SBPP

COMSATS

Institute Of Information Technology Abbottabad

Assignment # 01

Subject: SEMINAR IN BUSINESS POLICIES

Topic: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Submitted To: Dr Mansoor Shahab

Submitted By: Anum Raheem (SP12-MBO-010)

Hassan Roshan (SP12-MBO-009)

Usman Alam (SP12-MBO-005)

Date: April 9th, 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS1

TOPIC PAGE #

NUCLEAR POWER IN PAKISTAN 4

HISTORY 4

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR 6

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 7

CHINA 7

FRANCE 9

UNITED STATES 10

JAPAN 10

FUEL CYCLE 11

RADIOACTIVE WASTES MANAGEMENT 12

NUCLEAR REPROCESSING 12

RADIATION CONTROL 13

NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 13

INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIC 13

ACADEMIC RESEARCH 14

NON PROLIFERATION 14

PAKISTAN AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 15

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND NON WEAPON POLICY 16

NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 18

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 19

POLICY 23

PROTECTION 24

Modernization and expansion 25

Bilateral arms control proposals and confidence building measures 26

Disarmament policy 26

INFRASTRUCTURE 27

Stockpile 30

2

Second strike capability 32

MIRV capability 33

Personnel 33

Doctrine 33

Theory of deterrence 35

Nuclear Command and Control 37

U.S. assistance for arsenal security 39

Security concerns of the United States 39

National Security Council 41

Strategic combat commands 42

Weapons development agencies 42

Delivery systems 44

Future delivery systems 46

Proliferation 46

ABDUL QADEER KHAN 49

Proliferation of URENCO technology 57

International Atomic Energy Agency 64

References 73

NUCLEAR POWER IN PAKISTAN

As of 2012, nuclear power in Pakistan is provided by 3 licensed-commercial nuclear

power plants. Pakistan is the first Muslim country in the world to construct and operate 3

civil nuclear power plants. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), the

scientific and nuclear governmental agency, is solely responsible for operating these

power plants. As of 2012, the electricity generated by commercial nuclear power plants

constitutes roughly ~3.6% of electricity generated in Pakistan, compared to ~62%

from fossil fuel, ~33% from hydroelectric power and ~0.3% from Coal

electricity. Pakistan is one of the four nuclear armed states (along with India, Israel,

and North Korea) that is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but is a

member in good standing of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

HISTORY

Professor (and later Nobel laureate) Abdus Salam, as Science Advisor to the President,

persuaded President Ayub Khan, to establish Pakistan's first commercial nuclear power

reactor, near Karachi. Known as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), the

commercial power plant is a small 137 MWe CANDU reactor, a Canadian pressurized

heavy water reactor.

PAEC's Parvez Butt, a nuclear engineer, was project-director. The KANUPP began its

operations in 1972, and it was inaugurated by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Munir

Ahmad Khan as PAEC chairman. The KANUPP which is under international

safeguards is operated at reduced power. In 1969, France's Commissariat à l'énergie

atomique and United Kingdom's British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) contracted with PAEC

to provide plutonium and nuclear reprocessing plants in Pakistan. Per agreement, the

PAEC engineers were the lead designers of the power plants and nuclear reprocessing

facilities. While the BNFL and CEA provided the funds, technical assistance and nuclear

materials. The work on projects did not start until 1972, and as a result

of India's Operation Smiling Buddha — a surprise nuclear test in 1974 — the BNFL

cancelled the projects with PAEC. In 1974, PARR-II Reactor were commissioned, and

its project directors were Munir Ahmad Khan and Hafeez Qureshi. The PARR-II is an

4

indigenous reactor that was built under the auspices of PAEC's engineers and

scientists.

In 1977, due to pressure exerted by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the CEA

cancelled the projects with PAEC immediately. Without the assistance of United

Kingdom and France, the PAEC engineers completed the plutonium nuclear

reprocessing plant — New Labs — and the plutonium reactor — Khushab Nuclear

Complex. Both power plants are commercial power plants control by PAEC. In

1989, People's Republic of China signed an agreement with Pakistan to provide

300 MWe CHASNUPP-I power plant under the IAEA safeguards. In 1990, both France

and Soviet Union considered the Pakistan's request to provide the commercial nuclear

power plants under the IAEA safeguards. But, after the American Ambassador to

Pakistan's Robert Oakley expressed U.S. displeasure at the agreements between the

Soviet Union and France, the contracts were cancelled. By the 2000, China had

expanded its contract with PAEC and is currently assisting in construction of III,

and IV power plants. II was completed in April 2011. Due to its growing electricity

demands, the Pakistan Government ordered PAEC to set up nuclear power plants in

the country. According to PAEC, the goal is to produce 8800 MW electricity by the 2030.

Prime minister Yousaf Raza Gillani announced the Pakistan national energy policy in

2010 while the feasibility report was submitted in Prime Minister's Secretariat — the

official residence of prime minister of Pakistan. The PAEC are currently planning to lead

the construction of KANUPP-II nuclear power plant — a 1000 MWe power plant — and

the KANUPP-III — 1000 MWe. While the commercial plants will be indigenously built,

the preliminary work is put on hold as of 2009. In 2010, the Nuclear Power Fuel

Complex (PNPFC) — a nuclear reprocessing power plant — was commissioned. PAEC

led the construction, designing, and maintenance of the facility, while China and IAEA

provided funds to the facility.

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR

5

As of today, only 3 three commercial nuclear power plants are currently operating. The list provided the

information about current and future commercial nuclear power plants.

Nuclear

power

reactors

Type Location

Net

capacit

y

Gross

capacit

y

Constructio

n start

Connecte

d to grid

Commercia

l operation

CHASNUPP

-IPWR

Chasma, Punjab

Province

300

MWe

325

MWe

1 August

1993

13 June

2000

15

September

2000

CHASNUPP

-IIPWR

Chasma, Punjab

Province

300

MWe

325

MWe

28

December

2005

14 March

2011

20 May

2011

CHASNUPP

-IIIPWR

Chasma, Punjab

Province

340

MWe

330

MWe28 April 2009 2016 N/A

CHASNUPP

-IVPWR

Chasma, Punjab

Province

340

MWe

330

MWe2011 2017 N/A

CHASNUPP

-VPWR

Chasma, Punjab

Province

1000

MWe

1000

MWe2014 2020 N/A

KANUPP-I PHWR

Paradise

Point, Karachi, Sind

h Province

125

MWe

137

MWe

1 August

1966

18

October

1971

7 December

1972

KANUPP-II PHWR [19] [20]

Paradise

Point, Karachi, Sind

1000

MWe

N/A Preliminary

work started

but then the

N/A N/A

6

h Province

project was

put on hold

in 2009.

KANUPP-III PHWR [22]

Paradise

Point, Karachi, Sind

h Province

1000

MWeN/A

Designing of

reactor is

completed.

But the

construction

has not yet

started[23]

N/A N/A

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

CHINA

The People's Republic of China has been a strong vocal and avid supporter of

Pakistan's nuclear power generation programme from the early on. The history of

Chinese-Pakistan cooperation dates back to 1970s when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as prime

minister, first visited China. The strong academic interaction between Chinese and

Pakistan scientists was begun in 1970s. In 1986, the scientists from KRL and military

engineers of Pakistan Army Engineering Corps built a HEU enrichment plant

in Hanzhong province of PRC, and provided technical assistance to China in weapon-

grade centrifuge technology for Chinese nuclear weapons. From 1980s to present,

China has contracted with Pakistan to use of civil and electricity purpose use of nuclear

technology.

As of 1990 contract, the second commercial nuclear power plant is CHASNUPP-I in

Punjab—a 325 MWe PWR—supplied by China's CNNC under IAEA safeguards. The

main part of the plant was designed by Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and

7

Design Institute (SNERDI), based on Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. The commercial

nuclear power plant began its operations May 2000. In 2005, China expanded its

contract with Pakistan, and vowed to build more nuclear power plants in Pakistan.

Construction of its twin, CHASNUPP-II, started in December 2005. It is reported to

cost PkR 51.46 billion (US$ 860 million, with $350 million of this financed by China). In a

meeting with IAEA, an IAEA safeguard agreement with PAEC and IAEA was signed in

2006, and the grid connection is expected in spring of 2011. The enriched fuel takes

place in Pakistan's PNPFC facility, which is also under IAEA safeguards.

In 2005, both Pakistan government and the Chinese government adopted an Energy

Security Plan, calling for a huge increase in generating capacity to more than

160,000 MWe by 2030. Pakistan Government plans for lifting nuclear capacity to

8800 MWe, 900 MWe of it by 2015 and a further 1500 MWe by 2020.

Plans included four further Chinese reactors of 300 MWe each and seven of

1000 MWe, all PWR. There were tentative plans for China to build two 1000 MWe PWR

units at Karachi as KANUPP II and III, but China then in 2007 deferred development of

its CNP-1000 type which is the only one able to be exported. However, Last November

2012, China rolled out its new advanced 1000 MW pressurized water nuclear power

reactor, ACPR-1000 at the Hi-Tech Fair in Shenzhen. This reactor was "independently"

developed by China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation with full IPR and made its

debut at the 13th China Hi-Tech Fair, according to the official media. Since this reactor

has been developed by China independently without the involvement of foreign

suppliers, it is quite likely that China will export this reactor to Pakistan. PAEC is now

currently preparing reports and planning to set up small but more commercial nuclear

power plants indigenously.

In June 2008, the Pakistan Government announced plans to build commercial nuclear

power plants III and IV commercial nuclear power plants at Chashma, Punjab Province,

each with 320–340 MWe and costing PKR 129 billion, 80 billion of this from international

sources, principally China. A further agreement for China's help with the project was

signed in October 2008, and given prominence as a counter to the US–India agreement

8

shortly preceding it. Cost quoted then was US$ 1.7 billion, with a foreign loan

component of $1.07 billion.

In March 2009, SNERDI announced that it was proceeding with design of CHASNUPP-

III and IV, with China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor. The PAEC said

Beijing was financing 85% of the US$ 1.6 billion project. Contracts for CHASNUPP-I

and II were signed in 1990 and 2000, before 2004 when China joined the Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG), which maintains an embargo on sales of nuclear equipment to

Pakistan, but there are questions about China's supply of Chasma-3 and 4. On 24

September 2010, China informed the IAEA that it will implement an agreement with

Pakistan on the export of two nuclear reactors for Islamabad's Chashma nuclear

complex. Beijing has said that the reactor deal is part of a 2003 agreement between the

two countries, a claim many have questioned, though Germany has accepted. These

will be the third and fourth reactors at the complex. According to the Chinese

communication to the IAEA, the reactors will be placed under international

safeguards. Concerns have been expressed over the lack the safety features

incorporated into the Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 reactors, which are alleged to use a

design which is not considered safe enough to build in China.

In March 2013, Pakistan and China agreed to build a 1000 MW CHASNUPP-5

at Chashma Nuclear Power Complex.

FRANCE

In May 2009, France agreed to cooperate with Pakistan on nuclear safety, which

Pakistan's Foreign Minister called a 'significant development' related to the transfer of

civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan. But later a spokesman for the French

presidency was careful to rein in expectations, saying Mr Sarkozy had "confirmed

France was ready, within the framework of its international agreements, to co-operate

with Pakistan in the field of nuclear safety."

UNITED STATES 9

At U.S.–Pakistan strategic dialogue 24 March, Pakistan pressed for a civil nuclear

cooperation deal similar to that with India. One analyst suggested that such a deal was

unrealistic at present but might be possible in 10–15 years.

JAPAN

In 2011, Dr. Irfan Yusuf Shami, Director-general (Disarmament) of Ministry of Foreign

Affairs of Pakistan and Makyo maya Gawa, director general of Disarmament and Non-

proliferation department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan signed an agreement for

nuclear non-proliferation in Tokyo. Both countries agreed for stability in South Asia.

In 2011, during the state visit of President Asif Zardari, Pakistan seek civil nuclear

power cooperation with Japan, a similar deal that Japan and India had signed.

According to Jang news group, Japanese Government had denied the nuclear power

cooperation with Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Media, the Pakistan officials were

highly disappointed with Japanese denial. On the other hand, Japanese officials were

left disappointed as Pakistan had denied the Japanese request to support Japan's

candidacy for permanent seat for the United Nations Security Council.

According to the Jang News, Pakistan offered Japan to provide technical assistance to

control nuclear radiation, following the Fukushima reactor nuclear accidents, and

Japanese officials have accepted Pakistan's offer. On 20 March 2011, Jang News

reported that scientists from PNRA and PAEC were ready to leave for Japan as soon

as IAEA gives an approval.

FUEL CYCLE

The government has set a target of producing 350 tons (U3O8) per year from 2015 to

meet one third of anticipated requirements then. Low grade Ore is known in

central Punjab Province at Bannu Basin and Suleman Range.

A small (15,000 SWU/yr) uranium centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta has been

operated by the KRL since 1984 and does not have any apparent civil use. It was

10

expanded threefold about 1991. A newer plant is reported to be at Gadwal which is

operated by PAEC. The plant is not under safeguards of IAEA.

In 2006, the PAEC announced that it was preparing to set up separate and purely civil

conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants as a new US$ 1.2 billion Nuclear

Power Fuel Complex which would be under IAEA safeguards and managed separately

from existing facilities. At least the enrichment plant would be built at Chak Jhumra,

Faisalabad, in the Punjab and have a 150,000 SWU/yr capacity in five years — about

2013, then be expanded in 150,000 SWU increments to be able to supply one third of

the enrichment requirements for a planned 8800 MWe generating capacity by 2030.

RADIOACTIVE WASTES MANAGEMENT

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is responsible for the radioactive

waste management. From 1972, the PAEC has undertaken to establish the safety

objectives, management, and radioactive waste management. In 2004, the PNRA

issued guidelines for the management of nuclear and radioactive waste management in

nuclear and medical research centers under PAEC. In 2010, the PNRA issued

regulatory policy on radioactive waste materials, and Pakistan lawmakers presented the

regulatory policy in Pakistan Parliament. The Parliament passed the PNRA regulatory

policy unanimously, making it into laws.

The PNRA proposed new Waste Management offices to control of the radiation and

radioactive materials. The Waste Management Centers are proposed for Karachi,

Rawalpindi, Nilore, Lahore and Chashma. Used fuel is currently stored at each reactor

in pools. Longer-term dry storage at each site is proposed. The question of future

reprocessing remains open. A National Repository for low- and intermediate-level

wastes is due to be commissioned by 2015.

NUCLEAR REPROCESSING

11

The country also has operated one indigenous reprocessing plant, built by PAEC, which

was known as the New Labs — outside PINSTECH, Nilore, near Islamabad. The PAEC

had contracted with British BNFL for a reprocessing facility which was cancelled in

1974. It was built under the leadership of Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan The plant became

functional in the early 1980s, and it is not under IAEA inspection. The second nuclear

reprocessing plant was also started by PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan, in 1976, at

Chashma, under a contract agreement with France However; France cancelled the

agreement for the said plant under US influence in August 1978. In 2006, the PAEC

started work another nuclear fuel fabrication plant — Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel

Complex — located 175 kilometers south near Islamabad. An indigenous Nuclear Fuel

Fabrication Complex at Kundian, known as Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex (KNFC),

already exists which was built by PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan and completed by

1980. Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex makes nuclear fuel for KANUPP. However, the

2006 PNPFC project is being financed by the joint Sino-Pak Nuclear Technology

Consortium, and the PAEC is leading the designing and construction of the plant. It will

be under safeguards but KNFC is not under safeguards. The Pakistan Nuclear Power

Fuel Complex is under the IAEA safeguards and inspections as the IAEA also

contributed in the mega project financially.

RADIATION CONTROL

The PAEC's directorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) was

responsible for the radiation and high radioactive material control in the country.

However, in 2001, with the establishment of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory

Authority (PNRA), the responsibilities were shifted to PNRA. In 2003, the responsibilities

and agency's goals were expanded, as PNRA were given the status of an executive

agency. The PNRA oversees reactor safety and security, reactor licensing and renewal,

radioactive material safety, security and licensing, and spent fuel management (storage,

security, recycling, and disposal). The PNRA closely work with Chinese CNNC, and is

frequently visited by Chinese staff as its technical advisers.

12

NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS

On 18–19 October 2011, the KANUPP Karachi nuclear power plant imposed a seven-

hour emergency after heavy water leaked from a feeder pipe to the reactor. The

leakage took place during a routine maintenance shut down, and the emergency was

lifted seven hours later, after the affected area was isolated.

INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIC

The Pakistan Nuclear Society (PNS) is a scientific and educational society that has both

industry and academic members. The organization publishes large amount of scientific

literature on nuclear technology on several journals. The PNS also allied itself

with American Nuclear Society (ANS), European Nuclear Society (ENS), Indian Nuclear

Society (INS), Korean Nuclear Society (KNS), Chinese Nuclear Society (CNS),

Hungarian Nuclear Society (HNS), and the Spanish Nuclear Society (SNS). The

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission also published large sums of publication, and

published a quarterly magazine — The Nucleus. The PAEC's academic scientists and

engineers also publishes the newsletter — The Pak Atom — concerning on nuclear

technology and lobbying for the commercial nuclear power plants.

ACADEMIC RESEARCH

The academic research on nuclear technology began in 1956, with the establishment of

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. In 1965, United States provided a

10 MW research reactor –Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-I (PARR) – to Pakistan.

The PARR-Reactor consists of three research reactors with a single nuclear particle

accelerator. The first reactor was supplied by the U.S. government in 1965 and it is

13

operated by the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). In

1969, the Center for Nuclear Studies was established, and it began its research in a

small reactor that was provided by the PAEC. In 1989, the PAEC had built another

small research reactor, known as Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-II reactor. The

PARR-II reactor is an indigenously built reactor by the PAEC, and is under IAEA

safeguards since IAEA had funded this mega-project.

In 1986, another "multipurpose" heavy water reactor, a 50 MWe pressurized heavy

water reactor (PHWR) near Khushab, was built. Known as Khushab-I, it went critical

and started its operations in April 1998. The complex is evidently for producing

weapons-grade plutonium, isotope production and nuclear reprocessing. A similar or

possibly larger heavy water reactor has been under construction at Khushab since

about 2002. Khushab is reported to be making demands upon the country's limited

uranium resources. Reprocessing of weapon-grade material is reported to take place at

Chashma Nuclear Complex, 80 km west.

NON PROLIFERATION

Pakistan is not a signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it

maintains a civil nuclear power general program under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan has

repeatedly refused calls for international inspections of its enrichment and reprocessing

activities. Munir Ahmad Khan, unlike his rival Abdul Qadeer Khan, developed Pakistan's

nuclear weapons and power program ingeniously and quietly. While the weapons were

developed in extreme secrecy, the profiles of academic scientists are kept highly

classified and completely unknown to the public. Strict nuclear proliferation policies

were introduced by Abdus Sattar, Munir Ahmad Khan, and Ishfaq Ahmad in 1972, and

since adhered to by the PAEC.

In May 1998, Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, carried out

tests of 5 atomic devices — codenamed Chagai-I — at Ras Koh region of Chagai Hills.

The first five nuclear devices were evidently made from HEU, and the tests were

14

supervised by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Kahuta Research Laboratories,

and the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers. On May 30, small teams of PAEC scientists

performed another test of 1 or 2 nuclear devices — codename Chagai-II — at

the Kharan region. The devices were made of weapons-grade plutonium, and had a

yield reported to be between 20 and 40 kilotons of TNT equivalent.

PAKISTAN AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Pakistan began focusing on nuclear weapons development in January 1972 under

the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the

Chairman of PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan. In 1976, Abdul Qadeer Khan also joined the

nuclear weapons program, and, with Zahid Ali Akbar, headed the Kahuta Project, while

the rest of the program being run in PAEC and comprising over twenty laboratories and

projects was headed by Munir Ahmad Khan.[9] This program would reach fruition

under President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, then-Chief of Army Staff.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to neighboring India's

development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior academic scientists

and engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan, which came to known as "Multan

meeting".[citation needed]Bhutto was the main architect of this programme and it was here that

Bhutto orchestrated nuclear weapons programme and rallied Pakistan's academic

scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival. [10][dead link] At the Multan meeting,

Bhutto also appointed nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of Pakistan

Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who, until then, had been working as Director at

the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria. In December 1972, Abdus Salam led the

establishment of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) as he called scientists working at

ICTP to report to Munir Ahmad Khan. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of

nuclear deterrence capability. Following India's surprise nuclear test,

codenamed Smiling Buddha in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside

15

the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the goal to develop

nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.[11]

Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test (Operation

Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in

the Chagai district, Baluchistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan, the

underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by provincial Martial Law

Administrator General Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. The last test of Pakistan was

conducted at the sandy Kharan Desert under a codename Chagai-II, also in

Baluchistan, on May 30, 1998. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at

Nilore, Kahuta, and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by

the scientists. Pakistan thus became the 7th country in the world to successfully

develop and test nuclear weapons.[12]

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND NON WEAPON

POLICY

The uneasy relationships with India, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union, and

the energy shortage explains its nuclear policy to become a nuclear power as part of its

defense strategy.[13] On 8 December 1953, Pakistan media press welcomed

the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiatives, followed by the establishment of Pakistan in 1956.[14] In 1953, Foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan publicly stated that "Pakistan does not

have a policy towards the atom bombs".[15] Following the announcement, on 11 August

1955, U.S. and Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and

industrial use of nuclear energy which also includes a $350,000 worth pool-type reactor.[15] Before 1971, Pakistan's nuclear development was peaceful but an effective deterrent

against India, as Benazir Bhutto maintained in 1995.[13] Pakistan followed a strict non-

nuclear weapon policy since 1956 until 1971, and major proposals were made in 1960s

by several officials and senior scientists but PAEC under its chairman Ishrat Hussain

Usmani made no efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle for the purposes of active nuclear

weapons programme.[15]

16

After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Foreign minister (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the option of "nuclear weapons programmes"

but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad Shoaib and

chairman I.H. Usmani.[15] Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at IAEA became

aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, On

October 1965, Munir Ahmad Khan, director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Bhutto on emergency basis

in Vienna, revealing the facts about the Indian nuclear programme and a weapon

production facility in Trombay. At this meeting Munir Khan concluded: "a (nuclear) India

would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan

needed a nuclear deterrent...".[citation needed]

Understanding the sensitivity of the issue, Bhutto arranged a meeting with President

Ayub Khan December 11, 1965 at Dorchester Hotel in London. Munir Khan pointed out

to the President that Pakistan must acquire the necessary facilities that would give the

country a nuclear weapon capability, which were available free of safeguards and at an

affordable cost, and there were no restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely

available, and that India was moving forward in deploying it, as Munir Khan maintained.[citation needed] When asked about the economics of such programme, Munir Ahmad Khan

estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less

expensive, the then costs were not more than $150 million, after hearing the proposal

President Ayub Khan swiftly denied the proposal and quoted: "Pakistan was too poor to

spend that much money. Moreover, President Ayub Khan mentioned that if Pakistan

ever needed the (atom) bomb, Pakistan could somehow acquire it off the shelf..". [citation

needed]

Although Pakistan began the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan

responded to India's 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha) with a number of

proposals to prevent a nuclear competition in South Asia.[16] On many different

occasions, India rejected the offer.[16]

NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT17

Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956 following the

establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Pakistan became a

participant in U.S President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace Program." PAEC's first

chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad.[citation needed] In 1961, the PAEC set up a Mineral Center at

Lahore and a similar multidisciplinary Center was set up in Dhaka, in the then East

Pakistan. With these two centers, the basic research work started.[citation needed]

The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for Uranium. This continued for

about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in the Dera Ghazi

Khan district and the first-ever national award was given to the PAEC. Mining of

uranium began in the same year. Dr. Abdus Salam and Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani also

sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the field of Nuclear

Technology and Nuclear reactor technology. In December 1965, then-Foreign Minister

of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where he met IAEA nuclear

engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan. At a Vienna meeting on December, Munir A. Khan

informed Bhutto about the status of Indian nuclear program.[citation needed]

The next landmark under Dr. Abdus Salam was the establishment of PINSTECH

– Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, at Nilore near Islamabad. The

principal facility there was a 5MWe research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and

consisting of the PARR-I, which was upgraded to 10 MWe by Nuclear Engineering

Division under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990.[17] A second Atomic Research Reactor,

known as PARR-II, was a Pool-type, light-water, 27-30 kWe, training reactor that went

critical in 1989 under Munir Ahmad Khan.[18] The PARR-II reactor was built and provided

by PAEC under the IAEA safeguards as IAEA had funded this mega project. [18] The

PARR-I reactor was, under the agreement signed by PAEC and ANL, provided by

the United States Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and ANL had led the

construction.[17] Canada build Pakistan's first civil-purpose nuclear power plant.[citation

needed] The Ayub Khan Military Government made then-Science Advisors to the

Government Abdus Salam as the head of the IAEA delegation. Abdus Salam began

lobbying for commercial nuclear power plants, and tirelessly advocated for nuclear

power in Pakistan.[19] In 1965, Salam's efforts finally paid off, and a Canadian

18

firm signed a deal to provide 137MWe CANDU reactor in Paradise Point, Karachi. The

construction began in 1966 as PAEC its general contractor as GE Canada provided

nuclear materials and financial assistance. Its project director was Parvez Butt, a

nuclear engineer, and its construction completed in 1972. Known as KANUPP-I, it was

inaugurated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President, and began its operations in November

1972. Currently, Pakistan Government is planning to build another 400MWe commercial

nuclear power plant. Having known as KANUPP-II, the PAEC completed its feasibility

studies in 2009. However, the work is put on hold since 2009.

The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at Dera Ghazi Khan for the

concentration of uranium ores. The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day.[20] In

1989, Munir Ahmad Khan signed a Nuclear cooperation deal and, since 2000, Pakistan

is developing two more nuclear power plants with the an agreement signed with China.

Both these plants are of 300MW capacity and are being built at Chashma city of Punjab

Province called CHASNUPP-I, began producing electricity in 2000, and CHASNUPP-II,

began its operation in fall of 2011. In 2011, the Board of Governors of International

Atomic Energy Agency gave approval of Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal, allowing Pakistan

legally to build 300MWe CHASNUPP-III and CHASNUPP-VI reactors.[21]

DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to Pakistan losing roughly 56,000 square miles

(150,000 km2) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created

state of Bangladesh.[22]It was a psychological setback for Pakistanis; Pakistan had lost

its geo-political, strategic, and economic influence in South-Asia.[22] Furthermore,

Pakistan had failed to gather any moral support from its key allies, the United

States and the People's Republic of China.[23] The 1971 war with India was a crushing

defeat for Pakistan, and China failed to provide any significant assistance to Pakistan.[24] Isolated internationally, Pakistan seemed to be in great mortal danger, and quite

obviously could rely on no one but itself.[23] At United Nations Security Council meeting,

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto drew comparisons with the Treaty of Versailles which

19

Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat.

Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was "obsessed" with India's nuclear program,[25] that is

why Bhutto immediately came up with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons to prevent

Pakistan from signing another 'Treaty of Versailles' as it did in 1971.

In 1969, after a long negotiation, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA)

signed a formal agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant

capable of extracting 360g of weapons-grade plutonium annually.[14] The PAEC selected

a team five senior scientists, including geophysicist dr. Ahsan Mubarak,[14] were sent

to Sell a field to receive technical training.[14] Later, the team under Ahsan Mubarak

advised the government to not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, but key parts

important to build the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.[14]

At the Multan meeting on January 20, 1972, Bhutto stated, "What Raziuddin Siddiqui, a

Pakistani, contributed for the United States during the Manhattan Project, could also be

done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own people."[26] Raziuddin Siddiqui was a

Pakistani theoretical physicist who, in the early 1940s, worked on both the British

nuclear program and the US nuclear program.[27]Although a few Pakistanis worked on

the Manhattan Project who were also willing to return and do the same for their native

Pakistan, Prime Minister Bhutto still needed to recruit and bring in other Pakistani

nuclear scientists and engineers who never worked in the United States. This is where

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German educated metallurgical engineer, came into the

picture. Some of the initial funding came from oil-rich Arab states, particularly Saudi

Arabia.

In later years, some funding for the continuation of the nuclear development programme

came from the large British Pakistani population. In December 1972, Science Advisor to

the President, Dr. Abdus Salam had called theoretical physicists from the ICTP to report

of Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. This marked

the beginning of the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG). [28] Later, Pakistani theoretical

physicists at Institute of Theoretical Physics of Quaid-e-Azam University also joined the

TPG headed by Salam.[29] The TPG, which directly reported to Abdus Salam in PAEC,

was assigned to do research in the development of nuclear weapon devices, and 20

conduct mathematical calculations on complex hydrodynamical phenomenons and

the fast neutron calculations.[29] Professor Salam also had done the groundbreaking

work of the "Theoretical Physics Group", which was initially headed by Salam until in

1974 when he left the country in protest.[29] The TPG division at PAEC closely

collaborated and completed its physics and mathematical calculations on fast-neutron

calculations with the Mathematics Group led by Raziuddin Siddiqui and others, a

division which contained the pure mathematicians.[29] On other side, Munir Ahmad Khan

began to work on indigenous development of nuclear fuel cycle and the weapons

programme. Munir Ahmad Khan, with his lifelong friend Abdus Salam, had done a

groundbreaking work in the nuclear development, and after Salam's departure from

Pakistan, scientists and engineers who were researching under Salam, began to report

to directly to Munir Ahmad Khan.[30] In 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan, days after Operation

Smiling Buddha, launched the extensive plutonium reprocessing and uranium

enrichment programme, and the research facilities were expanded throughout the

country.[31]

In 1965,[32] amidst skirmishes that led up to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto announced:

“ If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even

go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians have the bomb, the

Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus have the bomb. Why not the Muslims

too have the bomb?[33][34] ”

In 1983, Khan was convicted in absentia by the Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands,

for stealing the blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.[35] A.Q. Khan then established a proliferation network through Dubai to smuggle

URENCO nuclear technology to Khan Research Laboratories. He then

established Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program based on the URENCO's Zippe-type

centrifuge.[35][36][37][38][39]

Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment

technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably 21

advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan was a German-trained metallurgist who brought with

him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position

at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in

charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was

established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive

clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its

developing uranium enrichment capabilities.[40]

“ It took only two weeks and three days for

Pakistan to master the field... and (detonate)

the nuclear devices of our own... ”

—Benazir Bhutto, on first nuclear tests on May

1998, [41]

A new directorate, known as Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr.

Zaman Sheikh and Hafeez Qureshi, was established in March 1974 by Munir Ahmad

Khan. The DTD was tasked to manufacture chemical explosive lenses, trigger

mechanism, and tampers used in atomic weapon. The DTD was later charged with

testing Pakistan's first implosion design in 1978, which was later improved and tested

on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a

nuclear device, codename Kirana-I. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24

more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also manufactured a

miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air

Forcefighter aircraft.[42]

Also, Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani’s contribution to the nuclear energy programme, is also

fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with

efforts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into

Pakistan’s premier nuclear research institution.[29] In addition to sending hundreds of

young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim world’s first

nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972.

22

Thus, Usmani laid solid groundwork for the civilian nuclear programme. [citation

needed] Scientists and engineers under Munir Ahmad Khan developed the nuclear

capability for Pakistan within early 1980s, and under his leadership the PAEC had

carried a cold test of nuclear device at Kirana Hills, evidently made from non-

weaponized plutonium. Former chairman of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan was credited

as one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent study from

the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London's dossier on Pakistan's

nuclear weapons program.

POLICY

Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April 1960. As for its Biological warfare

capability, Pakistan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or

having an offensive biological programme.[43] However, the country is reported to have

well developed bio-technological facilities and laboratories, devoted entirely to the

medical research and applied health sciences.[43] In 1972, Pakistan signed and ratified

the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1974.[43] Since then Pakistan

has been a vocal and staunch supporter for the success of the BTWC. During the

various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistan's representatives have urged more

robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as

part of the non-aligned group of countries, have made the case for guarantees for

states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for

purposes of scientific research.[43]

Pakistan is not known to have an offensive chemical weapons programme, and in 1993

Pakistan signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has

committed itself to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using

chemical weapons.[44]

In 1999, Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India

signed the Lahore Declaration, agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

This initiative was taken after an year past of both countries publicly tested nuclear

23

devices (See Pokhran-II, Chagai-I and II). However, Pakistan is not a party to the Non-

Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions.

Since early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities have not been without

controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Government has

taken concrete steps to ensure that Nuclear proliferation is not repeated and have

assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming Chashma Nuclear

Power Complex series of Nuclear Power Plants. In November 2006, The International

Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with the Pakistan

Atomic Energy Commission to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built

in the country with Chinese assistance.

PROTECTION

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed that Pakistan has dispersed its

nuclear weapons throughout the country, increasing the security so that they could not

fall into terrorist hands. Her comments came as new satellite images released by the

ISIS suggested Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, a fuel for

atomic bombs. The institute has also claimed that Pakistan has built two more nuclear

reactors at Khoshab increasing the number of plutonium producing reactors to three.[46]

In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test,

former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear security

is the strongest in the world.[47] According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear

safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and

there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess

nuclear weapons.

Modernization and expansion

Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a

Washington-based science think tank has reported.[49] The sixth nuclear test

24

(codename: Chagai-II) on May 30, 1998, at Kharan was a quiet successful test of a

sophisticated, compact, but "powerful plutonium bomb" designed to be carried by

aircraft, vessels, and missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium

based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an

increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%."[50] Citing new satellite images of the

facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery

suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof

beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall".[51] A third and a

fourth[52] reactor and ancillary buildings are observed to be under construction at

the Khushab site.

In an opinion published in The Hindu, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam

Saran wrote that Pakistan's expanding nuclear capability is "no longer driven solely by

its oft-cited fears of India" but by the "paranoia about U.S. attacks on its strategic

assets.[53][54] Noting recent changes in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, Saran said

"the Pakistan military and civilian elite is convinced that the United States has also

become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible

possession of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and its status as nuclear power.

Bilateral arms control proposals and confidence

building measures

Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation

steps to India, including:[55]

A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of

nuclear weapons, in 1978.[56]

South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978.[57]

Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in

1979.[58]

Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979.[59]

25

A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987.[60]

A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.[61]

India rejected all six proposals.[62][63]

However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear issues. In

1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.[64] Since then they have

been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on January 1 of each year.[65] Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations would

alert the other on ballistic missile tests.[66] In June 2004, the two countries signed an

agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that

could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were deemed essential risk reduction

measures in view of the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the

two countries, and the extremely short response time available to them to any perceived

attack.

Disarmament policy

Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as it continues to

produce fissile material for weapons.[68][69]

In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its

nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements

for meaningful negotiations:

A commitment by all states to complete verifiable nuclear disarmament;

Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime;

Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with

those who are NPT signatories;

Address new issues like access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state

actors;

26

Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state’s right to peaceful uses of

nuclear energy;

Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security

assurances to non-nuclear weapon states;

A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and

deployment of Anti-ballistic missile systems;

Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarization of

outer space, including development of ASATs;

Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of

conventional tactical weapons.

Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security,

disarmament and proliferation challenges.[citation needed]

INFRASTRUCTURE

Uranium infrastructure

Pakistan's uranium infrastructure is based on the use of gas centrifuges to

produce Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL)

at Kahuta.[4] Responding to India'snuclear test In 1974, Munir Khan launched the

uranium program, codename Project-706 under the aegis of the PAEC. The uranium

division at PAEC undertook research on several methods of enrichment,

including gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle and laser enrichment techniques, as well as

centrifuges.[71] Abdul Qadeer Khan officially joined this program in 1976, bringing with

him centrifuge designs he mastered in URENCO, the Dutch firm where he had worked

as a senior scientist. Later, the government separated the program from PAEC and

moved the program toEngineering Research Laboratories (ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its

senior scientist. To acquire the necessary equipment and material for this program,

27

Khan developed an illicit procurement network, which was later used to provide

enrichment technology to Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[72] The Uranium program proved

to be a difficult, challenging and most enduring approach. [73]Commenting on the

difficulty, one mathematician who worked with A.Q. Khan quoted in the book "Eating

grass" that "hydrodynamical problem in centrifuge was simply stated, but extremely

difficult to evaluate, not only in order of magnitude but in detailing also."[73] Many of

Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the enriched uranium on time

despite A.Q. Khan's strong advocacy.[73] One scientist recalled his memories in Eating

Grass: "No one in the world has used the [gas] centrifuge method to produce military-

grade uranium.... This was not going to work. He [A.Q. Khan] was simply wasting

time."[73] Despite A.Q. Khan had difficulty getting his peers listening to him, Khan

aggressively continued his research and the program was made feasible by Pakistan in

shortest time possible.[73] His efforts won him the praise from country's elite politicians

and the military science circles, and he was now debuted as the "father of the uranium"

bomb.[73] On May 28, 1998, it was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the

nuclear chain reaction which led the successful detonated of boosted fission devices in

an scientific experiment codenamed as: Chagai-I.

Plutonium infrastructure

As opposed to uranium, the parallel plutonium programme is indigenous, locally

developed and culminated under watchful eyes of PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.[11] Since 1972, earlier efforts were directed towards plutonium and necessary

infrastructure was built by Bhutto as early as 1970s.[11] Contrary to popular perception,

Pakistan did not forego or abandon the plutonium program and pursued it along with the

uranium route.[11]Despite many setbacks and international embargo, PAEC swiftly

continued its research on plutonium and directed a separated electromagnetic isotope

separation program alongside with enrichment program.[11]

Towards the end of 1970s, the PAEC began to pursue Plutonium production

capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab

Reactor Complex at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear

28

reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC

Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally

indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers.

Various Pakistani industries contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The

Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public

statements made by the U.S. Government officials, this heavy-waterreactor can

produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the

development of newer facilities,[74] sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.[75] The

reactor could also produce H 3  if it were loaded with Li 6 , although this is unnecessary for

the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use 6Li

directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Khushab'sPlutonium production capacity has allowed Pakistan to develop

lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of

the ballistic missiles.[citation needed]

The Plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place at the New Laboratories, a

reprocessing plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan

Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not

subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence

reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the

Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough

plutonium to facilitate the creation of as many as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year." [76]

[77][78] The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's

third plutonium reactor,[79] signaling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-

based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads. On

30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientific experiment and

sixth nuclear test: codename Chagai-II.[73]

Stockpile

29

Estimates of Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads vary. The most recent analysis,

published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2010, estimates that Pakistan has

70-90 nuclear warheads.[80] In 2001, the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC) estimated that Pakistanhad built 24–48 HEU-based nuclear warheads

with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads.[81][82] In 2003, the U.S. Navy Center

for Contemporary Conflict estimated that Pakistan possessed between 35 and 95

nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.[83] In 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace estimated a stockpile of approximately 50 weapons. By contrast, in

2000, U.S. military and intelligence sources estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal

may be as large as 100 warheads.[84]

The actual size of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is hard for experts to gauge owing to the

extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. However, in 2007, retired

Pakistan Army's Brigadier-General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the

Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper that Pakistan

had "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads."[85][86]

Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, on

30 May 1998 at Kharan Desert.

The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg.

Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 8–10 kg.

The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb

used only 6 kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type

weapons, they will typically use between 15–25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing

the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion

devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as

beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like

plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form.

However, only 2–4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20–

25 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium

production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs

30

by a factor of three to four. “The sixth Pakistan nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, (May

30, 1998) at Kharan Desert was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but

powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. A whole range and variety of

weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for

missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power

with an operational weapon capability, both first and second strike, based on assured

strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with

plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.

As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1970s

onwards. However, there were only two logistic problems faced by PAEC. One was that

Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and the PAEC did not divert spent

fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at the New Labs. This was enough

to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. The PAEC built its own

plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, known as Khushab-I reactor,

beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources.

Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural

uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of

the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium

ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide (UO2) (which is used to make

nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of

UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride(UF4) and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6).

The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive

hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF6 is pumped into the

centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is

produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used

in a bomb.

It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000-20,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This

means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75–100 kg of HEU

since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of

31

HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear

tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986

and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for

losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need

20 kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005.

Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested

under codename Chagai-I and Chagai-II. It is reported that the yields from these tests

were 12 kt, 30 to 36 kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan

can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kt and 150 kt in

the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300–500 kt[87] large-size

warheads.

Second strike capability

According to a US congressional report, Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability

in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been

dealing with efforts to develop new weapons and at the same time, have a strategy for

surviving a nuclear war. Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch

facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.[88] In January 2000, two

years past after the atomic tests, the NIE officials stated that the intelligence gathering

figures "overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those

of Pakistan".[89] The US CENTCOM commander, General Anthony Zinni, a friend of

Musharraf,[89] told the NBC that longtime assumptions, that "India had an edge in the

South Asian strategic balance of power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that

the Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians", General Zinni quoted to NBC.[89]

It was confirmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles, state-of-the-

art air defences around strategic sites, and other concealment measures. In 1998,

Pakistan had 'at least six secret locations' and since then it is believed Pakistan may

have many more such secret sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not

know where all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are located. Pakistani defence officials have

32

continued to rebuff and deflect American requests for more details about the location

and security of the country’s nuclear sites.[90]

MIRV capability

Pakistani engineers are also said to be in the advance stages of developing MIRV

technology for its missiles. This would allow the military to fit several warheads on the

same ballistic missile and then launch them at separate targets.[91]

Personnel

In 2010, Russian foreign ministry official Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere

between 120,000 to 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile

programs, a figure considered extremely large for a developing country.[92]

Foreign assistance

Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been repeatedly charged with

allegedly transferring missile and related materials to Pakistan.[93] Despite China

strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, the United States alleged China to

have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic bomb development

infrastructure.[93] China has consistently maintained that it has not sold any weapon

parts or components to Pakistan or anyone else.[93] On August 2001, it was reported that

US officials confronted China numerous times over this issue and pointed out "rather

bluntly"[93] to Chinese officials that the evidences from intelligence sources was

"powerful."[93] But they had been rebuffed by the Chinese, who have retorted by referring

to the U.S. support for Taiwan's military build-up which Beijing says is directed against

it.[93]

The former U.S. officials have also disclosed that China had allegedly transferred

technology to Pakistan and conducting putative test for it in 1980.[94] However, senior

scientists and officials strongly dismissed the U.S. disclosure, and in 1998 interview

given to Kamran Khan, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained to the fact that, "due to its

sensitivity, no country allows another country to use their tests site to explode the

33

devices," although the UK conducted such tests in Australia and the United States. [3] His

statement was also traced by Samar Mubarakmand who acknowledged that cold tests

were carried out, under codename Kirana-I, in a test site which was built by the Corps of

Engineers under the guidance of the PAEC.[3][95] According to a 2001Department of

Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided

critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons

development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which

China is a signatory.[96][97] In 2001 visit to India, the Chairman of the Standing Committee

of the National People's Congress Li Peng  rejected all the accusations against China

to Indian media and strongly maintained on the ground that "his country was not giving

any nuclear arms to Pakistan nor transferring related-technology to it." [98] Talking to a

media correspondents and Indian parliamentarians, Li Peng frankly quoted: "We do not

help Pakistan in its atomic bomb projects. Pakistan is a friendly country with whom we

have good economic and political relations."[98]

In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed a mutual treaty of peaceful use

of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civil-

purpose nuclear power plant. A grand ceremony was held in Beijing where Pakistan's

then-Foreign Minister Yakub Khan signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presence of

PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan and Chinese Prime Minister. Therefore, in 1989,

Pakistan reached agreement with China for the supply of a 300MW

commercial CHASHNUPP-1 nuclear power plant.

In February, 1990, President François Mitterrand of France visited Pakistan and

announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power

plant to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in

August, 1990, the French nuclear power plant deal went into cold storage and the

agreement could not be implemented due to financial constraints and the Pakistani

government's apathy. Also in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P.

Yakunin, said that the USSR was considering a request from Pakistan for the supply of

a nuclear power plant. The Soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was on its

way during 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed

34

U.S. displeasure at the recent agreement made between France and Pakistan for the

sale of a nuclear power plant.[99] After the U.S. concerns the civilian-nuclear technology

agreements were cancelled by France and Soviet Union.

Declassified documents from 1982, released in 2012 under the U.S. Freedom of

Information Act, said that U.S. intelligence detected that Pakistan was seeking

suspicious procurements from Belgium, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Turkey.[100]

Doctrine

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would strike India

with atomic weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistan’s

asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India's decision ability to

retaliate, as shown in 2001 and 2008 crises, when Pakistan-based terror organization

carried out deadly attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively subdued

response from India. A former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Shankar

Roychowdhury, stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from

seriously considering conventional military strikes."[101] India is Pakistan's primary

geographic neighbor and primary strategic competitor, helping drive Pakistan’s

conventional warfare capability and nuclear weapons development: The two countries

share an 1800 mile border and have suffered a violent history—four wars in less than

seven decades. The past three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of

Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in defense expenditure at a

decreasing share of GDP. In comparison to population, India is more powerful than

Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and political power—and the gap

continues to grow,"[102] a Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs report

claims.

Theory of deterrence

The theory of "N-deterrence" has been frequently being interpreted by the various

government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was

officially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's defence theory,[103] on the other hand, the 35

theory has had been interpreted by the government since in 1972. The relative

weakness in defense warfare is highlighted in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which

Pakistan considers its primary deterrent from Indian conventional offensives or nuclear

attack. Nuclear theorist Brigadier-General Feroz Hassan Khan adds: "The cohesive

orders and situations of Pakistan unified combatant commands are akin to NATO's

position in the Cold War. But, there are geographic gaps and corridors similar to those

that existed inEurope that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized Indian Army...

With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means,

especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear

defense policy."[104]

Indian political scientist Vipin Narang, however, argues that Pakistan's asymmetric

escalation posture, or the rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional

attacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South Asia. Narang supports his

arguments by noting to the fact that since India's assured retaliation nuclear posture has

not deterred these provocations, Pakistan's passive nuclear posture has neutralized

India's conventional options for now; limited retaliation would be militarily futile, and

more significant conventional retaliation is simply off the table."[101]

The strategists in Pakistan Armed Forces has ceded nuclear assets and a degree of

nuclear launch code authority to lower-level officers to ensure weapon usability in a "fog

of war" scenario, making credible its deterrence doctrine.[101] On further military

perspective, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), has retrospectively contended that "theory of

defense is not view to enter into a "nuclear race", but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-

existence" in the region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South

Asia."[105] The Pakistan Government officials and strategists have consistently

emphasized that nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance to safeguard

its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.[106]

Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to

allow another invasion of Pakistan.[107] President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq allegedly told

the Indian Prime MinisterRajiv Gandhi in 1987 that, "If your forces cross our borders by

an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities."[108]

36

Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the U.S. Defense Department report cited above,

"Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so

only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to the report by stating that

the United States itself has not ratified the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's

nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that

signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistanwill do so only after

developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection

with India's decision."

The Congressional Research Service, in a report published on July 23, 2012, said that

in addition to expanding its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances

under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons.[109]

Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to

allow another invasion of Pakistan.[110]

Nuclear Command and Control

The government institutional organization authorized to make critical decisions about

Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA.[111] The NCA has its genesis since

1970s[111] and has been constitutionally established in February 2000. [111] The NCA is

composed of two civic-military committees that advises and console both Prime

minister and the President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear

weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan

further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing theKhan Research

Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one

Nuclear Defense Complex. In November 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali

Zardari announced that he will be replaced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani as the

chairman of NCA.[112] The NCA consists of the Employment Control Committee (ECC)

and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired by the Prime

Minister.[113] The Foreign minister and Economic Minister serves as a deputy chairmen

of the ECC, the body which defines nuclear strategy, including the deployment and

37

employment of strategic forces, and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use.

The committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as the respective military

chiefs of staff.[113] The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions,

monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides on responses to emerging

threats.[113] It also establishes guidelines for effective command-and-control practices to

safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.[113]

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is the deputy chairman of the

Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons

development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientific, but not its

political, leadership.[113] Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a tight

control of scientific and ethical research; the DCC exercises technical, financial and

administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and

scientific research and development organisations associated with the development and

modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.[113] Functioning through

the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to fulfil the

force goals set by the committee.[113]

Under the Nuclear Command Authority, its secretariat, Strategic Plans Division (SPD),

is responsible for the physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects of

country's nuclear arsenals.[114] The SPD functions under the joint chiefs of staff

committee at the Joint Headquarters (JS HQ) and reports directly to the Prime Minister.[114] The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war

planning at the National Security Council (NSC).[114] According to the officials of

Pakistan's military science circles, it is the high-profile civic-military committee

consisting the Cabinet ministers, President, Prime minister and the four services chiefs,

all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of

the nuclear weapons.[114] The final and executive political decisions on nuclear arsenals

deployments, operational use, and nuclear weapons politics are made during the

sessions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which is chaired by the Prime

minister.[115] It is this DCC Council where the final political guideles, discussions and the

nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister. [115] The

38

DCC reaffirmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and arsenals through the

country's media.[115]

U.S. assistance for arsenal security

From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid

Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the

program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters,

night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[116]

Pakistan turned down the offer of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a

sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and

balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches". But

Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version

of PAL and U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to

be well secured.[117][118]

Security concerns of the United States

Since 2004 the United States government has reportedly been concerned about the

safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that

the United States has contingency plans to send in special forces to help "secure the

Pakistani nuclear arsenal".[119][120] Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation giving

testimony before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism,

Nonproliferation, and Trade concluded that "preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and

technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should be a top priority for the

U.S."[121] However Pakistan's government has ridiculed claims that the weapons are not

secure.[119]

A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the U.S. is training an elite

unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by

militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organization. This was done

in the context of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed Forces, multiple

attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions.

39

According to former U.S. intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. concerns are

justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases

since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all

Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them.[122] However,

during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M.

Gates denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.[123]

A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled

'Securing the Bomb 2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from

Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth".[124]

According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US

department of energy there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan

than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other,

the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[125]

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed

concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both

Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated Pakistan "has had many leaks from its

program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to

worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan,"[126]

A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistan’s Nuclear

Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken

several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years 'Instability in Pakistan has

called the extent and durability of these reforms into question.'[127]

In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear

programme safe and secure.[128][129] According to the IAEA, Pakistan is currently

contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan

as 10th largest contributor.[130]

40

In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic written by Jeffrey Goldberg

highlighting concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the

Pakistani Government announced that it would train an additional 8,000 people to

protect the country's nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government also

denounced the article. Training will be completed no later than 2013.[131] But on the other

hand, Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened the security over the several

years.[132] In 2010, the Chairman Joint Chiefs GeneralTariq Majid exhorted to the world

delegation at the National Defence University that, "World must accept Pakistan

as nuclear power."[132] While dismissing all the concerns on the safety of country's

nuclear arsenal, General Majid maintains to the fact: "We are shouldering our

responsibility with utmost vigilance and confidence. We have put in place a very robust

regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms" and processes to secure our strategic

assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have reassured

the international community on this issue over and over again and our track record

since the time our atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished".[132]

National Security Council

Defence Committee of Cabinet  (DCC)

National Command Authority  (NCA)

Ministry of Defence  (MoD)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee  (JCSC)

Strategic Plans Division (SPD) - also known as the Strategic Planning

Directorate[133]

Economic Coordination Committee  (ECC)

Development Control Committee (DCC)

Employment Control Committee (ECC)

Financial Monitoring Unit  (FMU)

41

Strategic combat commands

Air Force Strategic Command  (AFSC)

Army Strategic Forces Command  (ASFC)

Naval Strategic Forces Command  (NSFC)

Weapons development agencies

National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)

National Development Complex  (NDC), Islamabad

Project Management Organization (PMO), Khanpur

Air Weapon Complex  (AWC), Hasanabdal

Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi

Ministry of Defense Production

Pakistan Ordnance Factories  (POF), Wah

Pakistan Aeronautical Complex  (PAC), Kamra

Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), Chattar

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

Directorate of Technical Development

Directorate of Technical Equipment

Directorate of Technical Procurement

Directorate of Science & Engineering Services

42

Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad

Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology  (PINSTECH)

New Laboratories, Rawalpindi

Pilot Reprocessing Plant

PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors

Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad

Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad

Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center)

Khushab Reactor, Khushab

Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore

Hard Rock Division, Peshawar

Mineral Sands Program, Karachi

Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur

Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan

Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mianwali

Multan Heavy Water Production Facility , Multan, Punjab

Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad

Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra

Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala

Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad

New Labs Nilore,Islamabad

43

Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)

Aerospace Institute, Islamabad.

Computer Center, Karachi.

Control System Laboratories.

Sonmian Satellite Launch Center, Sonmiani Beach.

Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi.

Material Research Division.

Quality Control and Assurance Unit.

Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit.

Solid Composite Propellant Unit.

Liquid Composite Propellant Unit

Space and Atmospheric Research Center (space Center), Karachi

Static Test Unit, Karachi

Tilla Satellite Launch Center, Tilla, Punjab

Ministry of Industries & Production

State Engineering Corporation (SEC)

Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC)

Pakistan Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.

Delivery systems

44

Land systems

As of 2011, Pakistan possesses a wide variety of nuclear capable medium range

ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2500 km.[134] Pakistan also possesses nuclear

tipped Babur cruise missileswith ranges up to 700 km. In April 2012, Pakistan launched

a Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A, said to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead designed to

evade missile-defense systems.[135] The Babur cruise missile range can also be

extended to 1000 km or more. These land-based missiles are controlled by Army

Strategic Forces Command of Pakistan Army.

Pakistan is also believed to be developing tactical nuclear weapons for use on the

battlefield with ranges up to 60 km such as the Nasr missile. According to Jeffrey Lewis,

director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of

International Studies, citing a Pakistani news article,[136] Pakistan is developing its own

equivalent to the Davy Crockett launcher with miniaturized warhead that may be similar

to the W54.[137]

Aerial systems

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practiced "toss-bombing" in the 1980s

and 1990s, a method of launching weapons from fighter-bombers which can also be

used to deliver nuclear warheads.[citation needed] The PAF has two dedicated units (No.

16   Black Panthers  and No. 26   Black Spiders ) operating 18 aircraft in each squadron (36

aircraft total) of the JF-17 Thunder, believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of

nuclear weapons.[138] These units are major part of the Air Force Strategic Command, a

command responsible for nuclear response. The PAF also operates a fleet of F-

16 fighters, of which 18 were delivered in 2012 and confirmed by General Ashfaq

Parvez Kayani, are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. With a third squadron being

raised, this would bring the total number of dedicated nuclear capable aircraft to a total

of 54.[139] The PAF also possesses the Ra'ad air-launched cruise missile which has a

range of 350 km and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of between 10kt to 35kt.[140]

45

It has also been reported that an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with a range of

350 km has been developed by Pakistan, designated Hatf 8 and named Ra'ad ALCM,

which may theoretically be armed with a nuclear warhead. It was reported to have been

test-fired by a Mirage III fighter and, according to one Western official, is believed to be

capable of penetrating some air defence/missile defence systems.[141]

Naval systems

The Pakistan's Navy was first publicly reported to be considering deployment of nuclear

weapons on submarines in February 2001. Later in 2003 it was stated by

Admiral Shahid Karimullah, thenChief of Naval Staff, that there were no plans for

deploying nuclear weapons on submarines but if "forced to" they would be. In 2004,

Pakistan Navy established the Naval Strategic Forces Command and made it

responsible for countering and battling naval-based weapons of mass destruction. It is

believed by most experts that Pakistan is developing a sea-based variant of the Hatf VII

Babur, which is a nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile.[142] With a stockpile

of plutonium, Pakistan would be able to produce a variety of miniature nuclear

warheads which would allow it to nuclear-tip the C-802 and C-803 anti-ship missiles as

well as being able to develop nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth bombs and nuclear

naval mines.[citation needed]

Future delivery systems

Nuclear submarine

In response to INS   Arihant , India's first nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy pushed

forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as a direct response to the Indian

nuclear submarine program.[143][144][145] Many U.S. military experts believe that Pakistan

has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is ready to build such a fleet, but

Pakistan's Navy has cautiously monitored the status of India’s development of nuclear

submarines, and has reserved the right to take appropriate measures in response.[146] Finally in 2012, the Navy announced it would start work on and construction of a

46

nuclear submarine to better meet the Indian Navy's nuclear threat. [147] According to the

Navy, the nuclear submarine is an ambitious project, and will be designed and built

indigenously. However, the Navy stressed that "the project completion and trials would

take anywhere from between 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which

Pakistan would join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine."[147]

Proliferation

A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that personnel with sensitive

knowledge do not proliferate that expertise, but this aspect of nuclear security in

Pakistan was recognized only in the past 10 years and resulted in significant reforms of

its personnel security system. Many observers continue to be concerned that other

states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear

weapons from elements in Pakistan.150 This view is only encouraged by recent

instability and governance problems. The A. Q. Khan Network Proliferation networks

stemming from Pakistan have their roots in the effort to develop a Pakistani nuclear

bomb. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used extensive clandestine procurement

networks to obtain technology for its own nuclear weapons program. A report from

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence published September 15, 2011, stated that

Pakistan, as an under-developed country with no industrial infra-structure, had to buy

each and every bit of material and piece of equipment surreptitiously from abroad in the

open market and had to establish a network of cover companies within the country and

outside to by-pass embargoes and import all the necessary items.151Former Pakistani

nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan directed this procurement and subsequently used a similar

network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with designs and materials related to

uranium enrichment for profit.152 153 The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export

network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has

been damaged considerably. Then-Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte

implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007,

statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan had been a

47

major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A. Q. Khan network.”154

When asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign

Relations Committee hearing, then-Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns

replied that I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding

based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been

fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not

sure I could say thatSimilarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic

Studies found in a May 2007 report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to

have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market

business.”155More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said

that the network “is no longer operating.” For its part, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated

February 7, 2009, that Pakistan “has dismantled the nuclear black market network.”

Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview whether Pakistan was transferring “nuclear

weapons” or related advice to North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied

that there is “no evidence” that Pakistan is doing so. Furthermore, Acting Assistant

Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen described the network as “basically defunct” during

a July 22, 2010, congressional hearing, adding that “we’re on the lookout for sort of the

next A.Q. Khan network, so to speak.”156 Similarly, State Department spokesperson

P.J. Crowley told reporters during an August 3, 2010, press briefing that the United

States monitors the Khan network “very closely for signs that others within his realm are

still in business.” A March 2012 State Department report described the network as

“defunct.”157Asked during the 2007 hearing about Pakistan’s cooperation in

investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had

“personal, consistent access” to Khan, but added that he did not “have all the details of

everything we’ve done.” Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview Khan

directly, according to an agency official. However, sources report that Islamabad has

responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the

agency’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.158 Former IAEA official Olli Heinonen,

who investigated the Khan network during his time at the agency, stated in an interview

published in October 2011 that Khan “answer[ed] some of my questions in writing

48

through secret channels.”159 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he

would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office

spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan

investigation “closed”—a position an office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009.

The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on

13 individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The

sanctions were imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation

Prevention Act, and Executive Orders 12938 and 13382. Pursuant to a requirement in

the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73), Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton issued a certification on March 18, 2011, that Pakistan “is continuing to

cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the

acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials.”

ABDUL QADEER KHAN

Abdul Qadeer Khan[note 1] (Urdu:  خان القدیر عبد ;ڈاکٹر b. 1 April

1936); DEngr, NI (twice), HI, FPAS; also respectfully known by some

in Pakistan asMohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu:  پاک�ستان lit: Savior of Pakistan), more ;محسن

popularly known as Dr. A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical

engineer, colloquially regarded as the founder of HEU based Gas-centrifuge uranium

enrichment programme for Pakistan's integrated atomic bomb project.[2] Founded and

established the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, he was both its senior

scientist and the director-general until his retirement in 2001, and was an early and vital

figure in other science projects. Apart from participating in atomic bomb project, he

made major contributions in molecular morphology, physical martensite, and its

integrated applications in condensed and material physics.

Abdul Qadeer Khan was a prominent Pakistani scientist,[3] and was involved in the

country's various scientific programmes until his dismissal.[3] In January 2004, Khan was

officially summoned for a debriefing on his suspicious activities in other countries after

the United States provided evidences to the Pakistan Government, and confessed it a

month later.[3] Some have alleged that these activities were sanctioned by the

49

authorities, though the Pakistan government sharply dismissed the claims.[4][5] After

years of nominal house arrest, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) on 6 February 2009

declared Abdul Qadeer Khan to be a free citizen of Pakistan, allowing him free

movement inside the country. The verdict was rendered by Chief Justice Sardar

Muhammad Aslam.[6] In September 2009, expressing concerns over the Islamabad High

Court's decision to end all security restrictions on Khan, the United States warned that

Khan still remains a "serious proliferation risk".[7]

Khan was born in Bhopal, India (then British Indian Empire) into a Pashtun, but Urdu-

speaking family in 1936. His father Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Khan was an academic who

served in the Education Ministry of the British Indian Government and after retirement in

1935, settled permanently in Bhopal State.[8] After the partition in 1947, the family

emigrated from India to Pakistan, and settled in West-Pakistan.[9] Khan studied in Saint

Anthony's High School of Lahore, and then enrolled at the D.J. Science College of

Karachi.[9] There, he took his double BSC degree in Physics and inMathematics under

the supervision of physicist Dr. Bashir Syed.[9] In 1956, he attended Karachi

University and obtained a B.S. degree inMetallurgy in 1960 and subsequently got the

internship at the Siemens Engineering.[9]

After the graduation, he was employed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and

worked as an city inspector of weight and measures inKarachi, Pakistan.[9] In 1961, he

went to West Berlin to study Metallurgical engineering at the Technical University Berlin.[9] In 1967, he went to work in The Netherlands. Khan gained fame as a talented

scientist at the URENCO nuclear plant he worked in and gained special access to the

most restricted areas of the URENCO facility. He could also read the secret

documentation on the gas centrifuge technology. Qadeer Khan obtained an engineer's

degree in technology from Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and

a doctorate engineering in Metallurgical engineering under the supervision of Martin

Brabers from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 1972.[9] Qadeer Khan's

doctoral dissertations were written in German.[9] His doctoral thesis dealt and contained

fundamental work on martensite, and its extended industrial applications to the field

50

of Morphology, a field that studies the shape, size, texture and phase distribution of

physical objects.[9][10]

Research in Europe

In 1972, the year he received his doctorate, Abdul Qadeer Khan through a

former university classmate, and a recommendation from his old professor and mentor,

Martin J. Brabers, joined the senior staff of the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory

in Amsterdam.[11] There, he began his studies on the high-strength metals to be used for

the development of gas centrifuges.[12] The gas centrifuges were first studied by Jesse

Beams during the Manhattan Project in 1940s but research was discontinued in 1944.

The Physics Laboratory was a subcontractor for URENCO Group, the uranium

enrichment research facility at Almelo, Netherlands, which was established in 1970 by

the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants in the

Netherlands.[11] Soon when the URENCO Group offered him to join the senior scientific

staff there, Qadeer Khan left the Physics Laboratories. [11] There, he was tasked to

perform physics experiments on uranium metallurgy,[11] to produce commercial-grade

uranium metals usable for light water reactors.[11] In the meantime, the URENCO Group

handed him the drawings of centrifuges for the mathematical solution of the physics

problems in the gas centrifuges.[11] Uranium enrichment is a difficult physical process,

as 235U exists in natural uranium at a concentration of only 0.7%; URENCO used Zippe-

type centrifuges for that purpose to separate the isotopes 235U from non-fissile 238U by

spinning UF6 gas at up to 100,000RPM.[11] Abdul Qadeer Khan's academic and leading-

edge research in metallurgy brought laurels to the URENCO Group.[11] URENCO

enjoyed a good academic relationship with him, and had him as one of its most senior

scientists at the facility where he researched and studied. [11] At URENCO, Abdul Qadeer

Khan pioneering research to improve the efficiency of the centrifuges greatly contributed

to the technological advancement of the Zippe centrifuges, a method that was

developed by mechanical engineer Gernot Zippe in the Soviet Union during the 1940s.[11] URENCO granted Qadeer Khan access to the most restricted areas of its facility as

well as to highly classified documentation on gas centrifuge technology.[11]

51

1971 War and return to Pakistan

The clandestine and highly secretive atomic bomb project of Pakistan was given a start

on 20 January 1972, when President (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chaired a

secret meeting of academic scientists at Multan.[13] The winter planning seminar known

as Multan meeting, the atomic bomb project was launched under the administrative

control of Bhutto, and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) under its

chairman, Munir Ahmad Khan.[13] Earlier efforts were directed towards the implosion-

type bomb with exploration of the Plutonium route.[13] Prior to 1974, Khan had no

knowledge of existence of country's integrated atomic development, a controversy that

highly doubts Abdul Qadeer Khan's "father-of" claim. It was only on 18 May 1974, when

he was alerted after India surprised the world with its first nuclear

test (codename: Smiling Buddha), near Pakistan's eastern border under the secret

directives of Indian Premier Indira Gandhi.[13] Conducted by the Indian Army, it was only

three years since Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the 1971 Winter war and the

outcomes of the war had put Pakistan's strategic position in great danger. [14] The

nuclear test greatly alarmed the Government of Pakistan and the people.[13] Prime

minister Zulfikar Bhutto squeezed the time limit of the atomic bomb project from five

years to three years, in a vision to evolve and derived the country's scientific atomic

project as from the "atomic capability to sustainable nuclear power".[13] Sensing the

importance of this test, Munir Ahmad Khan secretly launched the Project-706, a

codename of a secret uranium enrichment programme under the domain of the atomic

project.[13]

Following the news about Pakistan, Khan wanted to contribute to the post-war military

posture and approached the Pakistan government officials, offering to assist in

Pakistan's secret atomic bomb project through his knowledge acquired at URENCO.[15] He insisted in joining the atomic bomb project[16] but was disuated by the military

scientists who considered as "hard to find" a job in PAEC as a "metallurgist".[15]

Undaunted, he wrote to Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, highlighting his specific

experience and encouraged Prime Minister Bhutto to work on an atomic bomb using

52

uranium.[15] According to Kuldip Nayyar, although the letter was received by Prime

minister Secretariat, Qadeer Khan was still unknown to the Government, leading Bhutto

to ask the ISI to run a complete background check on Khan and prepare an assessment

report on him.[17] The ISI declared him as "incompetent" in the field of nuclear

technology based on his academic discipline.[17] Unsatisfied with ISI's report, Bhutto was

eager to know more about him, and asked Munir Ahmad Khan to dispatch a team of

PAEC's scientists to meet him.[18] The PAEC team including Sultan Mahmood travelled

to Amsterdam and arrived at his family home at night. Discussions were held until the

next day.[18] After the team's return to Pakistan, Bhutto decided to meet with Khan, and

directed a confidential letter to him. Soon after, Abdul Qadeer Khan took a leave from

URENCO Group, and departed for Pakistan in 1974.[18]

Initiation and atomic bomb project

In December 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan went to Pakistan and took a taxi straight to the

Prime minister Secretariat.[19] The session with Bhutto was held at midnight and

remained under extreme secrecy.[19] There, Qadeer Khan met with Zulfikar

Bhutto, Munir Khan, and Dr. Mübaschir Hassan, government Science Adviser.[19] At this

session, he enlightened the importance of uranium as opposed to plutonium, but Bhutto

remain unconvinced to adopt uranium instead of plutonium for the development of an

atomic bomb.[19] Although Bhutto ended the session quickly he remarked to his friends

that: "He seems to make sense."[19] Early morning the next day another session was

held where he focussed the discussion on uranium against plutonium, with other PAEC

officials presented.[16] Even though he explained to Bhutto why he thought the idea of

"plutonium" would not work, Qadeer Khan was fascinated by the possibility of atomic

bomb.[16] Many of the theorists at that time, including Munir Khan maintained that

"plutonium and the nuclear fuel cycle has its significance",[14] and Munir Khan insisted

that with the "French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original

plan."[14] Bhutto did not disagree, but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort

toward acquiring HEU fuel.[14][20] At the last session with Zulfikar Bhutto, Khan also

advocated for the development of a fused design to compress the single fission element

53

in the metalized gun-type atomic device, which many of his fellow theorists said would

be unlikely to work.[16][21]

Finally in 1976, he joined the atomic bomb project, and became a member of the

enrichment division at PAEC.[19] Calculations performed by him were valuable

contributions to centrifuges and vital link to nuclear weapon research. [13] He continued to

push his ideas for uranium methods even though they had a low priority, with most

efforts still aimed to produce military-grade plutonium.[19] Because of his interest in

uranium, and his frustration at having been passed over for director of the uranium

division (the job was instead given to Bashiruddin Mahmood), Qadeer Khan refused to

engage in further research and caused tensions with other researchers.[19] He became

highly unsatisfied and bored with the research led by Mahmood; finally, he submitted a

critical report to Bhutto, in which he explained that the "enrichment programme" was

nowhere near success.

Kahuta research laboratories

Bhutto sensed great danger as the scientists were split between uranium and plutonium

routes.[19] Therefore, he called Khan for a meeting, which was held at the prime minister

secretariat. With the backing of Bhutto, Qadeer Khan took over the enrichment

programme and renamed the project to Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL).[19] Abdul Qadeer Khan insisted to work with theCorps of Engineers to lead the

construction of the suitable operational enrichment site, which was granted. The E-in-

C directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of Corps of Engineers to work with Qadeer Khan

in Project-706.[19] The Corps of Engineers and Brigadier Akbar quickly acquired the

lands of the village of Kahuta for the project.[22] The military realized the dangers of

atomic experiments being performed in populated areas and thus remote Kahuta was

considered an ideal location for reearch.[22] Bhutto would subsequently promote

Brigadier Zahid Akbar to Major-General and handed over the directorship of the Project-

706, with Qadeer Khan being its senior scientist.[23]

54

On the other hand, the PAEC did not forgo the electromagnetic isotope

separation research and a parallel programme was conducted by theoretical physicist

Dr. G.D. Allam at Air Research Laboratories (ARL) located at Chaklala PAF base,

though G.D. Allam had not seen a centrifuge, but only had a rudimentary knowledge of

the Manhattan Project.[24]

At first, the ERL suffered many setbacks, and relied heavily on the knowledge from

URENCO brought by Qadeer Khan.[24] Meanwhile in April 1976, theorist Ghulam

Dastigar Alam accomplished a great feat by successfully rotating the first generation

centrifuges to ~30,000 RPM.[24] When the news reached Qadeer Khan, he immediately

requested to Bhutto for G.D. Alam's assistance which was granted by the PAEC,

dispatching a team of scientists including G.D. Alam to ERL.[24] At ERL, Qadeer Khan

joined the team of theoretical physicists headed by theorist dr. GD Allam, working on

the physics problems involving the differential equations in the centripetal

forces and angular momentum calculations in the ultra-centrifuges.[24] On 4 June 1978,

the enrichment programme became fully functional after Dr. G.D. Alam succeeded in

separated the 235U and 238U isotopes in an important experiment in which Dr. A.Q Khan

also took part.[24][25] Contrary to his expectation, the military approved to the appointment

of Major-General Zahid Ali as the scientific director of entire uranium division.[24]

In 1981, when General Akbar was posted back to combat assignments, Khan took over

the operations of ERL as its interim director and senior scientist. [22][23] In 1983, his

appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President Zia-ul-Haq who

renamed the ERL after him.[26]

Despite his role Khan was never in charge of the actual development of atomic bombs,

mathematical and physics calculations, and eventual weapons testing. [26] Outgoing

General Zahid Ali recommended Munir Khan appointment as the scientific director of

atomic bomb project. This appointment came as a shock to Khan and surprised many in

the government and the military as Munir Khan was not known to be aligned to

conservative military.[24][26][27] The government itself restricted to provide full scientific

data of atomic projects and had him required the government security clearance and

55

clarifications of his visits of such secret weapons development sites, which he would be

visiting with senior active duty officers.[27]

In 1984, the KRL claimed to have carried out its own nuclear cold test of a nuclear

weapon, but this was seemed to be unsuccessful while PAEC underMunir Khan had

already carried out another test in 1983, codenamed: Kirana-I.[28]

PAEC's senior scientists who worked with him and under him remember him as

"an egomaniacal lightweight"[26] given to exaggerating his scientific achievements in

centrifuges.[26] At one point, Munir Khan said that, "most of the scientists who work on

the development of atomic bomb projects were extremely "serious". They were sobered

by the weight of what they don't know; Abdul Qadeer Khan is a showman." [26] During the

timeline of atomic bomb project, Qadeer Khan pushed his research

into rigorous theoretical physics calculations and topics to compete, but yet failed to

impress his fellow theorists at PAEC, generally at the physics community. In later years,

Abdul Qadeer Khan had became a staunch critic of Munir Ahmad Khan's research in

physics, and on many different occasions tried unsuccessfully to belittle Munir Khan's

role in the atomic bomb projects. Their scientific rivalry became public and widely

popular in the physics community and seminars held in the country over the years.

Uranium tests: Chagai-I

Many of his theorists were unsure that gaseous uranium would be feasible on time

without the centrifuges, since Alam had notified to PAEC that the "blueprints were

incomplete" and "lacked the scientific information needed even for the basic gas-

centrifuges."[29] However, calculations by Tasneem Shah, and confirmation by Alam

showed the possibility of improvise transformation of different centrifugal methods.[29] Against popular perception, the URENCO's blueprints were based on civilian

reactor technology; the blueprints were filled with serious technical errors.[13] ItsSWU rate was extremely low that it would have to be rotated for

thousands RPMs on the cost of taxpayer's millions of dollars, Allam maintained.[30] Calculations and innovation came from the team of his fellow theorists, including

mathematician Tasnim Shah, and headed by theorist G.D. Alam, who solved the

56

centrifugal problems and developed powerful versions of the centrifuges. [29]Scientists

have claimed that Qadeer Khan would have never gotten any closer to success without

the assistance of Alam and others.[29][31] The issue is controversial;[24] Qadeer Khan

maintained to his biographer that when it came to defending the "centrifuge

approach and really putting work into it, both Shah and Alam refused.[24]

The rivalry between KRL and PAEC intensified when neighboring India conducted a

series of tests of its nuclear bomb, codename Pokhran-II, in 1998 by the Indian Army.

This triggered a great alarm and calls for its own tests were made by country's

influential politicians. Nawaz Sharif, Prime minister at that time, came under intense

media and public pressure to authorise the nuclear testing programme. [28] After the

Indian nuclear weapons tests, Abdul Qadeer Khan repeatedly met with Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif, asking for permission to test the atomic bomb in Chagai. [28]At the

meeting, he even maintained that the tests could be performed at the controlled test site

in Kahuta. But this was rebuffed by the government, which instead ordered PAEC,

under Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, to perform tests in Chagai due to the experience of performing

the tests in the past.[28] When the news reached him, a furious Qadeer Khan was badly

upset and frustrated with the Prime minister.[28] Without wasting a minute, Khan drove

to Joint Staff Headquarters where he met with the chairman joint

chiefs General Jehängir Karamat,lodging a strong protest. General Karamat thereupon

called the Prime minister, and decided that KRL scientists, including Qadeer Khan,

would also be involved in the test preparations and present at the time of testing

alongside those of the PAEC.[28] It was the KRL's HEU that ultimately claimed the

successful detonation of Pakistan's first nuclear devices on 28 May 1998, under

codename Chagai-I.[25] Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging

to PAEC, under the leadership of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, detonated

a plutonium nuclear device, codename Chagai-II.[32] The sum of forces and yields

produced by devices were around ~40.0kt of nuclear force, with the largest weapon

producing around 35–36kn of force. In contrast, the single plutonium device had

produced the yield of ~20.0kt ofnuclear force and had a much more bigger impact as

compared to uranium devices.[32]

57

Many of Qadeer Khan's colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full

credit for something he had only a small part in. [29] He made an attempt to work on

the Teller design for the hydrogen bomb, but PAEC had objected the idea as it went

against government policy.[16][24][33] Abdul Qadeer Khan was known for taking full credit of

something he had only been one of the players, and often got engaged in projects

which were theoretically interesting but practically unfeasible

Proliferation of URENCO technology Abdul Qadeer Khan had established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO

technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.[25][35][36][37] In the 1980s, reports on

negotiations between People's Republic of China and Pakistan for the sale

of (UF6) and HEU fuel surfaced in the media.[38] The reports alleged that "A.Q. Khan had

paid a visit to China to provide technical support in their nuclear program whilst aiding

in building the centrifuge facility in Hanzhong province.[38] The Chinese

government offered nuclear material from their side, but Pakistan refused, calling it a

"gift of gesture" to China.[38] According to an independent IISS report, Zia had given a

"free hand" to Qadeer Khan and given unlimited import and export access to him. The

report showed that his acquisition activities were on the whole not supervised by

Pakistan governmental authorities; his activities went undetected for several years.[39]

Court controversy and U.S. objections

Pakistan's scientific activities rapidly attracted the attention of the outside world and

quickly suspected outside assistance. Suspicions soon fell on Qadeer Khan's

knowledge obtained during his years working in the URENCO Group.[40] In 1983,

Qadeer Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the local court in

Amsterdam for attempted espionage.[40] When the news reached to

Pakistan, Barrister SM Zafar immediately traveled to Amsterdam and filed a petition at

the Court.[40] Zafar teamed up with Qadeer Khan's old mentor professor Martin Brabers

and hisLeuven University to prepare evidence for the case.[40] At the trial, Zafar and

Martin argued that the technical informations supplied by Qadeer Khan were commonly

found and taught in undergraduate and doctoral physics at the university. [26] The

58

sentence was overturned on appeal on a legal technicality by the Court.[26] Reacting on

the suspicion of espionage, Qadeer Khan stated: "I had requested for it as we had no

library of our own at KRL, at that time".[26] He strongly rejected any suggestion at

Pakistan's proliferation attempts and stressed: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was

the result of our innovation and struggle. We did not receive any technical "know-how"

from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in

this connection."[26]

In a local interview given in 1987 he stated that: the U.S. had been well aware of the

success of the atomic quest of Pakistan.[41] Allegedly confirming the speculation of

export of nuclear technology, the Pakistan Government sharply denied all claims made

by Qadeer Khan. Following this, Qadeer Khan was summoned for a quick meeting with

President Zia-ul-Haq, who used a "tough tone" and strongly urged Qadeer Khan to

cease any information "he'd been providing in statements, promising severe

repercussions if he continued to leak harmful information against the Pakistan

Government."[41] Subsequently, he made several contacts with foreign newspapers,

denying any and all statements he had previously released.[41] After

U.S. terminating major aid to Pakistan, Benazir government reached an understanding

with the United States to "freeze" and "capped" the program to LEU which is up to 3–

5%. Later, the program was restored back to 90%HEU in 1990, and on July 1996, he

maintained, "at no stage was the program of producing 90% weapons-grade enriched

uranium ever stopped".[41]

North Korea, Iran and Libya

The defense treaty between Pakistan and North Korea was signed in 1990 after Benazir

Bhutto, Prime minister at that time, paid a state visit to the communist regime.

The diplomatic relations with Communist Korea were established during Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto's period.[43] In 1990, it was reported that the highly sensitive centrifuge

technology was being exported to North Korea in exchange for missile technologies.[43] On multiple occasions, Qadeer Khan had alleged that Benazir Bhutto had "issued

clear directions" for that matter. In 1993, downloaded secret information on uranium

59

enrichment was delivered to North Korea in exchange for information on developing

ballistic missiles.[39]

In 1987, Iran wanted to purchase a fuel-cycle technology from Pakistan, but it was

rebuffed.[39] Zia decided that the civil nuclear cooperation with Iran was purely a "civil

matter" and part of maintaining good relations with Tehran.[39] Zia did not further approve

any nuclear deals, but Qadeer Khan secretly handed over a sensitive report on

centrifuges in 1987–89.[39] It was only in 2003 that the nature of such agreements were

made public[43] The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the Western

world to fully disclose its nuclear program; the country agreed to accept tougher

inspections from the IAEA.[43] The IAEA inspection showed that Iran had established a

large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the URENCO designs,

which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1989". [43] The intermediary was

not named but diplomats and analysts pointed to Qadeer Khan.[43] The Iranians turned

over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the

Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the gas centrifuges invented by Qadeer Khan during

the atomic bomb projects.[43]

In 2003, the IAEA successfully dismantled Libya's nuclear program after persuading

Libya to roll back its program in order to have the economic sanctions lifted.[43] The

Libyan officials turned over the names of its suppliers which also included Qadeer Khan.[43] The same year, the Bush administration launched its investigation on Qadeer Khan's

leak in 2001 and 2002, focusing on Qadeer Khan's personal role.[43]

Dismantlement and revelation

The Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that "Libya had bought nuclear

components from various black market dealers, including Pakistan's".[43] The U.S.

officials who visited the Libyan plants reported that the gas centrifuges were very similar

to the Pak-1 centrifuges of Iran.[43] By the time the evidence against Qadeer Khan had

surfaced, he had become a public icon in the country and was the Science Adviser to

the Government.[43] His vigorous advocacy for atom bombs and missiles became an

embarrassment to the Pakistan government.[43] On 31 January 2004, Qadeer Khan was

60

suddenly dismissed from his post, and the government launched a full-fledged

investigation on Qadeer Khan to ostensibly "allow a fair investigation" of the allegations.[43]The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistan government officials" as

conceding that Qadeer Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S.

government's suspicions.[43]On 4 February 2004, Qadeer Khan appeared on state-

owned media Pakistan Television (PTV) and confessed to running a proliferation ring,

and admitted to transferring technology to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea

and Libya between 1991 and 1997.[44][45]

Although not arrested, the national security hearings were launched by the joint law

officers from JAG Branch.[43] The debriefings also implicated the role of the former chief

of army staff generalMirza Beg.[43] The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government

officials as saying that Qadeer Khan had told the military lawyers that "General Beg had

authorized the transfers to Iran."[46]According to IISS reports, Qadeer Khan had had for

several years security clearances over import and export operations which were largely

unsupervised and undetected.[39] Since 1970s, Abdul Qadeer Khan's security was

tightened, and he never travelled alone, but accompanied by the secret members of

the military establishment.[26]

Pardon, IAEA calls, and aftermath

On 5 February 2004, President Musharraf pardoned him as he feared that the issue

would be politicized by his rivals.[47] The constitution of Pakistan allows the President of

Pakistan to issue presidential pardons.[47] The hearings of Qadeer Khan badly damaged

the political credibility of President Musharraf and the image of the United States. While,

the Pakistan media aired sympathizing documentaries, the political parties on other

hand used that issue politically to the fall of Musharraf. The U.S. Embassy had pointed

out that the successor of Musharraf could be less friendly towards the United States;

this refrained United States from applying further direct   pressure  on Musharraf due to a

strategic calculation that may led the loss of Musharraf as an ally.

Strong calls were made by many senior IAEA officials, U.S. and European

Commission politicians, have Abdul Qadeer Khan interrogated by IAEA investigators,

61

given the lingering scepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding

Qadeer Khan's activities. All such requests were however strongly dismissed by the

Prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the government of Pakistan, terming it as "case

closed".

In December 2006, the WMDC headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief

and UNMOVIC chief; said in a report that Abdul Qadeer Khan could not have acted

alone "without the awareness of the Pakistan Government".[48] Blix's statement was also

reciprocated by the United States government, with one anonymous American

government intelligence official quoting to independent journalist and author Seymour

Hersh: "Suppose if Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear

technology around the world. Could he really do that without the American

governmentknowing?".[49]

In 2007, the hearings were suspended when Musharraf was succeeded by

General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani as chief of army staff.[3] Officially, all security hearings

were terminated by the Chairman Joint Chiefs  General Tärik Majid on November 2008.[3] Abdul Qadeer Khan was never officially charged with espionage activities nor any

criminal charges were pressed against him.[3] The military maintained that the

debriefings were the process of questioning Qadeer Khan to learn and dismantle

the atomic ring.[3] The details of debriefings were marked as "classified" and were

quickly wrapped up quietly following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf.[3]

In 2008, in an interview, Qadeer Khan laid the whole blame on President Musharraf,

and labelled Musharraf as a "Big Boss" for proliferation deals. In 2012, Qadeer Khan

later implicated Benazir Bhutto in proliferation matters, pointing out to the fact as she

had issued "clear directions in thi[s] regard." Domestically it is believed by some that

Qadeer Khan was made a scapegoat by President Musharraf to prove his uttermost

loyalty to the West whose support was urgently and desperately needed for the survival

of his presidency.[49] It was done so to protect the names of those high-ranking military

officials and civilian politicians, under whom Musharraf served in the past.[49]

Government work and political advocacy

62

Controversial, Qadeer Khan was shunned by much of the scientific community, but still

quite welcome in military science circles. In 2001, Musharraf promoted Abdul Qadeer

Khan to 'principalScience Adviser to the President'.[43]

Abdul Qadeer Khan remains a populous figure and many saw him as national hero of

Pakistan. He often served as Pakistan's extreme national pride, and his long association

with nuclear science bought Khan popularity. In the late 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan

promoted the funding of the Pakistan's integrated space weapons project and

vigorously supported, and supervised the Hatf-I andGhauri-I program.[50] In a television

speech in 2007, Prime minister Shaukat Aziz paid tribute to Abdul Qadeer Khan and

while commenting on last part of his speech, Aziz stressed: "(...)....The services of

(nuclear) scientist... Dr. (Abdul) Qadeer Khan are "unforgettable" for the country..(..)....".[51] In 2012, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan announced to form a political party Movement to

Protect Pakistan.[52]

Khan secured the fellowship and the presidency of Pakistan Academy of Sciences,

whose membership is restricted to scientists.[53] Through the Pakistan Academy of

Sciences, Khan published two books on metallurgy and material science.[54] Khan began

to published his articles from KRL in 1980s, and began to organise conferences on

Metallurgy by inviting scientists from all over the world. [54] Gopal S. Upadhyaya, an

Indian nuclear scientist and metallurgist as well, attended Khan's conference in 1980s

and personally met him along with Kuldip Nayar.[54] In Upadhyaya's words, Khan was a

proud Pakistani who wanted to show the world that scientists from Pakistan are inferior

to no one in the world.[54]

He contributed to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and

Technology when he served as the Project-Director of this university. [53] After the

construction of institute Khan took the Professorship of Physics while also serving as

the Chairman of Department of Metallurgy and Materials Science. [53] Later, Khan helped

established the Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at

the Karachi University.[53]

Legacy

63

During his time in the atomic bomb project, he pioneered Pakistan research in

the thermal quantum field and the condensed physics, while co-authored articles on

chemical reactions of the highly unstable isotopic particles in the controlled physical

system.[55] He maintains his stance to use of controversial technological solutions to

both military and civilian problems, including the use of military technologies for the

civilian welfare. Khan also remained a vigorous advocate for a nuclear testing program

and defence strength through nuclear weapons. He has justified the Pakistan's nuclear

deterrence program as sparing his country the fate of Iraq or Libya. [56] In his recent

interview, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained that he has no regrets for what he did and

maintained that:

[P]akistan's motivation for nuclear weapons arose from a need to prevent "nuclear

blackmail" by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been

destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If (Pakistan) had an [atomic] capability

before 1971, we [Pakistanis] would not have lost half of our country after a disgraceful

defeat.

—Abdul Qadeer Khan, statement on 16 May 2011, published the Newsweek, [57]

Abdul Qadeer Khan faced heated and intense criticism from his fellow theorists whom

he had worked with in the atomic bomb project, most notably theorist Dr. Pervez

Hoodbhoy.[58] In addition, Qadeer Khan's false claims that he was the "father" of the

atomic bomb project since its inception and his personal attacks on Munir Khan caused

even greater animosity by his fellow theorists, and most particularly, within the

general physics community towards Qadeer Khan.[2][58] Due to public promotion by the

Pakistan media, he remains one of the best known but also most controversial scientists

in the country.[3] He has been depicted in the media as Pakistan's own Dr.

Strangelove (commonly referred to Edward Teller) in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 satirical

film of the same name.[59]

He is the recipient of the following honors:

Nishan-e-Imtiaz  (1999) University of Karachi [53]

64

Nishan-e-Imtiaz (1996)

Hilal-e-Imtiaz  (1989)

Sir Syed University of Engineering

and Technology [53]

60 Gold medal from universities in

the country.[53]

Baqai Medical University [60]

Hamdard University [53]

Gomal University [53]

University of Engineering and

Technology, Lahore [53]

International Atomic Energy Agency

In 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Japan and the era of nuclear

proliferation began. From 1945 to 1962 four more nations joined the nuclear club and

many others were on the threshold. To deal with the growing threat of nuclear

annihilation, the countries of the United Nations came together to halt the spread of

nuclear weapons technology. To combat the ever increasing use of nuclear technology,

the United Nations created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is

based in Vienna. Then in 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed and

ratified by member nations and came into force in 1970. The purpose of both is to

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The NPT placed nuclear facilities

under the authority of the previously created IAEA.

Background

The International Atomic Energy Agency came into being in 1957, and by the mid-1960s

it had established a program of on-site inspections, audits, and inventory controls, the

basic purpose of which is to deter the diversion of peaceful nuclear uses to military

purposes by threat of early detection. To achieve its mission, the agency monitors the

flow of material into and out of nuclear installations in member countries by auditing

plant records and conducting physical inventories. Cameras and seals are used for

monitoring when IAEA personnel are not present. Although the IAEA has never 65

conclusively proved that materials were diverted from nuclear installations in any

country, they have not been permitted to inspect all facilities.

The IAEA has no authority to inspect nuclear programs of nations which are not bound

by treaty. In addition, the IAEA can only inspect those facilities that nations will allow it

to inspect. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the IAEA has never conducted a suspect

site inspection, but would conduct such an inspection if it received intelligence

information from member nations. However, the stand off between Iraqi officials and the

IAEA regarding inspection of facilities after the Gulf War is a good example of what

happens when the IAEA tries to conduct an inspection on facilities that a nation does

not want inspected. Another factor to consider is the inability of the IAEA to inspect

facilities of member nations that the countries have not put under IAEA auspices. For

example Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Pakistan all have installations that the IAEA

is not allowed to inspect even though there are other installations that the IAEA does

inspect within these nations.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors met in June of 1992 and

authorized the first budget increase since 1984. Also, at the 1992 meeting the IAEA

deferred discussion on the proposal to create a registry of nuclear-related transfers for

the second time. A registry of nuclear material would work like the international

conventional arms registry, which would enable organizations like the IAEA to keep

track of transfers of material that nations could potentially use to create nuclear

weapons. A registry would therefore make theft or diversion of nuclear material much

less likely because it would be easier to detect. In addition to the IAEA, another very

important part of nuclear non-proliferation attempts by the United Nations is the Non-

Proliferation Treaty. Both the NPT and the IAEA form the backbone of the UN efforts to

control nuclear technology.

The NPT came into force in 1970, creating an internationally binding treaty to prevent

the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The treaty calls for the existing nuclear

powers to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by not assisting any nation in the

66

creation of nuclear weapons. The treaty also calls upon non-nuclear member nations to

pledge not to use peaceful nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. Of the five

existing nuclear weapons nations in 1970 only three signed the NPT, the United States,

Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. China and France agreed to abide by the principles

of the treaty but did not sign it. It was not until 1992 that all established nuclear weapons

nations acceded to the NPT, China in March and France in August.

In the years following the ratification of the NPT, several other nations have achieved

what could best be described as ambiguous nuclear status. According to Spector and

Smith, India has exploded a "peaceful nuclear device," and Pakistan, South Africa and

Israel either possess nuclear weapons or are close to possessing them (6). The

problem with the NPT is that only the five original nuclear weapons nations, China,

France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are recognized nuclear

powers. Even if nations like India detonate a device they cannot be considered nuclear

powers under the NPT. This clause of the treaty creates a nuclear hierarchy, which

leaves non-nuclear weapons nations at the bottom. Thus, nations perceive that the

acquisition of nuclear weapons will strengthen their international status, resulting in an

incentive to acquire nuclear weapons rather than as a deterrent.

The NPT calls for a conference to review its progress every five years and a conference

at the end of twenty-five years to review and extend or dissolve the treaty. In 1995 the

twenty-five year conference will be held and the effectiveness of the treaty will be

evaluated. It will then be up to the committee to decide whether to extend the treaty as

is, amend it, or dissolve it. With the 1993 announcement of North Korea's intent to

withdraw from the NPT and the breakdown in negotiations between the United States

and North Korea in early 1994 still fresh in the minds of conference delegates, it is likely

that efforts will be made to strengthen the treaty and the inspections by the IAEA.

Current Issues

There are several issues that are very important in the current nuclear debate. After the

Gulf War, the IAEA, under United Nations mandate, tried to inspect a nuclear facility in 67

Iraq. The result was a stand off between inspectors and the Iraqi officials. In the end,

officials did get to inspect the Iraqi nuclear facility, but the international community

realized the impotence of the IAEA and the NPT. The United Nations realized how

difficult the IAEA and the NPT are to enforce if a member nation refuses to accede to

inspection.

After the Iraqi incident and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the focus of the

international community in regards to non-proliferation has changed. Attention has

turned from the previous spotlight on Western Europe, Canada, and Japan towards

other nations, and the system must be adjusted to meet the changing needs of

verification. At the center of the changing emphasis by the IAEA is the following

question: "Are there possibly other Iraqs, that is, countries successfully hiding nuclear

material that they should have declared and placed under international safeguards?"

Another current issue in the international non-proliferation debate is the potential

nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the time of this writing, the stand-off between

the United States and North Korea, regarding the latter's threatened withdrawal from the

NPT, is at an end. The nations have signed an accord in Geneva, and North Korea is

not leaving the NPT at this time. However, the threatened withdrawal of North Korea

from the NPT has exposed one of the treaty's weaknesses.

The enforcement of the NPT is almost impossible at this time because all member

nations have to do is to withdraw from it. Like most international treaties the NPT has an

escape clause which enables nations to withdraw from the treaty by giving member

nations and the United Nations Security Council notice of intent to withdraw and an

explanation of the extraordinary events that have led to such a decision.

The threatened nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, also brings to the forefront the

need to provide regional security assurances to help eliminate the need to arm. The

Korean Peninsula like the Indian Subcontinent, is characterized by hostile relations

between the nations that share borders. The South and North Koreans have an

adversarial relationship as do the Pakistanis and the Indians, which offer incentive for

68

those nations to have nuclear weapons as security. Then once one nation acquires

weapons the other must have one.

Take for example, the hostile relationship that exists between India and Pakistan. Once

India made a nuclear device to maintain weapons superiority over enemy state

Pakistan, the Pakistanis vowed to have one of their own. As one government official

stated "We will eat leaves and grass, even go hungry, but we will have one of our own".

The only way to eliminate proliferation in cases like India and Pakistan or North and

South Korea is to use the United Nations to work towards creating regional security

assurances to eliminate this incentive to nuclearize.

Not only is the current nuclear debate centering on how to strengthen penalties for

noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, but it has also been recommended that the

number of personnel and financial resources available to the agency be increased. By

increasing the resources available to the agency, it will have more money and people to

conduct more inspections. Conducting more inspections, will make diversion of

materials more risky to proliferators. Also, the inspections need to be modified to

increase the quality of inspections, not just the quantity.

If the inspections are done less thoroughly, then the increase in number will not matter.

In regards to the inspections that the IAEA carries out on facilities, another suggestion

that has come out is the use of surprise inspections like those used in Iraq after the Gulf

War. The surprise inspection does not allow time for the hiding of illegal activities and

the careful cover-up necessary to hide a country's nuclear weapons ambitions.

In addition to an increase in human and capital resources, the IAEA needs to have

broader access to intelligence data regarding suspect nations. Member nations need to

be encouraged to share with the IAEA their intelligence data on suspect facilities, so

that it can establish an early warning of such activity.

As mentioned above, the IAEA is also considering the creation of a registry of nuclear-

related transfers. This registry would function like the newly created international arms

69

registry and would help the IAEA track shipments of materials that could potentially be

used to create nuclear weapons grade material to occur.

As the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference approaches, there is new

attention being focused on the very real threat that the nuclear nightmare is not over.

Now rather than worrying about an East - West conflict, the real nuclear nightmare that

has been there all along is getting attention: the threat of a small nation gaining nuclear

weapons and having a regional conflict resulting in a nuclear exchange. Imagine the

current war in the former Yugoslavia being fought with nuclear warheads.

IAEA terms Pakistan’s nuclear

program safe and secure

ISLAMABAD, Apr 25 (APP): International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Monday

declared the nuclear program of Pakistan as safe and secure and appreciated the

obvious dedication to the safety and security of the regulators as well of

operators.Talking exclusively to APP on the sidelines of “International seminar on

nuclear safety and security”, held here from 21-23 April, Deputy Director General IAEA

Denis Flory said the IAEA emphasizes the importance of national responsibility for

security, which Pakistan takes seriously.In fact, Pakistan has had an Action Plan in place

to strengthen nuclear security since 2006, he added.

Giving details he said this plan covers such items as Management of Radioactive

Sources; Nuclear Security Emergency Co-ordination Center (NuSECC);Locating and

Securing Orphan Radioactive Sources.  

Pakistan has worked with the Agency both to implement that Plan and to provide

resources for its implementation, he maintained. 

For example, he said,Pakistan is the 10th largest contributor to the Nuclear Security

Fund, contributing $1.16 million.  This is an example of their strong leadership and

commitment as well as their serious approach to nuclear security in the course of

implementing its action plan.  

Additionally, over 200 people from Pakistan have attended IAEA training courses, he

70

went on to add. 

DDG IAEA said the Agency has worked with Pakistan to provide detection instruments;

staff from Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) receiving “on the job training”

with IAEA; security improved at a number of facilities in Pakistan using radioactive

sources. 

The relationship between the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and PNRA is close and

sets a good example for others he said, adding in fact, the Agency has benefitted from

lessons learnt, in particular through membership of the Chair of PNRA (past and current)

on the DG’s Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec).

When quizzed about the future of nuclear industry, after the Fukushima incident (Japan)

Denis Flory said the future of nuclear industry is not written down.It will depend on the

actions taken at national and international levels to strengthen safety, to harmonize the

implementation of international safety standards and to build the confidence of society

through transparency.

The nuclear community should address now these issues, before confidence is definitely

lost, he warned.

Denis expressed the IAEA’s support for the people of Japan as they respond to and

recover from the tragic events that occurred on March 11th. 

The IAEA, World Health Organization (WHO), and officials from other agencies have

maintained close contact with Japanese offices and have provided the Japanese

government with expertise, advice and technical assistance in a variety of areas, he

stated further.  

“Upon request, we have sent teams to Japan, who have the skills, expertise,and

equipment needed to help assess, survey, monitor, and sample the areas in and around

Fukushima Prefecture”. 

DDG IAEA said  “We cannot lose focus on the need for clean energy generation,

including solar, hydropower, wind and, Yes-nuclear  as a way to ease the world’s rapidly

growing energy demands and reduce its reliance on polluting fossil fuels”. 

Talking about challenges and opportunities in nuclear safety and security Flory said prior

to March 11, 2011, more than 60 countries indicated interest in introducing or expanding

71

nuclear power programmes, and the most important challenges were time and

resources. 

“To prevent another serious nuclear accident or terrorist incident, which,should it occur,

will completely erase the development of nuclear power worldwide, we need new

thinking and a new approach adapted to our dynamically changing global situations”.

One month ago, he said,the nuclear renaissance looked to be on track.  But, it has been

dealt a severe blow by Japan’s nuclear safety crisis.  The question is whether it could

stand the shock of a security incident; it would be particularly damaging to the

developing world looking to nuclear for its future energy needs, he added.

He emphasized the need for continued focus on international cooperation, especially

providing support for new entrants in building actual capacity and expertise to prevent

serious accidents. 

DDG IAEA also underscored strong commitment and leadership for safety and security

in ensuring robust national safety and security infrastructures with effective and

independent regulatory bodies, and strong safety and security management, leadership

and culture.

72

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