Sandiganbayan - Supreme Court

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYANQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

-versus-

ROGER CHIO Y CABALESROMULO PALCON Y SUPENAMARIFLOR GARCIA Y SANCHEZALMA MAHINAY y BERMEJOMELVIN C. MALlG

Accused.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

-versus-

ROGER CHIO y CABALESROMULO PALCON Y SUPENAMARIFLOR GARCIA Y SANCHEZALMA MAHINAY y BERMEJOELEAZAR P. DUCLAY AN,

Accused.

SB-17 -CRM-1633For: Violation of Section 3 (e)

Republic Act No. 3019

SB-17 -CRM-1634For: Violation of Section 3 (e)

Republic Act No. ~019

Present:

DE LA CRUZ, J., ChairpersonECONG, J. andCALDONA, J.

Promulgated:JAH 1 8 1019 f.

Resolution,

Criminal Cases Nos. S8-17 -CRM-1633 to S8-17 -CRM-1634Pp vs. Roger C. Chio, et al.Page 2 of 14)(- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

ESOLUTION

CALDONA, J.:

For resolution is the Urgent Omnibus Motion 1) To Quash/Dismiss

Information and 2) Pending its Resolution, to Defer or Hold in Abeyance the

Arraignment of the Accused, filed on October 3, 2018 by accused Mariflor

Garcia y Sanchez, through counsel.

During the scheduled arraignment of the accused and pre-trial

conference on October 5, 2018, her counsel, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon,

moved for the cancellation thereof on the ground that the said accused filed.

earlier an urgent omnibus motion, receipt of which was confirmed by the

prosecution. Being similar to the previous motion filed by her erstwhile eo-

accused, the prosecution manifested that it ~as adopting the

comment/opposition that it filed with regard to the latter motion.

To recapitulate, herein accused-movant stands charged together with

her erstwhile eo-accused public officials, Roger C. Chio, Romulo S. Palcon

and Alma B. Mahinay with two (2) counts of the crimes of violation of Section

3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, as amended, under separate informations which, save for the

dates of the commission of the offenses, the accused private parties

involved, the amounts and the values of the fertilizer that was purchased

which account for the damage to the government, as well as the

corresponding disbursement vouchers, are identically couched as follows:

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CRIMINAL CASE NO..SB-17-CRM-16331

That on May 13, 2004, or sometime prior or subsequentthereto, in Davao City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, accused public officers ROGER C. CABALESCHIO, ROMULO SUPENA PALCON, MARIFLOR SANCHEZGARCIA, and ALMA BERMEJO MAHINAV, being the RegionalExecutive Director (SG-28), Director III (SG-27), RegionalAccountant (SG-24), and Finance Division Chief/Manager (SG-24),respectively, all of the Department of Agriculture, Regional FieldUnit-XI (RFU-XI, Davao City), committing the offense in relation tooffice and taking advantage of their respective official functions,acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusablenegligence, conspiring and confederating with one another and withaccused MELVIN C. MALlG, representative of Farmate InternationalTechnologies, Inc., (Farmate, Inc. ) did then and there willfully,unlawfully, and criminally give unwarranted benefits, privilege andadvantage to Farmate, Inc. and/or accused Malig by entering into acontract or transaction on behalf of the government with Farmate,Inc. for the purchase of One Thousand Three Hundred (1,300)bottles of Farmate Liquid Foliar Fertilizers at P1,500.00 per bottle ora total of P1 ,911 ,000.00 after tax, as reflected under DV No. 04-05-4161 dated May 13, 2004 without conducting a public bidding,accused knowing fully well that said transaction was in violation ofRepublic Act No. 9184 (The Government Procurement Reform Act)and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and despite variousirregularities attending the transactions, including but not limited to,the purchase of fertilizers without report or survey of availablefertilizers that would best fit the needs of the intended beneficiariesin the 1st District of Davao del Sur, the unjustified resort to directcontracting, and the lack of proof that the fertilizers were distributedto the intended beneficiaries, to the damage and prejudice of thegovernment in the aforestated amount of P1,911 ,000.00.

Before the three (3) accused public officials could be arraigned, they

interposed motions to dismiss/quash the informations commonly assailing

the inordinate delay that the Office of the Ombudsman had allegedly incurred

in the disposition of their cases. Accused-movant Roger Chio in particular,

claimed that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of his case has

1 In S8-17-CRM-1634 the crime was allegedly committed on December 2, 2004, or sometimeprior or subsequent thereto with Eleazar P. Duclayan as the accused private party whopurportedly conspired with accused public officials. The amount of fertilizer that was purchasedconsists of 700 bottles for the total purchase price of P1,039,500.00 as reflected under DV No.04-12-12577 dated December 2,2004.

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been violated by the Office of the Ombudsman when it took eleven (11) years

and five (5) months to conduct fact-finding and preliminary investigations

before it could finally file the instant criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan.

Accused-movant Chio came up with a timeline indicating the dates of every

relevant incident leading to the filing of the cases in court, to wit:

DATE INCIDENT

February 2006 Creation of Task Force Abono tospecifically handle the investigation andcase build-up of the so called FertilizerFund Scam

October 2008 Creation of a special panel to conductpreliminary investiqation

July 24, 2013 Filing of the complaint

November 21, 2013 Issuance of the order to file counter-affidavit

January 22, 2014 Submission/Receipt of accused Chio'scou nter-affidavit

June 28, 2016 Issuance of the resolution finding probablecause against the accused

August 18, 2016 Approval of the Ombudsman of the June28,2016 Resolution

August25,2017 Filing of the informations

The accused-movant explained that based on the above tabular

presentation whose data were lifted from the documents available, a total of

about eleven (11) years and six (6) months had elapsed between February

2006 when Task Force Abono was created to conduct a fact-finding

investigation and August 25, 2017 when the informations were filed in court.

Even as the period of one (1) month representing the time before his counter-

affidavit could be filed would be deducted from the total period which took

the Ombudsman to terminate its entire investigation there still remained a

net period of eleven (11) years and five (5) months which must be accounted

for, explained, and justified by the Office of the Ombudsman. The long

period of almost eight (8) years spent from February 2006 when the task

force was created for the purpose of fact-finding investigation to July 24,

. iP

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2013 when the complaint was executed, and thereafter filed for the purpose

of preliminary investigation, another period which accounted for more than

three (3) years, was unjustified. Thus, computed in any which way, the said

period of time was capricious, oppressive, whimsical, and vexatious which

already amounted to inordinate delay in the fact-finding investigation,

preliminary investigation, resolution, and filing in court of the instant cases.

For their part, accused-movants Romulo Palcon and Alma Mahinay

highlighted the fact that it took the Office of the Ombudsman four (4) years

and one (1) month counted from July 24, 2013 when the complaint was

executed to August 25, 2017 when the informations were filed in court to

complete the preliminary investigation. According to them, the incident

subject of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman does not involve

novel and complicated legal and factual issues that would warrant detailed

scrutiny, research and evaluation as would justify a delay for more than four

(4) years and one (1) month in terminating the preliminary investigation. It

only involved the procurement of 2,000 bottles of Farmate liquid foliar

fertilizers for the 1st District of Davao del Sur in the aggregate amount of

P2,950,000.00.

Lastly, both the Rules of Court and the Rules of Procedure of the Office

of the Ombudsman provide clear timelines and definite periods for the

conduct of preliminary investigation of cases lodged before the Office of the

Ombudsman. For criminal cases,· Rule 11, Section 4 of the Administrative

Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) requires

the Ombudsman to follow the procedure laid out in Rule 112, Section 3 of

the Rules of Court. In these cases, it does not appear that the prescribed

periods of time were followed in the resolution of the complaint.

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On the other hand, the prosecution contended that contrary to

accused-movants' computation, the Office of the Ombudsman acted with

dispatch in resolving the complaint against them as it took only three (3)

years and ten (10) months to file the present informations; that is, from

October 24, 2013, the date of filing of the complaint dated July 24, 2013, until

August 25, 2017.

The accused-movants cannot reckon the delay in the proceedings

before the Office of the Ombudsman from February 2006 as the period

devoted to the fact-finding investigation should not be included in the

computation; more so, that there was no evidence to show that the fact-

finding investigation may be in these cases actually commenced upon the

creation of Task Force Abono. The prosecution stressed that the subject

transactions were not the only ones investigated by the task force. Granting

that the fact-finding investigation is included in the computation, it cannot be

determined when it actually started. What is clear only though was that as

of July 24, 2013, there was already. a complaint executed by the Field

Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman which was filed on

October 24, 2013. From July 24, 2013 to August 25, 2017, only four (4)

years and one (1) month passed.

The prosecution further contended that the last pleading (e.g.

respondent Jocelyn I. Bolante's counter-affidavit) was filed on January 28,

2014 while the resolution finding probable cause was issued on June 28,

2016. Considering the number of complaints filed before the Office of the

Ombudsman and the layers of review before the Ombudsman approved the

recommendation of Task Force Abono on August 18, 2016, the period that

lapsed is still reasonable. The informations could not be filed immediately

thereafter as accused Palcon and Mahinay sought a reconsideration of the

June 28, 2016 Resolution on October 27, 2016 and November 2, 2016,

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respectively, which were resolved in an Order dated February 6, 2017 and

subsequently approved by the Ombudsman on February 24, 2017. On May

22, 2017, the informations were prepared and approved by the Ombudsman

on June 8, 2017.

In the instant urgent omnibus motion, accused-movant Mariflor Garcia

echoes essentially the same views and arguments as those of her erstwhile

eo-accused public officials. On the timeliness of her motion, accused-movant

further avers that the constitution and case law do not place upon her the

duty to follow up on the development of the case before her right to speedy

disposition thereof can be recognized. Likewise, the inordinate delay has

caused her undue prejudice as she has not been receiving any pension since

her retirement from the government service in November 2016. She has also

been suffering anxiety, sleepless nights, embarrassment and moral suffering

even after the related administrative complaint" has long been dismissed on

June 28, 2016.

The court subscribes to the view that the accused-movant does not

bear the burden of having to monitor the development of the preliminary

investigation to justify the invocation of the constitutional right to speedy

disposition of her case. It has been held that upon the State lies the

responsibility to haul an accused to court if the quantum of proof so warrants

in a pending case; and not the other way around. Indeed, both the 1987

Constitution" and Section 13 of R.A. No. 67704 expressly provide that the

Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly

on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers and employees of

the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof.

20MB-C-A-13-0365.3 Article XI, Section 12.4 Ombudsman Act of 1989.

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Failure to live up to such mandate necessarily results in want of

authority to file and further prosecute the case; thus constituting a valid

ground for a motion to quash under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. In fact,

in the case of Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan,5 the Supreme Court had

opportunity to hold as follows:

There is no complete resolution of a case under preliminaryinvestigation until the Ombudsman approves the investigating officer'srecommendation to either file an information with the Sandiqanbayan or todismiss the complaint.

x X x

Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases isnot merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in theadministration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen byholding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that aninnocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of litigation or, ifotherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible timecompatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimatedefense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tacticaldisadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed againstthe State in favor of the individual.

Considering that the rest of the points raised by the parties have been

already amply passed upon and threshed out in the Resolution" promulgated

on November 22, 2017, reiteration of the pertinent disquisitions therein is

deemed appropriate for the complete disposition of the instant omnibus

motion, thus:

After a circumspect consideration, the court is inclined to answer inthe affirmative.

It may be gathered that before the actual preliminary investigationof the cases against the accused-movants was initiated with the filing ofthe formal complaint dated July 24, 2013 with the Office of theOmbudsman, an investigative body known as Task Force Abono wascreated by then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez sometime in February2006 specifically to handle the investigation and for case build-up with

SG.R No. 191411, July 15, 2013 (citations omitted).6 Records, Vol. I, pp. 380-395.

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respect to the so called Fertilizer Fund Scam. The fact-findinginvestigation by the Ombudsman was apparently spurred by earlierSenate investigations in 2005 which looked into the alleged misuse offunds intended to implement the Farm Inputs and Farm ImplementsProgram (FIFIP) of the Department of Agriculture (DA) in the total amountof P728,000,000.OO.

Out of the P728,000,000.00, the 1st District of Davao del Sur,represented by Congo Douglas Cagas, was allotted P3,000,000.00 for theimplementation of the program. Subsequently, Congo Cagas requestedthe DA, Regional Field Unit XI (RFU-XI) Executive Director and hereinaccused-movant Roger Chio to provide the 1st District of Davao del Surwith P3,000,000.00 worth of Farmate liquid foliar fertilizers forimprovement and productivity in the implementation of the Agriculture andFisheries Modernization Act.

On May 6, 2004, DA Undersecretary Jocelyn Bolante approved theauthority for the bidding and procurement of 2,000 bottles of foliar fertilizerestimated to be worth P3,000,000.00. Accordingly, Purchase Request(PR) No. 2004-1003 dated May 5, 2004 was issued for the procurementof2,000 bottles offoliarfertilizer at P1,500.00 per bottle. The procurementwas carried out in two (2) batches.

The procurement of the first batch began on May 5, 2004 whenFarmate, Inc., represented by herein accused Melvin Malig, submitted aprice quotation for Farmate liquid foliar fertilizer in the amount ofP1 ,500.00 per bottle for 1,300 bottles (1000 ml/bottle) or a total amount ofP1,950,000.00. On May 6,2004, accused Chio and DA RFU-XI RegionalAccountant and herein accused Mariflor Garcia signed and approvedPurchase Order (PO) No. 2004-0483 for the delivery of 1,300 bottles offoliar fertilizer for P1,500.00 per bottle, or a total amount of P1,950,000.00.On May 12, 2004 Farmate, Inc. delivered 1,300 bottles of foliar liquidfertilizer amounting to P1 ,950,000.00 to the DA RFU-XI as reflected in theDelivery Receipt No. 1306 with Sales Invoice No. 0555. The bottles offertilizer were inspected and received on the same day by DArepresentatives. Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 04-05-4161 dated May13, 2004 was then issued showing that funds totaling P1 ,911 ,000.00 (netof tax) was released to Farmate, Inc., through accused Malig. Paymentwas made through Philippine Veteran's Bank (PVB) Check No. 110954dated May 14, 2004. In turn, Farmate, Inc. issued Official Receipt (OR)No. 0805 dated May 13, 2004.

Anent the second procurement, it appears that on November 5,2004 accused Chio issued PO No. 2004-1557 to Farmate, Inc. for thedelivery of additional 700 bottles of foliar liquid fertilizer with the same unitcost at P1,500.00 per bottle for the total amount of P1,050,000.00.Thereafter, Farmate, Inc. delivered 700 bottles of foliar liquid fertilizer onNovember 11, 2004 to the DA RFU-XI as evidenced by DR No. 1320 andSI No. 0605. The fertilizers were then inspected by representatives of DARFU-XI in an undated Inspection and Acceptance Report. DA RFU-XIthus incurred an obligation to pay Farmate, Inc. for P1,050,000.00 asevidenced by the Allotment and Obligation Slip (ALLOBS) No. MOOE-04-11-6268 dated November 18, 2004 prepared by DA RFU-XI Finance

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Division Chief and herein accused Mahinay and Garcia with the lattercertifying as to the correctness and validity of obligations and availabilityof funds. Per DV No. 04-12-12577 dated December 2,2004, DA RFU-XIpaid the amount of P1,039,500.00 (net of tax) to Farmate, Inc. withLandbank Check No. 1035175 dated December 2, 2004. The DV wassigned and approved by DA RFU-XI Director III and herein accusedRomulo Palcon, Garcia and Chic. Proof of payment is reflected under ORNo. 0314.

In sum, a total of 2,000 bottles of Farmate liquid foliar fertilizerappeared to have been procured by DA RFU-XI for the 1st District ofDavao del Sur in the aggregate amount of P2,950,000.00.

The foregoing facts are embodied in the Complaint dated July 24,2013 which was filed on October 24,2013 by Assistant Graft InvestigationOfficer I (AGIO I) Julber P. Tadiaman with the Office of the Ombudsmanthat formally ushered the conduct of the preliminary investigation in thesecases. In turn, the principal basis of the complaint was the output fromthe fact-finding investigation of the task force that was formed way backin 2006. Notably, the Report on the Audit of the P728,000,OOO.00 GMAFarm Input Fund has been the primary source of evidence that was mainlyrelied upon by the fact-finding body which had been available as early asMarch 29, 2006. In other words, almost all, if not all, the necessary piecesof evidence had been collected way back since the said date for the fact-finding investigation to drag on for more than eight (8) years until thecomplaint could be finally filed on October 24, 2013.

It must be stressed, at this juncture, that the so-called fact-findinginvestigation lies within the ambit of the entire process from which thedetermination should be made on whether or not the constitutional right ofthe accused to speedy disposition of his case has been trampled upon.Thus, in the case of People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. the Supreme Courttook note of the date when then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo initiallycreated a special panel on January 2, 2003 to evaluate and conduct aninvestigation into the allegation that former Department of Justice (DOJ)Secretary Hernando Perez extorted $2,000,000.00 from Congo MarkJimenez in exchange for the latter's exclusion from the plunder casesaimed at former President Joseph Estrada. For some reasons, however,Ombudsman Marcelo created a new special panel on August 22, 2005assisted by a new team of investigators to evaluate, and if warranted,conduct administrative and preliminary investigations on the case. Afterconducting the· investigation where all parties concerned wererepresented, the panel recommended on November 6, 2006 the filing ofextortion (robbery) and graft cases against Perez, et al. This wasapproved on January 5, 2007 by then newly appointed OmbudsmanMerceditas Gutierrez. The cases were eventually filed with theSandiganbayan on April 18, 2008.

The information for robbery was quashed on the ground ofinordinate delay between the alleged commission of the crime onFebruary 13, 2001 and the filing of the information on April 18, 2008. The

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People elevated the ruling to the Supreme Court belying that it incurredinordinate delay inasmuch as the period it took the special panel toconduct fact-finding investigation should not have been considered in thewhole process of preliminary investigation. However, the High Court dealtwith the argument in the following wise:

The State further argues that the fact-finding investigationshould not be considered a part of the preliminaryinvestigation because the former was only preparatory inrelation to the latter; and that the period spent in the formershould not be factored in the computation of the perioddevoted to the preliminary investigation.

The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.

The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 ofArticle III of the Constitution applies to all cases pendingbefore all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Theguarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or notthe fact-finding investigation was separate from thepreliminary investigation conducted by the Office of theOmbudsman should not matter for purposes of determining ifthe respondents' right to the speedy disposition of their caseshad been violated.

Likewise, in the more recent case of Torres vs. Sandiganbayan, etal., it was further stressed by the Supreme Court that:

We find it necessary to emphasize that the speedy disposition ofcases covers not only the period within which the preliminaryinvestigation was conducted, but also all stages to which the accusedis subjected, even including fact-finding investigations conductedprior to the preliminary investigation proper. We explained in Oansalv. Femandez, Sr.:

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one ofthree provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice.It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy dispositionof their case"; includes within its contemplation the periodsbefore, during and after trial, and affords broader protectionthan Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to aspeedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection underArticle VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after thesubmission of the case. The present constitutional provisionapplies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.

There is thus no room for doubt that the initial fact-finding phase ofthe investigation leading to the eventual filing of the cases against the

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accused should be accounted for inasmuch as the constitutionalguarantee on speedy disposition of cases includes within itscontemplation the periods before, during and after trial.

Even if it will be conceded that the reckoning period should be theconduct of the preliminary investigation itself, which the prosecutionadmitted to have lasted for four (4) years and two (2) months, thesurrounding circumstances nevertheless betray unmistakable earmarksof delay by the Office of the Ombudsman. As earlier adverted to, all therelevant pieces of evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause havebeen at hand way back in 2006 after the conduct of audit relative to thealleged misuse of the fertilizer fund. Determining probable cause shouldnot be so overstretched a process because it only involves finding outwhether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the persons chargedcould be held for trial or not. It does not require sifting through andmeticulously examining every piece of evidence to ascertain that they areenough to convict which is within the purview of judicial function. In fact,the court actually failed to discern anything new which may have beenadduced by way of evidence during the preliminary investigation properthat had not been available all along during the previous fact-findinginvestigation to justify the period of more than four (4) years. Suffice it tostate that the instant cases involve the purported violation of Section 3 (e)of R.A. No. 3019 which are certainly not so novel for the Office of theOmbudsman to consider.

The prosecution cannot be allowed to justify the long delay toconclude the investigations in these cases with the almost boilerplateallusions to the purported steady streams of cases flooding the Office ofthe Ombudsman and the numerous layers of review which it took beforethe cases could finally find their way to the dockets of the court. In thisregard, it is apropos to reiterate herein that the Office of the Ombudsmanis bound by its own rules of procedure, specifically Rule 11,Section 4 ofAdministrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of theOmbudsman) adopting Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court thatusually affords the prosecution a period of mere ten (10) days to come upwith a resolution after the last pleading has been filed during thepreliminary investigation.

Neither is it fair or justified to contend that it behooves the accused-movants to have been vigilant in asserting their right even at the stage ofpreliminary investigation. Again, jurisprudence teaches that a defendanthas no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as theduty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. Besides, inthe case of Remulla vs. Sandiganbayan the Supreme Court even wenton to hold that it is not necessary for the accused-movant to invoke hisright when the case is still pending before the Office of the Ombudsmanfor preliminary investigation. At any rate, herein accused-movants did notomit to invoke their right at the appropriate time before they could bearraigned.

Anent the prejudice which could have led them to suffer in the wakeof the inordinate delay, it cannot be gainsaid that all the accused-movantsare now long retired from the government service. However, they cannot

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enjoy the full benefits of retirement as a consequence of the filing of theinstant cases. The efforts, time, and resources that the instant casesentail contribute to the stress, anxieties and mental anguish which they allclaim to have been going through as a result thereof. Hence, it isappropriate to quote herein the poignant observation of the SupremeCourt which explains the concept of prejudice that a case should surelybefall an accused in its decision in Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan:

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interestof the defendant that the speedy trial was designed toprotect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trialincarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of theaccused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defensewill be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last,because the inability of a defendant adequately to preparehis case skews the fairness of the entire system. There isalso prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recallaccurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accusedis not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged byrestraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud ofanxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financialresources may be drained, his association is curtailed, andhe is subjected to public obloquy.

Finally, the following admonition of the High Court in the above-cited case of People vs. Sandiganbayan may be reiterated herein, thus:

It must be remembered that delay in institutingprosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State,but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion,even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is thepolicy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, andthat statutes, enforcing such promptitude should bevigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace,but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilantactivity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trialsthe best evidence that can be obtained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the subject omnibus motion to

quash the informations in these cases, filed by the accused-movant, Mariflor

Garcia y Sanchez, is granted; and that the instant criminal cases are hereby

DISMISSED.

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The bond posted by the accused-movant for her provisional liberty is

ordered cancelled and released, subject to the usual accounting and auditing

procedures.

The Hold Departure Order (HDO) dated August 31, 2017 issued

against the accused-movant is hereby recalled.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

~....(;6-, )AlA CJut~ARDdvtoJ.CALDONAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

EFREN Nj1E LA CRUZAssociate Justice

Chairperson

ft,Vll!vUU~ ~~l~ J7/t!M\GERALDINE FAITH APECONG

Associate Justice