G.R. No. L-6207 August 4, 1911SIMON MALAHACAN, administrator of
the goods, chattels and credits of GUILLERMA MARTINEZ,
deceased,plaintiff-appellee,vs.JOSEFA IGNACIO, MACARIO IGNACIO,
PAULA IGNACIO and AGUEDA BUAG,defendants-appellants.M.P. Leuterio
for appellants.No appearance for appellee.MORELAND,J.:This is an
appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
subprovince of Marinduque, Province of Tayabas, the Hon. J.S.
Powell presiding, awarding the possession of the lands described in
the complaint to the plaintiff, with costs.The action is brought by
Simon Malahacan as administrator of the goods, chattels, and
credits of Guillerma Martinez, deceased, against the defendants,
the only heirs at law of the said deceased, to recover possession
of the real estate of which the said Guillerma Martinez died
seized, which said real estate the defendants had been occupying
for some years before the commencement of this action.Under the
provisions of the Civil Code the ownership of real estate passes to
the heirs of the owner instantly in his death. Guillerma Martinez,
having died seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the
defendants as her only heirs at law, it follows that said heirs
instantly became the owners and were entitled to the immediate
possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it
appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were
debts outstanding against Guillerma Martinez at the time of her
death. The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of
the heirs at law possession of the real estate of which his
intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be sold
to pay the debts of the deceased. In the case of Ilustre,
administrator of the estate of the deceasedCalzado vs. Alaras
Frondosa(17 Phil. Rep., 321), this court said:Under the provisions
of the Civil Code (arts. 657-661), the rights to the succession of
a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other
words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the
heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do
so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this
by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by
a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the
division. When there are no debts existing against the estate,
there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an
administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among
the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no
debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with
the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against
the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way
whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are
coowners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy
for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in
the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment
of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever
in the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who
have not received their participation, they have their remedy by
petition for partition of the said estate.The judgment appealed
from is reversed and the complaint dismissed on the merits, without
special findings as to costs.Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson,
JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-21725November 29, 1968AURELIO
ARCILLAS,petitioner,vs.HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, MODESTA ALFARO, GERONIMO ARCILLAS
and VICENTE ARCILLAS,respondents.Antonio J. Calvento for
petitioner.T. de los Santos for respondents.MAKALINTAL,J.:Filed
before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga on November 12 and
16, 1962, respectively, are two separate petitions having direct
and special reference to Lot No. 276. This lot, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-244 (2155 (0-656), forms a major part
of the estate of the late Eustaquio Arcillas who died intestate on
March 8, 1958 in the City of Zamboanga.In the petition dated
November 12 Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased,
sought the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244 in the name of the
deceased and prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title
in the names of the heirs in the enumerated proportions alleged in
the petition. It was claimed that at various dates after the death
of the deceased, several transactions affecting Lot No. 276
transpired, prominent among which were the separate sales of their
respective shares and participation in Lot No. 276 executed by four
(4) other children of the deceased in favor of co-heir Vicente
Arcillas. Invoking section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration
Act), Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion of each heir's
participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new
certificate of title. But before any other material pleading could
be filed with respect to this petition, five (5) other children of
the deceased filed the November 16 petition aforementioned. This
later petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 632, prayed for
the issuance of letters of administration in favor of herein
petitioner preparatory to the final settlement of the deceased's
estate. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this later petition, insofar as
pertinent to this case, read:3. That the deceased left an estate
consisting of real property in Zamboanga City with a probable value
of not less than SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), Philippine
Currency;4. That as far as petitioners know, the deceased left no
debts remaining unpaid;In the meantime, on November 23, 1962 herein
petitioner filed his opposition to the November 12 petition on the
ground that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 the subject matter thereof was
included in the estate of the deceased for which a petition for
administration had actually been filed and was awaiting resolution,
that petition (the one dated November 12) should be held in
abeyance until after Special Proceeding No. 632 was closed and
terminated. Recognizing then the merit of petitioner's ground,
respondent Judge issued an order on December 1, 1963 temporarily
holding in abeyance resolution of the November 12 petition until
the termination of the intestate proceedings.Meanwhile, in his
answer to the November 16 petition (Sp. Proc. No. 632) Geronimo
Arcillas, this time joined by Vicente Arcillas and the widow
Modesta Alfaro, opposed the issuance of letters of administration
to herein petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the
only property left by the deceased and the deceased left no debts,
the petition for administration was improper. However petitioner,
in his reply on January 18, 1963, insisted that there were still
other properties of the estate of the deceased besides Lot No. 276;
he likewise took issue with respondents' view that administration
proceedings could be dispensed with asserting, firstly, that there
was no unanimity among the heirs for extrajudicial partition and,
secondly, that some of the heirs had been unduly deprived of their
participation in the estate.On March 8, 1963 respondent court
denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and at the same time gave due course to the November
12 petition. Reasoned the court: "... to obviate the necessity of
spending uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the
estate; to avoid unnecessary delay in the partition of the property
involved herein, and following the doctrines established by the
Honorable Supreme Court in several cases of the same nature, which
is in consonance with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, the court is of the opinion that the herein
petition (should) be denied and (holds that) the cadastral motion
of the oppositor Geronimo Arcillas covering the same property is
the most expedient and proper action."Unable to have this order
reconsidered petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari
with mandamus and preliminary injunction. On December 2, 1963, upon
filing by petitioner of the required bond, we issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding
with the hearing of the "cadastral motion" dated November 12,
1962.The issues to be determined are whether respondent Judge acted
properly (1) in dismissing the administration proceedings under the
authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon
averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled
to share in its distribution are all of age and (2) in maintaining
that the "cadastral motion" brought under the provision of section
112 of the Land Registration Act was the more proper proceeding
under the circumstances.Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules
of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial guardians, the partiesmay, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the Register
of Deeds and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. And primarily anchored on the proposition that
inasmuch as in the present case the minimum requirements of the
aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will and
no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that there
is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the
appointment of an administrator for the settlement of the estate
for the reason that it is superfluous and unnecessary. In other
words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule 74 as
mandatory upon the heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor
any pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age.We
cannot entirely agree with the respondents. On a similar contention
in the past, we had occasion to explain inRodriguez, et al. v. Tan,
et al., 92 Phil. 273:... section I does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see
fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as
may be gleaned from the use made therein of the wordmay. If the
intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed
the wordshallas was done in other provisions that are mandatory in
character. Note that the wordmayits used not only once but in the
whole section which indicates an intention to leave the matter
entirely to the discretion of the heirs.Having decided to institute
administration proceedings instead of resorting to the less
expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial
settlement or ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then
be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion granted under
section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground
that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may
deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary
expenses incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed
to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that
they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the
alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from
the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in
administration proceedings rather than in any other
action.Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the
"cadastral" motion, supposedly brought under the authority of
section 112 of Act 496, cannot be sustained. While this section
authorizes, among others, a person in interest to ask the court for
any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title
"upon the ground that registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate have terminated
and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes within
its scope, such relief can only be granted if there is unanimity
among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case
becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary
case or in the case where the incident properly belongs (see Puguid
v. Reyes, L-21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases cited therein). In
the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in
interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection
to the cancellation of TCT No. RT-244, sufficiently removes the
November 12 petition from the scope of section 112 of Act 496.
Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are
summary in nature and hence inadequate for the litigation of issues
which properly pertain to the case where the incident belongs.IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside
the appealed orders and directing respondent Judge or whoever is
presiding the court below to reinstate Special Proceedings No. 632;
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued enjoining
respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the
"cadastral" motion dated November 12, 1962 is hereby made
permanent. Costs against respondents, except respondent
Judge.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989VICTORIA BRINGAS
PEREIRA,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA
PEREIRA NAGAC,respondents.Benjamin J. Quitoriano for
petitioner.Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private
respondent.GANCAYCO, J.:Is a judicial administration proceeding
necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any
debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the
deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which
need to be resolved in this case.Andres de Guzman Pereira, an
employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,
1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his
legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria
Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted
before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite,
Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.1In her verified petition,
private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria
Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that
the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the
deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death
benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees
Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as
well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300
square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and
finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had
been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half
of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.On March
23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the
petition of private respondent2alleging that there exists no estate
of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of
administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor
as the surviving spouse.In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the
Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira
Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman
Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The
trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and
personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory
thereof within three months after receipt of the order.3Not
satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in
its decision dated December 15, 1987.4Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues:
(1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a
judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no
debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be
appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister
Rita Pereira Nagac?Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that
there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death
benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to
her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she
submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she
is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the
savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as
supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property
of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the
petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs
of the deceased.Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that
it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the
estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She
points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of
the intestate proceedings.Petitioner asks this Court to declare
that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a
handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of
facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or
non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the
deceased.5The resolution of this issue is better left to the
probate court before which the administration proceedings are
pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive
evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the
rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.6The
function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the
probate court. However, the court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the
parties.7Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We
nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by
private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for
the reasons herein below discussed.The general rule is that when a
person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should
he fail to name an executor therein.8An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74.9Under this exception, when all
the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised
Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no
debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see
fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action.10It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no
debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible,
either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with
an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.11Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether
of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and
the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings .12Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a
judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs
are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case.In one case,13We said:Again the
petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute
as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of
partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and
that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus
of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in
sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated,
questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one
heir.In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an
appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of
suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective
could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is
not justified in issuing letters of administration.14In still
another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument
that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of
his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order
for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate
proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce
proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of
the latter.15We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the
case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten
months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are
no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is
that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable
reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix
is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently
in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling
reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the
estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman
Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since
the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered.
In most instances of a similar nature,16the claims of both parties
as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors,
should there be any, are protected in any event.We, therefore, hold
that the court below before which the administration proceedings
are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration,
there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding.With the foregoing ruling, it is
unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita
Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as
administratrix.WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby
revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without
prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new
action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman
Pereira. No costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO
KILARIO,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO
PADA,respondents.DE LEON, JR.,J.:The victory1of petitioner spouses
Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court2in
an ejectment suit3filed against them by private respondent Silverio
Pada, was foiled by its reversal4by the Regional Trial Court5on
appeal. They elevated their cause6to respondent Court of
Appeals7which, however, promulgated a Decision8on May 20, 1998,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.The following
facts are undisputed:One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely,
Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died
intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and
coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom, Leyte, denominated as
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It
is the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the
subject of the instant controversy.During the lifetime of Jacinto
Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from
him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the
house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in that
house since 1960.Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada
entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they, however,
never registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of
Leyte.At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was
himself present while his other brothers were represented by their
children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without
any issue. Marciano was represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador
was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higina was
represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in
this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his
daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during
the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.On June 14,
1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his
father, Ananias, as co-owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.On November
17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership
right of his father, Marciano. Private respondent, who is the first
cousin of Maria, was the buyer.Thereafter, private respondent
demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area.
They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest
efforts toward that end, failed.On June 26, 1995, private
respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom,
Leyte, a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages against
petitioner spouses.On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada,
namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and Angelito
Pada, executed a Deed of Donation9transferring to petitioner Verona
Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral Lot
No. 5581.On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their
Answer averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581
had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They
contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no
special power of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador
or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented
them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated
only through a private document that was never registered in the
office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.The Municipal Circuit
Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It
made the following findings:After a careful study of the evidence
submitted by both parties, the court finds that the evidence
adduced by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over . . .
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic]
successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property
is still under a community of ownership among the heirs of the late
Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that
Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly
of [sic] the above-described residential property . . . as their
share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial
settlement, how come that since 1951, the date of partition, the
share of the late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name of
his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in
the name of Jacinto Pada up to the present while the part
pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in
the name of his heirs . . ..The alleged extra judicial settlement
was made in private writing and the genuineness and due execution
of said document was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most
of the heirs were not participants and signatories of said
settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to
[sic] those who claimed to have represented their co-heirs in the
participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial
statement.Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of
the above-described property long before the sale of said property
on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as
vendor and the plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said
portion of the above-described property since the year 1960 with
the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the
[sic] present some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated .
. . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them,
virtually converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land
under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-owners became the
undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . .
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . their possession in the northern
portion is being [sic] lawful.10From the foregoing decision,
private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On
November 6, 1997, it rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:. . .
[T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo
were never questioned or assailed by their co-heirs for more than
40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two
vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or
sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the co-heirs of Juanita Pada
and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to
Marciano and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been
sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or estoppel.It is true
that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule,
but this doctrine of imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one
of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a period
sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the moment
one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that he is the absolute owner and
denies the rest their share of the community property, the question
then involved is no longer one for partition but of ownership. . .
. Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of 42 long years.
Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long
extinguished by laches, estoppel or prescription.x x x x x x x x x.
. . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a
brother of Marciano Pada, took place only during the inception of
the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the
time the extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said
donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors, among others,
were absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property
in question.11The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court reads as follows:WHEREFORE, a judgment is
hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic]
consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby ordered:1. To vacate
the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the
appellant, being the lawful possessor in concept of owner;2. To
remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the
option of acquiring the same, in which case the pertinent
provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;3. Ordering the
defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and
use of the portion of the land in question in the sum of P100.00
commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and until the
termination of the present case;4. Ordering the defendants to pay
to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the
further sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;5. Taxing defendants to
pay the costs of suit.12Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a
petition for review of the foregoing decision of the Regional Trial
Court.On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered
judgment dismissing said petition. It explained:Well-settled is the
rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possessionde
factoor physical or material possession and notde jure. Hence, even
if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, the court
may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of
possession, specially if the former is inseparably linked with the
latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership,
such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light
on the question of possession . . . .Private respondent Silverio
Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed by
petitioners on the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor
Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto Pada who
was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee
Maria Pada to sell the property was derived from the extra-judicial
partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada,
which was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein
the subject land was adjudicated to Marciano, Maria Pavo's father,
and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the
extra-judicial partition is now being questioned by the heirs of
Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court to
question the validity of such
partition.1wphi1.ntNotably,petitioners in their petition
admittedamong the antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the
co-owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . .
and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to Marciano (father of
Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and
Ananias, their heirs took possession of said lot,i.e. Maria Pavo
the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share . .
. . Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the
respondent court that during the cadastral survey of Matalom,
Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No.
5581, while the share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No.
6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were in possession
of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in
their Answer admitted that they have been occupying a portion of
Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the
liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now impugn
the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs in
1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada,
and her vendee, private respondent, is entitled to possession. A
voluntary division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs among
themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive
ownership of the respective portions assigned to them . . ..The
equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute
made by the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to
confer upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had
no interest nor right to transfer. . . . This gesture appears to be
a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong their stay in
the premises. Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed
out that the equitable principle of laches and estoppel come into
play due to the donors' failure to assert their claims and alleged
ownership for more than forty (40) years . . . . Accordingly,
private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over
Lot No. 5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by
petitioners.13Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the foregoing decision.On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.Hence this petition
raising the following issues:I.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED
FROM THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF JACINTO PADA
DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.II.WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD
FAITH.14There is no merit to the instant petition.First. We hold
that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada
among his heirs made in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an
unregistered private document. No law requires partition among
heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be valid.15The
requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves
against tardy claims.16The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic
validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities
is not undermined when no creditors are involved.17Without
creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs
of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in
a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules
from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a
writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid.18The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in
a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs that
participated therein.19The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil
Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for
convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity
or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among
themselves.20And neither does the Statute of Frauds under Article
1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that
it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but
rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who
accepts and receives the inheritance.21The 1951 extrajudicial
partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as
among his heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their
ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and
private respondent, respectively.22Second. The extrajudicial
partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and
spontaneously in 1951 has produced a legal status.23When they
discussed and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it
is presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual
interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and until
it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which
had not been paid.24No showing, however, has been made of any
unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is
no reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary
acts.The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are
the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to
petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed
the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial partition that allocated the
subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect.
In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not
the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto.
Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut
land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang, Matalom, Leyte and
one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte.
The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject
property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At
any rate it is too late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to
repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.Third. Petitioners are
estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the
heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer
that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the
liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.25Their admissions are
evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of
their possession of the subject property is concerned.Considering
that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by
sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew that their occupation of
the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the
land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
them.26Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in
good faith. It is well-settled that both Article 44827and Article
54628of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,i.e., one who builds
on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.29Verily,
persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of
Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada that they were going to
donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in
good faith for at the time the improvements were built on the
premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled,i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.30More
importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled, the donation is
void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners
of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. As such, petitioners cannot be said to
be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the
said lot.WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.Costs
against petitioners.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6871 January 15, 1912JOSE McMICKING, administrator of
the estate of Margarita Jose,plaintiff-appellant,vs.BENITO SY
CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto
Sy Pioco,defendant-appellee.Haussermann, Cohn & Fisher for
appellant.D. R. Williams for appellee.MORELAND,J.:On or about the
5th of February, 1902, one Margarita Jose, a native of the
Philippine Islands, died at Amoy, in the empire of China, leaving
an estate consisting of personal property partly in Hongkong and
partly in the Philippine Islands. On the 16th of April, 1902, one
Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator with the will annexed
of the estate of the said Margarita Jose, deceased, by the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, and Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco
and Dy Cunyao became his sureties and qualified as such in the sum
of P60,000. After the execution of this bond the said Palanca, as
such administrator, took possession of all the property of the said
Margarita Jose, amounting in all to $58,820.29 Hongkong currency.
On the 22d of April, 1904, the Mariano Ocampo Lao Sempco died in
the city of Manila, testate. The fact of his death was brought to
the attention of the Court of First Instance of said city on the
2nd of November, 1904, by an application made by one of the
legatees of said Margarita Jose, deceased, for an order directing
said administrator to furnish a new bond. Pursuant to this
application the court, on the 10th of November, 1904, made an order
directing the said Palanca to furnish a bond in the sum of P60,000
to take the place of the undertaking upon which said Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, and Dy Cunyao were sureties. The bond thus
required was duly filed on the 22nd of November, 1904, the sureties
thereon being Juan Fernandez, Luis Saenz de Vismanos and Alejandro
Palanca. On the 11th of May, 1904, one Doroteo Velasco was
appointed administrator with the will annexed of said Mariano
Ocampo Lao Sempco, deceased, and on July 7 following Mariano
Velasco and Pio de la Guardia Barretto qualified as sureties of the
said administrator in the sum of P30,000. Said Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco left him surviving as his heirs at law and devises and
legatees one daughter, to whom he devised two-thirds of his estate,
and three sons in China, to whom he devised the remaining
one-third. On the 27th of July, 1904, said Doroteo Velasco, as such
administrator, filed with the court a complete report and inventory
of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all
his debts and liabilities. As a part of this report and inventory
said administrator filed an instrument signed by all of the persons
interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the
partition of he estate among themselves without proceedings in
court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations
against the estate. This agreement of partition was drawn and
executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure
for the purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned. On the
28th of July, 1904, the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, upon the request of the administrator with the will annexed
and of all parties interested in the estate of the said Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, entered an order in said agreement. Pursuant to
such agreement and order of the court approving the same, and after
all the liabilities under which said estate lay had been fully paid
and satisfied, the said Doroteo Velasco, as said administrator,
delivered to the devisees and legatees of the said Mariano Ocampo,
deceased, all of the property of said decedent pursuant to the
terms of said agreement of partition, leaving in the hands of said
administrator no property or thing of value whatsoever belonging to
the said estate. From that time forward said administrator has not
had in his possession or control any of the assets of the said
estate and has not had any participation in the management thereof.
At the time the agreement for participation was made and signed and
at the time of the distribution of the property of the estate
pursuant thereto, no committee had been appointed to hear claims
against the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo, deceased, and no
notice had been published to creditors of the said deceased to
present their claims against the said estate in the manner
prescribed by law.On the 30th of March, 1908, by virtue of an order
made by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, upon
application of all parties interested, the said Engracio Palanca
was removed from office as administrator of the estate of said
Margarita Jose, deceased, and the plaintiff herein, Jose McMicking,
was appointed in his stead. The said Palanca was removed from
office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render
an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said
Margarita Jose, deceased, which has come to his possession as such
administrator, and failed and refused, on order of the court, to
deliver said property and funds or any portion thereof to the court
or to the said Jose McMicking, his successor. Instead of so doing,
he retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with
the same, and never returned to the Philippine Islands. At the time
of his removal he was indebted to the estate in the sum of
P41,960.15, no part of which has ever been received by the estate
or by its representative.On the 30th of June, 1909, Jose McMicking,
as administrator, made an application to the court for the
appointment of commissioners of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo
for the purpose of hearing claims against the estate. The
commission having been appointed and qualified, a claim was
presented to it by the plaintiff based upon the defalcation of said
Engracio Palanca, as administration with the will annexed of
Margarita Jose, deceased, which claim was allowed by said
commission and later approved by the court, which directed that the
said claim be paid by Doroteo Velasco, if he had sufficient funds
to make such payment. No part of the sum thus found to be due by
the commission has been paid to the representative of the estate of
said Margarita Jose, deceased.On the 3rd of November, 1905, Pio de
la Barretto, who, it will be remembered, was one of the sureties on
the undertaking of Doroteo Velasco, as administrator with the will
annexed of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, died in the city of Manila,
leaving an estate consisting of real and personal property located
in the city. Said deceased left a will which was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila on the
3rd day of February, 1906, and letters of administration with the
will annexed were issued to Benito Sy Conbieng, the defendant in
this case. On the 4th of June, 1909, upon the application of the
plaintiff in this case, a committee was appointed by the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila to appraise the estate of the
said Pio de la Guardia Barretto, deceased, and to hear claims
presented against his estate. Thereafter and within the time
prescribed by law the plaintiff herein presented to said committee
a claim for the sum of P30,000 "based upon the fact that the claim
for the larger amount had been allowed in favor of the estate of
said Margarita Jose Sempco, deceased;" and based upon the further
fact "that the Court of First Instance had ordered the said Doroteo
Velasco, as administrator of the estate of said Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco, deceased, to pay the said claim if there were funds
sufficient to make such payment, but that it has not been paid by
the said Doroteo Velasco, or any part thereof," The claim so
presented against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto,
deceased, was disallowed by the committee thereof. The plaintiff
herein within the time allowed by law appealed to the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila from the order of the
committee disallowing said claim.It is disputed in the case that
all of the claims against the estate of Mariano Ocampo were fully
paid and satisfied at the time of the partition of said estate,
with the exception of the alleged claim arising by virtue of his
having been a surety of the default Palanca. It nowhere appears in
the evidence or the record exactly when this claim arose it may be
inferred from the time of presentation in 1909, and we have no
means of determining whether the defalcation represented by the
said claim occurred before or after the substitution of sureties
herefore referred to.Upon these facts it was contended by counsel
for plaintiff that the judgment should be rendered in his favor for
the sum of P30,000, with costs, while counsel of defendant
contended that upon said facts judgment should be rendered in favor
of defendant, dismissing the complaint, with costs. The court
having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff,
dismissing the complaint upon merits, without costs. This appeal is
from that judgment.We are of the opinion that the judgment must be
affirmed. We base our affirmance upon the ground that Doroteo
Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was
surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been
commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the
obligation, the surety cannot be.At the head of the law of
administration of the Philippine Islands stands sections 596 and
597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:SEC.
596.Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in
certain cases. Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of
lawful age and legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the
heirs may, by a family council as shown under Spanish law, or by
agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion
and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit,
without proceedings in court.SEC. 597.In such case distributees
liable for debts. But if it shall appear, at any time within two
years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that
there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been
paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the
courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be
paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court
may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received
them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate
belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability
to creditors for the full period of two years after such
distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have
been made.These sections provide for the voluntary division of the
whole property of the decedent without proceedings in court. The
provisions which they contain are extremely important. The wisdom
which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of
every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of
property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its
possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reason
and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which
underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal
acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy
and use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence of
reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle
is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The
force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the
same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and created the
democracy of private owners.These provisions should, therefore, be
given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the
framers may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or
narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of
application without which they cannot produce their most beneficial
effects.Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of
administration of these Islands, they are the first provisions to
which our attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the
division and distribution of the property of deceased persons. They
are thus made prominent. And justly so. The purpose which underlies
them, as we have already intimated, is to put into one's hands the
property which belongs to him not only at the earliest possible
moment but also with the least possible expense. By permitting the
partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost
and substantially all expense and waste are saved. This is as it
should be. The State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens
if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution
of the property of a decedent is no cumbersome, unwidely and
expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in
the process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it
ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a
system which consumes any considerable portion of the property
which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being
undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its
owner and its deposit in the hands of another for administration is
a suspension of some of its most important rights of property and
is attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and
unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever
possible.In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under
the broad and liberal policy which we must adopt in the
interpretation and application of the provisions referred to, the
decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the form,
in the manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the
provisions of said sections and may be termed, therefore, and we
hold it to be, a partition of the property of a decedent without
legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of
the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing of an
inventory before such partition is of no consequence so far as the
right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only requisite
for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts
. . . or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When the
condition is fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what
stage the administration may have reached. By this it is, of
course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an
administrator will interfere with the rights acquired by third
person dealing with said administrator within the limits of his
authority and prior to the partition; nor that the administrator
can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in
possession without proper proceedings and the consent of the
court.As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a
surety on an administrators' bond is the fault or failure of the
principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of the
surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred
none. The question that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what
was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail? When the persons
interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon
a partition and division of the property of said estate and the
actual partition followed, the matter passed out of the hands of
Velasco as administrator. The parties to the partition stood
invoking their rights under section 596 and 597. Velasco was
helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties from taking the
property to which they were entitled under the agreement, it being
conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law. Those
sections were applicable to the situation and there was nothing
that Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided
according to their provisions. In giving his consent to the
partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of
the court thereto he did no wrong. He simply aided in carrying out
the provisions of the sections referred to. It is a universal
principle that one who follows a law commits no fault, incurs no
failure and wounds no rights. If one obeys the law he is free not
only in person but in property. Observance of the law discharges
obligations; it does not create them; and an obligation once
discharged cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which the
person as to whom it was discharged takes no part. The proceedings
under sections referred to were, after the partition was actually
made and the property duly turned over the administrator under the
proper proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, as it then stood, so far as the administrator was
concerned. Nothing further needed to be done. Every duty which
Velasco owed up to the time of the partition had been met. All
debts presented or known had been paid. The court had given it
approbation to the delivery of the property by the administrator to
the partitioning parties. Every obligation which lay upon him had
been removed. Nor could there arise against him any obligation in
the future in relation to the same property. The instant that the
partition occurred, in the form and manner stated, he stood
stripped of all responsibility to the estate, to its creditors, to
the heirs and to the court. He stood divested o every official duty
and obligation, as fully as before his appointment as completely as
if he had not been appointed at all. In law, therefore, he was no
longer administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased. He was in effect, discharged. As to him the
estate had been wiped out as a legal entity. It had ceased to
exist. And, while at any time within two years after the partition
the property, or a portion thereof, then in the possession of the
partitioning persons could have been placed in administration upon
the happening of certain events, it would not have been the same
estate that had been represented by Velasco, nor would Velasco have
been the administrator of the estate by virtue of his appointment
in the old. It would have been necessary for the court, upon the
proper application setting forth the conditions prescribed by the
sections, to appoint another administrator for the purposes
specified therein. It might have been Velasco, if he would have
accepted the appointment, or it might have been another. The point
isthat it would have been necessary to appoint a new
administratorjust as if one had not been named before. The new
administrator would have had new duties, some of which would have
been quite different from those of the administrator appointed
originally. He would have had different sureties, who would have
found themselves to different obligations.That on the partition
under said section the estate was, in this case, completely wiped
out and the administrator as completely discharged cannot be
doubted for the following reasons:1. The whole estate was, by
virtue of these sections, taken from the administrator and turned
over to the partitioning persons. No security was required or given
for its safekeeping or return.2. The persons to whom the estate was
thus turned over became absolute owners of the same, subject to be
devastated, wholly or only partly, on the happening of certain
events and the taking of certain proceedings thereon. But even such
divestiture could not have been avoided by the payment by the
parties, or any of them, of the debt which was the moving cause
thereof.From these premises it is the merest conclusion to say that
the decedent's estate was merged in their partitioning parties; and
this no matter whether the partition occurred before or after the
appointment of an administrator. When one has been named to perform
certain acts in relation to a given thing, and before said acts
have been begun, or, having been begun, are completed, the
appointing power has placed the thing upon which those acts were to
operate wholly beyond the possession, jurisdiction and control of
the one so appointed, there is a complete revocation of such
appointment, so far as all subsequent acts are concerned. An
administrator cannot be held to any accountability for property
over which he has absolutely no power or jurisdiction and in which
he has not the slightest legal interest. The thing on which he was
appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his ken by
the very power (the law) which appointed him, there is a complete
revocation of the appointment.Moreover, the sureties of an
administrator so appointed can not be held liable for property
which by force of law has been taken from the principal and its
ownership and control turned over to others. Their obligation is
that their principal shall obey the law in the handling and
distribution of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the
estate is legally turned over to those entitled thereto. The law
requires the principal to turn it over to those who bring
themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having turned over
the whole estate under the compelling power of the law, his
obligation ceased. The responsibility of the sureties ceased at the
same time. Without their consent another obligation could not be
imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the same
property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two
years. Their undertaking was that their principal should discharge
one obligation, not two.It requires no argument to demonstrate that
the duties and obligations imposed upon an administrator appointed
under section 597 might and probably would be different in many
respects from those of an administrator appointed in the first
instance; and that, therefore, the obligation of his sureties would
not be the same as that of the sureties of the administrator
appointed originally. The administration contemplated by section
597 is a new administration and one entirely apart from any other
administration theretofore had. This section requires the
appointment of a new administrator, with a new undertaking. The
administration under the section is distinct and separate from any
administration which may have been in progress at the time of the
partition and division under section 596. This is clear for the
following reasons:After the partition and division provided for in
sections 596 and 597 have been fully consummated, no further
administration of the estate can be had unless there occur the
following requisites:1. There must have been discovered a claim
against the estate "within two years after such settlement and
distribution of estate."2. The creditor holding the claim must be
the person who moves the court for the appointment of an
administrator.If those requisites are lacking, there can be no
administration. When one fails the right too such administration
does not arise and any person intersted in the estate may oppose
any effort to administer under such circumstances. These requisites
combined are that and that alone which give to the administrator
when appointed the right to recover the assets from the persons who
received them on the a partition. Indeed, if these requisites are
lackingno administrator can lawfully be appointed, and, if
improperly appointed, he fails of legal power to maintain an action
to recover the assets in the hands of those among whom they have
partitioned; in other words, he is powerless to administer. If
these requisites fail, then the real estate in the hands either of
the persons among whom it has been partitioned or of their
assignees is free from the lien created by section 597 and any
attempt to enforce such lien can be successfully opposed by any
person interested in such property. The appointment of an
administrator without the concurrence of these requisites is
without warrant of law and the appointee is powerless to perform
any act of administration. The statute must be strictly complied
with in every essential before it operates. Every essential
requirements must be fulfilled before it will be permitted that a
partition which has the clear sanction of the law and which is
strictly in accord with the public policy of the estate shall be
set aside and destroyed with all the evil consequences thereby
entailed.It is necessary deduction from the provisions of the
sections mentioned that the appointment of an administrator ought
not to be permitted, even when the requisites above mentioned
occur, unless the heirs or the persons among whom the property was
partitioned have been given an opportunity to be heard on that
application. It would be extremely unusual to proceed to the
appointment of an administrator under section 597, by virtue of a
debt which had been discovered after the partition and division,
without giving the heirs an opportunity to avoid such
administration by the payment of the debt, it being kept in view
that the object of the law in originally giving the right to pay
the debts and having partition without proceedings in court was to
avoid that every administration. Such a proceeding would be unusual
and irrational. Such a course would be in direct opposition to the
purposes which animated the provisions authorizing the original
partition.(1) In the case at bar no debt was discovered during the
prescribed period. It was nearly four years after the partition of
the estate and the taking possession by the heirs of their
respective portions before it was even discovered that Palanca had
been guilty of converting the property of the estate to his own
use; and, so far as the records shows, it was nearly five years
before the alleged claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo was
fixed.(2) No creditor made his application.The requirements of
section 597 not having been met, there could be no administration
under section. Therefore, the appointment of commissioners for the
hearing of the claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo presented
by the plaintiff in this case was an appointment without warrant or
authority of law. It was appointment in respect to an estatethat
did not existand in relation to an administrationthat had never
been inaugurated. Under section 597 the commencement of the
administration is the application of the creditor and the
appointment of the administrator pursuant to such application.
Without such appointment there is no administration. As we have
before stated, when the property was partitioned a described
heretofore, the estate, as such, ceased to exist and the
administration thereof by Doroteo Velasco was wiped out. There was
no administrator to carry on the administration. By operation of
the law the estate had been passed on the heirs who had become the
absolute owners of it. They were subject to the orders of the old
administrator and they held rights inferior to no one. To be sure,
as we have already stated, those rights might be modified to a
certain extent by the happening of subsequent events; but until
those events transpired their rights were absolute. Those
conditions never having been met, a fact admitted by both parties
in the case at bar, there was absolutely no estate at all, much
less one in the process of administration, at the time the
commissioners were appointed to her the claim for P30,000 presented
against the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, by the plaintiff
herein. Add to this the fact that there was no administrator of
said estate in extense at the time, and we have before us the
absurdity of the appointment of the commissioners to report on a
claim against an estate which did not exist and under the direction
of an administrator that had never been appointed.The necessary
conclusion is that the appointment of commissioners to hear the
claim above referred to was beyond the powers of the court and was
without jurisdiction. The finding of the commissioners had no force
or effect. It gave no right against the estate and none against the
so-called administrator.It must be remembered that it is only debts
discovered within the prescribed period that can be made the reason
for an administration of the estate subsequent to its partition.
The necessary result is t hat a debt not discovered within that
period cannot be made the reason for an administration of the
estate. The debt in the case at bar having first discovered more
than four years after the partition of the estate of Mariano
Ocampo, deceased, an administrator, even though appointed under
section 57, would not no authority in law, over the objection of
one interested, to pay the debt in question or to maintain an
action or other proceeding for the recovery of property for that
purpose. This section creates a statute of limitations which
deprives all debts which are not discovered within the prescribed
time of the power of requiring an administration of the estate. The
administration of the estate after the partition under the law has
been accomplished depends upon the discovery of the debt "at any
time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the
estate." The law does not operate unless that discovery is made
within the time prescribed.We have not overlooked the contention
that at the time this partition took place there was a contingent
claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claim which would
arise on the contingency that the administrator for whom Mariano
Ocampo was surety might default or otherwise fail to perform his
duties thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on his bond; and that
contingent claim, being one expressly recognized by sections 746 to
749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to
present, no partition of this estate under section 596 and 597 was
legally possible until such claim was provided for by the
petitioning parties. This contention goes upon the assumption that
a partition under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure so
often referred to is void unlesseverydebt is paid or provided for
by the petitioning parties, and may therefore be entirely
disregarded by the creditor holding a claim either unpaid or
provided for. We do not believe that this assumption is warranted.
In the first place, we must remember that the partition proceedings
in question are proceedingsout of court. Consequently there is no
prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The
appointment of commissioners, the publication of notice to
creditors, and all the other proceedings necessary in cases of
administrationin courtare not required in partitionout of court.
The law is silent as to how the claims are to be ascertained,
presented and determined. We must assume, therefore, that the
method of ascertaining them and determining their validity was left
to the good sense and sound judgment of the persons concerned.
Usually no difficulty will be experienced in solving the problem
presented by this conclusion. It is obvious that creditors always
know who owes them and that debtors generally know whom they owe.
It is equally obvious that, generally speaking, a creditor is one
of the first to learn of the death of the debtor, and that heirs of
the latter are the first to begin to calculate how much of his
property they are to receive. This cannot be known until the debts
are determined. The heirs know they cannot escape payment of the
debts. A surreptitious division behind the backs of the creditors
would not avail as the latter have two years thereafter in which to
throw at least a portion of the estate into administration and
thereby nullify the attempt to overreach them. Even the transfer by
the partitioning persons of the property received on the partition
to third persons would not profit them, inasmuch as the
consideration received on such transfer would, if necessary, be
subject to seizure to pay the debt presented and the real estate
would go into the hands of the vendees charged with the lien of
said debt.The method of ascertaining claims against the defendant's
estate not being prescribed, it is apparent that no objection to a
partition can be urged by a creditor whose claim has not been paid,
due to the faulty method adopted by the partitioning parties to
ascertain claims, or, even, the absence of any effort at all to
ascertain them.In the second place, it must be on served that
express provisions is made by sections 596 and 597 for the payment
of a claim discovered by them or presentedafter the partition. That
is one of the main provisions. It is a necessary deduction,
therefore, that it was not the intention of the law to pronounce
the partition void of no effect simply because not all of the debts
were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment
cannot, then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the
partitiondirectly; that is, by asserting that, inasmuch as a
payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right of
partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place
while a debt is outstanding. While a partition manifestly
fraudulent in inception and result might possibly be attacked
directly by an action to set aside, a question which we do not
discuss or decide, the manner of attacking the partition prescribed
by the law is the one, generally speaking, preferably to be
followed; and that is to throw into administration so much of the
estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method,
thoughindirect, accomplishes a better result than adirectattack.
The latter, by destroying the validity of the partition, would
throw the whole situation into confusion and uncertainty, something
always to be avoided. The former does not produce that result.
Where there is no fraud, and possibly where there is, a direct
attack on the partition is impossible under the provisions under
discussion. A claim discovered and presented within the two years
serves not to destroy, primarily, the partition. It does not even
permit the whole estate to be thrown into administration. Only such
portion as is necessary to pay the discovered debt can be
administered. This is apparent when it is observed that on such
administration the administrator is authorized to recoveronly the
amount of property necessary to pay the debt presented, leaving the
partitioning parties in undisturbed possession of the remainder.
Moreover, the partitioning parties may still pay the debt and
preserve undisturbed the partition in all it parts and thus assure
and maintain the rights of the parties thereunder. The mere fact,
therefore, that a creditor was not paid before the partition took
place furnishes no ground for a revocation of the partition. It
simply provides a fact which he may urge as a reason for the
appointment of an administrator and the consequent administration
of so much of the estate as may be necessary to pay the debt
discovered.But, as already seen, in order that it be a reason for
such appointment and administration,the claim must be presented
within two yearsfrom the date of the partition and
distribution.Summarizing, we have seen that lack of opportunity,
either by want of notice or otherwise, and the consequent failure
to present a claim before partition, is, under the sections we are
discussing, of no consequence whatever in so far as thevalidityof
the partition is concerned.We have also seen that the fact that
there were debts outstanding and unpaid at the time the partition
took place is of no importance so far as thevalidityof the
partition is concerned, leaving out account the question of fraud
to which we have already adverted and left undecided.We have also
seen that the fact such claim exists and is valid and subsistent
against the estate is of no consequence whatever with respect to
the right of its holder to require an administration of the
estateunless such claim is discovered and presented within two
years.The fact that the claim in the case at bar was, during a
certain period, a contingent one is of no importance. The sections
under discussion make no distinction between claims.The creditor
himself is not without duties. In the case at bar it was five years
after the petition before the alleged creditor made any attempt
whatsoever to "discover" or present his claim. He knew of the death
of Ocampo very soon after it occurred. He knew that it was among
the possibilities that Ocampo's estate might be called upon to
respond for the failure of Palanca to perform his duty as
administrator. It was his duty to see to it that he would be
protected in that event. Nevertheless he permitted the estate of
Ocampo to be partitioned and distributed without protest and
without the presentation of his contingent claim, and sat quiet and
passive for nearly five years thereafter knowing that it was very
probable that the property of the estate was being consumed,
incumbered, and transferred by the persons among whom it had been
distributed.The judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without
special finding as to costs.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and
Johnson, JJ.,concur.Carson and Trent, JJ.,concur as to the
dispositive part.
G.R. No. L-47475 May 6, 1942DONATO
LAJOM,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE P. VIOLA, RAFAEL VIOLA, and
SILVIO VIOLA,defendants-appellees.Simeon P. Mangaliman for
appellant.Adolfo A. Scheerer for appellees.BOCOBO,J.:This is an
appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
sustaining the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's amended
complaint and dismissing the case. On March 17, 1939, the
plaintiff-appellant, Donato Lajom, filed a complaint, which amended
on May 16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he be declared a
natural child of the late Dr. Maximo Viola and therefore a co-heir
of the defendand-appellees, Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola, and Silvio
Viola, legitimate children of said Dr. Maximo Viola; and that after
collation, payment of debts and accounting of fruits, a new
partition be ordered, adjudicating one-seventh of the estate to the
plaintiff and two-sevenths to each of the defendants. Among the
allegations of the complaint are the following:x x x x x x x x x2.
That the plaintiff is a natural child, impliedly recognized and
tacitly acknowledged by his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola,
begotten by the deceased Filomena Lajom and born in 1882 when both,
Maximo Viola and Filomena Lajom, were free and could have
contracted marriage;x x x x x x x x x4. That from early childhood
until before the year 1889, and even thereafter, the plaintiff had
been living with his father, the late Dr. Maximo Viola, and had
been enjoying the status of a son, not only within the family
circle but also publicly, on account of the acts of his said
father;x x x x x x x x x6. That a testate proceeding was instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, covering the estate left
by the said Dr. Maximo Viola, registered as civil case No. 4741 of
said Court; and this special proceedings was already closed on
March 17, 1937, as can be seen in a copy of the order of said
Court, hereto attached, marked as Annex D, and is being made an
integral part hereof;7. That the plaintiff did not intervene during
the pendency of the special proceeding above mentioned, as he
expected that his brothers, the herein defendants, would disclose
and tell the truth to the Court that they have a natural brother
whom they knew to be living, and whose address was well known to
them; a brother who should also participate in the estate of their
deceased father; and besides, the herein defendants promised to the
herein plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the
estate of their father;8. That the herein defendants willfully,
deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the Court
that they have a natural brother who should also participate in the
estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed
intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein
plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question;9.
That the herein defendants partitioned among themselves the estate
in question, as can be seen in their "Convenio de Patricion y
Adjudicacion," dated October 25, 1935, a copy of which is hereto
attached, marked as Annex E, and is made an intergral part hereof,
and since then up to the present time, each of the herein
defendants has been occupying, possessing and enjoying his
corresponding share, in accordance with the said "Convenio de
Particion y Adjudicacion"; while the properties alleged to be
paraphernal properties of the late Juana Roura in said "Convenio de
Particion y Adjudicacion" are not paraphernal but conjugal
properties of the late spouses, Dr. Maximo Viola and Doa Juana
Roura, acquired during their martial life;x x x x x x x x x18. That
the plaintiff had demanded of the defendants that they give to him
his lawful participation of the estate in question, as well as of
the products therefrom, in order not only to comply with their
promise but also in order to comply with the law; but the herein
defendants have failed to give to the herein plaintiff his lawful
share of the estate in questions, nor of the products or fruits
therefrom; and the said defendants continue to fail to give to him
his legal portion of the said estate and the fruits or products
therefrom, of which the plaintiff is entitled to one-seventh (1/7)
while each of the three defendants is entitled to two-sevenths
(2/7) of the same.By an order dated July 31, 1939, the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer
and dismissed the case. The Court held that the complaint did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because its
allegation called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of
the court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in
an ordinary civil case like the present. It was further held that
the court had no jurisdiction because there was no allegation that
the late Dr. Maximo Viola was, at the time of his death, a resident
of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that the will
of the deceased had already been probated in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and that court having first taken cognizance of
the settlement of the estate, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.The
two grounds for sustaining the demurrer to the complaint will now
be discussed.First, as to the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff
and one of the defendants, Jose P. Viola, are residents of Nueva
Ecija; and from the complaint it appears that 16 of the parcels of
land belonging to the estate are situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija, while 3 lots are in the Province of Isabela, 1 in the City
of Baguio, 6 in Manila, and the rest (46 parcels) are found in the
Province of Bulacan. Paragraphs 7, 8, and 18 of the complaint
allege a violation of contract, a breach of trust, and therefore
the case may be instituted in the Province of Nueva Ecija.
Paragraph 7 alleges "the herein defendants promised to the herein
plaintiff that they would give him his lawful share in the estate
of their father." Paragraph 8 states that "the herein defendants
willfully, deliberately and fraudulently concealed from the Court
the truth that they have a natural brother who should participate
in the estate of their deceased father, with the single and avowed
intention to deprive deliberately and fraudulently the herein
plaintiff of his lawful participation in the estate in question."
And paragraph 18 asserts that "the plaintiff herein had demanded of
the defendants that they give to him his lawful participation of
the estate question, as of the products therefrom, in order not
only to comply with their promise but also in order to comply with
the law; but the herein defendants have failed to give the herein
plaintiff his lawful share of the estate in question." These
allegations clearly denounce a breach of trust which, if proved at
the trial, the courts could not for a moment countenance.
Regardless of any legal title to the plaintiff's share, declared by
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in favor of the defendants
in the testate proceedings, high considerations of equity
vehemently demand that the defendants shall not take advantage of
such legal title, obtained by them through a betrayal of confidence
placed in th