Sandberg.howdoWeJustifyKnowledgeProducedWithinInterpretiveApproach.2005

10.1177/1094428104272000ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH METHODSSandberg / KNOWLEDGE PRODUCED WITHIN INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES

How Do We Justify Knowledge ProducedWithin Interpretive Approaches?

JÖRGEN SANDBERGUniversity of Queensland

The use of interpretive approaches within management and organizational sci-ences has increased substantially. However, appropriate criteria for justifying re-search results from interpretive approaches have not developed so rapidly along-side their adaptation. This article examines the potential of common criteria forjustifying knowledge produced within interpretive approaches. Based on this in-vestigation, appropriate criteria are identified and a strategy for achieving them isproposed. Finally, an interpretive study of competence in organizations is used todemonstrate how the proposed criteria and strategy can be applied to justifyknowledge produced within interpretive approaches.

Keywords: validity; reliability; truth; interpretive approach; qualitativeresearch

A central focus for researchers within management and organizational sciences is pro-ducing knowledge about human action and activities in organizations. Traditionally,knowledge has been produced from quantitative or qualitative approaches within thepositivistic research tradition. However, during the past three decades, interest in qual-itative approaches based on the interpretive research tradition has steadily increased inmanagement and organizational sciences (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1999; Prasad &Prasad, 2002; Zald, 1996), as well as within social sciences more generally (Atkinson,Coffey, & Delamont, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; 2000; Flick, 2002; Lincoln &Denzin, 2003; Schwandt, 1994). The strong growth of interpretive approaches mainlystems from a dissatisfaction with the methods and procedures for producing scientificknowledge within positivistic research. Advocates of interpretive approaches claimthat those methodological procedures and claims for objective knowledge have signif-icant theoretical limitations for advancing our understanding of human and organiza-tional phenomena (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1999; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2000;Lincoln & Denzin, 2003; Prasad & Prasad, 2002; Sandberg, 2001a).

Author’s Note: I would like to express my gratitude to Gloria Dall’Alba, Amedeo Giorgi, AshlyPinnington, Ron Weber, and the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of, and valuable commentson, an earlier version of this article.

Organizational Research Methods, Vol. 8 No. 1, January 2005 41-68DOI: 10.1177/1094428104272000© 2005 Sage Publications

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To overcome the shortcomings of positivism, advocates of interpretive approacheshave followed ideas from philosophical phenomenology,1 most notably, its emphasison lived experience as the basis of human action and activities. In an overview, Hol-stein and Gubrium (1994) found that the analytic paths of qualitative approacheswithin the interpretive research tradition have been varied and “diverge into a rich vari-ety of constructionist, ethnomethodological, conversation-analytic, and interpretivestrains” (p. 262). Prasad and Prasad (2002) identified a similar pattern in managementand organizational research. Interpretive approaches have provided new means ofinvestigating previously unexplored questions, thus enabling management research-ers to conduct research that has led to new forms of knowledge about management andorganization. Although the increased use of interpretive approaches has produced newknowledge, it has also contributed to methodological and epistemological confusionin management and within the social sciences more generally (Denzin & Lincoln,1994, 2000; Lincoln & Denzin, 2003; Prasad & Prasad, 2002; Seale, 2003; Smith &Deemer, 2000). One of the most significant confusions accompanied by the interpre-tive rejection of so-called objective methodological procedures for producing knowl-edge is how, and to what extent, knowledge produced within interpretive approachescan be justified. In other words, what criteria can be used, if any, to justify interpretiveknowledge claims?

The aim of this article is to explore the potential of common criteria for justifyingknowledge produced within interpretive approaches with a view to proposing appro-priate criteria. Criteria from the positivistic research tradition are rejected as inappro-priate by propagating a mixed discourse (Giorgi, 1994) of theoretical and method-ological principles from different philosophies of science. Not only is it contended thatthese criteria are unsuitable, but advocates from different intellectual orientationswithin the interpretive research tradition such as hermeneutics, critical theory, anddeconstructionism claim that objective knowledge is unattainable. Nevertheless, eventhough objective knowledge may be untenable, most advocates of interpretiveapproaches want to reject going as far as taking a complete relativistic stance. Basedon philosophical phenomenology, it will be argued in this article that truth claims arepossible using criteria consistent with the basic assumptions underlying a researchapproach.

Problem of Mixed Discourse Within Interpretive Approaches

As argued previously, there is evidence for a theoretical shift from positivistic tointerpretive approaches occurring in the social sciences as well as in the managementand organizational sciences. However, overall, this shift has not been accompanied bya corresponding methodological shift. More specifically, appropriate criteria for justi-fying research results from interpretive approaches have not been well developed. As aconsequence, many researchers such as Giorgi (1992, 1994) and Jones (1998) havequestioned the extent to which knowledge produced within interpretive approacheshas been justified as adequate. For example, Giorgi (1994) criticized the qualitativemethods within many of the interpretive approaches, such as those used by Morgan(1983), Van Maanen (1983), Miles and Huberman (1984), and Lincoln and Guba(1985). He argued that these methods combine theoretical and methodological princi-ples from fundamentally different philosophical traditions. For instance, in legitimat-

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ing research approaches as interpretive and qualitative, Giorgi (1994) found that prin-ciples and concepts from phenomenological philosophy were often employed. On theother hand, when justifying the results, methodological criteria from the positivisticresearch tradition were most frequently used.

The problem with embracing positivistic criteria when justifying the results ofinterpretive approaches is that they are not in accordance with the underlying ontologyand epistemology. In particular, validity and reliability are the criteria used for justify-ing knowledge produced within the positivistic tradition. These criteria are based onan objectivist epistemology that refers to an objective, knowable reality beyond thehuman mind and that stipulates a correspondence criterion of truth (Kvale, 1989;Salner, 1989). As Salner (1989) observed, the correspondence criterion of truthimplies that “facts are out there to which our ideas and constructs, measuring tools, andtheories must correspond” (p. 47). Common forms of validity in positivistic researchapproaches, such as internal and external validity (Kvale, 1989, 1995), are used tomeasure the extent to which our theories and instruments correspond to objective real-ity. Similarly, a common criterion for establishing reliability within the positivisticresearch tradition is whether scientific results can be duplicated under identical condi-tions (Enerstvedt, 1989). If somewhat different results are achieved, the variation istypically attributed to measurement error, such as influence from the context in whichthe measurements were taken. In cases in which the results differ significantly fromone occasion to the next, they are considered to be unreliable. Reliability is said to beestablished when repeated measurements of objective reality give similar results.

The ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the interpretiveresearch tradition are distinctive from those of the positivistic tradition. The develop-ment of the interpretive research tradition is often traced back to ideas from Weber(1947/1964) that subsequently have been developed further by phenomenologicalsociologists such as Schutz (1945, 1953), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Giddens(1984, 1993), and Bourdieu (1990). However, the roots of the interpretive research tra-dition are many, and it is not a single unified approach. The more influentialapproaches are various forms of social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966;Bourdieu, 1990; Giddens, 1984, 1993), critical theory (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000;Habermas, 1972), ethnomethodology (Atkinson, 1988; Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage,1984; Silverman, 1998), interpretive ethnography (Denzin, 1997; Geertz, 1973; VanMaanen, 1995) symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 1934; Prasad, 1993),discourse analysis (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000; Foucault, 1972; Potter & Wetherell,1987), deconstructionism (Derrida, 1972/1981; Kilduff, 1993), gender approaches(Calas & Smircich, 1996; Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985; Martin, 1994), institutionalapproaches (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995), andsense-making approaches (Weick, 1995).

Despite the great variety of approaches, what unifies them is their phenom-enological base, which stipulates that person and world are inextricably relatedthrough lived experience of the world (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Gadamer, 1960/1994; Heidegger, 1927/1981; Husserl, 1900-1901/1970; Schutz, 1945, 1953).2

Hence, within interpretive approaches, the human world is never a world in itself; it isalways an experienced world, that is, a world that is always related to a conscious sub-ject. Thus, the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the interpre-tive research tradition reject the existence of an objective knowable reality beyond the

Sandberg / KNOWLEDGE PRODUCED WITHIN INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 43

human mind. Instead, they stipulate that knowledge is constituted through lived expe-rience of reality. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to justify knowledge producedwithin this tradition using criteria based on an objectivist ontology and epistemology.

Interpretive Challenge to Knowledge and Truth

Many advocates of interpretive approaches have questioned not only the use ofpositivistic criteria but also the research goal of achieving objective knowledge andtruth. The major challenge comes from rejection of positivists’ assumptions, namely,the rejection of dualist ontology, objectivist epistemology, and language as an accuraterepresentation of objective reality (language as a mirror). I will first describe the gen-eral meaning of these assumptions and then discuss why most advocates within theinterpretive research tradition reject them.

To assume a dualist ontology is to treat subject and object as two separate, inde-pendent entities. A dualist ontology implies a division of research objects into twomain entities: a subject in itself and an object in itself (cf. Giorgi, 1994). For example,corporate strategy is typically defined and described by seeing organization and envi-ronment as two separate entities. First, the inherent qualities of the organization suchas its strengths and weaknesses are described, and then the inherent qualities of theenvironment such as threats and opportunities that it offers are described (Smircich &Stubbart, 1985).

To expound an objectivist epistemology is to stipulate that beyond human con-sciousness, there is an objective reality. The qualities and the meaning we experienceare assumed to be inherent to reality itself. Objective reality is thus seen as given andthe ultimate foundation for all knowledge. Through systematic scientific observationsand careful monitoring of the extent to which our theories correspond to the particularaspect of objective reality we are investigating, it is assumed that we will come closerto this true picture of reality.

The assumption that language is a mirror of objective reality stipulates that lan-guage can represent or, as Rorty (1979) argued, “mirror” reality in an objective fash-ion. The relationship between language and reality is thus seen as a relationship of cor-respondence. As it is assumed that language has the capacity to represent reality, it istreated as a representational system available to the researchers in their endeavor todescribe reality objectively.

Advocates of interpretive approaches reject all three of the above assumptions forseveral reasons. First, and most important, instead of assuming a dualist ontology thatimplies a division of subject and object, advocates of interpretive approaches regardsubject and object as constituting an inseparable relation. As Giorgi (1992) noted,

There are not two independent entities, object and subjects existing in themselveswhich later get to relate to each other, but the very meaning of subject implies a rela-tionship to an object and to be an object intrinsically implies being related to subjec-tivity. (p. 7)

As indicated previously, the problem of separating subject and object was origi-nally pointed out by phenomenologists such as Husserl (1900-1901/1970), Heidegger(1927/1981), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), and Gadamer (1960/1994) and then laterby a series of other researchers such as Schutz (1945, 1953), Berger and Luckmann


(1966), Foucault (1972), Derrida (1967/1978), Bourdieu (1990), Giddens (1984,1993), and Searle (1995). Husserl argued that, as subjects, we are always related to re-ality through our lived experience of that reality. Heidegger developed Husserl’s argu-ment further by suggesting that not only is reality mediated through our lived experi-ence, it is also mediated through the specific culture, historical time, and language inwhich we are situated. Derrida radicalized Husserl and Heidegger’s arguments evenmore by claiming that the meaning of reality can never be fixed but is fundamentallyindeterminate.

A number of other researchers in areas such as critical theory, literature theory,social theory, and gender theories have reached similar conclusions to Heidegger andDerrida on the problematic nature of objectivist conceptualizations of reality. Criticaltheorists such as Habermas have suggested that our descriptions of reality are oftencolored by taken-for-granted ideologies. Advocates of literature theory have arguedthat our descriptions of reality are furnished by established cultural conventions con-cerning specific genres and speech codes (Bruner, 1996). Gender studies have sug-gested that the dominating theoretical framework for producing knowledge is moldedby and saturated with male imagery (Richardson, 1995).

Based on these assumptions and empirical findings, advocates of interpretiveapproaches claim that it is not possible to produce an objective description of reality.Instead, their basic argument is that our descriptions are always colored by our specifichistorical, cultural, ideological, gender-based, and linguistic understanding of reality.Thus, instead of assuming an objectivist epistemology for the existence of objectivereality, advocates of interpretive approaches typically claim that reality is socially con-structed by continuous negotiation between people about the very nature of that real-ity. Finally, the assumption that reality is socially constructed means language is notseen as a representational system that can be used to classify and name objective real-ity. Instead, language does not achieve its meaning primarily through a correspon-dence with objective reality but through the way we socially define and use it in ourdifferent social practices.

The rejection of a dualist ontology, an objectivist epistemology, and the assumptionof language as a mirror of reality have given rise to many promising interpretiveresearch approaches that have opened up new possible spaces of inquiry. However, asAltheide and Johnson (1994) pointed out, it also has led to a crisis among qualitativeresearchers using interpretive approaches about which criteria, if any, are suitable forjustifying the knowledge produced. Denzin (1994) and Lincoln and Denzin (2003)argued in a similar vein. With reference to Guba (1990) and Rosaldo (1989), Denzin(1994) argued that “social sciences today face a crisis of interpretation, for previouslyagreed-upon criteria from the positivist and postpositivist tradition are now beingchallenged” (p. 501). More recently, in an overview, Smith and Deemer (2000)summarized this crisis in the following way:

With the end of the possibility that we could think of ourselves as neutral spectators atthe game of knowledge, the central problem that has preoccupied the thought ofnumerous researchers for the past few decades is that of “Now what are we going to dowith us.” (p. 878)

The dilemma interpretive researchers face can be stated in the following way: Atthe same time as advocates of interpretive research deny the possibility of producing


objective knowledge, they want to claim that the knowledge they generate is true insome way or another. But how can they justify their knowledge as true if they deny theidea of objective truth? Does not the rejection of objective truth mean that advocates ofinterpretive research approaches are forever condemned to produce arbitrary and rela-tivist knowledge? This is unlikely because it does not follow from the rejection of ob-jective truth that we cannot produce valid and reliable knowledge about reality. De-spite the rejection of objective truth, as Wachterhouser (2002) proposed, we can still“develop, apply, and retest criteria of knowledge that give us enough reliable evidenceor rational assurance to claim in multiple cases that we in fact know something and donot just surmise or opine that it is the case” (p. 71).

Rejecting the idea of objective truth while claiming the possibility of producingvalid and reliable knowledge gives rise to two central questions: What criteria could beused for justifying knowledge produced by interpretive approaches and, more funda-mentally, on what basis can such criteria be developed?

One of the most common responses to the above challenge is what Smith andDeemer (2000) called the quasi-foundationalist response. Advocates of this responsesuch as Hammersley (1990), Manicas and Secord (1983), Maxwell (1992), and Seale(2003) accept the interpretive idea that knowledge claims are dependent on the personwho makes them. But to avoid relativism, they adopt a realist ontology, which regardsreality as independent. As Hammersley (1990) argued, just because we accept thatobservation of reality is theory laden, “we do not need to abandon the concept of truthas correspondence to an independent reality” (p. 62).

Accepting a contructionist epistemology and simultaneously adopting a realistontology give rise to a major challenge. This is so because as Smith and Deemer(2000) argued, “any elaboration of criteria must take place within their commitment toontological realism on the one side and, on the other, their realization that they are obli-gated to accept a constructivist epistemology” (p. 880). In other words, their truth cri-teria need to take into account that knowledge claims are dependent on the perspectiveof the person making the claims and that knowledge claims should correspond toobjective reality. According to Smith and Deemer, criteria such as plausibility andcredibility validity (Hammersely, 1990) and descriptive validity (Maxwell, 1992) aresuccessful in the first instance but fail in the second. They fail to demonstrate how theyreach an independent reality that would attain their criteria of validity “the kind offorce that will allow it to stand over and against or beyond a process of socially andhistorically constrained judgements” (p. 883).

As Smith and Deemer (2000) noted, the quasi-foundationalist’s problem is similarto that of their intellectual precursor, Popper (1959, 1972). Although Popper convinc-ingly argued that observation of reality is theory laden, he retained the idea of an inde-pendent reality as against knowledge claims that could be tested through falsification.However, as several researchers have noted, it cannot be possible to carry out such avalidity check if observations are theory laden. “It is impossible to think of the com-parison of a hypothesis with theory-mediated facts as the same as testing a hypothesisagainst an independently existing reality” (Smith & Deemer, 2000, p. 883).

The quasi-foundationalists’assumption that observations are theory laden and theirassumption of an independent reality create a major inconsistency. This means thatthey fall into the same problem of mixed discourse, which faces traditional positivism,albeit in a more sophisticated form. It is consistent to justify knowledge producedwithin interpretive approaches using quasi-foundationalist criteria within the bound-


aries of their underlying constructionist epistemology, but there is a lingering incon-sistency arising from their grounding in realist ontology.

Truth as Relative to Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

Based on phenomenological philosophy, it is argued here that although objectivetruth cannot be achieved, truth claims are feasible using criteria consistent with thebasic assumptions underlying a research approach. More specifically, when establish-ing knowledge about an aspect of reality, every research approach also makes specificassumptions about the nature of reality under investigation (ontology) and about thenature of knowledge (epistemology). Seeing knowledge and truth as relative to onto-logical and epistemological assumptions is one way of overcoming both the problemof mixed discourse and the problem of extreme relativism that can arise from the inter-pretive rejection of objective truth claims. Although researchers such as Giorgi(1988), Guba and Lincoln (1989), Lincoln and Guba (2003), Altheide and Johnson(1994), and Smith and Deemer (2000) have argued in a similar vein, few studies havesought to identify the criteria that could be used for justifying results produced withininterpretive approaches in a systematic way. In particular, what is lacking is an elabo-ration of a nonfoundationalist platform and theories of truth and their ground for truthclaims on which interpretive truth criteria can be developed.

As truth is seen as relative to the ontological and epistemological assumptionsunderlying the interpretive research tradition, these assumptions are elaborated belowas a first step in exploring appropriate criteria. Second, theories of truth that accordwith these assumptions are elaborated. Third, based on the elaboration of ontologicaland epistemological assumptions and theories of truth, appropriate criteria are pro-posed. Finally, a strategy for achieving the proposed criteria is suggested.

Basic Assumptions Underlying the Interpretive Research Tradition

As argued above, the primary research object within the interpretive research tradi-tion is individuals’ and groups’ lived experience of their reality. The notion of livedexperience as the primary research object can be traced back to the phenomenologicalidea of life-world. It was first developed by Husserl (1936/1970) but has been furtherdeveloped by other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), Schutz(1967), Heidegger (1927/1981), and Gadamer (1960/1994, 1977). The idea of life-world expresses that person and world are inextricably related through the person’slived experience of the world. As Bengtsson (1989) argued,

Even if the life-world is objective both in the sense that it is a shared world and in thesense that it transcends (exceeds) the subject, that is, its qualities are not qualitieswithin the subject, it is likewise inseparable from a subject, namely, the subject whoexperiences it, lives and acts in it. The world is always there in the first person from theperspective of my space and time here and now. (p. 72)

As Bengtsson points out, the life-world is the subjects’ experience of reality, at thesame time as it is objective in the sense that it is an intersubjective world. We share itwith other subjects through our experience of it, and we are constantly involved in ne-gotiations with other subjects about reality in terms of our intersubjective sense mak-ing of it. Consequently, the agreed meaning constitutes the objective, intersubjective


reality. Furthermore, the life-world is objective in the sense that it transcends the sub-ject. This is because its qualities are not solely tied to the subjects’ lived experience ofit. At the same time, however, it is inseparable from the subjects through their experi-ence of it. For example, most European countries have agreed to have daylight savingand move the clock 1 hour ahead for the period from March to October. Daylight sav-ing thus becomes an objective fact through this intersubjective agreement. Even ifsome of us try to ignore the agreed daylight saving time, we encounter difficulty in do-ing so because its consequences extend beyond our subjective experience of clocktime.

The phenomenological notion of consciousness as intentional (Husserl, 1900-1901/1970) provides further specification of life-world as the basis of human actionand activities. At the same time, it has fundamental epistemological implications forthe interpretive research tradition. Epistemology—the theory of knowledge—refersprimarily to three central questions for the researcher. First, how can individualsachieve meaning and thereby knowledge about the reality in which they live? Second,how is this knowledge constituted? Third, under what conditions can the knowledgeachieved be claimed as true? (For further elaboration see, for instance, Chisholm,1977.)

In general, intentionality means that individuals’ consciousness is not closed butopen and always directed toward something other than itself. More precisely, Husserl(1900-1901/1970) argued that individuals’ various modes of consciousness such asperceiving or imagining are always related to something, which is not consciousnessitself but intentionally constituted in a particular act of consciousness.3 For example,“in perception something is perceived, in imagination something is imagined, in astatement something is stated, in love something is loved, in hate something is hated, indesire something is desired etc” (Husserl, 1900-1901/1970, p. 554). Figure 1 portraysthe intentional character of consciousness in more detail.

What appears when we experience the object in Figure 1? The object may presentitself as an umbrella. However, if we look at the object a little longer, the picture maybecome something else. Perhaps a three-dimensional cube appears from the sameobject as the umbrella. As foreshadowed in the discussion about Figure 1, it is not theobject itself, which is the content of the experience, but the meaning, which resultsfrom the way we experience the object. The meaning, such as umbrella or cube, is thusinseparable from both the object and we who experience it.

In our daily reality, we often ascribe the entire meaning of an experienced object tothe object itself; the object and the meaning, “umbrella” or “cube,” become the sameobject. However, if all of the meaning relating to an object is placed outside ourselves,we overlook the role of the subject in the process of constituting meaning. Achievingmeaning about the world demands that a subject be involved such that without anexperiencing subject, the meaning “umbrella” or “cube” would not appear from theobject. On the other hand, the meaning cannot be ascribed solely to the subject. As theexample in Figure 1 demonstrates, the qualities of the object transcend the subject, asthe meaning changes from umbrella to cube when a subject experiences the object.Although the object transcends the subject, its appearance is dependent on a subject;that is, it is intentionally constituted in a perceiving act as an umbrella or a cube. Thus,the intentional character of consciousness has a constitutive power. It constitutes themeaning of reality, that is, the meaning of reality that appears to us in our experience. Ifintentionality is seen as the basic epistemological assumption underlying the interpre-


tive research tradition, what appropriate criteria could be used for justifying theknowledge produced as true? Before addressing this question, possible theories oftruth that stipulate what truth is and when it is achieved within the interpretive researchtradition need to be explored.

Theories of Truth

The purpose of this section is not to discuss theories of truth in general (for such adiscussion, see, for instance, Allen, 1995). Instead, the aim is to explore theories oftruth that accord with the phenomenological assumptions of life-world andintentionality. As pointed out in the introduction, the positivistic research traditionmakes use of the correspondence theory of truth. This theory is based on a dualistontology and objectivist epistemology treating reality as objective and knowablebeyond the human mind. Given a dualist ontology and an objectivist epistemology, thecorrespondence theory of truth refers to the extent to which a statement made by aresearcher corresponds with the specific aspect of objective reality under investiga-tion. Truth is achieved if the statement is a representation of objective reality. Based onthe assumption of life-world and the epistemological assumption of intentionality,both Husserl (1931/1962) and Heidegger (1927/1981) rejected the idea of truth as arelationship between the researcher’s statement and an objective reality. This isbecause it overlooks the phenomenological insight about intentionality, that is, theresearcher’s intentional relation to the research object. Moreover, as the researcher isintentionally related to the research object, the truth claim does not refer to an objec-tive reality as such but to the specific meaning of the research object as it appears to theresearcher.

Within the interpretive research tradition, therefore, truth can only be defined, asLyotard (1991) claimed, “as lived experience of truth—this is evidence” (p. 61). But if


Figure 1: The Experienced Object

truth is confined to the researcher’s lived experience of truth, how can the researcherclaim that the knowledge produced is true? One possible way to attain or ratherachieve truth is in terms of intentional fulfillment. Intentional fulfillment is establishedwhen there is an agreement between the researcher’s initial interpretation of the objectbeing studied and the meaning given in lived experience. The following example fromHeidegger (1992) can be used to illustrate truth as intentional fulfillment:

I can in an empty way now think of my desk at home simply in order to talk about it. Ican fulfil this empty intention in a way by envisaging it to myself, and finally by goinghome and seeing it itself in an authentic and final experience. In such a demonstrativefulfillment the emptily intended and the originally intuited come into coincidence.This bringing-into-coincidence—the intended being experienced in the intuited asitself and selfsame—is an act of identification. The intended identifies itself in theintuited; selfsameness is experienced. (p. 49)

Following the idea of truth as intentional fulfillment, the general principle of truth inthe interpretive research tradition could be stated in the following way: Is the initial in-terpretation of an object fulfilled in experience of it; that is, does the initial interpreta-tion demonstrate itself to be based on the way the meaning of an object under investi-gation presents itself to consciousness? If this fulfillment is experienced, then truth isachieved. For instance, assume that the research object is socialization. Individualsparticipating in a study may have been interviewed about their lived experience of be-ing socialized into the organizations in which they work. As Heidegger (1927/1981)showed, to be able to interpret lived experience at all, the researcher must have someunderstanding of what socialization means. This understanding is the researcher’s ini-tial interpretation of what socialization means to the individuals interviewed. Whilereading through the transcripts, the researcher may experience a discrepancy betweenhis or her initial interpretation and the way socialization shows itself to consciousness.In such a case, truth is not evident. Based on the first reading, the researcher formulatesa new interpretation and reads the transcripts a second time. This iterative process con-tinues until the researcher experiences an agreement between his or her presumed in-terpretation of socialization and the way the individuals’ lived experience of socializa-tion shows itself to consciousness. Only then can truth be said to be achieved.

Truth as intentional fulfillment may appear to be identical to the correspondencetheory of truth through the analogous process of matching between the initial interpre-tation of an object and the meaning given in experience of it. However, a fundamentaldifference exists between these theories of truth. Within the correspondence theory,the matching process takes place between two separate entities, that is, between theresearcher’s statements and an independent research object. By contrast, within truthunderstood as intentional fulfillment, there is no separation between the initial inter-pretation and the meaning given in lived experience, for this matching process doesnot take place separate from the researcher. Instead, the matching process takes placewithin the researcher’s lived experience of the research object.

Although Husserl and Heidegger agree on the general principle of truth as inten-tional fulfillment, their views differ concerning when truth is achieved. In Husserl’sview, it is achieved through perceived fulfillment, and in Heidegger’s view, throughfulfillment in practice (Lübcke, 1987). These different views can be illustrated byHeidegger’s (1927/1981) example of investigating what a hammer is. From aHusserlian perspective, the researcher would observe the hammer, for example, in all


its various modes, ranging from perceiving it on a table to perceiving somebody ham-mering with it and to asking people about their lived experience of hammers and ham-mering. If the researcher studies the hammer and allows it to appear on its own condi-tions, then truth is achieved through perceived fulfillment. Following Heidegger, theresearcher would not only observe the hammer but also actively use it, hammeringwith it in practice. Hence, from a Heideggerian perspective, it is first in the researcher’slived experience of using the hammer in practice that he or she can achieve true knowl-edge of what a hammer is. In other words, truth is achieved through fulfillment inpractice.

A third form of truth that complements but at the same time challenges Husserl’sidea of truth and also Heidegger’s to some extent is the idea of truth within deconstruc-tion developed by Derrida. Deconstruction can be described as a radicalization ofphilosophical phenomenology (Moran, 2000). Derrida questions that the meaning ofreality, what he calls text,4 can be experienced or interpreted in a coherent andnonambiguous way. As Bernstein (2002) argued, Derrida has through his numerousdeconstructive studies successfully demonstrated that the meaning of reality is not pri-marily coherent and unambiguous but, rather, is fundamentally indeterminate andirresolvable.

Derrida is thus deeply skeptical toward the idea that we can reconcile the internalconflicts and contradictions in texts and turn them into a coherent meaning system,which to a large extent is presumed within many interpretive approaches (Derrida,1989). Given the focus on and a belief in irresolvable contradictions and tensions intexts, deconstruction can be seen to express a theory of truth as indeterminate fulfill-ment. This requires that the researcher deconstructing a text must experience an inde-terminate fulfillment of its meaning; otherwise, it will not have been properly decons-tructed. As Derrida (1984) explained, “To deconstruct a text is to disclose how itfunctions as desire, as a search for presence and fulfillment which is indeterminablydeferred” (p. 126).

Taken together, Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Derrida’s theories of truth can be seenas complementing each other as a “truth constellation” within the interpretive researchtradition. How each theory of truth can complement each other will be further elabo-rated when discussing possible truth criteria for justifying interpretive knowledgeclaims.

Perspectival Nature of Interpretive Truth Claims

A central implication of truth as intentional fulfillment is that truth claims aredependent on the researcher’s understanding of the research object. This does notmean that truth becomes purely subjective. As argued earlier, everyone is situated in aspecific historical, cultural, and linguistic understanding of reality, which is internal-ized through upbringing, education, and work. The internalized understandingbecomes to a large extent our framework for making sense of reality.

The basis for understanding reality for researchers is often the disciplinary field,such as sociological, psychological, educational, organizational, and anthropologicalperspectives. This perspective itself is evolving, for instance, Giorgi (1992) arguedthat in taking a psychological perspective on a research object, “the presuppositionhere is that psychological reality is not ‘ready made’but rather must be constituted” (p.69). Every research approach also contains a specific methodological perspective on


the phenomenon under examination. For instance, an ethnomethodological perspec-tive may give rise to a different interpretation of an event than an ethnographic per-spective (Silverman, 2001). This means that from the point of view of an interpretiveapproach, it is only meaningful to talk about truth with reference to the perspectivetaken by the researcher.

The perspectival nature of truth gives rise to the question of relativism. However, asSchrag (1992) argued, the problem with perspectival truth claims is not relativism butrather “that there appears to be an unmanageable surplus of truths” (p. 75). Schrag pro-posed one way of dealing with pluralistic truth claims by assessing one specific truthclaim in conjunction with others dealing with the same issue. This strategy, accordingto Schrag, allows us to speak about justification or “correctness” of a knowledgeclaim. Here, “correctness” does not mean representation of objective reality but rathera process of justification “that proceeds by ‘correcting’ the limitations and misunder-standings of other particular interpretations.” Other researchers such as Guba and Lin-coln (1989), Polkinghorne (1983), and Smith and Deemer (2000) have argued in asimilar vein.

The idea of “correcting” by comparing alternative knowledge claims has been fre-quently proposed and can be found in Hirsch’s (1967) claim that the requirement ofcertainty should be replaced by a probability judgment, Ricoeur’s (1971) discussionon validation as an argumentative discipline comparable to the juridical procedures oflegal interpretation, Habermas’s (1990) discussion on achieving trustworthiness andknowledge through communicative action, House’s (1980) discussion of validity inevaluation seen as an argumentative discourse, Karlsson’s (1993) concept of argumen-tative reasoning, and Norén’s (1995) trustworthy knowledge.

To summarize this section, assessing truth claims is an iterative process of correct-ing by comparing alternative knowledge claims within a certain research perspectiveas well as between specific research perspectives. It can lead to a deeper understandingof the aspect of human activity under investigation, and limitations in specific knowl-edge claims can be disclosed and replaced by more inclusive knowledge claims. Thismeans that truth achieved within interpretive approaches will never be one final andunambiguous truth but rather is an ongoing and open process of knowledge claimscorrecting each other.

Criteria for Justifying KnowledgeProduced Within Interpretive Approaches

If we assume that truth as intentional fulfillment can be achieved when theresearcher’s interpretation allows the research object to appear on its own conditionswithin the perspective taken, it still prompts the question as to what kind of criteriamight be applied in justifying such truth claims. To check researchers’ interpretations,criteria recommended by several researchers such as Kvale (1989, 1995), Lather(1993, 1995), Richardson (1995), and Sandberg (1995) are proposed in this section.These criteria are elaborated consistent with the assumptions of life-world andintentionality, following the concept of truth as intentional fulfillment. In particular,the criteria are elaborated in line with the proposed truth constellation consisting oftruth as perceived fulfillment, fulfillment in practice, and indeterminate fulfillment. Astudy on human competence at work (Sandberg, 2000) will be used to elaborate and


illustrate how the proposed criteria can be used to justify knowledge produced withininterpretive approaches.

Understanding Human Competenceat Work: An Interpretive Approach

In a study of what constitutes competence at work (Sandberg, 2000), an interpretiveapproach was proposed as an alternative to the prevalent rationalistic approaches. Themost central feature of the rationalistic approaches is that they all regard competenceas an attribute-based phenomenon. More specifically, competence is described as con-stituted by a specific set of attributes such as knowledge and skills, which workers useto accomplish their work. This view originates from a dualist ontology and objectivistepistemology such that competence is seen as consisting of two separate entities: a setof attributes possessed by the worker and a separate set of work activities.

The view of competence as an attribute-based phenomenon has, however, beensubject of increasing criticism. The most basic one comes from a growing body ofstudies using interpretive approaches to competence. Their main objection is thatadvocates of rationalistic approaches overlook the ways people experience or interprettheir work. From an interpretive standpoint, competence is not seen as consisting oftwo separate entities. Instead, worker and work form one entity through the lived expe-rience of work. Competence is thus seen as constituted by the meaning the work takesfor the worker in his or her experience of it (Dall’Alba & Sandberg 1996; Sandberg1994). Hence, a shift in the point of departure—from worker and work as two separateentities, to the workers’ lived experience of work—gives rise to an alternative way ofunderstanding what constitutes competence at work.

Drawing on previous interpretive research on competence, phenomenography wasadopted to further our understanding of what constitutes competence at work.Phenomenography is an interpretive approach that was originally developed withineducation to describe qualitatively different ways in which people understand or makesense of their world (Marton, 1981; Marton & Booth, 1997). More specifically, aphenomenographic approach to competence was adopted during an empirical study ofengineers, namely, engine optimizers in the department of engine optimization at theVolvo Car Corporation in Sweden. Their task was to develop engines for new carmodels.

In exploring what constituted competence in engine optimization, the point ofdeparture was the engineer’s understanding of their work. Interviews and observationwere used to identify the ways in which the optimizers understood and made sense oftheir work.

Three different ways of understanding engine optimization emerged from thestudy: namely, engine optimization as (a) optimizing separate qualities, (b) optimizinginteracting qualities, and (c) optimizing from the customers’ perspective. Within eachway of understanding, it was possible to distinguish a number of essential attributesand a specific structure of attributes, which characteristically appear as the optimizersaccomplish the optimization.

The most central findings were that human competence is not primarily constitutedby a specific set of attributes. Instead, workers’ knowledge, skills, and other attributesused in accomplishing the work are preceded by and based on the workers’ under-


standing of their work, which constitutes human competence. It is the workers’ waysof understanding work that form and organize their knowledge and skills into a dis-tinctive competence in performing the work. But how can these knowledge claims bejustified as true within the theoretical and methodological interpretive perspective? Inparticular, what criteria can be used to justify the knowledge claims as true accordingto the proposed truth constellation? Below communicative, pragmatic, and trans-gressive validity together with reliability as interpretative awareness are proposed andelaborated as suitable criteria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretiveapproaches. First, communicative validity is proposed as a criterion for establishingtruth as perceived fulfillment. Second, pragmatic validity is elaborated as the criterionfor establishing truth as fulfillment in practice. Finally, transgressive validity issuggested as an appropriate criterion for establishing truth as indeterminatefulfillment.

Truth Constellation of Criteria

Communicative validity. Communicative validity can be seen as one criterion forachieving truth according to the Husserlian notion of perceived fulfillment. The extentto which the researcher has achieved a truth claim can be justified in at least threephases in the research process. In the initial phase of generating empirical material,communicative validity can be achieved by establishing what Apel (1972) called acommunity of interpretation. According to Apel, the production of valid knowledgeclaims presupposes an understanding between researcher and research participantsabout what they are doing. In the Volvo study, a community of interpretation wasestablished by initially arranging a seminar with the optimizers in which I explainedthat my aim was to understand their lived experience of engine optimization. I alsospent about 1 week in their department observing and talking with them about theirwork and took part in an induction program for new employees. Moreover, at thebeginning of each interview, I reminded them that my purpose was to discuss theirexperience of engine optimization. Such clarification from both sides contributed toestablishing a fruitful community of interpretation for the subsequent interviews.

The interviews were conducted in the form of a dialogue because generating verbaldescriptions of lived experience becomes a one-sided activity when the researchermerely poses questions and the subject answers, and it is unlikely to achieve high com-municative validity. Instead, it is preferable that verbal descriptions be generatedthrough a dialogue, which conveys an openness toward the research object. AsGadamer (1960/1994) pointed out, genuine dialogue involves the process of questionand answer, with the priority of the question over the answer. We develop our under-standing through posing questions: “Recognizing that an object is different, and not aswe first thought, obviously presupposes a question whether it was this or that” (p.362). In the interviews at Volvo, only two principal open-ended interview questionswere used to encourage the optimizers to identify and describe what they themselvesunderstood as central in engine optimization. These questions were elaborated andsubstantiated with follow-up questions such as “What do you mean by that?” “Canyou explain that further?” and “Can you give an example?” Using only two questionsin combination with follow-up questions enabled me to constantly focus on their livedexperience of engine optimization throughout the interviews and thus achieve highcommunicative validity. The following discussion between the interviewer (I) and the


optimizer (O) provides one example of how the interviews in the Volvo study wereconducted as a dialogue with the intention of achieving communicative validity. Itillustrates how the interviewer, by getting involved in a genuine dialogue with theoptimizer, gradually arrives at a clearer understanding of what the optimizer means by“tricks” and how they are used to avoid extra loops in the optimization process.

I: Yeah, but are you a competent optimizer then?O: Well then you have other knowledge as well.I: Such as what?O: That you have been working here for a long time, you know, those tricks, as I said. As

usual it’s the error you make but shouldn’t, so you don’t fall into these traps yourself.I: Yeah, well what are you thinking about when you say “tricks”?O: There are a lot of things you do automatically which someone newly employed misses.I: Can you give an example?O: We know, for instance, that if they [the new employees] optimize Kennfeld [the ignition]

in the FP [function testing room]. For example . . . we have an ignition curve here . . . thenthe curve goes up, something like this, and sure when you drive in FP then you want tocontinue with this curve but we know that it will landing here depending on the emis-sions. Such tricks, they save enormously much time for us. We can avoid an extra loopbetween FP and EP [emission testing room] and FP.

I: Yeah, yeah, because the optimum seems to be here, but you mean that it must be here some-where instead?

O: Yes, the optimum seems to be here but we end up down here.

Second, when analyzing empirical material such as interview transcripts, commu-nicative validity can be achieved by striving for coherent interpretations (e.g., Eisner,1985; Karlsson, 1993). The principle of coherence is based on the notion of the herme-neutic circle (Palmer, 1972), which stipulates that interpretation is constituted by a cir-cular relation between parts and whole. For example, a text can be understood only inrelation to its parts and, conversely, the parts can be understood only in relation to thetext as a whole. Hence, striving for coherence means that the parts of a text must fit thewhole and the whole must fit the parts.

Using this strategy, conflicting interpretations can be judged with respect to howcoherent they are with the empirical material. The greater the number of parts of theempirical material that accord with a specific interpretation, the more coherent it is. Inthe Volvo study, I strived for coherence by making interpretations of the optimizers’statements about their work that were consistent with both the immediate context ofsurrounding statements and the transcript as a whole. When I had analyzed how eachoptimizer understood engine optimization, I shifted the analysis from singleoptimizers and compared the different ways of understanding engine optimizationacross optimizers. First, I grouped the optimizers who had understood engine optimi-zation in a similar way. Second, I compared them both within and between groups.This process enabled me to refine the coherence of my interpretations and thus toachieve high communicative validity.

A third way of establishing communicative validity is to discuss our findings withother researchers and professionals in the practice being investigated. Although singleresearchers may be the main producers of knowledge claims, it is ultimatelyintersubjective judgment that determines whether the original researcher’s knowledge


claim is true. As Gadamer (1960/1994) argued, truth is to a large extent achievedthrough dialogue between people. Seeing truth as intersubjective can be traced back tothe phenomenological idea of life-world. As discussed, the life-world is not only sub-jectively but also intersubjectively constituted through ongoing negotiations with oth-ers about its meaning. Hence, by discussing with different communities of interpret-ers, knowledge claims can be refined or challenged as limited. For example, theidentified ways of understanding engine optimization were presented to theoptimizers on two occasions, initially to the 20 study participants and then to all 50optimizers in the department. On both occasions, the optimizers confirmed that theunderstandings identified were valid. My research results were also further refined inthe communication with the reviewers and the editor during the review process.

However, it is important to note that intersubjective judgment can be influenced byfactors other than achieving defensible knowledge claims, such as the social control ofwhat is published. As Astely (1985) expressed it,

Producing quality work is not enough; it must be certified as being of high quality bythe right people. This privilege falls to the gatekeepers who control the discipline’sformal evaluation system. These gatekeepers define what will count as important orunimportant work and, in effect, determine what constitutes valid knowledge. (p. 509)

Thus, according to Astely, even if the gatekeepers realize a certain knowledgeclaim is of high quality, they may not accept it as true for other reasons. In initial at-tempts to publish the Volvo study, one of the reviewers claimed that although the find-ings were interesting and intriguing, they could not be accepted without an interjudgereliability check. Without such a check, the reviewer claimed that the readers of thejournal would not accept the knowledge claims as true.

Pragmatic validity. Although communicative validity enables us to check thecoherence of our interpretation, it does not provide enough attention to possible dis-crepancies between what people say they do and what they actually do. Research par-ticipants usually do not describe their lived experience in an undistorted way. AsAlvesson (2003) has indicated, their accounts are mediated via impression manage-ment, political action, moral storytelling, social codes, and cultural scripts. Such medi-ators may produce discrepancies between interview accounts and lived experience.

Pragmatic validity can reduce this weakness in communicative validity. Pragmaticvalidity involves testing knowledge produced in action (Kvale, 1989). It can be anappropriate criterion for judging the extent to which truth has been achieved accordingto a Heideggerian fulfillment in practice. Using pragmatic validation as part of theresearch process may increase the likelihood of capturing knowledge in action, whichcontrasts with what Argyris and Schön (1978) called “espoused theories.” One way toachieve pragmatic validity when generating descriptions of lived experience is to askfollow-up questions that constantly embed the statements in concrete situations, asoutlined previously in the Volvo study. Another way to ascertain whether a statementrefers to knowledge in action is to use a form of pragmatic validation indirectly. Withreference to Freud (1963), Kvale (1989) argued that a statement could be checked byobserving the subject’s reaction to a particular interpretation of it. In the Volvo study, Ioccasionally misrepresented the optimizers’ statements deliberately as a way to checktheir pragmatic validity. Most of the time they reacted quite strongly. To make sure I


had understood them correctly, they went back and elaborated the specific statements Ihad misinterpreted. The quote below illustrates how pragmatic validity is checked bythe interviewer appearing to misunderstand the optimizers’ statements about “tricks,”suggesting there may be many more tricks. The optimizer then clarifies that it is alsoabout knowledge as well as tricks, which is consistent with what he said previously inthe interview.

O: You have to have those rules of thumb to be able to judge where to make the thrust (directyour efforts) because we are always under time pressure, and it’s those small tricks [thatenable you to see links between the qualities of the engine].

I: But how have you acquired those small tricks?O: You have to listen, and XY [colleague with competence 3] is that type of person, because

he is an old hand . . . you discuss with him.I: Does he have more tricks then?O: Yes, he has great many tricks, it’s obvious, well tricks, he has knowledge, he knows how it

works.I: But tricks, does it mean that you know what to do?O: Yes, yes, it isn’t really anything strange.

A further way to validate researchers’ interpretations pragmatically is through par-ticipant observation. For instance, in many anthropological studies on foreign cul-tures, the anthropologists not only carry out interviews and collect various documentsbut also live and actively participate in the culture. In the Volvo study, I pragmaticallyvalidated my interpretations by observing the optimizers optimizing new car enginesand compared that with my interpretations of what they had said they did in theinterviews.

The most extensive way to pragmatically validate our interpretations is to use themin practice. However, this way of validating often requires a separate study in whichthe findings are recontextualized into the practice investigated. Such a pragmatic vali-dation was to a large extent carried out in relation to my Volvo study. The studyresulted in a request from Volvo for a model of competence to be developed based onmy findings. To elaborate such a model, another researcher replicated my study using7 additional optimizers from the group of 50, selected according to the criteria of theoriginal study. The independent research confirmed the three ways of understandingengine optimization reported in my study.

Transgressive validity. It has been argued that communicative and pragmatic valid-ity are two appropriate criteria for justifying the extent to which truth has beenachieved according to perceived fulfillment and fulfillment in practice. However,those criteria tend to encourage the researcher to search primarily for consistent andunequivocal interpretations of lived experience. For instance, to achieve them, it wasargued that the researcher should strive for coherent interpretations. This means thatthe criteria of communicative and pragmatic validity may encourage the researcher tooverlook various forms of ambiguity, complexity, and multiplicity in the livedexperience investigated.

Truth as indeterminate fulfillment can help the researcher to pay more attention toirresolvable contradictions and tensions. Lather’s (1993, 1995) and Richardson’s


(1995) transgressive validity could be seen as one appropriate criterion for judging theextent to which truth as indeterminate fulfillment has been achieved. Its primary aim isto help researchers to become aware of their taken-for-granted frameworks.

Lather (1993) suggested three main ways to achieve transgressive validity. Oneway is to use irony to interrupt and disturb our present interpretations in such a waythat we become aware of the codes that have guided us in producing them. A secondway is to search for differences and contradictions rather than for coherence in livedexperience. For example, in the Volvo study, I deliberately searched for differencesand contradictions by cross-checking my interpretation of each understanding ofengine optimization. I did so by reading through the transcript expressing a particularinterpretation and assessing it against the sense of an alternative perspective. I per-formed this cross-checking until I believed I had found the most truthful interpretationof each optimizer’s way of understanding engine optimization. This cross-checkingalso led to clearer and more precise formulations of my interpretations. I eventuallyreached a point at which, despite further cross-checking, each understanding of engineoptimization remained stable.

A third way to establish transgressive validity is related to the fact that the scientificframework for producing knowledge within Western culture is often molded by andsaturated within a male imaginary. As a consequence, the female imaginary in terms ofspecific lived experience and ways of being is to a large extent excluded. However, bysystematically recognizing not only male but also female lived experience, trans-gressive validity can be achieved. This form of transgressive validity was not estab-lished in the Volvo study because all of the 50 optimizers in the department of engineoptimization were men. The inclusion of women may have resulted in some additionalways of understanding engine optimization. However, this result is unlikely to havechanged the main knowledge claim, namely, that our understanding of work providesthe basis for competence at work, as evident in subsequent studies that includedwomen (Dall’Alba, 2002; Sandberg, 2001b, Stålsby Lundborg, Wahlström, &Dall’Alba, 1999).

To sum up, the proposed criteria of validity can be seen as a specification and elabo-ration of how each theory of truth within the proposed truth constellation correct eachother. The main strength of communicative validity is its focus on meaning coherence,stipulating that interpretations should be coherent with the empirical material investi-gated. Although communicative validity enables researchers to achieve coherentinterpretations, it does not adequately check discrepancies between what the researchparticipants say they do and what they actually do. Pragmatic validity corrects thatweakness. A weakness in both communicative and pragmatic validity is that they donot pay enough attention to possible contradictions, but this is corrected by trans-gressive validity. On the other hand, the strong focus on contradictions, and tensionsmake transgressive validity ill-suited to check for coherent interpretations: a weaknessthat is corrected by communicative and pragmatic validity.

Reliability as interpretive awareness. The principal question of validity has beenhow we, as researchers, can justify that our interpretations are truthful to lived experi-ence within the theoretical and methodological perspectives taken. Although the mainquestion of validity relates to the truthfulness of interpretations, the principal questionof reliability concerns the procedure for achieving truthful interpretations.


Given truth as intentional fulfillment, criteria of reliability, such as replicability andinterjudge reliability of results relating to objective reality, fall outside the domain ofinterest in achieving reliability within interpretive approaches (Sandberg, 1995).Instead, the proposed truth constellation implies first and foremost that researchersmust demonstrate how they have dealt with their intentional relation to the lived expe-rience studied. That is, researchers must demonstrate how they have controlled andchecked their interpretations throughout the research process: from formulating theresearch question, selecting individuals to be studied, obtaining data from those indi-viduals, analyzing the data obtained, and reporting the results.

Because researchers cannot escape their interpretations, one appropriate criterionof reliability in researching lived experience is the researcher’s interpretive awareness(Sandberg, 1994, 1995). To maintain an interpretive awareness means to acknowledgeand explicitly deal with our subjectivity throughout the research process instead ofoverlooking it. This form of reliability can be discussed in terms of Kvale’s (1996)notion of “biased subjectivity” and “perspectival subjectivity.” Biased subjectivitysimply results in unprofessional work. As Kvale argued, biased researchers princi-pally take note of statements that support their own opinions, selectively interpretstatements so they can justify their own conclusions, and tend to ignore counter-evidence. In contrast, researchers exercising perspectival subjectivity are more awareof how their own interpretations are influenced by the particular disciplinary, theoreti-cal, and methodological perspectives taken in the study. Thus, interpretation thenbecomes a strength rather than a threat to reliable results. The means by which theresearcher can achieve interpretive awareness will be further elaborated in the nextsection.

Using Phenomenological Epoché as a Strategy forAchieving Validity and Reliability in Interpretive Studies

The communicative, pragmatic, and transgressive validity and reliability as inter-pretive awareness have been proposed as appropriate criteria for justifying knowledgeproduced within interpretive approaches. But what research strategy could be used forachieving these criteria? Based on an overview of qualitative literature, Miles andHuberman (1994) confirmed the importance of justifying the production of knowl-edge throughout the research process. They suggested a strategy consisting of the fol-lowing tactics: checking for representativeness, checking for researcher effects, trian-gulation, weighting the evidence, checking the meaning of outliers, using extremecases, following up surprises, looking for negative evidence, making if-then tests, rep-licating a finding, and checking out rival explanations. It is important to note that thesetactics have been primarily developed within the positivistic research tradition, and asGuba and Lincoln (1989) noticed, even if adjustments are made to fit the assump-tions underlying interpretive approaches, “there remains a feeling of constraint, a feel-ing of continuing to play ‘in the friendly confines’ of the opposition’s home court”(p. 245). Hence, instead of adjusting the above tactics to interpretive research, there isa need for a customized strategy originating from the assumptions of life-world andintentionality.

One available strategy is the phenomenological epoché (Sandberg, 1994), whichunderlies most forms of phenomenology and also includes more radical phenomenol-


ogy, such as Derrida’s deconstruction.5 The aim of epoché is to ensure that theresearcher withholds his or her theories and prejudices when interpreting lived experi-ence. The epoché does not mean, however, that the researcher must or can bracket allprevious experience (Giorgi, 1990; Ihde, 1977). To reiterate, as researchers, we inter-pret the research object within particular disciplinary, theoretical, and methodologicalperspectives. Rather, the point behind the epoché, as Giorgi (1990) expressed it, is “tobracket that knowledge which is relevant to the issue at hand” (p. 71). That is, research-ers should strive to retain themselves from routinely applying their known theories andprejudices to be maximally open to the lived experience under investigation. Accord-ing to Ihde (1977), phenomenological epoché requires “that looking precede judge-ment and that judgement of what is ‘real’ or ‘most real’ should be suspended until allthe evidence (or at least sufficient evidence) is in” (p. 36). More specifically, epochéconsists of steps that can work as concrete guidelines for achieving the proposed truthcriteria throughout the research process. As phenomenology has been under continu-ous development (Spiegelberg, 1976), there are a number of variations of phenomen-ological epoché (Giorgi, 1990). In my use of the epoché, I will principally follow Ihde(1977).

The first step suggests that the researcher should be oriented to how the researchobject appears throughout the research process. Such an orientation enables theresearcher to be attentive and open to possible variations and complexities of livedexperience. For instance, in the Volvo interviews, I tried to achieve communicativevalidity by constantly being oriented toward the ways in which engine optimizationappeared to the optimizers. Similarly, I tried to achieve pragmatic validity by askingfollow-up questions that encouraged them to elaborate on their experience of engineoptimization in practical situations.

The second step of epoché suggests that the researcher is oriented toward describ-ing what constitutes the experience under investigation, rather than attempting toexplain why it appears as it does. One way to adopt a describing orientation is to ask“what” and “how” questions rather than “why” questions (Gubrium & Holstein, 2000;Sandberg, 1994). “Why” questions tend to encourage individuals to explain why theyexperience the research object the way they do. “What” and “how” questions, on theother hand, direct the individuals to the research object and what it means to them. Inthe Volvo interviews, I used this strategy to encourage the optimizers to focus ondescribing what engine optimization meant for them.

A describing orientation also helps the researcher to avoid generating interpreta-tions that surpass the lived experience investigated. As soon as researchers surpasswhat is given in their experience, they begin to explain and use their arsenal of theoriesand models, which essentially are outside what is lived experience. In the Volvo analy-sis, I tried to achieve the truth criteria by focusing on the ways the optimizers under-stood engine optimization. I tried to maintain focus by holding back my own priorunderstanding of competence and continually checking if my interpretations weregrounded in the optimizers’ description of their work.

Step 3 involves horizontalization, initially treating all aspects of the lived experi-ence under investigation as equally important. Ordering some aspects into being moreimportant than others is likely to distract the researcher away from a truthful inter-pretation of their experience. Horizontalization is critical in both collection and dataanalysis. In the Volvo interviews, I initially strived to treat all interview statements asequally important in combination with asking follow-up questions that required


the optimizers to elaborate on and be more specific about what they meant by theirstatements. Similarly, in the analysis, I initially treated all statements as equally impor-tant, which enabled me to be more truthful to the optimizers’ understanding of engineoptimization.

The fourth step implies a search for structural features, or the basic meaning struc-ture, of the experience under investigation. This step is particularly important forachieving communicative validity in analyzing data. Within philosophical phenomen-ology, this step is carried out through the method of free imaginative variation. Inempirical interpretive approaches, free imaginative variation would mean that when afirst tentative interpretation of individuals’lived experience is achieved, the stability ofthat interpretation must be checked. This is done by adopting different interpretationswhen subsequently reading through the data. The variation in interpretations of thedata continues until the basic meaning structure of the lived experience being studiedhas been stabilized.

This step is also central in achieving transgressive validity in the analysis. In theVolvo study, I searched for structural features of the optimizers’ understanding ofengine optimization by cross-checking my interpretation of each optimizer’s under-standing. As described previously, this cross-checking enabled me to formulate moreprecise and clear interpretations of the optimizers’ ways of understanding engineoptimization.

Step 5, using intentionality as a correlational rule, consists of three separate, butinternally related, phases. The first phase involves identifying what the individualsexperience as their reality. The second phase is to identify how the individuals experi-ence that reality. Finally, the constitution of the lived experience is fulfilled by integrat-ing the individuals’ ways of experiencing with what they experience as their reality.Using intentionality as a correlational rule was adopted throughout the analysis in theVolvo study. I initially tried to acquire a general grasp of the optimizers’understandingof engine optimization by reading each transcript several times. Second, I read all thetranscripts again, to systematically search for what each optimizer understood asengine optimization. Third, I analyzed all the transcripts again, but now in terms ofhow each optimizer understood engine optimization. The primary focus here was howthe optimizers delimited and organized what they understood as engine optimization.Finally, I analyzed all the transcripts again, simultaneously focusing on what eachoptimizer understood as engine optimization in relation to how they understoodengine optimization.

Taken together, each step in the epoché, from the most overarching principle ofholding back known theories and prejudices to the most specific principle of usingintentionality as a correlational rule, may increase the researcher’s chances of achiev-ing the proposed criteria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretiveapproaches. More specifically, each step in the epoché can be seen as a gradual specifi-cation of how communicative, pragmatic, transgressive validity and reliability asinterpretive awareness can be achieved.

However, even if researchers enter into the phenomenological epoché and experi-ence truth as intentional fulfillment satisfying the proposed criteria, errors may stilloccur. There is no complete guarantee that the research object will show itself on itsown conditions to researchers’ consciousness. As Giorgi (1988) claimed, there are“only checks and balances, and primarily the checks and balances come through theuse of demonstrative procedure” (p. 173). A thorough demonstrative procedure is,


however, of crucial importance as a way to defend our knowledge claims in ongoingargumentative discourses such as presenting papers at conferences and seminars andin review processes for scientific journals in which our knowledge claims are justified.

Concluding Remark

The central aim of this article has been to provide a platform from which research-ers can develop appropriate and shared criteria for justifying knowledge producedwithin interpretive approaches. Based on phenomenological philosophy, it is arguedthat although objective knowledge is untenable, it is still possible to make truth claimsconsistent with the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying theapproach to interpretative research. More specifically, the principal argument has beenthat knowledge produced from interpretive approaches can be justified as true in rela-tion to the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying this research tradi-tion. This was demonstrated first by explicating life-world and intentionality as thebasic assumptions underlying the interpretive research tradition. Second, based onthose assumptions, truth as intentional fulfillment, consisting of perceived fulfillment,fulfillment in practice, and indeterminate fulfillment, was proposed. Third, based onthe proposed truth constellation, communicative, pragmatic, and transgressive valid-ity and reliability as interpretive awareness were presented as the most appropriate cri-teria for justifying knowledge produced within interpretive approaches. Finally, thephenomenological epoché was suggested as a strategy for achieving these criteria.

It should be noted that because truth is always something unfinished within theinterpretive tradition, the criteria proposed do not enable researchers to generate abso-lute truth claims. Instead, they give researchers the opportunity to produce moreinformed and thorough knowledge claims in relation to their ontological andepistemological assumptions. However, although the criteria proposed are generallyapplicable for justifying knowledge produced from interpretive approaches, morespecific criteria need to be developed for justifying knowledge produced within thediverse range of interpretive approaches. This will have to take into account otheraspects of justifying knowledge, such as the perspective taken, the research object, andthe researcher’s purpose in carrying out the research. Finally, the core assumptions oflife-world and intentionality together with the proposed truth constellation, it has beenargued, provide a coherent philosophical foundation for developing more specificcriteria.

Notes

1. When referring to philosophical phenomenology, I do not primarily mean Husserl’s(1931/1962) descriptive phenomenology and his idea about a transcendental subject as thefoundation of all knowledge but rather the interpretive phenomenology developed after Husserl.More specifically, if we look at how the various forms of modern phenomenology have been de-veloped since Husserl, not even his closest colleagues accepted a pure and transcendental ego asthe foundation of all knowledge (Spiegelberg, 1976). It was primarily through Heidegger’s(1927/1981) work Being and Time that Husserl’s transcendental subject was rejected by mostadvocates of phenomenology. Heidegger’s work demonstrated above all that (a) a pure tran-scendental subject standing above reality cannot exist because subjects are always situated in aspecific culture, historical time, and language that mediate reality and that (b) it is not possible to


produce objective descriptions of reality because the descriptions are always constituted by theresearcher’s preunderstanding of the particular aspect of reality under investigation. In otherwords, researchers’descriptions of reality are always based on their interpretation of the realitydescribed. Moreover, because both Gadamer and Derrida are profoundly influenced byHeidegger’s thinking (Bernstein, 2002, p. 276), it can also be appropriate to see hermeneuticsand deconstruction as part of the ongoing development of philosophical phenomenology(Moran, 2000, p. 436). Although Husserl’s transcendental philosophy has been heavily criti-cized, modern philosophers such as Mohanty (1989) and social scientists such as Giorgi (1992)have established a descriptive phenomenology closely based on Husserl’s work.

2. Given the great variety of research approaches related to the interpretive research tradi-tion, there are naturally not only unifying themes but also significant differences and tensionsbetween the different approaches. See, for instance, Sandberg (2001a) and Schwandt (2003).

3. Husserl’s theory of consciousness may sound as far removed from a social constructionistepistemology underlying most interpretive approaches. This is, however, not the case. AsGubrium and Holstein (2000) argued, “Although the term construction came into fashion muchlater, we might say that consciousness constructs as much as it perceives the world. Husserl’sproject is to investigate the structure of consciousness that make it possible to apprehend anempirical world” (p. 488).

4. Derrida does regard not only written material such as books and journal articles as texts butour entire social reality such as social practices and events in the sense that they are sociallyconstructed.

5. For example, Derrida (1999) said, “It is true that for me Husserl’s work and precisely thenotion of epoché, has been and still is implied. I would say that I constantly try to practice thatwhatever I am speaking or writing” (p. 81).

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Jörgen Sandberg is a reader in management and director of research at the University of Queensland Busi-ness School, Australia. His research interests include competence and learning in organizations, leadership,and qualitative research methods, including their philosophical assumptions. His work has appeared in sev-eral journals and books including Academy of Management Journal and Harvard Business Review. He iscurrently writing a book for Sage about managing understanding in organizations.


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