Rule transgressions in groups: The conditional nature of newcomers' willingness to confront deviance

European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

Published online 22 March 2009 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.627

*

C

Short research note

Rule transgressions in groups: The conditional nature of newcomers’willingness to confront deviance

Correspondence to: Jolanda Jetten, School of P

opyright # 2009 John Wiley & Son

JOLANDA JETTEN1,2*, MATTHEW J. HORNSEY1,RUSSELL SPEARS 3, S. ALEXANDER HASLAM2

AND ELEANOR COWELL2

1School of Psychology, University of Queensland, Australia2School of Psychology, University of Exeter, UK3School of Psychology, Cardiff University, UK

Abstract

We provide evidence that, compared to old-timers, newcomers’ intentions to confront deviants are more sensitive to the

social context when confronted with rule-violations. Female rugby players (N¼ 71) were asked for their disapproval of,

and willingness to sanction, ingroup and outgroup members who broke important rules in rugby. We also manipulated the

status of the audience and found that newcomers were more likely to confront deviants when the audience was high status,

and when there was little risk of alienating other ingroup members. In contrast, old-timers expressed relatively high

intentions to confront deviants regardless of the context. Discussion focuses on the idea that newcomers resiled from

confronting deviants when an ingroup rule-breaker had to be directly confronted, presumably because the perceived costs

of doing so exceeded the potential benefits of ingratiating oneself to the high-status audience. Copyright # 2009 John

Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

At times, group members become aware of norm transgressions or rule-violations within their group. For example, a

medical doctor may notice that her colleagues are breaking codes of conduct by not treating a terminally ill patient, or a

bank employee discovers irregularities in the bank’s financial transactions. These individuals need to decide whether the

rule-breaker should be reported or whether, for fear of repercussions, it is better for them to keep quiet about the fact that an

important rule or norm has been violated. Those who confront deviance have to weigh up the costs versus benefits of their

actions (Gundlach, Douglas, & Martinko, 2003; Henik, 2008). Sometimes they are heralded as heroes, but more

commonly those who confront deviance face criticism, are portrayed as disloyal and receive little support from other

members of their group (Near & Miceli, 1995). Given that someone who confronts deviance can be seen either as a snitch

or as a loyal group member who is protecting key norms and rules, a question that presents itself is whether we can predict

who is most likely to expose norm-violations?

A relevant literature to address this question is the research on whistle-blowing. However, it is also clear that this

literature has primarily focused on identifying individual characteristics that affect the likelihood of whistle-blowing and

situations that promote whistle-blowing (e.g., organizational climate; Near & Miceli, 1995). As an example of the former,

a meta-analysis by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) examining the characteristics of whistle-blowers suggests

that, in organizational settings, whistle-blowers are likely to come from higher-pay categories and typically hold higher

supervisory positions in organizations. There is mixed evidence on the relationship between tenure and whistle-blowing.

Some researchers have found that whistle-blowers are likely to have more years of service than the average employee in

sychology, University of Queensland, St. Lucia 4072 QLD, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]

s, Ltd.

Received 21 July 2008

Accepted 9 February 2009

Newcomers versus old-timers and group behavior 339

the organization (Miceli & Near, 1988), but others failed to find a relationship (Sims & Keenan, 1998). Studies examining

whistle-blowing in the medical world have found either that tenure of medical students does not affect their whistle-

blowing intentions (Goldie, McConnachie, & Morrison, 2003), or that students in their latter years of study were less likely

to blow the whistle than students relatively early in their studies (Rennie & Crosby, 2002).

In sum, it appears that the relationship between tenure and willingness to confront deviance is not straightforward. Part

of the problem here is that there is a lack of systematic experimental research examining why and when tenure should

affect willingness to confront deviance. To address this issue, the present paper aims to deepen our understanding of

factors that constrain and facilitate intentions and acts of confronting deviance. We focus on intentions to confront

deviance and define this concept in the current study as the willingness to disclose rule-violations by others (see Mesmer-

Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

We build on the social identity theory framework (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and propose that an individual’s response to

rule breaking is affected by their standing within the group because willingness to confront deviance is tied to and

determined by intragroup and intergroup dynamics. Indeed, even though it is often only one individual that speaks up

against rule-violations, their action is likely to not only affect their own position within the group but also dynamics within

groups. This is because openly confronting deviance has the potential to threaten and weaken group identity and, at times,

the group may not survive the process of being exposed as harboring rule-breakers. Other groups may respond in a negative

and even hostile way when they learn about the norm transgressions—often because acts of confronting deviance make it

clear that the group has not earlier taken actions to stop the rule breaking. This also shows that, despite the fact that

confronting deviance is often an act of loyalty motivated by a wish to bring group members who violate important group

norms back in line, the costs of hanging out the dirty laundry may, at times, exceed the benefits of enforcing group norms

(Gunlach et al., 2003). We propose that newcomers and old-timers, because of their position within the group, differ in the

way they weigh up the costs versus benefits of confronting deviance.

RESPONDING TO RULE-VIOLATIONS AND INTRAGROUP POSITION

Group members’ differences in intragroup position or tenure in the group relate in meaningful ways to intragroup and

intergroup behavior and to how people experience group membership (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 1994; Noel, Wann, &

Branscombe, 1995). Old-timers are more likely to embody central group characteristics and are more likely to perceive

themselves as prototypical of the group than newcomers (Noel et al., 1995; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1999). In addition,

because old-timers have been around for longer, they are often more knowledgeable about important group norms and they

may also feel greater responsibility for enforcing commitment to rules and norms compared to more junior group

members. We therefore predict that old-timers, in an attempt to enforce normative behavior, should be more likely to

intend to confront deviance in response to norm-violations than newcomers.

What is more, old-timers’ intentions to confront deviance should be relatively high across contexts, regardless of who is

watching. Some evidence for this was obtained in a study by Noel et al. (1995) who found that old-timers were more likely

than newcomers to show outgroup derogation and their responses were not affected by whether outgroup derogation had to

be expressed publicly or privately. This suggests that old-timers feel relatively secure and confident so do not have to

engage in self-presentational and strategic behavior to safeguard their position in the group (Kramer, 1998).

In contrast, newcomers are likely to be anxious about being accepted by other group members (Levine & Moreland,

1994). For these reasons, newcomers appear to be highly responsive to the social context. One reason for this may be that

newcomers often feel pressured to assimilate to the group and change their behavior to become more similar to more

established group members (Van Maanen, 1977). Gaining greater acceptance in the group is often contingent on publicly

demonstrating good group member behavior. Presenting oneself favorably to other ingroup members, fulfilling the group’s

expectations, and flattering senior group members are all expected to lead to greater acceptance in the group. In addition to

a motivation to please the audience and to gain greater acceptance in the group, such behavior is also likely to be motivated

by a desire to construct a more favorable impression of the self (see Baumeister, 1982).

Evidence for the strategic behavior of newcomers was obtained by Noel et al. (1995; Study 2) who found that when

participants’ responses were visible to the rest of the group, the level of outgroup derogation displayed by newcomers

exceeded the level of outgroup derogation displayed by old-timers. However, outgroup derogation was much lower when

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

340 Jolanda Jetten et al.

newcomers had to give their responses privately. The authors interpreted this as reflecting the strategic nature of

newcomers’ behavior—when expressions of commitment have the potential to be strategically advantageous in terms of

proving their loyalty to the group, newcomers showed high levels of ingroup favoring behavior. Further evidence that

newcomers are sensitive to social context was obtained by Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie (2003). Two studies

were conducted in which newcomers learned that their acceptance by other group members would improve in the future or

that they could expect rejection by other group members. On various indices of group loyalty it was found that newcomers

who had weak identification with the group were less loyal when they anticipated future rejection and more loyal when

they expected future acceptance. Interestingly, research on whistle-blowing among medical students showed that even

though more junior students did not differ in whistle-blowing intentions from more senior students, junior students did

give different reasons for not intending to blow the whistle (Goldie et al., 2003). Compared to their senior counterparts,

junior students more frequently mentioned that they would not blow the whistle on malpractice because they would not

want to irritate more senior members of staff who may block their career progress or because they would fear for a

backlash from the ‘old boy system’ (see also Henik, 2008).

This suggests that newcomers’ public expressions of group loyalty to gain greater acceptance within the group are not

mechanical but finely attuned to the consequences that loyalty expressions may have. Newcomers are expected to be more

likely than old-timers to read the context as a guide for appropriate behavior. In this way, our argument ties in with a

broader literature showing that strategic behavior has to be contextually possible and appropriate (see Barreto & Ellemers,

2000; Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinper, 2003; Ellemers, van Dyck, Hinkle, & Jacobs, 2000; Spears & Lea, 1994).

We therefore predicted that, because newcomers are more sensitive to what the situation affords than old-timers,

newcomers should intend to confront deviance when that is likely to lead to positive outcomes, but they should also refrain

from confronting deviance and downplay the seriousness of norm-violations when that is what the situation affords.

In the literature, tenure is often treated as a proxy for group identification with those who have been a member for a

longer time identifying more strongly than newcomers. However, even though identification and tenure might be closely

related constructs and may even have parallel effects, they are distinct and separate constructs. Whereas identification is

conceptualized as the affective commitment to a group, tenure relates (at least in our conceptualization here) to the degree

to which someone feels like a newcomer to the group (see also Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). In our research, we will

examine the extent to which effects of tenure are independent of effects of group identification.

OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH

Our research was conducted in the context of rugby-players who were presented with rule-violations by ingroup and

outgroup members. We focus on three aspects of the context that should affect the extent to which newcomers and old-

timers within rugby teams are likely to confront deviance. First, we argue that, in order to understand when group members

confront deviance, one needs to know who will witness the act of confrontation. In particular, we assessed the status of the

audience as a factor that should affect intentions to bring deviants back in line. In line with social identity reasoning, we

define status of the audience here as the relative position of the audience vis-a-vis the ingroup on a particular dimension of

comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 43). Our high-status audience consists of people with more prestige (i.e., coaches

and professional players) and the low-status audience consists of people with less prestige (i.e., those who are interested in

playing rugby in the future) than the group (rugby-players). In this operationalization of audience status, high-status

audiences (but not low-status audiences), because of their greater prestige, have the power to affect members’ position and

standing within the group.

In line with previous research (Noel et al., 1995), we predicted that the status of the audience would not affect old-

timers’ responses because they would tend to confront rule-breakers regardless of who would be monitoring them.

Newcomers, however, are likely to be much more sensitive to the status of the audience and whether features of the

audience make responses strategically beneficial. For example, confronting deviance is less likely to be effective in terms

of ingratiating oneself to the group when the audience that one is addressing does not have the power to enhance the

newcomer’s position within the group. Presenting the self as a ‘good’ group member is therefore expected to be more

useful when the audience that one is addressing is of high status (Jetten, Hornsey, & Adarves-Yorno, 2006). Thus, we

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Newcomers versus old-timers and group behavior 341

predicted that intentions to confront rule-breakers would be more pronounced among newcomers when they addressed a

high-status audience than when they communicated to a low-status audience.

A second factor that is likely to affect responses to rule-violations relates to the type of response that is required to bring

rule-breakers back in line. The personal costs and commitment required of confronting deviance might be perceived as too

high in some contexts (Gundlach et al., 2003; Packer, 2008). In examining this, we distinguished two types of intentions to

confront rule-breakers: (a) intentions to express disapproval of the rule breaking, and (b) intentions to directly do or say

something about the rule-breaking behavior. We predicted that, although it might be relatively undemanding for

newcomers to disapprove of rule-breaking behavior of ingroup and outgroup members, committing oneself to sanction

rule-breaking behavior would be perceived as more risky.

A final moderator of the willingness to confront deviance examined in the present research is whether the rule-breaker

is a fellow ingroup member or an outgroup member. In this study, we assessed participants’ responses to rule-violations

and inappropriate behavior by both ingroup and outgroup members. We predicted that the costs are raised and the potential

benefits are reduced if one has to directly confront an ingroup member and bring them into line. We predicted that while

newcomers would perceive intervening as relatively cost-free when outgroup members engage in rule-breaking behavior,

the perceived costs and risks of doing so would be perceived to be higher when ingroup members break rules. Confronting

other ingroup members is more risky than outgroup members because such direct expressions of disapproval might affect

the group as a whole (e.g., by making ingroup enemies and undermining group harmony).

Considering all classes of moderators, we predicted that there is a complex interplay between who, how, and when

individuals will confront deviance. Considering all these factors, we predict that old-timers would condemn non-

normative behavior regardless of who the audience was and regardless of the group to which the deviant belonged. In

contrast, we expected that newcomers would be more strategic in their condemnation of non-normative behavior.

Specifically, because a high-status audience has more power to enhance a group member’s position within the group,

newcomers might be more likely to condemn non-normative behavior if they thought their protests were going to be

noticed by a high-status audience than if the audience had low status. However, there might be limits to what newcomers

would do to prove themselves. Although condemnation of non-normative behavior might successfully endear the

newcomer to their high-status audience, this strategy might backfire if it involves directly confronting an ingroup member

over their deviant behavior. In short, what the newcomer might gain in the eyes of their audience they might lose by

making an ingroup enemy and arousing intragroup tensions.

METHOD

Participants and Design

Seventy-one female rugby players participated in the study (mean age was 20.25 years). Participants were recruited from

various rugby clubs and their participation was voluntary. They had on average played for 28.46 months (ranging from 2 to

123 months). The design consisted of one manipulated variable (status of the audience: Low vs. High) and one measured

variable: perceived tenure in the team. Participants were randomly allocated to the high and low audience status

conditions. Participants recorded (a) intentions to express disapproval of the rule-violations, and (b) intentions to directly

confront the rule-violation. These measures were collected in response to both ingroup and outgroup rule violators.

Pilot

We conducted a pilot test to check overall awareness of rules among rugby players and to examine whether newcomers and

old-timers differed in their awareness of the appropriate way to behave as a rugby player. Thirty female rugby players

completed a short questionnaire. Participants were given six hypothetical situations in rugby. For example, they were

asked: ‘During a game you disagree with the referee. What should you do?’ The appropriate way to behave as rugby player

was mentioned by 97% of the players. This suggests that there was a high level of norm awareness. Importantly, this norm

awareness did not differ for newcomers compared to old-timers (98.9 versus 95.5%, respectively).

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

342 Jolanda Jetten et al.

Procedure

Participants were approached to take part in the study at rugby matches and training sessions. The study was introduced as

an investigation into the attitudes and opinions of women who play rugby. Status of the audience was manipulated by

providing information about the prestige of those who would have access to the results of the study. Both the low- and high-

status audience were outsiders or third parties and it was clear to participants that rule-violations would not directly affect

the audiences. Instructions for the low-status audience condition are reported below, with instructions for the high-status

audience condition in brackets.

‘‘People considering taking up rugby [Coaches and professional players] are interested in current female players’

opinions of and attitudes towards the game. By answering the following questions, an overview of players’ attitudes

towards women’s rugby can be constructed to help those who have not yet started playing [coaches and professional

players] to find out more. Your responses will be supplied to and used by a committee organizing an introductory weekend

for those who are interested in playing rugby in the future [committee of coaches and professional players who are

interested in reviewing the attitudes of women playing rugby]. Women and girls thinking of playing rugby [Coaches and

professional players] will learn more about the attitudes of female rugby players through the information that you and

others provide.’’

To strengthen the audience manipulation, participants were asked to write a few words about how they thought

information regarding the attitudes and opinions of female rugby players would be useful to the committee. After

completing all dependent measures, participants were thanked for their cooperation and were given written debriefing

explaining the purpose of the study.

Measures

Participants were asked how many months they had been playing rugby. This was followed by three items assessing

perceived tenure on scales ranging from 1 (‘‘not at all’’) to 7 (‘‘very much’’). Perceived tenure questions included: ‘‘Would

you say that you ‘know the ropes’ within your team?’’ and ‘‘Would you describe yourself as a newcomer in the team?

(reverse-scored).’’ A composite scale was formed (a¼ .93). We also assessed group identification with four items to rule

out the possibility that effects would be due to identification and not to tenure. An example group identification item was:

‘‘How committed to your team do you consider yourself to be?’’ (a¼ .87).

Participants were then presented with eight hypothetical situations (selected on the basis of the pilot) in which either a

member of their own team (ingroup) or a member of the competing team (outgroup) failed to behave appropriately on the

field (e.g., using ‘dirty’ tactics like punching and high tackling, verbally challenging the referee’s decisions, being offside

when the referee was not watching). To ensure that targets were perceived as ingroup or as outgroup, they were referred to

explicitly as ‘‘a member of your team’’ and ‘‘a member of the other team’’, respectively. Participants were asked to rate to

what extent they considered each of the four ingroup and outgroup rule-violations to be acceptable and to what extent they

would feel obliged to say or do something about the violations. Responses were made on 7-point scales ranging from (1)

‘‘not at all’’ to (7) ‘‘very much.’’ The responses on the acceptance scale were recoded so that higher scores indicated

greater disapproval. Disapproval responses and intention to sanction responses were separately averaged for ingroup and

outgroup targets.

To check whether participants had understood who the audience was, they were asked who was to benefit from their

responses. They could tick the following boxes: ‘coaches and professional players’, ‘committee organising an introduction

for prospective players’ and ‘don’t know’.

RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

All participants correctly identified the audience. In addition, we found that perceived tenure correlated quite highly with

membership duration, r(71)¼ .70, p < .001, which suggests that the longer participants had been playing rugby the more

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Newcomers versus old-timers and group behavior 343

they perceived themselves to be fully-fledged rugby players. Inspection of the self-rated tenure scores and membership

duration in month measures revealed that the former measure was normally distributed, but that the latter measure was

severely positively skewed making it less appropriate for regression analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). In addition to

this, because we were interested in the subjective experience of tenure, we decided to analyze the data using the self-

perceived tenure scale. Group identification was generally high, M¼ 5.25, SD¼ 1.03, and correlated positively both with

perceived tenure, r(71)¼ .74, p < .001, and membership duration, r(71)¼ .33, p¼ .005.

Disapproval Ratings

The perceived disapproval of ingroup and outgroup rule-breaking behavior was analyzed in two separate multiple

regressions in which perceived tenure was centered, the manipulation of audience status coded as low status (0) and high

status (1), and the interaction term between the two variables calculated. A main effect of tenure emerged on both

measures. On ingroup disapproval scores, b¼ .42, t(67)¼ 3.11, p¼ .003, and outgroup disapproval scores, b¼ .41,

t(67)¼ 2.86, p¼ .006, people disapproved more of the norm-violations when they considered themselves to be more

senior. In addition, disapproval of ingroup members’ rule-breaking behavior was higher when addressing a high-status

than a low-status audience, b¼ .34, t(67)¼ 3.19, p¼ .002. These main effects, however, were qualified by a significant

interaction between tenure and audience status. This interaction was significant in relation to both ingroup, t(67)¼ 2.94,

p¼ .004, see Figure 1, and outgroup members, t(67)¼ 2.59, p¼ .012, see Figure 2. Analysis of the slopes revealed a

similar pattern for both measures. When the status of the audience was low, disapproval of both ingroup, b¼ .53,

t(34)¼ 3.63, p¼ .001, and outgroup rule violators, b¼ .43, t(34)¼ 2.76, p¼ .009, was higher the more participants

perceived themselves to be old-timers. In contrast, when the status of the audience was high, newcomers and old-timers did

not differ in their disapproval of rule-breaking behavior, whether this be from ingroup members, b¼�.20, t(33)¼ 1.17,

p¼ .251, or from outgroup members, b¼�.19, t(33)¼ 1.11, p¼ .276.

Intentions to Sanction

Regression analysis of the intention to sanction outgroup rule-breakers revealed a main effect of tenure, b¼ .80,

t(67)¼ 6.86, p< .001, indicating that the more participants felt they were old-timers, the more they intended to sanction

outgroup members’ rule breaking. The main effect for audience was not significant. We also found a significant interaction

Figure 1. Disapproval of ingroup member rule-breaking behavior as a function of self-perceived tenure and audience status

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Figure 2. Disapproval of outgroup member rule-breaking behavior as a function of self-perceived tenure and audience status

344 Jolanda Jetten et al.

between tenure and audience status on this measure, t(67)¼ 3.08, p¼ .003 (see Figure 3). Analysis of the slopes revealed

that, when the status of the audience was low, participants showed stronger intentions to sanction the outgroup rule-breaker

the more they felt like old-timers, b¼ .81, t(34)¼ 7.96, p< .001. This effect was less pronounced and not significant when

the status of the audience was high, b¼ .21, t(33)¼ 1.25, p¼ .222.

Regression analysis of the intention to sanction ingroup members’ rule-breaking behavior revealed an effect for tenure,

b¼ .70, t(67)¼ 5.94, p< .001, and an effect for audience status, b¼ .25, t(67)¼ 2.69, p¼ .009. The more participants felt

like old-timers, the more they intended to sanction ingroup members’ rule-breaking behavior. In addition, such intentions

were higher when participants responded to a high-status as compared to a low-status audience. Inconsistent with previous

measures—but consistent with predictions—the interaction between tenure and audience status was not significant,

Figure 3. Intention to sanction outgroup member rule-breaking behavior as a function of self-perceived tenure and audience status

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Newcomers versus old-timers and group behavior 345

t(67)¼ 1.39, p¼ .17 (see Figure 4). Further analysis revealed that intentions to sanction ingroup members were higher the

more participants felt like old-timers, regardless of whether the audience was low status, b¼ .71, t(34)¼ 5.93, p< .001, or

high status, b¼ .44, t(33)¼ 2.84, p¼ .008. In other words, in line with our predictions, newcomers were more reluctant

than old-timers to sanction and take direct action against ingroup members’ rule-breaking behavior even when the status of

the audience was high.

The Role of Identification

We conducted further analyses in which we controlled for the influence of group identification. To account for the audience

dependent effects of identification, we also included the interaction term between identification and the audience status

manipulation.

On the disapproval ratings of ingroup and outgroup members, we found that when group identification and the

interaction term between identification and audience status was included as Step 1 in the analyses, the interaction between

audience status and tenure remained significant in relation to disapproval ratings of the ingroup, t(65)¼ 2.38, p¼ .020, and

marginally significant on disapproval of outgroup members ratings, t(65)¼ 1.96, p¼ .054.

We conducted further analyses in which we controlled for the influence of group identification and the interaction term

between identification and audience status on the intention to sanction rule-breakers. These analyses revealed that the

interaction between audience status and tenure remained significant in relation to intention to sanction outgroup members,

t(65)¼ 2.51, p¼ .015. On intentions to sanction ingroup members, we found that the main effect for tenure remained,

t(65)¼ 2.95, p¼ .004, but the main effect for audience status disappeared, t(65)¼ .62, p¼ .54. As before, the interaction

was not significant on this measure, t(65)¼ 1.49, p¼ .140.

These additional analyses show that the results remain rather similar when identification and the interaction term

between identification and audience status are controlled for. Thus, we are more confident that the effects of tenure are

separate from—and not reducible to—the effects of identification.

Figure 4. Intention to sanction ingroup member rule-breaking behavior as a function of self-perceived tenure and audience status

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

346 Jolanda Jetten et al.

DISCUSSION

The motivation for confronting deviance may be to uphold important group norms, but such behavior may also serve the

function of winning greater acceptance from other group members and fulfilling group expectations. In line with previous

research, we found that old-timers’ intentions to confront rule-breakers appeared to be less influenced by context than

those of newcomers (Jetten et al., 2006; Noel et al., 1995). We found that the status of the audience being addressed

affected the extent to which old-timers expressed disapproval of deviant ingroup and outgroup members to a lesser extent

than for newcomers. However, the status of the audience did matter for those who felt more new to the group. Disapproval

and intentions to sanction were lower among newcomers than among old-timers when the status of the audience was low.

However, when the status of the audience was high, disapproval ratings did not differ as a function of tenure.

Interestingly, when newcomers evaluated rule-breaking behavior by other ingroup members the pattern of results was

different for disapproval ratings than on a measure assessing the intention to do something about it. In particular, when

asked about their intention to directly confront an ingroup member, newcomers were relatively reluctant to confront the

transgressor even when the audience was high status. However, there was no holding back on disapproval ratings when the

audience was high status and newcomers were asked about an ingroup rule-breaker. This suggests that more is at stake

when direct action has to be taken against rule-breaking ingroup members rather than when more symbolic expressions of

loyalty are made (i.e., expressions of disapproval in a questionnaire). Reprimanding an ingroup member may undermine

the strategic effectiveness of such behavior because it could negatively affect intragroup relations and lead to

repercussions from other ingroup members that would be adverse for the self. Similarly, the finding that a different

response pattern emerged when comparing responses on measures of disapproval and intention to sanction when

evaluating ingroup rule-breakers but not when evaluating outgroup rule-breakers suggests that derogation of outgroup

rule-breakers is perceived to be more safe than derogating an ingroup rule breaker. The results suggest that newcomers pay

close attention to what social context affords before deciding whether expressions of loyalty are appropriate.

Interestingly too, the fact that the tenure main effect on willingness to sanction ingroup rule-breakers measure was not

qualified by an interaction between audience status and tenure suggests that under some conditions, old-timers may also

become more sensitive to the status of the audience. That is, old-timers may not be completely immune to strategic

considerations when reprimanding other group members. However, it is likely that their cost-benefit analysis is driven by

different motives than the ones that are of concern for newcomers. For example, old-timers may worry more about the cost

of disrupting harmony in the group by endorsing sanctioning of an ingroup member to a high-status audience. In addition,

compared to newcomers, they may be less interested in the benefit of endearing themselves in the eyes of a high-status

group.

We also found that, although group identification and tenure were positively correlated in this study, effects of tenure on

evaluations of ingroup rule-breakers emerged independently of ratings of identification. This provides some evidence for

the distinctiveness of these constructs (see also Jetten et al., 1997). Identification is likely to reflect commitment to the

group which can be relatively independent from one’s tenure. It is quite possible, however, that identification further

moderates the effects that were observed here. For example, future research should examine whether highly identified

newcomers are most likely to weigh up costs versus benefits of bringing rule-breakers back into line.

Implications and Limitations

The underlying assumption in the present research was that whistle-blowing intentions that vary as a function of the social

context reflect a cost-benefit analysis and strategic behavior. That is, such expressions were not perceived as indicative of

genuine concern for the group’s well-being but were believed to reflect self-interest (e.g., gaining greater acceptance

within the group; Noel et al., 1995). It could be argued that we only have indirect evidence that strategic considerations

underlie newcomers’ whistle-blowing intentions. Our reasoning is consistent with a large body of research examining

strategic behavior by group members that differ in intragroup status or group identification (e.g., Barreto et al., 2003;

Ellemers et al., 2000; Hornsey, Frederiks, Smith, & Ford, 2007; Jetten et al., 2003; Noel et al., 1995), and consistent with

research examining the costs and benefits associated with whistle-blowing (Gundlach et al., 2003) and group behavior

more generally (Packer, 2008). Note that there was also only indirect evidence of strategic behavior in these studies—it

was inferred from comparing public versus private responses (e.g., Noel et al., 1995), by manipulating the status gulf

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

Newcomers versus old-timers and group behavior 347

between participants and their audience (Hornsey et al., 2007; Jetten et al., 2006), or by comparing contexts where future

acceptance was likely or not (Jetten et al., 2003).

Despite the fact that we did not provide any empirical evidence for strategic behavior or cost-benefit analyses (as in

most other research), we argue that there is no other likely explanation for the greater sensitivity to the context than

assuming these must reflect strategic concerns. That is, by manipulating conditions that affect the trade-off between the

benefits that whistle-blowing is expected to bring and the expected costs and risks involved with such behavior, we infer

that findings reflect differences in strategic motivation.

Notwithstanding this, a few observations on the strategic nature of the responses of newcomers are in order. We

assumed that newcomers confronting deviance is a reflection of strategic behavior motivated by a desire to show their

loyalty to high status groups when the benefits outweigh the costs. However, this effect can also be interpreted as strategic

in the sense of not acting when the costs outweigh the benefits. This also makes clear that the fact that loyalty expressions

are costly in some situations does not by definition undermine their strategic potential. Indeed, the very fact that responses

are perceived to be costly can increase their strategic potential because of the increased salience of such actions. The point

we want to make is that loyalty expressions by newcomers are strategic insofar as such costs are taken into account and

because such expressions are in line with opportunities for self-enhancement (or self-preservation) that the situation

affords. Moreover, newcomers are less inclined to incur costs because they have less access to the rewards that

membership provides to old-timers. Thus, strategic behavior can be expressed in different ways and different strategic

motivations may underlie the same type of behavior.

We examined our hypotheses in a context where group norms are clear and endorsed by all those playing rugby. In many

other group contexts, however, norms are not all that transparent and what constitutes appropriate behavior may be open

for debate. We predict that the clarity about norms and rules should affect the extent to which newcomers use reprimanding

of norm-violators as a way to demonstrate their loyalty to the group. In particular, when group norms are implicit or not

consensually shared by all group members, newcomers may be more reluctant to express their disapproval of ingroup

behavior more generally for fear of arousing the irritation of some ingroup members, or for fear of mis-identifying the

norms. They may still, however, be harsh on outgroup members who act in ways that appear to violate rules. In such

situations, confronting outgroup deviants may not just serve the function of showing loyalty to the ingroup, but may also be

perceived as an opportunity to open a debate on what the norms are. We predict that old-timers would be less affected by

norm clarity because whether behavior is appropriate is measured against internal standards (that are quite often aligned

with group standards). Clarity of group norms also affects the extent to which confronting rule-breakers will be successful

in stopping the rule-breaking. When rules are unclear, ingroup cohesion is easily undermined when deviants are

reprimanded because confronting rule-breakers highlights the differences of opinion on what is appropriate. This may

divide the group rather than helping to rectify wrongdoings. These predictions should be tested in future research.

CONCLUSIONS

The present research adds to the observation of previous research that newcomers tend to be more strategic in their

expression of group loyalty than old-timers when responses are public. Whereas old-timers’ behavior is relatively

unaffected by the social context, newcomers are sensitive to the opportunities provided by the social context to present the

self. Although this explains the diversity in the intragroup and intergroup behavior displayed by newcomers, it does not

help to predict when confronting deviants as an act of group loyalty is deemed to be appropriate and possible and when it is

not. In order to understand the complexities of group dynamics, it thus appears that we need not only understand who is

most likely to confront rule-breakers, but also how the individual interacts with the social context and how this affects

perceptions about what the context affords.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research was supported by an ESRC grant (R000223981) awarded to the first and fourth author. We thank Lucy

Johnston and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp

348 Jolanda Jetten et al.

REFERENCES

Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2000). You can’t always do what you want: Social identity and self-presentational determinants of thechoice to work for a low-status group. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 891–906.

Barreto, M., Spears, R., Ellemers, N., & Shahinper, K. (2003). Who wants to know? The effect of audience on identity expression amongminority group members. British Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 299–318.

Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 3–26.Ellemers, N., Van Dyck, C., Hinkle, S., & Jacobs, A. (2000). Intergroup differentiation in social context: Identity needs versus audience

constraints. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63, 60–74.Goldie, J., Schwartz, L., McConnachie, A., & Morrison, J. (2003). Students’ attitudes and potential behaviour with regard to whistle-

blowing as they pass through a modern medical curriculum. Medical Education, 37, 368–375.Gundlach, M. J., Douglas, S. C., & Martinko, M. J. (2003). The decision to blow the whistle: A social information processing

framework. Academy of management Review, 28, 107–123.Henik, E. (2008). Mad as hell or scared stiff? The effects of value conflict and emotions on potential whistle-blowers. Journal of

Business Ethics, 80, 111–119.Hornsey, M. J., Frederiks, E., Smith, J. R., & Ford, L. (2007). Strategic defensiveness: Public and private responses to group criticism.

British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 697–716.Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & McKimmie, B. M. (2003). Predicting the paths of peripherals: The interaction of

identification and future possibilities. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 130–140.Jetten, J., Hornsey, M. J., & Adarves-Yorno, I. (2006). When group members admit to being conformist: The role of relative intragroup

status in conformity self-reports. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 162–173.Jetten, J., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1997). Distinctiveness threat and prototypicality: Combined effects on intergroup

discrimination and collective self-esteem. European Journal of Social Psychology, 27, 635–657.Kramer, R. M. (1998). Paranoid cognition in social systems: Thinking and acting in the shadow of doubt. Personality and Social

Psychology Review, 2, 251–275.Levine, J. M., & Moreland, R. L. (1994). Group socialization: Theory and research. European Review of Social Psychology, 5, 305–336.Mesmer-Magnus, J. R., & Viswesvaran, C. (2005). Whistle-blowing in organizations: An examination of correlates of whistle-blowing

intentions, actions, and retaliation. Journal of Business Ethics, 62, 277–297.Miceli, M. P., & Near, J. P. (1988). Individual and situational correlates of whistle-blowing. Personnel Psychology, 41, 267–281.Near, J. P., & Miceli, M. P. (1995). Effective whistle-blowing. Academy of Management Review, 20, 679–708.Noel, J. G., Wann, D. L., & Branscombe, N. R. (1995). Peripheral ingroup membership status and public negativity toward outgroups.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 127–137.Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1999). The role of prototypicality in group influence and cohesion: Contextual variation in

the graded structure of social categories. In S. Worchel, J. F. Morales, D. Paez, & J-C. Deschamps (Eds.), Social identity: Internationalperspectives (pp. 75–92). London: Sage.

Packer, D. J. (2008). On being both with us and against us: a normative conflict model of dissent in social groups. Personality and SocialPsychology Review, 12, 72.

Sims, R. L., & Keenan, J. P. (1998). Predictors of external whistle-blowing: organizational and intrapersonal variables. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 17, 411–421.

Spears, R., & Lea, M. (1994). Panacea or panopticon? The hidden power in computer-mediated communication. CommunicationResearch, 21, 427–459.

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1996). Using multivariate statistics (3rd ed.). Northridge CA: Harper Collins.Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social

psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.Van Maanen, J. (1977). Experiencing organization: notes on the meaning of careers and socialization. In J. Van Maanen (Ed.),

Organizational careers: some new perspectives (pp. 15–45). New York: Wiley.

Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 40, 338–348 (2010)

DOI: 10.1002/ejsp