A special colloquium on homeland security and ISyE “Developing Usable Metrics for Venue Security” Dr. Paul Kantor Honorary Associate, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison Distinguished Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University School of Communication and Information Research Director at the Command, Control, and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA) at Rutgers “Screening Commercial Aviation Passengers in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001” Dr. Laura Albert McLay Associate Professor, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Screening Commercial Aviation Passengers in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001
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A special colloquium on homeland security and ISyE
“Developing Usable Metrics for Venue Security”Dr. Paul Kantor
Honorary Associate, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-MadisonDistinguished Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University School of Communication and Information
Research Director at the Command, Control, and Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA) at Rutgers
“Screening Commercial Aviation Passengers in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001”Dr. Laura Albert McLay
Associate Professor, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Screening Commercial Aviation Passengers in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001
Laura Albert McLay, PhDAssociate Professor
University of Wisconsin-MadisonIndustrial and Systems Engineering
When risk is overestimated, high value security resources get used on low risk passengers, which may leave fewer high value security resources available for high risk passengers.
When risk is underestimated, high value security resources get used on high risk passengers, which targets more closely the high value security resources for high risk passengers
Resource matchingSensitivity analysis with respect to perceived risk in the system
Overestimate risk
True risk level < estimated risk level.
Underestimate risk
True risk level > estimated risk level.
Estimated risk level 𝜇′
Key ObservationsIn low risk environments, overestimating risk leads to a greater mismatch between security resources and passenger risk.
In low risk environments, underestimating risk leads to lower levels of underscreening and (for M small) lower levels of overscreening, compared to overestimating risk.
* Better resource matching
* TSA PreCheck
* Giving TSA Officers the (limited) flexibility to assign passengers to PreCheck lanes is an indirect way to mimic underestimating risk
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Gaming Strategies
BlockingOvertaxing / decoysTimingTrial and Testing
All can disrupt the system in limited resource environments
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Bad intentions
We are trying to prevent attacks
Is the goal to identify non-threat passengers with banned items or threat passengers with bad intentions (and no banned items)?
Risk based security focuses on the latter
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Security systems
http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/layers-security
Thank you!
Laura Albert McLay, PhDAssociate ProfessorUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonIndustrial and Systems [email protected]@lauramclayhttp://punkrockOR.wordpress.com/