Second Nature and Reflection. Towards a Negative Naturalism.

Second Nature and Re�ection

Second Nature and Re�ectionTowards a Negative Naturalism

Titus Stahl

Institut für Philosophie der

Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt a. M.

Naturalisms in EthicsJuly, 13-14, 2011

University of Auckland, New Zealand

Titus Stahl Goethe-Universität Frankfurt


What's the point of being an ethical naturalist?



Why be a naturalist?

Advantages of naturalism:

theoretical advantages

But also:

captures our self-understanding as autonomous moralagents

reference to objective moral facts makes criticism ofsocially shared norms possible

ordinary perceptual capacities are su�cient to recognizemoral features



Why be a naturalist?

Advantages of naturalism:

theoretical advantages

But also:

captures our self-understanding as autonomous moralagents

reference to objective moral facts makes criticism ofsocially shared norms possible

ordinary perceptual capacities are su�cient to recognizemoral features



Conservatism worries about naturalism

But there are also problematic aspects of naturalism in regardto its understanding of the activity of criticism:

problematic account of moral disagreement

tendency to support unwillingness to learn

problematic account of moral progress



Second-nature naturalism

Might McDowell's second-nature naturalism be able tosolve these problems?




Theoretical move 1:

critique of coherentism and �Myth of the Given�

judgements as answerable to the world only throughconceptual character of (natural) human sensibility

extension of concept of nature beyond natural sciences




Theoretical move 2:

rejection of subjectivist analysis of secondary qualities

rejection of disentanglement theses (fear and the fearful)

ineliminability of moral features from description of moralreactions

consequence: objectivity of moral properties




�The ethical is a domain of rational requirementswhich are there in any case, whether or not we areresponsive to them. We are alerted to these demandsby acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. Whena decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant wayof thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existenceof this tract of the space of reasons.�

� McDowell, Mind and World



Advantages of second-nature naturalism

Can second-nature naturalism make sense of the criticalautonomy of moral subjects?

(A) it allows for an explanation of moral disagreement




(B) It allows for re�ection and re�ective improvement

�Weaknesses that re�ection discloses in inheritedways of thinking can dictate the formation of newconcepts and conceptions�

�the essential thing is that one can re�ect onlyfrom the midst of the way of thinking one isre�ecting about�

� McDowell, Mind and World




(C) It allows for an understanding of moral progress

But there are also conservatism worries.




(C) It allows for an understanding of moral progress

But there are also conservatism worries.



Conservatism worries about second-nature

naturalism

Criticism 1: Blackburn. Seeing reactions as non-separablefrom perception, inference between perception and reactionbecomes immune to criticism (cf. �the cute and the lewd�).




naturalism

�the talk of a special perception available only tothose who have been acculturated, simply soundshollow: disguises for a conservative and ultimatelyself-serving complacency�

� Blackburn, Ruling Passions




naturalism

Criticism 2: Arguing from within a tradition seems only toallow very weak forms of critique. No critique of a tradition asa whole.




naturalism

Two forms of objection:

(1) objection to merely internal critique of speci�c moralnorms

(2) objection to elevation of a process of education and acharacter ideal to a necessary condition for morality




naturalism

Critique of ethical formation:

�It expresses the suspicion that a critique ofreason which still consents to let itself be regulatedby the very thing it purports to criticize mustharbour tendencies that are not merely`conservationist' but also conservative�

� Lovibond, Ethical Formation




naturalism

Two possible responses to these charges of conservatism.

(1) Genealogical re�ectivity

(2) Negative naturalism



Response 1: Genealogical Re�ectivity

McDowell's claims about re�ectivity:

�honest responsiveness to re�ective criticism�

�implicit standards for self-scrutiny�

�standing obligation to engage in critical re�ection�

But: How?



Response 1: Genealogical Re�ectivity

Genealogical re�ectivity:

Awareness of contingency of character formation

Moral condemnation of education might lead toskepticism towards resulting judgements

Radicalized version of re�ective criticism

But: Still too tame?



Response 2: Negative Naturalism

Revisiting the �nature� in �second nature�




The meaning of our moral perceptions is given by theirintegration into a complex second nature which allows us toperceive them to make appropriate a whole range of reactions.




Breakdowns of second nature: The integration of ourdi�erent reactive dispositions cannot be achieved in the courseof a particular experience.




Consequences of a breakdown of second nature:

second-order attitudes towards own reaction reintegratesecond nature

but: sometimes we must understand breakdowns asmaking defects of second nature visible

new integration changes meaning of perceived moralproperties




Negative naturalism (i):

breakdowns must be understood as caused by objectivemoral properties of a situation (in non-pathological cases)

breakdowns as opportunity for learning constitute a newrole for objective moral properties not exhausted by theirrole in successful moral perception

but: no �Myth of the Given�, no positive content




Negative naturalism (ii):

possibility for critique of a second nature as a whole byreference to objective moral facts

but: purely negative role of recalcitrant moral objectivity(and subjectivity)




Negative naturalism (iii): allows criticism of second natureby reference to moral experience.

this respects McDowell's epistemological insights

it rediscovers liberating features of naturalism

non-trivial conception of nature



Negative Naturalism in Hegel

Hegel's insights:

essentially dynamic conception of human reason

Brandom: conceptual pessimism



Negative Naturalism in Adorno

Adorno's insights:

rigid integration of second nature as cutting o� realexperience

need for re�ection on inexhaustible meaning ofnon-conceptualizable experience



Negative Naturalism in Adorno

Dialectics:

�It is exactly through [dialectics] that thinkingbecomes able to let that which is not identical tothinking, which is not thinking itself become visible,but without thereby submitting itself completely tothe contingency of that what merely exists. Throughdialectics, thinking rather keeps the strength to thinkeven about this non-identical, to think about thatwhich is not essentially thought.�

� Adorno, Lectures on Dialectics



Conclusion

A necessary revision:If we understand all instances disintegration of second natureas (potentially) making available new experiences, thisrecommends a liberal, non-deprecatory attitude towards theethically recalcitrant.



Thank you very much.

http://www.titus-stahl.de

[email protected]


Second Nature and Reflection. Towards a Negative Naturalism.

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