Ruth Bader Ginsburg versus Gender Discrimination

Stephen Quinn

LA 230 Sec 700

Research Paper

July 3, 2015

Ruth Bader Ginsburg versus Gender Discrimination

“Neither the Founding Fathers nor the Reconstruction Congress had

questioned two fundamental assumptions. The first, that a woman’s place

in the world was controlled by men and was divinely ordained… the

second assumption was that the law’s different treatment of a woman

operated benignly in her favor”.1

U.S. Presidents who were willing to formulate the idea of a

woman seated on the Supreme Court bench goes back to at least

President Gerald Ford, who was encouraged to do so by his wife.2

President Jimmy Carter, who followed after President Ford, said

publically that he wanted to place the first woman on the Supreme

Court, but a chance did not avail itself during his short four

year term. President Ronald Regan then promised to place the

1 Amy Leigh Campbell. Page 167. See Works Cited page. 2 Ford’s predecessor, Nixon, didn’t want a woman on the Supreme Court

bench. Although he had two possible female nominees, he worked against them behind the scenes (HBO Documentary Films: Nixon. From 14 minute mark to 20 minute mark. YouTube. June 20. Click on link).

first woman on the Supreme Court during his 1980 presidential

campaign (Gutgold 45; Oyez; Weisman).

Delivering on his promise, on July 7, 1981, President Reagan

announced the 51 year old Sandra Day O’Connor as his nominee to

replace Justice Potter Stewart. At the time, she was a judge on

the State of Arizona Appeals Court (Gutgold 45; Oyez; Weisman).

Ironically, she had experienced excruciating gender

discrimination just after completing law school in 1952. Law

firm after law firm unashamedly told her they did not hire women,

first in California and later in 1957 Arizona, for a total of at

least 40 firms in California, even though she was ranked high in

her class of 102 and obtained membership in the Order of the

Coif. Consequently, after law school, Sandra O’Connor ultimately

chose the public service sector; first in California, then in

Arizona (Gross; Oyez; Weisman). After sweeping her Senate

confirmation at 99 – 0, she officially began her Supreme Court

tenure on September 25, 1981.

Twelve years later, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined

Justice O’Connor as the second woman on the Supreme Court on

August 10, 1993 as a President Jefferson Clinton appointee; she

was confirmed by the Senate 96 – 3 (Gutgold 45-47). She began her

law career by attending Harvard Law School for two years from

1956 until 1958 and finishing her third year at Columbia Law

School (Ginsburg “Changing” 303-304). She earned a position on

the Harvard Law Review while at Harvard and then the Columbia Law

Review while at Columbia, which was an exceptional achievement at

the time by itself, but even more so due to social beliefs about

women (Ginsburg “Changing” 306; Leve 6-7; Lewis; Toobin).

For instance, September 1950 was the first time that Harvard

Law School permitted female admissions, and that since its

founding in 1817 (Ginsburg “Remarks”12; Kay 7). Likewise, it was

not until 1972 that Elisabeth A. Owens became the first female

faculty law professor at Harvard (Kay 5). Also, a female justice

on any federal bench was unheard of prior to 1950, except for

Florence Allen who was appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1934

to the Sixth Circuit Court. Before 1950, she was the only

“female life-tenured federal judge” in United States history

(Ginsburg “Remarks”12). Consequently in 1956, Ginsburg joined a

class of over 500 Harvard Law students that included only nine

females including her. In contrast, by the late 1970’s there were

over 100 women; in 1997, that number of women at least doubled

(Ginsburg “Remarks” 13, Kay 7). Furthermore, five years after

Justice Ginsburg’s appointment to the Supreme Court she described

other cultural barriers that surrounded her while a student at

Harvard Law School, which she recounted in a speech she gave at

Harvard on November 14, 1998:

When I attended Harvard Law School, there was no space in the

dormitories for women; women were not admitted to faculty club dining

tables; one could invite one’s father, but not one’s wife or mother, to the

Law Review banquet; the old periodical room at Lamont Library was

closed to women; law rooms could use the school’s placement facilities

though they would engage no women; and Harvard Business School

enrolled only men. Textbooks imparted such wisdom as ‘land, like woman,

was meant to be possessed.’ Statutes in many states proclaimed: ‘The

husband is head of the family. He may choose any reasonable place or

mode of living and the wife must conform thereto.’ Only one woman,

Florence Ellinwood Allen, had ever served on an Article III appellate bench.

[Finally,] three percent of Harvard’s law students were women”

(Ginsburg “Changing” 307).

Regardless, she received her law degree from Columbia in

1959. However, as with Justice O’Connor in her day, Justice

Ginsburg was not offered employment by any private law firm

(Ginsburg “Remarks” 14; Leve 2, 7; Toobin). This included the

firms at which she interned as a student (Leve 2, 7).

Accordingly, even with her remarkable qualifications, Ginsburg

entered the fray to practice law in a cultural atmosphere where

hardly any federal judges, “and certainly no Supreme Court

Justices, were willing to hire female clerks” (Campbell 161).

Consequently, in 1960, Supreme Court Justice Felix

Frankfurter declined to hire Ginsburg for a clerkship, although

two important Harvard Law professors had recommended her. Perhaps

surprisingly, although Justice Frankfurter thought “the candidate

was impressive, he just wasn't ready to hire a woman and so

[didn’t] offer [her] a job” 3 (Campbell 161; Leve p.8 footnotes;

qtd here from Lewis). However around this time, one of her

favorite law professors, Gerald Gunther, interceded. He reassured

and then cajoled “a federal judge in Manhattan, Edward Palmieri,3 Interestingly, a law clerk position on the Supreme Court can change

the course of a young lawyer’s career. For example, in 2006 when Supreme Courtclerks finished their one year commitment, “the clerks [were] considered such a catch that law firms [were] paying each one… a signing bonus of $200,000” (Greenhouse).

to hire [her]”; along with certain guarantees, it worked

(Campbell 162; Kay 9; Leve 7; qtd from Toobin).

Remarkably, after her scrutinized stellar performance for

Judge Palmieri, a few private firms began to offer her

employment; meanwhile, Justice Palmieri was so taken by

Ginsburg’s performance that he hired another female clerk the

next year. Nonetheless, Ginsburg hitched her wagon to academia

and travelled along that path (Campbell 162). However, there was

still no indication that she would lead, what could be called, a

cultural revolution.

While a Law professor at Rutgers University who was

eventually tenured, between 1963 and 1972 Ginsburg began to focus

attention on women’s rights and gender discrimination issues

(Ginsburg “Remarks” 15-17; Leve 8; Ogilvy 2-4; Toobin). For

instance, in 1970, years after the 1963 Equal Pay Act, she was

part of a “large” class action lawsuit encouraging Rutgers “to

enforce the law”, resulting in “an enormous [salary] increase”

for female faculty members (qtd here from Ginsburg “Remarks” 15;

Kay 13). Additionally, in the late 1960’s she began a Women’s

Rights seminar and clinic. This was based on her partnership with

the New Jersey ACLU4 pertaining to arbitrary discrimination cases

such as New Jersey schoolteachers compelled to go on unpaid

maternity leave as soon as they began to show5, meaning their

position might no longer be available, and blue collar women who

desired health insurance for their families but was unavailable

except for only themselves (Ginsburg “Remarks” 16; Leve 8, 9;

Ogilvy 2; Von Drehle).

At the time, “around 1970”, Ginsburg was teaching Civil

Procedure “and therefore knew something about how courts operate”

(Ginsburg “Remarks” 16). So the New Jersey ACLU thought she was

the logical partnership choice to help litigate its cases. At the

same time, there were students imploring her to teach a course on

‘Women and the Law’. The resultant seminar “centered on cases in

which Ginsburg was involved” (Ginsburg “Life”; Ginsburg “Remarks”

16; Leve 8, 9; Ogilvy 3).

In the clinic, students fulfilled the associate’s role for

Ginsburg “on whatever cases she was handling at that time” (Leve

9; Ogilvy 1, 3). Then she met Sally Reed when the national ACLU4 Ginsburg partnered with the New Jersey ACLU and then the National ACLU

between 1967 and 1980 (Campbell 158). 5 Apparently this was a common practice in other states as well. See:

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Also, this case is overviewed at the Oyez Project; just click on the link.

approached Ginsburg with a case that had just reached the Supreme

Court, i.e., Reed v. Reed 6 (Campbell 162, 169; Ginsburg “Remarks”

17). Thus began a journey, even a quest, in which the then

Professor Ginsburg led a campaign that sought gender

discrimination reform through legal action (Gutgold 51-53; Von

Drehle).

One avenue she travelled during her journey’s early stages:

Ginsburg offered a course entitled “Women’s Rights: Sex

Discrimination and the Law”, which she taught at Rutgers in 1970-

1971, Harvard Law School in 1971-1972, and Columbia University in

1972-1980 (Kay 13, 15). Also at Rutgers, the Reed v. Reed legal

brief was co-authored by Professor Ginsburg as well as the

national ACLU Legal Director7, and law students from Yale, New

York University, and Rutgers (Campbell 169; Ginsburg “Remarks”

17; Kay 12; Ogilvy 4). In Reed v. Reed, the issue was an Idaho

statutory preference, which compelled choosing men over women as

estate executors, when the female and male were in the same

entitlement class for dispensing an estate. Hence while working

6 See Reed v Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Also see overview at the Oyez Project.

7 Melvin L. Wulf was the Legal Director of ACLU's National Office, who visited Ginsburg at Rutgers and approached her with Reed v. Reed.

on Sally Reed’s brief, Professor Ginsburg and one student

assembled “an appendix of statutes” that afforded women special

treatment; it was an organized sampling of the widespread

discriminatory laws tarnishing “the statute books of the U.S. and

all 50 states…a true sign of the time” (qtd from Ginsburg

“Remarks” 17; referenced in Ogilvy 4 ). Likewise, Reed v. Reed

was an equal protection case. The Court held that the Idaho

probate law arbitrarily stipulating disparate treatment between

men and women in this context, with no perceived rational

objective related to the statute, was unconstitutional; the

justices based their decision on the Equal Protection Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also noted that such

treatment for administrative convenience, and they were specific,

was unacceptable8.

Another case begun at Rutgers, which reached the Supreme

Court in 1975, was Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld9. However, most of

work in this case transferred with Professor Ginsburg when she

accepted a position as the first tenured female law professor at

8 See Reed v Reed 404 U.S. 71 (1971) overview at the Oyez Project9 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Also see, Justia. Full

text of Syllabus and Case.

Columbia University in 1972; and thus achieving quite a milestone

because Columbia was founded in 1857 (Ogilvy 4-5; Kay 5, 14).

Additionally, she continued her law clinic and affiliation with

the national ACLU (Ogilvy 4-5). Hence, this case became within

the purview of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project. Professor

Ginsburg was hired to found and direct this project by the ACLU

during spring 1972 due to her successful collaboration with ACLU

staff during Reed v. Reed (Campbell 165).

Ginsburg’s team at the Women’s Rights Project, comprised of

the aforementioned and others, had “a definite strategy” (Ogilvy

7). First, based on the Reed case her team adopted the policy of

accepting only distinct winners for cases. This was determined by

situations surrounding real people that were very moving.

Likewise, Stephen Wiesenfeld’s circumstances became a definitive

example, which would then be easily understood by the justices

(Ogilvy 7). Accordingly, Stephen Wiesenfeld was a widower whose

wife died during childbirth. He sought benefits from Social

Security derived from his deceased wife’s earnings to help raise

his child (Ogilvy 6). Social Security ruled that benefits were

for widows and children; widowers did not qualify. He called the

New Jersey ACLU; they accepted the case (Ogilvy 6-7).

Next, like the above Wiesenfeld case, a number of cases used

male plaintiffs. This showed that Women’s Rights is not an effort

that should be confined only to women; however, the real issue

“was the equal stature of men and women before the law” (Ogilvy

8). Additionally, unsupportive elements could detrimentally use

the belief that this was an all-female process. So the overall

strategy here was to use both male and female plaintiffs with

cases that had very strong facts. In this way, the courts would

likely rule in the team’s favor. Consequently, the ultimate goal

was to demonstrate that capricious disparities in the laws

founded on gender injured everybody, whether man, woman or child.

This was to be accomplished by moving forward case by case.

However, in each case-brief or amicus brief submitted to the

Court she would provide ample rationale for choosing strict

scrutiny, thereby showing that gender bias severely impacted a

group and society on par with racial and national origin bias.

Hence, she employed an ingenuous strategy that was very similar

Justice Thurgood Marshall’s legal strategy during the Civil

Rights Movement (Ogilvy 8, 10).

Furthermore, the team, or Women’s Right Project, engaged in

a “kind of three-pronged effort, because nobody gets very far

just by arguing cases in court” (Ogilvy 9). First, they realized

a very large number of people were ready for the changes being

presented, i.e., public opinion (Gutgold 51; Klarman 252-257;

paraphrase from Ogilvy 9). Second, the team attempted legislative

change, which sometimes worked when Congress responded to public

opinion. Also, statutory differentiation based on gender

throughout the U.S. Code on a computer printout provided by the

Department of Defense was analyzed, and recommendations were

formalized as a report for U.S. Civil Rights Commission (Ogilvy

9).

To see how this works: the first two prongs were reflected

in federal legislation that passed in Congress “offering relief

from discriminatory employment practices”; also, signed

Presidential Executive Orders directed the elimination of

“discrimination against women in federal positions” during the

1960’s and, at least, the early 1970’s (Campbell 166).

Furthermore, several instances can be noted: the Equal Pay Act of

1963, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and

the “amended Title VI to include [gender] discrimination as a

trigger for the denial of federal funds to public or private

programs and activities” (Campbell 166 footnotes).

However, Ginsburg was concerned that the above legislation,

as well as forthcoming legislation, would not cover all the

bases. For example, the legislation up to that point did not

regulate many types of private employers. Furthermore, “areas

outside the workplace were not affected by governmental measures”

(Campbell 166). So, the third prong of her strategy was

overturning gender discrimination through the courts (Campbell

166). In particular, the Women’s Rights Project was maintaining

at least part of its focus on cases most likely to go to the

Supreme Court.

Hence when statutory issues were not changed by the

legislature, the team petitioned these issues to the Courts

(Ogilvy 9). Overall, Ginsburg’s team intended to induce change in

the Supreme Court’s perspective about the true significance of

gender discrimination, by showing the necessity to elevate the

customary level of review that the Justices had consistently

applied to gender discrimination cases over the previous 100 or

so years. In every instance, the team asked for “strict

scrutiny”; or “suspect classification” but at the same time, they

introduced to the Court Justices a “fallback position” (Campbell

162; Gutgold 51-53; Lewis; qtd from Ogilvy 9-10; Von Drehle).

For example, in Reed “the most immediate impact of the

ruling was the Court’s decision to include the brief’s language

of ‘substantial [relation]’ in its unanimous opinion” (Campbell

177-180). This then slightly elevated the judicial review of

gender biased statutes above the “rationally related” tier that

the Court had applied over the previous century, for which almost

any rationale that served any state or U.S. interest was

accepted. But also, in Reed v. Reed, the Court found that the

legalized objective, meaning gender bias in this case, was not

rationally related to the statute; therefore the court must then

measure as compared to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause, which it did10 (Campbell 177-180).

10 The statue in question “provides that different treatment be accordedto the applicants on the basis of their sex; it thus establishes a

So, the wave of public opinion and federal legislation

buttressed Ginsburg’s arguments as she sought redress for women’s

inequality in the case-briefs, amicus briefs, and oral arguments

that were to come. Likewise, it is logical to think the 1971-1980

Supreme Court majorities would be obliged to shift in the same

direction as the society which surrounded them, but only

according to their own sensibilities in the form of judicial

restraint.

In fact, a plausible factor involved in the Reed Court’s

decision was the principle of “judicial restraint” (Campbell

177). In other words, judicial restraint constrained the Court’s

decision to a small incremental change in review standards;

abruptly applying the highest review standard to centuries’ old

beliefs that defined gender roles was too radical. Interestingly,

“judicial restraint” was and is in agreement with Ginsburg’s

litigation and Court decisions philosophy11.

classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause” (Reed v.Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971) Page 404 U. S. 75 Notice that it is hyperlinked) Hence, the court elevated the level of review for statutory gender discrimination beyond requiring only a rational relationship to the statute.

11 Ginsburg once stated: “Roe v. Wade sparked public opposition and academic criticism, in part, I believe, because the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete justification for its action…The political process was moving in the early 1970s… [and] majoritarianinstitutions were listening and acting. Heavy handed judicial intervention was

Another plausible factor in the Reed Court decision to

decline “strict scrutiny” is the nine justices’ watchful eyes on

the pending Equal Rights Amendment, or ERA, which had been

presented to Congress. After the tumult caused by the Supreme

Court’s previous Civil Rights decisions, which could

retrospectively be construed as activist, Ginsburg contemplated

that the Court was “reluctant to take the lead in another social

reform”, and instead the Court looked to the ERA’s passage as the

more palatable path (Campbell 177).

However, this same issue seemed to hamstring the Court in

its 1973 majority opinion of 8 to 1 for Frontiero, in Frontiero

v. Richardson12. In this instance, women and men in the service

who claimed dependents were treated differently as per federal

statutes. Lt. Sharon Frontiero challenged these statutes, and the

court decided in her favor. Also, by this time the ERA had passed

through both houses of Congress and was swiftly wending its way

through the states for ratification. In relation to this, the

majority opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson was just one vote shy

difficult to justify and appears to have provoked, not resolved, the conflict”(qtd. in Reske and Goldberg 21).

12 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Justia. Full text of the Court’s decision is here.

of the five needed to classify statutory gender discrimination as

a “suspect category” that required “strict scrutiny” (Campbell

192-193). However, four of the eight justices did indeed include

“strict scrutiny” in their opinion (Campbell 192-193; Ginsburg

“Sexual”165). This at least showed that attitudes toward

widespread statutory gender discrimination were changing.

Likewise, in between the Reed case and the Frontiero case,

the Court was academically assessed in 1972 with “mounting

discontent” toward the “rigid two-tier formulations of the equal

protection [principle]” employed by the previous Warren Court.13

This same analysis concluded, there also existed within the then

current Supreme Court an unexpected preparedness “to use the

[equal protection] clause as an interventionist tool” rather than

applying “the strict scrutiny language of…the equal protection

[principle]” (Campbell 179). Also, it is from this analysis the

concept of intermediate scrutiny emerged. Hence, Ginsburg then

realized that for her tactics to succeed, she had to count on the

13 “Since Ginsburg’s days at Harvard, Gerald Gunther had been an influential person in her career…in 1972, Gunther published [an examination of] the evolution of equal protection, [an] analysis that proved inspirationalto Ginsburg’s [formulation] of the concept of intermediate scrutiny” (Campbell179-180).

Burger Court’s changed attitude becoming stronger with each

successive hearing before the Court (Campbell 180).

Hence, in 1976 in Craig v. Boren the Court directly

described the existence of an intermediate scrutiny The Court

“openly acknowledged that gender-based classification attracted

an elevated equal protection review standard, a standard more

exacting than lower tier ‘rational basis’, albeit less rigorous

than upper tier ‘strict scrutiny"” (Ginsburg “Sexual” 168).

Scholars refer to this new level as ‘heightened scrutiny’.

In this Craig v. Boren case brought before the Court, the

contention surrounded an Oklahoma statute that stated eighteen

year old females could purchase 3.2% beer, but for males it was

different; they had to wait until they were 21 to purchase 3.2%

beer. Based on prior cases before the Court, including Reed v

Reed, this was decided through the lens of the equal protection

principle. To wit: the majority opinion for the Court stated, “To

withstand constitutional challenge… classifications by gender

must serve important governmental objectives and must be

substantially related to achievement of those objectives”

(Ginsburg “Sexual” 168).

Indeed by this time, after the Reed case, six other gender

discrimination cases were heard before the Court, somehow

maintaining an overall review standard that was more stringent

than ‘rational relation’, but less stringent than ‘strict

scrutiny’ (Ginsburg “Sexual” 165-166). Also, although there has

been variation in the wording, a ‘heightened scrutiny’ has been

applied to the gender-bias class of statutes until the present

day.

As can be seen, the now Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had

journeyed on a road that few people get to traverse, or even

would traverse had they opportunity. She not only lived through

profound shifts in our society – going from the compliant and

discriminatory 1950’s, to living through the perhaps radical

1960’s, and living through an era of social change up to the last

year of the 1970’s – but she was also the nexus for the profound

shift leading to gender discrimination’s statutory demise,

benefiting both men and women. During these periods she was a law

student and burgeoning law professional who had to accept second

class status as a female; a woman Professor who was in the vast

minority when she began to teach; and a lioness who strongly

advocated for equal civil liberties through the courts14. Perhaps

her calling is best summed as a Supreme Court Justice in 1996,

when she wrote the opinion for United States v. Virginia15. After

making “heightened scrutiny” the crowning achievement in applying

equal protection laws during the 1970’s, in 1996 she in essence

wrote: “exceedingly persuasive justification”, which must be

presented by the state, is the new norm for intermediate

scrutiny. Hence, within her lifetime she raised the bar and

inverted accountability for judicial review from ‘rationally

related’ with the onus on the defendant, to ‘exceedingly

persuasive justification’ with the onus on the government.

14 “ [Ginsburg] shared a philosophy with the ACLU concerning the integral link between civil rights and civil liberties…sexual equality would be most effectively realized by systematic litigation in the courts that redressed discrimination against women “ (Campbell 166-167)

15United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).

Works CitedCampbell, Amy Leigh. "Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and

the ACLU Women's Rights Project." Tex. J. Women & L. 11 (2001):

157. ACLU.org. Web 25 June 2015.

Ginsburg, Ruth Bader (Speech). "The Changing Complexion of

Harvard Law School". Harvard Women's Law Journal 27 (2004): 303.

PDF text. Harvard.edu. Web 21 June 2015.

Ginsburg, Ruth Bader (Speech). “Life in the Federal Judiciary”

including “How the Tenth Circuit Got My Wife Her Good Job”.

Colorado Springs: 2010 Tenth Circuit Bench and Bar Conference. Video.

27 Aug. 2010. C-Span.org. Web. 24 June 2015. Note: See first 16

min.

Ginsburg, Ruth Bade (Speech). "Remarks on Women's Progress in the

Legal Profession in the United States." Tulsa Law Review

(1997). 33 1 PDF text. Tulsa.edu. Web. 28 June 2015.

Ginsburg, Ruth Bader. "Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to

Repair Unconstitutional Legislation." Clev. St. L. Rev. 28 (1979):

301. PDF text. Web. 29 June 2015.

Ginsburg, Ruth Bader (Lecture). "Sexual Equality under the

Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments." Wash. ULQ (1979):

161. PDF text. Web. 30 June 2015.

Greenhouse, Linda. “Women Suddenly Scarce Among Justices’

Clerks.” New York Times. 30 Aug 2006. NYtimes.com. Web. 22

June 2015.

Gross, Terry. “Out Of Order' At The Court: O'Connor On Being The

First Female Justice”. Fresh Air. 5 Mar. 2013. MP3 recording.

NPR.org. Web. 21 June 2015.

Gutgold, Nichola D. “Ruth Bader Ginsburg.” Chapter 3. The Rhetoric

of Supreme Court Women: From Obstacles to Options. Plymouth, UK:

Lexington Books, 2012. Google Books.com. Web. 19 June 2015.

Kay, Herma Hill. "Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law."

Columbia Law Review (2004): 1-20. Berkley.edu Web. 27 June

2015.

Klarman, Michael J. "Social Reform Litigation and Its Challenges:

An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg." Harv. JL &

Gender 32 (2009): 251. Law. harvard. edu. Web. 30 June

2015.

Leve, Karen Ellen. "Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 20 Years of

Supreme Court Jurisprudence." Law School Student Scholarship.

(Paper 513) 2014 May 1. Seton Hall University.

Scholarship.shu.edu. Web. 22 June 2015.

Lewis, Neil A. “The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as

a Clerk, Chosen as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg”.

New York Times. 16 June 1993. NYtimes.com. Web. 21 June 2015.

Ogilvy, Sandy (Interviewer). “Transcription of the Clinical Legal

Education Oral History Interview with Associate Justice Ruth

Bader Ginsburg”. 17 Aug. 2007. National Archive of Clinical

Legal Education. Kathryn J. DuFour Law Library, Columbus

School of Law, Catholic University of America. Cua.edu. Web. 24 June

2015.

Oyez Project. “Sandra Day O'Connor”. Chicago-Kent College of Law.

Oyez.org. Web. 21 June 2015.

Reske, Henry J., and Stephanie B. Goldberg. "Two Paths for

Ginsburg: The trailblazing women's rights litigator became a

moderate judge." ABA Journal (1993): 16-21. Google Books. Web.

1 July 2015.

Toobin, Jeffery. “Heavyweight: How Ruth Bader Ginsburg has moved

the Supreme Court”. 11 March 2013. The New Yorker.

NewYorker.com. Web. 21 June 2015.

Totenberg, Nina (Panel facilitator). "Reed v. Reed at 40: Equal

Protection and Women's Rights," Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the

Law: 20 (2), Article 1. (2011). Wcl.american.edu. Web 24

June 2015.

Weisman, Steven R. “Reagan Nominating Woman, an Arizona Appeals

Judge, to Serve on Supreme Court”. New York Times 7 Jul. 1981.

NYtimes.com. Web. 19 June 2015.

Von Drehle, David. “Redefining Fair with A Simple Careful

Assault”. 19 July 1993. Washington Post. WashingtonPost.com.

Web. 25 June 2015.