Safeguards: The evolving picture · Safeguards: The evolving picture ... and access to facilities without nuclear materi-als, that is, to locations where their own author-ity may

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Safeguards: The evolving pictureThe strengthened IAEA system of international safeguards stands tobe not only more effective, but also more efficient in many ways

by Bruno Pellaud i he effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards sys-tem depends on what the Agency knows aboutnuclear-related activities. With a broad knowl-edge of such activities and a good understand-ing of their relationships, the IAEA can with afair degree of confidence assess the non-prolif-eration credentials of a country. Up to now, thesystem has been rather narrowly focused, lead-ing to perhaps overly thorough safeguardsactivities on large and visible facilities such asnuclear power plants, while other smaller facil-ities with a potentially larger proliferation riskwould receive less attention. During the lastyears, the IAEA — the Secretariat, Board ofGovernors, and Member States — has taken afresh look at the safeguards system. A shift infocus is under way, a drive to look beyond thecurrent horizon to gain a broader horizontalview, rather than piling up controls verticallyon existing nuclear facilities. This article exam-ines key aspects of efforts to strengthen IAEAsafeguards, and addresses some concerns thathave been raised from the viewpoint of thenuclear industry.

Towards more efficient safeguards

Since 1991, the IAEA has begun to revampthe safeguards system through various initia-tives and programmes. In 1993, a programme ofstrengthening and efficiency improvement wasinitiated on a broad scale in close associationwith Member States. Nicknamed "Programme93+2", it led to a series of specific proposalsthat were approved by the IAEA Board ofGovernors and broadly endorsed by the Review

Mr. .Pellaud is the IAEA Deputy Director General forSafeguards. This article is adapted from his address to theannual meeting of the Uranium Institute in September1996, a summary of which was subsequently published inthe Institute's Core Issues magazine.

and Extension Conference of Parties to theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons in May 1995. Prime movers were thenegative experiences that the IAEA encounteredin Iraq and in the Democratic People's Republicof Korea, as well as the positive experiencesgained in the verification of the dismantlementof the South African nuclear weapon pro-gramme. By that time, it had become clear thatthe old approach of improving the effectivenessof standard safeguards only on declared facili-ties was approaching its limit. The IAEA had tobroaden the focus of its safeguards system toundeclared, clandestine activities. This newapproach requires by necessity access to moreinformation and more access to several kinds offacilities, whether such facilities contain nuclearmaterials or not. This double objective of addi-tional access — to information and to facilities— lies at the core of the strengthening propos-als contained in Programme 93+2.

In early 1996, the IAEA began to implementunder its existing legal authority new measurescontained in Programme 93+2. The collectionof environmental samples and unannouncedinspections stand in the forefront. FromKazakstan to South America and Australia, intens of countries, the inspectors have introducedthese new measures. This was done after con-sultations with the national authorities to ensurethat the modalities of applications would satisfythe Agency's requirements and the operators'needs for safe and unhampered use of theirfacilities. (See the following article for fullerdetails on the implementation of Part 1 mea-sures of Programme 93+2.)

Negotiations now are taking place in anopen-ended Committee of the IAEA Boardregarding other proposals for strengthened safe-guards that require additional authority, Part 2of Programme 93+2. In these negotiations,some delegations, reflecting the views of facili-

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ty operators with nuclear materials, haveexpressed concerns about providing extendedaccess to buildings on their sites beyond strate-gic points, to such places as workshops, storageareas, and administrative buildings. Further-more, some governments doubt their own abili-ty to provide the Agency with information aboutand access to facilities without nuclear materi-als, that is, to locations where their own author-ity may be quite limited.

The Board's open-ended Committee met inJuly 1996 for a first reading of the proposalsthat had been put forward by the IAEASecretariat for the measures requiring addition-al authority. The discussions were pursued inOctober 1996 in the course of a two-week ses-sion that included a thorough second readingwith a review of the amendments that had beenpreviously submitted by delegations. Muchwork remains to be done to reach an agreementon the substantial issues reflected in the currentbracketed text (rolling text). Intensive multilat-eral consultations are under way and it can behoped that substantial progress can be achievedin the negotiations during the next Committeesession in late January 1997.

Proposed strengthened safeguardsmeasures in a nutshell

The new measures include the provision tothe IAEA of additional information. For exist-ing nuclear sites, the State would provide addi-tional information containing a description andan explanation of the use of all buildings on thesite, and, in some cases, additional operationaldata of safeguards relevance. The State is alsocalled upon to provide information on pre- andpost-safeguards nuclear materials (mines,export-import, nuclear wastes, etc.), on fuelcycle research and development facilities thatdo not involve nuclear materials, as well as onsupporting facilities directly related to the oper-ation of nuclear facilities.

As far as additional physical access is con-cerned, the Agency would be given an assuredaccess to nuclear sites (where required "man-aged" to prevent exposure of commercially sen-sitive information) and a conditional access tonon-nuclear sites.

The additional authority sought by theAgency rests on a few essential principles thatshow clearly the difference from the conven-tional verification measures applied to nuclearmaterials:

• The focus will extend beyond nuclear materialsto the factors that might indicate the presence orproduction of undeclared nuclear materials. Thetreatment of the additional information and accesswill be qualitative rather than quantitative;• The IAEA will not routinely verify on sitethe additional information received; it will mostof the time assess such information in its ownoffices and when necessary ask questions tocheck its consistency; and• For the locations under complementaryaccess, the IAEA will not install traditionalsafeguards equipment as for nuclear materi-als. Its inspectors will mostly walk aroundfor visual observation and, when appropriate,they will take an environmental sample.

This short description should bring to lightan important fact that has been somewhat over-looked, namely that the main burden of imple-menting the additional authority sought by theIAEA will fall on the shoulders of the Stateauthorities and not on the nuclear industry.The authorities cannot always easily provideinformation about all "nuclear related facilities"in a State, and even less so ensure automaticaccess upon request. By contrast, the operator ofa nuclear site maintains at all times an overviewof his own facility, with a solid organization anda staff well trained in the related areas of securi-ty, safety, and safeguards. The additional infor-mation can be provided and updated by the oper-ator with a minimal effort, and the complemen-tary access granted with only a marginal pertur-bation arid burden.

Concerns of the fuel cycle industry

The nuclear fuel cycle industry has a recordof clear support for non-proliferation and for thesafeguards system put in place by the IAEA.

In co-operation withState authorities andfacility operators, theIAEA applies safe-guards at more than 800nuclear facilities world-wide.(Credits: KEPCO)

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Confronted with new proposals for the strength-ening of the existing system, the industry won-ders what is in stock for it, what could be the con-sequences in terms of costs or competitiveness.Those are of course legitimate concerns that gov-ernments participating in the negotiations of thenew legal instrument for the IAEA need to takeinto account. Yet, in reality, the impact of the newmeasures should not affect much, if at all, theircommercial interests.

An information paper issued by thenuclear industry of one State illustrates manyof the concerns expressed by operators. Someof the objections put forward (here in italics)call for a comment:• "...the safeguards approaches implementedhave so far proved successful in States withdemocratic societies". Yes, but as an interna-tional organization, the IAEA does not distin-guish between political systems. In carrying outits verification mandate, the Agency can onlytake into account the readiness of its partners todemonstrate transparency in the relevantnuclear activities.• About the additional information that theIAEA wishes to receive, it was stated that the col-lection "will require considerable effort on theoperator's part if it is to correspond to thedemands expected" and "will mean direct inter-ference with facility operation". At the least, sucha statement reflects a fundamental misreading ofthe proposals, since the additional informationrequested from nuclear facility operators willremain of a common nature with generally infre-quent updates. As already noted, the situationcould be quite different for State authorities inregard to facilities without nuclear materials.Incidentally, the proposals acknowledge concernsregarding commercially sensitive information andthat constraints may need to be imposed by oper-ators to maintain confidentiality.• A fear expressed about increased physicalaccess to nuclear facilities is that the "number ofpersonnel involved will increase quite consider-ably as opposed to earlier practice." An occa-sional visual visit to the workshop, the storagerooms or the laboratories by the very sameinspectors coming for materials verification maywell add a few hours to the duration of theinspection. But it will hardly require the hiringof additional personnel.• Environmental sampling is labelled as a"method unacceptable for routine use". Theobjections cover the rights of the operator (yes,the IAEA does leave duplicate samples in thefacility), the lack of representativity of individ-

ual samples (yes, but conclusions will bedrawn only from multiple samples), the fear ofcross-contamination (yes, but detailed samplecollection and handling procedures have beenimplemented that limit this possibility). Themethod is indeed quite sensitive — but notsensitive to the point of detecting "transbordernuclear transports and illicit transfer ofnuclear materials", tens or hundreds of kilo-metres away. The field trials carried out byIAEA staff in collaboration with manyMember States between 1993 and 1996 havedemonstrated that the method provides a pow-erful tool and that it is acceptable for routineuse. Therefore, as instructed by the IAEABoard of Governors, the IAEA inspectoratewill implement it in all States having compre-hensive safeguards agreements.• Another serious concern is that the discoveryof inconsistencies coming to light through addi-tional information and access could discreditoperators and nuclear energy as a whole. Overthe years the IAEA has handled a large numberof inconsistencies of varying importance with-out much publicity. Common sense in manag-ing inconsistencies calls for checking and re-checking, for a dialogue with operators andnational authorities, a dialogue that normallyresolves the matter. Only when this dialoguefails does the IAEA ring the bell.

The proposed measures have been discussedwith industrial representatives of many coun-tries having large nuclear industries. While con-cerns were also expressed about the stillunknown burden that these strengthening mearsures would entail, the measures themselvesand the ability of the IAEA to implement themwere not much questioned. The bottom line, thebottom question was rather: "What are the ben-efits — for us?"

Reducing the safeguards burden

Strengthening — that is, better effectiveness— is not the last word in Programme 93+2. Asa matter of fact, efficiency — that is, the betteruse of resources — is part of the Programme'sfull official title. The Programme's originalscope in matters of efficiency included two dis-tinct elements: the first covered the accelerateddevelopment of all the technical and adminis-trative measures which could be readily identi-fied; the second dealt with additional efficien-cies that would result from the strengthening ofthe system itself. Indeed, one important early

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dimension of Programme 93+2 has since thenbeen under-emphasized, namely that a strength-ening of safeguards can be a step towards a sim-plication of safeguards for existing facilities ofthe nuclear fuel cycle.

The search for greater efficiency hasalways been an essential element of good safe-guards management. The reduction from US$3000 in 1980 to $1000 in 1995 of the annualcost of safeguarding one "significant quantity"of nuclear material reflects this ongoing com-mitment.* This effort includes such things asthe optimization of safeguards planning (e.g.,through the use of regional offices) or the useof technological innovations that permit unat-tended modes of monitoring and verification.

In this respect, one technology stands out:the remote monitoring at IAEA headquarters,through line or satellite communications, ofsafeguards information in a facility located any-where in the world. Several field trials are underway or planned: one in Switzerland started inFebruary 1996 and another in the United Statesis scheduled to start in late 1996. The purpose ofthese field trials is to test the concept of remotemonitoring via satellite and telephone links inreal safeguards situations. Additional field trialsare planned in South Africa, Canada, and Japan.The experience from these trials, as well asfrom the use of remote monitoring in Iraq by theUN/IAEA Action Team, will help identify andresolve issues associated with remote monitor-ing, as well as provide data on costs. This exper-imental work provides a solid basis to simulta-neously establish the safeguards approaches andcriteria for various types of facilities whereremote monitoring is to be implemented, withpriority given to material stores and nuclearpower plants. A special Remote MonitoringProject has recently been established in theIAEA Department of Safeguards to prepare,through testing and planning, for the implemen-tation of remote monitoring in January 1998.

But there is more to greater efficiency thantechnological improvements.

Confronted with severe budgetary con-straints, the IAEA has no choice but to payattention to the optimum use of resources — toascertain that the money available is best usedto achieve its broad non-proliferation objectives— by properly distributing its resources on the

*A significant quantity corresponds to the approximateamounts of plutonium or uranium-233 (8 kg) or highlyenriched uranium (25 kg) which is required for the manu-facture of a first nuclear explosive device.

verification of declared facilities on the onehand, and providing assurances regarding theabsence of undeclared activities on the otherhand. In fact, for many years, the promoters ofProgramme 93+2 — in and outside the IAEA— have recognized that the strengthened mea-sures, by giving more teeth to the safeguardssystem, could also permit a simplification ofconventional verifications on declared facili-ties, thereby resulting in a better efficiency ofthe system as a whole. Simply stated, if thecontrols carried out in the most sensitive facil-ities of a country from the point of view of pro-liferation — research centres and some pro-cessing facilities — are conclusive, whyshould the IAEA inspect so frequently andthoroughly nuclear power plants? The greaterdegree of transparency that a State woulddemonstrate through the availability of moreinformation and by offering generous access toits facilities would create a solid basis for areduction in the inspection load in facilities ofless concern. The IAEA Secretariat has not yetspelled out in any detail what these benefitswould be — what it could "give" — preferringto await the end of the negotiations onProgramme 93+2 in the Board Committee.However, the Secretariat's commitment toimplement the revised safeguards system,within costs acceptable to Member States andwith a burden acceptable to operators, hasbeen repeatedly formulated, in particular byIAEA Director General Hans Blix.

A new look at spent fuel

The strengthening of the safeguards systemenvisaged by the full implementation ofProgramme 93+2 would open up new vistas andindeed allow a fresh look at some fundamentaltenets of classical safeguards. The spent fuelfrom nuclear reactor operations might be onesuch possibility.

Over the last decades, the IAEA has devel-oped specific procedures and criteria to applysafeguards to various forms of nuclear materi-als. In the case of uranium, safeguards applica-tion takes into account the nature of the mate-rials — natural, depleted, low-enriched, orhighly enriched uranium. The degree of prolif-eration concern varies and this fact is dulyreflected. Up to now, a differentiated approachhas not been considered for plutonium, exceptto take account of whether it is separated orstill mixed in spent fuel. Seen in the broad con-

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text of all nuclear materials; verification mightbe insufficient for separated plutonium andexcessive for high burnup spent fuel. The timemay well have come to revisit the issue.

A relevant initiative in this direction hasbeen taken in the report published in August1996 by the Canberra Commission, a groupof eminent personalities brought together bythe Government of Australia: Nobel PeacePrize recipient Joseph Rotblat, Sri LankanAmbassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Chair ofthe 1995 NPT Conference), former FrenchPrime Minister Michel Rocard, former USSecretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Dr.Ronald McCoy (International Physicians forthe Prevention of Nuclear War), and GeneralLee Butler (former Commander in Chief ofthe US Strategic Air Command), among oth-ers. The Commission dealt with the broadissue of nuclear disarmament and the requiredverification mechanisms.

The report contains interesting ideas aboutthe use of civilian and 'demilitarized fissilematerials. Noting that a proper balance mustbe struck between the legitimate civilian use ofsuch materials and the objectives of nuclearnon-proliferation and disarmament, theCommission states that striking such a balancemight be feasible:

"One possibility may be to draw a distinc-tion between plutonium of different isotopicgrades and to use this distinction both for safe-guards purposes and for a proscription on theseparation of plutonium of an isotopic composi-tion which makes it attractive for weaponsuse...It is an unfortunate consequence of thecurrent practice of not differentiating betweenplutonium grades for safeguards purposes thatspecial attention is not directed to plutoniumhaving the isotopic characteristics of greatestproliferation concern. Therefore, there would bemerit in investigating various categories of plu-tonium in terms of applicable safeguards mea-sures and resulting verification costs".

All those interested in strengthening safe-guards, as well as those keen to reduce costs,should have an interest in such an investiga-tion. For example, in analogy with the variouscategories of uranium, one could possiblydefine two or even three categories of plutoni-um: 1) degraded plutonium, such as high bur-nup spent fuel, 2) low-grade plutonium, suchas separated high-burnup plutonium fromlight-water reactors; and 3) high-grade pluto-nium, e.g. from weapons, in breeder blankets,or in low-burnup spent fuel.

A sense of perspective

The proposals formulated by the Agency tostrengthen its safeguards system have opened abroad debate on how the fight against prolifera-tion should be led. Most of the discussion hasbeen of a political nature — the lessons of Iraq,the need to reinforce the NPT regime, the drivetowards nuclear disarmament. Many operatorsof nuclear facilities — in particular in thosecountries with a large fuel cycle — feel that theburden to achieve these grandiose objectives willfall on their shoulders. The following pointsmust certainly be carefully thought about:

• The debate is indeed first of all political.Non-proliferation is part of the efforts of theinternational community to build a more secureworld. While protecting its legitimate interests,while questioning what would be done in theirfacilities and the costs incurred, industrial asso-ciations should also maintain a broad vision ofthe political dimension and recognize that cred-ible safeguards are vital to preserve public con-fidence in nuclear power.• To truly assess the potential burden ofProgramme 93+2, the open-minded observer inindustry should look at the fine print. He or shewill see that the proposed new measures will notreally affect the competitiveness of the business,that they will not in fact stand out through theburden they cause, but rather through their differ-ent nature: unannounced inspections, and requestfor access to unusual places, such as the work-shop. Observers should also know that the safe-guards budget of the IAEA will most likely stayat about the same level in the forthcoming years— it has been frozen for more than 10 years.Hence, there will be no resources for a profusionof burdensome inspections. Like any organiza-tion operating under the conflicting demands of"high-quality service" and "low cost", the IAEADepartment of Safeguards will have to focus rou-tine verification measures on the essential —namely, on the nuclear materials and facilities ofreal proliferation concern — and will have toplan its activities pragmatically, possibly by tun-ing down some of the old verification measuresin order to make room for new ones.

As a community, the nuclear fuel cycle indus-try has few reasons to object to Programme 93+2.As a matter of fact, nuclear operators shouldwholeheartedly support the additional authoritysought by the IAEA, since the better transparencyand better non-proliferation assurances offered bythe new measures will open the door to simpler,less frequent controls on nuclear materials. L"J

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