Secular Americans and Secular Jewish Americans: Similarities and Differences

Secular Americans and Secular Jewish Americans:Similarities and Differences

Ariela Keysar

Received: 26 March 2009 / Accepted: 7 July 2009 / Published online: 29 July 2009

� Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract This paper explores similarities and differences between Americans of

Jewish heritage who profess no religion and the general population of Americans

who profess no religion. The ‘‘no religion’’ group may be the vanguard of secu-

larism. In degree of secularization, Jews and non-Jews of no religion come from

different starting points and are on different trajectories. Data sources are the

American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS) 2001 for the Jewish population and the

American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) 2001 for the general population.

While the socio-demographic profile of a person who professes no religion in the

general population is quite distinct (a young, single male who resides in the West or

the Northeast), the no-religion segment of Jews is demographically much like the

religious segment. One explanation might be the relatively larger share of ‘‘no

religion’’ Jews in the total Jewish population so Jews professing no religion are not a

fringe group. Another is American Jews’ unique social history and greater exposure

to secularism.

Keywords Jews � Secular � No religion � Demographics � AJIS 2001 �ARIS 2001

A dimly remembered joke has a Soviet police officer asking a group of suspects

their religion. ‘‘We have no religion,’’ they answer. ‘‘We’re atheists.’’ The officer,

unsatisfied with the response, asks, ‘‘Christian atheists or Jewish atheists?’’ The

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for Jewish

Studies, December 2006, in San Diego, California.

A. Keysar (&)

Institute for the Study of Secularism in Society and Culture, Trinity College, 300 Summit Street,

Hartford, CT 06106, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

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Cont Jewry (2010) 30:29–44

DOI 10.1007/s12397-009-9018-7

point of the joke, of course, is supposed to be that ‘‘Christian atheist’’ and ‘‘Jewish

atheist’’ are oxymorons: an atheist is just an atheist. Perhaps, though, the Soviet

officer was not so stupid after all. This paper explores similarities and differences

between Americans of Jewish heritage who profess no religion and the general

population of Americans who profess no religion. The ‘‘no religion’’ category

includes not just atheists but self-proclaimed agnostics, seculars, and humanists, as

well as the larger number of people who simply answer ‘‘none’’ when asked in a

survey, ‘‘What is your religion, if any?’’

Looking at the ‘‘no religion’’ group is worthwhile because it may be the vanguard

of secularism both among Jews and in the general population. For most people,

professing no religion is the final, most extreme step in a gradual detachment from

religion. Many people continue to identify themselves with a religion long after they

have stopped attending services and even after they have ceased to believe in the

tenets of a particular faith. According to Beit-Hallahmi (2007a, b), ‘‘Individual

claims to identity labels (i.e. ‘‘I am Catholic’’) often persist in the absence of any

beliefs or practices.’’

The contribution of this paper is mainly analytical, providing data and suggesting

models for better understanding the complexity of being a Jew in America in the

21st Century. Most research on American Jews who profess no religion compares

them to religious Jews, focusing on the differences in the two groups’ adherence to

ritual. This paper uses a different basis of comparison. It compares Jews of no

religion to other Americans who say they have no religion. It will show that in terms

of degree of secularization, Jews and non-Jews of no religion come from different

starting points and are on different trajectories. The goal is to compare the socio-

demographic and geographic profiles as well as belief patterns of the two ‘‘no

religion’’ segments, the overall U.S. population and its minority Jewish population.

We also explore which determinants best predict a secular outlook in these

populations.

Secularization Trends

Diminishing religious ties become evident in many ways. Membership rates in

religious organizations drop; attendance at religious services becomes less frequent;

rituals are less observed; religious rites of passage are less celebrated and religious

philanthropy is reduced. These changes happen in segments of modern societies that

are becoming more secular. The decline in individuals’ religious practices and

beliefs occurs gradually, before they ultimately detach themselves from religion.

To clarify, professing no religion does not necessarily mean the absence of

theistic belief. ARIS (American Religious Identification Survey) 2001 revealed that

two-thirds of American ‘‘none’’ respondents agreed that ‘‘God exists’’ (Keysar et al.

2003).

In Western societies, professing no religion is associated with a certain socio-

demographic profile—male, single, young, educated urban adult (Stahl 2007;

Singleton 2007; Voas and Day 2007); and in the U.S., residing in the West (Killen

and Silk 2004; Keysar and Kosmin 2007).

30 A. Keysar

123

Among American Jewry, the share of adults who said they did not profess a

religion or identified themselves as atheists, agnostics, humanists, or secular grew

from 20% in 1990 to 32% in 2001 (Mayer et al. 2002). The denominator in this ratio

is defined as the Core Jewish population, which is an aggregate of Jewish by religion

(JBR) and having a Jewish ancestry and no religion (JNR).

Among Americans in general, adults who profess no religion are a smaller

minority, although a steadily growing one—8% in 1990 and 14% in 2001 (Kosmin

and Keysar 2006). We now know that secularization has continued since 2001 in the

general population, with the share of adult Americans who did not profess a religion

or identified themselves as atheists, agnostics, humanists, or secular reaching 15% in

2008 (see http://www.AmericanReligionSurvey-ARIS.org/). It is likely that secu-

larization also continued among Jews through 2008, although we do not have

updated survey data to support that assumption.

Modern Jews are among the most secularized groups anywhere. Jewish identity

has been maintained while the observance of Jewish religious practices has declined

(Sharot 1991; Cohen and Eisen 1998; Cohen 2000). Secularization meant that

Jewishness has been separated from Judaism as Jews assimilated and became

removed from historical religious traditions (Beit-Hallahmi 2007a, b). Alfred Kazin

described their disconnection with religion as ‘‘Jews who no longer know what they

stand for and cannot believe that Judaism once postulated the immortality of the

soul’’. This was a long historical process of detachment from Judaism. ‘‘From the

beginning of Jewish modernity, Jews have had three choices: to be Jews, to be

Christians, to be secularists. Many have decided that they cannot conscientiously be

Jews because they cannot believe what Judaism requires them to believe: that there

is a God, the Creator who revealed himself as Lawgiver to the patriarchs and the

prophets.’’

Modern secular Judaism originated in Europe in the 18th Century, just as Reform

Judaism did, adjusting to ‘‘circumstances and conditions of special times and

places’’ (Philipson 1907). Emancipation of European Jews at the end of the 18th

Century coincided with the decline in the role of religion in the general population

and the rise of secular nationalism, democracy and socialism (Beit-Hallahmi 2007a,

b). Emancipation and participation in the broader secular society facilitated and

accelerated the process of assimilation of European Jews, unraveling the religious

fabrics of their closed communities. ‘‘Secularized Jews were a European reality by

the early nineteenth century, and a significant majority in Western Europe by its

end. By the same time the process of secularization was making significant inroads

into Jewish communities in Eastern Europe’’ (Beit-Hallahmi 2002, p. 8).

High educational attainment is usually associated with skepticism and the

questioning of authority. These lead to challenging and rejecting belief in

supernaturalism and many aspects of religious teachings (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle

1997; Beit-Hallahmi 2007a, b). Described in terms of human capital investment

(Lehrer 1999), historically Jews in the U.S. have achieved among the highest

educational attainment of all other religious groups. The National Jewish Population

Survey (NJPS) 2000–2001 found more than half of all Jewish adults (55%) have

received a college degree, and a quarter (25%) have earned a graduate degree. In

comparison, among white Americans 25 years old and over in 2001, only 27%

Secular Americans and Secular Jewish Americans 31

123

http://www.AmericanReligionSurvey-ARIS.org/

completed four years of college or more (Statistical Abstract of the United States

2006, Table 214).

In addition to participating in society-wide trends, Jews had another secularizing

factor to deal with: intermarriage. As a minority religion, Judaism is far more

affected by intermarriage than Christianity is because a Jew who chooses a partner

without regard to religion is statistically far more likely than a Christian to happen

to choose a partner of a different religion. A high rate of intermarriage, reported by

NJPS 1990, produced a large cohort of young adults who are children of

intermarriages. Many of these intermarried couples opted to raise their own children

with no religion. Indeed AJIS (American Jewish Identity Survey) 2001 estimated a

major growth (almost doubling) in the Jewish child population raised without

religion.

Tom Smith (2005) shows the Jewish distinctiveness in America by comparing

their attitudes and behavior to those of other religious groups. Jews exhibit by far

lower levels of beliefs in God than Christians and other religions, and are only

slightly more likely to believe that God exists than the ‘‘no religion’’ group.

Data Sources

For the Jewish population the data source is the American Jewish Identity Survey

(AJIS) 2001 and for the general population the American Religious Identification

Survey (ARIS) 2001. Both are representative national surveys, obtained by means of

random-digit-dialing (RDD). The surveys are based on telephone interviews with

over 50,000 adult respondents nationally.

AJIS 2001 replicated the methodology of NJPS 1990 using the same screening

questions to qualify American Jewish households. In all it included 1,668 Jewish

households. For detailed discussion of the methodology see Mayer et al. (2002).

Two Measures of Religion and No-Religion: ‘‘Identification’’ and ‘‘Outlook’’

We categorize people using two questions: (a) by their religious self-identification;

(b) by their religious or secular outlook.

Question (a) What is your religion, if any?

Respondents were not offered a list of choices. Instead, they were asked to

answer in their own words. Those who reported having ‘‘no religion,’’ or said they

were atheist, agnostic, secular or humanist, were asked whether they had Jewish

parentage and whether they were raised Jewish. Those who qualified as Jews by

their Jewish parentage or upbringing but said they had no religion were defined as

‘‘Jews of no religion.’’

32 A. Keysar

123

Question (b) When it comes to your outlook, do you regard yourself as: religious,

somewhat religious, somewhat secular, or secular?’’1

The concept of outlook, Weltanschauung in German, means worldview or world-

outlook, and refers to views on life and perceptions about the universe (Berger and

Luckmann 1966). The subjective distinction between religious versus secular

outlook is used here to measure an attribute which appears to be associated with a

host of other indicators of opinion, belief, affiliation, association and practice as

well as demographic attributes.

A higher proportion of Jews than Americans in general regard themselves as

‘‘secular’’ rather than ‘‘religious’’ when asked about their outlook; 30% of Jews

compared with 6% of Americans said they were ‘‘secular’’ in their outlook (Mayer

et al. 2002).

When we compare the outlook of Jews of no religion to all Americans of no

religion, as illustrated in Chart 1,2 64% of the Jews of no religion regard themselves

as ‘‘secular’’ or ‘‘somewhat secular,’’ while 53% of all Americans of no religion in

general regard themselves as ‘‘secular’’ or ‘‘somewhat secular.’’ At the same time,

23% of the Jews of no religion regard themselves either as ‘‘religious’’ or

‘‘somewhat religious’’ while 36% of all Americans of no religion in general regard

themselves as ‘‘religious’’ or ‘‘somewhat religious.’’

The comparisons show that even for these segments of American society, both of

which distance themselves from organized religion by the self-label of ‘‘no

religion,’’ the general pattern persists. The Jews are more likely to view themselves

as ‘‘secular’’ and less as ‘‘religious.’’

Among Jews, a ‘‘secular’’ and ‘‘somewhat secular’’ outlook is more likely to be

associated with Reform Judaism and with those who do not identify with any branch

of Judaism. As expected, a ‘‘religious’’ and ‘‘somewhat religious’’ outlook runs

parallel with identification with Orthodox and Conservative Judaism (Mayer et al.

2002).

Socio-Demographic Comparisons

To what extent do people who profess no religion share universal characteristics?

The socio-demographic comparisons between Americans in general and Jews will

explore this research question.

In the general population of people professing no religion, gender differences are

large and significant. American males in general are by far more likely than females

not to identify with any religious group. The gender gap among Jews is clearly

smaller than among Americans in general. The gender balance of 52:48

1 While the religious identification question in ARIS 2001 was asked of 50,281 adult respondents, a

smaller representative sub-sample of 17,911 were asked additional questions, including the one on

outlook.2 In the analyses, some of the general population who profess no religion are of Jewish background; yet

this is a very small minority, which does not affect the results for the general population.


123

(male: female) among Jews is noticeably closer than the gender gap of 59:41 (male:

female) among the general no religion population.

The imbalance between males and females in the general population is most

noticeable in religious behavior, whereby females are more likely to be churchgoers,

for example. The narrower gender gap among Jews raises further questions. Does it

relate to educational attainment, or to age? If no socio-demographic factor explains

their lack of religious affinity, is it simply being raised Jewish?

Given the differences between males and females in the general population,

Chart 2 looks at age patterns for each gender separately.

At a first glance the bars seem to follow similar patterns as young people in

general are less religious than older people regardless of whether they are of Jewish

or non-Jewish background. Still, there are significant differences. Overall, the U.S.

no-religion population is younger than Jews of no religion. Almost half of them are

under age 35, both among males and among females. Interestingly, there are hardly

Jews of No Religion

Secular52%

Somewhat secular

12%

Somewhat religious

17%

Religious6%

Don't know13%

Americans of No Religion

Secular40%

Somewhat secular

13%

Somewhat religious

28%

Religious8%

Don't know11%

Chart 1 When it comes to youroutlook, do you regard yourselfas: religious, somewhatreligious, somewhat secular, orsecular? Source: AJIS 2001,ARIS 2001

34 A. Keysar

123

any differences between Jews and non-Jews among those aged 35 to 49, both for

men and women.

The most striking differences are among females. Almost half of all American

females who profess no religion are under age 35; among Jews only one-quarter are

Age and Gender Male Age Cohort Composition

36

45

2729

22

1715

8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50%

18-34 35-49 50-64 65+

Jews of No Religion Americans of No Religion

Female Age Cohort Composition

25

46

3031

28

1517

8

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50%


18-34 35-49 50-64 65+

Chart 2 Age and gender. Male age cohort composition and female age cohort composition. Source:ARIS 2001 and AJIS 2001


123

under age 35. Also, 45% of Jewish females of no religion are aged 50 or over, while

only 23% of American females of no religion are 50 years old or over. The share of

Jews among the oldest group, 65 years and older, is more than double that of the

general population.

These interactions between age and gender are worth following up. Usually life-

cycle events such as marriage and child-raising alter people’s worldviews and

religious behavior. We expect to observe this more prominently among women who

attend to the religious upbringing of children (see Keysar et al. 2000).

Marital status patterns of American males who profess no religion are similar for

Jews and Americans in general. In both groups about half of the males are married.

However, being single is almost as prevalent with over 40% of each male

population (Chart 3).

In the no-religion population, cohabitation (being single and living with a

partner) is more common among Jewish males than among American males in

general. Beyond diversity in attitudes toward cohabitation, this pattern is associated

also with delayed age at marriage among Jews.

Similarly, all American females who profess no religion are more likely to be

married than Jewish females. Differences in educational levels, labor force

participation and low level of expected fertility may explain these differences in

marital status (Lehrer 1999).

The largest gap between Jewish females and all American females who profess

no religion is in the likelihood of being a widow: 12% of the Jewish females are

widows compared with only 4% of American females in general. The latter pattern

also reflects the older age profile of the Jewish population. As noted before, Jewish

females who profess no religion are substantially older than their counterparts in the

general population. Therefore we are more likely to expect widows among them.

Typically, widows who are seeking a social network might be expected to reach

out to religious institutions. That so many Jewish widows do not do so may indicate

that their secular outlook outweighs their tendency to seek support from the Jewish

community.

Consistently, Jews of no religion have a higher educational attainment than

Americans of no religion in general. Chart 4 illustrates the fact that the higher

educational level among Jews persists even when we control for the gender of the no

religion sub-populations.

Among all American males and females of no religion, educational attainment

peaks at the high school graduate level with about one-third of these being adults.

On the other hand, among Jewish males and females of no religion, educational

attainment peaks at the college graduate level—33% of females and 39% of males.

Overall, 60% of Jewish males of no religion have graduated from college or

higher. In comparison, only 34% of all American males of no religion have

graduated from college or higher.

Similar large educational gaps are found among women: 54% of Jewish females

of no religion have graduated from college or higher; while only 35% of all

American females of no religion have graduated from college or higher.

36 A. Keysar

123

As expected, these disparities in educational levels are associated with age at

marriage and reproductive behavior. Although they are beyond the scope of this

research, these demographic processes are further related to the size and

composition of the no-religion population.

Marital Status

Male

2831

15

10

47 48

89

2 20

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50%

Single, nevermarried

Single, living with apartner

Married Divorced, separated Widowed


Female

2426

1010

44

49

810

12

4

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50%

Single, nevermarried

Single, living with apartner

Married Divorced, separated Widowed


Chart 3 Marital status. Male and female. Source: ARIS 2001 and AJIS 2001


123

EducationMale

6

11

17

32

15

21

39

22 21

12

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40%

more Jews of No Religion Americans of No Religion

Female

98

14

31

20

24

33

25

21

10

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40%

< high school High school graduate Some college Graduated college Graduate school or

< high school High school graduate Some college Graduated college Graduate school ormore


Chart 4 Education. Male and female. Source: ARIS 2001 and AJIS 2001

38 A. Keysar

123

Outlook and Belief

A majority of Americans, Jewish or not, profess a belief in the existence of God.

Even those who profess no religion say that they agree (somewhat or strongly) with

the statement that ‘‘God exists’’: 67% in the general population (Keysar et al. 2003)

and 64% of Jews.

People attribute to God various super powers. Here we look at God-beliefs

through the notion of ‘‘God helps me.’’ Among Jews who profess no religion only

41% agree with the proposition ‘‘God helps me’’ compared with 58% of Jews who

describe ‘‘Jewish’’ as being their religion.

The powers people attribute to God correlate with their worldviews, measured on

the spectrum of secular-religious outlook (Mayer, Kosmin and Keysar 2002). People

who describe their outlook as ‘‘secular’’ or ‘‘somewhat secular’’ are usually more

skeptical of belief in supernatural forces than those who say their outlook is

‘‘religious’’ or ‘‘somewhat religious’’.

The intriguing research question is whether the association between people’s

secular outlook and their disbelief in God differs between Jews and other

Americans, assuming both segments of the population profess no religion.

Predictors of Secular Outlook: Multivariate Logistic Regression Analysis

To investigate the likelihood of having a secular or somewhat secular outlook we

present two logistic regression analyses: one for Jews and one for American adults

in general. The logistic regression model helps determine the net effect of each

variable on the choice of a secular outlook when all other variables are kept

constant, while the explanatory power of the model is measured by R2. Here we

look at socio-demographic characteristics as well as religious identification and

beliefs.

The dependent variable is 1 for respondents opting for ‘‘secular’’ or ‘‘somewhat

secular’’ as opposed to 0 for those with a ‘‘religious’’ or ‘‘somewhat religious’’

outlook. The independent variables are gender, age, marital status, education,

region, belief in the power of God (‘‘God helps me’’) and identification with a

religion.3 For the general population an additional independent variable was added:

race/ethnicity.4 Several interactions were tested, and only age 9 education is

statistically significant; therefore a combined variable age 9 education (with eight

categories) is included in both models. The relationship between the independent

variables and having a secular outlook is presented in Tables 1 and 2 as odds ratios,

which express the relative odds of an occurrence of the event (secular outlook)

compared to the reference category.

3 For Jews we compare Jews by religion and Jews of no religion.4 Race/ethnicity is less applicable for Jews


123

Findings

Holding other factors constant, the most important predictors of a secular outlook,

not surprisingly, are religious indicators: disbelief in God and a lack of identification

with a religion. Among the general population the odds of opting for a secular

outlook are more than ten times as likely for those who disagree with the notion

‘‘God helps me,’’ and five times as likely for those not identifying with a religion, as

shown in Table 2. However, both disbelief and lack of identification with a religion

are weaker predictors for ‘‘core Jews’’ than for Americans overall by more than a 2-

to-1 ratio. This is consistent with the finding that many people are comfortable about

thinking of themselves as Jewish yet also secular.

Socio-demographic factors are important in the general model but are not

statistically significant in the Jewish one. A factor of education and age combined is

the best predictor among Americans in general in predicting secular outlook. Young

college graduates (age 18–34) are more than twice as likely as old non-college

graduates (65?) to regard themselves as secular, even after other factors are

controlled for. The interaction between age and education works as follows: Among

young people, youth matters more than college education in predicting secular

Table 1 Logistic regression: likelihood of having a secular or somewhat secular outlook [Jews of no

religion (AJIS 2001)]

Variable Reference category Cases Wald statistic Odds ratio

Identifying with Jewish religion Identifying with Jewish religion

Jews of no religion 262 16.86*** 1.98

Belief ‘‘God helps me’’ Agree

Disagree 294 71.11*** 4.04

Gender Female

Male 452 0.71 1.14

Marital status Widowed

Single 269 1.86 1.65

Married 441 0.47 1.25

Divorced/separated 91 0.58 1.34

Age 9 education Less than college 9 65?

College 9 18–34 134 1.31 1.47

Less than college 9 18–34 107 0.02 0.95

College 9 35–49 179 0.001 0.99

Less than College 9 35–49 71 0.03 1.12

College 9 50–64 151 0.13 1.12

Less than College 9 50–64 68 0.35 0.81

College 9 65 ? 68 2.58 0.56

Region Non-western

West 248 1.59 1.24

* p \ .05, ** p \ .005, *** p \ .001; R2 = .20

40 A. Keysar

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outlook. Conversely, among old people, education matters more than age in

predicting secular outlook.

Region is also an important predictor, whereby those residing in the West tend to

describe themselves as secular compared to non-Westerners.

Gender is an important factor. Yet the differences between males and females in

the odds ratios, while statistically significant, are small. Race and ethnicity, factors

only included in the general model, highlight the distinct secular worldview of

Asian-Americans, especially when compared to the reference group, namely

African-Americans.

Taken together, religious indicators and socio-demographic characteristics were

helpful in explaining 20% of the variation in having a secular outlook among Jews,

and 33% among Americans in general. There are obviously other variables not

measured in this model, perhaps religious or secular upbringing, which also explain

the preference for a secular outlook.

Table 2 Logistic regression: likelihood of having a secular or somewhat secular outlook [All Americans

of No Religion (ARIS 2001)]

Variable Reference category Cases Wald statistic Odds ratio

Identifying with a religion Identifies with a religion

U.S. no religion 2,886 874.62*** 5.05

Belief ‘‘God helps me’’ Agree

Disagree 1,304 1,038.47*** 10.19

Gender Female

Male 8,206 9.79** 1.18

Marital status Widowed

Single 4,262 1.04 1.10

Married 9,144 5.44* 0.82

Separated/divorced 1,622 6.76* 0.71

Age 9 education Less than college 9 65?

College 9 18–34 1,606 37.97*** 2.28

Less than college 9 18–34 3,572 47.05*** 2.32

College 9 35–49 1,926 27.84*** 1.99

Less than college 9 35–49 3,187 19.59*** 1.73

College 9 50–64 1,347 36.08*** 2.28

Less than college 9 50–64 2,357 7.47** 1.44

College 9 65? 778 21.61*** 2.07

Race/ethnicity Black

White 13,903 1.53 1.13

Asian 222 10.65** 1.95

Native American 232 3.12 0.62

Hispanic 932 1.14 1.16

Region Non-Western

West 3,617 13.19*** 1.24

* p \ .05, ** p \ .005, *** p \ .001; R2 = .33


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Discussion

The socio-demographic profile of a person who professes no religion in the general

population is a young, single, Asian male who resides in the West. In the general

population, the no-religion segment and the religion segment have quite distinct

socio-demographic characteristics. In contrast, among Jews, the two segments, the

religion and the no-religion populations, are less distinct. And the explanatory

power of various socio-demographic factors among Jews is weaker and statistically

not significant. One explanation might be the relatively larger share of the ‘‘no

religion’’ Jews in the Jewish population: Jews professing no religion are not a fringe

group. This reflects the Jews’ unique social history and heritage over a long period

and their exposure to secular forces in Europe.

Religious indicators, both among the general population and among Jews, are by

far the best predictors of a secular versus a religious outlook and outperform socio-

demographic characteristics.

In addition, in the general American population, there is a large gap between

those who profess a religion and those who do not, in terms of their likelihood to

have a secular worldview. (It is quite rare, for example, for a self-identifying

Catholic to say that he or she has a secular outlook.) One might suppose there to be a

similar large gap in the Jewish population: i.e., between those who currently identify

themselves as Jews by religion and those who were born to Jewish parents or were

raised as Jews but do not claim Judaism as their religion. In fact, that is not the case.

Data from the AJIS 2001 show that: (1) even among self-identifying Jews by

religion (JBRs) 44% have a secular worldview, seeing no contradiction between

adhering to a religion and having a secular orientation (Mayer et al. 2002); (2)

people of Jewish heritage who do not profess a religion (JNRs) are more secular

than the overall American ‘‘no religion’’ group; and (3) the religious-secular gap on

most social indicators is much narrower among Jews than for the general

population.

These findings might come as a surprise to social scientists who study

contemporary Jewry; yet they are hard to dismiss because they are drawn from a

religious self-identification survey. Most demographic and sociological studies of

Jews in the U.S. focus on religious practices, such as synagogue membership,

attendance at services, ritual observance, and celebration of Jewish holidays. Studies

of religious practices inevitably tend to overlook the behavior of non-religious Jews.

Yet already in 1990 NJPS asked, ‘‘When you think of what it means to be a Jew in

America would you say that it means being a member of a religious group; an ethnic

group; a cultural group; a nationality? Multiple choices were permitted. Being

Jewish as defined by cultural group membership was the most popular preference,

chosen by 80% of Jews of no religion and 70% of Jews by religion; and 68% and

57% respectively defined it in terms of ethnic group. About 40% of both these

groups defined it as a nationality. Furthermore, there was a low level of support for

the religious group preference: only 49% of Jews by religion and 35% of Jews of no

religion considered being Jewish as being a member of a religious group (Kosmin

et al. 1991). Clearly Jews of no religion reject the religious group concept and

42 A. Keysar

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alternatively opt for cultural and ethnic criteria as the meaning of being a Jew in

America.

The concept of ‘‘peoplehood’’ echoes a Jewish value which mostly appeals to

young people. The longitudinal Eight Up study, which followed a cohort of young

persons raised in Conservative synagogues from their bar mitzvah year to college,

highlighted these patterns. Whereas religious observance declined over an eight-

year period, with large attrition in synagogue attendance, these young people

continued to express pride as Jews and to feel connected to the Jewish people. The

value of caring for fellow Jews instilled in them was maintained through the college

years with a sense of responsibility to help Jews in need around the world. To quote

one college student: ‘‘To me being Jewish also holds religious value but the first

thing that comes to mind when considering being Jewish is the community I am part

of’’ (Keysar and Kosmin 2004).

Two related questions arise. Will the ‘‘no religion’’ share of the American

population eventually grow to be as large as the ‘‘no religion’’ share of the Jewish

population? And will the distinctions between religious and irreligious Americans

blur, as they have among Jews?

How one answers these questions depends on whether one thinks Jews are simply

ahead of the rest of the population in the secularization process, or, alternatively, are

on a different trajectory altogether. If Jews are simply early, then we can look to

them for a sense of where Americans in general will be in the near future. However,

the ‘‘different trajectory’’ story appears more plausible. As this paper has shown,

secularism in the Jewish community is different from secularism among Americans

in general in important and enduring ways. Much of this difference comes from

history. The blurred boundary between religious and non-religious Jews is nothing

new, going back to the 18th century—and is sharply different from the Christian

pattern. For example, it is common for self-identifying Jews to say they do not

believe in God, yet belong to a religious congregation and even follow religious

practices. For many Jews, Jewishness is a peoplehood or culture or ethnicity. This is

not true for, say, Methodists or Baptists. Assuming the different-trajectory theory is

true, then there is no reason to expect the American general public of the future to

resemble the Jews of today.

We would urge scholars who wish to study American Jewry and the

secularization process to seek additional non-religious indicators that predict being

a secular Jew in America, and to collect new types of data which will fill the gaps in

our knowledge of this growing segment of the American Jewish population.

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Author Biography

Ariela Keysar is associate research professor in public policy and law at Trinity College, Hartford, CT.

Keysar, a demographer, is also the Associate Director of the Institute for the Study of Secularism inSociety and Culture (ISSSC). She was study director of the 2001 American Jewish Identity Survey (AJIS)

and one of the principal investigators of ARIS (American Religious Identification Survey) 2008. She is

co-author of Religion in a Free Market and The Next Generation: Jewish Children and Adolescents.

44 A. Keysar

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Secular Americans and Secular Jewish Americans: Similarities and Differences

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