Rumeli Ayanlari: The Eighteenth CenturyDeena R. SadatThe Journal
of Modern History, Vol. 44, No. 3. (Sep., 1972), pp. 346-363.Stable
URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28197209%2944%3A3%3C346%3ARATEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-UThe
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[email protected]://www.jstor.orgSat Mar 22 13:59:55
2008RumeliAyanlari:TheEighteenthCentury Deena R. Sadat
RutgersUniversity-Camden College of Art s andSciences
TraditionexcludestheOttomanEmpirefromthedynamicmove-mentsofthe
eighteenth century.lThe government wasbankrupt,im- competant, and
corrupt; and the governed, confronted with the virtual
collapseofcivilauthority,becameincreasinglyisolatedandwith-
drawn.The relativelyopenOttomansocialstructureofearliercen- turies
seemed to solidify.Rolesbecame increasinglyhereditaryon all
levelsandinallprofessions;MuslimsandChristiansbegantobe
differentiated into rigidlydefinedandseparated millets. Yet,
internaldevelopmentsintheBalkanprovincesoftheEmpire duringthe
eighteenth centuryindicatethatthistraditionalviewmust
bemodified.The commercialrevolution oftheseventeenth andeigh-
teenthcenturiescreatedseveresocioeconomicdisequilibrium,and efforts
t o assimilate and adapt to the external worldinduced a crisis in
values throughoutOttomanBalkansociety.Bytheendofthecentu-
ry,newpatternsofsocialorganizationhadevolved,patternsvery similar
to those developing elsewhere in eastern Europe. Amongthe
mostsignificantinnovations ofthelateeighteenthcen-
turywastheemergenceofaseigneurialregimeintheBalkans,a
phenomenonlargelyassociatedwiththerisetopowerofagroupof urban
notables knownas hyfin. The origins of the hyhn,or thebydnlik as
theinstitutionwascalled,remainobscure.Theworditselfisan Arabic
plural(a' ydn) designating eminent personalities andwasused
torefertofriendsofMuhammad.InTurkish,itmeantthemost
distinguishedinhabitant ofadistrict or quarter, literallya" n~t a
bl e . " ~ A'yiinare notedinnumeroustowns
andvillagesoftheEmpireduring
theseventeenthcentury;however,thefirstindicationthattheterm
hadacquiredanymorespecificconnotationscameduringthe
Austro-Turkishwarof1683-99.At thattime,thetermdy6nwas
usedtorefertocertainwealthyindividuals,electedbythepeople, who
acted as intermediariesbetweenthelocalpopulaceandofficials
'Portionso fthisarticlehavebeentakenfromD.
Sadat,"UrbanNotablesinthe Ottoman Empire: TheAyan"(Ph.D. diss.,
RutgersUniversity,1969). 2M.Z.
Pakalin,"Ayan,"0.smanliTarihDryiinl~,ri r3c, Teri ml
oiSiizliigii(I\tanbul,
1947),pp.120-22;"Ayan."IslamAnsiklopedesi(Istanbul,
inprogress);"Ayan," EncyclopediaofIslam,"newed. (inprogress); H
.A.R. Gi bb andH . Bowen, Islamic SocietyandtheWest
(London,1950,1957),1:198-99,256-57,303;B. Lewis,The Emergence of
ModernTurkey (London,1961), pp.32-33. Rumel iAyanlari347
ofthePorte,especiallyinmattersoffinance,taxation,andmilitary r e~r
ui t ment . ~theelectorsnot Thenatureoftheelectionsandis known, nor
are the precise functions of the h'y8n.Whatisclearisthat
the6ydnwasinitiallyanurbanfunctionary,whowasreluctantly accepted
but not formally recognizedbythe g~ve r nme nt . ~
Oneimmediateresultofthisnew,semiofficialinstitutionwast o
shieldsomeofthepeoplesoftheOttomanprovincesfromthefull
consequencesofImperialcorruption.OfficialsofthePortewere forced t o
modifytheirdemandsinordertoconformto thelimitsset
bythelocalnotables,sincedydnwereoftenabletosecurethe
removalofaPashawhoignoredtheiradviceandrefusedtotemper avarice
withp r ~ d e n c e . ~ Unfortunately,this effectwastransitory,and
by1700 the termdydn hadtaken on an ambiguousmeaning.Thus,a
treatisewrittenin1703declaresthatoneofthecausesofdisorder and
decline is failure to show proper respectfor men ofworth,"a'yiin
veagrafvei h t i ~a r . " ~Yetthesametextrefersto2ydnanddyan-i
devlet as oppressors andexploiters ofthe p e ~ p l e . ~ For,
infact, what-
evertheirorigins,thedydnoftheeighteenthcenturygradually
evolvedfromanelementofmunicipalgovernmentintoapowerful landed
aristocracy. This
transformationwaspartofalocalresponsetomoregeneral 3Evliya Celebi,
Seyahatname,10 vols. (Istanbul,1898), 2: 195, 4: 175, 5:429; Ahmed
Cevdet Pasha, Tarih-i Cevdet, 2ded.,10 vols.(Istanbul,
1884-85),4:199;Osman Nuri (Ergin), Mecelle-iumur-u belediye
(Istanbul, 1922), pp.1655-58. 41ntheBalkans, it appears thatmost of
the 6yEn evolved from the militarycategories fyrrlikt~llari).For
ahypothesisregardingthe originsoftheciy6n,seeSadat, pp.1-50; H.
Inalcik,"TheNatureofTraditionalSociety,"inPoliticalModernizationinJapan
andTurkey, ed.R.E.WardandD.A.Rustow(Princeton,1964), pp.42-63;idem,
"Government,Revenues and Taxation intheAnatolianProvinces"(paper
delivered at
theColloquiumontheMuslimWorldintheEighteenthCentury.UniversityofPenn-
sylvania,June28-July2,1971);AvdoSuCeska,"BedeutungundEntwicklungdes
BegriffesA'
ylnimOsmanischenReich,"SudostJbrschungen25(1966),pp.3-26;
idem,"VilaietskiAjani,"Codi.iniakDr~tTtva lstori?ara- ~ o s n r
iHercegovinc~13 (1962). pp.167-98.
51nalcik,"AnatolianProvinces";Archive\nationalesdeFrance(Paris),Affaires
ktrangkres,sous-serie B"',Papiers de I'ancienbureaudes
consulats:Levantet barbarie
(hereaftercitedasAN.B1"),241,"ObservationssurI'echelledeSrnyrne,"n.d.(ca.
1779); Archives nationalesdeFrance,Affaires
etrangi.res,Correspondancepolitique: Turquie(hereaftercitedasAN),
213,Vidin,M6iagetoTalleyrand,February22, 1807; Travnik, Davidto
Talleyrand,April25,1807; G.Olivier,Voyage dams['Empire ottoman
(Paris, AnIX),pp.3 11-12; A.de Juchereaude
Saint-Denys,Revolutionsde
Con.stantinoplec,n1807et1808,2vols.(Paris,1819),1:235asnotetop.180;
F. Beaujour,TableauducommercedelaGri ce
(Paris,AnVIII),pp.48-49;andL. Svoronos, Lecommercede Salonique nu ~
~ I I l e s i h c I e (Paris, 1956),pp.8-9. V.
L.Wright,OttomanStatecraft,translationofSariMehmedPasha,"Nasa'ih
ul-viizeraveI'umera"(Princeton,1935),p.129189(thesecondfigurereferstothe
Ottoman text). 71bid., pp.73/15. 77/22,14611 18.
348DeenuR.SadatEuropeandevelopments,theintensificationandextensionofworld
commerce,which,particularlyaftermidcentury,becameanin-creasinglysignificant
economic factor within theOttomanlands.8 The eastern
Mediterranean,which hadsufferedeconomicdeclineafterthe close of the
sixteenth century, experienced a revivalin the eighteenth. Trade
also developedoverlandviaBelgradeintotheGermaniesand
theHapsburgEmpire.Despitemonetaryfluctuations,war,plague, anarchy,
and official impediment, profitsderiving from thistrade were
considerable. For example, ithasbeenestimatedthat aforeign factor
residentinSalonicacouldanticipateanannualnetprofitof200 percent on
his investment, while indigenous merchants,providedthey
weresufficientlycircumspect,hadevengreateroppor t uni t i e~. ~This
commercialrenaissancedidnotleadtointernaleconomicdevel- opment as
seen inthe West,for it was largelybasedupontheexport
ofagriculturalproductsandrawmaterials.Moreover,thetradewas not due
t o surplus productionbut to a rather pure form ofexploitation
associated with a changeinthesystem ofland tenure-theexpansion of
the so called riftlik regime.1 Theprimarymeaningoftheterm~i f t l i
kwastheamountofland
thatcouldbeploughedbyateamofoxen.llThesizeoftheunits
variedaccordingtolocaleandtotheproductivityoftheland,but
essentiallya~i f t l i kwasconceivedt obethatareathatcouldbe
workedbyanindependantpeasant.Onpaymentofasetfee(t apu bedeli) the
peasant acquiredthe right t o the landinperpetuity,losing
itonlyifitremaineduncultivatedforthreesuccessiveyears.In addition
to the purchase fee,the peasant paidvariousdues andtaxes, which
depended on thenature ofthe fiefor endowment on whichthe giftlikwas
located. During theseventeenth century, these distinctions
ceasedtobemeaningful,forthepeasanthadtodealwiththetax farmer
(miiltezim) regardless of the legalstatus of the land.12 Manyof
8The majorstudyo ftheseeconomicchangesisT
.Stoianovich,"TheConquering BalkanOrthodox
Merchant,"JournalofEconomicHistory20(June1960):234-3 13. Fora more
specializedhistory, seeSvoronos, Lecommerce de Salonic/rte.
9Svoronos, p. 114.
'OT.Stoianovich,"LandTenureandRelatedSectorsoftheBalkanEconomy,"
JournalofEconomicHistory13,no.4(Fall1953):398-41
1:idem,"Merchant,"pp. 253-55;"Ciftlik," Islam Ansiklopedesi
(Istanbul, in progress). ''$'iftmeans pair; cf .Polish
morgandGerman Spannfahig. 120n landtenure,seeH.
Inalcik,"LandProblemsinTurkey,"MuslimWorld45 (1955):221-28;0.
L.Barkan,"TiirkToprakHukukuTarihindeTanzimat,"inTan-zimat(Istanbul,
1940),p p . 321-421;S.Shaw, "The Ottoman Vi ew oftheBalkans,"in
TheBalkansinTransition,ed.CharlesandBarbaraJelavich(Berkeley,1963),pp.
56-58;B.Cvetkova, "L' tvolution durtgimefiodalturcdelafinduX V I
ejusqu'au milieuduXVIIIesiecle,"Etudeshistoriques1(Sofia, 1960):17
1-203;Gibband Bowen,1:46-63. Rumel iAyanlari349
thesetax-farmingleaseswerepurchasedbydyrin,whogradually converted
the taxrevenuesintopersonalincome.13 After1750, they took the
further stepofturningthe landitselfintoanextralegalform
ofprivateproperty.This wasdone throughthe piecemealacquisition of
riftlik deeds and titles from the peasants.14 The
originalholdingswereoftensmallandisolated, andthemeans used t o
develop and consolidate the estates were many, fromthe legal
acquisitionofvacantlandstovarioustypesofextortion.Astheir
powerincreased, theyresortedtoarmedmercenaries,largelyAlban-
ians,whoofferedprotectiontothepeasantforafeeleviedagainst
theharvest.The By8nseizedthelandonthefailuretopaythisand other
forms offorcedindebtedness.lSThus,the"GreatFear"ofthe French
peasant was a realityin Rumeli. The giftliks,as theyexpanded, were
converted to commercialagri-
culturewiththeintroductionofnewcashcrops,principallycotton, wool,
corn, tobacco, and wheat.16 Itwas on thebasisofthis economy
thattheexporttradeflourished,muchofitillegal.Withrareex-ceptions,theexportationofgrainwasforbiddenbytheOttoman
government,andstringent measuresofcontrolwereattempted;how-
ever,thedyiinengagedinaflourishingcontrabandtrade.Ifofficial
authorizationtosellthewheatcouldnotbepurchasedatCon-stantinople,
the enforcementofficers ofthePorte couldbeinducedto look away as
the grain was trans-shipped on the highseas or from the
islandsoftheArchipelago.17Thesepracticesweresocommonthat, bythe end
of the eighteenth century, the terms Bydnlikand riftlik had
losttheiroriginalmeaning.Thelatter,eveninOttomanlaw,meant 13Cevdet
(n.3above),4:214-16;7:96;Wright,pp.124,142 ff.,andonay&,
146/!18;Inalcik,"TraditionalSociety,"pp. 47-48.
14Ay6ninvestedinordinarytaxfarms(iltizam);however,theygottheirrealstart
withmalikiineholdings,whichwere for life andwhichcame
toberegardedas heredi- tary(cf. Cevdet.7:96; Suieska, "Ayin"[n.
4above], p.5. See alsoIbrahimMansour
Efendi,Me'moiressurlaGrPceetI'Albnnie.. . [Paris,18271, pp.342
ff.;Stoianovich,
"LandTenure,"pp.400-401;Inalcik,"LandProblems,"pp.224-25;Gibband
Bowen,1:256-57).
l5AN,215,Ruschuk,GalibEfenditoGen.Guilleminot,September16,1807;
MansourEfendi,
pp.344-46;G.Iakichitch,"NotessurPasvan-oglu.1758-1807, par
I'adjudantcommandantMeriage,"LLIrevueslav1, no.1(May1906):
266-67,vol.2, no.2(November/December1906), p.446;
vol.3,no.2(MarchiApril1907), pp.283, 286; Cvetkova. pp.198-201.
16Stoianovich, "LandTenure,"pp. 403-5;Svoronos. pp. 273 ff. 17AN
B"',236, "Memoireausujet dc latraitedesbledsdanslesestates duGrand
Seigneur,"1706, unsigned.This
containsdetailedinstructionsontheartofsmuggling
grainoutoftheOttomanEmpire,includingcontactsandsuggestedplacesofren-dezvous;idem,237,MemoirebyM.Causinery,May30.181
1;J. Dallaway,Con-stantinople AncientandModern(London,1797),
pp.190-92,289; J. C.Hobhouse. A Journeythrough Al bani a.. .
(London,18 13). p. 73; W. M.Leake,Travels inNorthern
Greece,4vols.(London, 1835), 3:201-3;and Juchereau,1: 1 17.
350DeenaR.Sadatlarge, commercial, private estates, while hydn
hadbeengeneralized to mean the rich and powerful.
Itshouldbenotedthat theGya"n werenotthesoleprotagonistsof
thenewregime,althoughtheyareclearlythedominantelementsin
theEuropeanprovincesoftheEmpire.Localreligiousdignitaries (aqraf)
alsosucceededinconvertinglandssetasideasreligiousen- dowments (
vakf )into hereditaryestatesfarmedforrevenue;andthe
Phanariotesinalliancewiththelocalnobilitywereintroducinga similar
system into thePrincipalities.18In Albania and easternMace-
donia,the~i f t l i kswereownedbylocalmagnates,presumablynot hydn,
whointhelatter partofthecenturywereforcedtosubmitto
theauthorityofTepedelenliAliPashaofJanina.19EveninThrace
andMacedonia,thedy6nwereinconflictwithvariousotherin-terests,
includingderebey20 and government officialswho occasionally claimed
provincialestates for themselvesor for one oftheir cl i enh21 To
furthercomplicatematters,thetiya"nlik wasneverhomogenous. There was
a clear distinction betweenthe more powerfula^ya^n (hane-
dan)andamuch largersecondary groupundertheircontrol.22 There
isalsoevidencethatsomeby&n maintainedtheiroriginalmunicipal
functions. In addition, at certain times after1770,the
titlewassoldto variousindividuals without regard to function.
Thisconfusioninnomenclaturemakesitdifficulttoestimatethe 180n
thePhanariotes,seeM.Zallony,Es
wisur1e.yFanari0te.s(Marseilles,1824); andN.
forga,"LedespotismeeclairedanslespaysroumainsauXVIIIesiecle,"
Bulletinof theInternationalComrni t t
e~ofHi.~toricalSciences9(1937):100-115.
Asraf(Ulemaandotherreligiousdignitaries)wereactiveintheBalkansbutwere
eclipsedbythehykn.Theirrolewasgreaterintheeast,especiallyintheArab
provinces (cf. H.Bodrnan, PoliticalFactionsin Aleppo,1760- 1826
[ChapelHill, N.C., 19631; A. Hourani,"TheChangingFace of
theFertileCrescentinthe18th Century," StudiuIslamica8[ 19571:
89-122). l9N0tallnotable\wereiTya^n.
Othertermsareused(cf.Cevdet.6:291and7:96,
whereheusesthetermvucuh).Moreover,someholdersofiltizarnsandgifllikswere
Christianmerchantsanddignitaries,esp.kocaba~i(cf.MansourEfendi,p.348;Hob-
house,pp.295-96;andB.Cunibert,E.$sai hi.rtoriquesurlesre'volutions.
. . dela Serbie . . . (Leipzig,1855), p. 24.
=OThedifferencebetweena"y6nandderebeyisunclear.Theywerefunctionally
similar,
andyetadistinctionisnormallymade.Ithasbeensuggestedthatthosewho
heldpowerlegallywereGybn,thosewhogaineditthroughrebellionwerederebey;
however, &y$n remained6ydn
despiterathercontinualrebellions.Perhapsonewasof urban, the other
of ruralorigin, but this is yet to be determined. 21This
wasespeciallytrueduringthe1768-74war,whenofficialsofthePortetook
advantage of the absence of the iiyc?nandboughtupprovincialtaxfarms
andoffices for themselvesor
theiragents.Cevdetgivesthisasthemajorreasonfortheseigneurial
reactionof the next few decades (Cevdet, 6: 175, 295; 7: 146-49).
22This isreflectedintheextensivealliancesystemsof ayansuchas
Tirisnikli-oglu Ismail~ g a ofRuschuk(I. H. Uzun$ar?ili,
AlerndarMustufaPasha[Istanbul,19421, pp.8 ff.), andOsman
PashaPasvano~luofVidin(Cevdet,6:2 16, 244,29 1-307). Both
notonlyledaregionalcoalition,theyalso
assumedtherighttoappointintowns subordinate to theircontrol(Cevdet,
7: 147). Rumel iAyanlari35 1 extent ofthe By&-~iftlik
regime.However, wecandeterminethatin
certainareasoftheBalkansthetownsweredefinitelyunderthe controlofthe
dydn attheend ofthe eighteenth century. Theseareas
were:Bosnia,theBlackSea coast,andhinterlandfromtheDobruja toEdirne;
westwardalong theDanubetoVidin;thenorthernslopes
oftheBalkanMountains;thenorthcoastoftheAegeanfrom
Giimiilciine(Komatin)toSerez(Serrai);andtheMaritza,Vardar,
andStrumaRivervalleys.23Clearly,thedydnlik,likethe~i f t l i k
,tendedt o expandalong theseacoastsandinlandwaterways,further
confirmingtheircloseconnectionwiththeexpansionofcommerce.
Aswouldbeexpected,thehy6nidentifiedtheirinterestswiththe
maintenance of agricultural exports, thus using theirpowerto
confirm theincreasingeconomicdependenceoftheEmpireonEurope.(See
fig.1.) The governmentcoulddonothingaboutit.Onthecontrary,the
outbreakofthewarwithRussiain1768finallyforcedthePorteto
recognizetheexistenceoftheiiydn,grantingthemofficialstatusin
exchange for otherwise unobtainable men andsupplies.24Long after it
hadceasedtobethebasisoftheiractualpower,thegovernment
recognizedelectionofhy6nbythe people;the governor(vali) ofthe
provinceconfirmingthe electionbytheawardofadocumentknown as
hydnlikbuyuruldusuon paymentofafee calleddydniye. The dyhn
werecharged withthe administration ofthe township(kaza),making
themresponsibleforlocalsecurity,provisioningofthetowns,the
collectionoftaxes,andthetraininganddispatchoftroops.Pre-viously,
these affairs hadbeen under the jurisdictionofthe Kadi, who
wasnowrestrictedt o mattersofMuslim(Seri ) law.Thus, thedy&n
received theirdiplomaofinvestiture atalmost thesametimethat the
nobles ofRussia were enfranchised byCatherine the Great (1785).
23Stoianovich, "LandTenure,"p.203;
AhmedVasifEfendi,"Tarih-iVasif,"voi.4
(IstanbulUniversityLibrary,MSSTY5979),12367b;13272a;Cevdet,6:212-13,
217,293,297,298-305,313;7:96,146.255-56.282-83;8:63;9:2-3;Mansour
Efendi, p.xxxii;L.LCger, trans.,"LaBulgariea la finduXVIIIe
sikcle:Mtmoires de
Sofroni,ev&quedeVratsa,"Me'langrsorientaux,2dser.,9(September1883):393,
408.For
theregimeinBosnia,seeMuhammadHadzjahic',"DiePrivilegiertenStadte
zur Zeit des Osmanischen Feudalismus,"Suddstforschungen20
(1961):130-58. 24Although alarge regulararmystillexistedonpaper,the
governmenthadbecome
almosttotallydependantuponlocalmercenaries(Cevdet,6:292-311 :
7:96,146-52, 159,175, 257;
Juchereau,1:45-46;AN,204,Pera,RuffintoTalleyrand,Prairial,X;idem,207,Pera.BrunetoTalleyrand,24Nivose,XII;
idem,208,Pera,Bruneto Talleyrand,8 Messidor,XII;idem,
209,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand,20Nivoseand 29Ventose,XIII).
ForthearmyofRumeliin1798,seeCevdet,7:296-97.Forthe entirearmy,
seeAN, 2 I1,"Officialnoteonthestate oftheTurkisharmy,"unsigned,
n.d.(ca.January1806).
Thisprocessbeganduringtheseventeenthcentury(cf.H.Inalcik,"TheHeydayandDeclineoftheOttomanEmpire,"inCambridge
HistoryofIslam,ed.P.
M.Hol;,A.K.S.Lambton,andB.Lewis,2vols.[Cambridge,19701, 1:342- 50).
352DeenaR.Sadat In most cases, thiswasmerelyarecognitionofthestatus
quo, and thegovernmentregulationsactedmainlyas asourceofrevenuefor
the vali, who sold the Byrinlikathisconvenience.In1779, an attempt
wasmade t o reform the institution.The rightof granting thediploma
was removed from thevali, and the methodofcertificationabolished.
Instead. the people were to submit the results oftheirelections to
the FIG.1.-1, Silivri;2,Corlu; 3, Tekirda'g; 4,UzunKoprii;5
,Kirklareli; 6, Lulebur- gaz; 7, Gumiilciine; 8,Edirne;
9,Orestias;10, Dimitrovgrad;11,Filibe;12, Pazarcik; 13, Iqtip;14,
Yenice;15, Negotin;16,Uskiip; 17, Serez;18, Breznica;19,Kustendil;
20,Dimitrovo;21,Sofia(uncertain);22,Izmail;23,Carmensylva;24,Silistra;25.
Kubrat;26,YeniPazar;27.yumnu;28,Herrazgrad;29,Ru s ~ u k ;
30,Zistovi;31, Tirnova; 32,Nigcbolu;33,Gabrovo;34,Lofca;35,
Plevne;36,Lom;37. Bcrkofca; 38, Vidin; 39, Bosna Saray. Runzeli
Ayanlari353 GrandVizirhimself, who wouldconfirm the
%y6ninofficeonlyifan investigation provedhimto
beofgoodmoralcharacter worthyofthe confidenceofthe g ~ v e r n me n
t . ~ ~ This totallyunrealisticeffort quickly collapsed,
and"control"oftheByAnlikwas returnedtothevuli.The
nexttenyearsweredominatedbythedialoguebetweenthecentral
governmentandtheseautonomous provincialnotables.The concern ofthe
government wastoreestablishitssovereigntyover thepeople
oftheEmpire,aproblemmorecomplexthantheeliminationofthe hyhnlik.The
riseof this parvenufeudalitywasatonce acause anda symptom
ofaradicalreorientationintheinterrelationofthegroups,
bothMuslimandChristian,whichconstitutedOttomanBalkan society.
Themostadverselyaffectedelementwast he.peasantry(rbyu,r e ~ y a ) .
~ ~ Everywhere,excessivetaxationbythefarmers-general was
impoverishingthepeasants.On the riftlikestates,theconsequences
ofthisfiscalextortionwereparticularlysevere,sincethepayments
takeninmoneyorkindwerecompoundedbydemandsforservices. The
peasantsnotonlyfurnishedthelaborbutalsothematerialfor any
publicrepairsor privateconstructionthebydnwishedto under-
take,andtheywerealsorequiredtoquarterandprovideforlocal
troops,official and feudal.Moreover, due to thechangeswhichwere
takingplaceintheland-tenuresystem,oftenmorethanonelord claimed dues
from the same peasants, dues whichwereinmanycases forciblye ~ t r a
c t e d . ~ ~ Theseexactions,combinedwiththepolitical disorders
attendantupontheusurpationofpowerbythedyiin,had two
contradictoryeffects. On the one hand,especiallytowardthe end of
the century, peasants begantocommendthemselvestothe protec-
tionofapowerfullord,exchangingfreedomforsecurity.Others
simplyabandoned theirholdingsandfled,acceleratingthedepopula-
tionofpartsofRumeliwhichhadbegunintheseventeenthcentury. The
government counteredwithdecreesforbiddingthesettlementof
peasantsinIstanbul,andtheshortageofrurallaborincreasedseig-
neurialeffortstohindthepeasanttothel a n d . 2 Vselsewherein 25Text
inPakalin, p.121. 2"'hechange in thestatus
ofthepeasantryisreflectedintheusageofthe termrciya
("flock").Initiallyr 6ya referredto allOttomansubjects
outsidethegovernment(thus, uskerver i i yu) .
Intheeighteenthcentury, it cametomeanpeasantandwas often used
withthead,jective"oppressed."Theuseof4 y
atodesignateChristiansubjectsisa nineteenth-century innovation.
27Leake, 3:203;Hohhouse,pp.121,140,410;Beau,jour,1:
130-32;lakichitch, "NotessurPasvan-oglu"(n.15 above),I,
no.2(June1906): 420;2.no.2(Novem-berIDecember1906):
446;Lkger,pp.414-16; GibbandBowen,1:253 ff.;Svoronos, pp. 363 ff.
28Cevdet, 7:148:Wright,pp.89,93/45,119174, 76/20
-21;Juchereau,2:302 -3;MansourEfendi,pp.350 - 5 1 ;
Iakichitch,3,no.2 (MarchiApril1907): 283,286,288;
354DeenaR.Sadatea\ternEurope,thepeasantslostnotonlytheirlandbutalsotheir
mobility; and the resultsin theOttomanEmpireresemble the agricul-
turalcolonizationwhich was occurring simultaneouslyin the Austrian
andRussian domains. Attempts to immobilize the
peasantrywerenotalwayssuccessful. Manyescapedtothe
mountainsandrevertedtoasemipastoralform
ofsubsistance.Others,bothMuslimandChristian,joinedrobber
bands.CalledKlephtsinGreeceandHaiduksinSerbia,theywere
prevalentthroughouttheBalkans,andtheproletarianizedvillage leaders
ofadispossessedpeasantrymadebrigandageacharacteristic of the
times.29 Whenalliedwiththe authorities, these armed peasants could
be asignificantelement oforder. The Pasha ofBelgradearmed
SerbianpeasantstocounteracttheMuslimfeudality;andArmatoli, disarmed
anddisbanded duringthe eighteenthcentury,seemtohave
beenreestablishedintheirofficialfunctionsinAtticaaslateas
18Basically, however,most peasants wereafraidandalienated,
susceptibletorevolutionaryuprising,butessentiallyinarticulate.31
Thebrigands,byaddingtotheconfusion,abettedthecauseofthe f e ~ d a l
i t y . ~ ~ To the iiydn, astate ofcontrolled andmodulated anarchy
was essential bothtomaintaintheirintimidationofthe peasantryand
sustain their independence of action against the central
government. Ifthepeasantswerethevictims,themerchantswerethenatural
allies ofthe iiy6n. The historicalroleoftheGreekmerchants as the
disseminatorsoftheEnlightenmentineasternEuropeshouldnot
obscuretheirfundamentallyconservativeorientation.Evenat the
timeoftheGreekWarofIndependence,merchantsexchangedone feudality for
another, aligningthemselves withthePhanariotes.Their alliance with
the Bydnwas builtuponamutualinterestinthe colonial Leger,pp.409-15;
Stoianovich,"Merchant,"pp.254ff;F. D.H. L.Pouqueville, Voyageen
Morbe . . . (Paris,1805), p.121; ANB"1,239."Reporton the Commerce
of
theBlackSea,"unsigned,1771.ForrhetextofadecreebySelim111bindingboth
peasants andtownsmen,see Vasif,4: 109, 54a and54b.
29Cevdet,6:214,216,244,295;7:95-96,146,282;AN, 204.Pera,Ruffinto
Talleyrand,16Floreal,X;idem.,207,Pera,Bruneto
Talleyrand,18Brumaireand24
Nivose,XIII;Hobhouse,pp.149-52,whichincludesavividdescriptionoftheman-
nersandcustomsofthebrigands.SeealsoT.
Stoianovich,AStudyinBulkanCiv- ilizariotz(New York,1967),
pp.141-44. 30Hobhouse, p. 479; LCger,p.419;AN204,Pera,Kuffinto
Talleyrand,14 Thermi- dor, XIII.31The
economicexploitationandincreasingserfdomprovokedatleastonearmed
peasantrebellion.ItoccurredintheKraina,anareanorthwestofVidin,in1806
and wassavagelyputdownbytheholderoftheestates,OsmanPashaPasvano~l
u(Ia- kichitch,2, no.2 [NovemberiDecember19061: 446). 32A~~6n
oftenencouragedandaidedthebrigands(Cevdet, 6:298,304-5;7:95.148,
282;Vasif,4:12367b;AN210,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand,2and14Thermidor,
XI I I ;idem, 2 lI, Rodosto,Salvatore toRuffin, April16
and22,1806). R~rrnel i Ayanl ari 355 trade. As longas
theBydnwereable to fulfill theirfunctionofsupply
andprotection,theyandthemerchantssharedacommunalityof vested
interests. While one prosperedthe other thrived.33
Justasthecommercialrevivaldidnotleadtogeneraleconomic expansion in
the Empire,so, too,this protobourgeoismerchantgroup
didnotreallyassume the characterofaWestEuropeanthirdestate. When it
came, self-awareness assumedaparticularist,nationalistcol- oration.
This was largely due to the ethnic, linguistic,andculturalgap
betweenthetownsandtheircountryside,complicatedinOttoman
societybythereligiousdiversityofthepopulations.Politicalcondi-
tionsaugmentedthisalienation,forthedisordersencouragedbythe
notables madelocalcapitalinvestmentprecarious,whileconspicuous
consumption and/or investmentwas discouraged bythe Turkish habit
ofconfiscation.Thus,theenterpreneurialfunctionwasassumedby the
state itself, or bythe aristocracyon the basisofservile labor, and
intheeighteenthcenturyremainedofmarginalsignificance.Com-
mercialcapitalwaseitherreinvestedintradeorsentabroad.The
merchants,particularlytheGreeks,maintainedcoloniesinmostof the
majorEuropean commercial centers.34 As far as the peopleofthe
Empirewere concerned, thelackoflocalidentification on the partof
themercantileclass confirmedtheexploitativerelationshipbetween
townandcountry, accenting thepolarizationofsocietyintothepos-
sessing and the dispossessed. This
divisionofsocietywasnotonlybetweentheruralandurban
elementsbutalsowithinthecityitself,wheretherewasanabsolute conflict
of interest between the Bybn and the artisans. Of allthe urban
groups,theartisanswerethemostimmediatelyaffectedbythein-
trusionofthe modernon the medievaleconomy. The basicproblems
ofinflationandfiscalmismanagmentwerenotpeculiartotheOtto-
manEmpire.However,thesituationtherewascompoundedbya combination
ofsevere urbanunemploymentandacontinuousrisein
commodityprices,inducedbycurrencymanipulationandachronic
shortageofgrain.35 Sincegrainshortageswereoftenduetoillegal
33Leake, 3:203;Hobhouse,pp.620-21;Dallaway,pp.199
ff.;Iakichitch,3,no.1 (January/February1907):138;
3,no.2(MarchIApril1907):
282-83;BarondeTott,Me'moires,4vols.(Maestricht,1785),
2:145-46;ANBjlJ,241,"Observationssur I'echelledeSmyrne,"1779,
unsigned;idem,242,"CommercedeLevant,"n.d.(ca. 1788), unsigned.
34Stoianovich, "Merchant."pp.294-96,306 ff.; Svoronos,pp.273
ff.,351 ff.The predominance of Christian merchantsisitselfan
innovationoftheeighteenthcentury. See the commentsbyH.Inalcik,
"CapitalFormationinthe OttomanEmpire,"Journal of Economic Hi.rtory
29, no.1(March1969): 97-140. 35Stoianovich,
"Merchant,"pp.255-56:idem,"LandTenure."pp.399-400;Svo-ronos, chap.
4;M.Shaw, The Ottoman Empire from1720- 1734 (Urbana,Ill.,1944).
356DeenaR.Sadat exportation, this exacerbatedconflicts between
artisans and both mer- chants and a^ya^nthroughoutthe century. In
fact, many"revolutions" werebreadriots and/or guildrevolts, for the
free-trade aspirationsof
thedydnandthebasicweaknessofthecentralgovernmentleftthe artisans u
n ~ r o t e c t e d . ~
~Anotherproblemwhichdevelopedduringthisperiodandfurther
dividedurbanallegianceswasgrowingtensionbetweentheMuslim
andChristianelementsofsociety.Thiswasparticularlynoticeable
withintheguilds, whichhadremainedinterconfessionalatleastuntil the
end of the seventeenthcentury. Relations graduallyworsened,the
twogroupstooktomeetingseparately,andeventuallynon-Muslims beganto
elect their ownguildofficers.Finally,lateintheeighteenth century,
Christians insome of the guilds requestedpermission tohold their
festivals~ e p a r a t e l y . ~ ~ The causesofthis phenomenonare
yetto bedetermined.PartoftheproblemmayhavebeentheMuslims'
growingsenseofthreatfromRussiaandAustria,combinedwitha
tendencyforsomeoftheOttomanChristiansubjectstocooperate
withtheenemy.Equallyifnotmoreimportantwastheeconomic
crisis,leadingtheMuslimmajoritytotrytolimitcompetitionby forcing
the minorities out ofthe urban economy. Partlyas a result ofthis
divisioninsociety, the conflict ofinterests
amongtheurbanelementsdidnotleadtothedevelopmentofa
class-orientedbourgeoisieorofanurbanproletariat.Ontheone hand, the
wealthierChristians, forcedout ofthe traditionaleconomic
relationshipsandexcludedfrom the landgrab ofthe late seventeenth
andearly eighteenth centuries, increasinglyentered trade,
whichrein-
forcedtheirextraterritorialaffiliations.This,combinedwiththecor-
ruption ofthe church andthe hellenizingpoliciesoftheGreekPatri-
archate,ledtoanincreasinglysecularorientationwhicheventually
combined with massdiscontentamongthe peasantry and ledtorevo-
lution. The Muslims responded differently, first, because they
couldidenti-
fyethnicallyandculturallywiththedominantgroupsand,second,
becauseofthe nature ofTurkish Islam. The decayandcorruptionof
the"religiousinstitution"didnotleadtoasecularizationofMuslim
societybuttoamoreovertexpressionofreligiousheterodoxy,the
traditionalIslamicformofsocialpr0test.3~Thisreactionwasnot
uniform.OnthemarchesofEurope,thereligiousrevivalwasBek-36Cevdet,
6:214- 15; 7 5 2 ;Svoronos, pp. 9,31;
AN204,Pera,RuffintoTalleyrand,
Prairial,X;idem,209,Pera,ParandiertoTalleyrand.18Germinal,XIII;
idem,2.14, Constantinople, Sebastiani to Talleyrand, June 9
and28,1807. 37Gibb andBowen, 2:289.
38ThistendencywasevidentthroughouttheMuslinWorldfromtheJihadsof
sub-Sahara
AfricatoWahabbipuritanisminArabia.Forthehistoricalbackgroundof
Rumel iAyanlari357
tashiandinterconfessional.Elsewhere,itassumedamoremilitantly Muslim
character.But everywhereMuslims sought salvationinprivi- lege.
TheenrollmentofMuslimartisansintheJanissarycorpsgave themstatus,
includingtherighttobeararms.39 Thus,theeconomic dislocations
didnotresultinadivisionof theguildsinto journeymen and masters
evolving into classes. Rather, it strengthened the need for
corporate integration, allowingthe Muslimartisans notonlyto identi-
fy with the guildmasters butalso withthe a^ya^n.What evolved wasa
strangetriangleofJanissary-guild-hyan.InfusedwiththeBektashi
mystique, these groupssetouttopreservethestatusquoinalliance
withthetraditionalreligiousauthorities,whosememberswerealso
agriculturalentrepreneurs.Howtheserelationshipsoperatedisnot clear,
nor weretheyconsistent.OftentheJanissarylartisansrevolted
againsttheirown Agusandthebyin,whiletheByilnwereincom-
petitionwiththe Agasandappearedat timeswillingtosacrificethe
corpstotheirowninterests.40 Moreover,whiletheBektashiand
Janissarieswereconsolidatingtheirreactionarycoalitionwithor-thodoxy,thesameDervishorderwasexperiencingarevolutionary,
interconfessionalrevivalin Albania and northernB~ l g a r i a . ~
~Thesecontradictionarenoteasilyresolved,andconditionsinthe
OttomanEmpireinthe1780sareoftendescribedaschaoticor anarchic. Yet,
ifwe abstract the essence of change from the confusion
indetail,itisan anarchywithapatternthatbearsastrikingresem-
blancetochangeswhichwereoccurringsimultaneouslyinPoland,
Russia,andinpartsoftheHapsburgt e r r i t o r i e ~. ~~The
qiftlikregime
suchmovements,seeC1.Cahen,"Mouvementspopulairesdanslesvillesde1'Asie
musulmaneaumoyenage:milice,etassociationsdeFoutouwwa,"Recueilsdela
Soclete'JeurtBodin,vol.7, Laville(Brussels,19551, pp. 273 -88;
F.Taeschner and CI.
Cahen,"Futuwwa,"lslamAnsiklopedesi(Istanbul,inprogress);G.Arnakis,"Fu-
tuwwa Traditions in theOttomanEmpire; Akhis,Bektashi
DervishesandCraftsmen," JournalofNearEasternStudies12(October1953):
232-47;B.Lewis,"TheIslamic Guilds,"EconomicHistory Review 8, no.1
(November1937): 20-37. 39The
processbywhichJanissaryandartisanfusedinto one categoryremainstobe
studied.Foradescriptionoftheresults,seeGibb
andBowen,1:276-95;andI.M. D'Ohsson,Tableau ge'nhrale de ['empire
othoman, 7 vols.(Paris,1788-1824), vol. 7. 40Sadat, pp.188-89.This
ambivalenceis demonstrated duringtherevoltofMustafa Pasha
Bayraktar, describedbelow. 41Sadat,
pp.146-51.TheconnectionbetweenJanissary,Bektashi,andguildwas
perhapsasoldastheEmpire.See,Arnakis,"Futuwwa,"andGibbandBowen,
158-59, 64-65,283,and285.For theBektashiin general
andtheirexpansionduring thisperiod,see J. K.Birge,The BektushiOrder
ofDervi.shes,2ded.(London,1965); andF.Hasluck, Christianityandlslam
underthe Sultans,2 vols.(Oxford,1929), esp.
2586-96.42Fordevelopmentsin these states see the
excellentbibliographyin L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since1453 (New
York,1958), pp.887-93;andW.H.McNeill,Europe's SteppeFrontier,1500-
1800 (Chicago,1964), an interpretivestudywhichalsoincludes
abibliographic essay. 358DeenaR.Sadat
intheOttomanEmpirereflectsacharacteristicfeatureofeastern
Europeintheeighteenthcentury,thedevelopmentofagricultural
capitalismbasedon the introduction ofnewcrops andtheexpansion
ofserfdom. The growingexportmarketforagriculturalcommodities
reinforcedthis trendandencouragedthe growthofamerchantclass
whichinmostcountries oftheEastwasofforeignorigin.Thisnew
economysustainedtheprivilegedpositionoftheeasternEuropean
aristocracy,apositiontheywerepreparedtodefendforcibly.Atthe
sametime,the gapbetweentheurbanandruralelementsofsociety widened,
as the peasantry,alienatedand enserfed,increasinglyturned to
flight, rebellion, or millenarian visions.
TheRussiancolonizationoftheUkraineofferstheclearestex-ampleofthesetransformations;however,theevolutionoflandlord,
serfandmerchantwasrepeatedinmostpartsofeasternEurope, includingthe
OttomanBalkans.Detailsvaryevenbetweenprovinces
withinthesamepolity,andthedifferencesbetweentheOttoman,
Hapsburg,andRussianexperiencesweresignificant.However,the
es4entialdifference was in therelativestrength ofthevarious govern-
ments.Thus, theexpansion ofcommercialagriculture, whichinRus- sia
andAustria wasencouragedbythestateandprotectedbyImpe-
rialgarrisons,waseffectedintheOttomanlandsbyprivateinitiative
supportedbyprivatemercenarytroops,althougheveninthisthe
dy6nresembledthePolishmagnateswhoalsoactedontheirown
initiative.Moreover,intheOttomanEmpire,aselsewhere,theat- tempt to
readjusttothese newconditionsprovokedapoliticalcrisis, whichinthe
West destroyedandintheEastconfirmedthemedieval world.
Thecrisisoriginatedintheactivitiesofthecentralgovernment.
ThereformeffortsoftheOttomansintheeighteenthcenturyare
normallythought ofas entirelymilitary;however,themilitaryweak- ness
of the Empire was recognizedas being only part of a much larger
problem. Like all the monarchies of Europe, the Ottomans were faced
withafiscalcrisisofincreasingmagnitude;andthemeasurespre-viouslyadoptedtorestoresolvency
-confiscation,increasedinternal
tariffs,anddeliberateinflation-merelyaggravatedtheproblem.To
operate,evenwithoutreform,thecentralgovernmenthadtoregain
controlofthefinancialresourcesofthestate,whichmeantbreaking
thepoweroftheprovincialnotablesandotherprivilegedgroups within the
Empire. ThiswastranslatedintopoliticalactionbyGrandVizirHalil
Hamid(1782-85). Apartfromtheintroductionofnewmilitarytech- niques
and educational institutions, he attempted to deal directlywith
thebasicproblemofthefeudality.In1785, byImperialdecree,the Rumel
iAyanlari359 ayznlik was abolished. Instead, the people of the
townsweretoselect one of their elders to represent them, who would
thenreceivethe title
yehirkethudasi.Inattemptingthisreform,theGrandVizirbadly
miscalculatedhisstrength.Thepowerofthenotablesremainedun-
diminished,andthe~ e h i r kethudasilackedtheprestigetofunction
without the assistance andsupport ofthe iiyhn.Localaffairsbecame
confused, and government business (presumably tax remittances) was
neglected.Withtheoutbreakofwarin1787, theresurrectionofthe
iiyiinlikbecameunavoidable,becausemercenariesofthe6y6nwere
themainmilitarysupportavailabletotheregime.Byadecreeof November1790
the dy6nlik was officially restored.43 The result of the
governmenteffortwastomakethedyhnmoreconsciousoftheir independence
and power, andtheyassumed and exercisedan author- ity more absolute
than before. Two years later, the challenge was renewed, thistime
ina far more serious effort. In1792-93,Sultan Selim I11
issuedaseries ofdecrees knowncollectivelyastheNi zam-i
cedid(NewOrder).44 Generally associatedwith the
militaryregimentthat borethatname,thedecrees prescribed a
far-reaching programoffiscal and administrativereform. One ofthe
initial concerns oftheSultan wastorationalizethefinan-
cialbasisofthestate,ifonlytofundthisnewmilitaryregiment.
Currencyreformswereinstituted, andanewtreasury(Irad-i cedid)
wascreatedtoreclaimtax-farmingleaseholdsandreceivecustoms duties
directly. In addition, certain military fiefs were confiscated, and
trade,especiallythegraintrade,wastobecontrolled.Therewasa
tentativeessayatstate-sponsoredindustrializationwhichconcen-tratedonthefoundingofpowderandpapermills;and,toregain
control of trade from the Greeks,Selim I11 triedto limitthe
capitula- tions andeventodevelopaTurkishmerchantmarine.These
efforts werelogicallyextendedtoincludeadministrativereform,sincethe
anachronisticandswollenOttomanbureaucracywasincapableof
adjustingtocontemporaryrealities.Withoutgoingintodetail,the 43Text
inPakalin(n. 2 above), p.121. 4 4 0 ~ r purposeis
todiscusstheNizam-icedidas acounterpointtotheactivitiesof
the8ydn.Therefore,wehaveavoidedadetaileddescriptionofthereforms.The
regulationscan befoundinCevdet,vol.6;Vasif,vol.4; Juchereau,vol.1;
Mahmud
Rayf,Tableaudestzouveauxr6glement.rde/'Empireottoman(Istanbul,1798);
E.2. Karal,SelimIIIiinHat-tiHumayunlnri:Nizam-i
Cedid(Ankara,1942).ForSelim
111'sdecreeregulatingtheZly$n,seeOsmanNuri(n.3above),pp.1660-61.The
firmans seekingtolimitthecapitulations are giveninAN21 1,
anddatedJanuary1I ,February12, andMay 3,1806. On the reign
ofSelim111, see S. J. Shaw. Between Old andNew: The Ottoman Empire
under Sultan Selim 111 1789-1807(Cambridge, Mass., 1971);
idem,"TheOriginsofOttomanMilitaryReform:TheNizam-icedidArmyof
SultanSelim111,"JournalofModernHistory37,no.3(September1965):291-302;
idem, "TheEstablishedOttomanArmyCorps
underSelim111,"DerIslam40(1965): 142-84. 360DeenaR.Sadat
importofthenewregulationswastolimittenureofofficeandre-establishresponsiblegovernmentintheprovincesaswellasinthe
capital. Obviously,the\eregulationswerewelldesignedtooffendevery
vestedinterestintherealm,andtheresultswerepredictable.The Sultan
hadnorealbase ofpower.There werereformersandbureau- crats
intheOttomanEmpirewhocouldidentifytheireffortswiththe
activitiesofthestate.Therewereevenindividualsamongthearis-
tocracywhosupportedSelim111.IsmailBey,AYdnofSerez,and
especiallySiileymanBeyCapanoglu,DerebeyofCentralAnatolia,
vigorouslyassistedintheapplicationoftheNewOrderwithintheir domains;
however, the domains remained theirs. Without either popu- lar or
militarysupport, the Nizam-i cedid was unenforceable.
Theresultsweretoencouragethefeudalitytogreaterexcesses. Thea"y$n,
althoughneverformallyorganized,begantoactasa
corporateentity,takingcollectiveactionagainstanyattemptofthe
governmenttoviolatethestatusquo.TheJanissariesofRumeli
openlyrevoltedanddefeatedaregimentofthenewtroopssent
againstthem;andbothiiya"nandJanissaryAgashiredgangsof
brigandsandmercenarysoldiers toterrorizeanddominatethecoun- t r y ~
i d e . ~ ~ It was this seigneurialreactionwhichled to the
rearmingof theSerbs andoftheGreek armatoli,
anditwasthisreactionwhich provokedthe Serbs into r e v o l ~t i o n
. ~~Finally, on May29,1807, using the Serb revoltand French
influence and intrigues as their excuse, the
coalitionofiiya^n,Janissary, andufema deposedSelimI11 andraised
MustafaIV to the S ~ l t a n a t e . ~ ~The triumphofthe ancien
rdgime wasnotquite complete.In June
1808,MustafaPasha,calledBayraktar,bybnofRusquk(Ruse),
marchedtoEdirne.ThereheassembledtheentirearmyofRumeli,
estimatedat40,000menand,raisingthebanneroftheProphet, marchedon
Constantinople(July23).On July26,heappointedhim- 45The
tendencytotakecollectiveactionwasespeciallyevidentbetween1800 and
1808 (Cevdet, 7:146-54,174,
255-56;8:63-65;Juchereau,2:27-34;lakichitch,1, no.
2[June19061:425;AN204,Adrianople,n.d.[ca.18021,"LapositiondelaRou-
melie.. ."; idem,206,Sebastiani,"Etatactuelde
1'Ernpireottoman,"n.d.[ca.18021; idem,212,Pera,Ruffin to
Tallevrand, July25 and30,1807; Sebastiani toTalleyrand,
August25,30,andSeptember21,1807; 1.H.
Uzun~argili,AlemdarMustafaPasha [Istanbul, 19421, p.12). 4 Th
ecausesoftheSerbrevoltaregenerallyrecognized,althoughnotallwould
agree that the JanissaryAgas were infact ciyhn.Butsee
L.vonRanke,The Historyof Servia andthe Servian Revolution. . .
(London,1853), p.74, wherehe callstheDahis of Belgrade
"Tschitluksahibis,"a corruption of giftliksahibi, and notes this as
theirreal tyranny. 47Cevdet,
8:143-88;Hobhouse,2:1027-34;Juchereau,2:103-43;AN214,Con-
stantinople,Sebastiani to Talleyrand, May27,28, and June 9,1807.
Rumeli Ayanlari36 1 self CommanderinChief(Serasker)
oftheImperialArmedForces
andonJuly28investedthePalace,forciblytooktheSultan'sseal from the
GrandVizir, and,since Selim I11 hadbeenmurderedinthe
interval,elevatedMahmudI1tothethrone.48 Thisactionofthe Bayraktar
wasnotan outgrowthofthe Janissary-artisan clique ofthe
capital:itwasanaristocratic movement,undertakeninalliance with
theGrandVizirandvariousAnatolianaycin.49 Further,thecoup
d'CtatwasmadeinthenameofSultanSelimI11andtheNizam-i cedid. It
issurprisingtofindsuchresidualstrengthinthereformmove-mentandperhapsmoresurprisingtofinditpersonifiedbyMustafa
PashaBayraktar.He wasan aydn, a JanissaryAka,andlatelyCom-
manderinChiefoftheImperialforcesontheDanube.Hehadnot beenan active
member oftheoppositiontoSelim111, and,afterthe
uprisingatEdirneandagain afterthe depositionofSelim111,hehad
receivedreformistrefugeesatOntheRus~uk. ~Ootherhand,the
Pashawasnotedforhistendencytowardindependantaction,and,
untilhisappearancebeforethewallsofConstantinople, hehadnot
beenidentifiedwiththereformparty.Moreover,onceinpossession
ofpower,theBayraktardidnotsimplyrevivetheNizam-icedidbut
demonstrated his own concept of the needs and nature of the State.
Given the absolute necessity for reform, MustafaPasha wasaware
thatanyfundamentalrevisionwasimpossiblebyadministrativefiat,
sincealleffectivepowerhadpassedtoprovincialnotableslikehim- self.
His solutionwas tosummon a council of his peers.In September
1808,lettersweresenttoallthemajorhy&nandPashasofthe Empire,
announcing the convocation ofa general consultativeassem-
bly(Meclis-i megveret) tobeheldatthebeginningofOctober.The dyhn and
derebey weretoappearinpersonor sendan agentwith full
powerstodiscussandagree uponaprogramfor the resolutionofthe major
problems of the state.51
MustafaPasha'smajorproposalwasmilitary,asanecessaryfirst
stepforanyotheractivity.He laidbeforetheassemblednotablesa
48Cevdet, 8:298-3 1 1; Juchereau,2: 164- 80;A.
Miller,MusrafaPashaBayraktar (Moscow, 1947). 49This wasrecognizedat
thetime(Juchereau,2:188-89;Cevdet,9:3;H. Inalcik, "Sened-iIttifak
veGiilhane Hatt-i Hiirnayunu,"Belleten28,no.112 [October19641:
604). SCevdet, 8:298-99;Juchereau,2: 164- 67.
SICevdet,9:2-3;Juchereau,2:197-201.ThereissomeindicationthatMustafa
Pashaconceivedoftheideaofafeudalconfederationbeforethecoupof1808.
In December1806, he wassaidto have
proposeda"ConfederationoftheDanube"to include all the rlyrln. This
was even before thePorte declaredwaron Russia(AN 213, Warsaw,
Talleyrandto Napoleon,January 9,1807). 362DeenaR.Sadat
planforareformoftheJanissarieswhichwouldhaveeffectively destroyed
the corps from withinbyisolatingthe hardcore ofregulars
andremovingartisansfromtherolls.Theconfirmationofthe rights and
privileges of the provincialaristocracy wentalong withthis de facto
eliminationofthe Janissaries. As aresultofthismeeting,an
alliance(sened-i ittifak) wasdrawnup,signedbyallthosepresent, and
proclaimedas law bythe Chief
ThisalliancewasanattempttoreestablishtheImperiumonthe basisof
acontractual agreementbetweenthe provincialnotablesand the crown, a
concept totally alien to Ottoman experience, but reminis-
centoftheconservativeaccommodationattemptedinPolandand achieved
byRussia andAustria. The Sultan wasnot adirect partyto the
agreement, since he ruledbydivine right; however, theseparation
ofthe Sultan-Caliph fromthepoliticaladministrationwouldineffect
facilitatesecularinstitutionalreforms.Theirrifakrepresentsacom-
pletelynewconcept inOttomanpoliticaltheory, aformalrecognition
ofthe rightsandobligationsofthe governmentand ofthesubjects of
therealm,definedintermsofawrittencontractapartfromthe
MuslimHolyLaw(Ser'i). Itwasaninnovationthatwouldhave implicitly
altered the very essence of the State. Infact,
thesened-iittifakwasneverputintoeffect.Mostofthe
ilyilnandderebeywithdrewbeforethesigning,unwillingtoaccept
limitationsuponwhattheyregardedas theirabsolute rights.Mustafa
Pasha, foolishly takingthe agreementat face value,allowedthe army
ofRumelitobreakcampafterthesigning.OnlyhisownAlbanian regulars
remainedinthe city, while AbdurrahmanKadiPasha,Selim Ill'
sserasker,held~s ki i dar . OnNovember14,1808,thedaythe
armywithdrew,the6ydnofBulgariamovedagainstRus ~ukand Edirne, and
the Janissaries andmobsofConstantinople rose inrebel- lion. The
Bayraktardied inthe first momentsofthe revolt,and, inby
farthebloodiestofthethreesuccessivecoups,theNewOrderwas
annihilated.53 Two generations later, after the Janissaries and the
dy6n hadfinally beendispossessed,theYoungOttomansweretolookbackwith
regretatthepassingofthebydn.Theyfeltthatthe6y6nwerean
essentialfactorinthebalanceofpowerofthestate,andthattheir
destructionmeant the isolationof the governmentand its bureaucracy
fromitsownprovincialresources,humanandotherwise. Thisisthe same
fundamental miscalculationthat destroyedMustafaPashaBay- 52The
textis in Cevdet, 9:278-82,with aFrenchversion in
Juchereau,2:201-7.For adiscussionofthe Sened-iItrifak,seeH.
Inalcik,"Sened-iIttifak,"pp.604-9;idem,
"TraditionalSociety,"pp.52-53;andN.Berkes,The
DevelopmentofSecularismin Turkey (Montreal,1964), pp. 90-91.
53Cevdet, 9:27-30;Juchereau, 2:217-37;Hobhouse;2:1034-45. Rumeli
Ayanlari363
raktar.Theseurbannotableswerenotaconstitutivefactorinthe state
butexisted apart from it and incontradictiontoit. The ittifak of
theBydnofRus ~ukofferedtheopportunityforthemtoassumea
functionparalleltothatoftheRussianorAustrianorHungarian
nobility.However,thenotablesrejectedtheentireconceptoftheir
powerasderivativefromorpertainingtothestate.Thea*ya^n of
RumeliassembledatTekfurdagresembledthePolishhighnobility meetingat
TargowicatoperservethelibertiesofthePolishnation. Not surprisingly,
Catherine the Great wasable to regardbothPoland and Turkey as
objects for partition. One
commentremains.Anexaminationofthesocialandpolitical
realitiesoftheBalkansintheeighteenthcenturyunderlinesthefact
thattheOitomanEmpirewasamajorEuropeanpower,sharingthe dynamics, the
tensions,the rhythmofthe MediterraneanWorld.The
confrontationbetweenSelim111 andthedydn andtheeffortsofthe
Bayraktarto gaincorporate recognitionfor hisown"estate"wasnot
auniqueandisolatedperformancepeculiartotheTurksbutoneof
many"relatedproductsofacommonimpulse."54 The OttomanSul-
tansharedtheadministrativeandfiscalproblemsofhiscolleagues, and the
dyan echoed the ambitions of their European peers. There are
differencesintheOttomanexperience: thecomplexconfigurationof
urbanloyaltieswhichisstillnotfullyunderstood;themystiqueof Islam,
notas astatic tradition,butas avigorousexpressionofsocial
protest;the$ydnthemselvesasnewcomers,relying,notonlawor
precedent,butalmostexclusivelyonforce; and,theextremeweak-
nessofthecentralgovernmentwhichwastheessentialqualitative
difference. The service nobility had longsince emancipateditself,
and themilitarywasasource ofweaknessratherthanofstrengthtothe
central authorities. Yet even these differences werenotso extreme
as theybecameinthenineteenthcentury,whenthedialoguebetween East and
West assumed a very different texture. It
wasnotafailuretoreacttothegeneralcrisisbutafailureto respondfully
thathelpedcreatethatdifference.For,intheOttoman Empire as
elsewhere, the premature efforts ofSelimI11 consolidated the
opposition, and the lack of any effective agency of coercion onthe
part of the state forced retreatrather thancompromise. Yeteventhat
retreat was temporary. Within twentyyearsofthedeath ofSelim 111,
Sultan MahmudI1 wasabletodestroytheJanissaries,theBektashi, the
Aydn, andthe Derebeyandredefinethenatureandthestructure of the
state. 54R.
R.Palmer,TheAgeoftheDemocraticRevolution:APoliticalHistoryof
EuropeandAmerica,1760- 1800,2vols.(Princeton,N.J.,1959,1964),1
:9.Fora bibliographyon
the"western"or"Atlantic"revolutionoftheeighteenth century,see
Palmer,"TheImpactoftheFrenchRevolution:RecentInterpretations,"TheNine-
teenth Century World, ed. S. Metraux andF. Crouzet (New York,1963),
pp. 44-85. You have printed the following article:Rumeli Ayanlari:
The Eighteenth CenturyDeena R. SadatThe Journal of Modern History,
Vol. 44, No. 3. (Sep., 1972), pp. 346-363.Stable
URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-2801%28197209%2944%3A3%3C346%3ARATEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-UThis
article references the following linked citations. If you are
trying to access articles from anoff-campus location, you may be
required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR.
Pleasevisit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn
about options for remote access to JSTOR.[Footnotes]8The Conquering
Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of Economic
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Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian
StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4.
(Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable
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Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian
StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4.
(Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable
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Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian
StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4.
(Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable
URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Ghttp://www.jstor.orgLINKED
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Face of the Fertile Crescent in the XVIIIth CenturyA. HouraniStudia
Islamica, No. 8. (1957), pp. 89-122.Stable
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Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian
StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4.
(Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable
URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G28The
Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable
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Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of
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Formation in the Ottoman EmpireHalil InalcikThe Journal of Economic
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URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28196903%2929%3A1%3C97%3ACFITOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H35The
Conquering Balkan Orthodox MerchantTraian StoianovichThe Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1960), pp. 234-313.Stable
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and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800Traian
StoianovichThe Journal of Economic History, Vol. 13, No. 4.
(Autumn, 1953), pp. 398-411.Stable
URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0507%28195323%2913%3A4%3C398%3ALTARSO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G37Futuwwa
Traditions in the Ottoman Empire Akhis, Bektashi Dervishes, and
CraftsmenG. G. ArnakisJournal of Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 12, No.
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Islamic GuildsBernard LewisThe Economic History Review, Vol. 8, No.
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Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-I Cedid Army of
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