-
Saratoga campaign
The Saratoga Campaign in 1777 was an attempt by theBritish high
command for North America to gain militarycontrol of the
strategically important Hudson River valleyduring the American
Revolutionary War. It ended in thesurrender of the British army,
which historian EdmundMorgan argues, was a great turning point of
the war, be-cause it won for Americans the foreign assistance
whichwas the last element needed for victory.[5]
The primary thrust of the campaign was planned and ini-tiated by
General John Burgoyne. Commanding a mainforce of some 8,000 men, he
moved south in June fromQuebec, boated up Lake Champlain tomiddle
NewYork,then marched over the divide and down the Hudson Val-ley to
Saratoga. He initially skirmished there with the Pa-triot defenders
with mixed results. Then, after losses inthe Battles of Saratoga in
September and October, his de-teriorating position and ever
increasing size of the Amer-ican army forced him to surrender his
forces to the Amer-ican General Horatio Gates on October 17.The
elaborate plans drawn up in London all failed.Colonel Barry St.
Leger was assigned to move on Albany,NewYork east through theMohawk
River valley, but wasforced to retreat during the siege of Fort
Stanwix afterlosing his Indian allies. The major expedition from
thesouth never materialized due to miscommunication withLondon when
General William Howe sent his army totake Philadelphia rather than
sending it up the HudsonRiver to coordinate with Burgoyne. A
last-minute eortto reinforce Burgoyne from New York City was made
inearly October, but it was too little, too late.The American
victory was an enormous morale boost tothe edgling nation. More
important, it convinced Franceto enter the war in alliance with the
United States, openlyproviding money, soldiers, and munitions, as
well ghtinga naval war worldwide against Britain.
1 British strategyToward the end of 1776 it was apparent to many
in Eng-land that pacication of New England was very dicultdue to
the high concentration of Patriots; and so Londondecided to isolate
New England and concentrate on thecentral and southern regions
where Loyalists supposedlycould be rallied.[6]
In December 1776General John Burgoynemet with LordGermain, the
British Secretary of State for the Coloniesand the government ocial
responsible for managing the
war, to set strategy for 1777. There were two mainarmies in
North America to work with: General GuyCarletons army in Quebec and
General William Howesarmy, which had driven George Washington's
army fromNew York City in the New York campaign.[7]
1.1 Howes plan to attack PhiladelphiaOnNovember 30, 1776,
Howethe British commander-in-chief in North Americawrote to
Germain, outliningan ambitious plan for the 1777 campaign. Howe
said thatif Germain sent him substantial reinforcements, he
couldlaunch multiple oensives, including sending 10,000 menup the
Hudson River to take Albany, New York. Then,in the autumn, Howe
could move south and capture theU.S. capital of Philadelphia.[8]
Howe soon changed hismind after writing this letter: the
reinforcements mightnot arrive, and the retreat of the Continental
Army overthe winter of 177677 made Philadelphia an
increasinglyvulnerable target. Therefore, Howe decided that he
wouldmake the capture Philadelphia the primary object of the1777
campaign. Howe sent Germain this revised plan,which Germain
received on February 23, 1777.[9]
1.2 Burgoynes plan to capture AlbanyBurgoyne, seeking to command
a major force, proposedto isolate New England by an invasion from
Quebec intoNew York. This had already been attempted by
GeneralCarleton in 1776, although he had stopped short of a
full-scale invasion due to the lateness of the season. Carletonwas
heavily criticized in London for not taking advantageof the
American retreat from Quebec, and he was alsointensely disliked by
Germain. This, combined with ri-val Henry Clinton's failed attempt
to capture Charleston,South Carolina, placed Burgoyne in a good
position to getcommand of the 1777 northern campaign.[10]
Burgoyne presented a written plan to Lord Germain onFebruary 28,
1777; Germain approved it and gave Bur-goyne command of the main
expedition.[11]
Burgoynes invasion plan from Quebec had two compo-nents: he
would lead the main force of about 8,000 mensouth fromMontreal
along Lake Champlain and the Hud-son River Valley while a second
column of about 2,000men (which Barry St. Leger was chosen to
lead), wouldmove from Lake Ontario east down the Mohawk Rivervalley
in a strategic diversion. Both expeditions wouldconverge upon
Albany, where they would link up with
1
-
2 2 AMERICAN STRATEGY
General John Burgoyne, portrait by Joshua Reynolds
troops from Howes army marching up the Hudson. Con-trol of the
Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson Riverroute from Canada to New
York City would cut o NewEngland from the rest of the American
colonies.[12]
The last part of Burgoynes proposal, the advance byHowe up the
Hudson from New York City, proved to bethe most controversial part
of the campaign. Germain ap-proved Burgoynes plan after having
received Howes let-ter detailing his proposed oensive against
Philadelphia.Whether Germain told Burgoyne, who was still in
Lon-don at that time, about Howes revised plans is unclear:while
some sources claim he did,[12] others state that Bur-goyne was not
notied of the changes until the campaignwas well underway.[13]
Historian Robert Ketchum be-lieves that Burgoyne would probably
have been aware ofthe problems that lay ahead had he been notied of
thePhiladelphia plan.[14]
Whether Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne had the sameexpectations
about the degree to which Howe was sup-posed to support the
invasion from Quebec is also un-clear. What is clear is that
Germain either left his generalswith too much latitude, or without
a clearly dened over-all strategy.[15] In March 1777 Germain had
approvedof Howes Philadelphia expedition and did not includeany
express orders for Howe to go to Albany. Yet Ger-main also sent
Howe a copy of his instructions to Carletonwhich plainly stated
that the northern army was to make ajunction with Howes army at
Albany.[16] In a letter fromGermain to Howe dated May 18, 1777 he
made clear thatthe Philadelphia expedition should be executed in
timefor you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed
from Canada and put itself under your command. Thislast letter,
however, was not received by Howe until af-ter he had departed New
York for the Chesapeake.[14]To attack Philadelphia Howe could
either have movedoverland through New Jersey or by sea via the
DelawareBay, both options would have kept him a position to
aidBurgoyne if necessary. The nal route he took, throughthe
Chesapeake Bay, was immensely time-consuming andleft him wholly
unable to assist Burgoyne as Germain hadenvisioned. The decision
was so dicult to understandthat Howes more hostile critics accused
him of deliber-ate treachery.[17]
Burgoyne returned to Quebec on May 6, 1777, bearinga letter from
Lord Germain which introduced the planbut lacked some details.[18]
This produced another of theconicts of command that plagued the
British throughoutthe war. Lieutenant General Burgoyne technically
out-rankedMajor General Carleton, but Carleton was still
thegovernor of Quebec. Germains instructions to Burgoyneand
Carleton had specically limited Carletons role tooperations in
Quebec. This slight against Carleton, com-bined with Carletons
failure to get command of the ex-pedition, led to his resignation
later in 1777, and to hisrefusal to supply troops from the Quebec
regiments togarrison the forts at Crown Point and Ticonderoga
afterthey were captured.[19]
2 American strategyGeorge Washington, whose army was encamped
atMorristown, New Jersey, and the American militarycommand did not
have a good picture of British plansfor 1777. The principal
question on the minds of Wash-ington and his generals Horatio Gates
and Philip Schuylerwho both were at turns responsible for the
ContinentalArmy's Northern Department and its defense of the
Hud-son River was of the movements of Howes army inNew York. They
had no signicant knowledge of whatwas being planned for the British
forces in Quebec, inspite of Burgoynes complaints that everyone in
Montrealknew what he was planning.[20] The three generals
dis-agreed on what Burgoynes most likely movement was,and Congress
also rendered the opinion that Burgoynesarmy was likely to move to
New York by sea.[21]
Partly as a result of this indecision, and the fact that itwould
be isolated from its supply lines if Howe movednorth, the garrisons
at Fort Ticonderoga and elsewherein the Mohawk and Hudson valleys
were not signicantlyincreased.[21] Schuyler took the measure in
April 1777 ofsending a large regiment under Colonel Peter
Gansevoortto rehabilitate Fort Stanwix in the upper Mohawk val-ley
as a step in defending against British movements inthat area.[22]
Washington also ordered four regiments tobe held at Peekskill, New
York that could be directedeither to the north or the south in
response to Britishmovements.[23]
-
3American troops were allocated throughout New Yorktheater in
June 1777. About 1,500 troops (includingthose of Colonel
Gansevoort) were in outposts along theMohawk River, about 3,000
troops were in the HudsonRiver highlands under the command of
General IsraelPutnam, and Schuyler commanded about 4,000
troops(inclusive of local militia and the troops at
Ticonderogaunder St. Clair).[24]
3 International interest
Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, portrait by Antoine-Franois
Callet
Ever since the Seven Years War, Frances foreign min-isters,
beginning with Choiseul, had followed the generalidea that the
independence of Britains North Americancolonies would be good for
France and bad for Britain,and furthermore that French attempts to
recover parts ofNew France would be detrimental to that cause.
Whenwar broke out in 1775, the Comte de Vergennes, then theForeign
Minister, outlined a series of proposals that ledto secret French
and also Spanish support of Congress,and some preparations for the
possibility of war, includ-ing expansion of their navies. Vergennes
did not thinkopen participation in the war was diplomatically or
polit-ically feasible until Washingtons army demonstrated
itsstrength and ability to gain military victories without
sig-nicant assistance.[25]
To further the aim of French participation in the war,Vergennes
closely monitored news from North Amer-ica and London, and worked
to remove impediments toSpanish participation in the war. Vergennes
went so faras to propose war to King Louis XVI in August 1776,
butnews of Howes capture of New York City scuttled
thatplan.[26]
4 Campaign begins
Most of Burgoynes army had arrived in Quebec inthe spring of
1776, and participated in the routing ofContinental Army troops
from the province. In addi-tion to British regulars, the troops in
Quebec includedseveral regiments from the German principalities
ofHesse-Hanau (from whose name the common referenceof Hessian
comes) and Brunswick under the commandof Baron Friedrich Adolph
Riedesel. Of these regularforces, 200 British regulars and 300 to
400 Germanswere assigned to St. Legers Mohawk valley expedition,and
about 3,500 men remained in Quebec to protect theprovince. The
remaining forces were assigned to Bur-goyne for the campaign to
Albany. The regular forceswere supposed to be augmented by as many
as 2,000mili-tia raised in Quebec; by June, Carleton had managed
toraise only three small companies.[27] Burgoyne had alsoexpected
as many as 1,000 Indians to support the expe-dition. About 500
joined between Montreal and CrownPoint.[28]
Burgoynes army was beset by transport diculties beforeit left
Quebec, something that apparently neither Bur-goyne nor Carleton
anticipated. As the expedition ex-pected to travel mainly over
water, there were few wag-ons, horses, and other draft animals
available to move thelarge amount of equipment and supplies on the
land por-tions of the route. Only in early June did Carleton is-sue
orders to procure carts sucient to move the army.Consequently, the
carts were poorly constructed of greenwood, and the teams were
driven by civilians who were ata higher risk of desertion.[29]
On June 13, 1777, Burgoyne and Carleton reviewed theassembled
forces at St. Johns on the Richelieu River,just north of Lake
Champlain, and Burgoyne was cere-monially given command.[30] In
addition to ve sailingships built the previous year, a sixth had
been built andthree had been captured after the Battle of Valcour
Is-land. These provided some transport as well as militarycover for
the large eet of transport boats that moved thearmy south on the
lake.[31]
The army that Burgoyne launched the next day had about7,000
regulars and over 130 artillery pieces ranging fromlight mortars to
24 pound (11 kg) pieces. His regularswere organized into an advance
force under BrigadierGeneral Simon Fraser, and two divisions. Major
Gen-eral William Phillips led the 3,900 British regulars on
-
4 5 TICONDEROGA FALLS
the right, while Baron Riedesels 3,100 Brunswickersand Hanauers
held the left. His regular troops startedout in good condition but
some, notably some of theGerman dragoons, were poorly equipped for
wildernessghting.[32]
Colonel St. Legers expedition was also assembled bymid-June. His
force, a mixed company of British regu-lars, Loyalists, Hessians,
and rangers from the Indian de-partment, numbering about 750 men
left Lachine, nearMontreal, on June 23.[33]
5 Ticonderoga falls
Fort Ticonderoga from Mount Deance
Main articles: Siege of Fort Ticonderoga (1777), Battleof
Hubbardton and Battle of Fort Anne
Burgoynes army traveled up the lake and occupied theundefended
Fort Crown Point by June 30.[34] The screen-ing activities of
Burgoynes Indian support were highlyeective at keeping the
Americans from learning the de-tails of his movements.[35] General
Arthur St. Clair, whohad been left in command of Fort Ticonderoga
and its sur-rounding defenses with a garrison of about 3,000
regularsand militia, had no idea on July 1 of the full strength
ofBurgoynes army, large elements of which were then just4 miles
(6.4 km) away.[36][37] St. Clair had been orderedby General
Schuyler to hold out as long as possible, andhad planned two
avenues of retreat.[38]
Open skirmishing began on the outer defense works ofTiconderoga
on July 2. By July 4, most of the Amer-ican garrison was either at
Fort Ticonderoga or nearbyMount Independence, the extensive
fortications on theVermont side of the lake. Unknown to the
Americans,their withdrawal from an outer defensive position
cleareda way for the British to place artillery on the hilltop
knownthen as Sugar Loaf (nowMount Deance), whose heightscommanded
the fort.[39] St. Clair withdrew the night af-ter spotting British
cannon on Sugar Loaf on July 5, andBurgoynes men occupied the main
fortication and the
positions on Mount Independence on July 6.[40] The un-contested
surrender of the supposedly impregnable fortcaused a public and
political uproar.[41] Although a laterinvestigation cleared both
Schuyler and St. Clair of anywrongdoing in the withdrawal, it
caused the ContinentalCongress to replace Schuyler with General
Horatio Gatesas commander of the Northern Department of the
Con-tinental Army in August.[42][43]
General Arthur St. Clair, portrait by Charles Willson Peale
Burgoyne sent forces out from his main body to pursuethe
retreating army, which St. Clair had sent south viatwo dierent
routes. The British caught up with elementsof the retreating
Americans at least three times. GeneralFraser and elements of Baron
Riedesels troops faced de-termined resistance in Battle of
Hubbardton on July 7,and a skirmish that same day between the
vanguard ofthe main army met Pierse Long's retreating companies ina
skirmish at Skenesboro. These were followed by an-other stando in
the Battle of Fort Anne on July 8, inwhich a forward company of the
British army was nearlydecimated. These actions cost the Americans
about 50%more casualties than those incurred by the British,
andthey demonstrated to the British ocers present that theAmericans
were capable of putting up sti resistance.Burgoynes army was
reduced by about 1,500 men as aresult of the Ticonderoga actions.
He left 400 men togarrison the magazine at Crown Point and another
900 todefend Ticonderoga, and the battles that followed resultedin
about 200 casualties.[44]
The bulk of St. Clairs army retreated through the NewHampshire
Grants (present-day Vermont). St. Clair is-sued appeals to the
states for militia support, and alsoarranged to have as much of the
areas livestock andsupplies delivered to Fort Edward on the Hudson
River,where the American armies would regroup. St. Clair
-
5reached Fort Edward on July 12 after ve days of gru-eling
marches.[45] Some of the remnants that had beenscattered at
Hubbardton rejoined the army, but SethWarner and the remains of his
regiment were stationedat Manchester in the Grants.[46]
6 Reaction and delayBurgoyne settled into the house of Loyalist
Philip Skeneat Skenesboro while the pieces of his army regroupedand
he considered his next steps. He penned letters de-scribing the
British victory, intended for public consump-tion. When this news
reached the capitals of Europe,King George was happy, and the Comte
de Vergenneswas not, as the news eectively scuttled an early
proposalfor French entry into the war. British diplomats
increasedpressure on the French and Spanish, demanding that
theyclose their ports to American shipping. While this de-mand was
refused, it markedly increased the tensions be-tween the powers.
The news was also harshly receivedby Congress and the American
public, including slandersthat St. Clair and Schuyler had been
bribed.[47]
On July 10 Burgoyne issued orders for the next series
ofmovements. Most of the army was to take the rough roadfrom
Skenesboro to Fort Edward via Fort Anne, while theheavy artillery
was to be transported down Lake Georgeto Fort Edward. Riedesels
troops were sent back up theroad toward Castleton, primarily as a
diversion intendedto suggest that he might be aiming for the
ConnecticutRiver.[48] Burgoynes decision to move the army
overlandvia Fort Anne was a curious one, for it contradicted hisown
earlier commentaries on planning the expedition, inwhich he
presciently observed that defenders could eas-ily block the route.
His decision appears to have beenmotivated by two factors; the rst
being the perceptionthat moving the army over water via Lake George
wouldrequire a retrograde movement that could be perceivedas a
retreat, and the second being the inuence of PhilipSkene, whose
property would benet by the improvedroad Burgoyne would have to
build.[49]
General Schuyler, at Albany when he received word ofTiconderogas
fall, immediately rode to Fort Edward,where there was a garrison of
about 700 regulars and1,400 militia.[50] He decided to make
Burgoynes pas-sage as dicult as possible, using the axe as a
weapon;as it was much easier to fell large trees in the enemyspath
than to remove them after they were down, thisbrought Burgoynes
advance to a crawl, tiring his troopsand forcing them to use up
supplies. On July 11 Burgoynewrote to Lord Germain, complaining
that the Ameri-cans were systematically felling trees, destroying
bridges,and damming streams along the road to Fort
Edward.[51]Schuyler also employed scorched earth tactics to denythe
British access to local provisions. In spite of Bur-goynes lack of
movement, his scouts were active; someof Schuylers work crews were
attacked.[52]
Schuylers tactics required Burgoyne to build a roadthrough the
wilderness for his guns and troops, a taskthat took about two
weeks. They moved out of Skenes-boro on July 24, and reached Fort
Edward on July 29,nding that Schuyler had already abandoned it, in
a re-treat that ended at Stillwater, New York.[53] Before he
leftSkenesboro, Burgoyne was joined by about 500 Indians(mostly
Ottawas, but also Fox, Mississauga, Chippewa,and Ojibwe, as well as
members of the Iroquois) fromthe Great Lakes region under the
leadership of St. Lucde la Corne and Charles Michel de
Langlade.[54][55]
7 St. Legers expeditionMain articles: Siege of Fort Stanwix and
Battle ofOriskany
Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger sailed up the St. Lawrenceand
crossed Lake Ontario to arrive at Oswego withoutincident. He had
about 300 regulars, supported by 650Canadian and Loyalist militia,
and they were joined by1,000 Indians led by John Butler and the
Iroquois warchiefs Joseph Brant, Sayenqueraghta and
Cornplanter.Leaving Oswego on July 25, they marched to Fort
Stan-wix on the Mohawk River, and began besieging it on Au-gust 2.
About 800 members of the Tryon County militiaand their Indian
allies marched to relieve the siege, butsome of St. Legers British
and Indians ambushed themon August 6 at the bloody Battle of
Oriskany. While theAmericans held the eld of battle, they retreated
becauseof the heavy casualties they suered, including the mor-tal
wounding of their leader, General Nicholas Herkimer.Warriors from
Iroquois nations fought on both sides of thebattle, marking the
beginning of a civil war within theSix Nations. During the Oriskany
action, the besiegedAmericans staged a sortie from Fort Stanwix and
raidedthe nearly empty Indian camp. Combined with the signif-icant
Indian casualties at Oriskany, this was a signicantblow to Indian
morale.[56]
On August 10, Benedict Arnold left Stillwater, New Yorkfor Fort
Stanwix with 800 men of the Continental Armyfrom Schuylers Northern
Department. He expected torecruit members of the Tryon County
militia when he ar-rived at Fort Dayton on August 21. Arnold could
onlyraise about 100 militia, as most of the militia men thathad
been at Oriskany were not interested in joining, sohe instead
resorted to subterfuge. He staged the escape ofa Loyalist captive,
who convinced St. Leger that Arnoldwas coming with a much larger
force than he actually had.On this news, Joseph Brant and the rest
of St. Legers In-dians withdrew.[57] They took most of his
remaining sup-plies with them, and St. Leger was forced to raise
thesiege and head back through Oswego to Quebec. Arnoldsent a
detachment a short way after them, and turned therest of his force
east to rejoin the American forces atSaratoga. St. Legers remaining
men eventually arrived
-
6 8 MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES
Burgoynes march on Albany JuneOctober 1777
at Fort Ticonderoga on September 27.[58] Their arrivalwas too
late to eectively support Burgoyne, whose armywas already being
hemmed in by the growing Americanforces around him.[59]
8 Mounting dicultiesMain articles: Battle of Bennington and Jane
McCrea
The advance of Burgoynes army to Fort Edward was, aswith the
approach to Ticonderoga, preceded by a waveof Indians, which chased
away the small contingent oftroops left there by Schuyler.[60]
These allies became im-patient and began indiscriminate raids on
frontier familiesand settlements, which had the eect of increasing
ratherthan reducing local support to the American rebels.[61]In
particular, the death at Indian hands of the attractiveyoung
Loyalist settler JaneMcCrea was widely publicizedand served as a
catalyst for rebel support, as Burgoynesdecision to not punish the
perpetrators was seen as unwill-ingness or inability to keep the
Indians under control.[62]
Even though the bulk of his army made the trip fromSkenesboro to
Fort Edward in just ve days, the armyslack of adequate transport
served to delay the army again,as the supply train, hampered by a
lack of draft animalsand carts and wagons that were capable of
dealing withthe rough tracks through the wilderness, took time
tofollow.[19]
On August 3, messengers from General Howe nally suc-ceeded in
making their way through the American linesto Burgoynes camp at
Fort Edward. (Numerous attempts
General John Stark, the Hero of Bennington
by the British generals to communicate were frustrated bythe
capture and hanging of their messengers by the Amer-icans.) The
messengers did not bring good news. On July17 Howe wrote that he
was preparing to depart by seawith his army to capture
Philadelphia, and that GeneralClinton, responsible for New York
Citys defense, wouldact as occurrences may direct.[63] Burgoyne
refused todivulge the contents of this dispatch to his sta.[63]
Realizing that he now had a serious supply problem, Bur-goyne
decided to act on a suggestion that Baron Riedeselhad made to him
in July. Riedesel, whose forces Bur-goyne had stationed at
Castleton for a time while he wasat Skenesboro, had observed that
the area was rich indraft animals and horses, which might be seized
for thearmys benet (including the mounting of Riedesels cur-rently
unmounted dragoons).[64] Pursuing this idea, Bur-goyne sent Colonel
Friedrich Baum's regiment towardwestern Massachusetts and the New
Hampshire Grantson August 9, along with some Brunswick
dragoons.[65]Most of Baums detachment never returned from the
Au-gust 16 Battle of Bennington, and the reinforcements hehad sent
after them came back after they were ravagedin the same battle,
which deprived Burgoyne of nearly1,000 men and the much-needed
supplies. What Bur-goyne had been unaware of was that St. Clairs
callsfor militia support following the withdrawal from Ticon-deroga
had been answered, and General John Stark hadplaced 2,000 men at
Bennington. Starks force envelopedBaums at Bennington, killing him
and capturing much ofhis detachment.[66]
The death of Jane McCrea and the Battle of Benning-ton, besides
acting as rallying cries for the Americans,had another important
eect. Burgoyne blamed his In-
-
7dian and Canadian allies for McCreas death, and, evenafter the
Indians had lost 80 of their number at Ben-nington, Burgoyne showed
them no gratitude.[67] As a re-sult, Langlade, La Corne, and most
of the Indians leftthe British camp, leaving Burgoyne with fewer
than 100Indian scouts.[68] Burgoyne was left with no protectionin
the woods against the American rangers.[69] Burgoynewould later
blame La Corne for deserting him, while LaCorne countered that
Burgoyne never respected the Indi-ans. In the British Parliament,
Lord Germain sided withLa Corne.[70]
9 American change of fortune
While the tactic of delay worked well in the eld, theresult in
the Continental Congress was a dierent mat-ter. General Horatio
Gates was in Philadelphia whenCongress discussed its shock at the
fall of Ticonderoga,and Gates was more than willing to help assign
the blameto reluctant generals. Some in the Congress had
alreadybeen impatient with General George Washington, want-ing a
large, direct confrontation that might eliminate oc-cupation forces
but whichWashington feared would prob-ably lose the war. John
Adams, the head of the WarCommittee, praised Gates and remarked
that we shallnever hold a post until we shoot a general.[71] Over
theobjections of the New York delegation, Congress sentGates to
take command of the Northern Department onAugust 10. It also
ordered states from Pennsylvania toMassachusetts to call out their
militias.[71] On August 19,Gates arrived at Albany to take charge.
He was coldand arrogant in manner, and pointedly excluded
Schuylerfrom his rst war council. Schuyler left for
Philadelphiashortly after, depriving Gates of his intimate
knowledgeof the area.[72]
Throughout the month of August, and continuing intoSeptember,
militia companies arrived at the Continen-tal Army camps on the
Hudson. These were augmentedby troops Washington ordered north from
the HudsonHighlands as part of General Arnolds operation to
re-lieve Stanwix. Those troops arrived at the end of Au-gust and
included the crack sharpshooters of Daniel Mor-gan's rie corps,
which he sent north from his ownarmy.[73][74] News of the American
successes at Benning-ton and Fort Stanwix, combined with outrage
over thedeath of Jane McCrea, rallied support, swelling Gatesarmy
to over 6,000 rank and le.[75] This number did notinclude Starks
small army at Bennington, which was re-duced in size by disease and
the departure of some ofits companies, but was also augmented by
several hun-dred troops raised by General Benjamin Lincoln, whowas
assigned to make attacks against Burgoynes supplyand
communications.[76]
10 Saratoga
General Horatio Gates, portrait by Gilbert Stuart
Main article: Battles of Saratoga
The Battle of Saratoga is often depicted as a singleevent, but
it was actually a month-long series of ma-neuvers punctuated by two
battles. At the beginning ofSeptember 1777, Burgoynes army, now
just over 7,000strong, was located on the east bank of the
Hudson.[77][78]He had learned of St. Legers failure at Stanwix on
Au-gust 28, and even earlier that Howe would not be givinghim
substantial support from New York City. Faced withthe need to reach
defensible winter quarters, which wouldrequire either retreat back
to Ticonderoga or advance toAlbany, he decided on the latter.
Subsequent to this deci-sion, he made two further crucial
decisions. He decidedto deliberately cut communications to the
north, so thathe would not need to maintain a chain of heavily
fortiedoutposts between his position and Ticonderoga, and hedecided
to cross the Hudson River while he was in a rela-tively strong
position.[77] He therefore ordered Riedesel,whose forces were in
the rear, to abandon outposts fromSkenesboro south, and ordered the
army to cross the riverjust north of Saratoga, which it did between
September13 and 15.[79] Moving cautiously, since the departure
ofhis Indian support had deprived him of reliable scouting,Burgoyne
advanced to the south.[80] On September 18 thevanguard of his army
had reached a position just north ofSaratoga, about 4 miles (6.4
km) from the American de-fensive line, and skirmishes occurred
between the leadingelements of the armies.[81]
WhenGates took over Schuylers army, much of it was lo-
-
8 10 SARATOGA
cated near the mouth of theMohawkRiver, south of Still-water. On
September 8 he ordered the army, then about10,000 men (of whom
about 8,500 were eective combattroops), to Stillwater with the idea
of setting up defensesthere. The Polish engineer Tadeusz Kociuszko
foundthe area inadequate for proper defensive works, so a
newlocation was found about three miles further north (andabout 10
miles (16 km) south of Saratoga). At this lo-cation Kosciusko laid
out defensive lines stretching fromthe river to the blus called
Bemis Heights.[82][83]
The right side of these defenses was nominally given toGeneral
Lincoln, but as he was leading troops intendedfor a diversion
against Ticonderoga, Gates assumed com-mand of that portion of the
line himself. Gates put Gen-eral Arnold, with whom he had
previously had a goodrelationship, in command of the armys left,
the westerndefenses on Bemis Heights. The relationship between
thetwo soured when Arnold chose to sta his command withfriends of
Schuyler, whom Gates hated. Combined withthe prickly natures of
both Gates and Arnold, this even-tually brought internal power
squabbles to a boil.[84]
Artists conception of General Benedict Arnold, color mezzotintby
Thomas Hart
10.1 Freemans Farm
Both Generals Burgoyne and Arnold recognized the im-portance of
the American left ank. Burgoyne recog-nized that the American
position could be anked, anddivided his forces, sending a large
detachment to the west
on September 19. Arnold, also recognizing that a Britishattack
on the left was likely, asked Gates for permission tomove his
forces out to Freemans Farm to anticipate thatmaneuver.[42] Gates
refused to carry out a general move-ment, since he wanted to wait
behind his defenses for theexpected frontal attack;[85] but he did
permit Arnold tosend Daniel Morgans riemen and some light
infantryout for a reconnaissance in force. These forces
precipi-tated the Battle of Freemans Farm when they made con-tact
with Burgoynes right ank.[86] In the ensuing battle,the British
gained control of Freemans Farm, but at thecost of 600 casualties,
ten percent of their forces.[87]
After the battle the feud between Gates and Arnolderupted. Not
only did Gates not mention Arnold at all inthe ocial account of the
battle he sent to Congress, buthe also transferred Morgans company
(which had beentechnically independent but operated under
Arnoldscommand in the battle) to his direct command. Arnoldand
Gates had a noisy argument in Gates quarters, inwhich Gates said
that General Lincoln would be replac-ing him. Following the
argument Arnold drafted a letterto Gates outlining his grievances
and requesting a trans-fer to Washingtons command.[88] Gates gave
Arnold apass to leave, and continued to inict petty indignities
onArnold.[89] A commonly referenced reason why Arnoldchose to
remain is that a petition signed by all of theline ocers except
Gates and Lincoln convinced him tostay.[89] While proposals for
such a document were con-sidered, there is no contemporary evidence
of one actu-ally being drafted and signed.[90]
Burgoyne considered renewing the attack the next day,but called
it o when Fraser noted that many men werefatigued from the previous
days exertions.[91] He there-fore dug his army in, and waited for
news that he wouldreceive some assistance from the south, as a
letter he re-ceived from General Clinton in New York on Septem-ber
21 suggested that a movement up the Hudson woulddraw o some of
Gates army.[92] Although he was awareof the persistent desertions
that were reducing the sizeof his army and that the army was
running short of foodand other critical supplies,[93] he did not
know that theAmerican army was also daily growing in size,[94] or
thatGates had intelligence on how dire the situation was in
hiscamp.[95]
10.2 Attack on TiconderogaUnknown to either side at Saratoga
until after the bat-tle, General Lincoln and Colonel John Brown had
stagedan attack against the British position at Fort
Ticonderoga.Lincoln had collected 2,000 men at Bennington by
earlySeptember.[96] After marching north to Pawlet, they re-ceived
word that the guard at Ticonderoga might be sus-ceptible to
surprise. Lincoln sent three detachmentsof 500 men each to annoy,
divide, and distract theenemy.[97] One went to Skenesboro, which
was found tobe abandoned by the British. The second went to
capture
-
10.4 Bemis Heights 9
Mount Independence on the east side of Lake Champlain,while the
third, led by John Brown, made the approach toTiconderoga.[97]
General Benjamin Lincoln, portrait by Charles Willson Peale
On the morning of September 18, Brown surprised theBritish
defenders at the southern end of the portage trailconnecting Lake
George to Lake Champlain. Rapidlymoving up the trail his men
continued to surprise Britishdefenders and capture artillery pieces
until they reachedthe height of land just before Ticonderoga, where
theyoccupied the old French lines (so named because itwas there
that a French defense improbably held againsta much larger British
army in the 1758 Battle of Caril-lon).[98] On the way he released
100 prisoners (thus in-creasing the size of his force) and captured
nearly 300.His demand for the forts surrender was refused, and
forthe next four days Browns men and the fort exchangedcannon re,
to little eect.[99] Since he had insucientmanpower to actually
assault the fort, Brown then with-drew to Lake George, where he
made an unsuccessfulattempt to capture a storage depot on an island
in thelake.[100]
General Gates wrote to Lincoln on the day of FreemansFarm,
ordering his force back to Saratoga and that notone moment should
be lost.[101] Lincoln reached BemisHeights on September 22, but the
last of his troops didnot arrive until the 29th.[101]
10.3 Sir Henry Clinton attempts a diver-sion
Main article: Battle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery
General Howe, when he left New York for Philadelphia,had put
General Sir Henry Clinton in charge of NewYorks defense, with
instructions to assist Burgoyne if op-portunities arose. Clinton
wrote to Burgoyne on Septem-ber 12 that he would make a push at
[Fort] Montgomeryin about ten days if you think 2000 men can
assistyou eectually.[102] When Burgoyne received the letterhe
immediately replied, appealing to Clinton for instruc-tion on
whether he should attempt to advance or retreat,based on the
likelihood of Clintons arrival at Albany forsupport.[103] Burgoyne
indicated that if he did not re-ceive a response by October 12 he
would be forced toretreat.[104]
On October 3, Clinton sailed up the Hudson River with3,000 men,
and on October 6, one day after receivingBurgoynes appeal, captured
the highland forts namedClinton and Montgomery.[105] Burgoyne never
receivedClintons dispatches following this victory, as all
threemessengers were captured.[106] Clinton followed up thevictory
by dismantling the chain across the Hudson, andsent a raiding force
up the river that reached as farnorth as Livingston Manor on
October 16 before turn-ing back.[107] Word of Clintons movements
only reachedGates after the battle of Bemis Heights.[108]
10.4 Bemis Heights
General Daniel Morgan, portrait by Charles Willson Peale
In addition to the Lincolns 2,000 men, militia unitspoured into
the American camp, swelling the Americanarmy to over 15,000
men.[109] Burgoyne, who had puthis army on short rations on October
3, called a coun-cil the next day. The decision of this meeting was
to
-
10 11 SURRENDER
launch a reconnaissance in force of about 1,700 men to-ward the
American left ank. Burgoyne and Fraser ledthis detachment out early
on the afternoon of October7. Their movements were spotted, and
Gates wantedto order only Daniel Morgans men out in
opposition.Arnold said that this was clearly insucient, and thata
large force had to be sent. Gates, put o one lasttime by Arnolds
tone, dismissed him, saying, You haveno business here.[110]
However, Gates did accede tosimilar advice given by Lincoln. In
addition to send-ing Morgans company around the British right, he
alsosent Enoch Poor's brigade against Burgoynes left. WhenPoors men
made contact, the Battle of Bemis Heightswas underway.[111]
The initial American attack was highly eective, andBurgoyne
attempted to order a withdrawal, but his aidewas shot down before
the order could be broadcast.[112]In intense ghting, the anks of
Burgoynes force were ex-posed, while the Brunswickers at the center
held againstLearneds determined attack.[113] General Fraser
wasmortally wounded in this phase of the battle.[114]
Whilefrequently claimed to be the work of Timothy Murphy,one of
Morgans men, the story appears to be a 19th-century
fabrication.[115] After Frasers fall and the arrivalof additional
American troops, Burgoyne ordered whatwas left of the force to
retreat behind their entrenchedlines.[114]
General Arnold, frustrated by the sound of ghting hewas not
involved in, rode o from the American head-quarters to join the
fray. Arnold, who some claimedwas in a drunken fury,[116] took the
battle to the Britishposition. The right side of the British line
consistedof two earthen redoubts that had been erected on Free-mans
Farm, and were manned by Brunswickers underHeinrich Breymann and
light infantry under Lord Bal-carres. Arnold rst rallied troops to
attack Balcarres re-doubt, without success.[117] He then boldly
rode throughthe gap between the two redoubts, a space guarded by
asmall company of Canadian irregulars. Learneds menfollowed, and
made an assault on the open rear of Brey-manns redoubt.[118]
Arnolds horse was shot out fromunder him, pinning him and breaking
his leg. Brey-mann was killed in the erce action, and his position
wastaken. However, night was falling, and the battle cameto an
end.[119] The battle was a bloodbath for Burgoynestroops: nearly
900 men were killed, wounded, or cap-tured, compared to about 150
for the Americans.[120]
11 SurrenderSimon Fraser died of his wounds early the next day,
butit was not until nearly sunset that he was buried.[121]
Bur-goyne then ordered the army, whose entrenchments hadbeen
subjected to persistent harassment by the Ameri-cans, to retreat.
(One consequence of the skirmishing wasthat General Lincoln was
also wounded. Combined with
Monument at Victory, New York
Arnolds wounds, this deprived Gates of his top two
eldcommanders.)[122]
It took the army nearly two days to reach Saratoga, inwhich
heavy rain and American probes against the col-umn slowed the armys
pace. Burgoyne was aided bylogistical problems in the American
camp, where thearmys ability to move forward was hampered by
delaysin bringing forward and issuing rations. However, Gatesdid
order detachments to take positions on the east sideof the Hudson
to oppose any attempted crossings.[123]By the morning of October 13
Burgoynes army wascompletely surrounded,[124] so his council voted
to opennegotiations.[125] Terms were agreed on October 16
thatBurgoyne insisted on calling a "convention" rather than
acapitulation.[126]
Baroness Riedesel, wife of the commander of theGerman troops,
vividly describes in her journal the con-fusion and besetting
starvation of the retreating Britisharmy. Her account of the
tribulation and death of ocersand men, and of the terried women who
had taken shel-
-
11
ter in the cellar of what later became known as the Mar-shall
House dramatizes the desperation of the besiegedarmy.On October 17,
following a ceremony in which Burgoynegave his sword to Gates, only
to have it returned, Bur-goynes army (approaching 6,000 strong)
marched outto surrender their arms while the American
musiciansplayed "Yankee Doodle".[127]
12 Aftermath
British troops withdrew from Ticonderoga and CrownPoint in
November, and Lake Champlain was free ofBritish troops by early
December.[128] American troops,on the other hand, still had work to
do. Alerted to Gen-eral Clintons raids on the Hudson, most of the
armymarched south toward Albany on October 18, whileother
detachments accompanied the "Convention Army"east.[129] Burgoyne
and Riedesel became guests of Gen-eral Schuyler, who had come north
from Albany to wit-ness the surrender.[130] Burgoyne was allowed to
returnto England on parole in May 1778, where he spent thenext two
years defending his actions in Parliament andthe press. He was
eventually exchanged for more than1,000 American
prisoners.[131]
In response to Burgoynes surrender, Congress declaredDecember
18, 1777 as a national day for solemnThanksgiving and praise in
recognition of the militarysuccess at Saratoga; it was the nations
rst ocial obser-vance of a holiday with that name.[132]
12.1 Convention Army
Main article: Convention Army
Under the terms of the convention Burgoynes army wasto march to
Boston, where British ships would transportit back to England, on
condition that its members notparticipate in the conict until they
were formally ex-changed. Congress demanded that Burgoyne provide
alist of troops in the army so that the terms of the agree-ment
concerning future combat could be enforced. Whenhe refused,
Congress decided not to honor the terms ofthe convention, and the
army remained in captivity. Thearmy was kept for some time in
sparse camps through-out New England. Although individual ocers
were ex-changed, much of the Convention Army was eventuallymarched
south to Virginia, where it remained prisonerfor several
years.[133] Throughout its captivity, a largenumber of men (more
than 1,300 in the rst year alone)escaped and eectively deserted,
settling in the UnitedStates.[134]
13 ConsequencesErected 1887 By
JOHN WATTS de PEYSTERBrev: Maj: Gen: S.N.Y.
2nd V. Prest Saratoga Mon't Asst'n:In memory of
the most brilliant soldier of theContinental Army
who was desperately woundedon this spot the sally port of
BORGOYNES GREAT WESTERN REDOUBT7th October, 1777
winning for his countrymenthe decisive battle of theAmerican
Revolution
and for himself the rank ofMajor General
Inscription on the Boot Monument
On December 4, 1777, word reached Benjamin Franklinat Versailles
that Philadelphia had fallen and that Bur-goyne had surrendered.
Two days later, King Louis XVIassented to negotiations for an
alliance.[135] The treatywas signed on February 6, 1778, and France
declaredwar on Britain one month later, with hostilities
beginningwith naval skirmishes o Ushant in June.[136] Spain didnot
enter into the war until 1779, when it entered thewar as an ally of
France pursuant to the secret Treatyof Aranjuez.[137] Vergennes
diplomatic moves followingthe French entry into the war also had
material impact onthe later entry of the Dutch Republic into the
war, anddeclarations of neutrality on the part of other
importantgeopolitical players like Russia.[138]
The British government of Lord North came under sharpcriticism
when the news of Burgoynes surrender reachedLondon. Of Lord Germain
it was said that the secretaryis incapable of conducting a war, and
Horace Walpoleopined (incorrectly, as it turned out) that we are
... verynear the end of the American war.[139] Lord North is-sued a
proposal for peace terms in Parliament that didnot include
independence; when these were nally deliv-ered to Congress by the
Carlisle Peace Commission theywere rejected.[140]
14 RemembrancesMost of the battleelds of the campaign have been
pre-served in some way, usually as state or national parks,but also
as historic sites under state or federal control.Some monuments
erected to mark the battles are listedas National Historic
Landmarks and some are separatelylisted on the National Register of
Historic Places. Manyof the battles are regularly reenacted, and
the Battle of
-
12 15 NOTES
Bennington (although it was actually fought in present-day
Walloomsac, New York) is marked in the state ofVermont by
Bennington Battle Day.[141]
The commemorations of Benedict Arnolds contributionsto the
American success of the campaign are particularlynoteworthy. The
obelisk at Saratoga National HistoricalPark has, on three of its
four sides, alcoves bearing statuesof three generals instrumental
in the success at Saratoga:Gates, Schuyler, and Morgan. The fourth
alcove, repre-senting Arnold, is empty.[142] The park also contains
theBoot Monument which, though again without identifyingArnold by
name, clearly honors his contribution in thesecond Saratoga
battle.[143]
15 Notes[1] This number is an estimate of the total number of
Ameri-
can combatants involved in the campaign. While Nicker-son
details a signicant number of the troop counts duringthe campaign
(pp. 435451), Pancake (1977) providesa more ready source of numbers
for recruitments. TheNorthern Department (under Schuyler and then
Gates),started with about 5,500 men (Pancake, pp. 151152),and the
Highland Department under Putnam, based ontroop deployments
ordered, had about 3,000 men (pp.153,180). Militia recruitment
after the fall of Ticon-deroga and the killing of Jane McCrea was
substantial:known recruitments included Stark and Warner 2,000
(p.153), Lincoln 1,500 (p. 178), and Herkimer 800. Gateshad 15,000
to 18,000menwhen Burgoyne surrendered (p.189), which did not
include about one-half of Putnamsand Starks men, the Mohawk River
outposts, Herkimerstroops, or earlier losses due to battle,
disease, or expiringenlistments. It did include Morgans 300+
riemen, dis-patched from Washingtons main army. Considering
thatPutnams forces were also swollen by militia following theBattle
of Forts Clinton and Montgomery (one British re-port claimed 6,000
men were following them on October16, Pancake p. 188), the number
of Americans in the eldin mid-October was probably well over
20,000.
[2] Nickerson (1967), p. 437, and other sources report Bur-goyne
starting with 7,800 men. Nickerson notes (p.105) that this number
does not include ocers and non-combatant sta and camp followers,
who would also re-quire supplies. That number also does not include
Indi-ans and Loyalists who arrived after the capture of
Ticon-deroga (about 700, Nickerson p. 439).
[3] See Siege of Fort Stanwix for details.
[4] See Battle of Forts Clinton and Montgomery for details.This
number includes all troops Clinton sent north fromNew York, not all
of which were involved in battle.
[5] Edmund Morgan, The Birth of the Republic: 1763-1789(1956) pp
82-83
[6] John Martin Carroll; Colin F. Baxter (2007). The Amer-ican
Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to thePresent. Rowman &
Littleeld. p. 14.
[7] Ketchum (1997), pp. 42, 51, 65
[8] Nickerson (1967), p. 78
[9] Black (1991), p. 127
[10] Ketchum (1997), pp. 19, 7782
[11] Ketchum (1997), pp. 7984
[12] Ketchum (1997), p. 84
[13] Samuel B. Grith, The War for American Independence:From
1760 to the Surrender at Yorktown in 1781
[14] Ketchum (1997), p. 104
[15] Black, p. 126
[16] Fisher, Sydney George. The Struggle for American
Inde-pendence Vol. II (1908) pp. 73-74
[17] Adams, Charles Francis. Campaign of 1777 Proceedingsof the
Massachusetts Historical Society, Volume 44 (1910-11) pp. 25-26
[18] Ketchum (1997), pp. 8788
[19] Nickerson (1967), pp. 188189
[20] Nickerson (1967), p. 137
[21] Nickerson (1967), p. 138
[22] Pancake (1977), p. 139
[23] Nickerson (1967), p. 139
[24] Pancake (1977), pp. 151152
[25] Nickerson (1967), p. 6566
[26] Nickerson (1967), pp. 55, 75
[27] Nickerson (1967), pp. 106107
[28] Ketchum (1997), p. 111
[29] Ketchum (1997), p. 107
[30] Nickerson (1967), p. 104
[31] Ketchum (1997), p. 129
[32] Ketchum (1997), pp. 136137
[33] Nickerson (1967), pp. 195197
[34] Ketchum (1997), p. 163
[35] Ketchum (1997), pp. 160161
[36] Pancake (1977), pp. 121122
[37] Ketchum (1997), p. 172
[38] Nickerson, pp. 138140
[39] Pancake (1977), p. 122
[40] Nickerson (1967), pp. 146147
[41] Pancake (1977), p. 125
-
13
[42] Ketchum (1997), p. 356
[43] Smith (1882), p. 95
[44] Nickerson (1967), pp. 146157, 438
[45] Ketchum (1997), pp. 217220
[46] Nickerson (1967), p. 180
[47] Nickerson (1967), pp. 161-62
[48] Nickerson (1967), p. 160-61
[49] Ketchum (1997), p. 240
[50] Nickerson (1967), p. 173
[51] Ketchum (1997), p. 244
[52] Ketchum (1997), p. 249
[53] Nickerson (1967), pp. 179180
[54] Nickerson (1967), p. 178
[55] Ketchum (1997), pp. 265268
[56] Nickerson (1967), pp. 195211
[57] Nickerson (1967), pp. 271275
[58] Nickerson (1967), pp. 276277
[59] Nickerson (1967), pp. 354355
[60] Ketchum (1997), p. 273
[61] Nickerson (1967), p. 183
[62] Ketchum (1997), pp. 275278
[63] Ketchum (1997), p. 283
[64] Nickerson (1967), p. 233
[65] Nickerson (1967), p. 240
[66] Ketchum (1997), pp. 285323
[67] Ketchum (1997), pp. 281282,322
[68] Ketchum (1997), p. 322
[69] Nickerson (1967), p. 269
[70] Tousignant
[71] Ketchum (1997), p. 335
[72] Ketchum (1997), p. 337
[73] Ketchum (1997), p. 338
[74] Scott (1927), pp. 267, 292
[75] Nickerson (1967), p. 288
[76] Nickerson (1967), p. 268
[77] Nickerson (1967), pp. 290295
[78] Luzader (2008), p. 230
[79] Nickerson (1967), p. 296
[80] Nickerson (1967), p. 299
[81] Nickerson (1967), p. 300
[82] Ketchum (1997), pp. 346347
[83] Luzader (2008), p. 210
[84] Ketchum (1997), pp. 350353
[85] Ketchum (1997), p. 355
[86] Ketchum (1997), pp. 356360
[87] Ketchum (1997), pp. 360368
[88] Ketchum (1997), pp. 386387
[89] Ketchum (1997), p. 388
[90] Luzader (2008), p. 271
[91] Luzader (2008), p. 248
[92] Ketchum (1997), p. 375
[93] Ketchum (1997), p. 381
[94] Nickerson (1967), p. 327
[95] Ketchum (1997), p. 380
[96] Ketchum (1997), p. 376
[97] Ketchum (1997), p. 377
[98] Nickerson (1967), p. 324
[99] Nickerson (1967), p. 325
[100] Ketchum (1997), p. 379
[101] Nickerson (1967), p. 326
[102] Nickerson (1967), p. 320
[103] Nickerson (1967), p. 344
[104] Nickerson (1967), p. 345
[105] Nickerson (1967), pp. 343344
[106] Ketchum (1997), p. 384
[107] Nickerson (1967), p. 405
[108] Nickerson (1967), p. 394
[109] Luzader (2008), p. 249
[110] Ketchum (1997), p. 394
[111] Nickerson (1967), p. 361
[112] Ketchum (1997), p. 398
[113] Nickerson (1967), p. 362
[114] Ketchum (1997), p. 400
[115] Luzader (2008), p. xxii
[116] Ketchum (1997), p. 399
[117] Ketchum (1997), p. 402
-
14 17 FURTHER READING
[118] Nickerson (1967), p. 365366
[119] Ketchum (1997), p. 403
[120] Ketchum (1997), p. 405
[121] Ketchum (1997), p. 406
[122] Nickerson (1967), p. 371
[123] Ketchum (1997), p. 410
[124] Ketchum (1997), p. 417
[125] Nickerson (1967), p. 387
[126] Ketchum (1997), pp. 420425
[127] Ketchum (1997), pp. 428430, 437
[128] Ketchum (1997), p. 439
[129] Ketchum (1997), pp. 437439
[130] Nickerson (1967), pp. 400404
[131] Ketchum (1997), p. 436
[132] Bennett (2008), p. 456
[133] Ketchum (1997), p. 435
[134] Ferling (2007), p. 432
[135] Nickerson (1967), p. 411
[136] Nickerson (1967), p. 412
[137] Nickerson (1967), p. 413
[138] Nickerson (1967), p. 415
[139] Ketchum (1997), p. 442
[140] Mary A. Giunta, J. Dane Hartgrove (1998). Documents ofthe
emerging nation. Rowman & Littleeld. p. 72.
ISBN978-0-8420-2664-2.
[141] See the individual battle articles for more detailed
infor-mation about a battles remembrances.
[142] Walworth (1891), p. 82
[143] Murphy (2007), p. 2
16 References Bennett, William J; Cribb, John (2008). The
Amer-
ican Patriots Almanac. Thomas Nelson Inc.
ISBN978-1-59555-267-9.
Black, Jeremy (1991). War for America: The Fightfor
Independence, 1775-1783. New York: St. Mar-tins Press. ISBN
0-312-06713-5.
Boatner III,MarkMayo (1974). Encyclopedia of theAmerican
Revolution. New York: McKay. ISBN 0-8117-0578-1.
Ferling, John E (2007). Almost a miracle: theAmerican victory in
the War of Independence. NewYork: Oxford University Press US. ISBN
978-0-19-518121-0. OCLC 85898929.
Ketchum, Richard M (1997). Saratoga: TurningPoint of Americas
Revolutionary War. New York:Henry Holt. ISBN 978-0-8050-6123-9.
OCLC41397623.
Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History ofthe Decisive
Campaign of the American Revolution.New York: Savas Beatie. ISBN
978-1-932714-44-9.
Murphy, Jim (2007). The Real Benedict Arnold.New York: Clarion
Books. ISBN 978-0-395-77609-4.
Nickerson, Homan (1928). The Turning Pointof the Revolution.
Port Washington, NY: Kennikatreprint. OCLC 549809.
Pancake, John S (1977). 1777: The Year of theHangman.
Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Al-abama Press. ISBN
978-0-8173-5112-0. OCLC2680804.
Scott, John Albert (1927). Fort Stanwix andOriskany: The
Romantic Story of the Repulse of St.Legers British Invasion of
1777. Rome, NY: RomeSentinel Company. OCLC 563963.
Smith, William Henry (1882). The St. Clair Papers:The Life and
Public Services of Arthur St. Clair.Cincinnati: Robert Clark. OCLC
817707.
Walworth, Ellen Hardin (1891). Battles of Saratoga,1777: the
Saratoga Monument Association, 18561891. Albany: J. Munsells Sons.
OCLC 2183838.
Tousignant, Pierre; Dionne-Tousignant, Madeleine(2000).
Biography of La Corne St. Loc. Dictio-nary of Canadian Biography
Online.
17 Further reading Bird, Harrison (1963). March to Saratoga:
General
Burgoyne and the American Campaign, 1777. NewYork: Oxford
University Press. OCLC 299497.
Burgoyne, John; O'Callaghan, Edmund Bailey(1860). Orderly book
of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne:from his entry into the state of New
York until hissurrender at Saratoga, 16th Oct. 1777 ; from
theoriginal manuscript deposited at Washingtons headquarters,
Newburgh, N. Y. Albany, NY: J. Munsell.OCLC 2130372.
-
15
Chidsey, Donald Barr (1967). TheWar in the North:An Informal
History of the American Revolution inand near Canada. New York:
Crown. OCLC394996.
Corbett, Theodore. No Turning Point: The SaratogaCampaign in
Perspective (University of OklahomaPress; 2012) 436 pages; detailed
history; argues itwas not a decisive turning point in the war
Elting, John R (1977). The Battles of Saratoga.Phillip Freneau
Press. ISBN 0-912480-13-0.
Glover, Michael (1976). General Burgoyne inCanada and America:
Scapegoat for a System. Lon-don: Atheneum Publishers. ISBN
0-86033-013-3.
Graymont, Barbara (1972). The Iroquois in theAmerican
Revolution. Syracuse, New York: Syra-cuse University Press. ISBN
0-8156-0083-6. ISBN0-8156-0116-6 (paperback).
Mintz, Max M (1990). The Generals of Saratoga:John Burgoyne
& Horatio Gates. New Haven: YaleUniversity Press. ISBN
0-300-04778-9. ISBN 0-300-05261-8 (1992 paperback)
Murray, Stuart (1998). The Honor of Command:General Burgoynes
Saratoga Campaign. Imagesfrom the Past. ISBN 1-884592-03-1.
Stone, William Leete (1893). Ballads and poemsrelating to the
Burgoyne campaign. Albany: J. Mun-sells Sons. OCLC 1392761.
Taylor, Alan (2006). The Divided Ground: Indians,Settlers, and
the Northern Borderland of the Ameri-can Revolution. Knopf. ISBN
0-679-45471-3.
Watt, Gavin (2002). Rebellion in the Mohawk Val-ley: The St.
Leger Expedition of 1777. Dundurn.ISBN 1-55002-376-4.
18 External links Fort Ticonderoga web site Hubbardton Battleeld
State Historic Site National Park Service web site for Fort Stanwix
Oriskany Battleeld State Historic Site Bennington Battleeld State
Historic Site National Park Service web site for Saratoga
NationalHistorical Park
Fort Montgomery State Historic Site The Marshall House,
Schuylerville, New York The Saratoga Campaign, Revolutionary War
Ani-mated
-
16 19 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES
19 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses19.1
Text
Saratoga campaign Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saratoga_campaign?oldid=673868849
Contributors: Roadrunner, Nonenmac,Jtdirl, CORNELIUSSEON, LouI,
Charles Matthews, Sebastian Wallroth, Tpbradbury, Hajor, PBS,
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19.2 Images File:ArthurStClairOfficialPortrait.jpg Source:
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jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Army Center for
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3.0
British strategyHowes plan to attack PhiladelphiaBurgoynes plan
to capture Albany
American strategyInternational interestCampaign
beginsTiconderoga fallsReaction and delaySt. Legers
expeditionMounting difficultiesAmerican change of
fortuneSaratogaFreemans FarmAttack on TiconderogaSir Henry Clinton
attempts a diversionBemis Heights
SurrenderAftermathConvention Army
ConsequencesRemembrancesNotesReferencesFurther readingExternal
linksText and image sources, contributors, and
licensesTextImagesContent license