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Even small disputes will torpedo relations tense regional climate magnifiesdisagreementsMurphy 11 (Brian Murphy, August 12, 2011, Mideast upheavals open doors for Saudi strategies, TheOlympian, http://www.theolympian.com/2011/08/12/1758478/mideast-upheavals-open-doors-for.html ,)

But even small rough patches between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia take on heightenedsignificance in the tense Mideast climate . The Saudi statement on Syria followed White House urging for theSaudis and their Arab allies to take a sharper stance on Assads government. Days later, the U.S. imposed new sanctionson Syria, and presidential spokesman Jay Carney said Thursday that Syria would be a much better place without Assad incharge. In March, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Bahrain was on the wrong track to allow Saudi-led forcesto help crush protests in the island kingdom which is home to the Pentagons main military force in the region, the U.S.Navys 5th Fleet. Rights groups also have called on U.S. officials to take a sharper stance against Saudi Arabiascrackdowns on internal dissent, including a proposed law that Amnesty International said would allow authorities toprosecute peaceful protests as a terrorist act. In Iraq, Saudi officials are deeply wary of the U.S.-backed government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite who owes his power to Iranian-allied political groups. Meanwhile, a higher regionalprofile invites uncomfortable scrutiny about Saudi royal succession with both King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan in their mid-80s and undergoing medical treatment this year. Christopher Boucek, who follows Mideast security issues at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes Saudi leaders view U.S. policymakers as morepreoccupied with being on the right side of history instead of standing by its friends.Increasingly, it seems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign

policy interests do not overlap with the United States and Washingtons security interest s,Boucek said. Saudi Arabia is now in a position to pursue its own interests.

Any deviation from the status quo will upset the SaudisBoucek 2011 (Christopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program- focusing on securitychallenges in Arabian Peninsula & Northern Africa, June 21, 2011, U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the ArabSpring http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il )

Since the onset of the Arab Spring, one of the things weve seen Saudi Arabia do is move tosupport its friends and allies in the region Egypt before and after Mubarak and the monarchies in the regionand within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC ), the six-nation Arab Gulf state organization. Saudi Arabia isalso on the ground in Bahrain, supporting the Bahraini government as it weathers the protest movement. But Saudi Arabiahas also been involved in moving to expand the GCC to include Morocco and Jordan, two other monarchies . SaudiArabia typically uses a combination of money and religious ideology to support things or to

advance its policies. Weve seen the mobilization of Saudi connected religious networks to deliver the message thatprotesting is not authorized and that its illegitimate to protest and demonstrate against the government. Preservationof the status quo is the most important thing.

Lack of prior consultation will anger the Saudis perceived as pushing AmericaninterestsBoucek 2011 (Christopher Boucek, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program- focusing on securitychallenges in Arabian Peninsula & Northern Africa, June 21, 2011, U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the ArabSpring http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il )

Oftentimes, American officials want to go to Saudi Arabia to do things to advance Americanforeign policy objectives , whether its to help Taliban reconciliation or the peace process. Washington shows up

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and wants Riyadh to help the United States achieve the things it wants. Very rarely do U.S. officials go andsay that Saudi Arabia has one set of interests and the United States has the same set of interests so how can the two countries work together on those interests. Thats what happened in the1980s when both countries were working to support the Afghans against Soviet occupationboth countries had interests,both were working to advance those interests, and the relationship worked very well . The United States needs tomove this relationship from one where Washington tries to get the Saudis to do things tohelp American objectives, to one where both countries work together to reach the samecommon goal .

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The Arab Spring puts the US and Saudi Arabia on a collision course US supportfor democratic movements will ruin US-Saudi relations cuts off US oil access.

Nasr 2011 (Vali, Bloomberg View columnist, Will the Saudis Kill the Arab Spring? Bloomberg,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-23/will-the-saudis-kill-the-arab-spring-.html )In his speech last week on the Middle East, President Barack Obama left little doubt that America standswith the people of the region in their demand for change. This puts the U.S. on a collisioncourse with Saudi Arabia. The kingdom has emerged as the leader of a new rejectionistfront that is determined to defeat popular demand for reform . One would have expected Iran to leadsuch a front, but instead it is Americas closest Arab ally in the region that is seeking to defeat our policy. Though thepresident made no mention of Saudi Arabia in his speech, in the near term, dealing with the kingdom is the biggestchallenge facing the U.S. in the Middle East. Saudi rulers have made clear that they find U.S. support for democracy naiveand dangerous, an existential threat to the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. If the U.S. supports democracy, the Saudis aresignaling, it can no longer count on its special bond with Riyadh (read: oil). The Saudi threat is intended to present U.S.policymakers with a choice between U.S. values and U.S. interests. The idea is that either Washington stays the course,supporting the Arab peoples demands for reform, and risks a rift with Saudi Arabia, or it protects that relationship and losesthe rest of the Middle East. In fact, the choice between U.S. values and interests is a false choice, as the president madeclear in his speech. Now, American policy has to reflect this truth. So far, Washington has tried to placate the

Saudis. It is time we challenged their words and deeds, instead. Tectonic Shift Its no surprise that thetectonic shift in Arab politics, a popular revolt calling for reform, openness and accountability, worries the Saudi monarchy.The kingdom, like the rest of the Arab world, has a young population that wants jobs, freedom and a say in politics. Thirty-nine percent of Saudis ages 20 to 24 are unemployed. Having watched Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak step down amidprotests in which Egyptian youths played a key role, Saudi King Abdullah announced $35 billion in newsocial benefits to head off demands for reform at home. That bought the monarchy time, buttoo many dominoes are falling in its direction to allow for complacency. Violent protests on SaudiArabias borders, inside Bahrain and Yemen, have been particularly troubling. From the outset, Riyadh encouraged everyArab ruler to resist reform. The more Washington embraced the Arab Spring, the more Riyadhworried. Saudi rulers took particular exception to Washingtons call for Mubarak to resign,and when the U.S. urged reform in Bahrain, they saw U.S. policy as a direct threat to them.

Saudi-Iran tensions increase oil prices and shocks and cause an arms race

Spindle and Coker 2011 (Bill,Maraget, WSJ, 4-16,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576262744106483816.html?mod=WSJ_World_LeadStory )

"The cold war is a reality," says one senior Saudi official. " Iran is looking to expand its influence. Thisinstability over the last few months means that we don't have the luxury of sitting back and watching events unfold." OnMarch 14, the Saudis rolled tanks and troops across a causeway into the island kingdom of Bahrain. The ruling familythere, long a close Saudi ally, appealed for assistance in dealing with increasingly largeprotests . Enlarge Image Iran's flag Iran Active troops: 523,000 Battle tanks: 1,613 Combat aircraft: 336 Regional allies:Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas Source: Military Balance Iran soon rattled its own sabers. Iranian parliamentarian RuhollahHosseinian urged the Islamic Republic to put its military forces on high alert, reported the website for Press TV, the state-run English-language news agency. "I believe that the Iranian government should not be reluctant to prepare the country'smilitary forces at a time that Saudi Arabia has dispatched its troops to Bahrain," he was quoted as saying. The intensifiedwrangling across the Persian?or, as the Saudis insist, the Arabian?Gulf has strained relations between the U.S. andimportant Arab allies, helped to push oil prices into triple digits and tempered U.S. support for some of the popular democracy movements in the Arab world. Indeed, the first casualty of the Gulf showdown has been twoof the liveliest democracy movements in countries right on the fault line, Bahrain and theturbulent frontier state of Yemen. But many worry that the toll could wind up much worse if tensions continue to ratchet upward. They see a heightened possibility of actual militaryconflict in the Gulf, where one-fifth of the world's oil supplies traverse the shipping lanes between Saudi Arabia andIran. Growing hostility between the two countries could make it more difficult for the U.S. toexit smoothly from Iraq this year, as planned. And, perhaps most dire, it could exacerbatewhat many fear is a looming nuclear arms race in the region.

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Only the aff collapses relations UN vote doesnt matter Mutter '11 (Paul, contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and The Arabist "The U.S.-Saudi "Special Relationship"and the Arab Spring" June 28, 2011, www.arabist.net/blog/2011/6/28/the-us-saudi-special-relationship-and-the-arab-spring.html)

The Arab Spring is clearly an unsettling development for both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia , despite allthe talk in Washington about the democratic aspirations of Arab peoples (as an aside, the Palestinian peoples aspirations,a grave concern for both Israel and the U.S. are noticeably absent from such official plaudits). Protests have alreadyremoved pro-U.S. and Saudi-friendly leaders in Tunisia (whose exiled president now resides in the Kingdom) and Egypt (theSaudis, for their part, now fear Egyptian rapprochement with Iran: Der Spiegel reports that the Kingdom has promised thenew transitional government US$4 billion) and Syria (though no friend of either power) is becoming a potential flashpoint.Discontent in other Arab monarchies, such as Jordan and Morocco, has caused consternation in the House of Saud eventhough neither Morocco nor Jordan are Gulf countries, the Saudis have been pressing for their acceptance into the GCC(which, if it is now looking for a new name, ought to consider The Holy Alliance). Red Scares have long since given way toShia Scares in the region. The reactionary fear in these countries is very real: with growing Shia populations, the minoritySunni monarchies of the Gulf states face increasing pressure from their subjects for change and see an Iranian (meaning,Shia) hand in everything. There is a growing sense of abandonment by the U.S. in Riyadh over the supposed Shia threat, according to Saudi analyst Nawaf Obaid [Ed note: Obaid is in fact an advisor to PrinceTurki): As Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has shown itself in recentmonths to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat. The emerging politicalreality is a Saudi-led Arab world facing off against the aggression of Iran and its non-stateproxies [Hezbollah, Hamas] and Saudi Arabia will not allow the political unrest in the regionto destabilize the Arab monarchies. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Saudis have made overtures toPakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia towards a policy of containment toward Iran. The U.S. shouldn't be counted on to restorestability across the Middle East, Prince Bandar, who served as the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. from 1983 to 2005, issaid to have told a group of Pakistani generals recently. Concerns over a reputed Iranian fifth column in Bahrain (Iransupports the protests in this Shia-majority country ruled over by a Sunni royal family) remain pronounced among GCC (andU.S.) officials. The U.S., despite expressing some human rights concerns, has largely praisedthe actions of the Bahraini monarchy in managing demands for greater democratization and warned againstIranian interference . "The US has not been as supportive of human rights activists in Bahrain as itwould be in other circumstances, and it's not putting as much pressure on the Bahraini government as it's putting onYemen, Syria and other countries where the government is engaged in suppressing protests," Marina Ottaway of theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace told Al Jazeera. According to her , Saudi pressure is exercising a

significant influence on U.S. politics. The U.S., though, needs no allied pressure to keep itshead down over Bahrain . President Obama recently met with Bahrains rulers to discuss the strategic situation inthe region, and with good reason: Bahrain is the base of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. And while Washington has observed thisstudied silence over human rights violations in Bahrain and (with Saudi help) is now ramping up a drone war in Yemenagainst al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Yemen: A Backstop against al Qaeda One could compare Yemenshistoric relationship with Saudi Arabia to that o f Mexicos with the U.S.: intervention in a 20th century civil war, adiscriminatory economic relationship and even a border barrier (purportedly aimed at keeping out illegal immigrants).Saudi involvement is only increasing in response to unrest and pro-democracy demonstrations in Yemen. Though nothappy with the content of the pro-democracy protests (and ever worried about al Qaeda and Iranian influence in Yemen),the Saudis are hoping to ease out a besieged President Saleh, while at the same time do what they can to maintain Saudiinfluence in the country. Although the U.S. publically supports a negotiated solution in Yemen (that will probably result inPresident Salehs removal), there is much talk in the U.S. of the Yemen becoming another Afghanistan. The rationale for the drone war is that it will prevent al Qaeda from finding a new safe haven. The U.S. blames AQAP for failed attempts todestroy U.S. planes, the (abortive) actions of the Times Square bomber and the Fort Hood shootings. WikiLeaksdisclosures reveal the extent of the drone war is larger than previously thought and that the Yemeni government is fullyinvolved in it (in contrast to the drone campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan). It is difficult to tell just how the Arab Springhas affected official U.S. policy in Yemen, but consider this: a secret CIA airbase in the Mideast is reported to be under construction to enable this expanded effort. The AP reports that the U.S. views the new airbase as a backstop, if al-Qaidaor other anti-American rebel forces gain control. Charity Begins at Home At home, the Saudis have moved quickly tosuppress any stirrings of unrest relating to the Arab Spring. It would be an understatement to suggest that the U.S. looksthe other way over Saudi human rights abuses but unfair to say that the Saudis are inherently worse than other alliesbecause they are Arab or Muslim. Strategic importance outweighs such trivialities as human rights when strategic alliesare concerned Musharrafs Pakistan, Mubaraks Egypt and Pinochets Chile, for instance (and, of course, in Bahrain).That said, U.S. silence on human rights in Saudi Arabia is deafening (especially when compared to, say, U.S. statementsdirected at Iran). Whether it is has been on the suppression of public demonstrations (demonstrations by workers have beensuppressed for decades, and striking was even made illegal in 1965), lack of religious freedoms (even for Saudi Arabiasown Shia Muslim population), the indentured servitude that non-Saudi guest workers endure, or the arrest of women whohave protested the countrys ban on female drivers, the U.S. response has been, in the words of Secretary of State HilaryClinton, quiet diplomacy. Domestically, the Saudis have moved quickly to buy off dissent with new social spendingprograms, reports Foreign Policy. This approach is not new, though, but the scale of it is (US$130 billion this year alone).And that is partly due to ever-increasing discontent within the Kingdom. In addition to financing housing and employment

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programs (as well as beefing up the bureaucracy), some of this money will go to the countrys religious establishment.Many Saudis see the extra cash for religious institutions, including the religious police, as a reward for their vocal publicstance against potential anti-regime demonstrations, according to Foreign Policy. Indeed, with the Kingdom of SaudiArabia founded upon the basis of a religious-royal alliance, religious legitimacy is a vital competent of the House of Saudslegitimacy. Wahhabism, a particularly Puritanical strain of Sunni Islamism, is the ideological glue that has held the countrytogether since its founding in 1932. We are back to the 1950s and the early 1960s We are back to the 1950s and early1960s, when the Saudis led the opposition to the revolutions at that time, the revolutions of Arabism, according to a Saudi

political activist speaking to The Washington Post. The We, of course, is a royal we: it refers to both Saudi Arabia and theU.S., who have maintained a special relationship for decades. The relationship between the two powers animates their responses to the Arab Spring. To understand it, though, we will have to go back before the 1950s. Such an assault willbe repelled by any means necessary U.S. involvement with Saudi Arabia began with oil concessions in the 1930s.However, a formal engagement between the two countries had to wait until the closing days of WWII. On February 14,1945, U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt met with King Saud on board an American warship in the Red Sea. Thatmeeting established the prenuptial agreement for the two partners: American protection of the Kingdom in exchange for oilaccess. Since that meeting, the U.S. has increasingly committed itself to defending Saudi sovereignty (Saudi oilssovereignty, to be precise: the U.S. partly managed Saudi oil exports through a consortium called Aramco during much of the Cold War). A succession of early Cold War policies (such as the Eisenhower Doctrine) entrenched the U.S.s postwar presence in the oil-rich Mideast. By 1980, following the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.President Carter had declared that: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will beregarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by anymeans necessary, including military force. During the 1980s Tanker War in the Gulf, in which Iran and Iraq attacked eachothers shipping and that of other nations, the U.S. made good on its word to use force to protect its interests there. Thespecial relationship deepened following the Iran-Iraq War (of which the Tanker War was an extension of) with the f irstGulf War. Saudi Arabia, demanding intervention and even giving religious sanction to Coalition forces, subsequently servedas a base for the first Gulf War coalition. American subsidization of Saudi Arabias defense (to the tune of US$60 billion in2010 alone) has long freed up Saudi oil revenues for other uses: modernization programs, foreign investment, extravagantroyal lifestyles, a social safety net . . . And financing Islamist terrorists. Support for such organizations, such as al Qaeda,has been the justification (well, one of the justifications) for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, of Iraq in 2003, theextension of the War on Terror to Yemen, and U.S. opposition to organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the MuslimBrotherhood and Islamic Jihad. The U.S. has taken Saudi Arabia to task at the urging of the U.S. intelligence: after 9/11,the Bush Administration pressured the Saudis to share more information with them on terrorist suspects and cooperate withinvestigations of terrorist financiers and the Saudis obliged. But, this pressure was the exception to the norm: over thecourse of the special relationship, the U.S. had largely ignored active measures that Saudi officials, including members of the royal family, took in financing Islamist organizations. And, during the Cold War, the U.S. aided and abetted theseendeavors. We can live with that As noted earlier, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established by a religious-royalalliance. The Wahhabi religious establishment dominates social life, regulating religion, morality and education. As theclergy has gained greater power at home, Wahhabism has increasingly become Saudi Arabias leading export after oil. TheU.S. helped this along after 1945. After WWII, U.S. officials naively saw Islam (not really caring about or understandingsectarian differences) as a counterweight to socialism and nationalism. When nationalists could not be cajoled or bought,the U.S. (and its allies), would turn to Islamic organizations to assist in demonizing and undermining them, as was the case

in Egypt (under Nasser) and Iran (under Mossadeq). The real religious boom, though, did not begin until 1979. The timingcould not have been more opportune because of several factors: the Shah of Iran had been deposed in a popular revolutionin 1979, leading to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that year And,most importantly, Saudi Arabia found itself awash in oil revenue and in the midst of an identity crisis. It was a perfectstorm that brought the U.S. and the Kingdom closer together than ever before. In the winter of 1979, a group of Saudiradicals took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islams holy of holies. The radicals leader declared himself the Madhi, or savior, of all Islam and called for an overthrow of the tainted House of Saud. With the emergence of the Islamic Republicof Iran (whose very existence challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi Islamic state) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistanalso occurring in 1979, it was a tense year, to say the least, in Saudi Arabia. Though the Madhists were defeated after abloody siege of the Grand Mosque, the Saudi establishment was deeply shaken by the events of 1979 and looked toadvance religious initiatives to regain domestic and international initiative. Support for the Afghan mujahedeen, andincreased deference to the Wahhabi clergy at home, was the solution the establishment settled on. Enter the U.S., smartingfrom its humiliation in Iran, hoping to give the Soviets a taste of Vietnam in Central Asia. The Saudis eagerly became theprimary channel for U.S. aid to the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Bank of Credit and CommerceInternational, now defunct, was utilized by the CIA to fund the Afghan mujahedeen (and other secret programs). Hundredsof millions of Saudi dollars went to promote Wahhabi-influenced religious schools in Pakistan for young Afghan refugeesthat engendered the Taliban. The Pakistans military political leadership supported these developments as well, benefittingfrom Saudi largesse. There was little impetus to step back and ask big uncomfortable questions about whether Saudicharities represented a fundamental threat to American national security, writes Steve Coll in Ghost Wars: Americanstrategy . . . was to contain and frustrate Iran and Iraq. In this mission, Saudi Arabia was an elusive but essential ally. Then,too, there was the crucial importance of Saudi Arabia in the global oil markets. The Taliban received further Saudi supportin the form of guidance on implementing a harsh Sha-derived legal system (which included a copy of the Saudi religiouspolice, the mutaween). Before 9/11, though, the U.S. was not overly concerned with such things. In fact, in 1997, Pakistani

journalist Ahmed Rashid reported a U.S. diplomat as saying: The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis. There willbe Aramco, pipelines, an emir, no parliament and lots of Sharia law. We can live with that. Or rather, we could until 9/11.Kernel of Evil Saudi money, from official and unofficial sources, flowed to extremist groups all over the Muslim world.Although this had long been known within policymaking circles, the fact that fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers (and, of course, alQaeda financier and demagogue Osama bin Laden) were Saudi that prompted a closer look at the Kingdom in the U.S.,though the Bush Administration sought to deflect some blame from the Kingdom (and themselves). In 2002, a controversialand widely commented on RAND Corporation study titled Taking Saudi Out of Arabia described Saudi Arabia as: thekernel of evil . . . . active at every level of the terror chain. The Saudis, the Pentagon-commissioned study contended,

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sought to spread Wahhabism everywhere and to survive by creating a Wahhabi-friendly environment fundamentalistregimes throughout the Moslem world. The study landed analyst Laurent Murawiec (d. 2009), a French neoconservative,in hot water (he also advocated seizing oil fields and Mecca & Medina), but it was indicative of the mood at the time,reviving old U.S. designs on seizing Saudi oil as a worst-case scenario. Congress began conducting inquiries andreferring to the Saudis as state sponsors of terrorism. Before 9/11, U.S. officials often let such Saudi peccadilloes slide. Thisis not so much the case nowadays. As a result, the special relationship isnt so special anymore. Many in the royal familyopposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (they were none to happy about the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, either, nor Saudi-

bashing in Congress and FBI pressure to share information on Saudi charities with them). The Saudis asked the U.S. toleave their bases after the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, a request the U.S. complied with by building upits assets in neighboring Qatar. The influential Prince Bandar, who once referred to the U.S.-Saudi alliance as a Catholicmarriage, certainly seems to have his doubts these days about the strength of the special relationship. The Saudis haveincreasingly made overtures to China and Russia since 2003. Chinese and Russian military hardware (as well as diplomaticsupport) has fewer strings attached. Ultimately, though, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have the same interests they have hadfor decades: maintaining the status quo in the Gulf. Iran has replaced the USSR as a source of mutual concern, andmaintaining internal stability in the Middle East (even at the expense of democratization) has been a p lank of the U.S.platform in the region since 1945 (and of the British and French before them). Events at home, once again, helped bring thetwo closer together, because in 2003, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ( AQAP) first emerged . Arab fighters whohad escaped the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan were returning to Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations formed the core of AQAP. A campaign of targeted killings and vehicle bombings tore through the Kingdom before petering out after AQAPrelocated to Yemen and al Qaedas central apparatus turned its attention to Iraq. These attacks (which failed to produce anuprising of any sort) led the Saudis to cooperate more closely with the U.S.-led War on Terror.The U.S. praised Saudi efforts to crack down on homegrown terrorism, and cooperation between the two (over such thingsas terrorist financing and renditions to Guantanamo Bay) increased well, sometimes, that is. In any case, by the mid-

2000s, the furor over Saudi perfidy had partly subsided as all eyes turned to Irans nuclear program and influence in post-Saddam Iraq. As, if not more, indispensable So for all the talk of the Saudis striking out on their own, things are verymuch business as usual between the U.S. and the Kingdom these days . For instance, an arms dealis on the table involving the Saudi receipt of warships with integrated air and Aegis missile defense systems, as well ashelicopters, patrol craft and shore infrastructure and a program to train a new Facilities Security Force (FSF) designed toprotect sensitive Saudi oil installations . . . to reach 35,000 strong (although the U.S. bases there are closed, U.S. militarytrainers continue to work in Saudi Arabia). The Facilities Security Force is rather indicative of the pillars of the relationship:protection of U.S. oil interests, as well as military cooperation against any actors democratic, terroristic or otherwise thatthreaten the Kingdom and U.S. influence in the region. Even the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is bound up in this oil, as PrinceTurki who masterminded the CIA links to the mujahedeen during the Cold War has made clear: American leaders havelong called Israel an indispensable ally. They will soon learn that there are other players in the region not least the Arabstreet who are as, if not more, indispensable. . . . .There will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if theUnited States vetoes U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state. One commentator predicts that U.S. support for theIsraeli position on Palestinian statehood will prove to be just not as indispensable asaffordable energy . Whether this will hold true for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict remains to be seen, but it has

certainly held true for most other issues between the U.S. and the Saudis. Whatever happens at the UN thisfall, though, the counterrevolution in the Gulf will continue. Neither the U.S. nor theKingdom is truly willing to risk upsetting the Persian Gulf over the Palestinians .

Saudis are especially committed to controlling Bahrain US pressure for politicalreform angers the Saudis it splits them on common interests like IranPant 9/4/11 (Harsh, Reader in International Relations, Department of Defence Studies, Kings College London.A new balance of power in the Middle East. Business Standard, September 4, 2011. http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/harsh-v-pantnew-balancepower-inmiddle-east/447953/

Saudia Arabia sent troops to Bahrain earlier this year where they backed up a violent crackdown on unarmedprotesters by Bahrains own security forces. For Saudi Arabia, t he issue in Bahrain is less whether Bahrainwill attain popular rule than whether Iranian and Shiite influence will grow. Iran and Saudi Arabiahave sparred on many fronts since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 a Shiite Muslim theocracy in Tehran versus a deeply

conservative Sunni Muslim monarchy in Riyadh in a struggle for supremacy in the world's most oil-rich region. Theanimosity was evident in Saudi Arabia's support for Iraq during its war with Iran, and it still shows in Iran's backing for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Now, after a decade that seemed to tilt the regional balance toward Iran, Saudi Arabiadecided that Bahrain was the place to put its thumb more heavily on the scale. It sent troopsunder the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council to help crush pro-democracydemonstrations because most of the protesters were Shiites challenging a Sunni king. The brutal crackdownin Bahrain posed the greatest Middle East democracy dilemma yet for the Obamaadministration, deepening a rift with its most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia , while potentiallystrengthening the influence of its biggest nemesis, Iran. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have chilledto their coldest since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi Arabia was miffed that President Obama had abandonedPresident Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the face of demonstrations, ignored American requests not to send troops into Bahrainto help crush Shiite-led protests there. The United States has long viewed Saudi Arabia as a last bulwark against anascendant Iran in a crucial region, and does not want Tehran stepping in to back Shiites in Bahrain or Saudi Arabia. But

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where the United States and the Saudis are split is over how to prevent Iran from gainingtraction. While American officials say the Saudi and Bahraini governments can head off trouble by making political reforms, the Saudis believe that political reforms would onlyopen the door to greater instability .

Even mild changes to the SQ would destroy US-Saudi relations Saudis viewBahrain crisis as an existential threatGhazal '11 (Amal, assistant professor of Middle Eastern History, Dalhousie University, "Saudi Interests Standin the Way of Bahrain's Democracy" February 23, 2011, www.themarknews.com/articles/4185-saudi-interests-stand-in-the-way-of-bahrain-s-democracy)

Saudi Arabia looks at Bahrain as a buffer zone between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula and thus between the Shiites andSunnis and considers the regime of Al-Khalifa to be the buffer zone between Bahraini Shiite and Saudi ones. SaudiArabia has its own marginalized Shiite community, which is located in the eastern provinces where mostof the oil wells are. In simple terms, the Saudis fear that a successful uprising in Bahrain willempower the Shiite community there and, in turn, embolden Saudi Shiites . The Saudi rulingfamily is neither ready nor willing to initiate political reforms that may even mildlychange the status quo. Thus it is expected that the country will continue to act aggressivelyto protect the Bahraini regime and ensure its survival at all costs . We can already see evidence of this in the brutal and fatal force that the regime has been using against protesters.

Any changes in Bahrain willdamage Saudi strategies in the Middle East, not only affecting the way Saudis perceive Iran as a threat,but also affecting the in ternal socio-political dynamics of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Saudi ruling elite cannot afford to loseanother strategic regional ally. The loss of Mubaraks regime was a serious blow to Saudi interests in the region. This hascaused anxiety within the Saudi ruling elite, and has put a strain on Saudi-U.S. relations. It is likely thatthe Americans will turn a blind eye to the uprising in Bahrain , not only because the stability of the Gulf regimes is crucial for American interests, but also because the Americans fear further upsetting theSaudis (who think the Obama administration scapegoated Mubarak too quickly).

Even if relations are resilient, pre-emption, lashout, and internal instability are allindependent of US relations, short-term reactions outweighQuinn 11 (Andrew, Analysis: Bahrain crisis exposes U.S.-Saudi Arabia rift, March 15, 2011,http://www.bestgrowthstock.com/stock-market-news/2011/03/15/analysis-bahrain-crisis-exposes-u-s-saudi-arabia-

rift/ )Few suggest that the fundamentals of the U.S.-Saudi relationship built on oil, counterterrorismcooperation and a shared wariness of Iran are under threat. But Saudi Arabias involvementin Bahrain injects an unpredictable new element into the mix that could backfire if the tinykingdoms political violence escalates . The long-standing pillars of the relationship are stillsolid, said Frederic Wehrey, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation. But if Bahrainreally goes south, there is a serious outbreak of violence and perhaps an overreaction bySaudi security forces, I think it could quickly escalate into a major issue between the twosides . White House spokesman Jay Carney said on Tuesday the United States was aware of Bahrains request for help from its neighbors and regarded Saudi Arabia as an important partner.

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Saudi Arabias biggest fear regarding Egypt is whether the government will allywith Iran or back the SaudisJacinto 11 (Leela Jacinto, August 3, 2011, Will Mubarak face justice? http://www.france24.com/en/20110802-egypt-hosni-mubarak-faces-justice-trial-health-speculation-arab-spring-protests )

But he added that while the Saudis dont want to see Mubarak on trial, there are other, more threatening issuesthat the Saudis hope their money can buy, such as Egypts alignment on Arabism and itssupport on Iran. Shortly after Mubarak was ousted there was a possibility that Egypt wouldestablish normal relations with Iran and this is more threatening for the Saudis . As the globalShiite powerhouse just across the Persian Gulf, Iran has long been a threat to Saudi Arabias Sunni monarchy.

Saudi Arabia wants a hand in Egypt to counter Iranian influence the Saudis fear that any number of forces sympathetic to Iran will fill the void left by Mubarak.Reuters 11 (Reuters, February 7, 2011, Saudi Arabia fears Egypt unrest could bolster Iran's role in region:analysts, http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_saudi-arabia-fears-egypt-unrest-could-bolster-iran-s-role-in-region-analysts_1504576 )

Yet the Saudis may feel that a weakened Mubarak on his way out is no longer an effectivebulwark against Shi'ite Iran. They more than share US fears that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons a chargeTehran denies. "Cut off the head of the snake," the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Adel al-Jubeir, quoted King Abdullahas advising US General David Petraeus in April 2008, according to a US cable released by WikiLeaks in November,referring to Iran. The kingdom, custodian of Islam's holiest sites, sees itself as a bastion of Sunni Islam, so it is also deeply concerned about wider Shi'ite influence in the region havingwatched the 2003 US-led invasion produce a Shi'ite-led government in Iraq. The Saudis fret that the balancecould tilt further if Mubarak's impending exit leads to prolonged uncertainty in Arabheavyweight Egypt , a staunch foe of Iran. "T here will be a vacuum. Egypt was a very importantelement for Middle Eastern stability. Saudi Arabia will have to carry the burden if there isinstability or a vacuum on the political side," said Turad al-Amry, a Saudi political analyst. "What is thedirection of the new regime and new government (in Egypt) and how fast can it perform business?" he asked. SPACE FOR

RIVALS Egypt, shaken by anti-Mubarak protests for the past 13 days, will in any case be too focused on its internal crisis tobolster Saudi efforts to counter Iran's sway, analysts say. Diplomats said Riyadh also worries that a diplomaticvoid left by a preoccupied Egypt will give openings to countries such as Turkey and Qatar ,a smaller Gulf rival of Saudi Arabia, which both seek bigger regional roles and are on good termswith Iran.

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The US must get Bandar on board with the plan to minimize Saudi Arabias fear of regional power imbalances. The impact is Saudi modernization, proliferation fromPakistan, and conflict with Iran.Hannah 11 (John Hannah, April 22, 2011, Bandars Return, Foreign Policy,http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/04/22/bandars_return )

As my friend Simon Henderson has been chronicling, "Bandar is back." Sidelined in recent years by some combination of illness and palace intrigue, Saudi Arabia's legendary former ambassador to Washington, PrinceBandar bin Sultan, is once again a major presence on the world stage. The Obama administrationwould be wise to take note. Working in tandem with the United States, Bandar's over-sized talents could prove a huge assetin efforts to shape the Middle East Revolts of 2011 in a direction that serves U.S. interests. Put to other uses, however,those same skills could lead to results that Washington may find, well, much less agreeable. The reason that Bandar hasbeen urgently called back into service is not hard to fathom. While many in the West have seen the promiseof democracy and freedom in the political turmoil roiling Arab lands, the Saudis see littlebut disaster. They view everything through a single prism: their existential struggle with a menacing Iran that is hell-bent

on collapsing the Middle East's existing order, unseating the House of Saud, and asserting a controlling influence over Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina. For the Kingdom, there really is only one yardstick by which to measureemerging developments: Are they a net plus or minus for the Persian theocracy across the Gulf that seeks to assert itshegemony throughout the region? From that vantage, the scorecard has not been good. The regime of Hosni Mubarak --longtime Saudi ally; pillar of regional stability; stalwart opponent of the mullahs -- is gone. Yemen, on the Kingdom'ssouthern border, teeters on the brink of anarchy. Most threatening of all, just miles off the Saudi coast, in tiny Bahrain -- avirtual protectorate of the Kingdom and the gateway to its oil-rich eastern province -- the Sunni al-Khalifa monarchy waspushed to the brink by Shiite protesters who, cheered on by Iran, dabbled dangerously with the idea of regime change.Brazenly challenged to defend one of their clearest redlines, the Saudis responded predictably, with a large-scale militaryintervention that underwrote a brutal crackdown to snuff out the escalating crisis. Exacerbating everything for Riyadh hasbeen its overarching loss of confidence in the reliability of American power. Against all Saudi advice, the Obamaadministration actively worked to help engineer Mubarak's ouster. In Bahrain, senior U.S. officials were publicly pressing theruling family to make bolder concessions to the protesters -- literally hours before Saudi tanks began to roll. More recently, atardy and hesitant exercise of U.S. military might has failed to dislodge Libya's Colonel Qaddafi, the man who just a fewyears ago contracted the assassination of Saudi King Abdullah . And in stark contrast to Washington's verypublic effort to push aside its longstanding Egyptian ally -- "yesterday," to quote Robert Gibbs -- Team

Obama has kept an embarrassingly low profile in the face of sustained protests andbloodshed in anti-American Syria, a regime that proudly serves as Iran's closest ally in the Arab world. Facing asituation where the region appears to be spiraling out of control, and its most important outside partner veers betweenweakness, incompetence, and reckless naivete, the House of Saud has circled the wagons, brought all hands on deck,called in the A Team -- choose your metaphor. But it all leads back to Bandar -- one of the most dynamic,creative, and aggressive statesmen of the past 30 years -- being summoned out of diplomatic purgatoryto help the Kingdom cope with what it sees as an unprecedented crisis . Make no mistake,the Saudis now feel themselves very much at war with Iran , albeit by other means, and the stakesas viewed from Riyadh are nothing less than the future of the Arab Middle East and thesurvival of the House of Saud. And the force of nature that is Bandar bin Sultan has clearly been placed at theforefront of the Kingdom's battle plan. I've lost count of how many times people have asked me in recent years, "Whatever happened to Bandar?" Now he's suddenly everywhere. Earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Gates visited Riyadh to seeKing Abdullah. Bandar was there. Days later, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon followed to deliver a message toAbdullah from President Obama. Again, Bandar was prominently featured in the photo-op. More interestingly -- andundoubtedly more worrisome -- at the end of March, in the wake of the Saudi intervention in Bahrain, Bandar was

dispatched to Pakistan, China and India to rally support for the Kingdom's hard line approach to the region's unrest.Bandar's formidable skills in the service of a Saudi Arabia that feels itself increasinglycornered and unable to rely on U.S. protection is a formula for trouble -- made even worse whenthe likes of Pakistan and China are thrown into the mix. No one should forget that, in the late 1980s, it was Bandar whosecretly brokered the delivery of Chinese medium-range missiles to the Kingdom, totally surprising Washington and nearlytriggering a major crisis with Israel. The danger today , of course , is that the Saudis feel sufficientlythreatened and alone to engage in similar acts of self -help. Would they seek to modernize their ballisticmissile force? Even worse, wou ld the Kingdom go shopping for nuclear weapons or, at a minimum,invite Pakistan to deploy part of its nuclear arsenal to the Kingdom ? Analysts have long speculatedthat Saudi money financed the Pakistani nuclear weapons program in exchange for a promise that when it becamenecessary, its fruits would be put at Riyadh's disposal. As the Middle East convulses and Iran relentlessly inches closer toachieving a nuclear weapons capability, has that time finally arrived? Even short of these extreme scenarios, other troubling possibilities exist. During his trip to Pakistan , Bandar reportedly discussed contingencies under

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which thousands of additional Pakistani security forces might be dispatched to Bahrain andSaudi Arabia for the purpose of, in effect, cracking Shiite heads . Iran condemned the news, ratchetingup tensions further and increasing the risk that the situation could erupt into a full-blown Sunni-Shiite war. Additionally, noone can discount the danger that, with its back against the wall, the Kingdom might not once again fire up the old Sunni

jihadist network and point it in the general direction of Shiite Iran -- leaving the rest of the world to deal with the nasty,unintended consequences of well-financed takfirists run amok. To minimize the risk that any of these dangers actuallycomes to pass, the Obama administration would be well advised to focus like a laser beam on repairing its breach of trustwith Riyadh. The visits of Gates and Donilon to the Kingdom clearly had that intent and, by most accounts, succeeded instemming the hemorrhaging in the relationship. But the effort will need to be sustained. The administration would also besmart to re-establish a very strong line of communication to Bandar now that he's again playing a major role in Saudi policy.Bandar working without reference to U.S. interests is clearly cause for concern. But Bandar working as a partner withWashington against a common Iranian enemy is a major strategic asset. Drawing on Saudi resources and prestige,Bandar's ingenuity and bent for bold action could be put to excellent use across the region in ways that reinforce U.S. policyand interests: through economic and political measures that weaken the Iranian mullahs; undermine the Assad regime;support a successful transition in Egypt; facilitate Qaddafi's departure; reintegrate Iraq into the Arab fold; and encourage anegotiated solution in Yemen. Even in Bahrain, if anyone in the Saudi hierarchy is going to understand over time that astable solution must eventually go beyond repression to include a renewed effort at real reform, it is likely to be Bandar.

Bandar hates the plan he wants Tantawi and the SCAF to have full power Escobar 11 (Pepe Escobar, author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War,The secret life of Arabia, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MF03Ak01.html)

The House of Saud has its hands full with Egyp t as well - now that the Egyptian Military Council has beenhanded a cool $4 billion by Riyadh. It's enlightening to know that Field Marshall Tantawi - the current,"transitional" strongman in Cairo - was the Egyptian Defense Attache in Pakistan during theAfghan jihad of the 1980s . So Tantawi is an ISI darling , as well as a Saudi Prince Bandar darling. WithTantawi as a House of Saud Trojan Horse, his bet for Egypt is much more Muslim Brotherhood than secular Tahrir Square.That happens to square off beautifully with Washington's own (not so secret) burning desire: a Pakistani model for Egypt,with the army in the background and a facade civilian government run by Islamic parties who won in the ballot box. But thismildly Islamic regime would only be acceptable if it were to kowtow to neo-liberalism and the Camp David accords withIsrael. The House of Saud subscribes to this project for a very simple reason. The House of Saud knows its supposed hegemony in the Arab world only holds as long as Egypt is keptpolitically insignificant . And the way to accomplish this is via an islamicization - the Wahhabi way - of the state andpolitics as a whole. Tahrir Square, hopefully, will fight it to death. At least there may be a few reasons toexpect not such a bleak, upcoming Arab Summer.

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Regional spillover Saudi Arabia wants a subservient Yemen to preventdemocratic movements throughout the region.Al-Shamahi 11 (Abubakr Al-Shamahi, freelance journalist and editor of Comment Middle East, August 8,2011, Taking a chance on a democratic Yemen, Al Jazeera,http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/08/2011847134790380.html )

Then come the two states with the biggest influence in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the US. Saudi Arabia has twogoals in Yemen: to try to retain its influence in the country, and to bring about a stable

Yemen without letting Yemen get too strong . Here we can refer to the alleged deathbed advice of KingAbdulaziz: "Keep Yemen weak". While this may not have happened, Saudi policy in the country certainly bears it out.Support for the royalists in the civil war in the 1960s, and for secessionists in the civil war of 1994, are two examples .The youth movement therefore presents a serious problem for Saudi policy in Yemen . Themovement has goals that are the antithesis of the way Saudi Arabia is run. Should the movement succeed inbringing about a civil, democratic state in Yemen, this would present a dangerous model inthe eyes of the ruling al-Saud . The youth movement also appears to not have been co-opted by Saudi Arabia yet,which puts the country in the strange position of having a powerful grouping in Yemen not under its sway. Should theyouth movement succeed, there is no doubt that there would be a move away from SaudiArabia, and an attempt to bring about an independent foreign policy. Yemen, the most populous country on the Arabianpeninsula, could become a relatively strong, democratic country, in the long term. This would no doubt upset thebalance of power in the region.

Saudi Arabia will accept only the GCC proposal they fear a Saleh trial would seta dangerous precedent in the region AND they want to maintain a hand in

Yemens politics. They want the transition to occur so General Ali Mohsen alAhmar can gain power.Shakdam 2011 (Catherine Shakdam, July 6, 2011, Foreign Policy Association,http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/07/06/general-ali-mohsen-al-ahmar-opens-cnn%E2%80%A6what-saying/ )

When asked what he thought should be done in Yemen, Mohsen said: The general public in Yemen isseeking a transfer of power to the vice president This is a principle that we must follow because there areagreements that sides have signed and it is compulsory that all sides agree on its specifics; not change its points.Interestingly the General is preaching to an implementation of the GCC proposal which wasunilaterally signed by the Opposition before President Saleh once again fell short of honoring his promises. Under the agreement, Saleh would transfer power to its Vice President, Hadi, who would in turncreate a coalition government and organize the next presidential elections . President Saleh wouldin exchange be granted legal immunity along with his close relatives and aides. What is important here is that rather thanadvocate an immediate transfer of power under the Yemeni Constitution, Gen. Mohsen wants to return to the pre-Salehdeparture proposal. It sounds rather strange given that the Constitution states that if the President is unable to fulfill hisexecutive duties, the VP would act as his replacement and arrange the next elections within 2 weeks. Why choose thelonger and unpopular option? Well for a start, Gen. Mohsen is a close friend and ally of Saudi Prince Nayef, the Head of theYemeni Affairs Council in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi have been from the get go the drivingforce behind the GCC proposal. Although the Kingdom recognizes the need for a change, itdoes not want to set a precedent in the region by allowing Yemen to drag Saleh to Courtand trial him for his crimes . Furthermore, by promoting the Saudi plan in the resolve of the

Yemeni crisis, the General is proving the Kingdom that he still has a role to play in Yemenspolitical landscape. Well aware that the KSA will have to anoint the next Yemeni President, Mohsen is acting as afervent and obedient vassal. The General went on saying: Our friends the Americans and the Europeans and the Britishand the GCC and Saudi Arabia are guarantors for its implementation. Quite cleverly here, Mohsen is positioning himself asa man of measure and poise, aware of the need of an international partnership in the region.

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Saudi Arabia will invade to stop successful democratic revolutions fear of a

revolution at home and loss of regional hegemony would jack oil marketstabilityAhlul Bayt News Agency 2011 (Ahlul Bayt News Agency, July 12, 2011 (Commander: Saudi RegimeFeeling Deeply Intimidated by Arab Spring, http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&id=252946))

He mentioned that Saudi officials are feeling deep concern for the outcomes of the currentrevolutions in Bahrain, Yemen and other Arab countries not just because they are fearful of the spread of theseuprisings to their country, but also because of the threats that such developments pose to the monarchy'sregional clout and influence. "They are concerned about the revolutions and developments which are influencedby the Islamic awakening in those areas which are connected to their land," Rashid said. He further touched on thepossible outcomes and negative impacts of the regional revolutions on Saudi Arabia's regional power and influence, andsaid, "When they look at the Bahrain revolution, Saudis feel that regions to the East of their country are gone and when theysee such a fundamental and revolutionary development in Yemen, they feel that those regions to the South of their countryare gone as well." Given the popular uprisings and revolutions sweeping the Middle-East and North of Africa and thegrowing discontent among the Saudi people, many analysts believe that regional unrests will soon

spread to Saudi Arabia . "The reason for the Saudi Army's invasion of Bahrain is that if people's revolutions inYemen and Bahrain yield results, the Saudi people will certainly follow suit and stage a popular uprising as well," a senior Saudi human rights activist and opposition figure, Seyed Hassan al-Moussavi al-Bahraini, told FNA in May. In similar remarks, a prominent Bahraini politician said in April that the current revolution in his Shiite-majority nation would give rise toa similar uprising among the Shiite minority of Saudi Arabia, who mainly live in oil rich regions of the Arab country."Adjacency of Bahrain's Shiite-majority population to Saudi Arabia's Shiite region of al-Shortiyah, which is just 25km awayfrom the borders with Bahrain, poses a potential threat to the Saudi regime," Representative of the Bahraini Shiites in IranAbdullah Daqaq said. "Victory of the Bahraini people's uprising would lead to a similar uprising by the Shiites of the al-Shortiyah region that has the richest oil resources in Saudi Arabia," Daqaq underscored. He further pointed out that thedeep and grave impact that such an uprising in Saudi Arabia would leave on the world oilmarket, which would certainly harm the interests of the western countries , is the root cause of theSaudi occupation of Bahrain and the brutal suppression of the Bahrainis' popular movement by the Al-Khalifa and Al-Saudregimes and the West's support for their crimes.

Even small changes in the Middle Eastern oil market will can price spikes and

shocks devastates the economic recovery and spreads globallyNewman 11 (Rick Newman, February 18, 2011, How Arab Unrest could Harm the World Economy, US News& World Report, http://www.usnews.com/mobile/blogs/flowchart/2011/2/18/how-arab-unrest-could-harm-the-world-economy.html )

Oil, however, is a different story, since it can rapidly transmit Middle East turmoil to many other nations . The Middle East accounts for 30 percent of the world's oil production and a bigger portion of proven reserves,and even small changes in the supply of petroleum can have an outsized impact on the oil-thirsty economies of the UnitedStates, Europe, and Asia. Research firm Roubini Global Economics points out that three of the last five globalrecessions have followed some kind of shock in the Middle East that drove oil prices up."Even regional political turmoil that does not disrupt oil supplies directly can increaseprices ," writes RGE Chairman Nouriel Roubini in a recent research note. So far, regime change in Tunisia and Egypt andthe increasingly violent protests in Bahrain and Yemen have left the oil markets unscathed. But the same types of socioeconomic problems exist in Libya, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other major oil producers, and if Egyptian-stylerevolution hit any of those countries, it could be a game-changer. For now, the overthrow of any Persian Gulf oilmonarchies seems unlikely, partly because oil-rich nations are somewhat insulated by their own wealth. When the nativesget restless in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, for instance, the government typically boosts the lavish subsidies paid to ordinarycitizens, essentially buying their quiescence. Plus, living standards are already much higher in the oil-rich nations than instruggling economies like Egypt or Yemen, where poverty and high unemployment drove protesters into the streets. Still,there's no guarantee that what has worked in the past will keep working. In Bahrain, for instance, the king tried recently tolull protesters by offering every family $2,500 in cash. The protesters only seemed to get angrier. "They're not going to beplacated just by money," says Mohsin Khan, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. "There'ssomething more in the air." [See 3 big lies about cutting the deficit.] Water-cooler worst-case scenarios focus on a militanttakeover of Saudi Arabia or another big oil nation, similar to the 1979 Iranian revolution. But far lesser shockscould also send oil prices skyrocketing, which in turn could be enough to torpedo thefragile economic recovery that's underway in many countries . Libya and Algeria, for instance, controlabout 4.5 percent of the world's oil production, and rulers in both countries are battling pro-democracy uprisings. If either nation underwent a full-fledged revolution, that wouldn't necessarily mean the oil fields would stop pumping. But there could

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be sabotage, strikes, or other measures meant to disrupt the flow of oil, and that could be enough to send prices upward.Iran, with about 4.8 percent of the world's oil production, is another obvious wild card. The theocratic, hard-line regime therehas been able to squash pro-democracy movements in the past, but its grip on control seems to be under stress onceagain. One common assumption is that if political developments impeded the flow of oil in one or two nations, other producersSaudi Arabia, mostlywould pump more, to make up for it. Roubini estimates that the Saudis have up tofour million barrels per day of excess capacity roughly equivalent to Iran's total productionwhich seems

like a lot of slack in the system. But that doesn't account for the jittery psychology of the oil markets,which at times can be more powerful than the underlying fundamentals. [ See how to survive taxhikes and spending cuts.] The world got a primer on that in 2008, when oil prices rose from $95 per barrel to $145 in amere six months. The causes still aren't completely clear, but it does seem evident that a bubble mentality led traders to bidup oil because they felt prices would go even higher in the future. The bubble burst as the global recession hit, and by theend of 2008, prices had collapsed by nearly 70 percent. On one hand, it's reassuring that o il prices fell back to levels moreconsistent with real economic activity. But the 2008 spike also revealed the extent to which psychology and fastcomputerized trading can dominate the market for volatile commodities like oil. "Once there's movement in prices,momentum trading kicks in and people want to lock in future prices," says Khan. "That pushes prices higher and higher. Themarket can overshoot significantly." If oil prices could surge by 50 percent in 2008when the world was sliding intorecession and the Middle East seemed a bit calmer than it does nowthen another bubble is certainly possible if severalMiddle Eastern capitals are in a state of rebellion. And one clear lesson of the last few years is that despite the expertise of Ph.D.'s trying to predict every possible development, "externalities" able to shock the global economy can still catcheverybody by surprise. So it might not be a challenge to the Saudi monarchy or the Iranian ayatollahs that sets off an oilshock, but a series of smaller triggers that nobody foresees right now. In addition to strikes or sabotage by oil workers, Khansays other indicators to watch for include the departure of foreign engineers or other technical experts who help keep the oilfields pumping in many Gulf states. [See 5 reasons to stop fearing China.] The global economy can probably withstand a10 or 15 percent rise in oil prices, but anything more than that could threaten the recovery. Roubini says that if pricescrested $100 and stayed there for a while, it would cut into global consumption and GDP growth, which could lead to adouble-dip recession in some countries. If political upheaval actually interrupted the flow of oil, the effect would be moreabrupt. " It wouldn't have to be a permanent loss of oi l," says Khan. " Even a temporary loss over six or 12 months would be enough for prices to rise very rapidly. The impact on the worldeconomy would be significant."

Oil wars cause extinction.Heinberg 03 (Richard Heinberg, core faculty member at New College of California, The Partys Over: Oil,War and the Fate of Industrial Societies, 2003, p. 230)

Today the average US citizen uses five times as much energy as the world average . Even citizensof nations that export oil such as Venezuela and Iran use only a small fraction of the energy US citizens use per capita.The Carter Doctrine, declared in 1980, made it plain that US military might would be applied to the

project of dominating the worlds oil wealth : henceforth, any hostile effort to impede the flow of Persian Gulf oilwould be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and would be repelled by any meansnecessary, including military force. In the past 60 years, the US military and intelligence services have grown to becomebureaucracies of unrivaled scope, power, and durability. While the US has not declared war on any nation since 1945, i thas nevertheless bombed or invaded a total of 19 countries and stationed troops, or engaged in director indirect military action, in dozens of others . During the Cold War, the US military apparatus grewexponentially, ostensibly in response to the threat posed by an archrival: the Soviet Union. But after the end of theCold War the American military and intelligence establishments did not shrink in scale to anyappreciable degree. Rather, their implicit agenda the protection of global resource interests emergedas the semi-explicit justification for their continued existence. With resource hegemony camechallenges from nations or sub-national groups opposing that hegemony. But the immensity of US military might ensuredthat such challenges would be overwhelmingly asymmetrical. US strategists labeled such challenges terrorism a termwith a definition malleable enough to be applicable to any threat from any potential enemy, foreign or domestic, while never referring to any violent action on the part of the US, its agents, or its allies. This policy puts the US on acollision course with the rest of the world. If all-out competition is pursued with theavailable weapons of awesome power, the result could be the destruction not just of industrial civilization, but of humanity and most of the biosphere.

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Saudis sabotage the plan and backlash they perceive it as a threat to their ownregimeDemocracy Digest '11 ("Saudi Arabia: countervailing power or 'midwives of change' in Yemen?" June 6,2011, www.demdigest.net/blog/2011/06/saudi-arabia-countervailing-power-or-midwives-of-change-in-yemen/)

With Yemen finely poised between transition and regression, some opposition activistsexpressed cautious optimism today that acting President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi couldinitiate democratic reform . But the protest movement may face fierce resistance to a genuinetransition from Saudi Arabia. We do not have any problem if Hadi takes control of the government. He isrespected by the people, said Tawakkul Karman, (right), the head of Women Journalists Without Chains. Hadi must usethis historic moment to enter Yemens history as a leader and revolutionary, she said. But she warned that if he does notconduct immediate reforms, the youth protesters will go against him the same way they did against Saleh. Its Hadis choiceto decide which door of history he wants to go through. Karman was one of the most prominent and unlikely faces at theprotests amid a sea of men in the early days and she predicted that Yemens transition would be more deadly andprolonged than the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. A prominent member of the opposition Islah party, she has emerged asa leading woman leader of the Arab spring, with her success in bringing so many protesters out, and keeping it largelypeaceful [recognized as] a remarkable achievement. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the decisive player in Yemens ongoingconflict, but the prospect of engineering a transition will not appeal to the ruling family . Riyadh is left with theresponsibility of fostering a new political order in a country with democratic aspirations butfew working institutions, even as they struggle to beat back the revolutionary currents unleashed by the Arab awakening, observers suggest. Its a real irony: the Saudis usually oppose change,but in Yemen they have become the midwives of change, said Bernard Haykel, a scholar of MiddleEastern studies at Princeton University. Riyadh is Yemens main source of aid and has used fundingto extend its influence within the countrys various tribes . It is likely to resist the politically diverse,youthful protest movements demands for a civil democratic state for fear of its potentially contagious effect. The prospectof a democratic Yemenis likely to make Saudi officials uncomfortable because democratic reforms could put pressure onGulf states to take similar steps, analysts said. Instability tends to slip over, said Kenneth Katzman, a regional expert atthe Congressional Research Center. First and foremost, the Saudis want stability. Over several monthsof sustained mobilization, the protest movement maintained its insistence on democratic reform. But it will now confront aregime which has emerged as the regions major authoritarian countervailing power to the Arab spring. They dont want to

see a systemic change in Yemen, said Sarah Phillips, a Yemen expert at the University of Sydney. A possible roadmap for transition would involve forming a broad-based national council of tribal, military, religious and opposition figures. There isno single institution or individual in Yemen who is capable of exerting control, said analyst Khaled Fattah. Yemensformal structures such as political parties and government institutions are in no position toshape events . The divided military, on the other hand, is a reflection of tribal coalitions and elite struggle, not statepower, he said. Saudi Arabia has resisted political change in other Arab states and intervened militarily to prop upBahrains beleaguered Sunni monarchy. But its security interests incline it towards supporting a transition in Yemen, someobservers suggest. In the long term, the Saudis are very keen on a stable, economicallyprosperous Yemeni youth to keep them away from al-Qaeda , said Khaled al-Maeena, editor of ArabNews. But it will be diff icult to know the Saudi outlook for Yemen in the short or medium term. Inside the Saudi corridors of powers, the priority is to see an end of al-Qaeda terror activities sooner rather than later. Security interests and theprospect of a failed state emerging from the current conflict mean that Yemens transition will be more delicate and torturedthan elsewhere in the region.

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Saudi Arabia will punish Yemen for breaking ranks will expel migrant workersand cut off aid to Yemen, crippling their economy.

Haykel 11 (Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, June 14, 2011, Global Public Sphere CNN Blog, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/14/saudi-arabias-yemen-dilemma/ )Riyadh has not hesitated to punish Sana'a whenever it has expressed an independentpolicy . For example, during the Gulf War, when Saleh sided with Iraq's Saddam Hussein against Kuwait and the Saudi-led coalition, Saudi Arabia expelled nearly a million Yemeni migrant workers and cut off officialaid to Yemen . (It did not, however, end its handouts to Yemen's tribes.) This moment marked the beginning of theunraveling of Yemen's economy, which today is in tatters. A few years later, in 1994, during Yemen's civil war , Riyadh continued to punish Saleh by supporting the secessionist socialists in southern Yemen . TheSaudi leadership was not bothered by the fact that, in Wahhabi eyes, the socialists were infidels, further underscoring thepragmatic and non-ideological nature of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.

Saudis backlash against Yemen democratizationKnickermeyer '11 (Ellen, "Trouble Down South" July 5, 2011,

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/05/trouble_down_south?page=full)But can Saudi Arabia, among the most risk-adverse of states, tolerate the kind of unrulytransition to democracy that demonstrators in Yemen's streets have been demanding for the past five months? Even in Saudi Arabia, many doubt it. "The government has alwaysused this money to control people, silence them. It worked for a long time," Mazin Mutabagani, a scholar and Yemen expert at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, told me. "If they could give Ali AbdullahSaleh a new life, they would give [it to] him, to go back. They are fond of dictators." Under Saleh, whose rise to thepresidency in 1978 was supported by Riyadh, Saudi Arabia has denied Yemen the monopoly of power and integrity of borders that are the basics of statehood, through payments that blur theallegiances of Yemeni tribes and others, and through cross-border security operations, argues AbdullahHamidaddin, a political analyst in Jeddah. "Increasing the autonomy of the tribe always degrades the authority of thecentral government," Hamidaddin told me, adding, "In what other countries do citizens receive a salary from a foreigngovernment?"

If the Saudis cant influence the choice of the next president theyll cut off financial assistance to Yemen that makes Yemen a new terrorist hotbed.Byman '11 (Daniel, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, "What's Next for Yemen?"March 22, 2011, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0322_yemen_byman.aspx)

Saudi Arabia may destabilize things even further. Riyadh views Yemen as the kingdom'sbackyard and worries that instability there could spread north. Saudi Arabia has often tried,and often failed, to play kingmaker in Yemen. Should a new ruler in Sanaa try to hew an independent linefrom Riyadh, as Saleh did, the Saudis may give financial and other support to his enemies. For the United States,the biggest worry is terrorism . Osama Bin Laden could take advantage of additional instability to channel moreresources to Yemen. No matter what, AQAP will take advantage of any easing of pressure to plan more attacks and buildtheir organization. A new government, like Saleh's, would probably see AQAP as a relativelyminor threat and would focus its intelligence services and political energies on its domestic enemies and rivals, leavingcounterterrorism a distant second. There is only so much cooperation the United States can buy.

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**Brink**

The Arab Spring has changed the paradigm of US-Saudi relations thesecurity alliance is on the brink because Saudi Arabia sees the US asabandoning key allies in the regionRichter 11 (Paul Richter, March 15, 2011, U.S. may lose either way in Bahrain crisis, LA Times,http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/15/world/la-fg-us-bahrain-20110316 )

Despite the cautious U.S. language, the crisis comes at a time when the historically close Americanrelationships with the Saudi and Bahraini governments are under stress . Saudi King Abdullahwas angry with the Obama administration for pushing former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign in February.Saudi officials also have been displeased that the White House has prodded them toaccelerate their own reforms, a process they insist cannot be rushed because of thekingdom's change-resistant clergy. The Saudis appear to have again signaled their displeasure this mont h, cancelling planned visits to the kingdom by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton andDefense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Saudi officials said the king was too ill, but U.S. officials acknowledged that the recenttensions may have prompted the move. The Saudis, like the Bahrainis and other governments of the Gulf Cooperation

Council, also are "angry that Washington has let staunch allies such as President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt be forced frompower, while doing little to push Col. Moammar Kadafi of Libya from his position," wrote Simon Henderson, a specialist onthe Arabian Peninsula at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Last month, U.S. officials said theSaudis were supportive of their plans for political change in Bahrain, and appeared willing toprovide massive financial aid to help relieve the poverty of its Shiite population. But the Saudi governmentchanged course as the protests continued and the opposition's demands increased . OnSaturday, Gates had made a public appearance in Bahrain and called for an acceleration of the reform effort, saying "babysteps" weren't enough. Two days later, Bahraini authorities asked the Saudis to send military help

The Arab Spring is a total game changer seen as betrayal of the securityalliance its caused relations to be at their tensest point in decadesReuters 11 (Jeff Mason and Richard Mably, June 15, 2011, Saudi, U.S. debated oil reserve swap before OPEC

sources, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/15/uk-saudi-us-crude-idUKTRE75E2JK20110615 )The failure of the oil swap idea comes amid the most tense US-Saudi relationship indecades , with Saudis most recently upset at how the United States treated former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, afellow Sunni Arab leader, who had been a strong U.S. ally . "The Saudis are very, very angry at whathappened with Egypt. They felt it was a betrayal, that the United States cannot be trusted asan ally ," said Gal Luft, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, a Washington-based think-tank focussed on energy security. The Saudis were infuriated by Obama administration criticism of Bahrain's violent crackdown on demonstrators . They saw Bahrain's repressed Shiite Muslims as thevanguard of attempts by majority-Shiite Iran, Saudi Arabia's long-time adversary, to spread its influence in the Arabheartland. Adding to tensions are concerns about U.S. monetary policy and the value of theU.S. dollar, which have a direct impact on Saudi profits and revenues , Luft said. "They want tomake sure that they don't get screwed. On the one hand, they increase production, and on the other hand, the dollar declines, and they lose on both sides. "A few dollars here and there is OK, but $80 a barrel is a big problem now for theSaudis. A really, really big problem," he said. Worried by unrest sweeping the Arab world, the world's top oil exporter haspledged to spend about $130 billion, o r around 30 percent of its annual economic output, on social programs to help thepoor.

Relations on the brink, plan causes collapseBoucek '11 (Christopher, associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program, fmr researcher, ostdoctoral researcher at Princeton University and lecturer in Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School. He was also previously a mediaanalyst at the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., U.S.-Saudi Relations in the Shadow of the ArabSpring" June 21, 2011, carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/21/u.s.-saudi-relations-in-shadow-of-arab-spring/1il)

Saudi Arabia is not immune from the protest movement and it will not be completely sparedfrom the Arab Spring . But Saudi Arabia will weather this Arab Spring better than any other country in the region. Thegovernment is better equipped to manage this season, in large part through its religious community and its financialresources. Saudi Arabia announced $136 billion in new social welfare spending to offset the economic and social drivers.The protests we have seen in Saudi Arabia have been very, very small so farprimarily confined to the eastern provinceand some other big citiesbut through a very large police presence, the mobilization of the official clerical establishment,

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and spending money, the government has been able to contain th is. So Saudi Arabia will weather this better than any other country in the region. It is also important to look at what the regional protest movement has done and will do to the price of oil. The new Saudi budget to account for all of the new social welfare spending is fixed atabout $88 per barrel, meaning that this is what the state must earn to break even on the newspending . As a result, we will most likely see Saudi Arabia not working to drive down the price of oil, but instead workingto prevent the oil market from becoming overheated. Are U.S.-Saudi relations in decline? We have seen the

emergence of greater tensions between Washington and Riyadh as a result of the ArabSpring. This comes in large part because in Saudi Arabia there is a belief that Washingtonhas not managed this process very well , doesnt know what its doing, and is putting issues of political reformahead of security and stability in the region. This is a part of the world where personal relationships, friendship, and loyaltyare more important than anything else and weve seen the United States support the removal of former friends, Ben Ali inTunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Saudis feel that there is a likelihood that this is not going to stop. Saudi Arabiaand Saudi foreign policy generally loathe instability or uncertainty and thats exactly what we see right now. Riyadh feelsthat the United States is more concerned about being on the right side of history, instead of standing by its friends and working to advance stability in the region this is very concerning to theSaudis. Whereas the United States and Saudi Arabia historically differed over domestic Saudi political issues, the twocountries usually agreed on foreign and regional policy issues. But increasingly, this is not the case. Increasingly itseems that Saudi Arabia looks out into the world and thinks that its foreign policy interestsdo not overlap with the United States and Washingtons security interests. Saudi Arabia isnow in a position to pursue its own interests. All that said, at the end of the day, the

relationship remains very stron g. In the region, there are several special relationships for the United States andone of them is with Saudi Arabia. Despite all of the difficulty and tensions, the relationship remains strong and it will remainstrong. The two countries need each other and there is no one else who can provide for Saudi Arabia what the UnitedStates does and no one that can provide for the United States what Saudi Arabia does.

Plan is perceived as threatening security, kills the whole relationshipFifield '11 (Anna, "Arab spring tests US-Saudi Relationship," June 16, 2011,www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4082dc70-984d-11e0-ae45-00144feab49a.html#axzz1ban9zk5P)

Still, Washington and Riyadh could be at a turning point in their 60-year relationship as theArab spring has laid bare its contradictions. The wave of democracy spreading across the Middle East iswidely viewed as good news in America , but the onset of dislocating change in the region is anythingbut good news for the Saudis . The US support for democratic change means we have become a source of insecurity rather than security for Saudi Arabia, Mr Miller said. The relationship is founded on the coreunderstanding that the US will provide security for Saudi Arabia, w hich in return will do its part tokeep oil prices stable. It has come under strain from the outset, notably when the US recognised the state of Israel in 1948.

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**Impacts**

Impact Pakistan CollapseThey also will seek nukes from Pakistan ensuing tensions cause Pakistani statecollapse which spreads through the region.Siddiqui 11 (Farrukh Siddiqui, Riyadh will build nuclear weapons if Iran gets them, Saudi prince warns, June30, 2011, http://www.stateofpakistan.org/riyadh-will-build-nuclear-weapons-if-iran-gets-them-saudi-prince-warns )

Today, Australias leading national daily, The Australian published an analysis which confirms the Guardians report.Earlier this month The Wall Street Journal reported another Saudi threat to go nuclear or to pursuepolicies that could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences, should Iran do the same. The Australian said thatuntil recently it appeared that US security guarantees would be a preferred alternative to Riyadhs pursuit of a nuclear option. However, the com