SECRET 1969 STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSM 13

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March 14,

STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSM 13

1969

At the present -time 87 countries have signed the NPT and ten have deposited their instrumenits of ratification. Ratifi.cation by the United States, especially if followed soon

thereafter by Soviet ratification, Could lead within a relatively

short timeHto. several key signatures. In partiCular, positive

decisions on NPT signature by the. Federal'Republic of Germ2ny

and Japan would be facilitated by oUr ratif4ation. The

signatures or ratifications of several additional influential

-countries will in turn become more f_ikely-after.Germ-eny and.

Japan have signed; this is especially true o lf such countries

as Switzerland and Sweden in EUrope and Australia and

Indonesiain Asia. 'In-any case our'ratification Will help to

impart a momentum to the treaty which itself will have a.

beneficial influence cn the deliberations of,other countries.

' Thereare three general courses of action atour disposal

as we attempt to maximize the impact of our atification. •

Each country's particular attitude Foward,the NPT, together

with the status of its consideration of echerence to the treaty,

will dictate the Most useful course to be adopted toward that

country.

The first .course of action is essentially passive, and,

would apply to some countries in e4ther of tro categories:

(1) those for whom U.S. ratification itself will probably be

sufficient to bring about a positive decision, at least in

conjunction with Soviet ratification. We believe this is

probably the case with a number of Smaller countries, such as

Austria, Jaaica. and .1slta who are Most likely simply waiting

for a resumption otf the. hreatv's mo nti'm; anA ()) tho-se

whOse early signature d ratification are so unlikely that

there fould bc no practical point tO a n y s apecil US e f tfors.

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March 14, 1969

STUDY REQUESTED BY NSSr·l 13

At the present time 87 countries have stgned the NPT and -- h 1•·· ! .c l.f ..

ten ave deposited tneir 1.nstrum2i11ts· 0.1.. ratµ.. ication.

Ratification by the United States, ~speciall~ if followed soon

thereafter by Soviet ratification, tould leaa within a relatively h ~ . 1' . I 1 • 1 ...

s orL time to_ severa_ ~ey signatures. n particu_ar, posicive

dee is ions on NPT signature by the Ffdera l · Re~ub lie of Germany

and Japan would be facilitated by oGr ratifitation. The ' I

signatures or ratifications of seve~al addit~onal influen~ial

-countries will in tur!1 beco~e !Tl.ore ~ikely- .?,ff-er. GermP.n.y 2.r:d

Japan have signed; this is especially true of such count~ies ' -1

c.s. S·witzerland and S\•1eden in El.lrooe 2.nd Australia and

Indonesia in Asia. ·In-any case 0~1\:· ratificf-tion ,vill help to

impart a momentu.:-1 to the treaty ~•:hii:h itself\ ~•.rilt have a

bene.Lr:1.•c1.•--,~- ;nr:.L·1ue,.1_c-e ~· d 0 1·· c,-,.-~J....! ,....,.. ,.I -'-hp~ -o 1n1'- -·ci ,;;. _ - en t..Ll2 .__ lOc .. -.i....!...O~ ... ::, OI:, O~- -.1.. <..: L-~--11-S. - ' I - .

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ere are t .. ree genera coursep OI act1.?n at our. 01.sposa1

as we attempt to maxi@ize the impac:t of ol!r ±:-atification.

Each country's par-tic·c..1la.r attitude t0';•12rd thk ~PT, together

with the status of its consideratioh of adhekence to the treaty,

will dictate the ~est useful course to be adboted toward that

co,.mtry. 1 ·

The first course of action is ~ssentially passive, and ld 1 • • • ! , ~ I •

wou ap~LY to some countries in e1tn2r o~ t~~o categor~es:

( 1) h " ' 'J c: • -- • • · - t l - 1 • 11 b ' 1 . _ t ose .1..or ·wnom t • ,..., • :::-2t1.ricac:!.op 1. se_.t wi pro ao y oe

ff . . . . b - . . d . . I 1 t . su icient to • ring a· ouc a positiv~ ecis1op, at eas in

conj~nction w~th Soviet ratificatio~. We ~e~icve this is

probably the case ~,,ri;:h a. nuu,ber o_f ~maller- c~untries; such as

A . • - • . . • 'f , t. : ... ·1 TT • 1 - ••

usc.ri·a, Ja·maica ar1a .-l2.!..ta ~·}l10 2re mosi: .Ll.:-,:e·L..y s1rnp1v ':-1-::11.ting

f ,.. .... ,-, ~- "--i l . r: rh,- ~ - '--, 1 c-, -.- ~--~ '-· ,--· J ,-i (?)- rh,,-o .....or c1. r.__~~LL:pi_ ____ or. o ..... ._ •• a:::.: ~r=ctL', :::i ""o-.,i~ni...L,a, a.1 ..... ,- --l-~,::;~

who·se e2.rly- s.i.2;r12t.t.~t·e ::1.~1d .ra.tiflcatlor~ a.~·2 s-b unli . .l . ..:ely that

th••• would b• no p<••ti••l ooinc tr ••y sp••r1 ial US efforts.

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DECLASSIFIED BY/RELEASE AUTHORITY: PAUL HILBURN, SENIOR REVIEWER U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL DATE: DECEMBER 5, 2019

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This group would include such countries as Cuba, Tanzania, Zambia, Communist China and Albania.:

The second course of action available to, us is that of low-key diplomatic approacheš. We would request aur embassies in countries where such a course seems desirable to convey -to: the local government our hope that the treaty will come into force soon and thus begin to: achieve its Purposes. i Our EMbassies could review the wor1d-wide security and economic considerations in favor of the treaty, drawing as appropriate upon the UN Secretary General's Report on non-proliferation. Each set of instructions would,'of course, be written so i as to take intoconsideration our knowledge of the particular country's attitude toward the treaty and, where applicable and Potentially productive, would ask the Embassy tO focus its remarks on that. cpantry's specific concerns by reitexatiing previous

statements we have made either privately or in public testinony.

Each of our Ambassadors would retain discretlion regarding the utilization of particular arguments: to ensure that no argument

was used which was likely to back-fire in discussions: with individual officials. The level within the jhost government

at which this approach is made would also bS left' in most

cases to the discretion of the Embassy. ,This type oflow-key

representation will be applicabLe to a1mostall countries . vthich are in general favorably disPosed toward the treaty and

which would not resent some further prodding. [

The third alternative course of actio is that Of

uniquely tailored approaches -for particulari countries. which we

believe require and warrant more intensive treatment. These

approaches could include any of the following elements:

(1) letters from high-1eyel U.S. Officials1 in cases such as

Japan, where the suggestion has been made by the Japanese

themselves, and Israel, where there is a precedent for such

action; (2) coordination of our approach with other interested

and influential governments, and (3) even the possibility of

exercisinm leverage. In looking at the possibility of

exercising leverage, we have- of course borne in mind paragraph

two of NSDX 6. Accordingly, suct-( a courselof action is

seriously considcrcd only in those cases where (1) the country

has an existing nuclear program; (2) the cOuntry cannot be

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This group would include such countr,ies as Zambia, Communist China and Albania.

I Cuba,

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Tanzania,

The second course of action av~ilable t~ us is that of low­key diplomatic approaches. We would request lour embassies in countries where such a course seems desirable to convey to the local government our hope that the treaty wiil come into force soon and thus begin to achieve its purposes. / Our Embassies could review the world-wide security and eco0omic considerations :in favor of the treaty, drawing as appropria~e upon the UN Secretary General's Report on non-proliferation. Each set of ~nstructions would, of course, be written 50:as to take into consideration our knowledge of the particular country's attitude toward the treaty and, where applicable and potentially productive, would ask the Er,tbassy to focus i

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ts remarks on that. co-untry's specific concerns by: reiterat1ing previous statements we have made either priv,ately or jin public testimony. Each of our Arr,bassadors s-.'Ould retain discretiion reg2.rding the utilization of particular arguments to ensu~e that no argument was used which was likel,c to back-fire in d~scussions, with

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~ndividual officials. The ~evel within the [host government at which this approach is made would also b~ left· in most cases to the discretion of the E,,;b~ssy .. This type of low-key representation will be applicabl.e to almost: all count:ries . ~ihich are in general favorably disposed tow<).rd the treaty and -which would not resent some further prodding.

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The third alternative course of action/ is that~£ uniquely tailored approaches £or particular1 countries. which we believe require and s-:arrant more iptensive !treatment. These approaches could include any of the followibg elements: (1) letters from high-level U.S. officials,/ in cas.es ,,such as Japan, where the Sl,ggestion has been made b;y the Japa:hese themselves, and Israel, where there is a p~ecedent fqr such action; (2) coordination of our appro2.c·h ,,1:ilth other interested and inflLtcncial governments, and (3) even tlhe possib~lity of exerc_is.ing leverage. In looking ~t the po~sibility cif exercising levcrJgc, we hav~ of course bor~e in mind p~ragraph ~-..-:o of l•:SD>l 6. AccordinP,l~..-, such' a. cour:-s,'21of act.ion is

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scriousl.v considered only· in those coses ;,_,here (1) the country . a I

1-.~s an , .. ,·cc· 'r,·~ nu"'1 ~-- ..... o--o~,.a•e• (?) thr- co',. untr'.' c 0 nnot be. ·'-~C.1- t.:,'---.:.> J. .:.;, l, L .l;.:<-l!.. • L Q- q.,, - L.. -} C, , ~

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persuaded to adhere to the.treaty through routine diplomatiC persuasion alone; and (3) the country's faqure to sign could have a crucial effect on theconsiderations of other countries.

Since the degree and type of influence which the U.S. can bring to bear varies so greatly from caSe to case, there is attached a series of individual country studies. Each study is in three -parts: (1) a brief deseription Vf the status of

the country's consideration of the NPT and any specific problems it has with the treaty; (2) a description o'f the specific areas of special and applicable influence available for use with the country, especially by the U.S.; and (3) a recommendation in light of these factors as to which alternatrive course of action

should be pursued regarding that Country.

It should be noted that in addition the more immediate-

actions recommended for each country, the U.S. can also take steps over the longer term to demonstrate that non-nuclear part.ies to the NPT have ready access to the benefits of Articles'

IV (peaceful uses generally) and V (benefis of peaCeful nuclear explosions). For example, the. U.S. can malle a point of responding with speed to any request for assistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy from parties to the treaty. :We should on the other hand be cautious in stimulatiilig requests from countries which are clearly recalcitrant. 1 L.:re can also attempt

to enhance the status of parties by supportinc, where it seems appropriate and practicable, their representation iri inter-

national bodies and_their qualified candiqltes for positions

of leadership in these bodies. In genera4, we should be careful

to respond to specific requests for assist'e.nce having in

mind the possible effects on the aittaudes of countries considering either signature or- ratificatilon. Suchvisible_

demonstrations of the positive benefits og the treaty for its parties would play a significant role.in iinducing persistent

hol.d-outs eventually to adhere. ,Anothe:r general factor likely

to affect the orospocts for wide radhorencel to the treaty is

the extent to ;,,hich sic:nifIcant nuclear arms controlnegotiations

are taking place.

One of our tactical objectives throushout will be to . separate countries that have assOciated t6cmselves .in groups

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persuaded to adhere to the treaty through r~utine diplomati~ persuasion alone; and (3) the coun~ry's failure to sign could have a crucial effect on the 1 consider~tions of other countries. · I

I Since the degree and type of influence1which the U.S.

can bring to bear varies so greatly from ca~e to case, there

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is ~ttached a series of individual.country ~tudies. Each study is in three ·parts: (1) a brief des,cription pf the status of the country's consideration of the. NPT and p.ny specific problems it has with the treaty; (2) a desc~iption of the specific areas of special and applicable influence available for use with the country, espectally by the U.S.; and (3) a recommendation in light of these factors as to which alternative course of action should be pursued regarding that country .

It should be noted that in aqdition t9 the more immediate actions recommended for ea.ch country, the l[.S. can also take steps over the longer term to demonstrate tlhat non-nucle2r

• ' N'='"' 1 l I 1 I 1 . - • . f .\ . 1 ' parties to tne L's l nave re2c.y access to tne oene.tits o 2.rt1.c es IV (peaceful uses gener2ll3,) and V (benefiis of pea~eful nuclear explosions), For example,i;the U.$. can ma~e a point of responding with speed to any requ~st for afsistance in peaceful uses of nuclear energy from parti~s to the I treaty. :we should on the other hand be cautious in sti.tcmlatimg requests from

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countries which are clearly recal~itrant. JWe can also attempt to enhance the status of parties ~y supporting, where it seems

. ' . bl h . I . . . appropriate ano pract1.ca _c, t e1.r represeptation in inter-national bodies and.their qualified candid~tes for positions of leadership in these bodies. In generalj, we should be careful to respond to specific requests for assistFnce having in mind the possible effects on the attitudesj of countries considering either signature or ~atificat~on. Such\visible demonstrations of the positive bqnefits ofj the treaty for. i.ts parties would play a significant role.in ~nducing persistent hold-outs eventually to adhere. lnother gicneral factor likely to affect the; or-osoccts for -:-.1idc ,·2dhcrcncd to the: trc·atv is-- • I ., the e:..:tent to 1,,;hich significant nucl-2.s.r ar:G1s contro.l'.negotiations are taking place. I

I 0 £ .... ,.., .... · 1 ' · t · ..... h.,.•,--.-1At~oL''" 1,.,i· 11 b,0 to nc O our LC:.:.CLlC2 08JCC iy2s LLc.:._\...'\..-::.PL .... ._

separat~ countries tl1at ha\rc associated t~ca1s~lvcs in groups

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in connection with NPT signirig. An!example is the situation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, none of which has signed. As long as Argentina and Chile do not sign, it is easier for Brazil to be a hold-out. We may thus be able to get at the Brazilian problem in the long-term by irpuencing Argentina and Chile. Argentina, for example,1should be interested in the fact that nuclear advanced countries of Europe have signed the treaty, including particularly ItalY.

In addition to consultations with our allies, particularly those who are members of Euratom, before the US deposits its instrument of ratification, we believe that we should also ascertain Soviet intentions regarding the timing of their ratification.

Soviet spokesmen have in the past suggested that the Soviets would delay ratification until after FRG signature, if not ratification. It is possibl'e the Soviets will defer ratification until the FRG signs. Iowever, if it appears that FRG signature may be delayed until after the Bundestag elections in October 1969, it is also possible that the Soviets will ratify beforehand in order to exert additionlal pressure on the FRG and others .to sign. 1

Recently there have been some hints thA the Soviets would act promptly after the US does. A possibly significant indication is the Czech decision to, ratify the next few weeks.

It would not be prudent to leave this question up in the air. As the Italians have pointed out to us, with the UK having already completed ratification, if the US deposited

its ratification and assuming the quota of the 40 additional ratifications, it would be left up to the d9cision of the

USSR whether or not the NPT comes into force. It 'seems doubtful that the Soviets would consider their best interest served by holding up ratification and preventing the NPT from

entering into force. Nevertheless, it would seem advisable for the US to raise the question officially with the Soviets

,before the US co.oloted ratiEicatioin.

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I I in connection with NPT signing. An:example is the situation of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, none of whi1h has signed. As long as Argentina and Chile do not sign, it is easier for Brazil to be a hold-out. We may thus befable to get at the Brazilian problem in the long-term by influencing Argentina and Chile. Argentina, for example, I should b~ interested in the fact that nuclear advanced countrie~ of Euro~e have signed the treaty, including particul2:rly Ital~. I

In addition to consultations with our allies, particularly those who are me;-;-,bers of Eura tom, b~fore the! US deposits its instrument of ratification, we believe that {ie should also ascertain Soviet intentions regarding the tifuing of their ratification. I

I Soviet spokesmen have in the past sugge~ted that the

Soviets would delay ratification un~il after! FRG signature, if not ratification. It is oossibl~ the Soviets will defer ratification until the FRG signs. ~lowever, :if it appears that FRG signature may be delayed until ·after thei BundeStag elections ' in October 1969, it is also possible that th1e Soviets will ratify bef~rehand i~ order to exert addition[al pressure on the FRG and otners to sign. 1

Recently there have been some hints th~t the Soviets would act promptly after the US does. A ,possibly !significant indication is the Czech decision tq ratify ~n the next few weeks.

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It would not be prudent to leave this ~uestion up in the air. As the Italians have pointed :out to ud, with the UK h . 1 d 1 d . " . . . " H1 US 1 • ' aving a rea y comp ete ratir:icat·~on, ir t

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e aeposit20 its ratification and assu~ing the quota of ~he 40 additional ratifications, it would be left uo to the d~cision of the USSR whether or not the NPT comes' into forcJ. It ·seems doubtful that the Soviets Hould consider thJir best interest served by holding up rat:ificatior, lnd orcveriting the NPT from entering into fo~ce. Ncvcrt~~lcss, ~t,_1wu11' ~•cc,,1.' adv~sa~l: for the US to raise the qucSLlOn o{f1_cially uith .::he ::,ovie--s before the US· co~aletcd r2tiEication. . ' • I

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Algeria:

Algeria has refrained from signing the NPT on the grounds that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear weapon parties, that-lt does not proVide for disarmament by the. nuclear. weapon • parties, and that security guarantees provided to non-nuclear patties are inadequate. In part, Algeria's position on the NPT reflects its desire to assert its non-alignment and independence on an important international iSsue that-it feels dOes not direetly affect its own interests. (We doubt that Algeria per-.ceives- eny- neer-term peaceful uses benefits that it might want to gain through the NPT.) An important factor is the Algerian

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view of: its role as a chapion of tne Arab 9ause.in the Con-tinuing war against IsraeL -The ldtter's adherence to the:Treaty .would remove an obstacle to action by- Algeri.a, .but it would not necessarily,..in itself, induce Algeria to sign.

The U.S. has no dipiomatic relations with Algeria and negligible influence Over Argeria ts position on an issue like the NPT. The Soviets have leverage through extensive trade and assistance; but they would probably be reluctant to use it in the case of Algeria. noteover, Algeria's independent line on the NPT to a degree reflects the AlgerianS' sensitivity to the influence the Soviets already exetcilse in their country. AlthoUgh France has not attempted to dissuade other countries from adhering to-the Treaty,-its aloof attitude has undoubtedly had an effect on Algeria.

Recomatended Action:

In any general US/USSR consultations on the NPT,.. we should inform the Soviets that we intend to eX.ercise whatever influence we may have,to move the.COA towatd adherence and would hope that the Soviet Union would do likewiaa

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Alge.ria:

Algeria has refrained from sigping the I

PT on the grounds that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear weapon parties, that it does not provide for disarrr1arr,ent by /the nuclear weapon · parties, and tha·t security guarante/es provid

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ed to non-nuc le:ar parties are inadequate. In part, A/lgeria's /position on the NPT reflects its desire to assert its non-alignment and independence on an imoortant: inter;:cational is sud thet it /feels do.es not directly' affect its o,·m interests. (We doubt that Algeria per­ceives any near-term peaceful uses benefits /that it might want _. to gain through the NPT.) An impoutant factor is the Algerian

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• l view oi its roe as a c ampion o~ ttne re· cause in t1e con-tinuing wa.r against Israel.. The 1Jtter's a4herence to the.Treaty

.would remove in obstacle to action/by Algeria, but it would not nec.es.sarily, in itself, induce Algeria to sign. .

I I The U.S. has no diplo;natic relations with Algeri.a and

negligible influence over Aige1·ia •); positio~ on an issue like the NPT. The Soviets have levera~e through extensive trade

. I and assistance; but they would probably be reluctant to use • ·t • t' " ~ 1 • '. I A 1 I. ' ' ' d 1 .1.n ne case 01. ~ ...... geri2. i.·toreover, :. gern..a s inoep_en ,2nt

. line on the NPT. to a degree re flee/ts .the A lgerie ns' sensitivity to the influence th~ Soviets alieady exe~ci~e in the{r country. Although. Frence has not attempted to dissua8e other countries from adhering to the Treaty, its aloof attitude has ~ndoubtedly had an effect on Algeria. ·

In any general US/USSR consultations on the NPT,' we should inform the Sovie ts that we intend / to e:.:erc :tls e whateve'r influence I . . -we mey have. to move the. GOA tm-1a_rd adherence and would hope that the Soviet Union would do likewisJ .

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Argentina:

Argentina's stated position has been that it fears the NPT will impede progress in the field of peaceful useS of nuclear energy. Although it has shown no disposition to adhere in the near future, Argentina has not actively opposed the treaty, and Foreign Ministry officials claim that the Armed Forces constitute the primary opponents of Argentine signature. The Armed Forces' position derives from a general reluctance to foreclose options, not from an advo.cacy of any particular program. Recently the Argentine Embassy in Washington indicated interest in following NPT developments more closely in order to advise Buenos Aires of the advantages or disadvantages of adherence to the treaty.

There is relatively little that the 1p can do in the immediate future to encourage Argentine signature of the NPT. The adherence of the FRG, Italy and Switzerland plus evidence that parties to the treaty enjoy assured access to the bene-fits of peaceful uses technology might h0..p induce Argentina

to sign. To a great extent the GOA is being influenced by the attitude of Brazil toward th treaty, particularly insofar as prestige facnrs are concerned. Howev r, this attitude might be offset by adherence of he sophi ticated European powers. Chile's adherence would also make it easier. for Argentina to adhere to the Treaty even though Brazil does

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Recommended Action:

. Continuing. low-key representations on advantages of - -Treaty: We would attempt to stimulate GOA to appreciate _

value of:taking position independent 'of Braz,11.

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Argentina:

Argentina's stated positio~ has been that it fears the

NPT w.ill impede progress in the , ield of J.:leaceful uses of

.nuclear. energy. Although it has 1 7hown no jdispos~tion to adhere .in the near future, Argentina has not actively ·

opposed the treaty, and Foreign 1!1inistry dfficials claim

that the .Armed Forc,es constitute I the primdry opponents of

Argentine signature. The Armed ~orces' pdsitionderives from

· a genera 1 reluctance to foreclose opt ions J not from an advo.cacy

of any particular program. Receilitly the Argentine Embassy in

Wa,shington ind·icated interest in I following NPT developments

rn. ore closely in order to advise Juenos Aiies of th.e advantages or disadvantages of adherence to the treai±y.

. , I There is relatively little that the US can do in the

. immediate .future to encourage Argentine signature of the NPT.

The adherence of tl:le FRG, Italy and SwitzJrland plus evidence

that parties to the treaty enjoylassured dccess to the .bene­

fits _of peaceful uses technology rnig~t hefp i~duce Argentina to sign. To a great extent the ·OA 1s being influenced by

the attitude of Brazil tou.ard th~ .treaty, jparticularly insofar as prestig~ fact0rs are concerned. However, this attitude

might be offset by adherence of !he sophi~ticated European

powers. Chile's adherence would,also makJ it easier for Argentina to adheie to the Treaty even th!uih Brazil does not.

Recommended Action:

Continuing. low-key represen ations on advantages of

Treaty. We ,:ould a~t 7mpt. to stiipulate GOt t~ appreciate value of taking pos1t1on 1ndependenc of B az~l. .

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Australia:

Although the GOA favors nonprioliferation in principle, voted for the June 12 UNGA Res., and was constructive about . the treaty at the NNC and 23rd UNGA, it has qualms about several aspects of the NPT, especiially the safeguards provisions which it fears will interfere with Australia's general capability for R&D. Questions asked by various Australian officials about certain provisions of the treaty revealed that one of the considerations to ,which they would attach particular weight in recommending:for or against adherence is the extent to which the treaty would prevent the COA from conducting basic research and making contingency plans for developing atomic weapons. Given its geogrpahic location and long-range concern ab-out U.S. rwithdrawal from the West Pacific, Australia is concerned about Japanese, ChiCOM and Ind.ian nuclear weapon capabilities. We have received some indications that Australia might sign, while making it clear that its signature did not signify a ccl7mitment to ratify.

The Australians are anxious to obtain maximum benefits from peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Prime Minister Gorton vigorously pressed for comitio.enCil by the U.S. to a joint feasibility study for a Plowshare' project at Cape Keraudren. We agreed, in a diplomatic note i-oplying that ultimately a U.S. decision on the project would have to be considered in conjunction with our NPT responsibilities, project's relationship to the Liited Test Gorton objected in the strongest ,terms to the text of our note, and there Was also a request that we should withdraw the note. Our AbassadorHwas instrticted to assure him that the note was not'intended to"put pressure on the .GOA to sign the NPT, and the4 the U.S. does not 'intend .to use the-Cape Keraudren project in any way to IFing - pressure on the GOA to sign the NPT. The Ambassador ?xplained that our references to the NPT arose out Of bur concern with the possible attitude of prospecti 3ve signatories especally among' the • developing .countries of the world, and ou

f_ wish to alert the

GOA to a problem we.foresaw the Possible riced •tode4.1 wit.h at a later stage. We agreed not toi publish the'note,..but•declined to withdraw it.

(as well laS the Ban Treaty).

our making public

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I Australia:

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Although the GOA favors nonpr~liferatipn in principle, voted for the June 12 UNGA Res. , and was co'ns true ti ve about the treaty at the NNC and 23rd UNGA, it has qualms about several aspects of the NPT, espec~ally the safeguards provisions which it fears will interfere Hith Australia's general capability for R&D. Questions as~ed by va~ious Australian officials about certain provision~ of the treaty revealed that one of the considerations to 1Hhich thdy would attach

. 1 . ' . , . 'r I • . d' . particu ar ,;-1eignt in recomrr:.enoing 1.1_or or againsc a oerence is

the extent to Hhich the treaty Hould prevedt the GOA from b . , d ,. .1 1 '° conducting asic researca an ma~1.ng contirygency pans LOr

developing atomic weapons. Given its geogtpahic location - I and long-range concern about U.S. 11'1ithdrawal from the West

Pacific, Australia is concerned a~out Japa*ese, ChiCON and Indian nuclear weaoon cao,, abilities. We have received some

• I

indications that Australia might sign, while making it clear h . . d. d . . "' . I • f t at 1.ts signature 1. not s1.gn1.i:y a co:;-.:c.1):ment to rat1._y.

The Australians are anxious :to obtain m2.ximum be.nefits from peaceful uses of nuclear te.chnology. Prir-:1e Hin~~-ter Gorton vigorously pressed for commitmenti by the ~.S. to a joint feasibility study for a Plowshar~ project ft Cape Keraudren. We agreed, in a diplor!'.atic' note fr1plying that ultimately a U.S. decision on the project wou~d have to/ be considered in conjunction with our NPT responsi!bilities ,/ (as i-Tell :as the project's relationship to the Liclited Tesb Ban Treaiy). Gorton objected in the strongest :terms to /our m2king public the text of our note, and there 0as also a request ihat He should withdraw the note. Our A1,bassador /was instrJcted to assure him that the note Has not;intended/to put prdssure on the .GOA to sign the NPT, and that the U.S. does not intend to use the Cape Keraudren project in any way to ~ring pressure on the GOA to sign the 1--iPT. The Ambassador t;:p lained that our

' I , references to the NPT arose out ~four comcern with 'the possible ' I attitude of prosp~ctivc signatories especially among· the

developing countries of the worl~, and oui: wish to i_lert the GOA to a proble,,, ..;e foresaw the possible heed to dea'l with at a later st2~e. He agreed not to

11i publish /the note, .but declined

to 1-lithdra,., it.

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There is very little external ,leverage which might induce Australia to sign the NPT. The sigrnature of Japan, and possibly Indonesia as well, may be a prerequisite for an Australian decision to sign. U.S. ratificatiOn and the example of the U.K. in early ratification will be an influence on Australia.

To the extent that Australian opposition rests on uneasiness about our commitment toidefend Australia, continued reassurances on this point may help to promote a more favorable attitude toward the treaty. However, opposition to the treaty appears to exist more among those OfficialsHoncerned with nuclear technology than at the political level.

Recommended Action:

We should be prepared to disctiss further with the GOA, if it shows any desire to do so, questions of interest to the GOA regarding che NPT. This could, be done ,either by our Ei.bassy or, perhaps at an appropriate timer after U.S. ratification by sending a high-level team of technical expe'rts from the AEC, DOD and ACDA. We should also be p'repared to reassure Australia regarding our commitment to its defense as appropriate occasions arise.

However, because of the demonstrated sensitivities of the AUstralian Prime Minister about any appearance of U.S. pressures, particularly regardin2 the NPT, we do not 4hink it would beadvisable at this time to take any formal or high-level initiatives regarding US-Australian consultations on the NPT.

Regarding the relationship of the Capei t(erandren project to' Australian signature of the N w nPT, e do ot believe any fUrther decisions need be made. atthis ti In.the event the feasibility study doos show that the project can proceed, we may than be faced with deciding whether ou overall interests would best be served by going ahead even if the GOA has not singed the NPT. 0n•the ona hand, Milpister Gorton would undoubtedly strongly resent any attempt bY us to make our participation in the project conto_ngent 'upon Australian sign ture

of the NE'T and the net result. co.0. be not only-a -serious strain

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There is very little external ,leverage which might induce Australia to sign the NPT. The signature o, Japan, and possibly Indonesia as well, may be a prerequisite fori an Australian decision to sign. U.S. ratification and thJ example of the U.K. in early ratification will be ,an influJnce on Australia.

' I

To the extent that Australian;oppositiJn rests on uneasiness about our co,1c.-nitment to, defend AJstralia, continued reassurances on this point may help to promcpte a more favorable attitude t01-iard the treaty. Houever, opposition to the treaty appears to exist more among those bfficials/concerned uith nuclear technology than at the political level.

Recommended Action:

'

We should be prepared to dischss furth1er with the GOA,

if it shows any desire to do so, questions of interest to the Go \ ' . · h · -~ ~ ~h . 1 r ' ' 1 • ' ' ~ ' 1: regaroJ_ng c e i"'it'·1. 1 is cou a; oe Gone

1e:1.tdi21· u-y our .c.i.aOcl.35.y

or, ~erhaps_a~ an appropriate tim~_after U.f. ratification by sending a hign-level team of tech~ical experts from the AEC, DOD and ACDA. lie :should also be p'.repared do rea-ssure Australia , regarding our cotT,,Hitment to its defense as a[JproP'.riate occasions arise.

H b fhd :. df ···· fh owever, ecause o t e emonstrate sensitivities o t e Australian Prime Hinister about ar\y appearince of U.S. pressures, particularly regarding the NPT, w~ do not Jhink it would be stdvisable at this time to take any formal 9r high-level initiatives regarding US-Australian consultations on the NPT.

I I

Regarding the relationship of the Capl Keraudren project to Australian signature of the ~:PT, we do bot believe any further decisions need be made ati this tim~. In the event the feasibility study does show that ~he ~roje~t can proceed, we may than be faced with deciding w~ether ou~ overall interests would best be served by going ahe~d even i~ the GOA has not singed the NPT. On the one h• nd,i Prime Mihister Gorton would undoubtedly strongly resent any aftcmpt b~ us to make our particip2tion in thQ project cont:ing~nt up

1

bn Austro.li-a.n si~n.;-iturc of the NPT and the net rcsul.t coLr1ld be no~ on1,1, a·scrioLtS strain

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in our relations with Australia but also a lessening of the chances of GOA acceptance of the NPT. On the other hand, U.S. " conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions with benefits resulting for Australia before it signed the \TPT Would probably be characterized by some NPT supporters as contrary to the spirit (although not the letter) of the treaty, and such countries as Mexico and Sweden would probably utilize this project to support their efforts to subject an nuclear explosion services to international regulation; moreo\er, as to countries that had nct decided to adhere to the NPT, our action might reduce the incentives to ratify since the assurance of availability of peaceful nuclear explosion benefits in Article V of the treaty is widely viewed as one of the advantages of the NPT. These considerations would be applicable although the project would be a research and development experiment under the US plowshare program'. If the GOA has not signed the NPT by the time the Cape Keraudren project becomes a confirmed possibility, we will have to assess whether there are any further diplomatic

means o.f encouraging Australian adherence without permitting

the issue to be cast in terms which Gorton may view as, IIcoercion."

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in our relations with Australia but also a lessening of the chances of GOA acceptance of the NP/. On th~ other hand, U.S. conduct of peaceful nuclear explosiens with .benefits resulting for Australia before it signed the INPT ,qould/ pro.bably be characterized by some NPT supporters as contrary to the spirit (although not the letter) of the tr

1

eaty, and such countries as Mexico and Sweden would probably utilize this project to support their efforts to subject a~l nuc1ea~/ explosion services .. 1 1· I 'h to 1.nternat:-on~- regu

1

atJ.o~; m:re~\1.er, as to1

~ount:i:s t ~t had not decidea to adaere LO tue NPrT, our actiou nngr,t reauce the incentives to ratify since the /assurancJ of availa•bility of peaceful nuclear explosion bene:rrits in A~ticle V of the trea.ty is widely vie,1ed as one of ~he ad van tlages . of the NPT. These considerations would be applicable altlhough the p~oject would be a research and development experimJnt under the US pJ.owshare program'. If the GOA has I not sign~d the NPT by the time the Cape Keraudren project be<::omes a cJnfirmed possibility,

"11 h ' ' 1 1 I f . d. 1 . we wi ave to assess wnetnar taere are any urtner ip omatic I , .

means of encouraging Australian adherence without permitting 1 • ,- • I . I •

the issue to oe cast in terms ,•frnch Gorton ,,.ay view as. 11 coe~cion."

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Brazil is not expected to sign the NPT In the near future. ' Its non-adherence reflects the strortg personal opposition of ' the Foreign Minister, and is psychologicall.y identified with patriotic nationalism. Although based on copsiderations of national prestige, Brazil's position has ipeen rationalized by a refusal to .accept limitations on nuclear research and development, including research on nuclear erplosive devices for peaceful uses, which Brazil argues is iulportant to the country's development. By opposing the super-powers on the NPT, Brazil hopes it can add to its credentials as a potential world power and a. leader in Latin America. The Brazilian position on the. NPT is also interwoven with domestic political issues.

As in the case of other countries with &Dm we have agreements for cooperation in the deaceful uses of atomic energy, Brazil has received assistance from the United States. Brazil is one of the 26 countries which has received a research reactor grant of $350,0* In addition, it has received 4 equipment grants totallyig $318,000 directly from the US and 5 U.S. financed equipmeTt grants totafting $71,500 through the IAEA. There are also presently 3 research reactors in operation in Brazil. A TrilateH2.1 Agreement (US/Brazil/IAFA) has been concluded under which these facilities will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

Tollowing. the Punta del Esta meeting of American Presidents,.. .theUnited .States- offered Brazil and the other Latin American countries additional possible programs. 'In the case of Brazil, we offered grants to bring senior Brazilian scientists to the US towork with the AEC at the professional ievel, cooperative research on thorium reactors; raw materials surveys, and joint studies in the fields of desalinization and irradiation. Although many of these programs could provide us. with some potential lon&-term leverage, for the time being the. nationalistic element in the Brazilian posi make US pressurcs counter-productdve. As f objection that the 'l:!PT prohibits acquisitio

tion would probably or Brazil's of nticl-ar

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·Brazil:

Brazil is not expected to sign the NPT in the near future. Its non-adherence reflects the strong person11 opposition of

. the Foreign Minister, and is psychoil.ogicallyl ide~tified with patriotic nationalism. Although ba~ed on considerations of national prestige, Brazil's posi~ion has been rationalized by a refusal to accept limitations on nucleai: research and development, including research on huclear e\-:plosive devices f -" 1 l., B ·1 I •. I , or peace.Lu_ uses, ·w 1icn razi argues is 1.rr,portant to tne country's development. By opposin~ the supe~-powers on the NPT, Brazil hopes it can ~dd to_it~ cr~dentifls as a_p~tehtial world po,-rer and a leader in Latin fimerica. The Brazilian position on the NPT is also interwo]1ven 1-,ith domestic political issues.

As in the case of othE.r count ,ies with whom we have f · · h 1 "l f . agreements or cooperation int e Reaceru lses o~ atomic

energy, Brazil has received assistdnce from the United States. Brazil is one of the 26 countries /hich has received a research reactor grant of $350,00• J In addition, it has

· I I , -

received 4 eq.uipment grants. tot2.lli.ng $318,100 dire.ctly from. the US and 5 U.S. financed equipme+t grants tota~ling $71,500 through the IAEA. There are also ,resently 3 research reactors in opera.tion in Brazil. A Trilatetal Agreement (US/Brazil/IAEA)

· has been concluded under ,-.,hich the[1

·e facilir! ies will be subject to .IAEA safeguards. .

· -Follow-ing the Punta del Es.ta .. eeting of American Presidents, the. United .States offered Brazil ahd the ot ,er Latin American countries additional cossible oro 0Dbams. In the case of Brazil,

• • I

we offered grants to bring senior Brazilian scientists to the US to work with the AEC at the pro~essional level, cooperative research on thorium reactors, raw materials surveys, and joint studies in the fields of desalinization and irradiation. Although many of these progr2ms could provi~e us. ~Jith some potential long~tcrm leverage, for the time being the nationalistic element in the Brazilian position ,-,ould oro.bablv

I . ,

make ·us prcs_sui·cs count'er-produc tive. As for Brc1zi.l' s obJ"cction tl12t tl1c NPT orohib·its dccuisitio~ of hLLcl~2r . '

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explosives for peaceful purposes, emphasis by us and other NPT adherents on the pesitive aspects of Article V might in time create an impression that remaining outside the treaty could limit Brazilian opportunities for economic deVelopment. It should be noted thfft while Brazilian actions relative to the NPT at the NC and 23nd UNGA contributed to raising obstacles for the treaty, Brazil's

official position at the ENDC and UN'GA has not precluded its

own eventual adherence. Brazil has simply reserved its decision to date.

Recommended Action:

No immediate action. We should be alert to opportunities to persuade Brazil that its- abstentffin is contrary to its true long-term interests, and that its adherence could be a stitulant

to increase US cooperation in the peaceful ndic1ear field. If brazil continues to drag its feet, we should consider allowing.

our efforts in peaceful nuclear col1aboratioy with Brazil to

shrink to the minimum consistent with existing formal agreements.

hAt no time, however, should it appeiar that- t e Uhited . States

is unwilling to meet its. el.sting rp_rm commiuments in the field

of peacefUl uses of nuclear energy. Such acItion could cause

other countries, including some of thos.e adh-ring to:the NPT,

to question U.S. assurances concerning fuel 'supply and our , willincness to meet lonrr-term commitments. We should, however,

be able to avoid the visible implication that US/BraZilian

nuclear cooperation remains completeiy unaffected by l Brazil's

continued non-adherence. In any event, pending a more positive.

GOB attitude toward rhe treaty, we should do nothingito expedite

new coopereltion with Brazil in the peaceful nuclear field and

should act deliberately on any new Brazilian requests, unless

there are other overriding considerations,. It should be

recognized, of- course, that the application of heavyhanded

pressure could- feed the nationalistic feelings already underlying

the Brazilian position on the NPT, and-could therebyprove

counter-productive. i

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explosives for peaceful purposes, e phasis b I us and other NPT adherents on the pOsitive aspectis of Art:i!cle V might in time create an impression that rJmaining dutside the treaty could limit Brazilian opportJnit:ies fdr economic developu1ent. It should be noted thdt while Brazilian

I I actions relative to the NPT at the i':i'/C and 23nd UNGA contributed to raising obstacles foJ the tredty, Brazil's official positio~ at the ENDC and U~GA has ndt precluded its O,•m eventual adherence. Brazil has sircf)ly r 1 served its decision to date.

Recommended Action:

No imu1ediate action. We should be alert to opportunities to persuade Brazil that its abstentlon is co!trary to its true 1 . . d ' . 1h 1 1 ' b . l ong-term interests, an tnat its a'" erence <cou a ea stimu ant to increase US cooperation in the pkaceful ntclear field. If

. Brazil continues to drag its feet, \•ie should/ consider allowing our effor.ts in peaceful nuclear col!Laboration vith B.razil to

l . 1 ' • . • • 1 1 . · .I f l s 1r1n.c to tn2 mlnJ • mum cons is tent i;;,1it 1 exis cing orma agreements. A . ' h l' . 1

• 11 u·· 'S t no tim2, no~~ever, Slou a it appear tnat t1e nite~ tates

. . 11 . t t . t .. . t . "I. · . L ,_ . ' - ' ;: . 1 d 1s unwi ing o mee 1 s e~ris ing r~rm commi~menLS 1~ Lne ~ie of peaceful uses of nuclec~r energy.I Such acFion could cause other countries, including some of !those adh~ring to.the NPT, t . us . - 1 1 1 '• o question .. assurances concerning rue fUPP-Y ano our willingness to meet long-term cor.rni1ltments. He shoulc, hoi·?eveJ:, be able to avoid the visible implic~tion that US/Brazilian nuclear coop er 2. tion remains comp le tJely unaf f cc ted by I Brazil's continued non-adherence. In any evlent, pending a mofe positive GOB attitude t01-,ard the treaty, we should do nothing! to expedite new cooperation with Brazil in the lp2aceful nuclear field and should act deliberately on any new Brazilian requests, unless there are other overriding conside9ations. It shoul~ be recognized, of course, that the appilication of heavy\-handed pressure could feed the nationalis •i.c feelings already underlying

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the Brazilian position on the NPT, and coul thereby: prove counter-productive. i

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Chile:

Chile has said it cannot sign the NPT until "certain other countries" do so, meaning Specifically Argentina and Brazil. Since Chile believes such countries would have to participate in order for the NPT to be effeetive, and since it has expressed to us the hope that its position will place greater pressure on reluctant countries, there appears littie likelihood of Chile Tb changing its attitude toward the NPT in the near future unless further efforts at persuasion are undertaken.

Recommended Action:

After. U.S, ratifibation, we should make low-key rep-resentations, urging Chilean adherence, stressingthat Chile has nothing to lose and much to gain by being the . first of the "ABC countries" to sign. We could draw at7 tbntion to long-term advantages to Chile in the. peaceful applications fi.eld from its adherence. I•ie should attempt to capitalize upon the liberal outlook of the Frei CoVernment.

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Chile:

Chile has said it cannot sign the NP] until ''certain other countries" do so, meaning specifica]ly Argentina and Brazil. Since Chile believeJ such coJntries would have to part ic ipa te in order for the NPT tlo be effective, a~d since it has expressed to us the hope/that ~ts position will place greater pressure on r~luctant crountries, there appears little likelihood of Chite's chan!ing its attitude toward the NPT in the near future unless further efforts at persuasion are undertaken.

Recommended Action:

After U O S, rat ifica:: ion, we should make 101•1-key rep­resen t2_tions, urging Chilean adh(orence, spressing that Chile has nothing to lose and much to gain by being t_he first of the "ABC countries" to sign. We could draw at­tention to long-term advantages to Chile in the peaceful applications field from its adherence. 1•7ie shou1d a-ttempt to capitalize upon the liberal dutlook 0£ the Frei Government.

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-Communist China:

There is no reason to believe that Communist China will

sign the NPT in the foreseeable fu ure. In fact, its opposition

to it will probably continue to be reflected in the negative

attitudes of such countries as Albania, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Its non-adherence will also be cited by a number of Asian

countries among their own reasons for not signing. It is difficult to predict when, and under what conditions, China's

attitude toward the NPT and other arms control measures might

change. In any case, Communist China's non-adherence will not

be a vital factor for achieving the purposes of the treaty.

Although Peking has made statements denouncing the NPT, we

do not believe that in practice Peking will provide nuclear weapons to third countries or substantially assist them in

becoming nuclear weapon states.

We have no influence over China's posture on the NPT.

We can continue to encourage it to participate in international

arrangements for arms control, in the hop: that in time the

Chinese leadership might recognize its stal-e in the outcome

of discussions of these matters.

Recommended Action:

We can see no specific action which this tirne, but we should continue in our express the hope that Peking will choose control arrangements.

1 . would be helpful at public statements to to p.articipate in arms

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·· Communist China:

There is no reason to believe that Communist China ,,1ill

sign the NPT in the foreseeable fulture. In/ fact, its opposition

to it will probably continue to be reflecte11:l in the negative

attitudes of such countries as Alb/ariia, Tanzania, and Zambia.

Its non-adherence will also be cited by a nlmber of Asian .

countries among their own reasons /for not signing. It is ·

difficult to predict when, and under ,-Iha.t conditions, China's

attitude toi-:arcl the NPT and other /arE1s control measures might

change. In any case, C01Ec\Unist China's nod-adherence will not

be a vital factor for achieving t~e purpogds of the treaty.

Although Peking has made stateE1encis denounding the NPT, we

do not believe that in pre.ctice PJking \·1i1] provide nllclear '·. d . b 1

• 11 1 • h . weapons to tnir collntries or su stantia x assist t cm in

becoming nuclear weapon states .

We have no influence over China's costture on th~ NPT.

We can continue to encourage it td particiJate in in.ternational

arnmgemen ts for arms control, in j the hope/that in time the

Chinese leadership might recognize its stake in _the outcome

of discussions of these matters. i.

Recoumended Action:

We can see no specific action which

this time, but we should continue in our

express the hope that Peking will choose

coritro.l arrangements .

i

I : I " would be hqlprul at

phblic staiements to I ~. . , .

to parLicipate in arms

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EURATOM Countries:

In order to ensure compatibility with the EURATOM Treaty, the non-nuclear members of EURATOM (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the FRG) will not ratify the NPT until IAEA and the European Communities Commission have reached agreement on a safeguards arrangement. The FRG is the only one of the five not to have signed as yet.

The EC Comrlission has thus far not been able to obtain a mandate to open talks with the IAEA before all Five have signed the Treaty., Thus, the delay in FRG signature is at the moment the principal cause of delay on progress tcwards an understand-ing between the two organizations.

In an earlier attempt t.o facilitate EURATOM adherence to the treaty and to ease Allied concern regariding a possible cut-off of U.S. nuclear fuel, we told our European allies in an aide-memoire d eatd Novelo.ber 13 J 19A7 th. t w? would take inf-o account the status of EURATOM neOtiations with IAEA before ratifying the NPT. However, in vlew of the delay in the FRG decision regarding signature, causied in large measure by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and tne importance of our ratifica-tion to the progress of the Treaty, we my:: feel that tying our ratification to the EURATOM/IAEA legotiations is impractical.

'Recommended Action:

Consultations with our Allies before depositing U.S. ratification in order to explain, in light of our satement of Novei-f.ber 13, 1967, why we plan to ratify soon. I

- If the U.S. fuel supply issuv is raisfd, that if the time deadline is noc met, we do not interpret the Treaty as automatically requiring a cut-of of fuel supplies. This would depend cm the circumsLonces.

we should say

We should work with the EURAir0M Countries and Wii.thin the .to facilitate a prompt and sratisfaotory conolu.S.ica to

their negotiations.

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EURATO::-[ Countries:

In order to ensure compatibility with the EURATO~l Treaty,· the non-nuclear members of EURATOc-l (Belgium/, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the FRG) will not ratify the NPT until IAEA and the European Conmmnities Corrunission havF reached agreement on a safeguards arrangement. The

1

FRG is the only one of the five not to have signed as yet.

The EC Commissiou has. thus far not been able to obtain a mandate to open talks 1•iith the IAEJA before !all Five have signed the Treaty.. Thus, the de lay in F~G s,igne ture i.s at the moment the principal cause of delay on plogress towards an understand­ing between the two organizationi. ·

In an earlier attempt. to f_ac '1 li ta te EqP"".'TON adher~mce to

the treaty and to ease Allied concern regal:jding a possible cut-off of U.S. nuclear fuel, we dold our European allies in an ai.cle-·mei'.l,oire cla ted Nove'cber 13 J 1967 th,,

1

1 t ,·."" ,-;oul.d take into account the stc1tus of EUR"iTON negdtiations with IAEA before

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ratifying t·he NPT. Hm,;ever, in vie,-1 of the delay in the FF,G d . . d" . 1 d . 1 1 b h ecision regar ing signature, cause in _an3e measure y t e • . " C ' 1 ' . d ,I . I ,' ' . C. invasion OJ... zecnos _ovaK1a: an, tcj1e importance o_r Ot+r ra ti.cicc:1-tion to the progress of th,1 Treaty, we no,·1 [fee 1 th2 t, tying our ratification to the EUP~,l,TO:I/L:;::.A !1 egotietiams is imp1,·actical.

Reco,n,,1ended Action:

· .Consultetions with our Allie before &epositing U.S. ra.t-ifica·t:ion in order to-expla'in,lin lightjof ou-r s¢-~ .. -teme·nt of Nove,uber 13, 19 6 7, why we p l2n to ratify so err. j

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- If the U.S. fuel supply issue is raised, we should say that if the time deadline is not ~.2t, '.·7•2 db not interpret the Tr:2ty as a~tom:iticallr re~uiring[ a c·ut-of[

1 · of fuel i;SL!pplies.

This would cepcr1d on tc12 circumstances. 11

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We should ,-:ork ,<Jith the EURAfOi[ countries and· ,.)'ithin the IAE.A to f;:-,cilit2te a pro,npt m1d setisfacto!:y conclu.s.io,J. to their negotiations ..

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France:

France has given no indication that it intends to sign the NPT, and we do not expect it to do so as long as De Gaulle,remains in power. However, the French Permanent Representative stated at the UNGA that France intends to "behave in the futu.r.e in this field exactly as states adhering to the Treaty." We do not believe that France itself will engage in proliferation. There is a possibility that the French attitude toward arms control, in general, and the NFT in particular, will change in the post-De Gaulle period.

*There is little that the U.S. can do at the present time tip influence France regarding the NPT. What persuasion we can bring to bear would best be utilized in seefring Fre.nch cooperatio:

in those areas where it is currently highly important, such as the relationship between EURATM and the IAEA, and in assuring that Franc.e maintains its positive stance toward the

principle of non-proliferation.

Recommended Action:

None.

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France:

France has given no indicatio, that it intends to sign the NPT, and we do not expect it t~ do so a

1 long as De Gaulle.

remains in pouer. · HOl•:ever, the French Permanent Representative stated at the UNGA that Fr2nce int~nds to 11iehave in .the future in this field exactly as states adfuering to I the Treaty." We do not believe that France itself till engage in proliferation. There is a possibility that the Fr 1 nch attiiude toward arms control in general, and the NPT in particul,1 r, will change in the post-De Gaulle period.

There is little that the U.S. can do a the present time I

to influence France regarding the rlPT. What persuasion we cah bring to bear 11oulci best be utiliz~d in sec/ing French cooperatio: in those areas where it is current!Ly highly in,portant, such

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as the relationship 1:.,et,.;een EURATO',I and the IAEA, and in assuring that France maintains its positive stance toward the principle of non-prolifera.tion. ,

None.

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FRG:

The NPT represents a particularly difficult domestic

political problem for the FRG. While the SPD and FDP favor adherinc, to the Treaty, a majority of the Chancellor's own party, the CDU/CSU, opposes it. .Supporters of adherence stress, in addition to the inherent merits of the treaty, the danger of Germany becoming isolated fro.11 its allies and especially of impairing its relat4ons with the U.S. The grounds for opposition have included (1) a reluctance t.o undertake an e:-:plicit obligation to the USSR to remain a non-nuclear weapons state without receiving a significant counter-concession from the Soviets; (2) concern that the "European option" preserved by U.S. interpretations of the Treaty does not provide a basis f8r the development of a European nuclear force short of tlie creation of a federated Europe; and (3) suspicion that ther Soviets would use the treaty to interfere with :he German peaceful uses program or in German affairs in general. Discussion of the NPT has recently focussed on Soviet references to the continuing validity of the "enemy states" articles of the U.N. Charter in a manner that mie-ht imply the Issertion of a unilateral right to intervene in FRG, affairs.

The Soviets in early February made a gesture that could alleviate this problem by stating that U. Security Council. Resolution 255 (196S) would also apply to the Federal Republic. The Germans have told the Soviets that with certain: additions the Soviet statement would be acceptable. One of these provides that the Soviets would cnduct their relations with the FRG, without reservation, in accordance with Article 2 of the U.N. Charter (proscribing the threat or use of force). This suggestion will probably no.t be_acceptable to. the Soviets since it implies a retreat from tneir position regarding the continuing validity of the "enemy states" articles of the U.N: Charter (Articles- 53 and 107).

rhere is a good chance that the FRG will eventually - adhere. But it is unclear whether the Cha-icellor will be able to bring thLs about befo:::e the elections ne,tt Saotaiebere

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FRG:

The NPT represents a particu arly difficult domes tic . political problem for the FRG .. WHile the SPD and .. FDP favor adhering to the Treaty, a maj orit~ of the Chancellor's o;-m party, the CDU/CSU, opposes it. Supporters of adherence stress, in addition to the inheredt merits of the treaty, · the danger of G2rmany becoming is.9lat.ed frolm its a_llies and especially of impairing its relat~ons with the U.S. The grounds for opposition have included (1) a re luc tanc.e to undertake an explicit obligatioct do the US R to remain a

1 . ' I .. I . ·r:· non-nuc ear weapons state witnout receiving a signiLicant counter-concession from the Sovietts; (2) cdncern that the "European option!! preserved by U.S. interpJetations of the Treaty does not provide a basis fJr the de~elopment of a European nuclear force short of tie creation of a federated Europe;. an~ (3) _ suspi~i.on _tha t thf Soviet:_ ji_!ou ld use the tre-a-cy co inter:cere Hitn ct1·e· Ge·rman peace:cul uses program or in German affairs in general. jDiscussidn of the N~T has recently focussed on Soviet references to !he contiriuinP validity of the "ene~ny states" articles of the -U-.N .. Cha;ter

.. · • • 1

• 1 · . 1 ,_. ,.. ·1 1 1.n a manner tna t m1-got 1.mp y tne asserL1.on or a un.1.; aterc:-~ right· to intervene in FRG; affairs l !

The Soviets in early Februart made a 0

esture that could alleviate this problecrr by statingj that U.N! Security Council · Resolution 255 (1968) would also apply to ihe Federal Republic. The Germans have told the Sovietsj t.h2,t ,-,it,,

1

1, certaini additions

the Soviet statement Hould be acceotable. One of these provides that the Soviets would cb~duct their relat~ons with the FRG, Hithout reservation, in rbccordanc~ with Ar~icle 2 of the U_.N. Charter (proscribing the threat oi· use of 'rorce). · T~is s~gg~sti~n will probably no.t b~_acce?~~ble to t~~ Soviets_ since it implies a retreat from tneir position regaraing the cont_.in;iing validi 7y of :he "enen,yj states" r6rticles o·'· f the U.N. Cnarter (Articles J3 and 1070. 1

' • . . I . . i · ! There is a good c!12nce that the FRG will eventL1ally

adhere. BLtt ·it is uncl.cn~ ~{h2thch tl1c Ch2J1c2llor ~iill be . • , .- t • I _ ·

able to bring th1s a • cL1t b2rore tlt2 clcc·ti~ns noxt 52.pt211~cr.

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We have in the past taken significant steps to make the Treaty more palatable to the Gerrr4n Government and to ensure, as far as possible, its eventual_adherence.. In, addition to,changes in the text of the Treaty we have made public inter-pretations of Articles of the Treaty of particular concern to the Germans. Moreover, Secretary Rusk stated at Reykjavik our full understanding of the views of other NATO ministers that the North Atlantic Treaty is an essential factor in their countries' continuing adherence to the NPT.

The President's discussion with Chancellor Kiesinger may afford additional indications of the FRG a titude.

We will need to study the results of the President's conversations before' we can determine the details of further steps.

Recommended Actl.on:

Avoid any appearance of pressure. Discuss- the matter with the Germans and offer to approach the Soviets again regarding possible further helpful gestures. (It should be recognized that if Germ:_lny's signature is not forthcoming before, the Federal elections, we in effect will enter a new situation regarding FRG NPT consideration whose elebents it is difficult to foresee.)

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17.

W. h . h k . I . f. k th e ave 1.n t e past ta en s 1.gn1. 1.cant steps t.o ma e e_ Treaty more palatable to the German Govern .ent and to ensure, as far as possible, its eventual.~dherence. In. addition to. changes in the text of the Treaty( we have made public inter­pretations df Articles of the Trebty of particular concern to

. the Germans. Horeover, Secretaryf Rusk sta~ed at Reykjavik our full understanding of the vie1-is of other NATO ministers that the North Atlantic Treaty is an eksential ~actor in their countries' continuing adherence tb the NPT.

The President's discussion wlth Chancellor Kiesinger may afford additional indications of the FRG a~titude.

We will need to study the re1

sults of the Pres·ident's conversations before we can determine the details of further steps .

Recommended Action:

Avoid any appearance of pres1

sure. D~scuss· the. matter with the Gerwans and offer to apDroach the Soviets again regarding possible further helpi~l gestur~s. (It should be recogniz eel that if Germ2.ny' s s igrla ture is 1no t forthcoming before the Federal elections, we fin effecb will ent¢r a new situation regarding FRG NPT consideration whose ele~ents it is difficult to foresee.)

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India:

•

India is not expected to sign the NpT in the foreseeable future. It desires to maintain its nuclear option in the face of the increasing nu4ear threat from Communist China, especially in view of what it considers to be inadequate security assurances froM the nuclear power signatories. The Indians also claim that the NPT contains an imbalance of obligations and does not fully protect the development of nuclear enery for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear parties. Another factor in Indian opposition to NPT signature is the feeling that the NPT constitutes a derogation of India's claim to great power status. Nevertheless, the Indian Government continues to maintain it will not pursue a nuclear weapons program.

The most likely source of leveragelas regards India's IIPT signature is probably the Soviet Union's extensive conventional military aid program, butlie Soviets have been most reluctant to apply any direct presure. - The U.S. could conceivably influenee India through our economic assistance program, but in practice preSsure of this kind is likely to prove counter-productive, Ipspecially if it cannot be concerted with the Soviets. The Indians have stated they will forego aid if necessarly to avoid conflicts with the perceived security needs. Another avenue of in-fluence at our disposal lies in the rellationship which has developed between Indian and American slicientists. The U.S. is helping India construct a nuclear power reactor at Tarapur. We are co=itted to supplj fuel for its operation. After lengthy nogotiations we appear to be nearing agreement with India to undert4ke a trilateral agreement (US/INDIA/IAEA) for safeguards. Any requests for additional nuclear assistance, or for an increase in the scope of the present agreement, could provide us with potential influence, although this woulcl probably

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India: /

I . India is not expected to sign the NPT in the

foreseeable future. It desires to maintain its nuclear

option in the face of the increasing nuclear threat from I

Communist China, especially in vie1-1 of 1·1hat it considers to be inadequate security assurances £rob the nuclear ·

power_signat~ries. The Indi~ns ~lso cl1im that the NPT

;~:~:~~st~: ~:~:i~;~,=n~fo~b~~~~~~~n:n:~~y d~~: ;~!c!~~iy

purpo.ses by non-nuclear par ties. Another factor in Indisn opposition to NPT signature is tlie feeling that the NPT constitutes a derogation of Indfa's claim to

I

great pm-1er status. Never the less, the J;ndian Government continues to maintain it will not pursue a nuclear weapons program. I

I I . The most likely source of leverage1as regards India's

NPT signature is probably the Soviet Union's extensive

18.

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conventional military aid program, but~e Soviets have been 1 ' d. 1

. h most re uctant to appLy any irect pressure. ~ e U.S. ld . ' 1 . "1 . I d. h 1 ' ' • cou conceivao_y inI_uence n ia t rougn our economic

. assistance progra~, but in practice pre~sure of this kind

is likely to prove counter-productive, ~specially if it cannot be concerted with the Soviets. The Indians have

stated they will forego aid if necessar~ to avoid conflicts

with the perceived security needs. Anolther avenue of in­

.fluence at our disposal lies in the rellationship 1-1hich has

developed between Indian and American ~cientists. The U.S. is helping India construct a nucl~ar power reactor

· at Tarapur. We are com,uitted to supply] fuel for its operation. After lengthy negotiations,1 1,ie appear to be

nearing agreement 1-ii. th India to under t4ke a tr ila tera 1

agreement (US/INDIA/IAEA) for safeguards. Any requests for additional nuclear assistance, or for an increase

in the scope of the present agreement, /could provide us with potential influence, although thiq: 1-1ould probably

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have little or no effect on India's decision not to

adhere. We would have to bear in thind the effeCt of

our responses on other countries considering adherence.

The Indians are planning to build a large reactor

themselves, but may have to seek outside assistance in

key areas, thus providing us with possible leverage if

we are approached. Any efforts to influence Indian nuclear policy should be conducted with maximum subtlety,

since-pressure whien India feels impinges on its national

pride or conflicts with its assessment of its national

security requirements, is likely to cause a negative

reaction.

Signature of the NPT by Pakistan would, to some

extent,. increase the pressure on India to 'Sign.

Reco=ended Action:

None for the present, except to hold firm to our

p.osition that IAEA safeguards are required for any

fuel or equipment might supply to India. Consult

with Soviets regarding desirability of concerted effort

over longer term, recognizing that the Indians are likely

to resist any combined influence which we and the Soviets

could bring to bear regarding NPT adherence.

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have little or no effect on Indii.a's deci ion not to , I I •

adhere. We would hava to beat Ii.rt Mind the effett of our responses on other countriek conside 1 ing adherence.

T~e Indians are planning t~ build a large reactor themselves, but may have to seek outside assistance in

key areas, thus providing us with possib! e leverage if we are approached. Any efforts to influ:ence Indian nuclear policy should be conducted with maximum subtlety, s·irrce· pre-ss9-re 1-Jhic·h Indi2. feels impinges on its national

.pride or conflicts with its ass1

essment of its national

security requirements, is likely to cause a negative reaction.

Signature of the NPT by Pakistan would, to some exter,it, increase the pre.ssure dn India tio sign .

Recommend~d Action:

None for the present, except to ho]d fiim io our position that IAEA safeguards dre requi~ed fo~ any f 1 · •· ' 11 I ct· C 1 ue or equipment we mignt SUJ~ y to n ia. onsu t with Soviets regarding desirability of doncerted effort

over longer term, recognizing that the Indi,ans are likely to resist any co2bined influenJe 1-,hich +e and the Soviets could bring to bear regarding ~PT adher nee .

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Indonesia

Foreign Minister Malik announced some time ago that Indonesia would sign after the Non-Nuclear Conference. There has been no further official GOI indication of its intentions since the conference•einded inSeptember. However, in response to an inqu:ry in January, the GOI replied that it did intend to sign but was vague on timing. The Germans, French; and Dutch have all been in contac.t with Indonesia regarding the possibility of cooperation in nuclear matters. Such approaches appear to have dealt solely with peaceful uses. Elements of the Indonesian military are seemingly reluctant to give up the theoretical option to produce nuclear weapons, but it is not clear whether this is a considered vIew or merely wishful thinking.

There is a reasonable chance that lindonesia wiil s-7cf-0n the NPT after the U.S. ratifies. This possibility would be further enhanced by Fac and oth'er key cd,untry signatures. If Indonesia nevertheless fails ta sign within a reasonable period, we should atteiwpt to persuaEe the GOI, especially key military officers and economic dffiOials, that the development of nuclear weapons 'is u=ealistic'for Indonesia and that the cost of the attempt womld impair'its prospects of playing a leading role in South st as it desires. The positive aspects of the peaceful uses provisions of the

treaty shot:E. be stressed and reiaLea to Indonesia's desire for regional prominence.

• Recommended Aetion:

Representation after ratification stressing regional importance of GO1's signature and gmositive arguments in peaceful uses area. Contact by at-taches among military, stressing realistic alternatives amailable.

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•Indonesia

Foreign Minis.ter :Malik announced some time ago that Indonesia would sign after the r:fm:n-.Nuclear Conference.

·There has been no further official GOI ibdication of its intentions since the conference:e• ded inl September. However, in response to an Italian inqury in January, the GOI replied that it did intend to sign but was vague on timing. The Germans, French, and Dutth have all been in contact with Indonesia regarding the possibility of cooperation in nuclear matters.· Sc!ch approaches appear to have dealt solely 1·1ith peacefu1 uses .j Elements of the Indonesian military are seemingly reluctpnt to give up the theoretical option to produce nuclear 1,1e;:1pons, but it is not clear whether this is a considered v

1

:iew or merely wishful thinking.

20 .

There is a reasonable chance ithat I!ndonesia will sign the NPT after the U.S. ratifies. This p;ossibility would be f 'lrth~r e11'nanc 0 c1 by H'D("I ;.ll'""\d orh'.-::.,,.- ·1~n,· cou,ncyy· ci·u,,-1f-,1r,-,c \.:,_ ' ...... ~ - '--' ._ '-.'~'J ~••• ·-• :--J, ,.__.._y I -- - '-' ,:;;,••··•--·- .;,.._;; ••

If Indonesia nevertheless fails to sign rithin a reasonable period, 11e should att12recpt to persu.202 the GOI, especially key military officers 2nd economic o'ffidials, th2.t the

I •

development of nuclear \1,'eapons 1is .lli:1re2..tistic :£or Indonesia and that the cost of the attempt ,;c,oJild :i!mpair 'its prospects of playing a leading role in Southe;:c:.st Fisia 2.s it desires. The positive aspects of the pea:ceful us~s provisioc1s of the treaty shouJ:! be stressed and re 1lat.cem to Indon0sia' s desire for regional prominence. I

Recomm211dcd Action:

Representation importance of GOI's peaceful uses area. stressing realistic

after ratifica~ion, 1stressing regional signature ~nd ? • sitive argl1ments in Contact by aft::;ache~ arrong military,

alternatives a1Vrcaila!ble.

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Israel:

Israel has not signed the NTT, evenithough all

Arab countries except Algeria and Saudi Arabia have

now signed. Officially the GOI!positionlis that it

has tot ye.t reached a decision One way or the other

on signature, and that it is stUdying the full implica-

tions of this step. The GOI declares, however, that it

is not a nuclear power and will; not be the first (area country) to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle

East. Moreover, Israel did vote affirma/tively for the

UNGA resolution last June commending the NPT.

Behind this official p.osition Israel is actively

working to improve its capability to prOduce nuclear

weapons at short notice. In the absence of progress toward a peace settlement, Israel's leaders have

probably decided Israel cannot affort Co surrender the

nuclear option. Until the Araps show a! disposition to

negotiate .with Israel, the GOl reasons !that there may

be advantages in not signing the NTT--ift_ keeps the Arabs

guessing as to Israel's deterent power, and It coulcl

provide bargaining power in the context of a settlement.

Elections this year in Israel!addanother factor working

against the likelihood of a favorable ecision by the

Israeli Government on the NPTIprior to that date.

The importance to the U.S. of/ Israeli adherence to

the NPT lies not only in the Very grealt effect of its

adherence on the prospects for tha general success of

the Treaty, but also becausey dthcr hold-outs,

we believe Israel is actively working/togive itself the

capability to build a bomb. /The Longer Israel delays

a decision on the NTT, the more molatentum its weapons

program is likely to acquire; and the more difficult

it will be for the COI to giVe it up.! Should It become !

generally accepted that Israel possesses nuclear weapons

(even if Israel has not condhcted a test), it would reduce

even further the prospects For a settlement of the Arab-

Israeli problem, and it could well cgiuse so many hold-outs , to the Treaty throughout tne!! world. as to seriously vitiate

the effectiveness of the •Treaty.

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Israel:

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2 J .•

Israel has not signed the ~PT, even/though all Arab countries except Algeria and Saudi ~rabia have now signed. Officially the GOijposition/is that it has not vet reached a decision one way or the other

J · I I

on signature, and that it is studying th1e full implica-

tions of this step. The GOI dee la res, h,m•1ever, that it is not a nuclear po1.,1er and will not be dhe first (area country) to introduce nuclear ,•1eapo:1s idto the Niddle East. Moreover, Israel did vote affirm~tively for the UNG:A. resolution last June coa@ending th~ NPT.

Behind this official position Isr2.l1 is actively working to improve its capability to pr~duce nuclear weapons at short notice. In the absenc~ of progress toward 2. peace settleuient, Israel's lea!Jers have probably decided Israel cannot effort t/6 surrender the nuclear option. Until the Ara;bs sho;-1 a

1

disposition to negotiate ,dth Israel, the GOT; reasons /that there may be advantages in not signing the Nt'T--:ut keeps the Arabs guessing as to Israel's deterient powe ✓, and ·it could provide bargaining po~·:er in the cont2xi of a settl~ment. El . h. . I 1 ' d ' ,l " ' · ections t is ye-ar in srae 1a u 2.:1otci1er ractor \,Jorre1-n0°

• ' I

against the likelihood of a favorable decision by the Israeli Government on the NPT/prior to/ that date.

The imcortance to the U.~. of Isr~eli adherence to the NPT lie~ not only in the

1~ery grea/t effect of its

adherence on the prospects fo'r the general success of the Treaty, but also bec2use,; unlike cith9r hold-outs,

• we believe Isreel is actively ,,,orki:,,g /to give itself the capability to build a bouib. iThe long~r Isr2.el delays a decision on the ~TPT, the m0re mo0.2c1tum its weapons program is likely to acquire, and tlne/more difficult it ,'I ill be for the GOI to n

0, ive it UCJ. I Should il become , • I .

generally accepted that Isra~l possesses nuclear weapons (even if Israel has not condGcted a tbst), it would reduce ev2n further th2 prospqc ts f

10r a setttjlcrr~cnt of the Arc.b­

Isr2~li pt·oblcm, a.nd it coul1d ~-Jell cc:.lusc so nnnv hold-outs to the TrL',~.ty throu::·hout the/ uorld as

1

to scrior_t~lv vit.ia.te th 0 nffn~t·1·•;n-,ccc 0-;: tl1° T--n-,',, . I ;

C: I,,.. '-'-- • ... • \...l, '"•'~ .L l ~- L<-..;'- LJ. I

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Because Israel views its nuclear option, and thus its position on the NPT, as an integral Part of its national security, its decision on the NpT will not easily be influenced by outside suasion or pressure. If the U.S. decides that Israeli adherence to the NPT is of major importance to its policy object Lves, we must be prepared to make this a crunch issue with Israel and to make it clear that if Israel elects to g? the nuclear route it would cause a fundameneal changT in the US-Israeli relationship, including our long-standing concern for.Israel's security. To make the Israelis i believe in our determination, we would have to show that we are prepared to have the issue becol-Le public and to defend our position in the face of domestic pressures. Short of using U.S. influence on this scale, it will be futile, and probably counter-productive, for the U.S. to resort to half-way measures, such as attempting to use Tsraeli requests for conventional weapons as leverage on thisl issue.

If. the U.S. decides it d.oes not wish toemploy pressure on this scale, there are perhaps some- actions in the realm of low-key: suasion that could have anmarginal (but not decisive) effeCt on Israel's atItitude toward the NPT. Through diplomatic approaches, we !eould,try, tosell the Israelis on the idea of signing the Treaty in the immediate future but withholding ratification until Israel's security concerns are more fully assured. We could eY_plore with the ussa the possibaity of lillaiting shipments of conventional weapons to area in return for Israeli forbearance on nuclear weapons and signature of thc NPT. We should consider the advantages and disadvantages of trying to meet directlji some of Israel's probable concerns about the effect-of Treaty On current Israeli activities-exploring with the cloI the eKtent to which the Treaty would prevent the GOI from condueting basic research and making, contingeney plans for developing atomic weapons.

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Because Israel views its nuclear option, and thus its position on the NPT, as an integral part of its national security, its decision on the N~T will not easily be influenced by outside suasion mr pressure. If the U.S. decides that Israeli adherenJe to the NPT is

I

of major importance to its policy objectives, we must be prepared to make this a crunch issue 1•1it~ Israel and to make it clear that if Israel elects to gcb the nuclear route it would cause a fundamencal changk in the US-Israeli relationship, including our long-standin~ concern for Israel's security. To make the Israelisjbelieve in our determination, we would have to show that we are prepared t;o have the issue becmr:e pu'olic and to dbfend our position in the face of domestic pressures. Short of using U.S. influence on this scale, it will be futile, and probably counter-productive, for the U.S. to reso~t to half-way measures, such as attempting to use Israbli requests for conventional 1/eapons as leverage on this/ issue. ,

If the U.S. dee ides it d.oes not 1,.,ish to s:rep loy pressure on this scale, there are perhap~ somi actions in the realm of lo,:-.1-key: su2sion th2.t cou_;ld have 2 1 marginal (but not decisive) effett on Israel's a~titude toward the NPT. Through diplom2tic approaches, we :could try to sell the Israelis on the idea of signi2g the [Treaty in 1 the iITu-nediate future but 1-1ithholding ratification unt

1

il Israel's security concerns are more ful~y assured. We could explore with the USSR the possibi]ity of likiting shipments of conventional weapons to th~ area in teturn f I 1 . -·' l I d .. or srae i toroearance on nuc ear ~?eapons an signature of the NPT. We should consider the advcir,ta,6 es and disadvantages of trying to meet directlj some of Israel's probable concerns about the effect-of ttje Treaty on current Israeli activities-~exploring with the qor the extent to which the Treaty would prevsnt the GOI from condu~ti11g

- ' ' basic resea~ch and rn3king contingcn6y p]ans for drveloping atomic weapons. ·

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RecOMmended Action:

Continuing high-level review, 7within Government as to the importance the U.S. to Israeli adherence to the NPT, aind the are prepared to take to achieve this objective. In the meantime, a Presidential letter to the Israeli Prime Minister stressing the contiinuity of U.S. non-proliferation objectives undeE the new Administration and our hope that Israel T,All sign: :the NPT. Consult ,•)i_th UK, France, and USSR as to availabialty of other bilateral or multilateral approaches.

the U.S. attaches measures we

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Recommended Action:

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Continuing high-level review, •within tohe U.,S. Government as to the importarn;:e tlm:e U.S. attaches to Israeli adherence to the NPT, and the measures we ar.e ;prepared to ta.ke to achieve this obJ:=c tive. In the meantime, a Presidential letter to the Israeli ·Prime :Minister stressing t:he cont.iinuity bf U.S. non-proliferation objectives under the nbw Administration

I. a,nd our hope that Israel will sigrrjt'he NPT. Consult with UK, France, and USSR as to avaiiabIJ1.iity bf other bilateral or multilateral ap~roaches .

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Japan:

24.

Japan is not likely to sign the NPT until well into 1969. The delay in U.S. ratification and the (delay by certain other threshold countries (notably the FRG) in signing have removed.

much of the external pressure for Japamese signature. In addition, domestic political considerations will affect GOJ timing. The Japanese also have probed for our reaction to their linking their signature with Jaganese membership on the ENDC. The treaty will probably not ba .ratified without a full debate in the Diet.

We expect U.S. ratification to, have a positive ef.fect on Japanese consideration of its NPT signature. Regarding a possible linkage between their signature and ENDC membership, we have told them that these two issues should be considered

on their merits and remain unrelated. The Japanese subsequent-ly appeared to accept our views against linking the two; nevertheless there seems little doubt that should Japan obtain an ENDC seat its signature wou'cl b4 cacilitated. The GOJ has also expressed concern that, should they sign, the Soviets will no longer favor their joining the ENDC.

Reco=ended Action:

Low-key representation after ratification, stressing merits of treaty and special importance US, as principal architect of treaty, attaches to Japan's adherence. Continued efforts to achieve Japan's membership Ln the ENDC as soon as possible.

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Japan:

Japan is not likely to sign the NPT until well into 1969. The delay in U.S. ratification and the <delay by certain other threshold countries (notably the FRG) :iLn signing have removed. much of the external pressure for J!lpaEitese signature. In addition, domestic political consid~rartions will affect GOJ timing. The Japanese also have probed .for our reaction to their linking their signature with :Japanese membership on the ENDC. The treaty will probably not. be ratified without a full debate in the Diet.

We expect U.S. ratification to, hav,e a positive effect on Japanese consider.a tion of its NPT signarture. Regarding a possible linkage bet,-1een their signatu:ce and ENDC membership, we have told them that these two issues should be considered on their mer.it:, and remain unrelated. 'lrhe Japanese subsequent­ly appeared to accept our views aga'inst: linking the tuo; nevertheless there seems little doubt tI~at should Japan obtain an ENDC seat its sign2.ture woul:! be, ::2.c:ilitated. The GOJ has also expressed concern thet, should they sign, the Soviets will no longer favor their joining the EjNDC ..

RecoGmended Action:

Low-key re.presentati0n after ratiE:iLcation, stressing merits of treaty and special importance US, as principal architect of treaty, attaches to Japan's adherence. Continued efforts to achieve Japan's membership iim. the ENDC as soon as possible .

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Pakistan:

25.

Pakistan continues to withholl its signature, primarily because of India's non-signature, although it supports the NPT in principle. The domestic prOblems currently confronting the government add to the unlikelihood of early Pakistani signature. However, we do not preclude Pakistan eventually signing, even should India not.

Our influence on Pakistan regarding NPT adherence is extremely limited in the absence of Indian sgnature. Pakistani deslre to play a leading role among the non-nuclear we.a,pon nations could be brought to bear at s'Ome point in the future.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation after U S. ratif]tcation. In urging Pakistan to sign the NPT, we could mal7 clear that it- woUld remain free to decide when ratification should actually take place. We also could point out that Paklc;tan's adherence would constitute additional pressure on Indial to reconsider its

, . . position on the treaty. If we succeed in ootalning Soviet agreel7ent to including Pakistan in dhe ENDC elinlargement package, we should consider using this as a slpringboard for additional representations.

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SECRET 25.

Pakistan:

Pakistan continues ,to withhold its signature, primarily because of India's non-signatute; J1though jt supports the NPT in principle. The domes tic prd

1

blems cuJrently confronting the government add to the unlikeliHood of early Pakistani signature; However, we do not predlude Pakistan eventually signing, even _should India riot.

Our influence qn Pakista,n regarding NPT adherence is extremely limited in the absence of\ Indian signature. · Pakistani des.i-re to play a leading role amonk the non-nuclear wea.pon nations could be· brought to bear at' s'bme point in the future.

Low-key representation after U.S. ratification. In I urging Pakistan to sign the NPT, we could me.Re clear that

i-t· would remain free to decide when ratificatlion should actually take place. We also could point out that Pa~istan'i adherence would constitute_ 2dditional pressurd on India\ to :reconsider its position on the treaty. If we succejed in obdainirig Soviet ·· agreemen~ to i;cludin~ Pa\i~tan in ohe. E~l?C e\1:largemen~ ?2.ckage, we shoula cons-ider using trns as a s\pr1.ngooara ·for additional re.preseil.ta tions .

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Port.ugal:

2

In July, 1968; Foreign Minister Franco -liogueira made clear tha.t Portugal did not intend to sign ttile NPT. He asserted that UN-linked guarantees for mon-nTclear states were not sufficient for Portugal. Portugal has little con-fidence in the UN, and is concerned with the l p ossibility that increased African influence in the IAEA , could lead to efforts to bar Portugal from the Board of' Goyernors. Some Portuguese have expressed the fear that the Chinese Communists might someday make nuclear weapons available to their special friends in Africa such as Tanzania, which was one of the few countries to vote against UNGA endorsement oJf the NPT. It is unlikely that Portugal's new government depart from its predecessor's negative attitude toward the Nin, but the change-over affords an opportunity for r weneed discussions.

The U.S. has lit.tle leverage in dealing with Portugal. It is unlikely that we could induce Portugail to adhere to the NPT by any means short of strong support for its policy towards its African colonies, which we are unable to give. Even this

step would not satisfy Portu,guese fears that it would be treated

unfairly in NPT implementation because of AJTrican influence over

the decisions of relevant international -bodies.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representation after rati-acation, stressing

importance of adherence by- all NATO allies.

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SECRET 26.

Po:r:tugal:

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In July, 1968, Foreign Minister Franco fogueira made clear that Portugal did not intend to s~gn t'e NPT. He asserted that UN-linked guarantees for ITTOn-nuclear states were not sufficient for Portugal. Portugal flas little con­fidence in the UN, and is concerned wi1tlh the/possibility that increased African influence in the IAEA:could lead to efforts to bar Portugal f;r:om the Board ,of Goyernors. Some Portuguese have e:-:pressed the fe,rr that: the Chinese Corrct1unists might someday make nuclear weapons avaLLable/ to their special friends in Africa such as Tanzania, ,,1hic'h was one of the few countries to v0te against UNGA endo:cse;:itent olf the NPT. It is unlikely that Portugal's new government will/ depart from its predecessor's negative attitude tm-1ard t:he N1PT, but the change-over affords an opportunity for rene1·1:ed discussions.

The U .s. has little lever2ge in de~linJ with P.?r•tugal . It is unlikely that we could induce Poritu£aJ! to adhere to the NPT by any means short of strong support: ~o~ its policy towards . Af . 1 . ' . h '1i I . E h' 1.ts _r1.ca.n co .on1..es, r,:n1..c1 \·le are unaDJ..£ to give_. ven t 1.s step would not satisfy Portuguese fears tha2 it would be treated

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unf2.irly in NPT implementation because o_f A4rican influence over the decisions of relevant iriternational bodies.

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Recom:r..end2d Action:

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Low-key represent2.tion after ratiff.cation, importance of adhen,nce by all NATO all-ii.es. i

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stressing

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South Africa:

27.

Although South Africa voted in favor of the UNGA resolution commending the NPT, there is no indication that it intends to sign the Treaty in 1969. South Africa has expressed its reservations on the NPT in technical terms: it is a major producer of uranium and sees a need for more precise clarification of how IAEA safeguards will apply to source materials; it also seeks assurance that Article V will be applied in. a non-discriminatory fashion. We believe, however, that South Africa is also concerned With the effect it believes NPT adherence might have on, its long-teiffl security. It is unlikely to surrender a defense option unless it perceives clear political advantages in doing so.. And like Portugal, it is undoubtedly concerned about possible discrimination because of African influence in the UN and pressures to increase African representation in the IAEA.

The US can continue the efforts it has pursued in the past to reassure Soath Africa about specific 'technical points in the Treaty. We can cite our successful efforts at the 23rd. UNGA to block the A-fricans' attempt to eN.clude South Africa from UNCTAD as evidence of our intentiOn toassure South Africa equitable treati-,,ent in internatiOnal organizations. For overriding political and economic reasons we would not wish to offer increased support to the South African re2ime on such matters as the arms embargo or its gold market, if it should seek any such quid oro quo for its adhei rence to the N PT.

Recommended Action:

Representation after ratification, revie,7ing technical points made previously.

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SECRET 27.

Sou th Africa :

Although South Africa voted in fa,ror of I the UNGA resolution commending the NPT, there is no indication that it intends to sign the Treaty in 1969. South Africa has expressed its reservations on the NPT in tec~nical terms: it is a major producer of uranium and sees a ~eed for more precise clarification of how IAEA safeguards ,will apply to source materials; it also seeks assurance th2Jt Article V will be applied in a nori-discriminatory fash~on. W~ believe, however, that South Africa is also cone.erned !with the effect it believes NPT adherence might have on its l'Dng-term security.

_It is unlikely to surrender a defense option 0nless it perceives clear political advantages in doing so. And 'rlike Portugal, it is undoubtedly concerned about posstble dilscrimination

because of !frican ~~f~~e~ce_i~ ~he~~ a~d prfssures to incl:'ea_se Af __ cen repLe,,_n._atio .. in tn- IAEA. ,

The US can continue the efforts it has pursued in the past t_o_. reassure SoCJth Africa about specific 'itechni_cal points i_n the Tre2ty. We c2n cite our successful efforts at the 23rd UNGA to block the Africans' a tterapt to eKclude South Africa from U~!CTAD as evidence of our iu.tentibn to·. assure S ' ~ c # .... 'l · .... .... . . · ;...•; 1 . . ....... outn ni.rica equ1.L.ao e creau.-:-(enL in 1.nte.r-naL..ipna orga,n1.22L1-ons. For overridin0°· oolitical and e.con~mic reasons~ ~e ~~ould not . . . wish to offer increased support to the South ~frican regime on such matters es the arms embargo or its gold market, if it should seek any such quid pro quo for its adh~rence to the

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NPT.

Recommended Action:

Representation after ratification, points made previously.

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Spain:

28.

The Spanish dovernment has 'stated- that.iit will take. no final poSition' on the NPT'until our negotiations for the renewal of the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreement have dealt.satisfactorily wi.th its desire for a treaty p roviding: for U.S. s.ecurity guarantees for Spain. Spain ha s indicated that the NPT poses no other serious problems Spanish security is provided for.

so Iong as

It seems certain that the Spanish desire for a treaty providing security guarantees cannot be fulfilled, given U.S. unwillin2ness to assume new commitmentslin this field. If the revised Defense Aareement is satisfacFory to Spain in otherrespects, however, and once the threat, of withhold-ing NPT signature is no longer useful to Spain as a negotiating ploy, it may be- that Spain will see its way clear to si_gn the Treaty. Adherence by other current European non-signatories will also favorably influence Spain's decision.

Recommende Action:.

None, pending renewal of the:Defense Agreement. There-after, low-key approach to' point out merits of broadest pb.s.sible worldwide adherence.

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Spain:

The S,panish Government has stated· that ilt will take no final position on the NPT until our negotiations for the renewal of the U.S.-Spanish Defense Agreementf have dealt· satisfactorily wi.th its desire for a treaty providing for U.S. security guarantees for Spain. Spain has indicited that the NPT poses no other serious problems so long as Spanish security is provided for.

It seems certain that the Spanish desir~ for a treaty provid·ing secuJ?ity guarantees cannot be fulfilled, given · U.S. unwillingness to assuIT'.e ne,,J comn1itments/in this field. If the revised Defense Agreement is satisfactory t9 Spain .in other.respects, however, and once the thrkat. of withhold­

,

ing NPT signature is no longer useful to Spain as a negotiating ' . b. ' " . . 11 . 1 1 · · ' pi.oy, it m&y e- tc12.t ..,~a.in 1•1l s22 1.ts 1;-1ay c .-~a.r to.· $1.:gn tne

Treaty. Adherence by other current European/non-signatories . will also favorably influence Spain's decision. ·

None, pending rene,'ial of the, Defense AgreeEient. There­after, low-b:cy approach to point Ollt merits of broadest possible worldwide adherence .

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- Sweden

Sweden signed the NPT in August of last year. The Foreign Minister made a. statement before Parliament in November, saying that Sweden would not ratify until the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Germany had ratified.

In spite of the Foreign Minister's st be, possible to obtain Swedish ratification and .USSR ratify and Germany signs. Sweden FRG's EURATOM commitment regarding deferment of ratification and, therefore, that German ratification may take up to two years from the treaty's entry into force.

Recommended Action:

Low-key representations. Our European ailies, particul-?rly the UY., sho':_rd .ba encouraged -to make approa ies. Representations could point out .the probable time lag before FRG ratification' and the benefit to the NPT of early ratifi-cation by threshold countries, following the example of Canada.

tement, it may after the U.S. is aware of the

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Swe·den

Sweden signed the NPT in August of lat yea~. The Foreign Minister made a statement before P¥rliament in November, sa;ying that Sweden would not ratify until the Soviet Union, the U.S., and Germany had ratified. .

29.

I . . t. . f h F . '-[" . I I . n sp1. e o t. e ore1.gn , 1.n1.ster s st[tement, 1.t may be possible to obtain Swedish ratification afte·r the U.S. . Stid USSR tatify and Germany sign~. Sweden is aware of the , FRG I s EURA TO;.[ connrri trt,en t regarding defenne t of ratification and, therefore, that German ratific'ation mby take up to two years from the treaty's entry into for 1 e.

Recormnended Ac ti on: '

Low-key representations. Our Europea allies, .. ' . ·, ... -, . ·.-· - -:.:· ,.-.1 ' :·. . . . ,

Part1.c11l ,irl V th~ uw cho" 1 r] ~~ c,''-,~o··r·~c-~d to "'ci''·~ appro .. , .. ' . . .·-:-:-----.✓ .- .._ --:-, ..., ·------ ~_-. -··--:- :--'" oo-- I J.LL __ '-"-C . ; ~1_.l.LC.:>.

Representations could point o0t .the probab~e time lag before FRG ratification and the benefit to the NPrI: of early ratifi-

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cation by threshold countries, following t e example of Canada. ·

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UNCLASSIFIED

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30.

Switzerland:

The Swiss Government wasforceT to reconsidet its signature of the NPTafter the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We remain hopeful that Switzerland will sign in the not too distant future, especially in view of the recent -Italian signature. We have received recent indications, however, that SWiss signature may be forthcoming only after Pest Gennany has signed and both the U.S. and the USSR have

There appears to be little that the U.S. can do to encourage Swiss stanature, besides contributing to the general -momentum of the treaty. Should Cermay temain a hold-out, the Swiss might respond to persuasion which would highlight the possibly helpful effect of their signature on FRG:Considetations.

Recbmmended Action:

Low-.key representation:, based on positive effect of SWiss.edherence on FRGHand other countries like.Australia;

- South- Africa andLatin American hOld7-outs.

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Switzerland:

The Swiss Government was forced" to reconsider its signature of the NPT after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. We remain hopeful that Switzerland will sign in the not too distant future, especially in view of the recent Italian signature. We have received recent indications, however, that S~-1i.ss signature may be fo.rthcoming only ~fter . .West Gei;many has signed and both the U.S. and the USSR ha.ve

. ri1tif:::~e appears to be little that the U.S.lcan do to

· encourage S1-;iss -si-gnature, besides contributi g to the· general momentum of the treaty. Should Germahy remain .a hold-:mt, the S1-.,iss might respond to persu2.sibn which would highlight the possibly helpful effect of thei 1 signature on ~RG. .. ·c-z.i:::.s i.c~e-ra tiOns.

Reco;:;c,s-ndc'd Action: I

Low-key representat.ion;, bas,ed on positiv, effect· of St,Ji:ss adherence on FRG and oths-r·countries li·e,Australia, South Africa and Latin American hold-outs.

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Thailand:

Thailand has been guarded in its attlitude toward the NPT, and has never stated Chat it wo141d sign. It has said it is not satisfied with the peaceful uses provisions, and has placed special emphasIs on what it considers to be the inadequacies of the security assurances given by the nuclear signatories- It also expressed c.oncern that neither France nor Comuriunist China intends to sign. We understand that attitudes towarld the treaty at the cabinet level are mixed.

Thai signature may well be fairtbcomdn' a when the treaty achieves renewed momentum. IE not, ve might reemphasize the positive benefits afforded by the Treaty in the area of peaceful uses, possibly by sending a specialist to Bangkok. Thailand hiss recently sought to obtain the services of AEC sciamtists in working out problems with its research reactor and in framing a long-range program for the use of n=lear energy. Such contacts could provide a basis for Enfluencing Thai nuclear policy in the future and sYrould ble encouraged.

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RecomTnended Action:

Representa.tion after ratifiatiion, stressing positive aspect.s of peaceful uses provisionS3-.. Enqourage contacts with AEC.

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Thailand:

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Thailand has been guarde.d in its attitude to1,ard the NPT, and has never stated thatt it wo~ld sign. It has said it is not satisfied with the pe~ceful uses provisions, and has placed special empha~is on what it considers to be the inadequacies of the security assurances given by the .nuclear signatories. It ha~ also expressed concern that neither France nor Cosrnunisci China intends to

' sign. We understand that attitudes to1vcrnfd the treaty at the cabinet level are mixed.

Thai signattire may 1•1ell be fo;rt\hcom~ng when: the treaty achieves l:'ene1-,ed momentum. [-a' nod,· we might reemphasize the positive benefits .afforded by tl-E Treaty in the area of peaceful uses, possfilbly b~ sending a specialist to Bangkok. Thailand &..2,s recJntly sought to obtain the services of AEC scie,m:tists ]in 1-10rking out problems 1-1ith its research reactor and in framing a long-range program for the use of mllcleari energy. Such· coCTtacts could provide a basis for :ii:nfluencing Thai nuclear policy in the future and sh@uld b,e encouraged. -

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Recomc:cended Action: I

Representation after ratificat:iion, sltressing positive aspects of peaceful uses provisi::ms:.. Enc;ourage contacts with AEC .

SEC KET

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UNCLASSIFIED

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United Arab Republic:

The UAR signed the NPT on July 1, 1968 Although we believe it intends to ratify; there is a possibility it might delay pending signature by Israel.

If the UAR should hold back, wie can expect to have ve.ry little direct influence on its ratificaItion. We can have indirect influence in that regard to the extent that we are able to obtaan Israeli adherence. Welcan coordinate our efforts regarding attitudes toward the treaty throughou.t the. Middle East with the Soviets.

Recom7end d Ac_tion:

None directly, but discu,ss with Soviets possible initiatives leading toward area-wide adherence.

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32. SECRET

United Arab Republic:

The UAR signed the NPT on July 1, 1968. Although we believe it intends to ratify, there is a possibility it might del~y pending signature by Israel.

If the UAR should hold back, ,•/1e can expect to have

very little direct influence on its ratific~tion, We can have ind i.rec t influence in that regard to the extent that we are ab le to ob ta'in I srae 1 i adherence. we\ can coo rd ina te (?U_i;: efforts .. regarding a.ttitudes toward the t ea ty throughout the Nidd le East. with the Sovie.ts.

Recorr01encl ed 1i, c.tion:

None directly, but discu.ss wit;h Soviets poss.i.ble initiatives leading toward area-,:ide adherence .

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UNCLASSIFIED

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