Sakyi, K. A. (2019). Public Corporation Monopolies - Case ...to engage in marginal cost pricing because he is a profit maximizer and a price maker. Penetration Pricing ... Disadvantages

AdvancesinSocialSciencesResearchJournal–Vol.6,No.4PublicationDate:Apr.25,2019DoI:10.14738/assrj.6252.

Sakyi, K. A. (2019). Public Corporation Monopolies - Case Study of Sale of Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG). Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 6(4) 148-167.

Copyright©SocietyforScienceandEducation,UnitedKingdom 148

PublicCorporationMonopolies-CaseStudyofSaleofElectricityCompanyofGhana(ECG)

KwesiAttaSakyiB.A.(Hons.)Ghana

MPA(summacumlaude)UNISA(MemberofOxfordRoundTable)ZCASUniversity(Head-Research)

DedanKimathiRoad,P.O.Box35243,Lusaka,Zambia

ABSTRACTThis essay begins by examining the theoretical economic underpinnings of differentmarket structures, particularly state monopolies in the form of public utilities ingeneral.Theessayexamines thecaseof thesaleof theElectricityCompanyofGhana(ECG) andanalyseswhy it is beingprivatised. The essay examines evidence globallyandholisticallywithreviewofthecaseforprivatisationoftheElectricityCompanyofGhana,makingsuggestions forandagainstprivatisation.The insightgained fromtheessaycaninformotherAfricancountries(suchasZambia)whicharecontemplatingthesaleoftheirpublicutilities.Themainargumentsusedformaintainingstatemonopoliesisthattheycreatemassivejobsforthepeopleandhelpthepooraccesspublicservicescheaply, therebynarrowing the incomegap.On theotherhand, themain argumentsagainstthecontinuedmaintenanceofstateenterprisesisthattheyareinefficientlyrun,and theyaccount for thebulkofexternalpublicdebtofpoorcountries.Besides, theyhavebeenheld toransombya fewpoliticiansandtheircohortswhereby thesestateenterprisesareusedasconduitpipesforsiphoningstatefundsintothepocketsofafewpeople in privileged political positions. Some of these state monopolies harbourpoliticalcadres,failedpoliticians,andghostworkers.TheWashingtonConsensusandthe Bretton Woods institutions which are some of the credible creditors to manyAfrican countries have over the years called upon many heavily- indebted Africancountriestoreformandaligntheirloss-makinginstitutions,hencethesaleofmanyofthe public institutions such as the Electricity Company of Ghana(ECG). To many anunlettered African, the sale of public utilities is seen as an act of abomination, anunpatriotic act, and a politically-motivatedmove. It is the objective of this essay todebunkthesefaultythesesorpremisesandlaybarethefacts.Key words: public utility, state-owned enterprise, public corporation, energy, electricity,privatisation, denationalisation, rationalisation, efficiency, state monopoly. ECG, marketstructures,divestiture

INTRODUCTION

Thisresearchprojectexaminesthe issueofmarketmonopolybyastatemonopoly inGhana,specificallytheElectricityCompanyofGhana(ECG)whichisbilledtobesoldtoaconsortiumofforeignownersledbytheManilaPowerCompanyofthePhilippines.TheessaywillcontainareviewandreflectionoftheManagerialEconomicstopicstackledintheManagerialEconomicscourse namely Demand and Elasticity, Supply andMarket Equilibrium, Economic Efficiency,and Pricing mechanisms under different market structures namely Perfect Competition,Monopoly, Oligopoly, Oligopsony, and Monopsony, Monopolistic Competition, Contestablemarkets,andMissingMarkets.

AdvancesinSocialSciencesResearchJournal(ASSRJ) Vol.6,Issue4Apr-2019

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TheessaywilltracethroughtheglobaldebateoutliningthetrendsonPublicCorporationsorParastatalsorState-OwnedEnterprises(SOEs),anddiscusstherationale foroffloadingtheseloss-making state monopolies through Divestiture, Liquidation, and Privatisation. Insightsgained in the reviewof the literaturewill lead tomaking recommendationsbasedonglobalbest practices, principles, and standards. Finally, issues of Ethics and Diversity in theprivatisationofECGwillbeexplored.The writer will show the significance of the study to himself and to other stakeholders,especially to those in his home country Ghana where many people make uninformedstatements about government policy decisionswhich they perceive to be based on politicalleanings and inclinations. This state of ignorance leads to conjectures, wild speculations,rumour-mongering,hearsayandfakenewsonsocialmedia.

REVIEWANDREFLECTIONOFMANAGERIALECONOMICSDemandandElasticityDemand ineconomicsmeanseffectivedemandordemandbackedbyability topay.Demandrepresents the manifest need for goods and services by consumers which is depicted by adownward sloping demand curve establishing an inverse or indirect relationship betweenprice and quantity demanded. Underlying the demand function is the marginal utility ofconsumerswhich shows their additional satisfaction derived from consuming an additionalunitofagood.Themoreelasticdemandis, the lessproducerscanexploitconsumers. In theperfect competitivemarket, producers face an infinitely elastic demand curve,whichmakesthemprice-takers.Elasticityofdemandaffectsthepricingdecisionsofmarketplayersaswhendemandiselastic,producersarelikelytolowerpriceinordertosellmoreandmakeprofitbyvolumesales.Onthe other hand,monopolists tend to increase price because they are price-makers and theyface an inelastic demand curve as their goods have few substitutes. In economics, we haveconcepts of unit elasticity, cross elasticity, and income elasticity. Basically, elasticity iscalculated as percentage change in quantity demanded or supplied divided by percentagechangeinprice.Thereispointelasticityandarcelasticity.SupplyandMarketEquilibriumSupply ineconomicsrepresents thequantityofgoodsandservicesbrought to themarketbytheprevailingmarketprice.Supplydoesnotreflecttheentireoutputavailable.Thuswehaveshort term, medium term, and long term supply curves. The short term supply curve isinelasticbecauseoftimeandtechnologicalconstraints.Theshortrunsupplycurveisinelasticbecauseittakestimetoorganisefurtherresources.Marketequilibriuminaperfectmarketsettlesatthepointwheredemandequalssupply,andthemarketiscleared.Pricedeterminationthroughfreeinteractionoftheforcesofsupplyanddemand is referred to as the invisible hand of the market while government interventionthroughpricecontrolsandgrantingofsubsidiesarereferredtoasvisiblehandofthemarket.EconomicEfficiencyEconomicefficiency is also referred toasParetooptimalityorAllocativeEfficiencywherebymaximumuseismadeofallresourcesavailablesuchthatforachangetobemadeoptimal,itshouldatleastmakeonepersonbetteroffandnoneworseoff(businessdictionary.com).


150 URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.64.6252.

PricingPriceistheexchangevalueofagoodorserviceorwhatacustomerdeemstheworthofanitemin terms of itsutility. There are differentways ofdetermining price basedupon the typeofmarketstructureorlevelofcompetitionpresentinthemarket.Cost-plusPricingCost-pluspricingisbasedontheunitcostofproductionorAverageCost(AC)whichisasumofAverageVariableCost(AVC)andAverageFixedCost(AFC).Cost-pluspricingismoretypicalofimperfectmarketswithconsiderableentrybarriersthanthatfoundinperfectmarkets.MarginalcostPricingMarginalcostpricingisfoundinalltypesofmarketsbecausetheyallfollowthegoldenruleofsettingMR=MC. If a firmhas to setpricebelowMC, itwillshutdown. Thepartof theMCcurveabovethepricelinebecomestheeffectivesupplycurveofthefirm.Themonopolisttendstoengageinmarginalcostpricingbecauseheisaprofitmaximizerandapricemaker.PenetrationPricingPenetrationpricingislowpriceadoptedbyanewentranttoamarketasapricingstrategyinordertocapturesomemarketsharefromexistingmarketplayers.PriceSkimmingPriceskimmingisapricingstrategywherebyattheinitialentryofanovelproducttoamarket,theproducerchoosestosetaveryhighpriceinordertorecoversunkcostveryfastbutasnewentrantsenterthemarkettocompete,hestartstoreducetheprice.TransferPricingTransferpricing is a strategywhichMultinationals (MNCs)with subsidiaries inmanyplacesaroundtheglobeusetotransfersomeoftheircostsinahighcostcountrytoalowcostcountrysothattheycanpostlowercostsandbeabletocompetefavourably.PremiumPricingPremiumpricing iswherebya firmsetshighprice foritsproductsbecause it isbrandedanddifferentiatedasasuperiorproduct.Mark-upPricingMark-up pricing is undertaken by wholesalers and retailers who are not producers butintermediariesinthesupplychain.Mark-upsrangefromabout5percentuptoabout25percent.GoingmarketpriceOligopolies tend to engage in price-leadership, dominant- price leadership, and barometricpriceleadershipasthereismutualinterdependence,marketinstability,anduncertaintyamongthe few large playerswhomay engage in collusion and non-collusion depending onmarketcontextualfactors.Thus,oligopolistsfollowthemarketgoingprice.

TYPESOFCOMPETITIONByusingtheHirschman-HerfindahlIndex(HHI)wecancalculatethetypeofmarketstructurebysummingthesquaresofthelargest50firms.Iftheresultiszero,thenwehaveasituationofperfectcompetition.Iftheresultis2,500(25%marketshare)andabove,upto10,000,(100%)thenwehaveamonopolymarket.



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PerfectCompetitionAperfectmarketisimpersonalbecausenooneindividualcanbytheiractioninfluencemarketconditionsandassuchnoabnormalprofitsaremadeinthelongrun.ThelongrunequilibriuminaperfectmarketoccursWhere,AR=AC=P=D=MR=MC.Each firm chooses the output theywant buthave to sell atmarket prevailing price. All theplayersareprice-takers CornfarmersareinperfectcompetitivemarketsbuttheybuyfarminputssuchasfertilizersandmachineryfromOligopolisticmarkets.

§ Inaperfectmarket,noabnormalprofitsexistsoconsumershaveabetterdeal.§ Producersarefreetoenterorexit§ Consumersarenotcheatedorexploitedbecauseoffreeaccesstoinformation§ Producerscanproduceasmuchastheywantandsellattheprevailingmarketprice§ Thereisnopricediscriminationasproductsarehomogenous.

Disadvantages

§ Absenceofabnormalprofitsmeansfirmscannothaveexcessinternalfundstoploughbackforexpansion

§ ConsumerscannotshowofftheirwealthbybuyingexclusivepremiumproductsSourcesofMonopolyPower

§ Controlovernaturalresourcessuchasmetals§ Controloverpatents,proprietarylicences,andprocesses(Microsoft,Apple,Samsung,

andHuawei,forexample)§ Naturalmonopoliesthatemergeafterapricewar,mergersandacquisitions§ Nationalstrategicmonopoliessuchaspublicutilitieswhicharelegalorstatutory

monopolies§ Solemarketfranchisegrantedtoadealere.g.ToyotadealerinSouthAfrica§ ExamplesofLegalmonopolieswhicharesetupbyActsofParliamentareESKOM,

ZESCO,ECG(powerutilitiesinS.A.,Zambia,andGhanarespectively)MonopolyPowerandExistingAnti-TrustLawsinUSA

§ ShermanActof1890§ ClaytonActof§ PackersandStockersActof1921§ Capper-VolsteadActof1922§ RobinsonPackmanAct§ Sarbanes-OxleyActof2002§ ThroughpricecontrolssuchasMinimumpricecontrol(Pricefloors)andMaximum

PriceControl(PriceCeilings)andAnti-TrustorAnti-MonopolyLawsuchas1890ShermanAct,monopolypowercanbecontrolled.

Microsoftatonetimewasaskedtodemergebuttheywontheircourtcase.TheFederalJusticeDepartmentandCompetitionCommissionhaveoversightovermonopolies.MonopoliescanbecheckedthroughTake-oversandnationalizationandthroughsettinguprivalfirmswhicharesupportedbygovernementsubsidies.InAfrica,povertylevelsarehigh,necessitatinggovernmentinterventionsinthefreemarketbyestablishing public-owned corporations and utilities such as electricity generation and



transmissionentitiessuchasESKOMinSouthAfrica,NEPAinNigeria,ZESCOinZambia,andECGinGhana.’Many Water and Sewerage companies, railway rolling stock and systems, universities, andhospitals belong to governments. These entitieswere established byActsof Parliament andfunded, managed, and controlled by governments. They provide goods and services atminimumcosttomajorityofthepoorpeople.Theyhelpbridgewideincomegapsbetweentherichandpoor,thushelpingtoalleviatepoverty.Theycreatemanyjobsformanygraduates.`They also avoid fragmentation of essential services by the private sector and they providestrategic services in the national interest to prevent control of the economy by foreigners.However, they are poorly managed and politicized with a lot of incompetence, leading toshoddyservicesandheavyfinanciallosses.Lack of competition leads to inefficiency and sub-standard goods and services being servedtoconsumers.Governmentmaynothaveenoughcapitaltorunandmaintainsuchgiganticventuressuchasrunning national airlines. There is a lot of theft, corruption, and mismanagement in publiccorporations in Africa which is due to political interference, and abuse of state assets bypoliticians.MonopolisticCompetitionImperfect markets include monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition,monopsony,duopsony,andoligopsony.Advantages

§ Monopoliesenjoyeconomiesofscalewhichpromoteresearchandproductimprovement

§ Monopoliessuchasstatemonopoliesavoidcompetitionandthereforetheyhelpreducemarketingandadvertisingcosts

§ Monopoliescanploughbackabnormalprofitsforexpansion§ MonopoliesundertakemanyCorporateSocialResponsibilityactsinSociety

Disadvantages

§ Theyreduceconsumerpowerandconsumerchoice§ Theyexploitconsumersduetoinformationasymmetry§ Sub-standardgoodsandservicesmaybesuppliedduetolackofcompetitionand

transparencyThisisamarketwithsomecharacteristicsofmonopolyoverbrandsandsomecompetitionintermsoffreemarketentryandexit,andhavinglargenumberofplayers.Players engage in non-price competition through product differentiation, advertising, andmarketsegmentation.TheysetpricewhereMR=MCandAR=AC=D=PServices such as Restaurants, Hotels, stationers, grocery shops, florists, hardware, and drycleaning outlets are all examples of enterprises in monopolistic competition. Firms in



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monopolisticcompetitionalso facedifferentcoststructuressotheirprofit levelsdiffer.Theyfaceadownward-slopingdemandcurvejustlikethemonopolist.ThepoultryindustrystartedwithamajordifferentiatedproductsuchasTysonbutlaterduetoease of entry and exit, others joined such as Perdue, Bell & Evans, andMurray (Keat etal.,2015)OligopolyAn oligopoly is a market of few large firms which together can behave in collusion like amonopoly. Suchmarketsexhibitpriceandnon-price competitionand in collusion, they formcartels,syndicates,andprice-andquantity-fixingarrangementssuchasIATA,OPEC,andACCA.(Keatetal.,2015)Giant steel companies such as TATA, MITTAL and others are oligopolies which deal withmonopolisticcompetitiveautomakerssuchasGM,Toyota,Nissan,Ford,andMercedesBenz.In the USA, the beer industry shows oligopoly with firms such as Anheuser Busch (50%),SABMiller)&MolsenCoors(30%),Heineken&StellaArtoisandInBev(Imports)(Keatetal.,2015)Aircraftmanufacturers such asBoeing, Airbus, Fokker, Lockheed, andBritishAerospace arealsooligopoliesduetohighentrycosttotheaircraftmanufacturingindustry,andtheneedforadvancedandsophisticatedtechnology.FarmmachineryandequipmentmanufacturerssuchasJohnDeere,J.I.Case,andNewHolland,Software developers of proprietary software such as Apple, Microsoft, and Intel constituteoligopoliesintheUSA(Keatetal,2015).ContestableMarketsA contestable market is a market with features just like perfect competition because eventhoughthereare fewplayers, theybehaveas if theywere inaperfectcompetitivemarketastherearenoentrybarriers.

BACKGROUNDOFECGThegeneration,transmission,anddistributionofpowerinGhanaisdonebydifferententitiesincluding Volta River Authority (VRA), Independent Power Providers (IPPs)(Generation),GRIDCo(Transmission),ElectricCompanyofGhana(ECG),andNorthernElectricDistributionCompany(NEDCo)(Distribution)(SeeAppendicesC,D,andE). TherearesevenpublicentitiesinvolvedwiththeelectricitysupplychaininGhananamelytheMinistryofPower,theEnergyCommission,thePowerUtilityRegulatoryCommission(PURC),Ghana Grid Company (GRIDCo), Volta River Authority, Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG),and Northern Electric Distribution Company (NEDCo), and Independent Power Providers(IPPs) in theprivate sector. The totalpotentialoutputofGhana is estimatedat about3325Megawatts(SeeAppendixD;Kumi,2017) ECG is a wholly-owned government enterprise which is a limited liability company of theGovernment of Ghana and was incorporated under Companies Code 1963(Act 171) inFebruary 1997 (ECG, History.online) It began operations in 1947 ten years beforeindependence as a Department under the British Colonial Government. In 1962, it becameknownastheElectricityDivisionunderthecivilservice.In1967,undermilitaryrule,itbecameknownasElectricityCorporationofGhanaunderNLCD123.In1987,NEDCowasestablished



to take over fromECG the distribution of electricity to the northern regions of Ghana (ECG,History.online)SaleofECGAccordingtoghanatrade.com(2016)theMillenniumDevelopmentAuthority(MiDA)willleadin the privatisation of ECG and it is likely a foreign investor would be brought in. Thearrangement was made to enable the Ghana Government access a 500 million dollar loanfacility from the MiDA Account in the USA. The Ghana Government had earlier on signedCompact2duringthepresidencyofformerPresidentJohnMahama(2012to2016)toenableGhana access loans from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) so that ECG’soperationalefficiencywouldbeenhancedanditslossesreduced.According to the outgoing US Ambassador to Ghana, Ambassador Jackson, ECG loses abouteight (8 million) million dollars every week due to wastage and transmission losses(ghanatrade.com)aswellasinefficientbillingasitisassertedthatbillingrakesinonly65percentofexpectedrevenue.TheagreementforthesaleofECGtoManilaElectricCompanyisfor20 years with existing employees guaranteed employment for the first five years(ghanatrade.com)It isreckonedthat thegovernmentofGhanasubsidizeselectricitysupplybyasmuchas160milliondollars.AfterthesaleofECG,theGovernmentofGhanawillretain51percentequityshareswithManilaElectricCompanyhaving49percent. ThisisaJointVenturePartnership(JVP) along the model of Build, Operate, Transfer, and Lease (BOTL) and Public PrivatePartnership(PPP)modelstoenableGhanagetthebestofbothworldsintermsofownership,expertise, and technology transfer, access to capital, and guarantee of jobs for locals(ghanatrade.com).The Compact 2 seems to consider diversity, inclusiveness and moral and ethical issues bycreatingspaceforlocalemployeestoberetained.Itisoftentraumaticinmostcasesformanyemployeeswhohappentobepartofanentityundergoingdivestiture,takeover,andmergerastheyarethrowninthecoldiftheyarenotgivenamplenoticetoadjusttochanges.Suchhard-landingseparationshouldbeavoidedasemployeeswhoaretobedischargedcanbegiven good packages or bemade as partners or equippedwith exit strategy such as FutureSearchentrepreneurialskills anda formof rehabilitation.That ismoreethical andaholisticapproach to divestiture and changemanagement. Inmost cases, such employees tend to becaughtunpreparedandaregivenlittletimeforadjustmentasmanyareunawareoftheirrightsinsuchcircumstances.According toHein&Co (1972) from1947 to1972,Ghana imported the legal formofPublicCorporationfromitsformercolonialmaster,Britain.HeinassertedthatPublicCorporationismidway between a governmentministry (civil service) and a private company hence it is ahybridformofbusiness.

LITERATUREREVIEWOFPUBLICCORPORATIONSNhema(2015:)contendsthatprivatisationofstateenterprises in thepast threedecadeshasbecome a trend in order to deregulate government role and create more space for privateenterprisetoflourish,especiallyinthedevelopingcountries.Nhema(2015)assertsthatthisisto end state monopolies which are epitomized by corruption and incompetence. Nhema(2015)viewsprivatisationassaleof government-ownedenterprises to theprivate sector inordertomakethemmoretransparent,efficientandcompetitive.



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However,onesizedoesnotfitallbecauseonthedevelopmentaltimescale,Africancountrieshave come from socialist dispensations where they enjoyed freebies and practisedeleemosynaryeconomicsofgovernmentsdispensingsubsidies,governmentlargesse,andtherewasthereforeabigvacuumofanentrepreneurshipclassinAfricawhichwouldstepintothebigshoesleftbehindbythedivestitureandliquidationofassetsofstateenterprises.ThesadandsorryscenarioisthatthefewrulingAfricaneliteinpoweraretheonlyoneswiththewherewithal to stakeequity shares in those sold stateenterprises, thusnot fulfilling theconditions for Pareto optimality as the majority poor get poorer and the minority rich getricher.Invariably,thesaleofstateenterprisesthroughtheausteritymeasuresofthe80sand90sledtomasspauperizationofmanyAfricanworkersandtheirnumerousdependants.Nhema (2015) defines privatization as the transfer of ownership and control of stateenterprises into the private sector domain by sale through the capital markets which aremostly underdeveloped inAfrica (Nhema, 2015:1). Richard,Mansoor,&Ali (1988) cited inNhema (2015:1) distinguished between divestiture which is an outright sale of a (goingconcern) public corporation on the one hand, and a liquidationwhich is the sale of a loss-makingpublicutilityontheotherhandinordertopaydebtors.In the case of the sale of ECG, it is a Joint Venture Capital arrangement with the GhanaGovernment retaining 51 per cent equity shares for the Ghanaian public and the ManilaElectricCompany(Meralco)having49percent.ThisisequitableandethicalinthesensethattheagreementgivesMeralcoleveragefor20yearstoinfusenewcapitalandtechnologyinECGand alsomanage it efficiently to reduce the leakages in the system. Public corporations areutilities such as transportation, water, electricity, telecommunications, financial institutionssuchasbanks,bourses,insurancecompanies,andresearchinstitutions,amongothers.Many are bedevilled by heavy deficits, mismanagement, revenue losses, inefficiency andincompetenceandaretherunningsoreor festeringopensoreofgovernment.Publicutilitiesarefinancedbytaxrevenues,loans,hardlybyinternallyandgovernmentsubsidiesandgrants(Nhema2015:1) InAfrica,moststate-ownedenterprisesareperceivedtobeconduitpipesforsiphoningstaterevenueintothepocketsofpoliticalpartyappointeesandpartycadres.TheWashingtonConsensusview themaspublicdrainsonstate resourcesand therefore theWorldBank and IMF in the 80s and 90s recommended Structural Adjustment Programmes(SAPs)andEnterpriseReformProgrammes(ERPs)formanyHighly-IndebtedPoorCountries(HIPC) in Africa. Those programmes imposed severe hardships on Africans as some of theprogrammesweresaidnottohaveahumanface.However,theywerecreditorsandtheywantedtheirmoneybacksothesayinggoes,‘hewhocalls the piper, pays for the tune’. Sadly enough, many citizens and stakeholders were notconsulted by their leaderswhen contracting external loanswhichwere used to finance thestate-ownedenterprisesandutilities.Thisthereforecallsfortransparencyandaccountabilityinademocraticdispensation.ThereisneedforAfricanleaderstoengagethecitizensinDialogue,Ubuntu,andNsakasothattheyrefrainfrombeingtingodsanddictators.PublicutilitiessuchasECGneedtobeoffloadeduntothemarkettobringaboutclosure,inclusivity,anddiversitythroughbroaderparticipationin the decision making arena. There is need for infusing good governance in the publiccorporationsbyborrowingbestpracticesfromtheprivatesectortohelpmakethestate-owned



enterprisessustainable.Thecorporationshavebeendebt-riddenduetogreed,insider-trading,andcronyism.WorldBank(1983);Nellis&Kikeri(1989:569)citedinNhema(2015:1)affirmedthatglobally,publicenterprisescontribute10percentofGDPatfactorcost;andforAfrica,itis20percentwithGhanaandZambiaclockinghighsof38percent(Obadan,2008citedinNzema,2015:2)whichfiguresshowhowweakandabusedourpubliccorporationsare.Furthermore,theyobservethatabigchunkofexternaldebtofthepoordevelopingcountriesisattributedtothepoorperformingpublicutilitieshencethe incessantcallsbycreditors fortheirsaleoroffloadingintotheprivatesector.Nhema(2015:2)observedthatfrom1979to1990,privatisationgainedmomentuminAfricaduetoexternalpressures.ZambiahasbeenunderbigpressuretosellZESCO,thepowerutilitybut thishasnotbeenofficiallyacknowledgedbythegovernmentdespitemanyrumoursthatthepowerutilityhasbeensilentlysold.TheZambianMinisterofFinance,Hon.MargaretMwanakatwe,haspubliclydeniedtherumourofthesaleofZESCO.In theUK, the thenPrimeMinister ,MargaretThatcher, accelerated the saleofmanyBritishpublicenterprisesincludingBritishSteel,Gas,andTelecoms,amongmanyothersthroughstateinterventionorstatevisiblehandundertheNewEconomicOrder(Nhema,2015:2).Themovewastoreducetheheavystateburdenandalsotheheavydebtburdenplacedonthenationalkittyby thealbatrosspublicutilities. Africancountriesat independenceembarkedonmanystate-engineereddevelopmentplanstoaccelerateeconomicgrowthandboostindustrialisationhencethecreationofmanystate-ownedenterprises.They saw massive state-owned enterprises as special purpose vehicles to implement theiragenda. Sadly enough, those state enterprises became like poorly fed cash cows that weremilkedbutgrudginglyfedonscraps.Thusbythe1990s,thosestateenterprisessetupinthe60s and 70s had begun towane in their fortunes as the euphoria of political independenceworeoffandpeoplebegantobecomerealisticandrational.The donors and foreign financiers began to decry the rot in the state-owned enterprises(Nhema2015:2),andtheyrecommendeddenationalisation,deregulation,publicsectorreform,restructuring,privatisationandaresorttomarket-basedeconomy.SomeAfricanscholarsandobservers saw calls for privatisation as a formof recourse to a newwave of slavery,whichsomehavedubbed ‘Digital Slavery’.Of course there is theprincipleofquidproquo(nothinggoesfornothing).AccordingtoWalle&Harden(1989)citedinNhema(2015:2)theexistenceofmissingmarketsformerit and public goods and alsomarket failure led to the establishment of State-OwnedEnterprisestohelpredistributeincomes,providepublicinfrastructure,imposepricecontrols,andassistincreatingjobs.However,governmentinterventionlaterledtogovernmentcapture,marketandgovernmentfailure,andincreaseinthewideningofthegapbetweentherichandpoor. (Hemming & Mansoor, 1988; Todaro 1989; Wall 1989; Djik, 1994) cited in Nhema(2015:3)



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Furthermore, academics believe thatmarket intervention by government leads to crowdingouteffectonprivatesectorenterprisesastheycannotcompetewithgovernmentineconomicspace.Nhema (2015:3) postulates that government intervention in economic space createsindifference among directors and CEOs of state–owned enterprises who have no financialincentivetohusbandresourcescarefullybecausetheyhave financialstake in theenterprisestheylordover.All they care for are the juicy perquisiteswhich gowith their political appointments to theboardsofsuchparastatalsorSOEs.Nhema(2015)positsthatthereasonwhyparastatalsdoless in performance compared to their private sector counterparts is because the oversightfunctionisweakerintheformerthaninthelatterduetoweaklevelsofcorporategovernanceandalsohavingnolinkageofappointmenttoownership,controlstructure,andperformancemetricsorKPIs(KeyPerformanceIndicators)orCSFs(CriticalSuccessFactors).Thishasunfortunately led tomanyCEOswhoareappointedbygovernment to indulge inasyndromeof‘enter,loot,andshare’.Kenya’sKenyaTeaDevelopmentAuthorityisonesuccessstoryofprivatisationinAfrica(Nhema,2015:3)becauseitisobservedthattheentityallowedcriticalstakeholders, theteagrowers, tositontheboard.OutsideAfrica,SwedenrecordedasuccessstorywhenStatsforetagwasfragmentedandsoldtotheprivatesector.Thatwasnot the case in Indiawhere in the1970s the breakup of Fertilizer Corporation ofIndia did not post any success story because according to Ayub & Hegstad (1987) cited inNzema(2015)thecontextdidnotchangeeventhoughthecontentdid.Lukje(1988)citedinNzema (2015) chronicled massive failure of privatisation in Senegal. Aristotle and StAugustine decried state ownership in their treatises even though Plato supported stateownershipofbusinesses.According toAristotleandAugustine,publicpropertyhasnoownerbecause it is anorphanthat is abused. Buchanan&Tullock (1962);Mueller (2003) cited inNhema (2015) lookedunfavourably on state enterprises as erratic and unsustainable models which often led togovernmentfailure,statecapture,andeventuallymarketfailure.In Ghana, about 38 per cent of the economy is state controlled, hence leading to massivewastage of state resources due to incompetence, over-bureaucratisation of state enterprisessuchasECG, insider trading, andpoliticalpatronage. Suchunfortunatepracticeshave led toballooningofthenationaldebtwhichcurrentlystandsat$34billiondollarsor58percentofGDP.This sad scenario has been attributed to the winner-takes-all syndrome in our politicaldispensation due toweak checks and balances in national governance. There is need to berobustwithMontesquieu’s and deTocqueville’s theory of Separation of powers by having areformofGhana’s1992ConstitutionwhichtiltsthepowerbalanceinfavouroftheExecutivearmofgovernment.AccordingtoObadan(2008);Paul(1985);Samuel(1999)citedinNhema(2015),governmentissaddledwithtoomuchbureaucracyastomakeproperuseofborrowedmoneytomanagethepublicutilities.ThisstanceisalsosupportedbyNellis(1986:11)citedinNhema(2015:5)AccordingtoNhema(2015:6)externaldonorpressureforreformofpublicenterpriseshassincethe1980sbeenthe



driverofprivatisationinGhanainparticularandAfricaingeneral.ThepressureismostlyfromtheWashingtonConsensuswhichismadeupoftheIMFandtheWorldBank.However,thesegiantmultilateralinstitutionshavebeentakenonaggressivelybydebtorsforprescribingpanaceawhichdonotfitthebillforAfricancountriesbecausetheirprescriptionslacked a human face, and they have since changed ways by working cooperatively andcollaborativelywithrecipientcountries.However,manycriticshavechastisedthedonors fordouble dealing as their aid has often been seen as fungible and improperly administeredbecause of lack of local capacity to absorb and administer aidmoney, leading to the cliché,DeadAidwhichwascoinedbyDembisaMoyo.There is therefore need to deepen local entrepreneurship knowledge base and also need todeployICTfacilitiestomonitordisbursementofaidmoney.ThereisneedtotrainandeducateCEOs on corporate governance tenets such as are found under COSO, The Combined Code,INTOSAI, London Stock Exchange Guidelines, and the Sarbanes –Oxley Act of 2002. Quasi-GovernmentalOrganisations (QUANGOS) such as the Internal RevenueAuthorities, Customsand Immigration, ECG, Ghana Water and Sewerage Company Limited and Civil AviationAuthoritiesneedtobecloselymonitoredtopreventtheftandleakagesoftheirrevenues.Zhou(2001)citedinNhema(2015:7)suggestedremovalofstrangleholdsonpublicutilitiesbyde-bureaucratizing them so that there can be massive inflow of Foreign Direct Investment(FDIs). The success of privatisation has been chronicled by Megginson & Netter (2001);Obadan(2008);Kikerietal.,(1994);Perevalow(1999)citedinNhema(2015)whoallagreedontheoverallsuccessofprivatisationglobally.However, empirical researchneeds tobe carriedout toestablish the social, ethical, culturaland human rights cost dimensions of such an exercise as the human suffering attributed toprivatisationmayfaroutweighthefinancialgainsfromprivatisation.Russiahasbeencitedasone country where privatisation was not very successful because the exercise ended upempowering a few Russians in the oligarchy (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988) cited in Nhema(2015:8)TheGhanaMinistryofFinanceReportof2017statedthat45enterpriseswerewhollyownedbygovernmentwithanother41ofthembeingJointVentureCapital(JVC)makingatotalof86state-ownedenterprises.ThedebttoGDPratioinGhanain2016was73.1%butthishasbeenrevisedin2019to58%.Majorityofthisdebtisownedbythestate-ownedenterpriseswhichhavebeenusedby someunpatrioticpoliticians to line theirpocketsand toappeasepoliticalcadresbyrewardingthemwithappointmentstoboardsofsuchenterprises.Torationalisetheiroperations,asingleumbrellabodyhasbeensetupbygovernmentknownas State Interests Ghana Authority (SIGA) whose equivalent in Zambia is the IndustrialDevelopmentCorporation(IDC).Thesebodieshadtheirequivalentslongagointheimmediatepost-independenceerasuchasGIHOC (Ghana IndustrialHoldings Corporation) andMEMACO in Zambia. The newumbrellabodieswilloverseetheoperationsofthesefragmentedstateenterprises.However,thisisseenasbusinessasusualassuchbodiesoftenareineffectiveandareusedasmeanstocreatejobsforgovernmentappointees,thusthiscanbeviewedasanexerciseinfutility.TheReport(MOF,2017:45)indicatesthattheAuditorGeneralhassetupActionPlanstosealthegapsinvariousstate-ownedenterprisesinGhanaincludingECG,VRA,GWCL,GNPC,TDC,



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andSEC.Itisthisauthor’sopinionthattherearetoomanyoperatorsinthepublicarenasuchthatitisdifficulttoapportionblamewheneveranythinggoeswrong.This is Ghana for you. Ghana needs a radical shake-up by having a bold leaderwhowill re-engineerthesystemthroughconstitutionalreformandalsochangethemind-setofGhanaianstobelessselfishandmorepatriotic.Moralshavedegeneratedaspeoplehavebeenfixatedonacquisitionofill-gottenwealththroughget-rich-quickmethods,byfairorfoulmeans.Themoral decay is somuchso thatNiccoloMachiavelliwould be seen bymanyGhanaianstodayasaheroratherthanavillain.TopemployeesofstateenterpriseshavenoperformanceagreementswiththeGhanagovernmentontheirperformancetargetsordeliverablesbecausethereisaplethoraofoversightbodiesandassuch,theyaremadeineffective.TheEnergysectorinGhanahasthehighestcostofallstate-ownedenterprisesinGhana,hencethe need to offload ECG (MOF, 2017). According to the Report (2017:13) ECGwas highlygearedwith lowliquidityand itwasunable tomeet its current liabilities.Besides, itdidnotadherestrictlytoauditandperformancecompliance.Itsstrategicdirectionwasunclearanditlackedcompetenceforfutureexpansion.Mahmoud (n.d.,:16)observed thatSOEsweresetup towidenownershipbaseandgeneraterevenuesforgovernmentbutinGhanaandinZambia,SOEshavebeenmilkedascashcowsbyafewpeopleinpowerandtopmanagersofthoseenterpriseswhohavepoliticallinkagetothecorridorsofpowerbecausetheyowetheirappointmentstothepowers-that-be.Mahmoud asserted that wide budget deficits in developing countries are as a result ofsubsidizingloss-makingstateenterprises.MahmoudchroniclesprivatisationsuccessinSouthAfrica,Singapore,UKandothercountries,statingthatintheUSAprivatisationwasextendedto refuse collection, prison services, road repair, railroads, and petroleum reserves, amongotherenterprises.ThisAmericanmodelhowever, in theviewofthisauthor, is theextremeofcapitalismorthefree market economy because privatising prisons and national security services has itsnational security,moral, social, and ethical implications. If that is the case, then there is noneedtohaveacentralgovernmentinplacebecausethereareactivitiessuchasprisonservicesand state securitywhich should remain centralised, asoutsourcing those services toprivateproviderscouldleadtovindictiveness,socialinstability,andnationalinsecurity.Some services are constitutional imperatives for central government. The Americanmodelshouldnotbereplicatedhook,line,andsinkereverywhereintheworldbecauseeachcountryhas its own cultural, contextual, and political nuances. Capitalism cannot solve all humanproblems,hencetheexistenceofmissingmarkets,marketfailuresandgovernmentfailure.Mahmoud (n.d.,:11) bemoaned the lack of developed capitalmarkets inAfrica and also notmatchingmarginalsocialbenefits(MSB)withmarginalsocialcosts(MSC).Hefurtherlamentednotcreatingenablingenvironmentstoattractforeigninvestors(Mahmoud,n.d.,:10-11)Appiah-Kubi(2001)positedthatbetween1987to1999SOEsinGhanagenerated14%ofGDP.He observed that the sale of some SOEs raised socio-political issues of not observingdistributive justice, fairness, accountability and sustainability. He observed that the soldenterprisescouldnotgeneratehighrevenuesbecausetheGhanaianeconomyhasnotmatured



enoughandalsothatthesoldenterprisesweredebt-riddenandhadbeenover-regulated.ThiswriterconcursintotowithAppiah-Kubi’sinsightfulobservations.Adda (n.d.;1) observed that for SOEs not to pursue market objectives, they become loss-leaders and uncompetitive. That was why in the UK Margaret Thatcher sold British Steel,BritishAerospace,BritishAirways,Rolls-Royce,BritishGas,BritishTelecom,BritishCoalandBritishRail.

RESEARCHQUESTIONS1. WhatisECG?2. WhyisECGbeingsold?3. AreGhanaiansawareofthecontextualcircumstancesleadingtothesaleofECG?4. WhatwillbethebenefitstoGhanaiansofsellingECG?5. IsprivatisationofState-ownedenterprisestheonlyoption?

RESEARCHOBJECTIVES

1. ToprovideaprofileofECG2. Toexplorethenarrativeonthereasonsforprivatisationofstate-ownedenterprises3. ToprovideevidencethatexplainswhyECGisbeingsold4. Toexaminesuccessstoriesofprivatisedstate-ownedenterprises5. Toexamineoptionsinvolvedinprivatisationofstate-ownedenterprises

PROBLEMSTATEMENT

TheElectricityCompanyofGhana(ECG)hasundergonemanytransitionsandit isoneof theprime state assetswhichwas so visible and essential to everyGhanaian. As such, any newsaboutthereformofECGattractsalotofattentioninthemedia.ManybusinessesintheprivatesectordependonservicesprovidedbyECGfortheirlivelihood.TheentityprovidesbothdirectandindirectservicesandemploymenttomanyGhanaiansandresidents.Itisplannedthatfrom1stFebruary2019,ECGwillbemanagedbyaforeignconsortiumledbya Philippino company, Manila Electricity Company (Meralco) as part of a compact signedbetweentheGhanaGovernmentandtheUSA-basedMillenniumChallengeAccount(MCC)andMillenniumDevelopmentAgency(MiDA)Thedemandforelectricityeverywhereintheworldisinelasticbecausetherearefewsubstitutealternativessuchassolar,biogas,andgeothermalenergywhichmanycannotafford.ThusECGisavirtualnaturalmonopolyinGhana.Electricitytariffincreasesthereforehavegreatknock-oneffectonalldomesticandindustrialactivities in Ghana. Being a virtual monopoly, it has not been competitive and efficient insupplying power to consumers who sometimes have to go several hours or days withoutelectricity, and this has adverse effects on productivity, GDP, international tourism, ForeignDirect Investment,andgenerally thestandardsandqualityof lifeofcitizensofGhana,hencethistopicbeingofgreatsignificancetotheauthorandmostofall,stakeholders.

SIGNIFICANCEOFTHESTUDYThecrisisofpowersupplyinGhanacapturedtheattentionoftheinternationalmediaacoupleofyearsago,preciselyfrom2013to2015whenseverepowersupplyshortagescausedalotofinconvenience in Ghana. The issue was heavily politicised and the then ruling NationalDemocraticCongresspartywasdubbedasincompetent.The Ghana Government therefore sought many interventions including procuring a powerbarge and increasing and diversifying power supply sources to include thermal, solar, and



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hydro-electricity.Thisresearchpaperwillprovidea lotofevidenceonthepowercapacityofGhana, and will help enlighten many citizens who are not aware of the hard facts on theground. It will be useful to future researchers, students, and foreign investors who needinformationoninvestmentopportunities.

LIMITATIONSANDSCOPEOFTHERESEARCHThispaperislimitedinscopeastolengthandthescopeofcoverage.Theauthorwouldhaveloved to explore best practices around the globe to make the work empirical but timeconstraintaswellaswordcountlimitmakeithardtodelvedeeper.

METHODOLOGYTheapproachadopted inthispaper isqualitativeanddescriptiveas it isareviewofexistingliteraturetogaininsightsandtohelpmakerecommendationsandinformedjudgments.

ETHICSOFRESEARCHANDDIVERSITYThere isa lotofpoliticalvibration inGhanaovermany issues includingthesaleofECG.Theauthorwilladoptanapoliticalstancebybeingneutralandobjective.Furthermore,theauthorwillcontinuouslyacknowledgesourcesofinformationusedintheresearchinaccordancewiththeAPAstyleofcitation,academicwritingandappropriatereferencingstyle.Thiswillbedonetoavoidissuesofplagiarismornotdulyacknowledgingsecondarysourcesused intheresearch.Furthermore,acriticalstyleofwritingwillbeusedbybeingmindfulofthe needs, emotions, and feelings of readers. The authorwill also adopt a balanced style ofwriting by examining both sides of an argument in order to bring closure and inclusivity toreflectculturaldiversity,andaholisticapproach.

FINDINGSANDANALYSISAppendix A shows the map of Ghana with 10 regions with an estimated population of 30million and a land area of 238,535 square kilometres (CIA World Facts 2018;worldometres.com) Ghana currently has a population density of 120 people per squarekilometre,whichhappenstobeonthehighersidecomparedtoacountrysuchasZambiawithadensityof21peoplepersquarekilometre,sixtimeslessthanGhana’s.TheimportofthisisthatthereisahigherdemandforelectricityinGhanamorethaninZambiahencethereismoreinvestmentopportunityintheenergysectorinGhana.Thehighdensityofpopulation in Ghana also calls for utilisation of more and cheaper energy sources such asbiogas,solarpower,geothermalenergy,tidalpower,windpower,uraniumornuclearenergy,and ethanol. The current ruling NPP Government has created six more regions oradministrative regions in February 2019 in order to increase political participation and toaccelerateeconomicgrowthinallpartsofthecountry.Thislatestnewdevelopmentwillmakegreaterdemandsontheenergysectorparticularly,onthe generators and distributors of power in Ghana such as ECG and VRA. Critics of theGhanaian Government think that this move to create an additional six regions is not well-intendedasitwillleadtobalkanizationofthecountryandfragmentationofutilityservices.Bethat as it may, the decision for the creation of new additional regions was arrived atconstitutionallyanditfolloweddueprocessofholdingreferendaandreceivingpetitionsfromtheinterestedparties.Ghanahasacoastlineof560kilometresontheGulfofGuineaontheAtlanticOcean.ThereisthereforegreatpotentialtotaptidalpowerfromtheseaasitisdoneinIsrael.



Theseacanalsoofferopportunities for tappingwindpoweraswellassolarpower.Withoilproduction on stream along the western coast of Ghana, what is required is to increaseefficiency,transparency,andeffectivenessinthewaytheoilrevenueismanagedandutilizedto benefit Ghanaians, with regard to the Sovereign Fundwhichwas set up to ring-fence oilroyaltyrevenuesandproceeds.Oilproductionalsocomeswiththeopportunityofutilisingtheefficientandcheapergaswhichisoftenflaredoffandwasted.Appendix B. depicts the Supply Chain which begins with power generation, transmission,distribution, and endswith the end-users, the consumerswho aremade up of importers ofpower, domestic consumers, commercial and industrial consumers, government andinstitutionalconsumers,andotherusers.Moreoften thannot, governmentministriesandoutfitshavebeenheavily indebted to thosepowerdistributorssuchasECGandNEDCoattheveryendofthesupplychain.Alsotherehavebeen thefts by private consumers who are engaged in illegal electrical connections. This ispossibleduetopoornumberingofstreets,alleysandhousingunitsinGhana,andpoorhumansettlementplanningashousingplansareill-regulatedduetoindiscipline,highlevelsofbriberyandcorruption,andlowlevelsoflawenforcement.At the electricity generation stage, the government has liberalized power generation bybringinginbothlocalandforeigncompaniestocompetewiththegiantsinthefieldsuchastheVoltaRiverAuthority(VRA)atAkosomboinGhana,theownersofthegiantHydro-ElectricityDam. The heavy investment required and the high level of technology required to set up inpowergenerationhasthinnedoutthefield,thuscreatingvirtualoligopolyandmonopoly.Themarket shareof the IndependentPowerProviders (IPP) is indeedminimalasshownbyAppendixCwherebyVRA (AkosomboDam)aloneproduces1,020Megawattsor44%outofthe total installed capacity of about 3300 Megawatts. The demand for electricity growsexponentiallyinGhanaasthereisabulgeinthemiddleclass,andasmajorityoftheyouthfulpopulationhavetakentotheuseofICPproductssuchascomputersandsmartphones.The middle class is growing rapidly as many people are becoming entrepreneurial,sophisticated and well educated. The government recently embarked on a free SeniorSecondarySchoolprogrammetoprovide freeprogression intoseniorsecondaryschool fromtheJuniorSecondarySchool.CriticsofthesystemofpowerdistributioninGhanaquestiontherationalebehindexportingpowertoneighbouringcountriessuchasTogo,Benin,andBurkinaFasowhilesectorsofthelocalpopulationarenotconnectedtothenationalgrid.AccordingtoKumi(2017)about82.5%ofGhana’spopulationhaveaccesstoelectricityandthedemandforelectricitygrowsaheadofsupply.Kumi(2017)recommendsdiversificationoftheenergysectortoincluderenewablesourcesofenergysuchaswind,solar,tidalandgeothermal.Theuseofnatural gasbyvehicles inGhanahasbeenaround forupwardsof about20yearsnow, and many drivers have recommended its use for its low cost and environmentalfriendliness.WiththeannouncementslastyearthatworldclasscorporationssuchasSiemens,Nissan,andVWwillestablishplantsinGhana,thereisneedtoincreaseinstalledelectricalcapacitytomeettheneedsoftheseindustrygiants.AppendicesD,E,andFshowthenumberofplayersfoundinthesupplychainofelectricityinGhana,which to all intents and purposes shows a sign of duplication, confusion, and chaos.



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Thereare far toomany regulators, institutions, and think-tankson theground, asobserversbelieve that thishasbeen sobecauseof theneedof thepoliticians to findavenues to createjobsfortheirpatronsandloyalists.Thisdoesnotbodewellforefficientadministrationandmanagementofstateassets.ThepolicymakingbodyonenergyinGhanaistheMinistryofPowerwhiletheadvisory,monitoring,andplanning body is the Energy Commission. In some rich countries, these functions of policy,advisory,monitoring,andplanningwouldhavebeenmergedintoonebodyastheMinistryofEnergy,wherebureaucrats,technocrats,andadministratorswouldsitunderthesameroof.PURCisthePublicUtilitiesRegulatoryCommissionwhichadvisesorsanctionssuggestionsforelectricity tariff increases. This body which is supposed to be independent is often in thepocket of the government because its members are appointed by government. This bodyshouldratherberotatinglikea jurywhich isadhoc.Theroleof theVoltaRiverAuthority isnon-controversial as they are the ownersof the hydro-electric dams such as theAkosombo,Kpong,andBuiHydro-ElectricPower(H.E.P.)stations.Theyareengagedinthetechnicaljobofpower generation,with a few small-scale Independent Power Providers (I.P.P.s) chipping inwithsupplementsofsolar,thermal,andgassourcesofpower.It ishoped theseSMEswillhelpdiversify thesourcesofpowerand thatwith time theywillgrowbigtochallengethemarketmonopolyofthegiantplayers,withthebenefitstranslatingtolowertariffsforconsumers.ThusthegovernmentofGhanahastocreatealevelplayingfield,andaconduciveenvironmenttoattractforeigninvestors,andalsotoenableprivateprovidersthrive.PowertransmissioninGhanaissolelybyGRIDCoastransmissionisahighlytechnicalfield.However,beforeGRIDCowasformedasanintermediaryinthesupplychain, generationandtransmissionweredonebyVRAandECGrespectively. Muchas specialisation in theenergysupply chain is appreciated, having a long chain of suppliers or providers in the upstream,midstream, and downstream sections of the supply chain unnecessarily increases cost ofservices to the final consumer. Thus Ghana may lose competition to countries withcomparativelycheaperpowertariffs.Finally, it is imperative for theplayers in the supply chain to seek tight forward,horizontal,lateralandverticalintegrationinthesupplychaintoreducecostsandtopassonthegainsofeconomiesofscaleandscopetothefinalconsumer.Inthatway,Ghanacangainanupperhandover other investment destinations as a country with competitive advantage for attractingForeignDirectInvestment(FDI)

CONCLUSIONSInconclusion,itisclearthatpublicutilitiesareadrainonscarcepublicresourcesbecauseofincompetence and political interference. However, privatisation has not been all that rosyeither, because of poorly developed capital markets and lack of entrepreneurial andnegotiationskillsinmanyAfricancountries,Ghanabeingnoexception.ThesaleofECGby1stFebruary2019isonpointbuttheexperienceofothercountries’successstoriesinKenya,Sweden,Singapore,andSouthAfricacouldbeenlighteningtotheGovernmentofGhanaaswellastootherAfricancountriessuchasZambiawhererumoursarerifethatthestatepowerutility,ZESCOhasbeeneithersoldorabouttobesoldtheChinesetowhomthereisagreatdealofindebtednessduetoperceivedexcessivepublicbilateralborrowing.



RECOMMENDATIONS§ ItisrecommendedthatthesaleofECGshouldinvolveextensivedialoguewithall

stakeholdersbycommunicatingtothemthebenefitsandalsoeducatingthemonthedireneedtoselloffECG

§ Allsalesofstateenterprisesshouldbeconductedinethicalandtransparentmanner§ ThesaleofStateenterprisesshouldbeconductedwiththoroughcircumspectionas

foreignmodelsshouldnotbecopiedwholesalebecauseofeachcountry’speculiarhistorical,social,andeconomiccontextualfactors

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Pindyck,R.S.andRubinfeld,D.L.(2013)Microeconomics(InternationalEdition,8thed.).London:PrenticeHall

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APPENDICES

AppendixAMapofGhanashowingthetenregionsandcapitals

Source:http://www.ecgonline.info/index.php/about-the-power-sector-in-ghana.html



AppendixBSupplyChainofElectricPowerinGhana


AppendixCInstalledcapacityofpoweroutputinGhana




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AppendixDPlayersinthepowerindustrynexusinGhana


AppendixEPlayersandtheirrolesinthepowerindustryinGhana


AppendixFProducersandconsumersofpowerinGhana


Sakyi, K. A. (2019). Public Corporation Monopolies - Case ...to engage in marginal cost pricing because he is a profit maximizer and a price maker. Penetration Pricing ... Disadvantages

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