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Hobbes, Rousseau, and the "Gift" in Interpersonal RelationshipsAuthor(s): Nathan MiczoReviewed work(s):Source: Human Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2002), pp. 207-231Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20010268.

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?M Human Studies 25: 207-231, 2002. 207P* ? 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in theNetherlands.

Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Gift in Interpersonal Relationships

NATHAN MICZODepartment of Communication, Memorial Hall room 300, Western Illinois University,Macomb, IL 61455, USA (E-mail: [email protected])

Abstract. This paper compares and contrasts the philosophical positions of Hobbes andRousseau from the standpoint of interpersonal communication theory. Although both menargued from the state of nature, they differed fundamentally on the nature of humankind andthe purpose of relationships. These differences should be of concern for interpersonal schol?ars insofar as they reflect differing sets of axioms from which to begin theorizing. The sec?ond part of thepaper establishes a linkbetween Hobbes' philosophy and the social exchangetradition: The Hobbes-social exchange tradition begins with the assumption that individualsform relationships tomaximize rewards and minimize costs; aRousseauist position must begin

with the assumption that individuals form relationships in pursuit of some common goal. Thus,relational continuity and quality are not a function of cost-benefit ratios, but of how wellpartners work together toward their common good.

Key words: gift-exchange, interdependence theory, social exchange, state of nature

Axioms are the latchkey kids of the social sciences: we know they're waitingfor us, and we care about them, but we're often too busy to give them the kindof attention and devotion they need and deserve. Interpersonal communica?tion theory is no exception to this observation. Those who study close rela?tionships are committed to the idea that the dyad ismore than just the sum oftwo individuals. Yet, these researchers have, for the most part, adhered to asocial exchange tradition that takes as its starting point the highest form ofindividualism, the idea that relationships are initiated and maintained becauseof what the partners can obtain from one another. The premise of this paper isthat in order to establish a viable alternative theoretical foundation, we needto understand the philosophical tradition that has provided the axioms of thesocial exchange theories, because the alternative theory is going to come froma philosophy that opposes that tradition. Thus, if Hobbes is the founder of

modern social exchange theory, then his most earnest opponent, Rousseau,may provide at least the initial impetus for an alternative theoretical frame?work.

The question might arise as towhy we should pay attention to philosophiesthatwere written for times very different from our own. Simply put, the shape


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208 NATHANMICZOof the modern world was molded in the ideas of the Enlightenment. There issomething to be said, then, for going back to our roots in order to understandsome of the problems of high modernity (Giddens, 1991). Many of ourtheorists and philosophers have soaked up both the strengths and weaknessesof modern society. As Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote, We are incompetent tosolve the times. Certainly, Hobbes and Rousseau were not able to solve theirtimes. They were able, however, to provide a new vantage point from whichto view their times through their intimate knowledge of ancient Greek and

Roman sources. So, perhaps by stepping back and immersing ourselves in theirphilosophies, we may gain a new vantage point for some of the problems of

modernity.The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to compare and contrast thephilosophical positions of Hobbes andRousseau; (2) to linkHobbes to thesocial exchange tradition in communication research, with a particular fo?cus on Interdependence Theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959); and, (3) to takea first step toward understanding close relationships from a Rousseauianstandpoint, drawing upon the writings of Georges Bataille (1989,1991) and

McCall and Simmons' (1966) Role-Identity Model. Such a step is timelybecause of the crisis facing the field of close relationships. It is a field richin constructs and methodologies, but poor with respect to the variety of itstheoretical underpinnings. The remedy to this situation lies at the level ofthe axiom, in the philosophical roots that are rarely brought up to the lightof day.

Rousseau Contra Hobbes

The Englishman Thomas Hobbes and the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseauhave both had a profound impact upon our theorizing about the state of na?ture and the subsequent origin of the social contract. The differences in theirthinking are the primary substance of this paper. Before proceeding to theirdifferences, however, itmight be fruitful to point out some areas of similar?ity. First, both men believed that the primary concern of human beings is self

preservation. Second, they both started with the premise that human beingsare originally asocial creatures. The conclusion they both draw is that humani?ty's social nature is a function of socialization. Norms and rules of conduct,then, are founded upon conventions established by people. Both philosophers

were concerned with grounding those conventions upon an understanding ofhuman nature. Finally, the issue of sovereignty, and how it could be madelegitimate, was central to their respective positions. That is, if asocial crea?tures are their own convention -makers, why should they accept conventionsfounded by others (i.e., accept socialization)?


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 209The Human Telos

HobbesHobbes begins with a consideration of voluntary, or intentional, behavior,which is initiated with sensory reactions to external stimuli. The small begin?nings of motion are referred to as endeavours, of which there are two kinds:

movement toward and movement away. This Endeavour, when it is towardsomething which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE (Lev., 6, p. 119).1And when the Endeavour is fromward something it is generally called AVER?

SION (Lev., 6, p. 119). The purpose of movement toward is acquisition ofthe object desired, which is accompanied by pleasure, or felicity. FELICITY,therefore (by which we mean continual delight), consisteth not in having pros?pered, but in prospering (HN, 7, p. 45). The content, or object, of the appe?tite is not given a priori. Rather, pleasure comes in the pursuit and acquisitionof the object desired.

On the other hand, human beings have an aversion to that which wouldhinder their delight, or prospering. The greatest threat to the pursuit of felicityis death. As the ultimate cessation of motion, death is the primary antithesisof felicity. It is also possible, however, that our felicity might be hinderedby the acquisitive behavior of others. With respect to a desired object, then,individuals must calculate a course of action that will preserve their lives as

well asminimize the hindrance posed by others. This act of calculating, calleddeliberation (Lev, 6, p. 127), is a form of instrumental reason. Reason involvescalculating the most efficient means to attain the objects of our desire and toavoid the objects of our fears (Hoyt-O'Connor, 1998, p. 402). Self-interestbecomes the cornerstone for a Hobbesian telos.

Curthoys (1998) argues that, despite his overt anti-Aristotelianism, a formof Aristotelian logic invades Hobbes' thinking. Curthoys' argument can besummarized as follows: Aristotle, like the ancients in general, believed thatthere was an endpoint, or ultimate purpose for human existence. With telos inhand, Aristotle was able to provide the criteria for evaluating how well a per?son was accomplishing his or her ultimate purpose. Overtly, Hobbes is a rela?tivist: he does not want to posit a particular end toward which appetites andaversions are directed. But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or

Desire; that is it,which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,and Aversion, Evill (Lev., 6, p. 120). However, even though good and evilare merely terms applied to external objects, there is an overarching good, andan overarching criterion of success, in self-preservation. That is, it is good toacquire the object of one's desire, even though the object ofthat desire isobjectively neutral; and, it is evil to not be able to pursue one's appetite, eventhough the hindrance is objectively neutral. As the penultimate hindrance toacquisition, death is the greatest evil. Therefore, one is enjoined to do what?ever is necessary to preserve one's life and to avoid death. For Aristotle, pr?s


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210 NATHANMICZOervation at all costs was not necessary, particularly if one had achieved one'stelos. For Hobbes, self-preservation

becomes the human telos because it is theonly condition that ensures that human beings will continue to be able to pursuethe objects of their desire.

RousseauRousseau did not differ from Hobbes in asserting that all organisms exhibitapproach and avoidance tendencies, as a function of sensory perception. Fur?ther, all organisms are capable of some degree of reasoning about the meansto attain the things they desire. Rousseau did make explicit the link betweenreason and the passions: It is by [the activity of the passions] that our reasonis perfected (DO, 1, p. 46). The demands of basic needs arouse the passions,

which stimulate the exercise of reason to obtain satisfaction of those needs.Therefore, a being cannot reason beyond the needs itmust satisfy. The differ?ence between human beings and other animals in this respect ismerely a dif?ference in degree. If human beings have more highly developed reasoningabilities, it is because those abilities have kept apace with the development ofdiverse appetites that demand satisfaction.

What distinguishes humanity from the rest of the animal world in gen?eral, then, is free agency: [I]t is not so much understanding which causesthe specific distinction of man from all other animals as it is his being a freeagent (DO, 1, p. 45). Being a free agent means human beings can chooseto follow or resist the impulses of nature. Further, in the power of willing,or rather of choosing, and in the feeling of this power, we find only purelyspiritual acts (DO, 1, p. 45). Human beings are material organisms endowed

with spirit. This spirit feels itself, becomes aware of its own power, in theact of choosing. The essence of agency, then, is the unfettered ability toengage in the act of choice.

With respect to the human telos, agency means that human beings are ca?pable of resisting the impulses of nature^br thepurpose of making themselvesinto something of their own devising. This faculty of self-perfection representsa bind that Rousseau does not resolve satisfactorily. On the one hand, in the

Reveries of the Solitary Walker, he defines freedom not as the ability to dowhat one wants to do, but as the ability to avoid doing what one does not wantto do. This is possible to the extent that one does not depend upon others; and,dependency isminimized when people are rendered more or less equal in theirabilities and circumstances. Thus, freedom rests upon a foundation of equal?ity.Yet, freedom entails the ability to choose to resist the impulses of nature,to be a tyrant over himself and nature (DO, 1, p. 45). This can be under?stood in two ways. To be a tyrant implies that one subordinates others to one's

will, creating a condition of inequality. Then again, self-perfection might alsobe taken as the root of specialization. With specialization, one aspires to per?fection at the price of being well rounded. One might be forced to the conclu


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 211sion that self-perfection requires dependence upon others. If all are special?ized, the resulting inequality may

seem somewhat benevolent, but it is inequal?ity nonetheless. While Rousseau would readily admit this, citing this facultyof self-perfection as the cause of the ills of civil society, he de-emphasizedthe point that if humanity is characterized by self-perfection, then natural

man was not human until he acquired this faculty. But as soon as this facultywas acquired, and he became human, he would cease to be natural in the senseRousseau depicts.

The Nature of Association

HobbesAccording toHobbes, the state of nature exists whenever there is no commonpower able to regulate the power struggle among individuals pursuing the sameobjects. What characterizes the state of nature is selfishness: the motivationto acquire the object of one's desire, regardless of any consideration of oth?ers. In other words, everyone has the right to everything, subject to the dic?tum that one refrain from doing that which is destructive of his life, or takethaway the means of preserving the same (Lev., 14, p. 189). This law of na?ture confers upon individuals the right to preserve their lives with all theirpower and to be the judge of what constitutes a threat to that preservation.

Ironically, a condition inwhich everyone has a right to everything, and ishis or her own judge in the matter, is equivalent to a condition inwhich noone has the right to anything, because there would be no security in posses?sion. This is why the state of nature is a war of all against all. Individualsengaged in a struggle over objects of acquisition may do whatever they deemnecessary to obtain those objects, short of contravening the law of nature. Thestate of nature, then, presents individuals with a dilemma in the awareness thatthey might lose their lives if they come into conflict with one another, but theymust necessarily come into conflict with one another if they are in pursuit ofthe same objects. The state of nature is a state of fear and desire.

To resolve this dilemma, Hobbes asserts that individuals must reason thatthe only way to ensure their continued preservation is to alienate their per?sons and their power to a sovereign. As Hoyt-O'Connor (1998) argues, Onsuch a view, civil society is a necessary evil, a condition of alienation which

must be endured lest individuals remain subject to the continual fears anddangers of the natural condition (p. 405). People must see that the pursuit offelicity is at odds with their continued self-preservation, and so they mustsubjugate their desire to their reason (Curthoys, 1998). Preservation is con?tingent upon a person not doing to another that which would cause threat fromthe other and vice versa: self-preservation is such that we cannot effectivelypursue itwithout pursuing the preservation of all (Curthoys, 1998, p. 15).


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212 NATHANMICZOWhereas, in the state of nature, individuals were motivated only by selfish?ness, in civil society

selfishness isreplaced

to a large extent bya calculated

self-interest, which does not exclude a consideration of the desires of others.

RousseauRousseau argued against Hobbes that the state of nature was a state of peace.If people cannot reason beyond their passions, then, in a state of abundance,

where passions are easily satisfied, reason would not advance very far. Theinhabitants of this premoral state would resemble other animals in that satis?fying their appetites would be almost their only concern. Such beings are noteven selfish in that they have no sense of self or other. Even were they to findthemselves reaching for the same object, a kind of natural pity would preventthem from doing violence to one another. The state of nature, then, is not onlya state of peace; it is the very antithesis of a state of war.

As argued above, however, Rousseau's natural state is not recognizable ashuman. Human beings possess free agency and a faculty of self-perfection. Ifthey are rendered more or less equal it is because the conditions they facerender them so. There is always the potential for them to resist natures; to tyr?annize nature, even the nature that they themselves represent. Natural mancannot do this. He ismore or less free and equal in the same sense that ani?mals are more or less free and equal; his preservation depends almost entirelyupon his own efforts. It is well known that Rousseau cited the creation ofproperty as the foundation of civil society. But property must be distinguishedfrom territoriality. An animal may maintain a territory and possess a feelingthat this ismine. What the creation of property allows is the accumulationof more than one needs. With the possession of more than one needs, thepossessor is in a position to create dependencies in others: But as soon asone man needed the help of another, as soon as one man realized that itwasuseful for a single individual to have provisions for two, equality disappeared,property came into existence, labor became necessary (Rousseau, DO, 2, p.65). Rousseau was clear in asserting that there was no return to the originalstate of nature. The foundation for establishing equality in the midst of civilsociety lay in understanding why individuals would choose to exit the stateof nature.

Rousseau argued that men exit the state of nature to overcome nature'sresistance against their forces employed individually: I suppose thatmen havereached the point where the obstacles that are harmful to their maintenancein the state of nature gain the upper hand by their resistance to the forces thateach individual can bring to bear tomaintain himself in that state (SC, 6, p.147). This amounts to saying that they cannot remain in the state of nature

and be free and equal. But why would having provisions for two be prob?lematic or be a cause for exiting the state of nature? Perhaps, and this is a pointexplored by Bataille, the accumulation of more than one needs is itself prob


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS 213lematic for human beings? One of the problems of civil society would then

be to provide mechanisms by which individuals might dispose of,or consume,

what they have accumulated while allowing them tomaintain their freedomand equality.

Whereas the cause of association for Hobbes lies in a negative, for Rousseauthe cause of association is a positive. Individuals come together for somecommon purpose:

[T]he social contract is the means whereby isolated individuals come to?gether through a creative political act and transform themselves intomoralbeings by becoming self-legislating citizens. Thus, Rousseau argues thatsociety exists not only to provide individuals with peace and happiness,though this is one of its aims, but also to educate them into moral beings.(Ansell-Pearson, 1991, pp. 53, 54)

The goal of association is to create a rational, autonomous human agent; totake people out of the state of nature where they were premoral and put theminto a state where they can live up to their true human potential. Unlike theignorant innocence of theman of nature, the citizen must learn to choose vir?tue because he loves the good. The resultant tension between natural passionsand moral rationality does not disappear (Rorty, 1996), but it is to be modu?lated through education. As Rousseau says, It is not enough to say to thecitizens: be good. They must be taught to be so (PE, p. 121). For Hobbes,then, learning to be virtuous is necessary to avoid the negative repercussionsof pursuing felicity; for Rousseau, inculcating virtue is necessary to promotethe positive embracement of the common good; or again, to dispose of whatone has accumulated in amanner that benefits the common good.

The Social ContractHobbes

In the state of nature, people are beset by a contradiction between their appe?tites and their aversions. Deliberation should suggest that the only resolutionof this dilemma is for everyone to divest themselves of their right to every?thing. There are two ways inwhich people can divest themselves of their rightto everything. They can give up the right completely, or they can transfer it toanother. To give up a right completely is to lose it; further, one places oneselfat the mercy of the other, who may decide to kill one, which would contra?vene the law of nature. To transfer a right is to give it to another with the ex?pectation of something in return. This mutual transfer of rights establishes acontract between the parties. Thus, in order to ensure their own preservation,people give up their right to everything by coming together in a society andestablishing a contract with a common power. Under the terms of this con


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214 NATHANMICZOtract, people transfer, or alienate, all their rights to the sovereign, in exchangefor security and protection.The goal of this peace and security is to enable individuals to continue topursue their felicity, although this pursuit is now moderated by a concern forthe interests of others. The ideal form of sovereignty, then, is that which maxi?

mizes each individual's goal attainment. As Mandle (1997) states, Personsin aHobbesian state of nature establish a commonwealth through bargaining

with each other to establish amutually advantageous contract. Such a con?tract will reflect the existing balance of power (p. 552). This is so becausethe transfer is done willingly and that which is done willingly is always donefor one's own advantage. The sovereignty that is given up in exchange forsecurity is transferred to the government. The claim, then, that people alien?ate their lives and the use of their power to the sovereign amounts to sayingthat they alienate their lives to either another person or some body of people.

Even though individuals still engage in acquisition, they no longer enjoy thesovereign use of all their powers.

RousseauIndividuals exit the state of nature together in pursuit of some common pur?pose. This common goal presupposes some amount of cooperative behavioron their part. By virtue of the cooperation necessary to attain that end, a com?

mon will is enacted. This general will can be said to refer to those behaviorswhose necessity is dictated by the requirements of the common goal. Thisgeneral will exists even if it is never fully promulgated. It exists by the factthat, and for as long as, it is needed. Nor does it have to be explicitly agreedto by all parties. Every member of the community shares the general will andit subsumes each and every person's private will. In other words, the general

will is sovereign. Each member of the community, therefore, must alienatehis person and all his power (SC, 6, p. 148) to the general will. However,since every person does so, everyone also partakes of the sovereignty that

is the general will. As part of the sovereign body, each person remains freeand equal (Mandle, 1997). This condition of equality holds regardless oftheir initial circumstances or bargaining power. For Rousseau, sovereigntycannot be established simply by an arbitrary agreement based on private

wills (Mandle, 1997, p. 553). However, individuals do not thereby com?pletely divest themselves of their private will. People should identify them?selves with the common good, and that is largely the goal of socialization,but Rousseau does not claim that the general will should obliterate privatewills.

The fundamental tension in society, then, lies in distinguishing the 'will ofall' from the general will. The 'will of all' is the aggregation of private wills,and ismore akin to the kind of commonwealth envisioned by Hobbes. AsMandle (1997) writes,


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 215If the will of all rather than the general will is acted upon, it is because a

majority of individuals are motivated to act only toward the satisfaction oftheir private interests. Notice that a special case of such an outcome is, inmodern vocabulary, the result of a bargaining game between individualspursuing only their private interests, (p. 551)

A crucial distinction between Hobbes and Rousseau can be found in the ques?tion of determining whether or not a decree is in conformity with the general

will. For Hobbes, to live in civil society is to alienate the use of one's power,and one is therefore bound to obey any decree passed by the sovereign. For

Rousseau, to live in civil society is to partake of sovereignty, and one is there?fore bound to attempt to ascertain the extent towhich a decree accords withthe general will.

Several commentators have argued that determining the 'will of all' (i.e.,by some kind of voting procedure) is not equivalent to determining the gen?eralwill (Ansell-Pearson, 1991;Gaus, 1997;Mandle, 1997).Mandle (1997)argues that the only true way to determine the general will is in an idealizedassembly of fully informed, rational, and virtuous citizens, each entitled toparticipate and vote; however, citizens are not enjoined to vote on their pref?erences with respect to the proposed decree, but on whether or not the decreeaccords with the general will. In other words, the citizen must put him or herselfin place of the common good and reason from that perspective. Given thedifficulty in ascertaining the general will for any specific occasion, there isalways the possibility that the citizen will still vote wrongly. This can happenif the citizen mistakes his or her private will for the general will. Or, a corpo?rate private interest may persuade the citizen that its will is the general will.This is one of the dangers of viewing the vote as a true reflection of the gen?eral will. Even if amajority votes for something, that does not mean it accordswith the general will. Only to the extent that the procedure approaches the

idealized assembly can it come near to reflecting a true expression of sover?eignty.

Social Exchange Perspectives on Close RelationshipsThe Social Exchange Tradition

Social exchange perspectives have played a prominent role in theorizing aboutinterpersonal communication processes (Berscheid andWalster, 1977; RusbultandBuunk, 1993 ;Thibaut andKelley, 1959), relationshipdevelopment (Altmanand Taylor, 1973), and maintenance (Stafford and Canary, 1991). However,researchers in this tradition do not always agree on the precise nature of theassumptions, which underlie it. Brewer and Crano (1994) suggested that so?cial exchange theories assume that people are hedonistic, seeking tomaximize


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216 NATHAN MICZOrewards and minimize costs and punishments. Other notions of exchange begin

with aRational Man Model, assuming that the decision to continue a relation?ship is based on a rational calculation of rewards and costs, rather than a he?donistic gratification. Molm (1997) has been critical of these explanations,arguing that there need not be a necessary foundation in rationalism or he?donism; instead, the starting point is that people will seek tomaintain rela?tionships inwhich the rewards simply outweigh the costs. Despite this lackof agreement on assumptions regarding rationalism or hedonism, exchangetheories can be distilled down to one common assumption about relationships:individuals seek tomaximize their rewards and minimize their costs (Brewerand Crano, 1994; Hinde, 1997; Molm, 1997; Rusbult and Arriaga, 1997;Rusbult and Van Lange, 1996).

The emphasis on the individual maximization of rewards and minimiza?tion of costs makes social exchange a variant of psychological egoism. Thus,itmight be useful to disentangle the concepts of selfishness, self-interest, and

hedonism associated with that philosophy. Rachels ( 1993) argues that psycho?logical egoism suffers from three confusions: First, a failure to distinguishselfishness from self-interest. As Rachels writes, selfish behavior is behaviorthat ignores the interests of others in circumstances inwhich their interestsought not to be ignored (p. 70).2 Acting in our own interests, deciding forourselves what is best for us, may have implications for others, and thoseimplications may even be negative, but that does not make our behavior nec?essarily selfish. The who and what of interests that ought not to be ignored

may be negotiable and not always clear, but that is not the same as declaringsocial exchange theories as promotive of selfishness. Second, the failure to dis?tinguish self-interest from hedonism. Hedonism entails engaging in behaviorthat provides pleasure or sensory gratification. Citing the example of a smoker

who continues to smoke despite knowing the health risks involved, Rachelswrites, We do lots of things because we enjoy them, but that does not meanwe are acting from self-interest (pp. 70, 71). Not only are all actions notselfish, then, but all actions are not motivated by self-interest either. And, third,as Rachels argues, one cannot assume that a concern for one's own welfarecomes at the expense of a concern for the welfare of others. Taking accountof others' interests may oftentimes be essential to the promotion of one's owninterests. Thus, there is nothing in the fundamental assumption of social ex?change that implicates selfishness or hedonism; and, in fact, certain behaviorpatterns (i.e., an alcoholic who spends the family paycheck at a bar) may rep?resent clear violations of the principle of self-interested maximization of re?wards and minimization of costs.

To what extent is Hobbes consistent with the starting premise of socialexchange? Hoyt-0'Connor (1998) argued that Hobbes is not necessarily acrude psychological egoist: The goods an individual seeks may in fact be

motivated by a desire to promote the advantage of another (p. 402). Hobbes


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS217does not claim that selfishness or hedonism is the sole basis for acting. In fact,Hobbes concluded that the pursuit of felicity must be subordinated to virtue,where virtue takes into consideration thewelfare of others. This focus on selfinterest is consistent with more recent formulations of social exchange thatexplicitly deny that one needs assumptions of selfishness or hedonism. So?cial exchange theories assume only that people are motivated tomaximizerewards and minimize costs. However, insofar as thought precedes action,this calculation of self-interest is consistent with Hobbes' notion of delibera?tion as instrumental reason. In other words, people will seek what they per?ceive to be the good, and avoid what they perceive to be the bad. Whether ornot they are correct in their calculation is another issue. It is sufficient at thispoint to show the consistency between Hobbes and the exchange theorists uponthe fundamental starting premise of social exchange.

Interdependence Theory

Interdependence theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) continues to be the pre?dominant social exchange paradigm in interpersonal relationship research.3The theory is centrally concerned with interaction, the phenomenon wherebyindividuals express behavior in each other's presence, they create productsfor each other, or they communicate with each other (p. 10). The theory linksinteraction to the fundamental reward-cost assumption through the interac?tion matrix. In other words, the actions of one person, A, have consequencesfor the partner, B, and vice versa. These consequences for B can be reward?ing, punishing, or some combination of the two, yielding a total outcome valuefor that particular action. Similarly with any act initiated by B. The matrixrepresents the outcomes each person would experience for each of themani?fold interaction possibilities (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 19). The matrixcontains the outcome values for each possible behavior sequence A and B

might enact, given their respective personality characteristics, dispositions,social skills, cultural backgrounds, behavioral repertoires, and so forth, eventhough A and B may enact only a small number of behavioral sequences dur?ing any given interaction. Relationship development, then, involves an in?creased sampling of the range of values of the matrix.

Interdependence increases as an increasing number of cells in the matrixyield outcomes for both partners. The matrix itself is value-neutral; it is thesubjective experience of outcomes that determines satisfaction and depend?ence. This subjective experience of interdependence is affected by three typesof outcome control: reflexive control, the extent towhich a person controlsthe quality of his or her own outcomes (Rusbult and Arriaga, 1997, p. 227);fate control, the extent towhich the individual's outcomes are influenced bythe actions of the partner (Rusbult and Arriaga, 1997, p. 227); and, behavior


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218 NATHANMICZOcontrol, the extent to which the individual's outcomes are influenced by theinteraction of both partners' behaviors. A's behavior control is greater the

more B stands to gain by adjusting his behavior in accord with A's behavioralchoices (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, p. 103). IfA has complete reflexive con?trol over his or her own outcomes, then A is independent of B's actions.Similarly, ifA has complete fate control over B's actions, then B is en?tirely dependent upon A and A is independent of B's behavioral choices. Adyad becomes interdependent, then, to the extent that the partners convert re?flexive control and fate control into behavior control; that is, to the extent thatthey affect one another's outcomes, or have the potential to do so.

Critique of Interdependence Theory

Interdependence theory, and social exchange theories more generally, haveoftentimes been criticized for promoting selfishness (cf. Rusbult and Arriaga,1997, p. 240). Based upon the conceptual distinctions drawn by Rachels(1993), it can be argued that this particular criticism is a straw man debate.Social exchange theories begin with the primary assumption that individualsseek tomaximize their rewards and minimize their costs; there is nothing inthe concept of psychological egoism that renders it isomorphic with selfish?ness. However, this straw man debate masks a criticism that ismore funda?

mental and far-reaching in its implications.The problem centers around research suggesting that partners in close re?

lationships often, or at least often enough, exhibit a preference for their part?ner's interest at the expense of their own. For example, Roloff and Campion(1985), after reviewing several studies, concluded: Spouses in non-distressed

marriages appear to some degree to be unconditionally benevolent toward eachother (p. 171). They then go on to interpret this conclusion in the followingmanner: Thus, providing seemingly noncontingent resources now may maskan incurred obligation which one must repay in the future (p. 172, italicsadded). In other words, noncontingent benevolence may only be apparent.Such an interpretation saves the assumption of self-interest by explaining hownoncontingent benevolence, or any other resource, is really an instance ofcalculated self-interest, designed to keep the partner obligated, but it does soat the expense of falsifiability.

To circumvent this awkward interpretation, Interdependence theory hasintroduced the idea of the transformation of motivation. In order to understandthis concept, one must distinguish between two matrices, the given matrix,and the effective matrix. The given matrix represents the structure of in?terdependence based upon direct, self-interested preferences (Rusbult and

Arriaga, 1997, p. 234). The effective matrix represents the reconceptualizedpreferences that directly guide behavior (Rusbult and Arriaga, 1997, p. 234).


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 219It should be noted that this distinction, by its very nature, acknowledges thatall behavior is not

guided byself-interest. Further, this distinction is not drawn

in Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) original formulation of the theory. Thus, theoriginal outcome matrix has been reinterpreted as an effective matrix aftertransformations have already occurred based on given matrix preferences.

Formally, the transformation of motivation accounts for the fact that in?dividuals often respond inways that depart from 'gut level' given matrix pref?erences, instead behaving in such amanner as to promote broader interactiongoals (Rusbult and Arriaga, 1997, p. 234). If this is taken tomean that indi?viduals often don't act the way they want to act because these broader inter?action goals are more consistent with self-interest, then this is perilously closeto equating the given matrix with a kind of selfishness. It is possible, though,to interpret this as meaning that given matrix preferences are based on selfinterest, but that actual behavior may appear contrary to self-interest becausebroader interaction goals may include the promotion of another's interests.

Rusbult and Van Lange ( 1996) have defended the association between selfinterest and the given matrix along three lines. First, across all relationships,self-interested preferences tend to be the rule rather than the exception (p.

578). Second, self-interest can be motivating individuals even if they are notaware of their motives: Although individuals sometimes are unaware of selforiented given matrix structure, this does not deny the existence of self-inter?est (p. 578). Third, even in close relationships, self-interest stands as a pointof departure even when individuals behave well by deviating from immedi?ate self-interest (p. 578). In support of this, the authors cite conflict researchshowing that:

[W]hen close partners are induced to set aside the concerns that normallyinfluence social behavior?concern for the partner's feelings, the future ofthe relationship, and their public image or self-concept ? and to indicatehow they earnestly wish to behave (given matrix), response preferencesare substantially less prosocial and more self-oriented than are those ofpartners operating under conditions of normal social concern, (p. 578)

In other words, in the absence of social influences, partners in conflict situa?tions often report a desire to pursue their interest more forcefully.

The first defense of the given matrix/self-interest association is really justa restatement of the primary assumption. The second defense can be questionedon the grounds that, once motivations are allowed to operate without aware?ness, the same could be said of any motivation (i.e., apparent self-interestedbehavior could as easily be attributed to an unconscious prosocial motivation).The third defense is open to criticism on two grounds. First, if selfishness isdefined as behavior that ignores the interests of others in circumstances in

which their interests ought not to be ignored (Rachels, 1993, p. 70), thenindividuals in conflict situations who ignore the concerns that normally influ


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220 NATHANMICZOence social behavior would seem to be acting more selfishly than self-interestedly

? unless we are of the opinionthat someone whose interest dif?

fers from ours should have his/her interests ignored. Second, and morefundamentally, if interdependence is a situation of mutual behavior control,if the outcome matrix is a graphical representation of the structure of inter?

dependence, then there is no such thing as in the absence of. In other words,an individual who can and does ignore the partner's interests is independ?ent of the partner, not interdependent with the partner. Itmakes no sense thento ask the person what he or she would do in the absence of social influ?ences, because outcomes in the cells of the matrix depend upon those influ?ences. Once a person enters a relationship, there is no way of knowing ifthe numbers in the given matrix represent the outcomes of true self-inter?est, because if the relationship is one of interdependence, self-interest isentwined with the interests of the partner and the relationship. Self-interestdoes not disappear, but neither does it remain independent of an interdepend?ent outcome matrix.

Contributions of Rousseau

Rousseau makes two contributions that are along the lines of theoretical propo?sitions: First, the idea that individuals come out of the state of nature in pur?suit of a common goal, which provides criteria for the cooperative behaviorsnecessary for its realization. Also, once individuals have come together, ageneral will is established. This general will concerns those cooperativebehaviors and takes precedence over private wills, but it does not obliteratethem. Thus, there exists a dialectical tension between the general will of thedyad and the private wills of each member of the dyad.

Bataille

The philosopher Georges Bataille was fundamentally concerned with howsocieties dispose of excess resources, the problem of consumption, and sov?ereignty. Although he shared with Rousseau the assumption that labor andaccumulation were essential in the transition from animal to human, he ar?gued, contra Rousseau, that abundance made possible a truly human life.Rousseau's natural man provided him a standpoint from which to condemncivil society. However, because his natural man seems less than human, hiscondemnation appears based on flawed premises. That does not detract fromthe insight that the pursuit of a common goal presupposes behaviors neces?sary to attain it. The problem of interpersonal relationships centers aroundthe cooperative behavior necessary to dispose of excess resources.


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS 221

SovereigntyFor Bataille, sovereignty exists in an uneasy relationship with slavery.

Theslave is one who has been reduced to the status of an object, a thing: Theslave bound to labor and having become the property of another is a thing justas awork animal is a thing (Bataille, 1989, p. 56). What ismost characteris?tic of this thing is its usefulness to another person who is thereby made a sub?ject relative to an object.4 It is possible, however, for persons to stand in sucha relationship with themselves when they labor:

The first labor established the world of things, towhich the profane worldof theAncients generally corresponds. Once the world of things was pos?ited, man himself became one of the things of this world, at least for thetime inwhich he labored. It is this degradation that man has always triedto escape, (p. 57)

If to labor is slavery, then to consume the products of labor is sovereignty. Wemay call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that utility doesn't justify

(utility being that whose end is productive activity). Life beyond utility is thedomain of sovereignty (Bataille, 1991, p. 198, italics in original). Or, again,

sovereignty ? in a practical sense, the use of resources for nonproductiveends (p. 281). To be a laborer is to be concerned with utility, the future, andaccumulation. To be sovereign is to be concerned with uselessness, the present,and consumption.

ConsumptionBataille (1989) asserts that it is not necessity but its contrary 'luxury, ' thatpresents living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems (p. 12,italics in original). This is so because organisms are typically capable of pro?ducing more than they need to sustain themselves. A portion ofthat excessenergy is devoted to the growth of the organism; to extension beyond meremaintenance. However, there is still an accursed share ; a portion of energyor a contingent of resources that cannot be turned profitably to the growth ofthe organism. If this portion is not spent in some fashion, itwill go to wasteand be lost. The paradox is that it is possible for this loss to be put to use insuch a way that it actually contributes to the maintenance of society, ratherthan just themaintenance of the organism. On the one hand, man's ability toposit thing-ness to objects, giving them use-value, allows him to accumulatemore than he needs, but this very accumulation makes urgent the demands ofconsumption. Thus, all societies must establish themeans whereby slavery isbalanced by sovereignty. Inmodern, democratic societies, there is no person?age or class devoted to the consumption or circulation of luxuries; rather, eachindividual is confronted with the dilemma of how to dispose of the excess thathis or her labor affords.


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222 NATHANMICZOThe GiftStrictly speaking, individuals

are entitled to sole consumption of the productsof their labor. This solipsistic method of disposing of one's resources ismoreakin to the practices of animals than humans. Having created a world of ob?jects, human beings are aware of how the subject stands in relation to the object.

Human beings, at some point, desire to be subjects, and, to avoid being ob?jects. To consume one's resources in the fashion of animals suggests that oneis the slave to one's appetites. What characterizes humanity is restraint; to be

master of oneself is to be the subject who disposes of one's resources with anair of indifference. That is, one consumes what is necessary for the preserva?tion of one's body, and disposes of the rest in the form of the gift: the gift isitself the renunciation, the prohibition of immediate, unreserved, animal gratifi?cation (Bataille, 1991, p. 56). Thus, if the fundamental problem of inter?personal relationships is one of utilizing one's excess resources, the giftprovides for the resolution ofthat problem.

R.W. Belk and G.S. Coon (1993) define the gift as a good or service (in?cluding the giver's time, activities, and ideas) voluntarily provided to anotherperson or group through some sort of ritual [ceremony] (p. 394). If we in?clude information as a resource that can be given to another, then informa?tion about the self (i.e., self-disclosure) qualifies as a type of gift. In theirresearch on gift-giving, Belk and Coon uncovered two modes of gift-giving:economic exchange and agapic love.5 In the exchange model, gifts givers at?tempt tomaximize the rewards which a particular gift can obtain for them ataminimum cost. The value of a gift is defined by its economic worth. To givea gift is an attempt to incur an obligation, and thus to get something in return.

Receivers recognize this and therefore attempt to discharge the burden ofobligation as quickly as possible. What will ultimately be reciprocated is sub?ject to negotiation between the parties (e.g., the female who makes itvery clearup front that she does not engage in sexual activity on the first date). Becausethey understand that the partner desires something from them, that they arecommodities and things to the partner, parties to an exchange are continually

wary of being exploited. For this reason, they avoid becoming too dependentupon one another. Since the outcome of the exchange depends upon the re?sources at each party's disposal, the partner with less to give is at a disadvan?tage from the start. Such a portrait corresponds perfectly with the Hobbesianapproach to relationships described earlier.

In the agapic love model, considerations of the other take precedence overconsiderations for oneself. As such, the gift is a sacrifice on the part of thegiver: It is given with no expectation of return and without regard to cost oreffort. The value of the gift results from the fact that it is perfect for therecipient. That is, the gift may be something that was spotted while one wasengaged in some other activity, signifying that the recipient is close in thoughtfor the giver. Related to this, the gift expresses the giver's feelings about the


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS 223recipient and the relationship: expressive gifts celebrate the giver's feelingsfor the beloved?a person idealized

astotally unique and

apreordained matchwith the giver. Such uniqueness is referred to as singularity (Belk and Coon,

1993, p. 408). This singularization is antithetical to the commodification ofthe partner that occurs with economic gift-giving.

Presentation of the gift is only half the story. In a study of gift receipt, Ruth,Otnes, and Brunei (1999) found that gifts had different relational meanings,often based on the attributions of the recipient. Their results reveal two prin?cipal ways inwhich the gift is perceived.6 It can be perceived as an attempt tomove the relationship to a deeper level. If the attempt iswelcomed, then therelationship is strengthened; if the attempt is not welcome, the relationship isweakened. The gift can also be perceived as ameans of maintaining an exist?ing relationship. Once again, such gifts can be viewed as affirming the posi?tive qualities of the relationship, such as connection and commitment, orconfirming a lack of connection or bonding. It is interesting to note that arecipient's perceptions of who the gift is really for differ by valence. Withstrengthening and affirmation, recipients feel that the gift was given becauseit had personal meaning for the recipient, because itwas an expression of thegiver's concern and feelings for the recipient. To accept such a gift does notinfringe on one's own power, rather, the gift increases it.With weakening and

negative confirmation, however, there is a feeling that the gift was given tosatisfy a felt obligation on the part of the giver, or to control the recipient'sfeelings or behavior. What characterizes these negative effects is the sense thatthe gift does not attempt to please or singularize the recipient (p. 394).

Because such gifts render the recipient as an object with use-value (for thegiver), they infringe upon the recipient's sphere of power and require a returngift to the giver.7

We have amodel, then, inwhich a gift is presented in either an acquisitiveor expressive mode and can be perceived as being either welcome or unwel?come, appropriate or inappropriate. One important dimension iswhether ornot the gift is perceived as singularizing the recipient. Singular gifts show thatthe giver is thinking about the recipient, paying attention to the recipient's likesand dislikes, tastes and feelings. What seems to matter most, however, is thecorrespondence between the giver's intentions and the recipient's perceptions.This is a question at the forefront of interpersonal communication and bringsus back to the notion of exiting the state of nature.

Recall that the state of nature is an asocial state. Yet human beings wouldseem to be social creatures (Brown and Levinson, 1987; Maslow, 1968; Schutz,1958). According to Baumeister and Leary's (1995) belongingness hypoth?esis, human beings have a fundamental motivation to form interpersonal at?tachments. These attachments have two characteristics: First, there is a needfor frequent, affectively pleasant interactions with a few other people, and,second, these interactions must take place in the context of a temporally sta


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224 NATHANMICZOble and enduring framework of affective concern for each other's welfare(p. 497).

It is proposed, then, that individuals exist in the state of nature when,and for so long as, this fundamental desire is unfulfilled. For social creatures,such a state should be stressful, giving rise to existential anxiety, loneliness,and depression. In this state, individuals also lack a firm sense of identity.Thoits (1983, 1995) has argued that identities help provide a sense of mean?ing and purpose to life by providing individuals with behavioral expectations.

These expectations function as role requirements, allowing actors to know howto behave. Knowing how to behave gives actors a sense of purpose and direc?tion to their lives. Given the dissolute character of existence in the state of

nature, it is possible that individuals would seek solace in addictive behaviors(i.e., maladaptive coping) that would actually reduce their sovereignty bymaking them slaves to their appetites. It seems that to realize agency, to beother than what nature would make of us, we need other people. Thus, a lackof fundamental attachments should constitute sufficient motivation for exitfrom the state of nature.

The state of production is concerned with that part of time and effort de?voted to preserving oneself. This is the realm of work and labor. Becauseworking presents one with roles and behavioral expectations, it represents apartial solution to the problem of the state of nature. However, the state ofproduction is a state of task-orientation. Time devoted to social relationshipswhile at work is the concern of the next state. While laboring, the individual

is engaged in usefulness, useful activity. The person is a slave whose activi?ties are guided by the utility of the end product of labor. The laborer is notsovereign. Further, the successful laborer very quickly produces more than is

needed for preservation. For example, consider aman who completes the workof an 8-hour day in 5 hours. What is he to do with the remaining 3 hours? Heconfronts the prospect of how to utilize the accursed share of time. To con?sume it by himself puts him back in the world of unrestrained and selfishanimality. Thus, he must enter the realm of interpersonal communication,

which is the arena of shared consumption.The state of consumption is concerned with the distribution and consump?

tion of excess resources. Of course, the individual could choose to devote thoseresources to the self. Such a choice entails a loss of power (Bataille, 1989, p.69) because the solo consumption of excess displays the lack of restraint char?acteristic of animals. To establish relationships, this excess must be given toothers as a gift. As described earlier, however, there are two modes of giftgiving. On the one hand, there is the acquisitive mode of gift-giving. Thisinvolves the presentation of a gift with the expectation of reciprocation. Be?cause it attempts to render the other as an object, it is rightly classified as a

mode of production, amode whose purpose is to acquire an object of desire.The possession of the object entails a loss of sovereignty in that it subjectsboth individuals towhat is useful to obtain the object. However, it should be


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS 225pointed out that if both parties are interested in acquisition, such a relationshipdoes meet the condition of exit from the state of nature. Imagine

a man and awoman, neither of whom is primarily interested in the other person as a sub?ject, but with the gratifications that can be obtained from a relationship with thatother person. They have come out of the state of nature together in pursuit of acommon goal: gratification. The relationship should be stable as long as both partiesadhere to the rules of exchange. The relationship would become problematic assoon as one party became interested in amore expressive relationship.

The other mode of gift-giving is expressive. It is not concerned with whatcan be gained from the other, but with how the other can be made into a sub?ject for oneself. The expressive gift singularizes; it recognizes the uniquenessof the other. If the gift is given and received in the spirit of agape, then it sim?ply is the expression of how the partners feel about one another. There is noattempt to gain advantage, nor any feeling of exploitation. Both partners, assubjects to each other, are restored to the world of sovereignty. We should notbe surprised to find that many of these gifts are shared and enjoyed in com?mon. They communicate that the relationship is unique. Production and ac?quisition are safe because one does not risk one's self, only one's resources.In expression, however, resources are subordinate to expression, so that whatis truly risked is the self, the sovereign being that desires to come out of thestate of nature into a fully human existence. Expressive consumption is theheart of intimacy.

The Role-Identity Model

The second contribution of Rousseau is the idea that once individuals havecome together out of the state of nature, a general will is established that standsalongside each person's private will. The Role-Identity Model (McCall andSimmons, 1966) begins with the assumption that though human beings arebounded by a physical existence in amaterial world, they are capable of idealconceptions ofthat world and their place in it: At all costs, as we shall see,[man] must preserve his picture of himself as an ideal being (p. 41). Identityis a central concern of this model. Several commentators have pointed out that

communicators do not cease to be themselves when they occupy a role (Burke,1980;McCall and Simmons, 1966;Thoits, 1995). In incorporating the roleinto their self-view, they craft an identity for themselves. Identity, therefore,is defined as the particular manner inwhich an individual with a unique selfconcept occupies a given social role. To the extent that individuals occupymultiple roles, they may have multiple identities of varying importance(McCall and Simmons, 1966).

According to the model, then, individuals strive to enact their ideal identi?ties. Given that role-identities are idealized, that they are enacted in relation


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226 NATHANMICZO

ships and therefore subject to challenge (Goffman, 1967), and that some tasksassociated with some roles may be mandatory for retention of the role eventhough the tasks chafe the individual, there is often likely to be a discrepancybetween the person's ideal self and situational self. Given this discrepancy,individuals are engaged at least some of the time with obtaining the legitima?tion for their identities that will allow them tomaintain those conceptions. Thislegitimation from others requires role-support, the expressed support ac?corded to an actor by his audience for his claims concerning his role-identity(McCall and Simmons, 1966, p. 72). The important points about role-supportare, first, that the audience expresses it, and, second, that it confirms and le?gitimates, not just that one is in a given role, but the idiosyncratic manner inwhich one occupies that role.

This confirmation and legitimation can be obtained from others in twoprincipal ways. First, one can obtain role-support by successful performanceof a role. This method is not altogether perfect. Because others are seekinglegitimation of their own identities, they may offer less than complete atten?tion to our performances; social norms may dictate that support be offered,resulting in questions about its authenticity; rules of tact may result in sup?port being offered equivocally or ambiguously; finally, as repetition of theperformance increases, so does the probability of a loss of expressive con?trol (Goffman, 1959). As the adage says, success is temporary but failure isforever. Role-support provided by the self as audience is subject to the samevicissitudes as support offered by others. Thus, role-support that is solely theresult of successful performance is likely to be subject to discrepancies be?tween the ideal self and the actual self.

There is, however, another way inwhich individuals can obtain role-sup?port for their identities:

As a consequence of our recurring needs for role-support and the othercommodities of social exchange, we are disposed to seek dependably re?curring sources of them. And when we locate or are thrown together withindividuals or groups that, for whatever reason, are able, willing, and readyto afford us supplies of such exchange commodities, we are disposed to'corner the market' by establishing more durable bonds with those alters,that is, by establishing interpersonal relationships. (McCall and Simmons,1966, p. 168, italics inoriginal)

In other words, whereas the first form of support is contingent upon continualsuccessful performance, establishing an interpersonal relationship providesone with a dependable source of identity support. Although standards of per?formance remain, support will be forthcoming despite fluctuations in actualperformance, for individuals in relationships.

Once a relationship is established however, the duties and obligations nec?essary to sustain it give it a structure. Relationships may be initiated because


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS 227of the gratifications they provide, but they last because partners do things that

make them last, including things they maynot

particularlywant to do. Thus,

partners acquire a relational identity that must be managed alongside otheridentities. This identity places limits upon one's former freedom. The ques?tion remains as to how that which places limits on one's freedom can also bethemeans to extend one's sovereignty.

We have now reached the point atwhich the dual contributions of Rousseauconverge. When individuals exit the state of nature in pursuit of the same goal(whether that goal be acquisition or expression), the relationship should bemore stable than when their goals are discrepant. As the relationship devel?ops (meaning that identity-support is offered and accepted for the manner inwhich the partners are fulfilling the duties and obligations of the role) part?ners acquire a relational identity, regardless of whether they embrace it or feelthey are shackled to it. This identity must be managed alongside other iden?tities, producing a dialectical tension between each person's private will (whathe or she wants to do) and the general will (what is good for the relationship).The general will can never be known with complete certainty, but partnersshould approach it to the extent that they approach the idealized assembly,reasoning from the common good.

What is good, however, is that the relationship ensures the sovereignty ofboth parties; otherwise, they would have been better off remaining in the stateof nature. Acquisition and accumulation, which require labor, involve a lossof sovereignty. Therefore, no matter how stable the relationship, when part?ners share the goal of production, the relationship does not promote theirdevelopment into virtuous, autonomous human agents. Or, to put it another

way, they are disposing of what they have accumulated in such a way as toaccumulate more, rather than sacrificing what they have accumulated. On theother hand, because expression and consumption take the other out of theworldof utility and restore him or her to the sovereign order, they promote the de?velopment of the individual into a virtuous, autonomous human agent. Or, whathas been accumulated is sacrificed and therefore cannot be the basis for fur?ther accumulation.8

These propositions allow us to understand something about relationshipconflict. There may be conflict over the division of labor. That is, partners mayargue over chores and the positions are already given in a clash of private willversus general will. But there is another, potentially more serious, source ofconflict stemming from the fact that, even though relationship identities en?croach somewhat upon freedom, there is still something left over. This is trulyan accursed share in that conflict over the partner's commitment to the re?lationship, jealousy over the attention a partner pays to a third party, and thelike, are disputes over how the excess is being spent. Thus it is that the giftremains an important component of even well established relationships. It is

precisely in regard to this portion that one has some choice about consump


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228 NATHANMICZOtion. To fail to bestow it upon one's partner may suggest that the partner has

been placed back into the world of things, an object relative to the subject.One must be slave and sovereign in the same relationship, rather than slaveto one's partner and sovereign with another.

Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to stimulate thinking about interpersonalrelationships from a philosophical perspective that, from its inception, is op?posed to the social exchange

tradition derived from Hobbes. Thus, I havedrawn upon literature selectively, rather than exhaustively. Should the ideaspresented here prove palatable, there follows the difficult task of reviewingextant bodies of research and attempts to derive more formal propositions andtests of those propositions. For example, self-disclosure conceived as a typeof gift shares with all gifts issues for both giver and receiver. Self-disclosurecan be an attempt to elicit information from one's partner, or away of increas?ing the intimacy of the relationship; recipients of disclosure may deem theinformation inappropriate or unwanted.

In the standard model of scientific progress (Kuhn, 1996), new theories be?come necessary when anomalies accrue to prevalent theories. The coopera?tion and benevolence shown by partners in close relationships represent suchanomalies. Within the last two decades, Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1982)and Dialectics (Baxter andMontgomery, 1996) have emerged as potential al?ternatives to Social Exchange theories. Both of these approaches are consist?ent with a position derived from Rousseau. The starting point for a formallyplanned framework is likely to be some variant of the following statement:rather than ask, What do individuals want from relationships, we should ask,

What do relationships want from individuals?

AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to acknowledge and thank Michael Burgoon for allowinghim to pursue the issues presented in this paper during a theory constructionclass; thanks also to Lisa Miczo, Lenore Langsdorf, and two anonymous re?viewers for their comments and suggestions.

Notes1. Abbreviations for Hobbes and Rousseau are as follows:

Lev ? Leviathan, Hobbes, 1651HN - Human Nature, Hobbes, 1650


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THE GIFT IN INTERPERSONALELATIONSHIPS229DO - Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau, 1754PE ? Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau, 1755SC - Social Contract, Rousseau, 1762

2. Because individuals inHobbes' state of nature recognize the concept of right, they arecapable of selfishness. For Rousseau, people in the state of nature did not see themselvesas entities distinct from nature. This iswhy they cannot legitimately be accused of self?ishness.

3. A recent textbook on relational communication (Guerrero, Andersen, and Afifi, 2001)essentially equated the two: Social exchange theory, which has also been called inter?dependence theory, is based on the general principle that people want their rewards tooutweigh their costs (p. 200).

4. In other words, if the useful thing is rendered an object, the one who makes use ofthatthing, employing it to his or her own advantage, becomes the subject.5. Belk and Coon (1993) also found evidence for a symbolic exchange model, which com?bined elements of both economic exchange and agapic love. For clarity of presentation,consideration of that model has been omitted.

6. They also found thatgifts could have negligible effects upon the relationship. Such giftsmight be given and accepted more on the basis of politeness norms than because of theirrelational potential.

7. What reduces power, autonomy, and sovereignty in the gift is the obligation to give agift in return. Because the expressive gift is a sacrifice on the part of the giver, it cannotbe recovered. The recipient is not obligated to repay the gift. If a gift is given back, it isdone in the same spirit of sacrifice.

8. Made explicit, the warrant of this argument would read something like this: To developa truly human existence, one must learn to sacrifice what one has accumulated.

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