    organization)

    Robust

    Secondary Home Agent (Reparenting of HA)

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    Mobile Network Design Goals Secure

    Scalable

    Manageable

    Ability to sharing network infrastructure

    Robust

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    Public

    Internet

    FA

    FA

    MR

    MR

    MR

    US Coast Guard

    Canadian Coast Guard ACME Shipping

    HA

    HA

    HA

    HA

    ACME

    SHIPPING

    M

    R

    US Navy

    Shared Network Infrastructure

    Encrypting wireless linksmakes it very difficult toshare infrastructure.

    This is a policy issue.

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    Secondary Home Agent

    (reparenting the HA)

    Primary

    Home Agent

    SecondaryHome Agent

    Reparenting Home Agent

    Helps resolve triangular routing

    Problem over long distances

    X

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    Emergency Backup

    (Hub / Spoke Network)If primary control site becomesphysically inaccessible but can beelectronically connected, asecondary site can be established.

    If primary control site is

    physically incapacitated, thereis no backup capability.

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    Secondary Home Agent

    (Fully Meshed Network)

    1

    2

    3

    4

    5

    If primary control site is physically incapacitated, asecond or third or forth site take over automatically.

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    We Are Running with Reverse

    Tunneling Pros

    Ensures topologically correct addresses on foreignnetworks

    Required as requests from MR LAN hosts must passthrough Proxy inside main firewall

    Greatly simplifies setup and management of securityassociations in encryptors

    Greatly simplifies multicastHA makes for an excellent

    rendezvous point. Cons

    Uses additional bandwidth

    Destroys route optimization

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FACleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    MR

    TunnelEndpoint

    (Public Space)

    HA

    Tunnel Endpoint

    (Public Space)

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FA

    Cleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    USCG Officers Club

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    Open Network

    Data Transfers

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FA

    Cleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    USCG Officers Club

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    Encrypted Network

    Data Transfers

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FA

    Cleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    Open

    Network

    Monitoring

    Point

    Open

    Network

    Monitoring

    PointUSCG Officers Club

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    Monitoring Points

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FA

    Cleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    USCG Officers Club

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    Note, We are monitoring

    The Neah Bay.

    We are using lots of bandwidth

    To do this.

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    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET USCG

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FA - Detroit

    FA

    Cleveland

    HA

    Encryption

    PROXY

    Encryption

    802.11b link

    FIREWALL

    Public Address

    USCG Officers Club

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    Note, We are monitoring

    The Neah Bay.

    We are using lots of bandwidth

    To do this.

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    MobileLAN

    10.x.x.x

    Encryption

    EAST

    WEST

    Dock

    RF Bandwidth

    1.0 Mbps (manually set)

    1.0 Mbps (manually set)

    11.0 Mbps (auto-negotiated and shared with Officers Club)

    7 Kbps to 56 Kbps in 7 Kbps chunks (1 to 2.5 seconds delay)

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    20

    Wireless Only? Wireless can be jammed

    Particularly unlicensed spectrum such as

    802.11 Satellites is a bit harder

    Solution is to find interferer and make

    them stop.You still want land line connections

    Mobile Routing can be used over land lines.

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    Globalstar/Sea Tel MCM-8 Initial market addresses maritime and

    pleasure boaters.

    Client / Server architecture Current implementation requires call to be initiated

    by client (ship).

    Multiplexes eight channels to obtain 56 kbps total

    data throughput. Full bandwidth-on-demand.

    Requires use of Collocated Care-of-Address

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    Satellite Coverage

    Globalstar

    From SaVi

    INMARSAT

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    Layer 2 Technology

    Globalstar

    MCM-8

    Hypergain802.11b

    Flat Panel

    8 dBi

    Dipole

    L3-Comm

    15 dBic

    Tracking Antenna

    Sea Tel TrackingAntenna

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    Backbone Network Topology

    Detail Network Diagram

    (Intentionally Blank)

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    Neah Bay Network Topology

    Detail Network Diagram

    (Intentionally Blank)

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    USCG Officers Club Network Topology

    Detail Network Diagram

    (Intentionally Blank)

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    Securing Mobile and WirelessNetworks

    Some ways may be better

    than others!

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    Constraints / Tools Policy

    Architecture

    Protocols

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    Public

    Internet

    FA

    MR

    US Coast Guard

    Mobile Network

    HA

    US Coast Guard

    Operational Network

    (Private Address Space)

    CNIPv4 Utopian Operation

    Triangular Routing

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    30

    Public

    Internet

    FA

    MR

    US Coast Guard

    Mobile Network

    HA

    US Coast Guard

    Operational Network

    (Private Address Space)

    CNIPv4 Real World Operation

    PROXy

    Proxy had not originated therequest; therefore, theresponse is squelched.Peer-to-peer networkingbecomes problematic at best.

    Glenn Research Center Policy:No UDP, No IPSec, etcMobile-IP stopped in its tracks.Whats your policy?

    Ingress or Egress Filtering stopsTransmission due to topologicallyIncorrect source address. IPv6

    Corrects this problem.

    USCG Requires 3DES encryption.WEP is not acceptable due toknown deficiencies.

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    Public

    Internet

    FA

    MR

    US Coast Guard

    Mobile Network

    HA

    US Coast Guard

    Operational Network

    (Private Address Space)

    CN

    Current Solution

    Reverse Tunneling

    PROXy

    Anticipate similar problems forIPv6.

    Adds Overheadand kills route

    optimization.

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    Public

    Internet

    FA

    FA

    MR

    MR

    MR

    US Coast Guard

    Canadian Coast Guard ACME Shipping

    HA

    HA

    HA

    HA

    ACME

    SHIPPING

    M

    R

    US Navy

    Shared Network Infrastructure

    Encrypting wireless linksmakes it very difficult toshare infrastructure.

    This is a policy issue.

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    Security

    Security Bandwidth Utilization Security Performance Tunnels Tunnels Tunnels and more Tunnels Performance Security

    User turns OFF Security to make system usable!

    Thus, we need more bandwidth to ensure security.

    PAYLOADHEADER

    ORIGINAL PACKET

    HEADER

    VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK

    HEADER

    ENCRYPTION AT THE NETWORK LAYER

    HEADER

    ENCRYPTION ON THE RF LINK

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    Additional and Future

    Security SolutionsAAA

    Routers (available today)

    Wireless bridges and access points(available 2002)

    IPSec on router interface

    Encrypted radio links IPSec, type1 or type2, and future improved

    WEP

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    Conclusions Security Breaks Everything

    At least it sometimes feels like that.

    Need to change policy where appropriate. Need to develop good architectures that

    consider how the wireless systems and protocolsoperate.

    Possible solutions that should be investigated:

    Dynamic, Protocol aware firewalls and proxies.

    Possibly incorporated with Authentication and Authorization.

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    Moblile-IP Operation

    IPv4

    M bil IP (IP 4)

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    Mobile Node

    Foreign AgentForeign Agent

    Home Agent

    139.88.111.1

    143.232.48.1

    NASA Ames

    Corresponding Node

    Internet or Intranet

    139.88.112.1

    NASA Glenn

    143.232.48.1

    Home IP

    128.183.13.103

    Care-Off-Address

    139.88.111.50

    128.183.13.1

    NASA Goddard

    Mobile-IP (IPv4)

    M bil R t (IP 4)

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    Mobile Router(Mobile Node)

    Foreign Agent

    Home Agent

    Corresponding Node

    139.88.112.1

    Internet WAN

    Tunnel-0

    10.2.3.101

    128.183.13.1

    Internet WAN

    Internet

    10.2.2.1Roaming

    Interface

    10.2.3.1

    Virtual LAN

    Interface

    Tunnel-1

    128.184.25.1

    HA Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    139.88.100.1

    FA WAN

    10.2.4.10

    MR Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    COA 139.88.100.1

    Mobile-Router (IPv4)

    Mobile Router

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    Mobile Router(Mobile Node)

    Home Agent

    Corresponding Node

    139.88.112.1

    Internet WAN

    Tunnel-0

    10.2.3.101

    128.183.13.1

    Internet WAN

    10.2.2.1Roaming

    Interface

    10.2.3.1

    Virtual LAN

    Interface

    Foreign Agent

    Tunnel-1

    128.184.25.1

    HA Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    139.88.100.1

    FA WAN

    10.2.4.10

    MR Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    COA 139.88.100.1

    Mobile-Router (IPv4)

    Collocated Care-Of-Address

    Internet No Foreign Agent

    No Second Tunnel

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    Mobile Router(Mobile Node)

    Home Agent

    Corresponding Node

    139.88.112.1

    Internet WAN

    Tunnel-0

    10.2.3.101

    128.183.13.1

    Internet WAN

    Internet

    10.2.2.1Roaming

    Interface

    10.2.3.1

    Virtual LAN

    Interface

    128.184.25.1

    HA Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    139.88.100.1

    10.2.4.10

    MR Loopback

    Virtual Interface

    COA 139.88.100.1

    Mobile-Router (IPv4)

    Collocated Care-Of-Address

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    Whats Next

    The End Game

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    Mobile Networks Share Network Infrastructure

    USCG, Canadian Coast Guard, CommercialShipping, Pleasure Boaters

    Open Radio Access / Restricted Network Access Authentication, Authorization and Accounting

    Architecture Limited, experimental deployment onboard Neah

    Bay Move RIPv2 routing from Fed. Bldg to Neah Bay

    Move to full scale deployment Requires full commitment

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    MR

    Public

    Mobile

    LAN

    10.x.x.x

    INTERNET

    INTRANET

    10.x.x.x

    FACleveland

    Public

    HA

    Public

    PIX- 506until we install our PIX FW

    Then we should not need the baby

    PIX.

    PROXY

    PIX-506

    802.11b link

    FA - Detroit

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    Areas that need to be

    addressed Home Agent Placement

    Inside or Outside the Firewall

    AAA Issues Open Radio Access / Restricted Network Access

    Secure Key Management

    IPv6 Mobile Networking Development

    Work with industry and IETF Develop radio link technology

    Enable better connectivity throughout the worldfor both military and aeronautical communications

    (voice, video and data).

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    NASAs Needs

    Mobile Networks

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    Relevant NASA Aeronautics

    ProgramsAdvanced Air Transportation

    Technology (AATT)

    Weather Information Communication(WINCOMM)

    Small Aircraft Transportation System

    (SATS)

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    Aeronautic Networking Issues Move to IPv6

    IPv6 Mobile Networking

    Authentication, Authorization andAccounting

    Bandwidth, Bandwidth, Bandwidth

    Media Access Policy

    Sending of Operations over EntertainmentChannels

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    Earth Observation

    T1

    T2

    ?

    T3

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    Space Flight Implementation Sharing Infrastructure

    Common Media Access

    Common Ground Terminal Capabilites

    Common Network Access

    AAA

    Common Modulation and Coding Software Radio

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    Backup

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    Asymmetrical Pathing

    Mobile Router

    MilStar,

    Globalstar,

    Others

    DVB

    Satellite

    Internet

    Home Agent

    Foreign AgentForeign Agent

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    Neah Bay

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    Papers and Presentationshttp://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/papers_presentations/papers.html

    or

    http://roland.grc.nasa.gov/~ivancic/

    and pickPapers and Presentations