Three Counter-Theses Against Alan Ponikvar's Janos-Faced Dualist Interpretation of Hegel by Ryan Haecker Thank you for providing this detailed response on how you interpret Hegel's Absolute. Before I address the points which you raise, I wish to briefly preface this discussion with a summary of the questions surrounding my hypothesis at the present. The hypothesis that I had presented was that the homology between the anti-foundationalism of Hegel's Absolute and the lack of a foundation in mathematics suggested the possibility of a Hegelian analysis of the problem of the foundation of mathematics, in which mathematics could be categorized as a formal domain of thought that is abstracted from, opposed to, and united with Hegel's system of philosophy as it united within the difference of the Absolute. I wrote (colored blue): "I argue that, because mathematics is not founded upon itself, it must be founded upon something other-than-itself; and that the most plausible candidate is the self-subsistent Hegelian Absolute..." To establish this thesis requires, from the standpoint of the Absolute, a deduction of the abstract domain of mathematics from Hegel's Logic; and from the standpoint of mathematics, a demonstration of the impossibility of a foundation to mathematics; which I proposed might be the consequence of Bertrand Russell's Paradox as it was re-employed in Kurt Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Assuming an agreement on the nature of the Absolute and the anti-foundationalism of mathematics, this hypothesis requires a definite description within and through the speculative dialectic, of the mediating relation between the Absolute and all mathematics. I observe definite structure to the present dispute, concerning my hypothesis and the objections: (A) my hypothesis proposes to describe the (M) mediating relation between (S) the Absolute and (P) all mathematics to account for the absence of a foundation within mathematics, e.g. S-M-P (which can be understood as the self-mediation and self-identity of mathematics; e.g. Mathematics - Mediation - Mathematics; mathematics predicated of itself, or S = S ), which can alternatively be understood, from the standpoint of mathematics, as an explanation of the foundation of mathematics in the Absolute, e.g. Mathematics - Mediation - Absolute, P-M-S. The objection of Alan concerns, not the (A) mediation relation, but only the nature of the subject term of the Absolute within this syllogistic relation. (B) Bill and Alan objected to my characterization of Hegel's Absolute in the admittedly Fichtean terms as the Absolute Ego. Alan elaborated to say that the Absolute was neither (a) self-identical, (b) self- subsistent or (c) subjective and intentional. As the hypothesis of the (A) mediation relation of the Absolute to Mathematics (e.g. S-M-P) is a composite of the constituent conceptual terms of the Absolute and mathematics, the (B) objection to a definite nature of the subject term of the Absolute jeopardizes the consistency of my hypothesis. The three objections can be further distinguished as (a) logical, (b) ontological, and (c)
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Ryan Hacker - Three Counter-Theses Against Alan Ponikvar
Ryan Hacker's debate with Alan Ponikvar on Hegel and religion. Ryan Hacker, who claims to be a Right Hegelian, debates Hegel's views on religion with atheist Hegel scholar and a specialist on speculative thinking in Hegel.
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Three Counter-Theses Against Alan Ponikvar's Janos-Faced Dualist Interpretation of Hegel
by Ryan Haecker
Thank you for providing this detailed response on how you interpret Hegel's Absolute.
Before I address the points which you raise, I wish to briefly preface this discussion with
a summary of the questions surrounding my hypothesis at the present. The hypothesis
that I had presented was that the homology between the anti-foundationalism of Hegel's
Absolute and the lack of a foundation in mathematics suggested the possibility of a
Hegelian analysis of the problem of the foundation of mathematics, in which
mathematics could be categorized as a formal domain of thought that is abstracted from,
opposed to, and united with Hegel's system of philosophy as it united within the
difference of the Absolute. I wrote (colored blue): "I argue that, because mathematics is
not founded upon itself, it must be founded upon something other-than-itself; and that
the most plausible candidate is the self-subsistent Hegelian Absolute..." To establish
this thesis requires, from the standpoint of the Absolute, a deduction of the abstract
domain of mathematics from Hegel's Logic; and from the standpoint of mathematics, a
demonstration of the impossibility of a foundation to mathematics; which I proposed
might be the consequence of Bertrand Russell's Paradox as it was re-employed in Kurt
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Assuming an agreement on the nature of the
Absolute and the anti-foundationalism of mathematics, this hypothesis requires a
definite description within and through the speculative dialectic, of the mediating
relation between the Absolute and all mathematics.
I observe definite structure to the present dispute, concerning my hypothesis and the
objections: (A) my hypothesis proposes to describe the (M) mediating relation between
(S) the Absolute and (P) all mathematics to account for the absence of a foundation
within mathematics, e.g. S-M-P (which can be understood as the self-mediation and
self-identity of mathematics; e.g. Mathematics - Mediation - Mathematics; mathematics
predicated of itself, or S = S ), which can alternatively be understood, from the
standpoint of mathematics, as an explanation of the foundation of mathematics in the
Absolute, e.g. Mathematics - Mediation - Absolute, P-M-S. The objection of Alan
concerns, not the (A) mediation relation, but only the nature of the subject term of the
Absolute within this syllogistic relation. (B) Bill and Alan objected to my
characterization of Hegel's Absolute in the admittedly Fichtean terms as the Absolute
Ego. Alan elaborated to say that the Absolute was neither (a) self-identical, (b) self-
subsistent or (c) subjective and intentional. As the hypothesis of the (A) mediation
relation of the Absolute to Mathematics (e.g. S-M-P) is a composite of the constituent
conceptual terms of the Absolute and mathematics, the (B) objection to a definite nature
of the subject term of the Absolute jeopardizes the consistency of my hypothesis. The
three objections can be further distinguished as (a) logical, (b) ontological, and (c)
epistemological. Observe further that in the order of being (ordo esse), from the
standpoint of the Absolute, the latter is derived from the former; something is only (c)
thinking if it is (b) self-subsistent; and something is only (b) self-subsistent if it is (a)
self-identical. Hence, the question of whether or not the Absolute is (c) subjective and
intentional will depend on its (b) self-subsistence, which further depends on (a) its self-
identity. This means also that the self-identity and self-subsistence of the Absolute do
not (abstractly for the understanding) depend on (c) the subjectivity and intentionality
of the Absolute. For this reason, I proposed that my hypothesis of the (1) mediating
relation of the Absolute to Mathematics might be consistent even without disputing the
theological question of the (c) subjectivity and intentionality of the Absolute, which is
simply the personhood and self-consciousness of God. Although I admit that these
distinctions and relations of dependency (1 & 2, and 'a → b → c') reduces the speculative
Absolute to the categories of finite understanding, I expect that this mode of thinking
and writing may nonetheless be helpful to frame and adjudicate the present dispute.
In response to Alan's objection to characterizing the Absolute as subject, self-conscious
and intentional, I replied with an argument from grammar that contended that Alan
was inconsistent in characterizing the Absolute as an "Absolute form" of "self-reflective
subjectivity" for there can be no self-reflection without a self and no subjectivity without
a subject: both terms 'self-reflective' and 'subjectivity' refer to either an adjective or a
verb form of a composite term of self and subject. To deny that the Absolute is self or is
subject is, simply grammatically, to deny that it can be composed further to have self-
reflection and or subjectivity:
"The biggest objection that I have to this interpretation is that I do not understand how
thought can be self-reflective and subjective in any way without a self, an Ego, and a
subject of thought. It seems a flat contradiction to say that the Absolute is "self-reflective
subjectivity" and yet the Absolute has no self. This problem, I expect, requires Hegelian
interpreters to either affirm that the Absolute is, simply by its essence, or in virtue of
some other particular thing, a self-reflective Ego."
"intentionality is the determinative intellective activity of a subject, a self, and an Ego; if
the Absolute is subject, self and Ego then it has intentional relations towards objects of
its consciousness."
The argument from grammar would ordinarily defeat the contention, that a self-
reflective Absolute has no self, simply because the former predicate cannot be applied
while the latter is denied, without equivocation. However, because we are disputing
Hegel's Absolute, Alan can possibly wiggle out of what amounts to the equivocal fallacy
by appealing in some imaginative way to the infinite dialectical movement of speculative
reason. Thus, Alan (colored red) responds with two counter-claims:
"I would like to make two claims that seem inconsistent. (1) First, as you note,
the true may be both taken as substance as well as subject but it is not a
self-subsistent substance nor an actual subject. And (2) second, the absolute
only emerges within the orb of finite subjectivity."
1) "With the first point I wish to indicate that we can employ the absolute without
buying into the notion that the absolute is some ultimate substance or some actual
infinite spirit that has intentions."
Alan appears to agrees with my previous claim that, because we can perhaps "employ
the absolute without... (c) intentions" then the (A) mediating relation between the
Absolute and mathematics can be true without attributing (c) self-consciousness,
subjectivity and intentionality to the Absolute. I wish to note that, according to my
argument above for the independence of (a) self-identity and (b) self-subsistence from
(c) subjectivity and intentionality, this means that Alan agrees that my hypothesis could
be sound even in spite of his criticisms.
2) "With the second point I provide the reason for the first point. There is nothing grand
about the absolute – either with respect to substance or subject – because the absolute
first comes on the scene as the form that finite thought takes when this thought is
brought to a dialectical impasse."
Here Alan first defines how the (2) second point provides the justification for the (1)
first (e.g. 1 iff 2, or 2 <=> 1). Thus, both points are defeasible if the (2) second point is
defeated. Alan describes that "comes on the scene" which ambiguously implies that the
Absolute existed prior to coming on the scene; for nothing 'comes' anywhere without
having first been existing somewhere else. This is important because it will contradict
the non-metaphysical emergentist account of the Absolute that Alan afterwards
presents; in which the Absolute is a form of the thought of an inter-subjective human
community which emerges as the "form that finite thought takes" is "brought to a
dialectical impasses", namely the contradictory impasses of the Kantian antinomies.
Alan explains:
"Only if there is frustrated finite thought is there a dialectic. And only if
there is a dialectic is there absolute form. All truths for Hegel manifest
this absolute form that is the identity in difference of dynamic, idealized
moments. As infinite or unconditioned the absolute form comes on the scene
by means of an insight by the speculative philosopher who attends to what
happens to finite thinking at this moment of frustration."
According to Alan's description there is little possibility of discerning the central
question of our dispute, namely the essence of the Absolute as subjective and
intentional, because Alan carefully conceals any commitment a realist definition of the
Absolute that pre-exists human thought, or an anti-realist idealist definition of the
Absolute that emerges only with human thought. When Alan describes the Absolute as
"infinite or unconditioned" that may "come on the scene" "by means of an insight" by
the speculative philosopher he appears to imply that the philosopher generates the
Absolute where there was none before. Is this what Alan means? If not, then how does
the Absolute exist before insight of the speculative philosopher? One answer that Alan
might give is to affirm that the Absolute exists intellectually by knowing itself in-and-
through its own intentional subjectivity. Another answer is that the Absolute exists in an
inchoate and unrealized nascent form among the inter-subjective thinking of historical
human communities. The former is the so-called transcendentist, metaphysical, and
theological interpretation of the Absolute as the subjective self-conscious and
intentional God of Christianity, while the latter is the so-called immanentist, non-
metaphysical, and humanist interpretation of the Absolute as the self-understanding of
historical human communities. Alan affirms the latter and deny the former, even as he
sometimes employs ambiguous language that seems to suggest the former. Previously,
Alan and I had apparently disagreed upon the ontological status of the Absolute. I
wrote:
" I believe that our disagreement pertains rather to the ontic status of this becoming,
specifically the question of whether it may essentially possess the power to be self-
subsistent and provide the foundation of mathematics that mathematics does not
provide for itself: I want to affirm greater ontology and power of self-subsistence while
you wish to deny these to Hegel's Absolute."
At the end of Alan's reply, he apparently agrees with me that the Absolute can be
interpreted ontologically, as either self-subsisting or implicitly ontologically divided
within itself:
"what this shows is that Hegel's absolute has ontological import."
Yet Alan still wants to disagree on the nature of this "ontological import." Alan writes:
Hegel's absolute is not theological but prosaic in the extreme. It comes into being and
inverts due to the way it reflects thought's ability to shift perspective... Thought and
being are one, but not as a simple identity."
When Alan describes Hegel's Absolute as "prosaic in the extreme" he means to
ontologically reduce the ontological divisions intrinsic within the Absolute even after he
has affirmed that the Absolute is in some sense ontological; for 'prosaic' means the
absence of any definite features, in the manner of free-prose, and is thus opposed to real
ontological divisions (such as any equivocal division between subject and object, creator
and creatures) within the unity of the Absolute. In my previous reply I objected to the
ostensible contradiction of Alan affirming that the Absolute is self-reflective while
denying to the Absolute a self; unless perhaps if the self could, in some way, be a
historical human community of inter-subjective thinking:
"I interpret you, on the other hand, to understand the 'self' Hegel's self-reflective
Absolute to be like Pinkard's absolutization of the inter-subjective self-reflective thought
of historical human communities. The initial objection re-emerges with this answer:
where in a historical community of inter-subjective thinking is there any 'self' to which
the Absolute subjectively may reflect upon?"
Of course, this careful concealment of ontological commitment is just the trick that
Hegel relies upon to work through the different stages in the dialectic. Alan is similarly
presenting a dialectic of stages of dialectical thought in his speculative reply to my
objections. The difference between how I interpret Alan and how I interpret Hegel is
that I understand Alan to be presenting a two-stage dialectic that culminates in the
negative moment which effaces all logical-identity and obliterates all ontological
subsistence (both (a) and (b) of which are crucial to any hypothesized founding of
mathematics upon the Absolute), while I understand Hegel to reconcile the negative and
positive moments in a synthesis which preserves both positivity and negativity is a self-
moving concept. In short, I envisage Alan's dialectic to never advance beyond tarrying
with the negative in a bad infinite of negating the positive moment. I invite Alan to
correct me if he observes that I am misrepresenting his position. As evidence, observe
how Alan writes:
The dialectic itself arises at that point when thought attempts to complete
itself as a self-concern. Hegel's Logic is about this self-thinking thought... The problem
is that thought does not complete itself by providing this final comprehensive insight
that totalizes its self-thinking. Instead, at this culminating point thought breaks down. It
ceases to make sense. It exhibits an inconsistent thought or antinomy in keeping with
the attempt to think frame as simultaneously also item framed... this is where Hegel
thinks the paradoxical thought: the inability to think the final ultimate thought IS the
final ultimate thought. The dialectic that exhibits the impasse of finite thinking also
exhibits the coherent absolute form of this impasse.
Any Hegel interpreter that rises to the self-criticism of modern philosophy, especially
the skeptical phenomenalism of Hume and transcendental criticism of Kant, must admit
that classical realism, represented by the positive moment in Hegel's dialectic, to be
untenable from the standpoint of human knowing (ordo episteme). This is not
disputed. What will be disputed is whether there is real self-subsistence in the Absolute,
in the order of being (order esse), from the standpoint of the Absolute. The question
that I wish to raise for Alan is whether or not there is a negative moment, in which
thought "breaks down" and "ceases to make sense" by exhibiting an "inconsistent
thought or antinomy" is the final moment in Hegel's dialectic. As I read Hegel, his
dialectic does not ultimately conclude in the thinking of the "paradoxical thought" and
the "inability to think the final ultimate thought" as a "coherent absolute form", but
rather both the positive moment of realism and this negative moment which opposes
realism are joined together in a mutually enriching third synthetic moment: the
negation of the paradox does not simply nullify positive reality through its opposition,
but rather the positive reality and the opposition of the negative criticism are altogether
taken upon into a self-moving conceptual synthesis that unites and preserves the
alternation of positing and negating in their mutual opposition. This is how I described
our dispute in the previous reply:
"I understand Hegel to interpret the synthetic moment as the truth and concrete reality
of the prior conceptual moments. If Becoming emerges from the dialectic of Being and
Non-Being, then it must possess some being of the former moments, of Being and Non-
Being; simply because for nothing emerges from nothing and without possessing some
being. This is why I interpret Hegel's dialectic as both logical and ontological. An
emergence of something is an addition of being viz. the emergence. Hence I interpret
the concrete synthetic moment of Hegel's dialectic as both an increase in truth and
reality over the previous abstract moments. "
Further, I described how this interpretation conceptually subsumed the ultimate-ness of
the negative moment of paradox in what I interpret to be Alan's negative dialectic:
" I would contend that the negative moment of the dialectic, that negates the being of
what is posited, is not itself ultimate but is rather combined with the posited being in
such a way that ontologically enriches the synthesis of the previous moments: e.g. being-
for-self is contradicted by being-for-others and becomes being-for-self-and-others, or
being-in-and-for-itself. Thus, I interpret the ontologically robust conception of Hegel's
Absolute to be the result rather than the refuse of critical speculation."
To explain away the equivocal fallacy and to dialectically narrate his definition of the
Absolute as not a subject, self or self-consciousness with any intentionality, Alan
presents his long-awaited negative inversion of the realism of the Absolute, in a manner
consistent with (P) his Pinkardian non-metaphysical interpretation and with his (Z)
Zizekian emphasis on paradox:
"Finite thinking seeks to comprehend what is self-identical or a self-standing content,
meant in this way to be an absolute content. The dialectic subverts this intention. [i.e.
subverts the intention to be self-standing] The infinite then appears as what is not
intended: the form of this failure to grasp content. Thus the absolute comes on the scene
by way of cunning behind the back of the thought of an intentionally directed finite
subject. But this absolute is not itself a subject. It simply is thought that as self-reflexive
exhibits subjective form."
Alan describes how the cunning of reason moves "behind the back of thought of an
intentionally directed finite subject" to the dialectic of thought that "is not itself a
subject" but simply exhibits "thought that as self-reflexive exhibits subjective form."
Who or what is the thinker that thinks the reason that moves "behind the back" of the
thought of the "intentionally directed finite subject"? If it is not the subjective,
intentional self-consciousness of the Absolute and is also not the finite thinking of the
speculative philosopher, then there is only one other option; which is the mediation
between (PhG, C.CC) religious consciousness and (PhG, B) finite individual
understanding; the (PhG, C.AA & C.BB) Spirit of the inter-subjective historical human
community. Thus, the rejection of the theological interpretation of the Absolute as an
intentional subject, even as thought is described to act independently of the finite
speculative philosopher, means, as a consequence of the limited sets of thinking
thinkers, that Alan must adopt the (P) Pinkardian interpretation of the Absolute as the
inter-subjectivity of a human community; for some thinking could only subvert some
thinking if these thinking activities were distinct; and were the distinction not between a
man and the Absolute then it must be between the mankind and a man, between the
collective and the individual.
Alan supports his Pinkardian reading of Hegel's dialectic by describing how any attempt
to conceive of or apprehend the Absolute results in a reduction of the dynamic self-
moving Spirit of the Absolute to a static image that may be analyzed according to the
finite categories of the Understanding, or 'common reason' to use Alan's term. Alan
writes:
The absolute immediately inverts when thought. It becomes a static or abstract version
of the exhibited dynamic... Finite thinking caught in the endless cycle of the transiting of
being/nothing gives way by means of a perspective shift. What motivates the shift marks
a divide between common and speculative thinking... there are no realities that persist
thus there is nothing for us to think. Speculative reason in contrast embraces the evident
paradox: there are no realities to think, only ideal moments that vanish into one
another, this then is what we will think. In this way, thought is a self-concern.
Alan contends that because thought "immediately inverts" the dynamism of the
Absolute, to become a static abstraction of common reason and understanding, finite
thinking (i.e. common reason) is caught in a bad infinite "cycle of transiting" from the
positive moment of being to the negative moment of non-being. This is the (Z) Zizekian
paradox that Alan interprets Hegel to have dialectically generated from the "impasse" of
the Kantian antinomies for common reason. For Alan, the bad infinite of the "cycle of
transiting" resulting from the Kantian antinomies produces a "perspective shift" in
which "there are no realities that persist" and "there is nothing for us to think" unless
we, as speculative reasoners, follow Alan in embracing the interpretation of the
conclusion of the negative moment as a paradox, in which "ideal moments vanish into
one another" as a totally immanent "self-concern" of historical human communities.
Hence according to Alan the non-metaphysical (P) Pinkardian interpretation depends
upon the (Z) Zizekian dialectic of paradox.
I have two objections to Alan's narration of Hegel's dialectic as in this negative fashion
of a dialectic of paradox. Following Alan's example, (Z.i) the first is dependent upon
(Z.ii) the second. (Z.i) First, rather than addressing the interpretation that I had
proposed, in which Hegel's dialectic should be interpreted as three logical moments in
the familiar triadic arrangement, Alan presents what appears to be a dialectic of only
two logical moments that concludes by affirming the ultimate-ness of the negative
moment, and rejoicing in its paradox. For example, Alan describes how the negativity of
the negative moment entirely obliterates all intrinsic reason and substance of the
positive moment when he describes how afterwards "there are no realities that persist
thus there is nothing for us to think." If I am correct in interpreting Alan as thusly
ejecting the reason and substance of the positive moment, then Alan commits himself to
the sort of "bad skepticism" that Hegel describes (colored green) in the Introduction to
the Phenomenology of Spirit:
"To make this comprehensible we may remark, by way of preliminary, that the
exposition of untrue consciousness in its untruth is not a merely negative process.
Such a one-sided view of it is what the natural consciousness generally adopts; and a
knowledge, which makes this one-sidedness its essence, is one of those shapes assumed
by incomplete consciousness which falls into the course of the inquiry itself and will
come before us there. For this view is scepticism, which always sees in the
result only pure nothingness, and abstracts from the fact that this nothing
is determinate, is the nothing of that out of which it comes as a result.
Nothing, however, is only, in fact, the true result, when taken as the nothing of what it
comes from; it is thus itself a determinate nothing, and has a content. The
scepticism which ends with the abstraction “nothing” or “emptiness” can advance
from this not a step farther, but must wait and see whether there is possibly
anything new offered, and what that is — in order to cast it into the same
abysmal void. When once, on the other hand, the result is apprehended, as it truly is,
as determinate negation, a new form has thereby immediately arisen; and in
the negation the transition is made by which the progress through the complete
succession of forms comes about of itself." (PhG, §79, Miller Trans.)
I contend that Alan's negative dialectic of paradox, which emphasizes the ultimate-ness
of the negative moment as paradox, is simply the sort view of skepticism that Hegel
critiques in this section from the Phenomenology of Spirit. For both Alan and the shape
of incomplete consciousness of Skepticism, the result of the dialectic is to only see "pure
nothingness" in which there is no reason, or substance, and "nothing is determinate"
and from this nothing Skepticism brings forth its result, the result of paradox.
(Z.ii) Second, I object that, in just the same way as Skepticism can bring forth no
determinate content of thought as a result, Alan is mistaken to hold that he can bring
forth any determinate content of thought from the annihilating negativity of a paradox
in which "there are no realities that persist thus there is nothing for us to think." To say,
to the contrary, that determinate thought come from nothing, Alan must violate
Parmenides prohibition and contend the impossible: that some determinate thing can
come from the indeterminateness of nothing! Blessed Plato writes:
"You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we have trespassed far beyond
the limits of his prohibition... He says you remember, ‘Never shall this be proved that
things that are not, are, but keep back thy thought from this way of inquiry.’”
- Plato, the Sophist, 258c-d
Alan mentions his indebtedness to Zizek, but where did Zizek discover this doctrine?
Zizek found it buried in the Jena writings of none other than F.J. Schelling! For Zizek,
Alan and Schelling, there is no determinate way of resolving the contradictions of
thought in the Kantian antinomies. The resolution is, thus, for Zizek to think through
the paradox (which I confess that I don't understand) just as it was for Schelling to have
an aesthetic intuition of the identity between ideality and reality, the system of things
thought and of things of extension. In either case we have a empty nothingness in which
nothing can emerge according to any reasoning at all; for nothing less than a miracle can
bring forth something from nothing and miracles are totally inscrutable. Again Hegel
criticizes this doctrine of Schelling, in which determinate thought arises from nothing,
in a famous passage from the Phenomenology of Spirit:
"This monotonousness and abstract universality are maintained to be the
Absolute. This formalism insists that to be dissatisfied therewith argues an incapacity
to grasp the standpoint of the Absolute, and keep a firm hold on it... we find here all the
value ascribed to the general idea in this bare form without concrete realisation;
and we see here, too, the style and method of speculative contemplation identified with
dissipating and, resolving what is determinate and distinct, or rather with hurling it
down, without more ado and without any justification, into the abyss of vacuity.
(PhG. §16, Baillie Trans.)
For Alan the "abstract universality" "maintained to be the Absolute" is the cunning of
reason that persists in the inter-subjective human community "behind the back of the
thought of an intentionally directed finite subject." The paradox of the Kantian
antinomies may totally negate and obliterate all reason and substance in the positive
moment only because some reason and substance of thought persists, behind the back
of the finite subject, in the activity of self-reflective thinking of the inter-subjective
human community.
If my interpretation is correct, Alan like Schelling holds that the dialectic of self-
reflective reasoning may persists, even in spite of hurling down the determinate and
distinct content of speculative contemplation into the paradoxical "abyss of vacuity",
because thought subsists, not in "an intentionally directed finite subject", but "in the
abstract identity A = A" of the spiritual substance of the inter-subjective human
community; which is not thought but remains a "bare form without concrete
realization." The totally un-thought abstract identity of the historical human
community, which Zizek perhaps identifies with historical materialism, is an empty
notion with no rational content; it consists in the positing that would "pit this single
assertion, that “in the Absolute all is one”, against the organized whole of determinate
and complete knowledge"; it is to "give out its Absolute as the night in which, as we say,
all cows are black – that is the very naïveté of emptiness of knowledge." (PhG. §16,
Baillie Trans.) The (Z.i) first objection that Alan performs the incomplete stage of
conscious thought of "bad skepticism" follows from (Z.ii) the second objection of the
emptiness and impossibility of the negative dialectic of paradox in which nothing comes
from the "abyss of vacuity."
To conclude, I distinguished the disputes into two questions: (A) the mediating relation
between the Absolute and mathematics (e.g. S-M-P), and (B) the nature of the Absolute
as the self-conscious and intentional being which we call God. I distinguished three
characteristics that had been attributed to the Absolute; (a) self-identity, (b) self-
subsistency, and (c) self-conscious subjectivity and intentionality; and argued that (A)
the mediating relationship of my hypothesis minimally required (a) self-identity and (b)
self-subsistency but did not require (c) self-conscious subjectivity and intentionality. I
observed that Alan agreed with my claim that the (A) mediating relation between the
Absolute could operate even without (c) the self-conscious subjectivity and
intentionality, but only with the (a) self-identity and (b) self-subsistency of the Absolute.
Because Alan only contests whether the Absolute is (c) self-conscious, subject and
intentional, and we both agree that this property (c) is not required for the truth of (A)
the mediating relation between the Absolute and Mathematics, I judge that Alan admits
the possibility (A) that mathematics could be categorized as a formal domain of thought
that is abstracted from, opposed to, and united with Hegel's system of philosophy as it
united within the difference of the Absolute.
If, on the contrary, Alan intended to reverse this opinion and contend that (c) self-
conscious subjectivity and intentionality were essential to any conception of (A) the
Absolute that mediates and founds mathematics, then I have further critiqued the basis
of Alan's critique of the (c) self-conscious subjectivity and intentionality of the Absolute.
Alan's critique of (c) was presented in two theses, in which (1) the first thesis, that the
Absolute "is not a self-subsistent substance nor an actual subject" entirely depends upon
(2) the second thesis, that "the absolute only emerges within the orb of finite
subjectivity." My arguments are directed against the second thesis to, as a consequence
of their dependency, kill two birds with one stone. I argued from grammar that Alan
was inconsistent in characterizing the Absolute as an "Absolute form" of "self-reflective
subjectivity" while also denying that that the Absolute possessed a self, subject and Ego.
Alan suggests with the language of "emerge" and "come on the scene" that the Absolute
possesses subsists prior to the finite thought of the intentional subject, but he neglects
to immediately disclose in what substance the Absolute subsists in. I propose three
domains of thinking in which the self-reflective thought of the Absolute may subsist: (i)
in the intentional subjectivity of the Absolute which is what we call God; (ii) in the inter-
subjective human community which Hegel calls Spirit; or (iii) in the finite thinking of
the speculative philosopher, posited by what Fichte calls the Ego. I argued that if Alan
denied that the Absolute subsisted (i) in subjective intentionality then it can only subsist
in (ii) Pinkard's historical human communities and in (iii) Fichte's posting. I had
previously argued that Alan was attempting to reduce the Ontological differentia of the
Absolute to an immanentist non-metaphysical interpretation by denying being, but now
Alan affirms that the Absolute possesses being, which he describes as "ontological
import." I argued that Alan's two-stage dialectic that culminates in the negative moment
was intended to obliterate all (a) logical self-identity and (b) ontological self-
subsistence. I described how the real difference in Alan and I's interpretation was that,
while he identified the transcendentist interpretation of the Absolute (possessing
properties a, b, and c) with the positive moment of naive realism, I contended that all of
the properties (a, b, and c) could be attributed to the Absolute through a critical dialectic
of speculative reason in a synthetic moment which preserves both positivity and
negativity is a self-moving concept. I challenged Alan to defend the ultimate-ness of the
negative moment of the paradox.
Finally, I showed how the (P) Pinkardian interpretation which reduces the (i) self-
reflective subjectivity of the Absolute to the (ii) inter-subjectivity of the historical human
community crucially depends, for the force of this negative reduction, upon the (Z)
Zizekian dialectic of paradox. Just as thesis (1) could be defeated by defeating thesis (2),
so could the (P) Pinkhardian sociological reduction be defeated by defeating the (Z)
Zizekian dialectic of paradox (e.g. 1 iff 2, P iff Z). I described how the (Z) Zizekian
dialectic of paradox was Hegel's triadic Trinitarian dialectic but an incomplete skeptical
negative dialectic which totally ejected the reason and substance of the positive moment.
Alan committed himself to "bad skepticism" when he wrote: "there are no realities that
persist thus there is nothing for us to think." Just as it is impossible for anything emerge
from nothing, so is it impossible for determinate thought to emerge from the
annihilating negativity of the paradox. Alan hurls all reason and substance into the
empty notion of the abysmal vacuity and seeks to pull them back out again. This may
only be possible if reason and substance subsist in (P) Pinkard's inter-subjective
historical human community. However, because the (P) Pinkardian interpretation of the
Absolute as the inter-subjectivity of the historical human community depends upon the
(Z) Zizekian dialectic of paradox, Alan cannot appeal to (P) Pinkard to justify (Z) Zizek.
Alan's Zizekian dialectic of paradox is no better as a rebuttal to the self-conscious
subjectivity and intentionality of the Absolute, than Schelling's conceptually vacuous
aesthetic intuition of the Absolute - the night in which all cows are black.
***
First Counter-Thesis against the Dualist Interpretation of Hegel
Thank you once again for your thorough response to my criticism of your criticism of
my mathematical hypothesis. I agree that, insofar as we are "each presenting aspects of
our contrasting conceptions of Hegel's absolute," there will unavoidable
misunderstandings and contentions. I hope that I may bring the points of conflict into
sharper relief in the following response. It has become exceedingly apparent that you
and I disagree on no merely superficial and accidental element of our respective
interpretations of the philosophy of Hegel. Rather, we each of us interpret the most
essential element, Hegel's dialectic, in different ways. In each case, the different
interpretation of the essence of thought, finitely and absolutely, conditions an altogether
different interpretation of the accidents in the whole. Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote at
the beginning of De Ente et Essentia (Essence and Existence), that a "small mistake in
the beginning is a big one in the end." Hence, beginning with a small disagreement in
Hegel's Logic we come to an absolute disagreement in our interpretation of Hegel's
Absolute. For this reason, it had been a mistake to begin by analyzing the properties of
the Absolute, as though these hung ready at hand from the branches of a the Tree of
Knowledge, without having first analyzed the essential origin of these properties in the
essence of Hegel's Absolute, the Logic of Hegel's Dialectic.
Before I begin my reply, I wish to briefly sketch what I take to be the interpretive
traditions in which we each implicitly stand. The Right or Old Hegelians who
personally studied under Hegel and posthumously edited and compiled Hegel's
collected writings in the Hegel Yearbook are generally said to have followed Hegel in
his conclusions of the fittingness of Lutheran Christianity and constitutional monarchy.
Later these original Hegelians were opposed by a younger-generation of student
radicals, Left or Young Hegelians, who intended to employ the dialectical form of
Hegelian philosophy against the received content of Hegelian philosophy. Thus the
interpretive tradition of the philosophy of Hegel has been divided along political lines,
that homologously represents the division of political liberalism into right-
conservatives and left-progressives. Although Hegel was adamantly opposed to sects
and dualities, the bare inert factuality of his philosophical corpus offers little possibility
of resolving the dilemma, as each interpretative pole will claim for themselves
legitimacy according to either the content or the form of the philosophy of Hegel: Right
Hegelians will claim to follow the conclusions, while Left Hegelians will claim to follow
the method of the master.
Admitting this conundrum, I believe it more expedient that our labor of philosophical
exegesis should focus less upon the extrinsic correspondence between an interpretation
and the text, and more on the intrinsic coherence of the interpretation itself. Hence,
while I understand that you have argued about the correspondence of your
interpretation with better informed Hegel scholars than myself, I intend only to argue
for the superior coherence of what I will call my Trinitarian interpretation of Hegel in
relation to what I will call your Dualist interpretation of Hegel (if you would prefer
another designation for your interpretation, I would gladly adopt an alternative
nomenclature). Finally, I must mention that I was puzzled by your off-handed
comment that the "natural misreadings" in which commentators fail to free themselves
from "natural assumptions" "block comprehension" and "characterize most
commentaries" as this statement seems to dismiss most Hegelian commentators: which
interpretative tradition and which commentators do you find common agreement with?
On my behalf, I can identify as standing within the Right Hegelian tradition, which
includes Johann Adam Möhler, Franz von Baader, James Sterling, Emil Fakenheim,
Benedetto Croce, Jean Hyppolite, J.N. Findlay, Cyril O'Reagan, Dale Schlitt, Robert
Pippin and our own beloved Stephen Theron. Without intending any censure, may I
ask which commentators, besides your oft-mentioned references to Slavoj Žižek, you do
find yourself in agreement with? If your interpretation is only consonant with Mr.
Žižek, have you familiarized yourself with the critiques of Žižek, both as a Hegel
some goal or thing... As the Latin etymology of ‘intentionality’ indicates, the relevant
idea of directedness or tension (an English word which derives from the Latin
verb tendere) arises from pointing towards or attending to some target."
Franz Brentano gave a modern formulation to the term in his book "Psychology from an
Empirical Standpoint"(1874):
"Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle
Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call,
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object
(which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not
do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something
is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This
intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical
phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by
saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within
themselves."
'Intention' primarily denotes the mental representation of an object, as the mediating
relation between subject and object of conscious thought. 'Intentionality' differs from
'intention' as an act differs from an activity as the repetition of the intentional relation in
successive moments. Intention and intentionality are thus basic features of
consciousness, which Hegel refers to as the "pure This" of a consciousness relation to an
object, and not a self-reflective volition of some extra-mental object or state-of-affairs.
What is meant by 'intention'; as for instance when I say that it is my intention to write a
response to Alan Ponikvar; is not the same as what is meant by 'intention' for
philosophers. This definition of intentionality as the basic relation between subject and
object of consciousness, prior to any self-conscious volition, will be important later
when intention becomes operational in the Hegelian Dialectic.
Second, the term 'consciousness' has an idiosyncratic meaning in Hegel's philosophical
system, which is speculatively constructed in the section A. Consciousness in the first
three chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although Hegel appropriates many
philosophical terms, he does so primarily, not to simply import their meaning from
convention, but as vehicles to creatively re-conceptualize their meaning according to the
various relations they assume within the overall architectonic of concepts that is the
system of philosophy. Consciousness is the first major division of the Phenomenology
of Spirit - the introduction to the entire system of philosophy - and accordingly assumes
an altogether different meaning, as it is speculatively constructed in first standpoint of
consciousness, than it may have in either conventional vernacular, or even in
specialized psychoanalytic theory, psychological research and psychiatric practice. The
meaning of consciousness only comes to be known through the whole sequence of the
dialectical movement through the standpoint of consciousness. Hegel summarizes this
at the beginning of B.IV Self-Consciousness:
"In the kinds of certainty hitherto considered, the truth for consciousness is something
other than consciousness itself. The conception, however, of this truth vanishes in the
course of our experience of it. What the object immediately was in itself — whether mere
being in sense-certainty, a concrete thing in perception, or force in the case of
understanding — it turns out, in truth, not to be this really; but instead, this inherent
nature (Ansich) proves to be a way in which it is for an other. The abstract conception of
the object gives way before the actual concrete object, or the first immediate idea is
cancelled in the course of experience. Mere certainty vanished in favour of the truth.
There has now arisen, however, what was not established in the case of these previous
relationships, viz. a certainty which is on a par with its truth, for the certainty is to itself
its own object, and consciousness is to itself the truth." (PhG §166)
In support of the idiosyncrasy of the definition of 'consciousness' in the philosophy
Hegel, I appeal to two authoritative sources: the first-hand account that Hegel gives in
A.I - A.III of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the second-hand account of
commentators on the idiosyncratic meaning that Hegel gives to the term. In the first
two paragraphs Hegel defines Consciousness (as much as Hegel defines anything in
fixed non-speculative propositions) as the bare being and immediate object and of
intention:
"The knowledge, which is at the start or immediately our object, can be nothing else
than just that which is immediate knowledge, knowledge of the immediate, of what is...
This bare fact of certainty, however, is really and admittedly the abstractest and the
poorest kind of truth. It merely says regarding what it knows: it is; and its truth contains
solely the being of the fact it knows... Rather, the thing, the fact, is; and it is merely
because it is. It is – that is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and that bare fact
of being, that simple immediacy, constitutes its truth." (PhG §90 and §91)
Hegel again defines Consciousness in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences:
"Consciousness constitutes the reflected or correlational grade of mind: the grade of
mind as appearance. Ego is infinite self-relation of mind, but as subjective or as self-
certainty. The immediate identity of the natural soul has been raised to this pure
'ideal' self-identity; and what the former contained is for this self-subsistent reflection
set forth as an object." (Enc. §413)
Michael Innwood defines Consciousness thusly in the Hegel Dictionary:
"Bewusst, a technical term in philosophy and psychology since the eighteenth century,
means 'conscious'. It is used to distinguish conscious mental states and events from
unconscious ones, but in philosophy it primarily indicates intentional consciousness
or consciousness of an object (Gegenstand)... Kant and Hegel use das Bewusstsein
('consciousness', literally 'being conscious') to denote not only a subject's consciousness,
but the conscious subject himself, in contrast to the object of which he is conscious."
Consciousness is thus the simple immediate phenomenological intuition of a uniform
manifold of totally indeterminate being. It is the abstract apprehension of a totally
indeterminate, self-identical and univocal ideal space of mental intuition. The
definitions of intention and consciousness are related to one another as form and
content that mediates between the subject and the object: intention is the form of the
relation of the subject to its object, while consciousness is the content of this relation in
which both subject and object are placed; or, alternatively, it might be said that
intention is the abstract concept of the mediation between subject and object, while
consciousness is the concrete phenomenological apprehension of being.
'Unconsciousness' is (qua 'un' and 'consciousness') then nothing more than the simple
negation of consciousness; i.e. what consciousness is not; what is not simply and
immediately phenomenologically intuited as uniform and indeterminate being. There
is, further, an important difference between negation as opposition and simple negation
(negatio simpliciter): negation of polar opposites is the opposition of things which are
each the contrary of the other, such that to increase the degree of one is to decrease the
degree of the other; while simple negation is the disjunction of things that are unrelated
as opposites. This difference in senses of negation has been expounded by, among
others, Benedetto Croce in the first chapter of What is Living and What is Dead in the
Philosophy of Hegel, and by Thomas Cajetan as a simple contrary as, for example,
between red and black. Thus, unconsciousness is not an alternate mode of
consciousness that is the contrary opposite of consciousness, but rather simply what
consciousness is not, what is altogether other-than consciousness, the bare Fichtean
non-Ego.
I have labored so diligently over the definition of these terms; intention, consciousness
and unconsciousness; because I allege that you have interpolated an alien
psychoanalytic meaning of these terms into your reading of the philosophy of Hegel
(whether this was done willfully or not is irrelevant). The meaning of the
'unconsciousness' that you interpolate is the Lacanian psychoanalytic meaning of
'unconsciousness' that is an opposed mode of consciousness that is submerged below
ordinary conscious thought, like the body of an iceberg below the water-line, which
emerges unpredictably in the course of self-conscious reflection. Where
unconsciousness is for Hegel the simple negation of what is other-than consciousness;
i.e. the non-Ego; unconsciousness is for you the opposite of consciousness that results in
an original duality of consciousness and unconsciousness: consciousness and
unconscious operate in tandem with to one another; yet only the conscious mind is
immediately known; hence the unconsciousness is the unknown aspect of mind, just as
the non-Ego is the unknown aspect of the Ego; in which the negativity of the
unconscious non-Ego is submerged within the positivity of the conscious Ego. You
intimate this duality when you write:
"As I read the Phenomenology it is a complex exposition of the identity in difference or mutual implication of the reader and his self-alienated other, natural consciousness. The education to the standpoint of science that Hegel speaks about involves challenging the reader to comprehend this most comprehensive identity in difference of two way of thinking, one common and the other speculative. In the end, we are educated when we comprehend that when we are one with the absolute thought involves two views and not just one. We have to learn how to think twice, once as does the common intellect with thought directed to a self-standing thought in view and then again to the thinking of what is in view when what is in view devolves and manifests a dialectic."
Here you appear to identify the "self-alienated other" as the "common intellect" of
"natural consciousness", and the "standpoint of science" as the comprehension of the
"identity in difference of two ways of thinking, one common and the other speculative."
Speculative reasoning subsumes both "ways of thinking" within itself as the identity of
their difference. The "common intellect" of "natural consciousness" is alienated from the
self, from the Ego, from consciousness: it is the opposite of consciousness, the
unconsciousness.
"To comprehend speculatively the reader is shown how thought functions as dual. There is the intentional thought of the common intellect and then there is the cunning of the absolute that appears inadvertently behind the back – behind what is intended but frustrated in act."
Here you explicitly juxtapose the duality of thought as intentional and non-intentional;
conscious and unconscious; as "common intellect" and as the "cunning of the absolute."
One might ask how the Absolute "appears inadvertently behind the back" of "what is
intended" in intentional conscious if there is no consciousness of this cunning. Hegel's
consciousness is all being that is known. Hence there can be no conscious knowledge of
what transpires "behind the back" of consciousness. Whatever else the unconsciousness
is, it is a totally unknown non-Ego. For your psychoanalytic interpolation of
'unconciousness', what transpires "behind the back" of consciousness is always
immanently subsumed under consciousness as merely another aspect of the mind.
"We are to take to heart this truth: the absolute as it will develop and unfold is not to be found anywhere other than where there is a beating human heart. In fact, we can say two things right off about Hegel's absolute. First, it lies dormant as the contradiction inherent in all that is. And second, it is articulated at the very point when the finite subject comes to a dialectical impasse and ceases to function as an intentional subject."
Prior its recognition in speculative reasoning, the Absolute remains "dormant of the
contradiction [i.e. negativity] inherent in all that is." It is in man but not known to man:
in the "beating heart" but not in the mind's conscious awareness. Intentionality is just
the abstract relation between subject and object of conscious thought. The cessation of
the functioning of the "intentional subject" is then just as much the cessation and
negation of consciousness; consciousness turned around to face its opposite; the
unconsciousness.
***
Second Counter-Thesis against the Dualist Interpretation of Hegel
Thank you for elaborating upon your interpretive distinction between the "dual view"
of consciousness. This helps me to understand how you are reading Hegel. Before I
begin elaborating upon (B) my second counter-thesis, I wish to briefly comment upon
your previous description. I acknowledge this distinction that Hegel frequently invokes
in the Phenomenology of Spirit between consciousness for-itself and for-us.
"Hegel writes so as to keep intentional consciousness and consciousness of the cunning of reason separate. In the Phenomenology this is done by distinguishing what is for consciousness and what is for us. As I have mentioned the education to the standpoint of science involves folding both views into one finite consciousness which is then prepared to enter the system and read what is written speculatively or to read employing a dual view."
I interpret consciousness for-itself as the description of how the consciousness, that is
the phenomenological protagonist, understands the journey of consciousness through
the stages of the dialectic; and I interpret consciousness for-us as a description of how
we, as the phenomenological readers, observe what transpires to, but not for, the
consciousness of the phenomenological protagonist. I call consciousness for-itself a
protagonist because I believe the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a Romans-
Bildung, an romantic novel of the coming-of-age of the Spirit, in which consciousness is
the heroic protagonist. I have found it amusing to imagine the narrative as a sort of
modern-day Divine Comedy in which Hegel is both Dante and Virgil: Hegel is both the
naive consciousness for-itself, from the first-person standpoint, and the guide for this
consciousness, from the third-person standpoint, just as we phenomenological readers
watch on as the audience consciousness for-us.
"Why there are two views rather than one is that there are two ways of focusing our attention. First, we focus on the content as it slips away and then returns only to slip away again. We thus focus on the movement. Second, we can shift focus and attend to the coherent form of the slipping away... What is distinctive to Hegel is that first this ability is divided in the Phenomenology between the reader and natural consciousness. It is not the commonplace ability indicated by simple self-awareness."
Where we may still disagree is on the persisting significance of this "dual view" of
consciousness: to the question of whether this "dual view" is merely a heuristic literary
device meant to provide readers with a ladder to climb up the stages of consciousness
and toss away, or is ultimately constitutive of Hegel's epistemology, I answer the
former while I suspect that you would answer the latter. This interpretive difference,
between duality of views as constitutive hypostatized substance and regulative abstract
heuristic will be the basis of my criticism of your interpretation of Hegel's resolution of
the Kantian antinomies in the second counter-thesis that follows.
(B)
The second counter-thesis is that, in hypostatizing the "dual view" of the opposition
between consciousness for-us and consciousness for-itself, you also hypostatize the
negative opposite of consciousness, which is the unconsciousness; the negative of
consciousness as such. This original opposition between consciousness and what is
other-than consciousness, or between the Ego and the non-Ego, is then retained as the
negative other, the non-Ego, and the negativity of the Paradox, rather than subsumed in
the concept as difference within unity. This duality, of the Ego and the non-Ego, is
abstractly represented in the differing interpretations of the sequence of moments with
which we each describe Hegel's dialectic: where my Trinitarian interpretation present
three moments in the conventional triadic movement (e.g. thesis-antithesis-synthesis),
your own Dualist interpretation presents only two moments, or maximally three
moments that are reducible to two. This difference in our interpretation of the dialectic
will, when absolutized, account for the different interpretations of the Absolute: the
Trinitarian interpretation unites the opposed first and second moments in a third
synthetic moment as equivocal predication is united in analogical predication, while the
Dualist interpretation retains the opposition of the duality of the first and second
moments in an empty identity, which I presume you would exalt as thinking the
negative opposition of the paradox.
Before turning to your examine your response, please examine Hegel's description of
these speculative moments at the conclusion of the Introduction to the Phenomenology
of Spirit. In §81 Hegel mentions that "it may be useful to say something about the
method of carrying out the inquiry." Starting in §82, Hegel describes the origination of
the contradiction between the "abstract determinations" of the (α) positive moment of
the object in-itself and (β) the negative moment of our knowledge of the object for-us
which together constitute knowledge:
"... Consciousness, we find, distinguishes from itself [α] something, to which at the same
time it [β] relates itself; or, to use the current expression, there is something [β] for
consciousness; and the determinate form of this process of relating [α & β], or of
there being something for a consciousness, is knowledge. But from this [γ] being for
another we distinguish [α] being in itself or per se; what is [β] related to knowledge is
likewise distinguished from [α] it, and posited as also existing outside this relation; the
aspect of [α] being per se or in itself is called Truth..."
In the second quoted sentence of §82, Hegel describes how knowledge is distinguished
within itself into (α) the positive reality of "being in itself or per se" and (β) the negative
ideality of "what is related to knowledge" and "distinguished from it." In §83, Hegel
distinguishes the question of knowledge of (α) the object in-itself, as the naive
correspondence between ideal thought and reality, and the (β) critical knowledge of the
knowledge, as the object that is known for-us:
"If now our inquiry deals with the truth of knowledge, it appears that we are inquiring
what [α] knowledge is in itself. But in this inquiry [β] knowledge is our object, it is for
us; and the essential nature of knowledge, were this to come to light, would be rather its
being for us..."
At the conclusion of §83, Hegel gives a warning against making the essence of
knowledge, the relation of object of knowledge to the subject, an object in-itself, as a
fixed form of knowing, or as a logic of method. This fixed form of knowing, or
methodologism, is (β) the second negative moment of knowing for-us that has been
made into an object, just as (α) the object in-itself makes the first positive moment into
the object of "what is called truth" of the thing-in-itself. In each case, the (α) first
positive and (β) the second negative moment are reified as self-subsistent finite objects.
This reification of each moments as finite objects will later be exposed to be self-
contradictory, in (γ) the third synthetic moment that exposes the unreality of both in the
process of their mutually related opposition.
In §84, Hegel explains how "consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself"
to overcome the fixidity of any such form of methodologism, by once again
distinguishing (β) the negative ideal relation of knowing for-us from (α) the object itself:
"Consciousness furnishes its own criterion in itself, and the inquiry will thereby be a
comparison of itself with its own self ; for the distinction, just made [α & β], falls
inside itself. In consciousness there is [β] one element for an other, or, in general,
consciousness implicates the specific character of the moment of knowledge At the
same time this “other” is to consciousness not merely [β] for it, but also [α] outside
this relation, or has a being in itself, i.e. there is the moment of truth. Thus in what
consciousness inside itself declares to be the essence or truth we have the standard
which itself sets up, and by which we are to measure its knowledge.
In the final sentences of §84, Hegel appears to confirm what you describe as the
"perspective shift" in which both the first positive moment and the second negative are
united in a bare and simple identity of opposites. However, after affirming that 'both of
these processes are the same' Hegel goes on to describe how the (α) first positive and (β)
the second negative moment both "fall within that knowledge which we are
examining", the totality of knowledge that was first mentioned in §82:
"It is clear, of course, that both of these processes are the same. The essential fact,
however, to be borne in mind throughout the whole inquiry is that both these
moments, notion and object, [β] “being for another” and [α] “being in itself”,
themselves fall within that knowledge which we are examining [§82]. Consequently
we do not require to bring standards with us, nor to apply our fancies and thoughts in
the inquire; and just by our leaving these aside we are enabled to treat and discuss the
subject [γ] as it actually is in itself and for itself, as it is in its complete reality."
The appearance Hegel affirms the equivalency between the two moments in a bare
identity is altogether premature because, in §84, Hegel is describing how "consciousness
furnishes its own criterion in itself" in which the distinctive moment of the (α) first and
(β) second moments "falls inside itself." The criterion that emerges from within
consciousness, and not from brought as fancies of "standards with us", is the
'knowledge' that Hegel has been examining all along; the endogenous (γ) third
synthetic moment of the dialectic that unites the opposition of the former two within
itself; in the actuality that is "in itself and for itself"; and the "complete reality."
In §85, Hegel juxtaposes the notion and the object, the fixed "criterion" and the object of
"what is to be tested", to describe how the form and the content of knowledge are each
dependent upon the other; for "as knowledge changes so too does the object for it
essentially belonged to this knowledge." To conclude, in §86 Hegel makes explicit,
what had only hitherto been implicit: how (α) the first positive and (β) the second
negative moments together combine in "the new and true object" of (γ) the third
synthetic moment, which is the process that contains the opposition of the former two
as difference within its unity:
"This dialectic process which consciousness executes on itself — on its knowledge as
well as on its object — in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, is
precisely, what is termed Experience. In this connection, there is [γ] a moment in the
process just mentioned [in §85] which should be brought into more decided
prominence, and by which a new light is cast on the scientific aspect of the following
exposition. Consciousness knows something; this something is [α] the essence or is per
se. This object, however, is also [β] the per se, the inherent reality, for
consciousness. Hence comes ambiguity of this truth [i.e. α & β]. Consciousness, as we
see, has now two objects: one is [α] the first per se, the second is [β] the existence for
consciousness of this per se. The last object [β] appears at first sight to be merely the
reflection of consciousness into itself, i.e. an idea not of an object, but solely of its
knowledge of [α] that first object. But, as was already indicated [in §85], by that very
process the first object is altered; it ceases to be what is per se, and becomes
consciously something which is per se only for consciousness. Consequently, then,
what this real per se is for consciousness is truth: which, however, means that this is
the essential reality, or the object which consciousness has. This [β] new object
contains the nothingness of the first; the new object is the experience concerning that
first object."
Hegel announces that he will make explicit "the new and true object" which is the
"moment in the process" of §85. This new moment is the processing of (γ) the third
synthetic moment that contains the opposition of (α) the first positive and (β) the
second negative moments within its own self-movement. The second moment shows
the abstract untruth of the first, and "contains the nothingness of the first", just as the
third moment will show the abstract untruth of the second. In the third moment, the
former two are revealed in their abstractness, finitude, unreality and untruth. The
reification of the fixed form of knowing of (β) the second negative moment of knowing
for-us, as methodologism, is shown to be just as self-contradictory as (α) the first
positive moment of "what is called truth", of the object in-itself. Hegel describes (γ) the
third synthetic moment as one that "does not seem to agree with what is ordinarily
understood by experience", the experience that understands only finite objects:
"This moment is the transition from the first object and the knowledge of it to the
other object, in regard to which we say we have had experience, was so stated that the
knowledge of the first object, the existence for consciousness of the first ens per se, is
itself to be the second object. But it usually seems that we learn by experience the
untruth of our first notion by appealing to some other object which we may happen to
find casually and externally; so that, in general, what we have is merely the bare and
simple apprehension of what is in and for itself. On the view above given, however,
the new object is seen to have come about by a transformation or conversion of
consciousness itself."
You contend (colored red) that the "transformation or conversion of consciousness" is
the result of the "futility of finite thought" of "common reason" that opens a hole for the
insight of speculative reason viewed in its "absolute form."
"The futility of finite thought guided by common reason opens a hole which with
insight can be viewed as absolute form. The void or lack of subjectivity is where the
absolute as Hegel conceives it may be thought."
While I entirely agree that the futility of the understanding of common reason results
from its finitude, and consequent inability to grasp the infinite judgment of speculative
reason, I contend that, far from nullifying finite thought in a "hole", "void or lack of
subjectivity", the much of the admittedly finite reality and truth of the α) the first
positive and (β) the second negative moments is taken up into and preserved in the (γ)
the third synthetic moment. Hegel corroborates this when he describes how the form of
(γ) the third synthetic moment is contributed by our intentionality, through our
intentional "way of looking at the matter", in the whole "series of experiences" in a
"scientifically constituted sequence":
"This way of looking at the matter is our doing, what we contribute; by its means the
series of experiences through which consciousness passes is lifted into a
scientifically constituted sequence..."
Hegel distinguishes between the two views that you have endorsed: the first-person
view of consciousness for-itself and the third-person view of consciousness for-us, the
reader:
"... but this does not exist for the consciousness [for itself] we contemplate and consider.
Hegel then directs our attention back to the exposition of skepticism in §78-79, when
Hegel had previously distinguished between the bad skepticism that ejects the positive
content of what is skeptically negated as an "empty nothing", and the good skepticism
that instead retains the positive content of "what truth of the proceeding mode of
knowledge" that had been skeptically negated":
We have here, however, the same sort of circumstance, again, of which we spoke a short
time ago when dealing with the relation of this exposition to skepticism [§78-79], viz.
that the result which at any time comes about in the case of an untrue mode of
knowledge cannot possibly collapse into an empty nothing, but must necessarily be
taken as the negation of that of which it is a result — a result which contains what
truth the preceding mode of knowledge has in it.
Previously you had contended that the (α) first positive moment contributes nothing to
(γ) the third synthetic moment:
"Common reason sees the senseless dialectic and is ready to come to a skeptical
conclusion: there are no realities that persist thus there is nothing for us to think."
I (colored blue) have previously criticized you for precisely this form of bad skepticism:
"If I am correct in interpreting Alan as thusly ejecting the reason and substance of the
positive moment, then Alan commits himself to the sort of "bad skepticism"
that Hegel describes (colored green) in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit"
Hegel confirms my criticism to be correct when he describes how (γ) the third synthetic
moment, that is the processing of the opposition of (α) the first positive and (β) the
second negative moments within its own self-movement, assumes this form only by
subsuming the previous two moments through subsuming the truth and reality of each,
in the process of their mutual sublation that is good skepticism:
In the present instance the position takes this form: since what [α] at first appeared as
object is reduced, when it [β] passes into consciousness, to what knowledge takes it to
be, and the implicit nature, the real in itself, becomes what this entity per se, is for
consciousness [§85]; this latter is [γ] the new object, whereupon there appears also a
new mode or embodiment of consciousness, of which the essence is something other
than that of [β] the preceding mode. It is this circumstance which carries forward the
whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity.
Hegel signals that this is a "new object" of a "new mode of embodiment or
consciousness" (Miller translates this as "a new pattern of consciousness... for which the
essence is something different from what it was at the preceding stage"), which signals
this to be the "new and true object" mentioned in §86, and not either of the opposed and
preceding moments that had previously been exhaustively described.
Previously I described how this dispute turned on the question of how many
conceptual moments there were in Hegel's dialectic: according to my Trinitarian
interpretation this "new and true object" is (γ) the third synthetic conceptual moment
that unites (α) the first positive and (β) the second negative moments within itself;
while according to your Dualist interpretation there are only (α) the first positive and
(β) the second negative moments united by consciousness for-us as the consequence of
a "perspective shift." The difference between these interpretation crucially depends on
this transition between a second and a third conceptual moment. You write:
"The positive moment is the second perspective on the absolute negativity of the cycling. It is the insight into the coherence of this cycling. It is the negativity recollected in its coherence. I am not sure where you intend to find the positive moment. I suspect once again it is the synthesizing third referencing a thought activity that stands apart from what is being synthesized. In other words, it is not activity as immanent but an intentional activity of a subject attending to some matter in view. It is an activity delegated to the common intellect."
You describe how the positive moment of the dialectic is the "second perspective" of
speculative reason which unites the (α) first positive and (β) the second negative
moments in an "absolute negativity of the cycling" as the "negativity recollected in its
coherence." You distinguish the activity of immanent speculative reasoning from its
negative opposite, the "intentional activity of a subject" of "common intellect." This
distinction between the intentionality of common intellect and the non-intentional
activity of immanent speculative reasoning, or between the activities of consciousness
and the unconsciousness, is contradicted by Hegel's explicit description of the necessity
of our contributing to the (γ) third speculative moment as "our doing,
what we contribute. [viz. the intentionality of consciousness]" Our activity of thought is
intentional simply because in it is maintained the relation between subject and object.
You further describe how this (γ) third speculative moment is nothing other than the
"two moments synthesized" in one:
"Hegel's thought, being immanent, never moves beyond a two as one. There is no third thought; there are simply two views of what the two in one means. There are not two moments synthesized. There are two moments as one that lend themselves to being taken by the common intellect as nonsense and by the speculative intellect as generative of a newfound sense."
The first two moments are understood by "common intellect", and these same two
moments re-imagined by speculative reasoning. You, intend to escape the difficulty of
thought intentionally positing a (γ) third speculative moment by, alternatively,
affirming that there are two speculative moments and two aspects of thought: positive
and negative; and common intellect and speculative reasoning. Then you proceed to
clarify the nature of the positive moment of "the second point of view" of speculative
reason that unite the "moment cycles" of the two moments:
The second point of view on the dialectic is not a mere recognition of the negative movement. It is a recognition that because this movement cycles it is coherent. It subsists as an identity in difference. It is only the ideal moments of this cycle that do not subsist. So rather than dismissing the dialectic as nonsense as does the common intellect we who view speculatively have insight into what coheres. This is the positive moment that you will soon say is missing from my account.
The negativity of the "movement of cycles" is coherent when it is united in the "identity
in difference." How, may we ask, does the negativity of the opposed moments, become
coherent in an identity? Alternatively, we may ask; what is the nature of the identity-
relation between the two opposed moments, and how is this coherent? Recall the
contradiction is traditionally taken to be the universal sign of incoherence, just as
identity is traditionally taken to be absence of difference between two terms. What then
could it mean for the negative opposition of the "movement of the cycles" to become
coherent, i.e. non-contradictory, and identical, i.e. non-different? The crucial difference
between the Trinitarian interpretation and the Dualist interpretation concerns how the
opposition of the conceptual moments is resolved; either into a third synthetic concept
or as an identity between the cycling of the two discrete moments. You write:
"But I am only able - as you note - to count to two. Three is too many and certainly a community of humans is way too many."
To summarize the differences in our respective interpretations: the Trinitarian
interpretation negates the truth and reality of each of the previous moments just as it
sublates and unites their truth and reality in a third synthetic concept; which while
consisting of neither simply the first or second moment, or both taken moments
together; nonetheless is constituted by the truth and reality of each of the previous
moments, as they have been intentionally transformed by consciousness. Contrary to
this account, the Dualist interpretation denies that any of the reality and truth of the
previous moments persists to constitute a formally distinct third, but rather affirms that
each of the previous two moments remain in their mutual untruth and unreality as they
cycle around one another and just as much ceaselessly contradict one another, in the
paradox of their mutual negativity. You write:
"Hegel's thought is about the identity in difference of being and thought. It is about what
first appears as pure negativity. I have been pounding the table to say that this is the crucial point: the skeptic and speculative thinker have before them the same dialectical movement. The skeptic says that pure negativity means that there is nothing more to think. The speculative philosopher says that this pure negativity is the
infinite movement of the concept. Same content. Two views!"
In this interpretation, neither duality is united in a common third; for the positive and
negative moments of conscious common intellect are together re-imagined in the
negative opposite of consciousness, the unconsciousness of speculative reasoning.
Thus, the duality of the positive and negative moment is altogether transferred,
although not transformed, in the full turbulence of their "negative cycling", to the
unconsciousness, in which this duality persists. You write:
"So the contradictions are not resolved. We never free ourselves from
contradiction. What we do is learn to think the reason appropriate to such
contradictions. We learn to shift from common to speculative reason."
The impossibility of resolving the contradictions means that the negativity of the
dualities is never overcome in a speculative "third thought" because there "are not two
moments synthesized" but rather only two dualities; or two pairs of two; two moments
in two senses "that lend themselves to being taken by the common intellect as nonsense
and by the speculative intellect as generative of a newfound sense." Consciousness
cannot resolve the contradictoriness of the two moments in a third so the Dualist
interpretation posits yet another duality, the duality of consciousness and
unconsciousness, the unconscious activity of speculative reasoning "behind the back" of
consciousness:
The trauma comes about because the common intellect assumes that when we have the absolute as such before us we can think it. It is the thought that harmonizes our worldview. What Hegel is showing is that this harmonized thought is a fiction of metaphysical thinking. If we attempt to think this thought we find there is nothing to think other than the slipping away of this thought. Our need to disguise the disturbance at the heart of the absolute – our need to convince ourselves that we inhabit a well-ordered universe – is the divine thought that we need to give up. It is nothing but a fiction as shown at the inception of the Logic. The thinker that thinks the reason behind the back of consciousness is identified by Hegel to be the reader.
The unconsciousness of speculative reason cannot be the consciousness for-itself, and
thus must be the consciousness for-us, the reader; and this duality of consciousness is,
on the Dualist interpretation, not merely a heuristic narrative aid to the reader that is
ultimately resolved into the Absolute Idea, but is altogether reified as persisting in the
empty identity of the two mutually exclusive, negating and unreal positive and
negative moments. The duality of consciousness and unconsciousness; of Ego and
non-Ego is then altogether absolutized in the Logic and the entirety of Hegel's system of
Absolute Idealism! The Trinitarian interpretation concludes in a third synthetic
moment that is epistemologically and ontologically enriched to afford to it a greater
truth and reality than either of the two preceding moments, while the Dualist
interpretation concludes in a bare and simple identity that contains the difference of its
mutually undifferentiated moments in the ceaselessly negativity of their empty formal
identity, from which no thought save paradox can emerge like the night in which all
cows are black.
In (C) the third and final thesis, I will argue that the consequence of the interpolation of
the unconsciousness of speculative reasoning, and the absolutization of the negation of
consciousness, is the absolutization of the unknown object; which is known only as
what is unknown and which Fichte calls the non-Ego; as an absolute non-Ego which
ceaselessly negates the absolutivity of what is called the Absolute.
***
Third Counter-Thesis Against the Janos-Faced Dualist Interpretation of Hegel
Introduction
For every instance of duality, thought demands two should be mediated by a third.
Two things can only be thought to be separate and distinct in and through some third
thing, in which each is joined together with the other. This is the Principle of Mediation
that is the operative principle behind the Platonic-Aristotelian Third Man Argument
and F.H. Bradley's infinite regress arising from the duality of universals and particulars.
This principle had long ago been recognized in the geometrical cosmology of the
ancient Pythagoreans, who affirmed the logical necessity that any dyad should be
mediated by a third within a triad: Alexander Polyhistorius described how Xenophius
of Chalsis "regarded the 'monad' as the beginning of all things. From this the Dyad was
produced and from it numbers, from the numbers points, from the points lines, from
the lines surfaces and from the
surfaces solids." (Eduard Zeller,
Outlines of the History of Greek
Philosophy, p. 89) In Pythagorean
cosmogony, the Monad begets the
Dyad; the Dyad begets the Triad;
then the Triad begets numbers, points and lines; and lines beget the surfaces of
polygons, which beget the solids of polyhedra. The logical necessity of the Principle of
Mediation, both for Pythagorean cosmogony and for Hegelian phenomenology, is the
converse consequence of the impossibility of conceiving any two things without some
mediating relation: whenever two may be conceived together there must ineluctably be
some third relation between the two in and through which each are thought with the
other, and both are apprehended together as a duality within triplicity.
This third mediator may be thought of as something or nothing: as a minimally
substantival Aristotelian quintessesnce or as a totally contentless void. Hegel showed,
in the first part of the Science of Logic, that the concepts of being and non-being,
something and nothing, were the positive and negative moments of the individual
concept of becoming. Positive being and negative non-being are, in their opposed
duality, two abstract concepts that emerge concretely in the third concept of becoming,
through which each are subsumed and mediated in and through the self-particularizing
individual concept. Hegel's logic is trinitarian because the third moment of the synthetic
concept constitutes a fuller being and a richer truth than either the prior moments, of
self-satisfied or self-alienated concepts, or both together, in a formal identity of duality.
The synthesis of opposites, through which a concept is estranged from and then
reconciled with itself, is the fundamental trinitarian pattern of Hegel's dialectical logic.
Summary of (A) First and (B) Second Counter-Theses
This Trinitarian interpretation of Hegel's logic is opposed to Alan Ponikvar's Janos-
faced Dualist interpretation. In the following, Alan's comments are colored red while
my comments are colored blue. Please allow me to briefly summarize the major points
of the previous (A) first and (B) second counter-theses before I precede to argue (C) the
third counter-thesis: the consequence of dualism is the absolutization of the object that
is known only as it is unknown, which Fichte calls the non-ego.
In (A) the first counter-thesis I contended that Alan had artificially interpolated the
Zizekian-Lacanian psychoanalytic notion of the unconsciousness in place of Hegel's
unconsciousness. I quoted Franz Brentano to define 'intentionality' as primarily
denoting "the mental representation of an object, as the mediating relation between
subject and object of conscious thought." Then I quoted Hegel and Inwood to define
consciousness as " the simple immediate phenomenological intuition of a uniform
manifold of totally indeterminate being. It is the abstract apprehension of a totally
indeterminate, self-identical and univocal ideal space of mental intuition." Finally, I
defined the unconsciousness as the contrary opposite of consciousness:
"The meaning of the 'unconsciousness' that you [Alan] interpolate is the Lacanian
psychoanalytic meaning of 'unconsciousness' that is an opposed mode of consciousness
that is submerged below ordinary conscious thought, like the body of an iceberg below
the water-line, which emerges unpredictably in the course of self-conscious reflection.
Where unconsciousness is for Hegel the simple negation of what is other-than
consciousness; i.e. the non-Ego; unconsciousness is for you the opposite of
consciousness that results in an original duality of consciousness and unconsciousness:
consciousness and unconscious operate in tandem with to one another; yet only the
conscious mind is immediately known; hence the unconsciousness is the unknown
aspect of mind, just as the non-Ego is the unknown aspect of the Ego; in which the
negativity of the unconscious non-Ego is submerged within the positivity of the
conscious Ego."
In (B) the second counter-thesis I argued that the Dualist interpretation was the
consequence of the mistaken hypostatization of this opposition between conscious Ego
and the unconscious non-Ego. I presented three pieces of textual evidence from the
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit (§81 to §86) as evidence against the Dualist
interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic: first, Hegel announces in §85 that he will make
explicit "the new and true object"; second, Hegel describes how this object is contributed
by an intentional "way of looking at the matter"; and third, Hegel distinguishes between
the bad skepticism, which negated the content of the conceptual moments as an "empty
nothing", and the good skepticism, which retained their positive content as the "truth of
the proceeding mode of knowledge." The new object preserves, through the positing of
conscious intentionality, the reality and truth of the perceiving moment and thereby
implies the Trinitarian interpretation in which "the third synthetic moment negates the
truth and reality of each of the previous moments just as it sublates and unites their
truth and reality," contrary to the Dualist interpretation which "denies that any of the
reality and truth of the previous moments persists to constitute a formally distinct third,
but rather affirms that each of the previous two moments remain in their mutual
untruth and unreality as they cycle around one another and just as much ceaselessly
contradict one another, in the paradox of their mutual negativity."
(C) Third Counter Thesis
The following third counter-thesis will present the speculative origin and absolute
consequences of the dualist interpretation of the philosophy of Hegel, in which the
seminal consequences of the prior theses (A) & (B) will blossom into the deadly poison
of the Janos-faced paradoxical Absolute.
Dualism and Trinitarianism in the Philosophy of Hegel
"Thus, we have my claim: consciousness actualizes a dialectic which it is
unable to comprehend. So the greatest mystery for Hegel's reader is why is it that out
of this dialectic the new true object arises."
The locus of the controversy surrounds what Alan has credibly described as the
"greatest mystery" of the Hegelian dialectic: how may the contrary opposition of theses
be resolved into a form of coherent knowing? The resolution of opposites is a mystery
because classical logic holds that contradictions result in the obliteration of one or both
of the opposed terms (ex falso quodlibet or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet). Following
Aristotle's prohibitions, contradictions were held to destroy the truth of any proposition
and the conceivability of any concept (See Metaph IV 3 1005b19–20, 24 ,29-30, and IV 6
1011b13–20). In pre-critical philosophy, the fear of the danger of the explosiveness of
contradictions led philosophers (with rare exceptions such as Nicolas of Cusa) to
present systems of deductions whose premises and conclusions were altogether without
contradiction, or non-contradictory. Coherence means simply this: that there are no
contradictions between the premises and the conclusion; or, to say that same thing, that
the conclusion may be predicated as identical to the collective entailment of all of the
premises (e.g. A = A).
Hegel's dialectical logic is frequently alleged to violate the classical prohibition on
contradiction which is the Law of Non-Contradiction. Rather Hegel should be said to
universalize contradiction by affirming a Law of Contradiction, in which 'all S is
contradictory', in absolute opposition to the Law of Non-Contradiction, in which 'no S is
contradictory'. Hegel does not so much seek to circumvent contradictions as to
instrumentalize their very explosive force within his concepts. This instrumentalization
of contradiction is motivated by a dialectical revolution in logic, beginning with the Port
Royale logic and culminating with Hegel's Science of Logic (See Evald Ilyenkov's
Dialectical Logic, 1974): for Spinoza every determination is a negation and the contrary
opposite of what is determined; for Kant the contradictory paralogisms of the
antinomies obliterate the transcendental conditions of conceivability; and for Fichte the
Ego self-posits all universal laws of logic. Alan and I agree that Kant's antinomies of
reason demonstrated the impossibility of conceiving of an encyclopedic system of
philosophy as a coherent and non-contradictory deduction. The "greatest mystery" of
the Hegelian dialectic is how Hegel conceives of the dialectical emergence of the "new
true object" from the contrary opposition of the prior objects of thought.
Modern philosophy can be viewed as a project to reconcile medieval theology and
modern natural science: the natural sciences presented the spectacle of a lawfully
ordered cosmos from the minutae to the gargantuan, while the theological notion of
truth demanded systematic unity. In Spinoza, this duality appears as that of extension
and thought in substance. In Leibniz, this duality appears as the manifold of intuition
and the windowless monads. From these sources of the infinite and the infinitesimal,
German Idealism inherited both the duality of thought and being as well as the dual
loci of their unity in the Absolute and in the Ego. For Kant, the duality of thought and
being is that of concepts and percepts; and the dual loci of their unity is the idea of God
(the All or omnitudo realitatis, and the most real being or ens realissimum) and the mind's
apperceptive unity. German Idealism sought to reconcile these dualities into a form of
systematic unity and place all conditions in their logical and systematic relations within
and for the unconditioned condition of all conditioned things (See Paul Franks's All or
Nothing, 2005).
The Hegelian dialectic of opposed concepts filially received the inheritance of both the
Spinozist doctrine - determinatio est negatio - of the negative opposite determination of
any single determination (See letter 50 to Jelles); as well as the Kantian antinomies of
reason; in which any determination of a definite deduction is just as much a negation of
some opposite determinable deduction, so that an antithesis is implicit in the positing of
every thesis: as the Kantian antinomies oppose contrary deductions any definite
deduction will be opposed by its contrary resulting in the opposition of possible
deductions which Kant called a paralogism, or a paradox or reason. As these two
conditions apply to any definite syllogistic deduction, their conjoined effects are
operative in every exercise of reason, regardless of its degree of magnitude and
complexity.
Of course, I deny that such a moment exists because the first and second moments you
reference also do not exist. But leaving that aside for the moment, it seems that this
'synthesis' accomplishes two things at once: it exposes an unreality and it reveals an
identity in difference in its place."
The new synthetic object that emerges from the opposition of the antitheses of the first
and second moment (i) exposes the relative unreality of the former conceptual
moments, and (ii) replaces their mutual contrary opposition with an identity that
subsumes, unites and preserves their differences. The question remains as to the
relative (i) ontological status of these moments and (ii) epistemic nature of the 'revealed'
identity in difference. The Trinitarian interpretation holds the synthesis of opposites to
(i) subordinate the former conceptual moments to a single superordinating synthetic
concept, and (ii) reveals the untruth of the former moments even as it incorporates the
true content of each into the richer truth of the synthetic concept. On this account, the
Hegelian dialectic of opposites generally produces concepts of fuller being and richer
truth with the completion of each dialectical sequence, and may thus be said to
ontologically and epistemologically progress up the via delorosa of Spirit (PhG §77).
The Dualist interpretation denies any ontological and epistemological progress, and
contends, contrary to the whole purgative spiritual trajectory of the Trinitarian
interpretation, that the Hegelian dialectic ends no better than it had begun; in the
negativity of mutually contradictory conceptual moments, and exalts this totally empty
identity of mutual contradiction as an "insight" into paradox. Precedents for logical
dualisms are readily discovered throughout all of modern philosophy and especially in
the various systems of German Idealism: Kant opposed equally valid but mutually
contradictory deductions to one another and concluded in a general aporia; Fichte
proposed unconditioned activity of the conscious Ego posited any deduction in
opposition to what was not thought, the non-Ego, and subsequently resolved the
opposed deductions of Ego and non-Ego in an identity of their recursive alternation;
and Schelling absolutized the Fichtean non-Ego as the unconditioned Absolute,
opposed the deductions of conscious to the absolute deductions of nature, and affirmed
the parallel unity of thought and being known through intellectual intuition. Thus
Kant, Fichte and Schelling each reconceived of the dualisms of Kant in different ways:
as antinomies of reason; as Ego and non-Ego; and as consciousness and nature. The
Dualist interpretation is motivated to preserve the negative duality of modern
philosophy; the opposition between theology and substance; Leibniz and Spinoza;
Jerusalem and Athens; so as to avoid the sacrifice of Cavalry, the speculative good friday,
in which all concepts are negated and systematically united in the Absolute.
Hegelian Hermeneutics
"You seem to suggest something dangerously close to my view. You reference
the third synthetic moment."
The dialectic of opposed theses admits for equally opposed readings. Reading Hegel is
the construction, for consciousness, of the systematic relations of concepts. Every
determinate concept may be abstractly empowered to determine its opposite in one-
sided domination. Thus logical opposition is the condition for hermeneutic opposition.
This is the consequence of the Spinozist doctrine determinatio est negatio, the Kantian
antinomies, and the reversibility of the syllogism (i.e. (S-M-P) = (P-M-S)): determinatio est
negatio demands that every determination of reason has an equally opposed negative
determination; the Kantian antinomies oppose contradictory determinative deductions
to one another; and the syllogism from the subject to the predicate may just as easily be
reversed as a syllogism from the predicate to the subject. Dialectic opposes conceptual
deductions to one another and invites the reader to judge their merit, both intrinsically,
in relation to themselves, and extrinsically, in relation to each other. Just as it is possible
to read Callicles and Thrasymachus as radical subverting Plato's grand Eleatic-
Pythagorean synthesis, so it is possible to read antitheses of contrary opposites in the
system of Hegel as a radical subversion of his grand Spinozist-Boehmian-Kantian
synthesis. In each case, the antithetical reading, which empowers one opposite to
dominate another, is motivated to subvert the prevailing interpretation of the
systematic unity of author's thought in favor of a counter-reading that, in emphasizing
disunity and a-systematicity, endeavors to emancipate an autonomously crafted
reading from the normative constraints of scholarly tradition.
In the philosophy of Hegel the reading that emphasizes the contrary opposition of the
antitheses is the Dualist interpretation, while the reading that emphasizes the systemic
unity of syntheses is the Trinitarian interpretation. Both interpretations acknowledge
that the initial theses of the dialectic are abstract untruths; oppose these theses to their
opposite antitheses; and affirm that the opposition of theses and antitheses reveals the
mutual unreality of the contrary opposites. Yet these interpretations differ on how to
understand the dialectical resolution of this contrary opposition: for the Dualist
interpretation duality is primary and unity is secondary, while for the Trinitarian
interpretation unity is primary and duality is secondary. The interpretations
consequently oppose one another as unity and duality seeking to mutually sublate one
another.
"The moments of the dialectic are equally ideal. Neither is properly characterized as
positive or negative. In the Logic the common intellect will offer such a distinction. But
the dialectic will reveal this to have been a mischaracterization. The moments are
mutual, expressing the same dialectical identity in difference. There is no third
synthesizing agent that brings these two together. It is because they show themselves
as together in the dialectic that a new point of view is required to break the dialectical
deadlock."
For the Dualist interpretation, each of the opposed conceptual moments negates the
other just as it is negated by the other: each is positive in relation to itself and negative
in relation to the other; or each is both positive and negative as well as neither properly
positive or negative. The mutual relations of 'identity in difference' is no third concept
but merely the self-posited formal identity of two different concepts from the
standpoint of either (e.g. if M is formal identity, and S is the first thesis, and P is the
second antithesis, then S-M-P or P-M-S). The formal identity relation of the conceptual
moments appear to constitute a new concept in which contradictory opposites are
identified, yet this appearance is misleading because the self-posited formal identity is
nothing other than the mediating hypostatized contradiction in which nothing is
posited as something. The positing of nothing is, not a postulate of something
constitutive, but merely the postulate of the Kantian regulative principle of identity.
Hegel describes his system of philosophy as a ladder to the absolute knowledge and the
science of infinite being. The metaphor of the ladder implies a noetic ascent from a
lower to a higher stages of knowing, in which the lower stages are known as they are
sublated within the higher stages. The model of former narrative sections and lower
epistemological stages sublated into later narrative sections and higher epistemological
stages altogether suggests the classical Platonic epistemologico-ontological ascent from
the cave of ordinary knowing to the sunshine apprehension of the forms; in which
thought "passes from the dark void of the transcendent and remote super-sensuous,
and steps into the spiritual daylight of the present." (PhG §177) This ascent is what
Robert Wallace describes as the "vertical dimension" of Hegel's thought, from the naive
certainty of the reality of the phenomena to scientific knowledge of the pure forms of
essences. Hegel writes in the Phenomenology of Spirit:
"Science on its side requires the individual self-consciousness to have risen into this
high air, in order to be able to live with science, and in science, and really to feel alive
there. Conversely the individual has the right to demand that science shall hold the
ladder to help him to get at least as far as this position, shall show him that he has in
himself this ground to stand on. His right rests on his absolute independence, which
he knows he possesses in every type and phase of knowledge; for in every phase,
whether recognized by science or not, and whatever be the content, his right as an
individual is the absolute and final form, i.e. he is the immediate certainty of self, and
thereby is unconditioned being, were this expression preferred." (PhG §26)
The Trinitarian interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic, as constituting a vertical
Platonic ascent from opinion and appearances to the pure forms of knowing, is
hermeneutically opposed by the Dualist interpretation of this same dialectic as no more
than a horizontal extension of the nothingness of the hypostatized contradiction. The
origin of this hermeneutic opposition is the conceptual opposition between the
univocity and multivocity of contradiction, or of one and many senses in which
contradiction is used. The hypostatic contradiction is the hermeneutic key to unlocking
the labyrinth of the Dualist interpretation; the eye of the storm from which reason may
enter into all sides; which simultaneously mediates, negates and divides all of the
dualisms within the paradoxical absolute.
What an uneducated reader is unable to see when they for instance consider
the bad and true infinite in the Logic is that these are not two distinct
concepts. They are two ways of speaking about the same thought movement.
The bad and the true infinite are ways of thinking rather than ways of speaking.
Thought is not separated from thought as a word is separated from the speaker in
gesticulation. Thought contains itself within itself even as it differentiates itself from
and is likewise differentiated within itself. The bad infinite of the indefinite
prolongation of the separation of thought from itself, in the bare repetition of the
isolated particular which never is resolved back into the self-mediating universality of
thought. The two aspects of the mind's apprehension which the reader sees are
together carried over into the domains of propositional judgment and speech, but
remain immanently mediated within the infinite self-movement of thought. Hegel
describes the understanding thinking the bad infinite in the Encyclopedia of Philosophical
Sciences:
"no doubt thought is primarily an exercise of Understanding; only it goes further, and
the notion is not a function of Understanding merely. The action of Understanding
may be in general described as investing its subject-matter with the form of
universality. But this universal is an abstract universal: that is to say, its opposition to
the particular is so rigorously maintained, that it is at the same time also reduced to
the character of a particular again. In this separating and abstracting attitude towards
its objects, Understanding is the reverse of immediate perception and sensation,
which, as such, keep completely to their native sphere of action in the concrete. It is by
referring to this opposition of Understanding to sensation or feeling that we must
explain the frequent attacks made upon thought for being hard and narrow, and for
leading, if consistently developed, to ruinous and pernicious results. The answer to
these charges, in so far as they are warranted by the facts, is that they do not touch
thinking in general, certainly not the thinking of Reason, but only the exercise of
Understanding. It must be added, however, that the merit and rights of the mere
Understanding should unhesitatingly be admitted. And that merit lies in the fact that
apart from Understanding there is no fixity or accuracy in the region of theory or of
practice." - Enc. §80
The paradoxical Absolute of the Dualist interpretation is just such an opposition of
concepts that is falsely united by the insight of the faculty of imagination. No sense or
coherence can be made of contradictory opposites without some mediation. Thus the
Dualist interpretation imagines that contradiction itself may constitutively mediate
between the concepts. However, as contradiction is nothing more than the explosive
nothingness of opposed incompossibilities, the conceptual mediation of contradiction is
mistakenly imagined to be constitutive when it is, in fact, merely regulative. The
division of logic into Kantian and Hegelian infects all thought with disease of finitude.
Thus, the paradoxical Absolute is not so much discovered by an insight from the
standpoint of science, as it is continually posited by the imagination as a Fichtean
regulative postulate of what ought to be to make the contradictory opposite concepts
sensibly cohere. To his credit, Alan honestly concedes the indeterminateness, unreality
and inconceivability of the paradoxical Absolute:
"The absolute that transcends the ordinary – the absolute as such – is for Hegel
indeterminate. It appears at the inception of the Logic designated as pure being. The
thought of pure being actually is never thought. Before we can get to this thought we
find that we have been deflected towards nothing. And if we think that nothing is what
is before us we soon learn that before we can pin this thought down it has already
slipped away. All that we have is the negativity of the slipping. That is the absolute as
such for Hegel. So for Hegel, the absolute in all its glory is an unachievable thought.
That is the lesson of the beginning of the Logic."
We may well wonder how Hegel was able to write so many gothic paragraphs about
the indeterminate "negativity of the slipping" that is "unachievable in thought": just as
nothing may ever be said of anything that is not thought, so may Hegel not have
written so voluminously about an absolute nothing. Alan proposes that there is an
esoteric mode of reading the writings of Hegel, that justifies the Dualist interpretation
by remaining caught in the deception of the concepts exoterically written by Hegel:
"Interpretive readings will often say more than what is evident on the page... You like
every commentator are caught in Hegel's deception... Here we reach the height of
Hegel's deception... We then learn why Hegel cannot simply come at his readers with a
direct presentation of science. It baffles his readers because they are in no position to
alter their natural assumptions about knowledge. Here Hegel briefly really says what
will happen. And no one seems to know what to make of this... Unfortunately, for
Hegel's readers they are only able to view what happens as does consciousness. It is for
this reason that when they first come upon this passage as we all did at one point it
reads as pure nonsense. It makes no sense unless one has been educated to the
standpoint of science... It is a deception that an educated reader will have to unravel."
The defense of the Dualist interpretation from esoteric reading crucially depends upon
the duality of the common intellect of consciousness and the speculative reason of the
unconsciousness. The "natural assumptions about knowledge" of the common intellect
are frustrated by the contradictory antinomies of reason, yet, from the educated
standpoint of science, speculative reason reveals these contradictions to be the absolute
paradox of science. The requirement that one be "educated from the standpoint of
science" betrays the explicit intentions of the The Phenomenology of Spirit to guide the
reader to the standpoint of science, for this requirement makes The Phenomenology of
Spirit altogether hermeneutically dependent upon The Science of Logic and The
Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, even as it is presented as a prolegomena to them.
The consequence is a hermeneutical circle which the reader can neither tentatively enter
into nor successfully resolve; and which recapitulates the same bad infinity of the
closed-circle of Fichtean subjective idealism. On the contrary, Hegel explains the
systematic place and meaning of The Phenomenology of Spirit in the Introduction to The
Science of Logic:
"In the Phenomenology of Mind I have expounded an example of this method in
application to a more concrete object, namely to consciousness. Here we are dealing
with forms of consciousness each of which in realizing itself at the same time resolves
itself, has for its result its own negation — and so passes into a higher form . All that is
necessary to achieve scientific progress — and it is essential to strive to gain this
quite simple insight — is the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is
just as much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a
nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of
its particular content, in other words, that such a negation is not all and every
negation but the negation of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and
consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially contains that
from which it results; which strictly speaking is a tautology, for otherwise it would be
an immediacy, not a result. Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation, it
has content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its predecessor; for it is richer
by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something more,
and is the unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system of Notions as
such has to be formed — and has to complete itself in a purely continuous course in
which nothing extraneous is introduced." - Hegel, The Science of Logic, § 62
A Dualist Psychology
"the choice of 'unconscious' to designate what is enacted by consciousness but is for us
is probably a bad choice of words... Consciousness is aware of the dialectic it brings
into being but interprets it as a failure to know... the common and speculative are
simply two points of view. They both see the same dialectic but interpret it
differently. 'Unconscious' is too weighty a word to employ to get this point across. That
is why I prefer the intentional/inadvertent distinction to describe this situation."
The Dualist interpretation divides Hegelian psychology into two views or two aspects:
intentional conscious common intellect and inadvertenent unconscious speculative
reason. Intentionality is the simple relation of subject to object in consciousness. Thus
the negation of intention, i.e. inadvertency, is just as much the negation of
consciousness, or the unconsciousness. The Dualist interpretation of consciousness
ideally posits its object of dialectic and "brings it into being" but does not know it.
Speculative reason knows the dialectic that the consciousness of common intellect has
created. Both aspects of the mind apprehend the same object, yet speculative reason
knows it more truly than the understanding of common intellect. Were the object truly
united in the "same object" then the Dualist interpretation would be a triad of common
intellect, object, and speculative reason, such that the same object would be seen by
both aspects and mediate between the opposed aspects of mind. Such a dualism of
psychological aspects then conceptually collapses into the Trinitarian interpretation of
moments of consciousness. To avoid this consequence, the Dualist interpretation can
avoid the reduction to the Trinitarian interpretation by absolutizing the duality of mind
in the duality of the paradoxical Absolute.
"Second, I still want to maintain that you reference a synthesizing activity that never
takes place... What I wish to assert is that dialectics frees what appears from that of
which it means to be an appearance. In Hegel's language, it is appearance qua
appearance. As such, we have appearance that can now be viewed in two distinct
ways."
Alan denies the possibility of an ultimate synthesis of opposed concepts, and, in place
of this synthesis, presents the Scotistic doctrine of un-instantiated accidents, or pure
appearances. Appearance qua appearances can mean nothing else than the
appearances which have as the summation of their qualities to be appearances. For
Duns Scotus the phenomenal appearances of a thing, like the unconsecrated Eucharistic
host, can possibly be individuated from their essential ground in the substance of the
thing-in-itself: through God's direct intervention in the Eucharistic sacrifice, the
substance of the host comes to consubstantially locate the body of Jesus Christ
simultaneously remains located in the host and in Heaven (viz. bilocation). Lewis
Caroll satirized the Scotistic doctrine of pure appearances with the lingering appearance
of the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland. Alan seems to believe that this doctrine is
necessary to explain the view of speculative reason of the negativity of paradox,
because the void resulting from an absolute paradox is nothing at all; hence all of the
appearances are appearances of nothing, or appearance qua appearances by themselves.
That is the whole point of a dialectical exposition. It shows how the breakdown of
common thinking/knowledge frees thought from treating what appears as an
instrument or medium for the unimpeded access to what is true. It frees thought from
the singular gaze so that what is in view can be viewed from two distinct points of
view. This is only possible when thought ceases to intend and becomes dialectical.
Alan describes how dialetics "frees thought from the singular gaze... to be viewed from
two distinct points of view" negates the truth of unilinear apprehension to become dual
apprehending, and yet mistakenly holds the Trinitarian interpretation to affirm the an
"unimpeded access to what is true", i.e. the direct realism of things-in-themselves of
sense-certainty. Having progressed through the dialectic of (A.I) Sense-Certainty and
(A.II) Perception, through the Trinitarian interpretation holds, not that the direct
realism of sense-certainty should be re-affirmed, but that both moments should be
synthesized in (A.III) Force and Understanding. The Dualist interpretation, on the
contrary, affirms that the self-contradictoriness of the first and second moments "frees
thought" from direct realism so that "what is in view can be viewed" under the dual
aspects of common intellect and speculative reason. Notice that Alan affirms that the
object of apprehension for both aspects is "in view" even before it "can be viewed" by
the mind, which suggests there to be a real and not merely apparent object of dialectic,
which can only be the paradoxical Absolute. Finally, Alan affirms that thought
becomes dialectical only when it "ceases to intend." Hence, thought under the aspect of
speculative reason is held by him to be non-intentional, opposed to consciousness and
altogether unconsciousness. The psychological dualism of conscious, Ego and non-
conscious non-Ego was presented by the subjective ideas J.G. Fichte. Hegel criticizes
Fichte's dualism of intentional consciousness and inadvertent unconsciousness in the
Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
"ordinary consciousness as the active ego finds this and that, occupies itself, not with
itself, but with other objects and interests, but the necessity that I [intentionally] bring
forth determinations, and which determinations — cause and effect, for example, —
lies beyond my consciousness: I bring them forth instinctively and cannot get behind
my consciousness. But when I philosophize, I make my ordinary consciousness itself
my object, because I make a pure category my consciousness. I know what my ego is
doing, and thus I got behind my ordinary consciousness. Fichte thus defines
Philosophy as the artificial consciousness." - G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of
Philosophy, Pt. 3, Section 3, C.1
The Dualist interpretation reproduces this Fichtean dualism between active intentional
ordinary consciousness and inadvertent non-intentional unconsciousness "behind...
ordinary consciousness." The philosophic striving of ordinary consciousness to get
behind and negate consciousness is, for the dualist interpretation, the emergent
breakdown of ordinary consciousness through dialectical self-contradiction. What is
called speculative reason is the distinct point of view that results from this contradiction
of consciousness and unconsciousness. The contradiction of all thought and all truth is
what becomes known through the Hegelian dialectic as "identity in difference":
"We have Hegel giving a preliminary account of the contradiction inherent to the truth
of a particular form of consciousness. The knowledge actualized then is revealed to
correspond to Hegel's preliminary account. The split inherent to truth becomes the
split revealed in actual knowing as the dialectical identity in difference."
For the Dualist interpretation, truth is the self-contradictory duality of concepts, split
and divided between themselves, self-posited together in formal identity, as an
"identity in difference." For the Trinitarian interpretation, the ostensible contradiction
of the first and second conceptual moments are intentionally incorporated into a third
synthetic concept with greater reality and richer truth. The thesis and the antithesis are,
together with their differences, each incorporated into a common concept and self-
identical truth. For the Dualist interpretation, on the contrary, the difference between
the contradictory conceptual moments remains only as real and true as they have each
been united in a merely formal identity of mutual cycling. Thus, for the Trinitarian
interpretation, difference is subsumed within identity, while, for the Dualist
interpretation, difference subsumes identity. Alan explains that for the Dualist
interpretation "the truth" is that the "contradiction is absolutized" in the "absolute form"
of the identity of contradictory opposites:
"The contradictory two in one that Hegel exposes is actualized as a dialectical knowing
that for us is a speculative identity in difference. The contradiction is actualized as
absolute form. This is the truth."
How can contradiction be absolutized if contradiction is nothing? Contradiction must
be hypostatized in thought; its inherent explosive nothingness must be made something
for thinking. The hypostatization of the contradiction is the motive and mediator of the
Hegelian dialectic which connects mind to the Absolute. The Absolute is opposed by its
contradictory opposite, just as consciousness is opposed and contradicted by
unconsciousness; an absolute non-Ego erected to oppose an absolute Ego in a cycling
duality, an eternal "tarrying with the negative", that may never be resolved to reach any
end. In Plato's Thaetetus Socrates juxtaposes the idealist philosopher 'friends of the
gods' with the materialist philosopher 'titans' and describes how each school of
philosophy battles ceaselessly as though partaking in a never-ending wrestling match:
"... for little by little our advance has brought us without our knowing it, between the
two lines, and unless we can somehow fend them off and slip through, we shall suffer
for it, as in the game they play in the wrestling schools, where the players are caught by
both sides and dragged both ways at once across the line." (181a)
The Trinitarian and Dualist interpretations of the philosophy of Hegel recapitulate the
titanomachy between the idealist 'friends of the gods' and the materialist 'titans', for the
Trinitarian interpretation of the Hegelian system philosophically mediates between the
minds of men and the Absolute, while the Dualist interpretation of the Hegelian system
just as absolutely abolishes the possibility of philosophical mediation, shatters the paths
to Mount Olympus, and leaves only a vacuous chasm between the mind and the
paradoxical absolute. For the Trinitarian interpretation, the Absolute mediates all
differences by a self-identical synthetic concept which simultaneously enriches its truth
and elevates its reality. For the Dualist interpretation, the Absolute is mediated only by
the hypostatized contradiction between the formally united contradictory opposites.
The former interpretation enriches and elevates the concept while the latter
interpretation announces the contradictoriness of the opposed yet formally united
concepts, precludes any vertical ascent from mind to Absolute, and nullifies the truth
and reality of philosophical science.
"what is original for consciousness is the transparent identity of certainty and truth in
actual knowing. What happens is that this actualization elicits an unintended split
that appears as the dialectical cycling that blocks knowledge and indicates a
breakdown of knowing. A transparent identity breaks up into moments that cycle
seemingly to no purpose. What is intended is replaced by this non-intentional seeming
nonsense."
On the Dualist interpretation, the contradictions of the first and second conceptual
moments "elicits an unintended split" viz. their mutual contradiction of the other
moment; a contradiction which simultaneously motivates their mutual cycling and
'blocks' consciousness's intentional knowledge of its object. Yet this split of
consciousness is a separation rather than a reconciliation and consequently is not
sufficient to account for any resolution of the aporia of the mutually opposed
conceptual moments. The Dualist interpretation concludes in the self-satisfaction of this
aporia which it idolizes as the absolute paradox, while the Trinitarian interpretation
progresses the dialectic even further. The mysterious power of insight is to account for
the knowledge of the aporetic paradox that concludes the Dualist interpretation. The
veil of mystery that obfuscates insight is torn asunder once it is recognized to be merely
the Schellingian mental faculty of intellectual intuition. Here Alan responds to the
criticism in (B) the second counter-thesis that the insight of speculative reason is really a
hypostatized negative opposite of consciousness, i.e. the unconsciousness:
"This dialectic which you here call the hypostatized negative opposite of consciousness
[i.e. unconsciousness] is not subsumed in the concept as difference within unity. This
hypostatized negative is the bad infinite that is the endless cycling of ideal
moments. But when properly viewed this very same hypostatized negative is the true
infinite. One appearance; two views. This is the thought that I am challenging you to
think. I contend that it is the thought that most closely accounts for what Hegel actually
presents."
Alan concedes the negative opposition between consciousness and the unconsciousness;
or alternatively between the thesis and the antithesis; to be the "bad infinite that is the
endless cycling of ideal moments", but further contends that this is also the "true
infinite" of the paradoxical Absolute. Hence, is shown to result in both the Dualist
interpretation results in both self-contradiction and a bad infinity of endless ideal
cycling. I had suggested this at the conclusion of (B) the second counter-theses when I
wrote that "I envisage Alan's dialectic to never advance beyond tarrying with the
negative in a bad infinite of negating the positive moment." Alan seeks to escape from
the thorns and bushels of this criticism into the rarefied clouds of speculative reason.
Hegel predicted that such a dialectic that did not escape from the Kantian antinomies of
the understanding would cycle in just such a bad infinite that could never achieve
knowledge of the infinite ideas:
"If no advance is made beyond the abstract negative aspect of dialectic, the result is only
the, familiar one that reason is incapable of knowing the infinite; a strange result for-
since the infinite is the Reasonable it asserts that reason is incapable of knowing
Reasonable” - Hegel Science of Logic, Miller trans. § 68
The bad infinite of the endless ideal cycling of conceptual moments seems to proceed
onward in an infinite series, as though to fulfill reasons purpose, the bad infinity, but in
fact turns reason back upon itself, into its own self-made aporetic enigma which, by this
ceaseless cycling, never escapes from within its own self-enclosed circuit to fulfill the
absolutely unlimited freedom of reason. Alan seeks to justify the speculative
perspective upon the bad infinity of the dualist interpretation by distinguishing
between the two aspects of mind as classical logic that adheres to the Law of Non-
Contradiction and a logic that does not adhere to this prohibition, but rather "seeks
insight" into the truth of the emergent Absolute:
The basic distinction [of common intellect and speculative reason] is between a logic
that adheres to the law of non-contradiction and thus seeks to grasp truths as realities
and one that does not and instead seeks insight into the truth as the emergent absolute
form of idealized moments. Like Kant, all consciousness is able to see are the
antinomies made evident in the dialectic. Hegel looks at the antinomies and sees truth.
These are the two views, the first negative or skeptical and the second positive or
speculative.
For the Dualist interpretation consciousness is limited by the Kantian prohibition of
metaphysical reasoning beyond the contradictory paralogisms of the antinomies, while
speculative reason is, in some way, unlimited and spreads its wings like the Owl
Minerva with Hegel's dialectic far above the crumbling deductions of classical logic.
There is a great chasm between the two aspects of mind which no finite deduction of
classical logic may ever bridge. Yet in its purview the unconsciousness of speculative
reason is able to look the contradictory antinomies in the full negativity of their
paradoxical cycling and see the truth. Moments of mind emerge in dual pairs: "first
negative or skeptical" and second "positive or speculative." Alan then accounts for how
the Dualist interpretation explains how the unconsciousness of speculative reasoning
inadvertently achieves the synthesis:
"The first and second moments are engendered for the first time when they appear as
ideal within the dialectic. The synthesis is not intentional but an inadvertent
achievement of a misguided consciousness attempting to avoid the split in its actual
knowing. As you say, it is what is exposed."
I have previously defined the term intentionality as "the mental representation of an
object, as the mediating relation between subject and object of conscious thought."
Intentionality is an essential property of conscious thought. Hence, all conscious
thought is necessarily intentional thought, and all non-intentional thought is non-
conscious, or unconscious thought. It cannot be objected that the Dualist interpretation
does not describe its own notion of non-intentional speculative reason in this way as the
unconsciousness, for this is precisely the point of the present criticism. The (B) second
counter-thesis criticized your Dualist interpretation for implicitly dividing
consciousness from unconsciousness according to the oft-repeated dualism between the
intentional consciousness of common intellect and the non-intentional insight of
speculative reason. Moreover, the opposition between consciousness and
unconsciousness follows immediately from the standard definition of intentionality as
an essential property of consciousness: the negation of intentional consciousness is just
as much a negation of consciousness as it is the unconsciousness.
"For the common intellect or natural way of viewing things first we need to expose the
error. For the speculative way of viewing things the supposed exposed error is the
truth."
This duality between exposed error as error, and exposed error as truth, can partly be
explained by Alan's insistence that the contrary opposition of the first and second
moments is a repetition of the Kantian antinomies, which he describes as the "the split
in actual knowing" that exposes common intellect to error. On this Dualist
interpretation, each conceptual moment is, like the Kantian antinomies, a valid
deduction of reason, which may be opposed to an equally valid deduction, so that their
individually valid conclusions must mutually contradict one another, in a paralogism of
reason. However, Alan further maintain that Hegel resolves this ostensibly
inconceivable paralogism through an inexplicable "perspective shift" to a "speculative
way of viewing things" in which the very same mutually contradictory paralogism is
revealed as a coherent and cycling paradox. On this account the duality of
consciousness and unconsciousness is itself simply a duality between Kantian and
Hegelian logic of concepts: the first two contrary opposed conceptual moments are
interpreted as mutually paralogistic Kantian deductions, while their speculative
resolution is interpreted as a Hegelian paradox of 'identity-in-difference'. This division
between the Kantian and Hegelian logics is hermeneutically problematic because the
distinction between the first and second moments and their mutual resolution is never
conceptually isolated from previous conceptual moments of the wider philosophical
system. Whereas for Kant all judgments float in relative indifference, for Hegel all
judgments find an absolute place in and through the systematic coherence of the
Absolute idea. The relation of all concepts is intrinsic and essential to the Absolute
Idea. Each of the conceptual moments subsumes within itself, and operates upon the
presupposition of, all of the moments of the preceding stages of being and
consciousness. For example, the first moment of Desire in B. Self-Consciousness
subsumes within itself and operates with the presupposition of the entire preceding
stage of consciousness of A. Consciousness, for there can be no self-conscious desires
without conscious intentionality. Hence, any attempt to isolate and divide the
conceptual moments; as conscious and unconscious or Kantian and Hegelian; is bound
to be exposed as mutually inconsistent caprice when the concepts are cut open and
found to contain all of the preceding conceptual stages; so that the Kantian
consciousness will contain Hegelian unconsciousness just as the Hegelian
unconsciousness contains Kantian consciousness and each is intrinsically the other.
Neither the first and second conceptual moments can be said to be simply Kantian
common intellect nor can their mutual resolution be said to be simply Hegelian
speculative reasoning; for each is intrinsically contained within and identical with the
other; neither is exorcizing the Hegelian speculative reason from the Kantian common
intellect, the unconsciousness from consciousness, any more plausible than the
Cartesian dualism of mind and body, which equally attempted to tear the animating
principle of the whole organism from within its corporeal embodiment. Rather than
any such duality between static Kantian conscious intellect and dynamic Hegelian
unconscious speculative reasoning, every concept must be thoroughly Hegelian,
speculative and syllogistic; both in its infinitesimal intension and in its infinite
extension. The unity of consciousness and speculative reasoning is the only way in
which the concepts may be mutually sublating and absolutely cohering in a system of
philosophy. The system may be conceived as either finite static determinations for
ordinary understanding or as the infinite self-movement of speculative reason, yet the
thought of each remains within and through itself. To affirm the contrary is to produce
a-systematic and unreasoning schisms throughout Hegel's entire system of philosophy.
Alan affirms such an original duality of consciousness and unconsciousness, as the
results of dualisms throughout Hegel's broader system, when he describes the
"contradiction inherent in the truth object":
"What consciousness intends is that knowledge and object are transparently one and
never two in a true knowing. What we have now [in speculative reasoning] is the truth
of knowing as a two in one that is the dialectical identity in difference. This truth
reflects the contradiction inherent to the true object. Thus contradiction may expose
consciousness but it also exposes the truth, the contradiction that correlates with the
dialectic."
On the Dualist interpretation, the intention of the conscious subject to know the
transparent unitary object is deceived in the intention of knowing the object, for "the
truth of knowing" is, not one, but "two in one": what was thought to be one is in fact
two non-identical concepts that are united in self-posited formal identity which Alan
calls "identity in difference." The difference in identity is the mutually contrary
opposition of the conceptual moments that results from the dualisms throughout the
contradictory system that Alan celebrates as the true paradox of speculative reasoning.
The absolute paradox is at once the hightest illumination and bleakest subterfuge of the
Dualist interpretation, for its dualisms and contradictions are the mistaken consequence
of the dogmatic original dualism between consciousness and unconsciousness, and
between the Ego and the non-Ego, that results in a paradox that does not cohere but
remains totally incoherent, self-contradictory and altogether intellectually self-
destructive. The absolutization of contradiction between the Ego and the non-Ego is not
any grand paradox but rather a monstrous suicide of reason in which nothing is
thought but the totally vacuous positing of formal identity.
On Dialectical Logic
Hegel often describes organic concepts through the metaphor of seeds and plants. For
example, Hegel writes: "[T]he great necessity in Philosophy is to possess one living
Idea; the world is a flower which is eternally produced from one grain of seed." The
Trinitarian interpretation of exhaustive dynamism is consonant with this embryonic
metaphor but the Dualist interpretation of merely extrinsic dynamism is not. The
embryo is the synthesis of the gamete cells of spermatozoa of the father and the ova of
the mother, and each of these cells is negated upon their mutual copulation: nucleic
meiosis totally dismembers their very DNA and RNA strands and afterwards
recombines each together. Thus the child is born through the negation and synthesis of
the reality and truth of the parents. Parents are thus present within the child as abstract
concepts of their essential genetic inheritance. However, on the Dualist interpretation
we would be compelled to presume just the opposite: the parents would be presumed
to continue to exist as static miniscule persons within the child, like the pre-formationist
homunculi of 16th-Century alchemy!
The Dualist interpretation seeks to reduce the synthetic moment of the Trinitarian
interpretation into the naive realism of the first moment, so that it may be sublated
during the first moment of the Dualist interpretation. This interpretation may seem
plausible simply because every non-Absolute synthetic moment of a syllogism begets
the first moment of a further opposed syllogism viz. determinatio est negatio. The Dualist
interpretation intends to further demonstrate that this alternation of opposed
determinations progresses neither epistemologically nor ontologically, but cycles in an
eternal and totally empty paradox. For the Dualist interpretation there is indeed
nothing new under the Sun: every synthesis is just as much a thesis as an antithesis and
never moves beyond this mutually negating contradiction. Hence, Alan challenges the
Trinitarian interpretation to explain the very necessity of the contradictory moment of
the dialectic:
"why is this gap exposed and shown to be a contradiction? Why isn't there just a
series of demonstrations of how consciousness is unable to match what is for
consciousness with what is in itself? That is, why does a dialectic appear rather than a
failed comparison between the positive and negative moments. That is, if consciousness
examines itself – makes the comparison itself – then why isn't this failed comparison
what we see in the exposition?"
The gap or negation, that is shown in the progression of the Hegelian dialectic is
necessary to motivate the concepts own self-movement. The concept must move itself
to resolve its own intrinsic contradictions. Because of the self-negation of any finite
determination that was made explicit in Kant's presentation of the antinomies of reason,
no simple series of demonstrations will suffice to describe what is for consciousness and
in the concept. The self-movement of the concept is necessary because consciousness
must come to know; through the full depth, despair and suffering of "tarrying with the
negative"; how each and every positive and negative moments are intrinsically self-
contradictory. It is not enough for the concepts to be compared to one another as a
merely extrinsic finite static objects, for each of the concepts must be related to one
another through the mediation of a third: the finitude of each concept, indicates that,
through this mutual comparison, they are each finite and self-contradictory just as each
contradicts the other. Hegel describes these two problems of the Kantian antinomies in
the Science of Logic:
"True, Kant's expositions in the antinomies of pure reason... do not indeed deserve any
great praise; but the general idea on which he based his expositions and which he
vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the
contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations: primarily, it is
true, with the significance that these determinations are applied by reason to things in
themselves; but their nature is precisely what they are in reason and with reference to
what is intrinsic or in itself. This result, grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else
but the inner negativity of the determinations as their self-moving soul, the principle
of all natural and spiritual life." - Hegel Science of Logic, Miller trans. § 68
The necessity of the contradiction that essentially belongs to thought determinations is
also the inner negativity of the self-moving spirit. Spirit must be self-moving if it is to
develop from within and through itself, rather than from without and through another.
Plato described in the Sophist how the explosive force of negation can generate
movement:
"Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be
disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the
words in the same sense. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the
same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its
participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that
but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same." (Sophist, 256a-b)
The difference between the same in-itself and the same for-others is the negation of sense
of the same as intensive and extensive. Motion is the result of the negation of the
concept that is the same and the not the same, that is negated between two senses,
which when equivocated is this semantic difference united in identity. Both the Dualist
and the Trinitarian interpretations of Hegel's dialectic agree that a contradictory
moment is necessary for the concept to be resolved by its own intrinsic self-movement,
yet each disagree on the nature and consequences of this contradictory moment.
"In effect, we have an organic unity or a unity of dynamic moments. A contradiction
references static moments. So for Hegel what subsists as true only does so as the
moments as ideal do not subsist. The difference of respect folded into Hegel's thought
is between the dynamic and static conception of truth. Both are moments of a
speculative truth. Only if there is a perishing is there a persistence."
The identity-in-difference of the first and second moments is without a doubt organic
and dynamic. Hegel inherits the doctrine of the hylozoism, in which all concepts are
living, from the influence of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. The Trinitarian and Dualist
interpretations diverge both on the nature of this identity-relation and as to the degree
of difference afforded by it: the Trinitarian interpretation holds the dynamism of the
concept to be exhaustively dynamic with no perpetually static parts, while the Dualist
interpretation holds the dynamism of the concepts to be, not intrinsic to the content of
the first and second conceptual moments, but rather the mere cycling mutual
contradiction of independently static determinations. The Dualist interpretation thinks
of the Absolute like a pair of diploid cells, in which the individual organism is divided
within itself into two distinct yet adjacent cells which each possess the full set of nucleic
chromosomes. The nucleic chromosomes signify the essence of the organism, while the
diploids signify its intrinsic division into two essentially self-contained parts. The
Trinitarian interpretation holds that this pair of diploid cells is not essentially self-
contained, but rather is essentially related to the whole dynamic organism. The reason
for absolute dynamism of the concept is that any perpetual static immutability of a
conceptual moment must result in its causal independence in relation to Absolute;
independence is division; division is negation of the infinite becoming of the Absolute;
and this negation entails that both the Absolute and the conceptual moment are
mutually finitized contrary to the unity and absolutivity of the Absolute.
The conceptual moments are also essentially preserved rather than annihilated in the
dynamism of the conceptual synthesis. In an absolute sense the preservation of the
concepts is only abstract, for the previous conceptual moments are intrinsic within the
conceptual synthesis as abstracta of the real concrete concept. The Hegelian doctrine of
the essential preservation of the sublated conceptual moments is a development of John
Duns Scotus's doctrine of formal distinctions: between the distinctions among real
substances and the distinctions among ideal imaginings, there is a third distinction;
midway between reality and ideality; between real substances and their formal
essences. For Scotus allows for substances to have many essences but only one
haecceitas, (the ultimately individuated this-ness of the thing in-itself) and it is this one
haecceitas that ultimately individuates and unites the substance for Scotus, just as it is
the conceptual synthesis that unites the substance for Hegel. For Hegel, abstract
moments of concrete concepts are just like Scotus's formal distinctions of essences from
real substances: one concrete concept has many abstract conceptual moments, just as
one individuated substance has many essences. Thus, just as essences are for Scotus
intrinsic within real substances, abstract conceptual moments are for Hegel intrinsic
within all concrete synthetic concepts. For example, in the Phenomenology of Spirit
(A.I) sense-certainty and (A.II) perception are both abstract conceptual moments
essentially contained within the (A.III) understanding of (A) consciousness, just as (A)
consciousness and (B) self-consciousness are essentially contained within (C) reason.
The Dualist interpretation denies that the conceptual moments are exhaustively
dynamic, and contends, to the contrary, that they are each preserved as mere static
deductions of finite understanding and "common intellect." Each of the deductions is
conceived to be a discrete individual concept that contains a series of propositions and
inferences within itself: the propositions are the matter and the inferential relations are
the forms that together constitute the individual concept. Each of the opposed concepts
essentially contradicts the other in virtue of their contradictory conclusions which
produces the explosive negativity of their mutual cycling. The dynamism of the
concepts in there relation of identity-in-difference is thus a totally extrinsic relation of
their mutual contradiction, rather than an intrinsic differentiation and re-combination in
a thoroughly united synthetic concept. For the Dualist interpretation conceives of the
static concepts as Kantian deductions and dynamic Hegelian concepts. Each concept
extrinsically negates the other as a consequence of their mutually contradictory
conclusions.
"Another way to put this is that this negativity is not what you are calling
the difference within unity. It is not subsumed. It is the difference that
is unity. We do not move beyond difference. We see difference differently."
Alan confirms that the difference of the concept is altogether not subsumed but remains
a difference of opposition of dual of discrete ideal moments. Whatever unity there is
does not really exhaustively negate the opposed moments, for the moments remain
unsubsumed.
"What I propose Hegel means here is what I have been saying all along: the
nothingness of the first object – the dialectical identity in difference of the object's
inherent contradiction – is the truth about this object, a truth that is new and comes to
be posited as the new object for a new form of consciousness. The dialectical downfall is
also a new truth. One experience of consciousness; two points of view on what this
experience means."
The nothingness of the contradiction, inherent to the first object of consciousness among
the mutually contradictory paradoxical cycling of the opposed concepts, is the
purported truth of the Dualist interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic. The one
experience of the paradoxical object gives meaning to the two aspects of the mind. In
the previous counter-thesis (B) I asked:
"How, may we ask, does the negativity of the opposed moments, become coherent in
an identity? Alternatively, we may ask; what is the nature of the identity-relation
between the two opposed moments, and how is this coherent? Recall the contradiction
is traditionally taken to be the universal sign of incoherence, just as identity is
traditionally taken to be absence of difference between two terms. What then could it
mean for the negative opposition of the "movement of the cycles" to become coherent,
i.e. non-contradictory, and identical, i.e. non-different?"
Alan answered:
"We do not judge what consciousness reveals. We just note that whether we focus in
on one moment or the other each exhibits the same dialectic identity in difference. So
in Perception if we begin by taking the thing as what is a being for self or whether we
begin by taking the thing as a being for another what we get in the end are simply two
ways of expressing the same truth: the two mutually implicate. This is the identity
relation when two moments mutually implicate. The identity is the coherence of the
cycling through moments."
Alan distinguishes between intentional judgment and non-intentional noting of the two
aspects of the mind. Both aspects of mind are said to "mutually implicate" one another,
in which to 'implicate' means to be involved in or to be causally related to. Hence, both
aspects of mind are held to be mutually causally related. How are the two opposed
moments causally related to one another? Alan answers that this mutual causation of
implication is the identity relation. However mutual causation supposes some prior
non-identity of the agents of causation; for whatever is no simply self-caused must
cause an effect in what is other-than and non-identical to itself; and the non-identical
agents relate to one another not through identity but only through their mutual effects
upon one another. Alan has repeatedly affirmed that there is never any synthesis of the
two agents of causation, or the two objects of the first and second moment of the
dialectic. Thus there is an identity between the different conceptual objects.
"So the cycle does not become coherent. It is coherent because it cycles."
Alan affirms, as though anticipating this argument from the non-identity of mutually
causing agents, that the cycle of the agents' mutual causation is also an identity-relation
that only becomes coherent for speculative reason, even while it is not coherent for
common intellect. This interpretation is plausibly suggested by Hegel, yet this response
affirms, contrary to dualism, the Trinitarian interpretation in which there is a third
synthetic moment of identity that is itself irreducible to duality of the former two
conceptual moments: if the first and second objects of the Hegelian dialectic are
thoroughly united in some further identity, then this self-same identity of the former
two objects can be nothing other than the third synthetic conceptual moment of the
Trinitarian interpretation. The Trinitarian interpretation accounts for the former two
conceptual moments as essentially preserved abstract moments of the concrete synthetic
concept. The Dualist interpretation cannot simply account for both the real identity of
the former two conceptual objects without also simultaneously denying their non-
identity? Two cannot be one any more than one can be two, without a contradiction. If
Alan both denies and affirms the identity of the two objects then he commits a
contradiction, but if Alan chooses to affirm the real identity of the two objects then he
must also affirm the third synthetic moment of the Trinitarian interpretation. With the
former option the Dualist interpretation violates the law of non-contradiction and is
totally incomprehensible to our common understanding, while with the latter option
the Dualist interpretation is subsumed within the Trinitarian interpretation, which may
without contradiction explain both concrete identity and abstract non-identity among
concepts. Hegel describes this same problem of identity and dualism for Fichte's self-
positing Ego:
"The first proposition [of the self-identical Ego] must be simple, in it predicate and
subject must be alike; for were they unlike, their connection — since in accordance with
their diversity the determinations are not directly one — would have to be first of all
proved by means of a third. The first principle must thus be identical." - G.W.F. Hegel,
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Pt. 3, Section 3, C.1
Unless the mind is a simple self-identical proposition, i.e. Ego = Ego, then it is unlike,
not alike, and non-identical. If the mind is a non-identical duality then, lest it cascade
into schizophrenic duality, it requires some third principle to unite the non-identical
principles. The Platonic principle of the One over Many applies in this way to the old
Platonic problem of the Third Man: any set of many things that are alike in any way
must, to be alike have a principle that is common to all things; just as for any duality
between the individual man and the idea of man there must be an idea of a 'third man'
that mediates between them. This principle and this problem of Platonism were first
systematically addressed by the Neo-Platonic philosophy of Proclus, who influenced
Hegel through the medieval mysticism of Ekhart and Boehme. The principle of One
over Many is applied to the problem of the Third Man, by the doctrine of intrinsic
relations of all terms, and by the essential relatedness of all things in A.III
Understanding. Hegel holds that all thought and existence are syllogistic and
Trinitarian: just as the syllogism has a subject, a predicate, and a mediating copula; and
the Trinity has the three persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit; so does Hegel's dialectic
have a thesis, an antithesis and a synthesis. Upon this principle of the Trinitarian
dialectic are all dualities resolved into an absolutely synthetic and systematic unity.
Benedeco Croce writes this about opposed dualisms in the first chapter of What is Living
and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel?:
"Opposition gives rise to deep fissures in the bosom of the philosophic universal and
of each of its particular forms, and to irreconcilable dualisms. Instead of finding the
concrete universal, the organic whole of reality which it seeks, thought seems
everywhere to run against two universals, opposing and menacing each other. In this
way, the fulfilment of philosophy is impeded; and since an activity which cannot attain
to its fulfilment, thereby shows that it has imposed an absurd task on itself, philosophy
itself, the whole of philosophy, is menaced with failure. "
Hegel describes the Fichtean dualisms between the Ego and the non-Ego for which
there is no "third thought" to synthesize the duality of the Ego and its opposite:
"This Notion [being as such], which is immediately actuality, and this actuality which is
immediately its [Ego's] Notion, and that indeed in such a way that there neither is a
third thought above this unity [of Ego and non-Ego], nor is it an immediate unity
which does not possess difference, separation, within it, is the ego; it is the self-
distinction of opposites within itself. That whereby it distinguishes itself from the
simplicity of thought, and distinguishes this other, is likewise immediately for it; it is
identical with, or not distinguished from it." -ibid.
For Fichte, as for the Dualist interpretation, the distinction of opposites within the self is
not resolved in any further conceptual synthesis but is merely reaffirmed in the
immediate individual thought that retains the non-identity of contradictory concepts in
the appearance of self-posited conceptual unity. Any dualist interpretation must thus
affirm the former lemma which concedes that the Dualist interpretation is, at least for
the understanding of the common intellect, self-contradictory, and deny the latter
lemma in which the Dualist interpretation is subsumed within the Trinitarian
interpretation, by contending that, even in spite of self-contradiction, only speculative
reason may have "insight" into the paradoxical Absolute. Alan intends to flee from the
wreckage of the understanding into the salvific insight of self-contradictory speculative
reason. The (C) third counter-thesis argues, that, even if Alan affirms that the Dualist
interpretation escapes the self-contradiction of identity and non-identity by contending
that the paradoxical Absolute is known through the intellectual intuition of "insight",
then the Dualist interpretation will nonetheless suffer from Hegel's criticism of
Schelling's identity-philosophy, in which the identity of non-identical concepts is an
empty, non-conceptual, and unintelligible relation between concepts; nothing other
than an immediate imagined self-posited identity-form among non-identical concepts -
the night in which all cows are black.
On the Nature of Contradiction
A small mistake at the beginning is a big mistake at the end. All of the dualisms of the
Dualist interpretation originate from a mistaken univocal understanding of
contradiction, in which contradiction is thought of as negating its object in just the same
way without regard to the specificity of its object. Only that which in some sense exists
may be spoken of with the same, i.e. univocal, reference, for reference directs thought to
that which exists and never to that which does not exist. Hence, if the notion of
contradiction is univocalized then this notion must in some sense exist. Aristotle and
Plato held negation to crucially depend upon the prior positivity of the object that is
negated. The nature of the objects confer to negation this specific sense in which it
negates its object. Negation is not a self-subsistent separate Platonic form which self-
exemplifies as negation negating itself, but rather only exists insofar as it negates what
already exists. This is the asymmetry of being and non-being, positing and negating
that the Eleatic Stranger elaborates in Plato's Sophist. As negation negates according to
its object, and the sense in which all objects are spoken of differs according to the nature
of the object, so must the sense in which negation is said to negate differ according to
the object which is negated. Hence, this understanding of negation and contradiction is
multivocal because it holds these to be used in many different ways according to the
nature of whatever is negated. For example, the negation of a proposition (e.g. ¬ P)
differs from the negation of a numeral (e.g. -1) just as propositions differ from
numerals.
Contrary to this, the Dualist interpretation understands contradiction to negate all
objects in a manner that is univocal and indifferent to the content of the object negated.
Contradiction is conceived of as subsisting in-itself prior to whatever it contradicts.
This conception of contradiction may only be possible on the assumption that negation
and contradiction have some existence which is altogether prior and independent to
what is contradicted and negated. Contradiction is a form of the mutual
incompossibility of propositions. According to Aristotle's Prior Analytics, contradiction
only explodes the mutual possibility of opposed propositions (e.g. All cows are black
[i.e. All S is P] and no cows are black [i.e. No S is P]). The philosopher writes: “It is
impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same