Russo-Japanese WarThis article is about the war between the
RussianEmpire andthe Empire of Japan. For the conictbetween the
Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s, seeSovietJapanese border
conicts. For the war in 1945,see SovietJapanese War (1945).The
Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 5September 1905) was fought
between the Russian Em-pire and the Empire of Japan over rival
imperial ambi-tions in Manchuria and Korea. The major theatres
ofoperations were the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden inSouthern
Manchuria, and the seas around Korea, Japan,and the Yellow
Sea.Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacic Ocean fortheir
navy and for maritime trade. Vladivostok was op-erational only
during the summer, whereas Port Arthur,a naval base in Liaodong
Province leased to Russia byChina, was operational all year. Since
the end of the FirstSino-Japanese War in 1895, negotiations between
Russiaand Japan had proved impractical. Russia had demon-strated an
expansionist policy in Manchuria dating to thereign of Ivan the
Terrible in the 16th century.[4] Throughthreat of Russian
expansion, Japan oered to recognizeRussian dominance in Manchuria
in exchange for recog-nition of Korea as within the Japanese sphere
of inu-ence. Russia refused and demanded Korea north of the39th
parallel to be a neutral buer zone between Russiaand Japan. The
Japanese government perceived a Russianthreat to its strategic
interests and chose to go to war. Af-ter negotiations broke down in
1904, the Japanese Navyopened hostilities by attacking the Russian
Eastern Fleetat Port Arthur in a surprise
attack.Russiasuerednumerous defeats toJapan, but
TsarNicholasIIwasconvincedthatRussiawouldwinandchose to remain
engaged in the war; at rst, to await theoutcomes of certain naval
battles, and later to preserve thedignity of Russia by averting a
humiliating peace. Thewar concluded with the Treaty of Portsmouth,
mediatedby US President Theodore Roosevelt. The complete vic-tory
of the Japanese military surprised world observers.The consequences
transformed the balance of power inEast Asia, resulting in a
reassessment of Japans recententry onto the world stage. Scholars
continue to debatethe historical signicance of the war.1
BackgroundIn 1853 Commodore Perry of the US Navy arrived
inJapanandbrought anendtoJapans policyof self-isolation by forcing
the Tokugawa shogunate to sign theConvention of Kanagawa the
following year. This en-counter with a modern Western power served
to portraythe West as having a confrontational and imperialist
po-litical agenda, which Japan viewed with respect throughWorld War
II.[5] Japan sought to maintain its autonomyand resisted
colonialism by Western nations. The MeijiRestoration in 1868 served
as an early Japanese responseto the challenges of the modern
world.After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Meiji govern-ment
endeavored to assimilate Western ideas, technologi-cal advances and
customs. By the late 19th century, Japanhad transformed itself into
a modernized industrial state.The Japanese wanted to preserve their
sovereignty and berecognized as equal with the Western
powers.Tsarist Russia, as a major imperial power, had ambitionsin
the East. By the 1890s it had extended its realm acrossCentral Asia
to Afghanistan, absorbing local states in theprocess. The Russian
Empire stretched from Poland inthe west to the Kamchatka Peninsula
in the east.[6] Withits construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway
to the portof Vladivostok, Russia hoped to further consolidate
itsinuence and presence in the region. In the Tsushima in-cident of
1861 Russia had directly assaulted Japanese ter-ritory. Fearing
Russian expansion, Japan regarded Korea(and to a lesser extent
Manchuria) as a protective buer.1.1 Sino-Japanese War
(18941895)Main article: First Sino-Japanese WarBetween the Meiji
Restoration and its participation inChinese generals in Pyongyang
surrender to the Japanese, Octo-ber 1894.12 1 BACKGROUNDWorld War
I, the Empire of Japan fought in two signif-icant wars. The rst was
the First Sino-Japanese War,fought in 1894 and 1895. The war
revolved around theissue of control and inuence over Korea under
the ruleof the Joseon dynasty. A peasant rebellion led to a
re-quest by the Korean government for the Qing dynasty tosend in
troops to stabilize the country. The Empire ofJapan responded by
sending their own force to Korea andinstalling a puppet government
in Seoul. China objectedand war ensued. Hostilities proved brief,
with Japaneseground troops routing Chinese forces on the
LiaodongPeninsulaandnearlydestroyingtheChineseNavyinthe Battle of
the Yalu River. Japan and China signedthe Treaty of Shimonoseki,
which ceded the LiaodongPeninsula and the island of Taiwan to
Japan. After thepeace treaty, Russia, Germany, and France forced
Japanto withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula. Soon after,Russia
occupied the Liaodong Peninsula, built the PortArthur fortress, and
based the Russian Pacic Fleet in theport. Germany occupied Jiaozhou
Bay, built the Tsingtaofortress, and based the German East Asia
Squadron in thisport.1.2 Russian encroachmentInDecember
1897aRussianeet appearedoPortArthur. After three months, in 1898,
China and Russianegotiated a convention by which China leased (to
Rus-sia) Port Arthur, Talienwan and the surrounding waters.The two
parties further agreed that the convention couldbe extended by
mutual agreement. The Russians clearlyexpected such an extension,
for they lost no time in oc-cupying the territory and in fortifying
Port Arthur, theirsole warm-water port on the Pacic coast and of
greatstrategic value. A year later, to consolidate their
position,the Russians began to build a new railway from
Harbinthrough Mukden to Port Arthur. The development of therailway
became a contributory factor to the Boxer Rebel-lion, when Boxer
forces burned the railway stations.[7]The Russians also began to
make inroads into Korea. By1898 they had acquired mining and
forestry concessionsnear the Yalu and Tumen rivers,[8] causing the
Japanesemuch anxiety. Japan decided to attack before the Rus-sians
completed the Trans-Siberian Railway.1.3 Boxer RebellionMain
article: Boxer RebellionThe Russians and the Japanese both
contributed troopsto the eight-member international force sent in
1900 toquell the Boxer Rebellion and to relieve the
internationallegations under siege in the Chinese capital, Beijing.
Rus-sia had already sent 177,000 soldiers to Manchuria,
nom-inallytoprotect itsrailwaysunderconstruction. Thetroops of the
Qing Empire and the participants of theBoxer Rebellion could do
nothing against such a mas-Troops of the eight-nation alliance in
1900. Left to right: Britain,UnitedStates, Australia,[9]India,
Germany, France, Austria,Italy, Japan.sive army and were ejected
fromManchuria. The Russiantroops settled in[10] and despite
assurances they would va-cate the area after the crisis, by 1903
the Russians had notestablished a timetable for withdrawal[11] and
had actuallystrengthened their position in Manchuria.1.4 Pre-war
negotiationsThe Japanese statesman It Hirobumi started to
negoti-ate with the Russians. He regarded Japan as too weak toevict
the Russian militarily, so he proposed giving Russiacontrol over
Manchuria in exchange for Japanese controlof northern Korea.
Meanwhile, Japan and Britain hadsigned the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
in 1902, the Britishseeking to restrict naval competition by
keeping the Rus-sian Pacic seaports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur
fromtheir full use. The alliance with the British meant, in
part,that if any nation allied itself with Russia during any
waragainst Japan, then Britain would enter the war on Japansside.
Russia could no longer count on receiving help fromeither Germany
or France without there being a dangerof British involvement in the
war. With such an alliance,Japan felt free to commence hostilities,
if necessary.On 28 July 1903, the Japanese minister in St.
Peters-burg was instructed to present his countrys view oppos-ing
Russias consolidation plans in Manchuria. On 12 Au-gust, the
Japanese minister handed in the following doc-ument (quoted
verbatim) to serve as the basis for furthernegotiations:[12]1.
Mutual engagement to respect the independence andterritorial
integrity of the Chinese and Korean em-pires and to maintain the
principle of equal oppor-tunity for the commerce and industry of
all nationsin those countries.2. Reciprocal recognitionof Japans
preponderatinginterests in Korea and Russias special interests
inrailway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the rightof Japan to
take in Korea and of Russia to take inManchuria such measures as
may be necessary for1.4 Pre-war negotiations 3the protection of
their respective interests as abovedened, subject, however, to the
provisions of arti-cle I of this agreement.3. Reciprocal
undertaking on the part of Russia andJapan not to impede
development of those indus-trial and commercial activities
respectively of JapaninKoreaandofRussiainManchuria, whicharenot
inconsistent with the stipulations of article I ofthis agreement.
Additional engagement on the partof Russia not to impede the
eventual extension ofthe Korean railway into southern Manchuria so
asto connect with the East China and Shan-hai-kwan-Newchwang
lines.4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found nec-essary
to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Rus-siatoManchuria,
forthepurposeeitherofpro-tecting the interests mentioned in article
II of thisagreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disor-der
calculated to create international complications,the troops so sent
are in no case to exceed the actualnumber required and are to be
forthwith recalled assoon as their missions are accomplished.5.
Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusiveright of Japan to
give advice and assistance in theinterest of reform and good
government in Korea,including necessary military assistance.6.
Thisagreement tosupplant all previousarrange-ments between Japan
and Russia respecting Korea.On3October, theRussianministertoJapan,
RomanRosen, presented to the Japanese government the Rus-sian
counterproposal as the basis of negotiations, as fol-lows (quoted
verbatim):[13]1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence
andterritorial integrity of the Korean Empire.2. Recognition by
Russia of Japans preponderating in-terests in Korea and of the
right of Japan to give ad-vice and assistance to Korea tending to
improve thecivil administration of the empire without infringingthe
stipulations of article I.3. Engagement on the part of Russia not
to impede thecommercial and industrial undertakings of Japan
inKorea, nor to oppose any measures taken for the pur-pose of
protecting them so long as such measures donot infringe the
stipulations of article I.4. Recognition of the right of Japan to
send for thesame purpose troops to Korea, with the knowledgeof
Russia, but their number not to exceed that actu-ally required, and
with the engagement on the part ofJapan to recall such troops as
soon as their missionis accomplished.5. Mutual engagement not to
use any part of the ter-ritory of Korea for strategical purposes
nor to un-dertake on the coasts of Korea any military workscapable
of menacing the freedom of navigation inthe Straits of Korea.6.
Mutual engagement to consider that part of the ter-ritory of Korea
lying to the north of the 39th parallelas a neutral zone into which
neither of the contract-ing parties shall introduce troops.7.
Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoralas in all
respects outside her sphere of interest.8. This agreement to
supplant all previous agreementsbetween Russia and Japan respecting
Korea.Negotiationsthenfollowed; althoughbyearlyJanuary1904, the
Japanese government had realised that Russiawas neither interested
in settling the Manchurian nor Ko-rean issues. Instead, Russias
goal was buying time - viadiplomacy - to further buildup
militarily.[14]Neverthe-less, on 13 January 1904, Japan proposed a
formula bywhich Manchuria would be outside the Japanese sphereof
inuence and, reciprocally, Korea outside Russias. By4 February
1904, no formal reply had been received
andon6FebruaryKurinoShinichiro, theJapaneseminis-ter, called on the
Russian foreign minister, Count Lamb-sdor, to take his leave.[15]
Japan severed diplomatic re-lations with Russia on 6 February
1904.[14]Potential diplomatic resolution of territorial concerns
be-tween Japan and Russia failed; historians have argued thatthis
directly resulted from the actions of Tsar Nicholas II.One crucial
error of Nicholas was his mismanagement ofgovernment. Although
certain scholars contend the sit-uation arose from the
determination of Tsar Nicholas IIto use the war against Japan to
spark a revival in Russianpatriotism, no historical evidence
supports this claim.[16]The Tsars advisors did not support the war,
foreseeingproblems in transporting troops and supplies from
Euro-pean Russia to the East.[17] Convinced that his rule
wasdivinely ordained and that he held responsibility to
God,Nicholas II held the ideals of preserving the autocracyand
defending the dignity, honor, and worth of Russia.[18]This attitude
by the Tsar led to repeated delays in negotia-tions with the
Japanese government. The Japanese under-standing of this can be
seen from a telegram dated 1 De-cember 1903 from Japanese minister
of foreign aairs,Komura, to the minister to Russia, in which he
stated:"...the Japanese government have at alltimes during the
progress of the negotiationsmadeit aspecial point togiveprompt
an-swers to all propositions of the Russian govern-ment. The
negotiations have now been pend-ingfor noless thanfour months,
andtheyhave not yet reached a stage where the nal is-sue can with
certainty be predicted. In these4 3 CAMPAIGN OF
1904circumstancestheJapanesegovernmentcan-not but regard with grave
concern the situationfor which the delays in negotiations are
largelyresponsible.[19]Errors by Nicholas II in managing the
Russian
govern-mentalsoledtohismisinterpretingthetypeofsitua-tioninwhichRussiawastobecomeinvolvedinwithJapan.
Some scholars have suggested that Tsar NicholasII dragged Japan
into war intentionally, in hopes of re-viving Russian nationalism.
This notion is disputed by acomment made by Nicholas to Kaiser
William of Ger-many, saying there would be no war because he did
notwish it.[20]This does not reject the claim that Russiaplayed an
aggressive role in the East, which it did, ratherthat Russia
unwisely calculated that Japan would not goto war against its far
larger and seemingly superior navyand army. Evidence of Russias
false sense of securityand superiority to Japan is seen by Russian
reference toJapan as a big mistake.[21]2 Declaration of warGreater
Manchuria. Russian (outer) Manchuria is the lighter redregion to
the upper rightJapan issued a declaration of war on 8 February
1904.[22]However, three hours before Japans declaration of warwas
received by the Russian government, the JapaneseImperial Navy
attacked the Russian Far East Fleet at PortArthur. Tsar Nicholas II
was stunned by news of the at-tack. He could not believe that Japan
would commit anact of war without a formal declaration, and had
been as-sured by his ministers that the Japanese would not ght.When
the attack came, according to Cecil Spring Rice,rst secretary at
the British Embassy, it left the Tsar al-most incredulous.[23]
Russia declared war on Japan eightdays later.[24] Japan, in
response, made reference to theRussian attack on Sweden in 1809
without declarationof war, and the requirement to declare war
before com-mencing hostilities was not made international law
untilthe Second Hague Peace Conference was held in
October1907.[25]TheQingEmpirefavouredtheJapanesepositionandeven
oered military aid, but Japan declined it. How-ever, Yuan Shikai
sent envoys to Japanese generals sev-eral times to deliver foodstus
and alcoholic drinks. Na-tive Manchurians joined the war on both
sides as hiredtroops.3 Campaign of 1904Port Arthur, on the Liaodong
Peninsula in the south ofManchuria, had been fortied into a major
naval base bythe Russian Imperial Army. Since it needed to control
thesea in order to ght a war on the Asian mainland, Japansrst
military objective was to neutralize the Russian eetat Port
Arthur.3.1 Battle of Port ArthurMain article: Battle of Port
ArthurOn the night of 8 February 1904, the Japanese eet
underJapaneseinfantryduringtheoccupationofSeoul, Korea,
in1904.Admiral Togo Heihachiro opened the war with a
surprisetorpedo boat destroyer[26] attack on the Russian ships
atPort Arthur. The attack heavily damaged the Tsesarevichand
Retvizan, the heaviest battleships in Russias far East-ern theater,
and the 6,600 ton cruiser Pallada.[27] Theseattacks developed into
the Battle of Port Arthur the nextmorning. A series of indecisive
naval engagements fol-lowed, in which Admiral Togo was unable to
attack theRussian eet successfully as it was protected by the
shorebatteries of the harbour, and the Russians were reluctantto
leave the harbour for the open seas, especially after thedeath of
Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov on 13 April1904. Although the
actual Battle of Port Arthur was in-decisive, the initial attacks
had a devastating psychologi-cal eect on Russia, which had been
condent about theprospect of war. The Japanese had seized the
initiativewhile the Russians waited in port.[28]These engagements
provided cover for a Japanese land-ing near Incheon in Korea. From
Incheon the Japaneseoccupied Seoul and then the rest of Korea. By
the endof April, the Japanese Imperial Army under Kuroki Itei3.3
Siege of Port Arthur 5was ready to cross the Yalu River into
Russian-occupiedManchuria.3.2 Blockade of Port ArthurBattleelds in
the Russo-Japanese WarTheJapaneseattemptedtodenytheRussians
useofPort Arthur. During the night of 1314 February, theJapanese
attempted to block the entrance to Port Arthurby sinking several
cement-lled steamers in the deep wa-ter channel to the port,[29]
but they sank too deep to be ef-fective. A similar attempt to block
the harbour entranceduring the night of 34 May also failed. In
March, thecharismatic Vice Admiral Makarov had taken commandof the
First Russian Pacic Squadron with the intentionof breaking out of
the Port Arthur blockade.On 12 April 1904, two Russian
pre-dreadnought battle-ships, the agship Petropavlovsk and the
Pobeda, slippedout of port but struck Japanese mines o Port
Arthur.ThePetropavlovsksank almost immediately, while thePobeda had
to be towed back to port for extensive re-pairs. Admiral Makarov,
the single most eective Rus-sian naval strategist of the war,
perished on the battleshipPetropavlovsk.On 15 April 1904, the
Russian government made over-tures threatening to seize the British
war correspondentswho were taking the ship Haimun into warzones to
reportfor the London-based Times newspaper, citing concernsabout
the possibility of the British giving away Russianpositions to the
Japanese eet.The Russians quickly learned, and soon employed,
theJapanesetacticofoensiveminelaying. On15May1904,
twoJapanesebattleships, theYashimaandtheHatsuse, were lured into a
recently laid Russian mine-eld o Port Arthur, each striking at
least two mines.The Hatsuse sank within minutes, taking 450 sailors
withher, while the Yashima sank while under towtowards Ko-rea for
repairs. On 23 June 1904, a breakout attempt bythe Russian
squadron, now under the command of Ad-miral Wilgelm Vitgeft,
failed. By the end of the month,Japanese artillery was ring shells
into the harbour.3.3 Siege of Port ArthurMain article: Siege of
Port ArthurThe Siege of Port Arthur commenced in April
1904.Bombardment during the Siege of Port
ArthurJapanesetroopstriednumerousfrontalassaultsonthefortied
hilltops overlooking the harbour, which were de-feated with
Japanese casualties in the thousands. Eventu-ally, though, with the
aid of several batteries of 11-inch(280 mm) Krupp howitzers, the
Japanese were able tocapture the key hilltop bastion in December
1904. Fromthis vantage point, the long-range artillery was able
toshell the Russian eet, which was unable to retaliate ef-fectively
against the land-based artillery and was unableor unwilling to sail
out against the blockading eet. FourRussian battleships and two
cruisers were sunk in suc-cession, with the fth and last battleship
being forced toscuttle a few weeks later. Thus, all capital ships
of theRussian eet in the Pacic were sunk. This is probablythe only
example in military history when such a scale ofdevastation was
achieved by land-based artillery againstmajor warships.Meanwhile,
attempts to relieve the besieged city by landalso failed, and,
after the Battle of Liaoyang in late Au-gust, the northern Russian
force that might have been ableto relieve Port Arthur retreated to
Mukden (Shenyang).Major General Anatoly Stessel, commander of the
PortArthur garrison, believed that the purpose of defendingthe city
was lost after the eet had been destroyed. Ingeneral, the Russian
defenders were suering dispropor-tionate casualties each time the
Japanese attacked. In par-6 3 CAMPAIGN OF 1904Japanese assault on
the entrenched Russian forces, 1904ticular, several large
underground mines were explodedin late December, resulting in the
costly capture of a fewmore pieces of the defensive line. Stessel,
therefore, de-cided to surrender to the surprised Japanese generals
on2 January 1905. He made his decision without consult-ing either
the other military sta present, or the Tsar andmilitary command,
who all disagreed with the decision.Stessel was convicted by a
court-martial in 1908 and sen-tenced to death on account of an
incompetent defense andfor disobeying orders. He was later
pardoned.3.4 Battle of Yalu RiverMain article: Battle of Yalu River
(1904)IncontrasttotheJapanesestrategyofrapidlygainingground to
control Manchuria, Russian strategy focused onghting delaying
actions to gain time for reinforcementsto arrive via the long
Trans-Siberian railway, which wasincomplete near Irkutsk at the
time. On 1 May 1904, theBattle of Yalu River became the rst major
land battle ofthe war; Japanese troops stormed a Russian position
aftercrossing the river. The defeat of the Russian Eastern
De-tachment removed the perception that the Japanese wouldbe an
easy enemy, that the war would be short, and thatRussia would be
the overwhelming victor.[30] This battlewas also the rst battle in
decades to be an Asian victoryover a European power and marked
Russias inability tomatch Japans military prowess.[31] Japanese
troops pro-ceeded to land at several points on the Manchurian
coast,and in a series of engagements, drove the Russians
backtowards Port Arthur. The subsequent battles, includingthe
Battle of Nanshan on 25 May 1904, were marked byheavy Japanese
losses largely from attacking entrenchedRussian positions.3.5
Battle of the Yellow SeaMain article: Battle of the Yellow SeaWith
the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov during thesiege of Port Arthur
in April 1904, Admiral WilgelmVit-geft was appointed command of the
battle eet and wasordered to make a sortie from Port Arthur and
deploy hisforce to Vladivostok. Flying his ag in the
French-builtpre-dreadnought Tsesarevich, Vitgeft proceeded to
leadhis six battleships, four cruisers, and 14 torpedo boat
de-stroyers into the Yellow Sea in the early morning of 10August
1904. Waiting for him was Admiral Togo and hiseet of four
battleships, 10 cruisers, and 18 torpedo boatdestroyers.At
approximately 12:15, the battleship eets obtained vi-sual contact
witheachother, andat 13:00withTogocrossing Vitgefts T, they
commenced main battery re ata range of about eight miles, the
longest ever conductedup to that time.[32]For about thirty minutes
the battle-ships pounded one another until they had closed to
lessthan four miles and began to bring their secondary bat-teries
into play. At 18:30, a hit from one of Togos bat-tleships struck
Vitgefts agships bridge, killing him in-stantly.With the
Tsesarevich ' s helm jammed and their admiralkilled in action, she
turned from her battle line, causingconfusion among her eet.
However, Togo was deter-mined to sink the Russian agship and
continued pound-ing her, being saved only by the gallant charge of
theAmerican-built Russian battleship Retvizan, whose cap-tain
successfully drew away Togos heavy re from
theRussianagship.[33]Knowingoftheimpendingbattlewith the battleship
reinforcements arriving from Russia(the Baltic Fleet), Togo chose
not to risk his battleshipsby pursuing his enemy as they turned
about and headedback into Port Arthur, thus ending naval historys
longest-range gunnery duel up to that time and the rst modernclash
of steel battleship eets on the high seas.3.6 Baltic Fleet
redeploysRoute of Baltic Fleet, to and backMeanwhile, theRussians
werepreparingtoreinforcetheir Far East Fleet by sending the Baltic
Fleet, underthe command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky. After a4.2
Battle of Mukden 7false start caused by engine problems and other
mishaps,the squadron nally departed on 15 October 1904, andsailed
half way around the world from the Baltic Sea tothe Pacic via the
Cape of Good Hope in the course ofa seven-month odyssey that was to
attract worldwide at-tention. The eet was forced to take this
longer routeaftertheDoggerBankincident on21October1904,where the
Russian eet red on British shing boats thatthey mistook for enemy
torpedo boats. This caused theBritish to deny them access to the
Suez Canal, thus forc-ing them around Africa, and nearly sparking a
war withGreat Britain (an ally of Japan, but neutral, unless
pro-voked by a non-combatant nation).4 Campaign of 1905Retreat of
Russian soldiers after the Battle of Mukden.Withthefall ofPort
Arthur,
theJapanese3rdArmycouldcontinuenorthwardtoreinforcepositionssouthof
Russian-held Mukden. With the onset of the severeManchurian winter,
there had been no major land en-gagements since the Battle of Shaho
the previous year.The two sides camped opposite each other along 60
to 70miles (110 km) of front lines south of Mukden.4.1 Battle of
SandepuMain article: Battle of SandepuThe Russian Second Army under
General Oskar Gripen-berg, between 25 and 29 January, attacked the
Japaneseleft anknearthetownofSandepu, almost breakingthrough. This
caught the Japanese by surprise. How-ever, without support from
other Russian units the attackstalled, Gripenberg was ordered to
halt by Kuropatkinand the battle was inconclusive. The Japanese
knew thatthey needed to destroy the Russian army in
ManchuriabeforeRussianreinforcements arrivedviatheTrans-Siberian
railroad.4.2 Battle of MukdenMain article: Battle of MukdenThe
Battle of Mukden commenced on 20 February 1905.An illustration of a
Japanese assault during the Battle of Mukden.In the following days
Japanese forces proceeded to as-sault the right and left anks of
Russian forces surround-ing Mukden, along a 50-mile (80 km) front.
Approxi-mately half a million men were involved in the ghting.Both
sides were well entrenched and were backed by hun-dreds of
artillery pieces. After days of harsh ghting,added pressure from
the anks forced both ends of theRussian defensive line to curve
backwards. Seeing theywere about to be encircled, the Russians
began a gen-eral retreat, ghting a series of erce rearguard
actions,which soon deteriorated in the confusion and collapse
ofRussian forces. On 10 March 1905, after three weeks ofghting,
General Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to thenorth of Mukden. The
Russians lost 90,000 men in thebattle.The retreating Russian
Manchurian Army formations dis-banded as ghting units, but the
Japanese failed to destroythem completely. The Japanese themselves
had sueredheavy casualties and were in no condition to pursue.
Al-though the Battle of Mukden was a major defeat for theRussians
and was the most decisive land battle ever foughtby the Japanese,
the nal victory still depended on thenavy.8 5 PEACE AND
AFTERMATH4.3 Battle of TsushimaMain article: Battle of
TsushimaAfter a stopover of several weeks at the minor port
ofJapanese battleship Mikasa, the agship of Admiral Tg Hei-hachir
at the Battle of Tsushima.Nossi-B, Madagascar, that had been
reluctantly allowedby neutral France in order not to jeopardize its
relationswith its Russian ally, the Russian Baltic eet
proceededtoCamRanhBayinFrenchIndochinapassingonitsway through the
Singapore Strait between 7 and 10 April1905.[34][35]The eet nally
reached the Sea of Japanin May 1905. The logistics of such an
undertaking inthe age of coal power was astounding. The squadron
re-quired approximately 500,000 tons of coal to completethe
journey, yet by international law, it was not allowedto coal at
neutral ports, forcing the Russian authorities toacquire a large
eet of colliers to supply the eet at sea.The weight of the
shipsstores needed for such a longjourney was to be another major
problem.[36] The Rus-sian Second Pacic Squadron (the renamed Baltic
Fleet)sailed 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to relieve
PortArthur. Thedemoralizingnewsthat Port Arthurhadfallen reached
the eet while it was still at Madagascar.Admiral Rozhestvenskys
only hope now was to reach theport of Vladivostok. There were three
routes to Vladi-vostok, with the shortest and most direct passing
throughthe Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan. However,this
was also the most dangerous route as it passed be-tween the
Japanese home islands and the Japanese navalbases in Korea.Admiral
Togo was aware of Russian progress and under-stood that, with the
fall of Port Arthur, the Second andThird Pacic squadrons would try
to reach the only otherRussian port in the Far East, Vladivostok.
Battle planswere laid down and ships were repaired and retted
tointercept the Russian eet.The Japanese Combined Fleet, which had
originally con-sisted of six battleships, was now down to four (two
hadbeenlost tomines), but still retaineditscruisers, de-stroyers,
and torpedo boats. The Russian Second PacicSquadron contained eight
battleships, including four newbattleships of the Borodino class,
as well as cruisers, de-stroyers and other auxiliaries for a total
of 38 ships.Bythe end of May, the Second Pacic Squadron wason the
last leg of its journey to Vladivostok, taking theshorter, riskier
route between Korea and Japan, and trav-elling at night to avoid
discovery. Unfortunately for theRussians, while in compliance with
the rules of war, thetwo trailing hospital ships had continued
toburn theirlights,[37]whichwerespottedbytheJapanesearmedmerchant
cruiser Shinano Maru. Wireless communica-tion was used to inform
Togos headquarters, where theCombined Fleet was immediately ordered
to sortie.[38]Still receiving naval intelligence from scouting
forces, theJapanesewereabletopositiontheireet sothat theywould
cross the T"[39] of the Russian eet. The Japaneseengaged the
Russians in the Tsushima Straits on 2728May 1905. The Russian eet
was virtually annihilated,losingeightbattleships,
numeroussmallervessels, andmore than 5,000 men, while the Japanese
lost three tor-pedo boats and 116 men. Only three Russian vessels
es-caped to Vladivostok. After the Battle of Tsushima, acombined
Japanese Army and Navy operation occupiedSakhalin Island to force
the Russians to sue for peace.5 Peace and aftermath5.1 Treaty of
PortsmouthMain article: Treaty of PortsmouthThe defeats of the
Russian Army and Navy shook upNegotiating the Treaty of Portsmouth
(1905). From left to right:the Russians at far side of table are
Korostovetz, Nabokov, Witte,Rosen, Plancon; andtheJapaneseat
nearsideoftableareAdachi, Ochiai, Komura, Takahira, Sato. The large
conferencetable is today preserved at the Museum Meiji Mura in
Inuyama,Aichi Prefecture, Japan.Russian condence. Throughout 1905,
the Imperial Rus-sian government was rocked by revolution. The
popula-tion was against escalation of the war. The empire
wascertainly capable of sending more troops, but the
poorstateoftheeconomy, theembarrassingdefeatsoftheRussian Army and
Navy by the Japanese, and the relativeunimportance of the disputed
land to Russia made thewar extremely unpopular.[40] Tsar Nicholas
II elected tonegotiate peace so he could concentrate on internal
mat-5.3 Political consequences 9ters after the disaster of Bloody
Sunday on 22 January1905.Japan-Russia Treaty of Peace, 5 September
1905Bothsidesacceptedtheoer ofAmericanpresident,Theodore Roosevelt,
to mediate; meetings were held inPortsmouth, New Hampshire, with
Sergius Witte lead-ing the Russian delegation and Baron Komura, a
graduateof Harvard, leading the Japanese delegation. The Treatyof
Portsmouth was signed on 5 September 1905 at thePortsmouth Naval
Shipyard on Seaveys Island, Kittery,Maine, while the delegates
stayed in Portsmouth, NewHampshire.[41] Witte became Russian Prime
Minister thesame year.After courting the Japanese, Roosevelt
decided to sup-port the Tsars refusal to pay indemnities, a move
thatpolicymakers in Tokyo interpreted as signifying that theUnited
States had more than a passing interest in Asianaairs. Russia
recognized Korea as part of the Japanesesphere of inuence and
agreed to evacuate Manchuria.Japan would annex Korea in 1910
(JapanKorea Treatyof 1910), with scant protest from other
powers.[42]Russiaalsosignedoverits25-yearleaseholdrightstoPort
Arthur, including the naval base and the peninsulaaround it, and
ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Islandto Japan. Sakhalin would
be taken back by the SovietUnion following the defeat of the
Japanese in World WarII.[43][44]Roosevelt earnedthe Nobel Peace
Prize for his ef-fort. George E. Mowry concludes that Roosevelt
han-dled the arbitration well, doing an excellent job of bal-ancing
Russian and Japanese power in the Orient, wherethe supremacy of
either constituted a threat to growingAmerica.[45]5.2
CasualtiesSources do not agree on a precise number of deaths
fromthe war because of a lack of body counts for conrma-tion.
ThenumberofJapaneseArmydeadincombatis put at around 47,000 with
around 27,000 additionalcasualties from disease, and between 6,000
and 12,000wounded. Estimates of Russian Army dead range
fromJapanese propaganda of the war: woodcut print showing
TsarNicholas II waking froma nightmare of the battered andwounded
Russian forces returning from battle. Artist KobayashiKiyochika,
1904 or 1905.around 40,000 to around 70,000 men. The total num-ber
of army dead is generally stated as around 130,000 to170,000.[46]
China suered 20,000 civilian deaths, and -nancially the loss
amounted to over 69 million taels' worthof silver.During many of
the battles at sea, several thousand sol-diers being transported
drowned after their ships wentdown. There was no consensus about
what to do withtransported soldiers at sea, and as a result, many
of theships failed or refused to rescue soldiers that were
leftshipwrecked. ThisledtothecreationofthesecondGeneva Convention
in 1906, which gave protection andcare for shipwrecked soldiers in
armed conict.5.3 Political consequencesThis was the rst major
military victory in the modernera of an Asian power over a European
nation. Russiasdefeat was met with shock in the West and across the
FarEast. Japans prestige rose greatly as it came to be seenas a
modern nation. Concurrently, Russia lost virtuallyits entire Pacic
and Baltic eets, and also much inter-national esteem. This was
particularly true in the eyes ofGermany and Austria-Hungary before
World War I. Rus-sia was Frances and Serbia's ally, and that loss
of prestige10 5 PEACE AND AFTERMATHPunch cartoon, 1905; A cartoon
in the British press of the timesillustrating Russias loss of
prestige after the nations defeat. Thehour-glass represents Russias
prestige running out.had a signicant eect on Germanys future when
plan-ning for war with France, and Austria-Hungarys war
withSerbia.IntheabsenceofRussiancompetition,
andwiththedistractionof Europeannations duringWorldWar I,combined
with the Great Depression that followed, theJapanese military began
eorts to dominate China andthe rest of Asia, which eventually led
to the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacic War theatres of World
WarII.5.3.1 Eects in RussiaAlthough popular support for the war had
existed follow-ing the Japanese attack on Port Arthur in 1904,
discon-tent occurred following continued defeats at the hands
ofJapan. For many Russians, the immediate shock of un-expected
humiliation at the hands of Japan, caused theconict to be viewed as
a metaphor for the shortcom-ings of the Romanov autocracy.[47]
Popular discontent inRussia after the war added more fuel to the
already sim-mering Russian Revolution of 1905, an event NicholasII
had hoped to avoid entirely by taking intransigent ne-gotiating
stances prior to coming to the table. Twelveyears later, that
discontent boiled over into the FebruaryRevolution of 1917. In
Poland, which Russia partitionedin the late 18th century, and where
Russian rule alreadycaused two major uprisings, the population was
so rest-less that an army of 250,000300,000larger than theone
facing the Japanesehad to be stationed to put
downtheunrest.[48]Somepolitical leadersofthePolishin-surrection
movement (in particular, Jzef Pisudski) sentemissaries to Japan to
collaborate on sabotage and intelli-gence gathering within the
Russian Empire and even plana Japanese-aided uprising.[49]In
Russia, the defeat of 1905 led in the short term toa reform of the
Russian military that allowed it to faceGermany in World War I.
However, the revolts at homefollowingthewarplantedtheseedsthat
presagedtheRussianRevolutionof1917. ThiswasbecauseTsarNicholas II
issued the October Manifesto, which includedonly limited reforms
such as the Duma and failed to ad-dress the societal problems of
Russia at the time.[50]5.3.2 Eects on JapanJapan had become the
rising Asian power and had proventhat its military could combat the
major powers in Europewith success. Most Western powers were
stunned that theJapanese not only prevailed but decisively defeated
Rus-sia. In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had also portrayeda sense
of readiness in taking a more active and leadingrole in Asian
aairs, which in turn had led to widespreadnationalism throughout
the region.[47]Althoughthewar hadendedinavictoryfor
Japan,Japanesepublicopinionwasshockedbytheveryre-strained peace
terms which were negotiated at the warsend.[51] Widespread
discontent spread through the popu-lace upon the announcement of
the treaty terms. Riotserupted in major cities in Japan. Two specic
require-ments, expected after such a costly victory, were
espe-cially lacking: territorial gains and monetary reparationsto
Japan. The peace accord led to feelings of distrust,as the Japanese
had intended to retain all of Sakhalin Is-land, but were forced to
settle for half of it after beingpressured by the United States,
with President Rooseveltopting to support Nicholas IIs stance on
not ceding ter-ritory or paying reparations. The Japanese had
wantedreparations to help families recover from lost fathers
andsons as well as heavy taxation from the government.[52]Without
them, they were at a loss.The U.S held strength in the Asian region
from aggravat-ing European imperialist encroachment. To Japan,
thisrepresented a developing threat to the autonomy of theregion.
U.S.-Japanese relations would recover a bit in theearly 20th
century, but by the early 1920s, few in Japanbelieved that the
United States meant anything positivefor the future of Asia.[53] By
the 1930s, the U.S. presencein Asian aairs, along with the
instability in China andthe collapse of the Western economic order,
Japan wouldact aggressively with respect to China, setting the
prece-dent that would ultimately culminate in the Greater EastAsian
Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some scholars suggest that5.5 Reception
around the world 11Japans road to World War II had begun not upon
winningthe Russo-Japanese War, but when it lost the peace.[54]5.4
Historical signicanceThe eects and impact of the Russo-Japanese War
in-troduced a number of characteristics that came to dene20th
century politics and warfare. Many of the techno-logical
innovations brought on by the Industrial Revolu-tion rst became
present on the battleeld in the Russo-Japanese War. Weapons and
armaments were more tech-nological than ever before. Technological
developmentsof modern armaments, such as rapid ring artillery
andmachine guns, as well as more accurate carbine ries,were rst
used on a mass scale in the Russo-JapaneseWar. The improved
capability of naval forces was alsodemonstrated. Here was the
introduction of iron-clad,steam driven boats, equipped with large
and heavy guns.Military operations on both sea and land
demonstratedthat warfare in a new age of technology had undergonea
considerable change since the Franco-Prussian War of1870-71.[54]
Most army commanders had previously en-visioned using these weapon
systems to dominate the bat-tleeld on an operational and tactical
level but, as eventsplayed out, these technological advancements
forever al-tered the capacity in which mankind would wage
war.[55]For East Asia it was the rst confrontation after
thirtyyears involving two modern armed forces.The advanced weaponry
led to massive casualty counts.Neither Japan nor Russia had
prepared for the number ofdeaths that would occur in this new kind
of warfare, orhad the resources to compensate for these losses.
Thisalso left its impression on society at large, with the
emer-genceoftransnational andnongovernmental organiza-tions, like
the Red Cross, becoming prominent after thewar. The emergence of
such organizations can be re-garded as the beginning of a meshing
together of civi-lizations through the identication of common
problemsand challenges; a slow process dominating much of the20th
century.[56]Debate with respect to the Russo-Japanese War
preludingWorld War II is a topic of interest to scholars today.
Ar-guments that are favorable toward this perspective con-sider
characteristics specic to the Russo-Japanese Warto the qualities
denitive of total war.[57] Numerous as-pects of total war
characterize the Russo-Japanese War.Encompassed on both ends was
the mass mobilization oftroops into battle. For both Russia and
Japan, the warrequired extensive economic support in the form of
pro-duction of equipment, armaments, and supplies at such ascale
that required both domestic support as well as for-eign aid.[54]
The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Waralso demonstrated the need
for world leaders to regarddomestic response to foreign policy,
which is argued bysome scholars as setting in motion the
dissolution of theRomanov dynasty by demonstrating the ineciencies
oftsarist Russias government.[54]5.5 Reception around the worldTo
the Western powers, Japans victory demonstrated theemergence of a
new Asian regional power. With the Rus-sian defeat, some scholars
have argued that the war hadset in motion a change in the global
world order withtheemergenceofJapanasnotonlyaregional power,but
rather, the main Asian power.[58] Rather more thanthe possibilities
of diplomatic partnership were emerging,however. The Japanese
success returned self-condencetothe colonised Asian peoples
Vietnamese, Indone-sians, Indians and Filipinos and to those
countries likeTurkey and Iran in immediate danger of being
absorbedby the Western powers. It also encouraged the Chinesewho,
despite having been at war with the Japanese onlya decade before,
still considered Westerners the greaterthreat. We regarded that
Russian defeat by Japan as thedefeat of the West by the East. We
regarded the Japanesevictory as our own victory, declared Sun
Yat-sen. AndJawaharlal Nehru, Japans victory lessened the feeling
ofinferiority from which most of us suered. A great Euro-pean power
had been defeated, thus Asia could still defeatEurope as it had
done in the past.[59]In Europe too, subject populations were
similarly encour-aged. James Joyce's novel Ulysses, set in Dublin
in 1904,contains hopeful Irish allusions as to the outcome of
thewar.[60] And in partitioned Poland the artist Jzef Mehof-fer
chose 1905 to paint his Europa Jubilans (Europerejoicing), which
portrays anapronedmaidtakingherease on a sofa against a background
of Eastern artefacts.Executed following demonstrations against the
war andRussian cultural suppression, and in the year of
Russiasdefeat, its subtly coded message looks forward to a timewhen
the Tsarist masters will be defeated in Europe asthey had been in
Asia.[61]Thesignicanceof thewar for oppressedclasses aswell as
subject populations was clear too to the Social-ist thinker Rosa
Luxemburg: The Russo-Japanese Warnow gives to all an awareness that
even war and peace inEurope its destiny isnt decided between the
four wallsof the European concert, but outside it, in the
giganticmaelstrom of world and colonial politics. And its in
thisthat the real meaning of the current war resides for
social-democracy, even if we set aside its immediate eect:
thecollapse of Russian absolutism. This war brings the gazeof the
international proletariat back to the great politicaland economic
connectedness of the world, and violentlydissipates in our ranks
the particularism, the pettiness ofideas that form in any period of
political calm.[62] It wasthis realisation of the universal
signicance of the warthat underlines the historical importance of
the conictand its outcome.5.6 Assessment of war resultsRussia had
lost two of its three eets. Only its Black SeaFleet remained, and
this was the result of an earlier treaty12 6 MILITARY ATTACHS AND
OBSERVERSthat had prevented the eet from leaving the Black
Sea.Japanbecamethesixth-most powerful naval force,[63]while the
Russian Navy declined to one barely strongerthan that of
AustriaHungary.[63] The actual costs of
thewarwerelargeenoughtoaecttheRussianeconomyand, despite grain
exports, the nation developed an exter-nal balance of payments
decit. The cost of military re-equipment and re-expansion after
1905 pushed the econ-omy further into decit, although the size of
the decitwas obscured.[64]The Japanese were on the oensive for most
of the warand used massed infantry assaults against defensive
posi-tions, which would later become the standard of all Eu-ropean
armies during World War I. The battles of theRusso-Japanese War, in
which machine guns and artillerytook a heavy toll on Russian and
Japanese troops, were aprecursor to the trench warfare of World War
I.[65] AGer-man military advisor sent to Japan, Jakob Meckel, had
atremendous impact on the development of the Japanesemilitary
training, tactics, strategy, and organization. Hisreforms were
credited with Japans overwhelming victoryover China in the First
Sino-Japanese War of 18941895.However, his over-reliance on
infantry in oensive cam-paigns also led to a large number of
Japanese
casualties.Militaryandeconomicexhaustionaectedbothcoun-tries.
Japanese historians regard this war as a turningpoint for Japan,
and a key to understanding the reasonswhy Japan may have failed
militarily and politically later.After the war, acrimony was felt
at every level of Japanesesociety and it became the consensus
within Japan thattheir nation had been treated as the defeated
power dur-ing the peace conference.[51] As time went on, this
feel-ing, coupledwiththesenseofarroganceatbecom-ing a Great Power,
grew and added to growing Japanesehostility towards the West, and
fueled Japans militaryand imperial ambitions. Only ve years after
the war,Japan de jure annexed Korea as part of its colonial
em-pire. In 1931, 21 years later, Japan invaded Manchuriain the
Mukden Incident. This culminated in the inva-sion of East,
Southeast and South AsiainWorldWarII, in an attempt to create a
great Japanese colonial em-pire, the Greater East Asia
Co-prosperity Sphere. Asaresult, most Chinesehistoriansconsider
theRusso-Japanese War as a key development of Japanese
mili-tarism.Following the victory of the Battle of Tsushima,
Japanserstwhile English ally presented a lock of Admiral
Nel-son'shairtotheImperial JapaneseNavy, judgingitsperformance then
as on a par with Britains victory atTrafalgar in 1805. It is still
on display at Kyouiku Sank-oukan, a public museum maintained by the
Japan Self-DefenseForce. Nevertheless,
therewasaconsequentchangeinEnglishstrategicthinking,
resultinginen-largement of its naval docks at Auckland, New
Zealand;Bombay, British India; Fremantle and Sydney,
Australia;Simons Town, Cape Colony; Singapore and British
HongKong.[66]The naval war conrmed the direction of theBritish
Admiralty's thinking in tactical terms even as itundermined its
strategic grasp of a changing world.[67]Tactical orthodoxy, for
example, assumed that a navalbattle would imitate the conditions of
stationary combatand that ships would engage in one long line
sailing onparallel courses; but more exible tactical thinking
wouldnow be required as a ring ship and its target
maneuveredindependently.[68]The US reaction to the war had also
been mixed, withfears of a Yellow Peril eventually shifting from
China toJapan.[69] American gures such as W. E. B. Du Bois
andLothrop Stoddard saw the victory as a challenge to
whitesupremacy.[70]6 Military attachs and observersMainarticle:
Militaryattachs andobservers intheRusso-Japanese WarMilitary and
civilian observers from every major powerJapanese general, Kuroki,
and his sta, including foreign ocersand war correspondents after
the Battle of Shaho (1904).closely followed the course of the war.
Most were able toreport on events from the perspective of embedded
posi-tions within the land and naval forces of both Russia
andJapan. These military attachs and other observers pre-pared
rst-hand accounts of the war and analytical pa-pers. In-depth
observer narratives of the war and morenarrowly focused
professional journal articles were writ-ten soon after the war; and
these post-war reports con-clusively illustrated the battleeld
destructiveness of thisconict. This was the rst time the tactics of
entrenchedpositions for infantry defended with machine guns
andartillery became vitally important. Both would becomedominant
factors in World War I. Even though entrenchedpositions had already
been a signicant part of both theFranco-Prussian War and the
American Civil War, it isnow apparent that the high casualty
counts, and the tac-tical lessons readily available to observer
nations, werecompletely disregarded in preparations for war in
Europe,and during much of the course of World War I.[71]In
19041905, Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton was themilitary attach of
the British Indian Army serving withthe Japanese Army in Manchuria.
As one of the severalmilitary attachs from Western countries, he
was the rst13to arrive in Japan after the start of the war.[72] He
there-fore would be recognized as the dean of multi-national
at-tachs and observers in this conict, although out-rankedby
British eld marshal, WilliamGustavus Nicholson, 1stBaron Nicholson,
who was later to become chief of theImperial General Sta.7
Anglo-Japanese intelligence co-operationEven before the war,
British and Japanese intelligencehad co-operated against
Russia.[73] Indian Army stationsin Malaya and China often
intercepted and read wirelessand telegraph cable trac relating to
the war, which wasshared with the Japanese.[74] In their turn, the
Japaneseshared information about Russia with the British with
oneBritish ocial writing of the perfect quality of
Japaneseintelligence.[75] In particular, British and Japanese
intel-ligence gathered much evidence that Germany was sup-porting
Russia in the war as part of a bid to disturb thebalance of power
in Europe, which led to British ocialsincreasingly perceiving that
country as a threat to the in-ternational order.[76]8
FinancingDespite its gold reserves of 106.3 million pounds,
Rus-sias pre-war nancial situation was not enviable. Thecountry had
large budget decits year after year, and waslargely dependent on
borrowed money.[77]Russias war eort was funded primarily by France,
in aseries of loans totalling 800 million francs (30.4
millionpounds); another loan in the amount of 600 million francswas
agreed upon, but later cancelled. These loans wereextended within a
climate of mass bribing of the Frenchpress (made necessary by
Russias precarious economicand social situation and poor military
performance). Al-thoughinitiallyreluctanttoparticipateinthewar,
theFrench government and major banks were co-operativesince it
became clear that Russian and French economicinterests were tied.
In addition to French money, Rus-sia secured a German loan in the
amount of 500 millionmarks (24.5 million pounds).[77]Conversely,
Japans pre-war gold reserves were a modest11.7 million pounds; a
major portion of the total cost ofthe war was covered by money
borrowed from the UnitedKingdom,[78] Canada, and the United
States.During his canvassing expedition in London, theJapanese
vice-governor of the Bank of Japan met JacobSchi, an American
banker and head of Kuhn, Loeb &Co.. Schi, in response to
Russias anti-Jewish pogromsand sympathetic to Japans cause,
extended a critical se-ries of loans to the Empire of Japan, in the
amount ofUS$200 million (41.2 million).[79][80]Japans total war
expenditurewas 2,150million, ofwhich 38%, or 820 million, was
raised overseas.[81]9 List of battles1904 Battle of Port Arthur, 8
February: naval battleinconclusive1904 Battle of Chemulpo Bay, 9
February: navalbattle Japanese victory1904Battleof YaluRiver,
30April to1May:Japanese victory1904 Battle of Nanshan, 25 to 26
May, Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Telissu, 14 to 15 June,
Japanese vic-tory1904 Battle of Motien Pass, 17 July, Japanese
vic-tory1904 Battle of Ta-shih-chiao, 24 July, Japanese
vic-tory1904 Battle of Hsimucheng, 31 July, Japanese vic-tory1904
Battle of the YellowSea, 10 August: naval
bat-tleJapanesevictorystrategically,
tacticallyincon-clusive1904BattleoUlsan, 14August: naval
battleJapanese victory19041905 Siege of Port Arthur, 19 August to
2January: Japanese victory1904 Battle of Liaoyang, 25 August to 3
September:inconclusive1904 Battle of Shaho, 5 to 17 October:
inconclusive1905 Battle of Sandepu, 26 to 27 January:
incon-clusive1905 Battle of Mukden, 21 February to 10
March:Japanese victory1905 Battle of Tsushima, 27 to 28 May naval
battle:Japanese victory10 Cultural legacy10.1 Graphic artsThe
Russo-Japanese War was covered by dozens of for-eign journalists
who sent back sketches that were turned14 10 CULTURAL
LEGACYGetsuz's woodblock print of The Battle of Liaoyang,
1904intolithographs andother reproducibleforms. Pro-pagandaimages
werecirculatedbybothsides, oftenin the form of postcards and
basedon insulting racialstereotypes.[82]Thesewereproducednot
onlybythecombatants but by those from European countries
whosupported one or the other side or had a commercial orcolonial
stake in the area. War photographs were alsopopular, appearing in
both the press and in book form.[83]In Russia, the war was covered
by anonymous satiricalgraphicluboksforsaleinmarkets,
recordingthewarfor the domestic audience. Around 300 were made
be-fore their creation was banned by the Russian govern-ment. Their
Japanese equivalents were woodblock prints.These had been common
during the Sino-Japanese war adecade earlier and celebrations of
the new conict tendedto repeat the same imagery and situations. But
by thistime in Japan postcards had become the most commonform of
communication and they soon replaced prints asa medium for
topographical imagery and war reportage.In some ways, however, they
were still dependent on theprint for their pictorial conventions,
not least in issuingthe cards in series that assembled into a
composite sceneor design, either as diptychs, triptychs or even
more am-bitious formats. However, captioning swiftly moved fromthe
calligraphic side inscription to a printed title below,and not just
in Japanese but in English and other Euro-pean languages. There was
a lively sense that these im-ages served not only as mementoes but
also as propagandastatements.[84]War artists were to be found on
the Russian side and evengured among the casualties. Vasily
Vereshchagin wentdown with thePetropavlovsk, Admiral Makarovs
ag-ship, when it was sunk by mines. However, his last work,a
picture of a council of war presided over by the admi-ral, was
recovered almost undamaged.[85] Another artist,Mykola Samokysh, rst
came to notice for his reportsduring the war and the paintings
worked up fromhis diarysketch-books. Other depictions appeared
after the event.The two by the Georgian nave painter Niko
Pirosmanifrom 1906 must have been dependent on newspaper re-ports
since he was not present.[86] Then Yury Repin madean episode during
the Battle of Yalu River the subject ofa broad heroic canvas in
1914 at the outset of World WarI.[87]10.2 MusicOn either side,
there were lyrics lamenting the necessityof ghting in a foreign
land, far from home. One of theearliestofseveral Russiansongsstill
performedtodaywas the waltz Amurs Waves (Amurskie volny),
whichevokes the melancholy of standing watch on the frontierbetween
Russia and Manchuria.[88]Two others grew out of incidents during
the war. "Onthe hills of Manchuria" (Na sopkah Manchzhurii)
(1906)is another waltz composed by Ilya Shatrov, a
decoratedmilitary musician whose regiment suered badly in thebattle
of Mukden. Originally only the music was pub-lished, under the
longer title The Mokshansky Regimenton the Hills of Manchuria"; the
words by Stepan Petrovwere added later.[89] These lyrics mourned
the fallen ly-ing in their graves and threatened
revenge.[90]Anothersong, Variag, commemorates the Battle of
Chemulpo Bayin which that cruiser and the gunboatKorietz steamedout
to confront an encircling Japanese squadron ratherthan surrender.
That act of heroism was rst celebratedin a German song by Rudolf
Greintz in 1907 but
wasquicklytranslatedintoRussianandsungtoamartialaccompaniment.[91]Nikolai
Rimsky-Korsakov also reacted to the war by com-posingthesatirical
operaTheGoldenCockerel, com-pleted in 1907. Although it was
ostensibly based on averse fairy tale by Alexander Pushkin written
in 1834,the authorities quickly realised its true target and
imme-diately banned it from performance.10.3 PoetrySome Japanese
poetry dealing with the war still has a highprole. General Nogi
MaresukesOutsidetheGold-land fortress was learned by generations of
schoolchil-dren and valued for its bleak stoicism.[92] The army
sur-geon Mori Ogai kept a verse diary which tackled
suchthemesasracism, strategicmistakesandtheambigui-ties of victory
which can now be appreciated in historicalhindsight.[93] Nowadays
too there is growing appreciationof Yosano Akikos parting poem to
her brother as he leftfor the war, which includes the critical
lines.Never let them kill you, brother!His Imperial Majesty would
notcome out to ght ...How could He possibly make thembelievethat it
is honourable to die?[94]Even the Emperor Meiji himself entered the
poetic lists,writinginanswer toall thelamentationsabout
deathinaforeignlandthat thepatrioticsoul
returnstothehomeland.[95]10.4 Fiction 15European treatments were
similarly varied. Jane H. Oak-leyattemptedanepictreatment
oftheconict inthe86 cantos of her
contemporaryARusso-JapaneseWarPoem (Brighton 1905).[96] The French
poet Blaise Cen-drars was later to represent himself as on a
Russian trainon its way to Manchuria at the time in his La prose
duTranssibrien et de la Petite Jehanne de France (1913)
andenergetically evoked the results of the war along the way:I saw
the silent trains the black trains returningfrom the Far East and
passing like phantomsAt Talga 100,000 wounded were dying for lackof
careI visited the hospitals of KrasnoyarskAnd at Khilok we
encountered a long convoyof soldiers who had lost their mindsIn the
pesthouses I saw gaping gashes woundsbleeding full blastAnd
amputated limbs danced about or soaredthrough the raucous
air[97]Much later, the Scottish poet Douglas Dunn devoted
anepistolary poem in verse to the naval war in The DonkeysEars:
Politovskys Letters Home (2000). This follows thevoyage of the
Russian Imperial Navy agship Kniaz to itssinking at the battle of
Tsushima.[98]10.4 FictionFictional coverage of the war began even
before it wasover. An early example was Allen Upwards The
Interna-tional Spy, being the secret history of the
Russo-JapaneseWar (1904). Set in both Russia and Japan, it ends
with theDogger Bank incident involving the Baltic Fleet.[99]
Thepolitical thinking displayed there is typical of the time.There
is great admiration for the Japanese, who were En-glish allies.
Russia is in turmoil, but the main impetustowards war is not
imperialism as such but commercialforces. Every student of modern
history has remarkedthe fact that all recent wars have been
promoted by greatcombinations of capitalists. The causes which
formerlyled to war between nation and nation have ceased to
op-erate (p.40). The true villain plotting in the
background,however, is the German Emperor, seeking to
destabilisethe European balance of power in his countrys
favour.Towards the end of the novel, the narrator steals a Ger-man
submarine and successfully foils a plot to involve theEnglish in
the war. The submarine motif reappeared inGeorge Griths science
ction novel, The Stolen Sub-marine (1904), although in this case it
is a French super-submarine which its developer sells to the
Russians foruse against the Japanese in another tale of
internationalintrigue.[100]Though most English-language ction of
the period tookthe Japanese side, the Rev. W. W. Walkers
Canadiannovella, Alter Ego (1907), is an exception. It features
aCanadian volunteer in the Russian army who, on his re-turn, agrees
to talk about his experiences to an isolatedupcountry community and
relates his part in the battle ofMukden.[101] Though this incident
only occupies two ofthe books six chapters, it is used to
illustrate the mainmessage there, that war is anti-Christian and
barbarous,except in a defensive sense (Ch.3).Painting of Admiral
Togo on the bridge of the Japanese battleshipMikasa, before the
Battle of Tsushima in 1905.Various aspects of the war were also
common in contem-porary childrens ction. Categorised as Boys Own
ad-venture stories, they oer few insights into the conict,being
generally based on news articles and sharing unre-ectingly in the
contemporary culture of imperialism.[102]Amongthese,
HerbertStrangwasresponsiblefortwonovels: Kobo: A Story of the
Russo-Japanese War (1905),told from the Japanese side,[103] and
Brown of Moukden(1906), viewed from the Russian side.[104]Three
morewerewrittenbytheprolicAmericanauthor, EdwardStratemeyer:
UndertheMikadosFlag, orYoungSol-diers of Fortune (1904);[105]At the
Fall of Port Arthur,or a young American in the Japanese navy
(1905);[106]and Under Togo for Japan, or Three Young Americanson
Land and Sea (1906). Two other English stories be-gin with the
action at Port Arthur and follow the eventsthereafter: ASoldier
ofJapan: ataleoftheRusso-Japanese War by Captain Frederick Sadleir
Brereton, andThe North Pacic (1905) by Willis Boyd Allen
(1855-1938).[107]Twomorealsoinvolveyoungmenghtingin the Japanese
navy: Americans in For the Mikado,aJapanese Middy in Action
(1905)[108]by Kirk Munroe,and a temporarily disgraced English ocer
in Under theEnsignoftheRisingSun (1916)[109]by Harry Colling-wood,
the pen-name of WilliamJoseph Cosens Lancaster(1851-1922), whose
speciality was naval ction.Russian novelist Alexey Novikov-Priboy
really did servein the Baltic Fleet and wrote about the conict on
his re-turn, but his early work was suppressed. It was not untilthe
changed political climate under Soviet rule that he be-gan writing
his historical epic Tsushima, based on his per-sonal experiences on
board the battleship Orel as well as16 13 REFERENCESon testimonies
of fellow sailors and government archives.The rst part was
published in 1932, the second in 1935,and the whole novel was later
awarded the Stalin Prize. Itdescribes the heroism of Russian
sailors and certain of-cers whose defeat, in accordance with the
new Sovietthinking, was due to the criminal negligence of the
Impe-rial Naval command. A German novel by Frank Thiess,originally
published as Tsushima in 1936 (and later trans-lated as The Voyage
of Forgotten Men), covered the samejourney round the world to
defeat.Later there appeared a rst-hand account of the siege ofPort
Arthur by Alexander Stepanov (18921965). Hehad been present there
as the 12-year-old son of a batterycommander and his novel, Port
Arthur: a historical nar-rative (1944), is based on his own diaries
and his fathersnotes. The work is considered one of the best
historicalnovels of the Soviet period.[110] A later novel in which
thewar appears is Valentin Pikuls The Three Ages of Okini-San
(1981). Centred on the life of Vladimir Kokovtsov,who rose through
the ranks to admiral of the Russianeet, it covers the period from
the Russo-Japanese Warthrough to the February and October
Revolutions.[111] Amuch later Russian genre novel uses the period
of the waras background. This is Boris Akunins The Diamond Ve-hicle
(2003), in the rst part of which the detective ErastFandorin is
charged with protecting the Trans-SiberianRailway from Japanese
sabotage.Themainhistorical novel dealingwiththewar
fromtheJapanesesideisShibaRyotarosimmenseCloudsabove the hill,
published serially in several volumes be-tween 1968-72.[112]The
closely researched story
spansthedecadefromtheSino-ChineseWartotheRusso-Japanese War and
went on to become the nationsfavourite book.[113]11 FilmographySee
also lm list about Russo-Japanese warPort Arthur (1936)Kreiser
Varyag (1946)Nichiro sens shri no hishi: Tekich dansanbyaku-ri
(1957)Meiji tenn to nichiro daisenso (1958)The Battle of the Japan
Sea (1969,: ,Nihonkai-Kaisen) depictsthenaval battlesofthewar, the
attacks on the Port Arthur highlands, andthe subterfuge and
diplomacy of Japanese agents inSweden. Admiral Togo is portrayed by
Toshiro Mi-fune.The Battle of Tsushima (1975) [documentary],
de-piction of the naval Battle of TsushimaThe Battle of Port Arthur
(1980, sometimes
referredas203Kochi[114])depictionoftheSiegeofPortArthurNihonkai
daikaisen: Umi yukaba (1983)Reilly, AceofSpies (1983). Russian-born
Britishspy Sidney Reilly's role in providing intelligence
thatallowed the Japanese surprise attack that started theSiege of
Port Arthur is dramatised in the secondepisode of this TV
seriesBogatstvo (2004)Saka no ue no kumo (2009)12 See alsoKentaro
KanekoBaron RosenImperialism in AsiaLiancourt RocksList of warsList
ofwarshipssunkduringtheRusso-JapaneseWarRussian Imperialismin Asia
and the Russo-JapaneseWarSergius Witte13 References[1] Montenegro,
Japan to declare truce, United Press Inter-national (US);
Montenegro, Japan End 100 Years War,HistoryNewsNetwork(US).
citingWorldPeaceHer-ald, 16June 2006; Montenegrina,
digitalnabibliotekacrnogorske kulture (Montegreina,digital library
of Mon-tenegrin culture), Istorija: uro Batrievi, citing Batrie-vi,
uro. (1996). Crnogorci urusko-japanskomratu(Montegegrans in the
Russo-Japanese War); compare DrAnto Gvozdenovi: general u tri
vojske. Crnogorci u rusko-japanskom ratu (Dr. Anto Gvozdenovic:
General in ThreeArmies; Montegegrans in the Russo-Japanese War)[2]
Samuel Dumas, Losses of Life Caused By War (1923)[3] Erols.com,
Twentieth Century Atlas Death Tolls andCasualty Statistics for
Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides.[4] John Steinburg,
WastheRusso-JapaneseConict WorldWar Zero?. p. 2.[5] Rewriting the
Russo-Japanese War: A Centenary Perspec-tive, Schimmelpenninick van
der Oye, p. 80.[6] University of Texas: Growth of colonial empires
in Asia17[7] Connaughton, pp. 19-20[8] Paine, p. 317[9] Example of
Australian uniform of the period[10] Connaughton, pp. 78.[11]
Paine, p. 320.[12] Text in Japanese Ministry of Foreign Aairs,
Correspon-dence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) pp. 79.[13]
Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) pp.
2324.[14] Koda, Yoji (1 April 2005). The Russo-Japanese War:Primary
Causes of Japanese Success. Naval War CollegeReview. Retrieved 6
April 2015 via HighBeam. (sub-scription required (help)).[15]
Connaughton, p. 10.[16] RaymondEsthus,
NicholasIIandtheRusso-JapaneseWar,RussianReviewvol. 40, No. 4(Oct.,
1981),Accessed on 13 May 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/129919 ,
p. 411.[17] Robert W. Tolf (1976). The Russian Rockfellers.
HooverPress. p. 156. ISBN 0-8179-6583-1.[18] Esthus, p. 397.[19]
Text in Correspondence Regarding Negotiations ... (19031904) p.
38.[20] David Schmmelpenninck van der Oye, The ImmediateOrigins of
the War, in David Wol et al. (eds), TheRusso-JapaneseWarinGlobal
Perspective: WorldWarZero (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), 42.[21]
Jukes, The Russo-Japanese War, p. 21.[22]
Somescholarlyresearcherscredit EnjiroYamazawithdrafting the text of
the Japanese declaration of war seeNaval Postgraduate School (US)
thesis: Na, Sang Hyung.The Korean-Japanese Dispute over
Dokdo/Takeshima,p. 62 n207 December 2007, citing Byang-Ryull
Kim.(2006). Ilbon Gunbu'ui Dokdo Chim Talsa (The Plunderof Dokdo by
the Japanese Military), p. 121.[23] SpringRicetoRobert H. M.
Ferguson,inStephenGwynn, The Letters, (March 2, 1904). and
Friendships ofSir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, 2 vols. (Boston,
1929),p. 402.[24] Connaughton, p. 34.[25] YaleUniversity:
LawsofWar: OpeningofHostilities(Hague III); October 18, 1907,
Avalon Project at YaleLaw School.[26] Grant, p. 12, 15, 17, 42[27]
Shaw, Albert (March 1904). The Progress of the World Japans Swift
Action. The American Monthly ReviewofReviews (New York: The Review
of Reviews Company)29 (3): 260[28] Jukes[29] Grant, p. 4850[30]
Connaughton, p. 65[31] Connaughton, p. 86[32] Forczyk p. 50[33]
Forczyk p. 53[34] The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile
Advertiser(18841942), 8 April 1905, Page 2,
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singfreepressb19050408-1.2.6.aspx[35]
The Straits Times, 8 April 1905, Page4,
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050408-1.2.32.aspx[36]
Japan at War - An Encyclopedia, Louis G. Perez, editor;Santa
Barbara, California, 2013, p. 345.[37] Watts p. 22[38] Mahan p.
455[39] Mahan p. 456[40] Connaughton, p. 109,342[41] Connaughton,
p. 272; Text of Treaty; Signed by the Em-peror of Japan and Czar of
Russia, New York Times. 17October 1905.[42] Cox, Gary P. (2006).
Review of The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World
WarZero". Journal ofMilitaryHistory70(1):
250251.doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0037.[43]
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm ,Chapter 2
Section C[44] Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An
Adventurein American Diplomacy (1969).[45] George E. Mowry, The
First Roosevelt, The AmericanMercury, (November 1946) quote at p
580 online[46] TwentiethCenturyAtlas DeathTolls
andCasualtyStatistics for Wars, Dictatorships and Genocides[47]
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86.[48] Abraham Ascher, The
Revolution of 1905: Russia in Dis-array, StanfordUniversityPress,
1994, ISBN0-8047-2327-3, Google Print, p.157158[49] For
PolishJapanese negotiations and relations during thewar, see:Bert
Edstrm, The Japanese and Europe: Imagesand Perceptions, Routledge,
2000, ISBN 1-873410-86-7,pp.126133Jerzy Lerski, A Polish Chapter of
the Russo-JapaneseWar, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of
Japan, III/7p. 6996[50] Warner, p. 575-76[51] Japans Present Crisis
and Her Constitution; TheMikados Ministers Will Be Held Responsible
by the Peo-ple for the Peace Treaty Marquis Ito May Be Able
toSaveBaronKomura,NewYorkTimes. 3September1905.18 13 REFERENCES[52]
Connaughton, p. 342[53] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 86[54]
Steinburg, p. 7.[55] Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, p. 84.[56]
Steinburg, p. 6.[57] Steinburg, p. 3.[58] Schimmelpenninck van der
Oye, p. 83.[59] Quora[60] EishiroIto, UnitedStates of Asia, James
JoyceandJapan, in A Companion to James Joyce, Blackwell Pub-lishing
2013, pp.195-6[61] David Crowley, Seeing Japan, Imagining Poland:
Polishart and the Russo-Japanese war, Faktograa July 4, 2012[62] Le
Socialiste, 1-8 May 1904[63] Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare,
18151914, p. 192[64] Strachan, p. 844.[65] Keegan p. 179, 229,
230[66] Strachan, p. 384.[67] Strachan, p. 386.[68] Strachan, p.
388.[69] Lyman, StanfordM. (Summer 2000). TheYellowPeril Mystique:
Origins and Vicissitudes of a Racist Dis-course. International
Journal of Politics, Culture, and So-ciety (Springer Publishing) 13
(4): 699. ISSN 0891-4486 via JSTOR. (subscription required
(help)).[70] Heale, M. J. (April 2009). Anatomy of a Scare: Yel-low
Peril Politics in America, 19801993. Journal ofAmerican Studies
(Cambridge University Press on behalfof the British Association for
American Studies) 43 (1):21. ISSN 1469-5154 via JSTOR.
(subscription required(help)).[71] Sisemore, James D. (2003).
CDMhost.com, The Russo-Japanese War, Lessons Not Learned. U.S. Army
Com-mand and General Sta College.[72] Chapman, John and Ian Nish.
(2004). On the Peripheryof the Russo-Japanese War, Part I, p. 53
n42, Paper No.IS/2004/475. SuntoryToyotaInternational
CentreforEconomics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), LondonSchool
of Economics and Political Science (LSE).[73] Chapman, John W. M.
Russia, Germany and the Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration,
18961906pages4155 from Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited
byMark & Ljubica Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son,
2004 page 42.[74] Chapman, John W.M. Russia, Germany and the
Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from
Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica
Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004 page 55.[75]
Chapman, John W.M. Russia, Germany and the
Anglo-JapaneseIntelligenceCollaboration, 18961906pages4155 from
Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy edited byMark & Ljubica
Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004. p. 54.[76]
Chapman, John W. M. Russia, Germany and the
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Erickson, London: Weidenfeld & Nicol-son, 2004. pp. 5254.[77]
Sherman, A. J."German-JewishBankersinWorldPol-itics, The Financing
of the Russo-Japanese WarLeo Baeck Institute Yearbook(1983) 28(1):
5973doi:10.1093/leobaeck/28.1.59[78] British Assistance to the
Japanese Navy during theRusso-Japanese War of 1904-5. The Great
Circle (Aus-tralian Association for Maritime History) 2 (1): 44.
April1980. Retrieved 9 March 2015 via JSTOR. (registrationrequired
(help)).[79] Schi, Jacob Henry. Dictionary of American Biogra-phy.
New York: Charles Scribners Sons. 19281936.pp. 430432.[80]
Steinberg, JohnW. (January2008). WastheRusso-Japanese War World War
Zero?". The Russian Review(Wiley on behalf of The Editors and Board
of Trusteesof the Russian Review) 67 (1): 5. ISSN 1467-9434
viaJSTOR. (subscription required (help)).[81] Ion, A. Hamish;
Errington, E. J. (1993). Great Powers andLittle Wars: The Limits of
Power. Westport, CT: PraegerPublishers. pp. 146, 152. ISBN
978-0275939656. Re-trieved 8 August 2015 via Questia. (subscription
re-quired (help)).[82] John W. Dower, 2010[83] Dower, Yellow
Promise/ Yellow Peril[84] Dower, Yellow Promise/ Yellow Peril[85]
State Historical Museum Opens 'The Year 1812 in thePaintings by
Vasily Vereshchagin', Art Daily, March 11,2010; War Lasted 18
Months ... Russian Miscalculation,New York Times, August 30,
1905.[86] Wikiart and Wikiart[87] Chuliengcheng. In a glorious
death eternal life, Wikimedia[88] Words at Armchair General; a
performance on YouTube[89] Editions Orphe[90] There is a
translation at Mudcat and a performance onYouTube[91]
Thewordsandadescriptionofthenaval actionisatArmchair General; there
is a performance on YouTube[92] War Poets Association[93]
Intersections issue 419[94] See Janine Beichmans 2006 lecture to
the Asiatic Societyof Japan[95] Takashi Fujitani, Splendid
Monarchy: Power andPageantry in Modern Japan, University of
California1996, p.126[96] Internet Archive[97]
SelectedWritingsofBlaiseCendrars, NewDirections1966, p,93[98] David
Wheatley gives an account in his article for TheLondon Review of
Books, 21 June 2001, pp.40-41[99] Gutenberg[100] E.F. and R.
Bleiler, Science Fiction: The Early Years,Kent State University
1990, p.308[101] Gutenbeg[102] The Russo-Japanese War and Boys Own
Adventure Sto-ries, The Russo-Japanese War Research Society
2003[103] Gutenberg[104] Gutenberg[105] Hathi Trust[106]
Gutenberg[107] Gutenberg[108] Internet Archive[109] Gutenberg[110]
Details in the Russian 1978 edition, 'About Author' sec-tion[111]
NoviiRusskii[112] Translated in 2013, introduction and excerpts on
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The Battle of Port Arthur (203 Koshi) in the Internet
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vsJapanese Battleship, Yellow Sea 190405. Osprey.ISBN
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John Murray. First and secondeditions published in 1907.Keegan,
John (1999). The First World War. NewYork: Alfred A. Knopf. ISBN
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TheSino-JapaneseWarof18941895: Perceptions, Power, andPrimacy.ISBN
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Imperi-alism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and
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TheUSNavysFirst TorpedoBoats. SouthCarolina: Arcadia Publishing.
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AnthonyJ. (1990). TheImperial RussianNavy. London, Great Britain:
Arms and ArmourPress. ISBN 0-85368-912-1.15 Further readingCorbett,
SirJulian. MaritimeOperations InTheRusso-Japanese War 19041905.
(1994) Originallyclassied, and in two volumes, ISBN
1-55750-129-7.20 16 EXTERNAL LINKSBay, Alexander. Beriberi
inModernJapan: TheMaking of a National Disease. University
ofRochester Press (2012). ISBN 978-1-58046-427-7Hough, Richard A.
The Fleet That Had To Die. Bal-lantine Books. (1960).Jentschura,
Hansgeorg; Dieter Jung, Peter Mickel.Warships of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 18691945. UnitedStates Naval Institute,
Annapolis,Maryland, 1977. Originally published in Germanas Die
Japanischen Kreigschie 18691945 in 1970,translated into English by
David Brown and AntonyPreston. ISBN 0-87021-893-X.Jukes, Geory.
TheRusso-JapaneseWar19041905. Osprey Essential Histories. (2002).
ISBN978-1-84176-446-7.Kowner, Rotem (2006). Historical Dictionary
of theRusso-JapaneseWar. Scarecrow. ISBN0-8108-4927-5.Kowner, Rotem
(2007). The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War. Routledge. ISBN
0-4155-4582X.Matsumura Masayoshi, Ian Ruxton (trans.),
BaronKanekoandthe Russo-Japanese War (190405),Lulu Press 2009 ISBN
978-0-557-11751-2Morris, Edmund (2002). Theodore
Rex,Books.Gooble.com. NewYork: Random House.10-ISBN0-8129-6600-7;
13-ISBN978-0-8129-6600-8Novikov-Priboy, Aleksei. Tsushima. (An
accountfrom a seaman aboard the battleship Oryol, whichwas captured
at Tsushima). London: George Allen& Unwin Ltd. (1936).Nish, Ian
Hill. (1985). The Origins of the Russo-JapaneseWar. London:
Longman. 10-ISBN0-582-49114-2; 13-ISBN 978-0-582-49114-4Okamoto,
Shumpei (1970). The Japanese Oligarchyand the Russo-Japanese War.
Columbia UniversityPress.Pleshakov, Constantine. The Tsars Last
Armada:The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima.
ISBN0-465-05792-6. (2002).Saaler, Sven und Inaba Chiharu (Hg.).
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Bilderbogen, Deutsches Institut frJapanstudien Tokyo,
(2005).Seager, Robert. Alfred Thayer Mahan: The ManAnd His Letters.
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Regarding the Negotiations be-tween Japan and Russia (19031904),
Presented tothe Imperial Diet, March 1904 (Tokyo, 1904)16 External
linksRussoJapaneseWar.com, Russo-JapaneseWar re-search
society.BFcollection.net, Database of Russian Army Jewishsoldiers
injured, killed, or missing in action fromthewar.BYU.edu, Text of
the Treaty of Portsmouth:.Flot.com, Russian Navy history of
war.Frontiers.loc.gov, Russo-Japanese Relations in theFar East.
Meeting of Frontiers (Library ofCongress)CSmonitor.com, Treaty of
Portsmouth now seen asglobal turning point fromthe Christian
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2005."Russo-Japanese War, The". The NewStudents Ref-erence Work.
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(Montenegrin).Stanford.edu, Lyrics, translation and melody ofthe
song On the hills of Manchuria (Na
sopkahManchzhurii).GoogleMapwithbattlesofRusso-JapaneseWarand other
important events.2117 Text and image sources, contributors, and
licenses17.1 Text Russo-Japanese War Source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Japanese_War?oldid=675404717
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