Rousseau and Nietzsche : the philosopher as legislator

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ROUSIIEjTU Al{D IIIEl'ZÉiCtlE I TIIiI PIITLOÍiOPHIIR AS LEGTSLATOR

BY

Ia¡ G" Forbes

 thesis submitted in fulfil-nent of the::equirements for the degree of Master ofArts at t,he Universjty of Adelaid.e, South

Aust.ral-i a.

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A]]ST'IìACT OF M A. TÍ{ESIS

ROUSSEAU AND NTETZSCI{H: THn P}IILæOFHER .4,5 LIËISIATOE

This thesis reveals an i.mportant relatiÕnehip between the thought

of Jea:r-Jacgues Rousseau and. Ï?ied.::ich Nietzsche" To achieve this,

Bousseaurs thor:ght is presr:ntecl as a fund.&nentally moral theory, and

Nj.etzschets vork is approached through his criticlue of all moral

phiì.osophy. In this wa.y, it ca.¡r be seen hol¡ Rousseaurs contributiorr

to pol-itical thought w¡rs to influence I'Iietzsche, in the first instance,

and f\rrl,her, how Nietzsche provicìes the ba^sis of a new interpretation

anrl criticis¡n of Rousseaurs theory. Tn the course of a close textual

analysis, the examination of rnorality, society, the state, and the individual

try each thinker in turn wiì-Ì be discussed., and. will be followed. by a¡r

a.ssessment of the ¡ulva.nces made by each thinker"

Chapters ff anil III, then, constitute the first part of the thesis,

where Rousseaurs moral theory is expticated, anil which theory is seen

to und.erpin and. structure his social- and. politieal- conclusions. The

next two chapters take the forrn of an exegesis of Nietzschers critiqrre

of Roussear¡ in particulor a:rd morality in 6eneral, md the marÌner in

which concepts central to political theory refiect and. end.orse that

morality.

Finalþ, ehapters VT and. VII coneentrate upr:n the thec¡ries of

ehange of both Rousseau a¡rd. Nietzsche. This ineh,¡.d^es a¡¡ exmination

of notions of Lrrmarr nature es thq¡ rel-ate to the scope and. posoibílity

of na¡ chan6ing himself and society. AIso, the implications of both

thinkers choosing to a.dopt the role of ¡ùrilosopher as Legislator to

soeiety are d.iscussecl , frqn the point of view of each writerf s vork,

and uith re*pect to political theory. t\rther to bhia, other notable

eonchrsionsi re¿rched. cer¡tre upon the extent of Nietzechers

inrlebted¡ress to & ns¡ whose thought he attacked most vehmently'

end the real theoretica-l advances mede in these two critiques

of contmporaqf society.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

Ed.itions anrl Abbreviatinns Ltsed

Page

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r TMTODUCTTON

lï ROIFSEAU: TOI4IARD AN ANTI-RÏLIGIOUS MORALITY

1. Ind.ivid.uals before Religion2" Morality for the Ind.ividual3. Ttre Politics of Morality

1I] ROUSSEAUIS COMMU}Ir'IY FOR TNDIVTDUAT-s 3T

1. Images of Hunen Natureå,¡ Sanua4e natureb o SoeiaI netr¡reco Return to NatureComunity for Individ.uals1.

IV NI¡ITZSCIiE'S CRITTQLIE 0F ROttsSEAU: FBOM MORAL T0 E)ffnA- TZMORAL

'fhe Death of GodRousseau and. the nineteenth centu:¡rNi-etzsehe on the Return to NaturettNornal-tt noralityRessentímentNietzsche on Rousseaurs State

V STATE AND THE GENEAIOGY OF MORAI^S tOl+

2.fitate end SocietyGenealo6r of More"lsBo ChristianitySociety without Religion3

vI THEORIES OÏ' CHANGE: PERFECTIBILITY AND TR.A]{SEICIJËATION 133

Free will- in RousseauWill, to Power in NietzscheConsciousnese and. Fr<¡gressEter:nal RecunenceTransfiguration end Hr¡nan kogress

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (contd..)

trTTT THE PHTT,OSOPIIER AS Í,NGISI"ATOR

Rousseeu as LegistatorNietzsche as LegíslatorLegislators and Eclucation - RousseauLegislators and Eilucation - NietzscheThe lndividuaJ- zurd. the Lav

\rl]T CONCLI.tsTON

Se Iectecl Bib J-i ography

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ACKNCffLEDCNiÍESITS

f gratefuJ-\y acknorrledge the encor.rragmrent ernd assistence of

my supen/isor, PauJ Coreor&n! vhose i.nterest, advice, and, criticisns

with respect to each succeerling d.raf'f and, the enterprise itsel-f

have proved inval"uable. I woultl also like to thank Brian Abbry

for supervising ne in Dr. Corcorå.rrf s absenc'e, a,nd. Professor Grame

Duncan of the University of East Anglia for resding arid criticising

an earl-ier drafù of this thesis. The thesis is ded.icated to

Consta¡,ze I'orbes, vhose support and. eoneern has always been cn¡eial.

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II

EDITTONS AND ABBRE\IATIONS USED

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l,lorks by Nietzaehe

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Works

Baníe Wrùtings of Níetaseheo Trans. and Ed", ltalterKaufìnann, Mod"ern Library (New York L966). lfhe folloringabbreviations serve to separate the contente, Ðd inclieatethe time of vrriting" The aþbreviation wiJ-l be uEed. withthe nrmber of the section, in arabic nr¡¡erals, or villrefer to chapter and. section nunbers.

The Biy,th of Tvagedy, L872.

Beyond. GoqJ øú. EuiL, 1886.

On the Ge-nealogy of l.lonaLs, 1887.

Eece tlomo, 1888.

The Gay Scienee, Trans" WaLter Kauflnann, Vintage Booìcso(Nev York IgTb).

The Por.tabLe Níetzsehe, ËeLected. a¡rd Trans., Ifalter Kamfuannnviring Iless (Nev York 1968). This eclition contains ma.rysmaLl fragnents, vhich wilJ- he referred to by page ntmber,in arabic nr¡merels " targer sections r¡i1"l be refemed toby the following abbreviations.

Humøt, ALL-Too-Hwnan, 1BTB.

M[æed opinions øtã Marf,ns, 18?9.

The Da,m, fBBt e¡¿ L887.

Thus Spoke Zatøthustra, 1883-1885.

I\.'tíl.ight of the Id.ols, 1888.

The Antiehnist, 1888.

The ltiLL ta Pouser, Trans. Wa-lter Kaufbann and R. J, Hollingdale,Ed. Ìlalter Kautuann, Vintage Boolcs (New York 1968).

l,,lork-s, tB Vols.n Trans. O. Levy, Allen anô Unwin (tond.onL9A9-27) " ÌIhere speeific works ere referred. too theabbreviations noted above wj-IL be used., folloned by sectionnu¡ber and. ttler4¡tt.

l,loz'ks by Rousseat

Conf. Confeasúorn¡ J. M. Dent end. Sons (Everlmants Library)(London 193f), 2 vols.

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The Confessions of JeørJanques Roueseau., (fro¡ls. Jo M.Cohen), Penguin Books (Ha::nondsr¿orth 1953) .

Al-l citations frcrn the Ðuer¡menrs edibion have the vo}.menunber in upper-ease Rana¡¡ numernls, e.nd. the page nr.mberin arabic nr¡rerals. Citations flcm the Penguin edítionmay be d,istinguished sinee only the page m.mber is cited..

EmtLe, (Trerrs. Barbara Foxley)¡ J. Mn Dent and, Sons(Everlnranrs Librery) (london 1911) ,

The SoeiaL Contract ØLd. ùiseourses, lTrans. G. D. H. Cole),J, M. Dent and. Sons (Ever¡manrs University Librery) ,( London 1973) .

Ttris e¡iition csrtains an import,ant collection of politicalvritings, md the folloning abbreviations serve to seperatethe contents "

A Discouz,se an the IvloraL Effeets of üte Ants md. Seíences.

A ùíssertabíon on the Origín m<l Foundation of tlze Ineqwalityof Mrr*ind.

A Diaeourse an PoLitieaL Eeonøng.

Ihe GeneraL SocùetA of 'bhe Hwnøt Reea.

The Soaial Coruf,ract or tuíneiplee of PoLítieal Ríght,

Citations frcrr the Sosial Contract witl cite the bocilr number,in upper-ease Rcmran numeral-e, followect by the ehapter m¡nberin arabie numerals " Page nunbers vill be cited. in all-other ca^ses, in arabic ntuerals.

Consíderatíon"s on the Gouermment of PoLøtã, ød, on itePnoposed Refonnation, ín Røtsseat t PolitícaL Wz,ì,tingo,(frans. zurc1 Ed.. F?ed.erick Watkins), Ttrcmas Neleon s¡dSons (Nelson Phílosophical Texts)o (London 19?O).

ConstítutíortaL Project fon Coraiea, íbid.

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CHAPTER I /s¿rg ¡

]NTBODUCTION

The rel-ationshi,p between the thought of Jean-Jacques Roussea¡.r and

Friedrich Nietzsche presents sn interesting but problsnatic topic for

diseussion. It is ¡rrcrnisir:g insof&r a,s the life and vork of each

thinker a.re so reguJ,arly linked with the most i.üporta¡t architects of,

ard. contributors to, political phiJ"osophy anrl theory. û.rtstanding

exmples of such men include Socrates, Plato, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke,

Kant, Hegel , Man'x, Freuil arul Sertre, amd. one might perhaps expect to fincl

a eonsi<i.er¡rble amorrnt of secondar-y literature on the subject of Rot¡ssea¡¡rs

influence on Nietzsche. This is nob the case, hov¡ever. Apart frcm

passi.rç references to Rousseau in the Nietzsche Literatur-e, there are

only two stud,ies that attsrpt e, systematic analysis of the extent of

the relaticnship betveen the two men. Herbert Krmerrs dissertetion,

Nietzsahe und Roussean, exmines the accuracy of the critiques and.

criticisms of Rousseau that are scatter"ed. throughout Nietzschers works -ftan Lfmost d.isappeari.ng fra€¡nent of critical achierrernentrf , in Kramerrs

vord.s - ns well a-s providir:g a biographical monograph.l More recentlJ,

W, Do Williemst l¡ook, Nietzsehe øuï the fuenelz, has a large section

devoted to Rousseaurs influence on Nietzeche, particular\y in reletion

to the concept of "return to nature""2 Notwithstand-ing their relevence

to our stud.yo such research belongs primarity in the eategory of

ìþ¡,etzsehe-Stuåien, rather than politica-l theory, and. the absence of

f\rrdørentaÌIy political analyses voul-d. seem to indicate that there ere

insufficient ground.s for proposing that Rousseau and Nietzsche were in

L. Herbert Kremer , Nietzsche urd Rouseean, Ti^r¿rLs, I. Kn:nins,R. Noehe (feipzie 1"928).

W. D. Williams, Nietzsehe øå the f'venú, Basil Blackwel'l(ùrfc¡ra 1952) .

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substertial- intetl-ectual agreement .

rt is in this sense that our stud,y is probrematic, rt would be

a rel-ativel-y simple matter to establish that Rousseau and. Nietzsche

shered a serect range of concepts , assrm.ptions , beliefs and. errors,

Such a d.iscussion might traverse topics like society, the ind.ivictual,

and' cul-ture - ir¡terestirrg topics in themserves, Ìaeking only the

possibiJ-ìty of achieving anybhing but the most obvious conclusion"

T'ìr.is exercise voul,d. be just ss Nietzsche d.escribes it.

Those vho vish to be med.iators between two resolutethinkers are marked. as med.iocre: they lack eyes to see theunparalleJ-ed; seeiqg thi.ngs .cs similar and rnaking thsr thesame is the m¿¡rk r:f r¡eak eyes. 1

With this in mind, our analysis vi1l concentrate on the simílarities

betveen the thought of Rø,rssequ e¡rd. Nietzsche better t,o eppreciate

their differences. Thus, the discussion rril-r. be doninated. by the

exa¡nination of morarity, society" and the ind.ivid.ual by each thinker.

While rmaining tme to Rc¡usseauts argumentation on these issues, his

id.ees wiff be presented" so Ers to highlight their influence on Nietzsche'!6

thor-ryht in the sueceed.ing century.

Such a presentation vilI be ccrnplemented by the exposition of

Îùietzschers vork, vhich will in turn fom the ba,sis of a critíque

of Rousseaurs propositior¡.s a¡d. concLusions, In this way, we vil_l- be

abl-e to prcn'id.e an eval.r¡ation of Rousseeuf s contribution to politieal

theory at søre veriance vittr t¡re interpretatíons offered. by the

ccsrm,trnitaria¡ a¡d. liberal--democratic trad.itions, a.s well a"s gaining

an insight to a Nietzschean critique of mass soeiety and. its politÍcaI

character" FinaLì-y, the sigrrificance of one fìrrther simiråríty ín

outl-ook between these two great thinkers wilr be discussed." Botlr

emphzu;ise that it is the ta-qk of the philosopher to be Legieretor to

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ma¡kind. Both, it vil1. be argued, sre dravn to such a conclusion

by the very nature of their approach to the principal- concerns of

this d.i.ssertation,

Before summarisirrg those approaches, howevero it should. be

interpoì-ated that the lives of Rousseau and Nietzsche wil-l not be

examined. in an¡r systematic a:rd detailett fashion. Excellent biographies

<rf each thinker exist, which sugment Rousseauts Confese¿orß end

Nietzsche ts Ecee [! rtno respective]-y"1 .As mentioneel. earlier, Kraner has

evaluatecl and ccrnparecl their' lives, and pointed to basic simil-arities

and nota'bIe <iiffer*r,""n "2 f n o'¿r opinion, a co1lection of events and

circumstances cclnmon to men of <lifferent centuries &nd. cc¡Jntries

must to scme extent re\r on either coincid.encÊ or scmetimes d.ubious

psychologising, enhancing the possibility for serious errors of

interpretation. For: instance, Kremer regard.s Rousseau a¡ld Nietzsche

to be as unpolitical as Don Quixote, yet believes that Rousseau lra.s

responsible for the French Revol-ution of ]'f89, and that Nietzsche

eaused World l,¡aÌ' t.3 Biographical cqnments wil-l, therefore, be linited.

to those occssions when a similar occurence in theír lives is direct\y

related. to a shared. concept or orientation.

The ba.sis of Rousseå.urs contribution to politieal theory is

centred. on the moral nature of his thought " Catl.ing into question

al-1" fonns of iÌlegitimate a,uthority over men in society, Rousseau

preached" a moral-j-ty that chaJ-Ienged. specificalJy the Churchrs

dcrnination of ind.ividual spirituality" In Rousseaurs opini<irnn the

1. q.v., Sir Gavin d.e Beer, Jeøt-Jacq1les Roussean Øzd His \lot'|d.,Thcnas Hud.son (Lond.on L972); Mathew Josephson, Jeøt-Jaeq1ßî Rous9eø,ì.,Russell a¡d Russel] (New York l97O) ; e.n<I D. Haléwy, The Lï,fe ofFniedt+ch Nietzsche, (Tra¡,s" J" M" Hone) Unwin Bros (Lon<lon f911);Jankcr Lsrvrin, Nietzsehe: A BíographícaL Intrúuction, Stud.ío Vigta(London 1971)

"

2. Krener, op. cil;., pp. Y(-r5.

3. Ibid. ' p, ,5. Neither claim is substa¡itiuble.

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in<i.ividrral- harl to be rescued frûn restrictive religious practice

in order to acquaint hin with tris irrner self and. to foster an a,rlareness

of his ¡rersonal relateclness to a Supreme Bej"r:6* In effect, Rousseau

argued that man ha^s a f\rnclanentally moral orientation to hi¡rself ancl to

the worlcl . Thus each person v€ùs seen as responsible for his actions

and thoughts, which, because they vere morally concei'¡edr could be

interprebed as good. or evil. Man in general, therefore, vrtsi responsible

for the 6ood, end" evil of his society. By portraying the initiviilual as

the creator of his oun mor"a] cond.uct, then, Rousseau provid.ed the stimulus

for and. possibiiity of significant changes to the prevail-ing conceptions

of the self a^nd. society"

The ind,ivid.uafistic strain in Rousseaur s thought d.oes not

pred.cririnate, however. The impetus toward. self-realisation pronpts

Rousseu¡ tc corrsider the various images of hr.ma¡¡ nature underlying the

phitoscrphies of the Bnlighte¡urent generally and. Hobbes a¡d Locke

pertieularly. Rr:usseauts exanination of the nature of man takee

the form of an hypothetical strrQr of man in his I'naturalrt ccnd.ition, in

ord.er to understand., not that m€tn or thet sttte of nature, but the

effect that society has had on manfs motivetion and behavir:urs. This

lee,C.s hi-m to contrast and counterpose søn)qgë nature with a social

nature that ha^s d.eveJ-oped. witti the grorth of civit society. Forsseau

conelud.ed. that man in society is prevented frcn erhibiting his true soeial

nature, however, by unsatisfactory political systems, anil that socis,l

inter-relationships &re soured and perverted. by the decadence of modern

ciyil-isation. fitus, man is robbed. of his llr.unanity, forced. into roles

that cripple his creativity srrd tend only touard the nainten&nce of those

very institutions that steal away Ìris virtue, and maÌçe it inpossible

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to relate to his fell-crw-nen except through deceit a¡rcl selfishness.

This antipnthy bovard contemporary society manifests itself not in an

argument that man shoul-d eschel¡ society per se, and return to a natr:raI

ov sauùag¿ existenee, but that nev forms of political- essociation shouJ.d.

be forted. to enabLe the individ.uat fu1ly to achieve his potential- both

noral\r and socialþ" The cr¡neeption of a cømunity for individ.uals

und.erpins Rousseauts eontrat sociaL, where he sought to cluonstrate that

the neture of na¡r, changed as it was by the onset of, society, could yet

be realisecl und.er those very cond.itions "

Nietzsehers critiqu,e of Rousseau need- not - indeed, ca^nnot - be

based on the fif-by or so references to Le cítogen de Gerúoe that are

scattered throughout the vorkso .As it happens, Niebzsche shares

Rousseaurs concern with morality, but frcrn a much more advanced a¡rd.

critical- perspective. lfhere Ror:sseau strove to heighten manrs moraJ-

sense, Nietzsche seeks to take man a¡id. therefore society beyond f-he pre-

vailing noraf. stand"ard.s, frcrn which extra-moral position maJt might create

new val-uations rel-evant to hrunanity and. its futr.re. Thus Nietzsche

is opposed to the structure of a Rousseauian interpreta+-ion of norality,

and we are not d.ealing with merely a personal- a¡ltipathy"

Just að r.¡ith Rouseeau, Nietzsche vished. to excoriate the influence

of the Church in society. fnstearl r:f dealing vith the religious

institutions thr:mseÌves, hovever, Nietzsche perceives that the source

and etrength of rel,igion must lie witfrin the individual-rs belief system.

rn this wqy, he attacks the very ìrasis of the personai ühristi.anity

r+hich Rousses,u espoused., and. the target is the belief in the existenee

of a Supreme Being or e god.. Nietzsche rn¡a-s not, even in his opinion,

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being Bny more original with respect to this issue tha¡r other contemporary

writers, but his forrnulation, that t'çod is d.eo.d^rr, is a-11 the more potent

because he cl-aims that man lras d.eveloped. his coneept of self to the stage

vhere aL1 external- and extra-terrestial fomrs of authority can be d"ispenser.l

with and. overcçme. l^Iithout the sa¡ction of a god. to verif)r the moratity

that untLerpins the ï.Jestern philosophical tra¡lition, Nietzsche claÍms that

man must exmine himsel.f , moral beLiefs and. political society in ord.er

to ascertain vhich val-ues remain appropriate to the hr.ma¡r cond.ition.

Having d.isposed. of the basis presupposition of Rousseauian moral

thought, Nietzsche turns to critica-I analysis of nineteenth centr:ry

society. What is remarkable is that, in the critiques of both Rousseau

and Nietzsche, the themes of the artificiality of hrman re-lations and

the d.e6eneration of man in mcxlern society resonate with great force

in each aceount. For Nietzscheo the sourees of that d.egeneration d.o

not lie vitt¡ the irntitutional structr¡re of soeietJf r âs Rousseau suggests "

Ratlrer, nineteenth century man suffers to the extent that Juäeo-Christían

morality has perrneateri. pol-itical thought, through the ageney of thinkers

such ¿¡¡s Rousseau. Here lrlietzsche attacks the noti-on of man beconing

more natural, vhen natural impì-ies a soflt, pleasant, conflict-free

existence, vith the a^id of ttgood soci.etyt'. Criticising not only Rousseau

but the rna"jor political- movements of his <ì,ay, Nietzsche points out

that so-cell-ed. a¡lvances in poli.tical thought are only perrnutations of

longstandírtg moraL prejudices about man and. society.

frr particulerr, lJietzsche provid.es an account of the effect that

Christi¿rn morality has on the mass of in,Lividua.l-s, or trthe herdrr as he

describes thern. The herd. is cørposed. of the ordinary, the everage

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speciïens of mankincl , and that herd.n numerically pnedcminant in society,

ccmes to eulopt the val-ues of 'rsfave moral.ityrr" Here, evil is always

ascritred. to that r¡hicli is higher, r&re or differe'nt, Bs a means of d.efenee,

because the herd a¡rimaf experienceÊ reÊsentíment t<ryard. his existence,

ancl vishes to lay the ì¡la.me for that existence et the feet of society.

This phenr:ürrenon, argues Nietzsche, is d.irectly attributable to the

influence of Rousseau on the nineteenth century.

Nietzschers argi.unent is, of collrse, more wide-ranging than these

specific cr"iticisms of Rousseau suggest. Using a.s a ba^sis the notion

that types of moral-ity exist vithin man arrcl vithin society, Nietzsehe

forms a critique of ariy lìtate which serves as the ir""stn¡ment of a

valuational code. To sr.tpport his case, he undertakes to provid.e a history

of the develo¡rnent of contemporary moral codes, e.rrel to show hor¡ those

codes are reinterpreted and. transfomed., so thert they becme the basis

for seemirrgly secular Weltøtschcntungs. Thus Nietzsche is able to d.ernonstrat-

that Rous.$e&u, for insta¡ce, stud.ied. the histot'g clf morals, but not

morals themselves" Þloreover, it is Nietzsehets opinion that political

movements tcn¡ard. d,emocraey and. eocialisn are but nore recent versions

of the Judeo-thristian ethie. Nihi.Iism, on the other hand, because it

questions and rejects aLL ynlues o is the nost pasitive and. produetive

¡rovement of the nineteenth century, even though l{ietzsche sees the

nihil-istic trait as a necessriry but not sufficient cond.ition for the future

of mankino. Notvithstand.ing his attacks on polifical and socie-l

rnovements by and for the mass, Nietzsche does not reject the neeû for

societyu lie seelis to assl¡me its i:lportance, so that he can eoncentrate

on the more Fressing ancl difficulL te.sk of discuesin6 society a"s it vould.

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be without retigion, broadJ-y conceived. as the sorrrce of ma¡rrs bel-iefs

about himsel-f and the r^'orld.

Despite their differences, the thought of both Roussearr and Nietzsche

progresses frqn a consid.eration of morality to staternents concerning the

vays in man must change if he is to a.dvance a.s &n inilividual errd as a

species. Thus ve find. that we each provid.e a theory of ehange. Rousseau

bases his theory on the notion of hrman perfectíbifity, ancl thus remains

within the eonfines of Enlighterrnent optimisn vith reepect to the future

for huran society. Central to his viev of ma¡r undergoing progressive

change is the belief in the free agency of man, a qrrality or characteristic

he possesses in ccurnon with the Supreme Being. l,1,an can improve by examining

himsel,f , achieving individ.ual virtue, srÌd by for:ning an organ:ic political

cmmnnity which vil-l enable and assist him to be aoe¿aLZy virtuous.

Nietzsche, on the c¡ther hand., rejects this view of human natr¡re

because he does not accept that willing is a distinct facet of personal

existence. For Nietzsche, man vas motivated, in all respects, by

the psychoiogical prime mover of the víII to pntler - the desire to gain

control and. to master oneself s,nd. the physiea-l- and social- envirorment.

fhe conflict between their inherpretations and explanation"s of hrna¡¡

neture is a t\¡ndsnental- one, and. one which is significant in the develo¡ment

of politie al thought over the l-ast tr¡o centr:¡ies - By cler¡¡ing that nan

is perfectible, Nietzsche sets himsel-f against the I{estern ¡:hilosophical

traditiono vhet-her it be in ccmmunitarian or liberal-democratic form"

Steppirg outside the nobion that the future progress of man must

be fixed in the el-ernental- substrate of an eternally unchanging hunan nature,

Nietzsche is free to chaflenge other conceptions of the prerequisites

for charge- Specificu"Ily, Nietzsche analyses the role of the eonseicn-is

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e

self, B.nd. concl-udes that progress is not to be achieveô by efforts to

rai.se conscious¡tess, or by allolring mere rationality to dcminate social-

organisation. In his opinion, nev values, as vell &s new myths, have

to be created. for man, to provide the emotional a¡rel intel-lectual

support while the oLd. valuations Bre examinetl anrl perhaps discsrd.ed."

Ttre mytli that Nietzsche introduces he terrns "the theory of eternal

recr-Lrrencett, whereby man is asked., as a spiritual restorativen to

be prepared. to face a repetition of his existence into eternity" Ihis

id.ea is an err-celfent exonpLe of hov od.d- and chaflengins a thinker Nietzsche

is, since lre is quite prepared to admit that hip u¡yth is onl.y a mytlt,

even though it mrrst be treatetl provisionalþ ac the truth"

In fact, the provisional nature of truth j.s an important

principJ.e in Nietzschers thought, and. relates d.irectþ to his theory

of change. That is, Niet'æchebelieves that h'urnan progress is best

d.efined as a series of total and. irreconcilable trffisfigwøtíons.

Man cloes not improve a part of himself, thus advancing along the lineal-

continuun of perfectibility" Rather, the indiviaudo havirrg tranefigured

hj¡rself , cq,n no longer b* cunpared to his forrner self" nor can he

be ecmpor.ed to tlie being he vilt beccrne afber a ñ¡rther transfigrrration.

For Nietzsche, thr:n progress is a non-teleoJ,qic*1 proceËs, becantse

each individual- must alvays -De on the path to a fresh transfiguration,

and nev ¿efinitions of reality zurd truth"

FirraJly, our analysi.s of the rs:lationship between the thought

of Rousseau an<l Nietzsche brings us to s similet"ity of scrne significance"

i,ie clisccver that the roJe of the philosopher es eocial critíc is given

a proninent position in the vorks of both rnen" It will be argued' that

it is the specief nature of their philosophies that leads the¡¡ to eonclud.e

10

t

that the philosopher must be Legislator to mar¡kind" fheir d"ecísions

personal.l;u bo fu1-fiI that function as well s,s proposing it as a theoretical

sol-ution stem frcrn their explanations of the moral world., a.ncl the ways

in which marr might charrge himself and his society"

fn Rousseaurs work, the Legislator hae the task of rrnifying ttre

ideoJ-ogical basis of his thought with the prngmatic need"s of a political

society. Ttre general- witl is '¡sualfy seen s.s the unifling element of

Le conty,at socíal, thus justifying Rousseaurs optimistic vision of politica"L

society, However, that, qeneraL vill- remains inçccessible to the citizensl

canprehension, unless the peopJ,e have been cha¡ged âJìd. prepared- for their

nev form of association. This is the role of Fousseauls LegisLator.

It is his responsititity to create the lavs for men, anil then to

convince then to transcenrl their alienated seÏves in favour of a

virtuous social- existence. Only then can they be in tune r¡ith the

general i¡il-i of the collectivity" T'he impo.rtence of the Legislator

to Rousseau!s theo¡y, therefore, should not be und.erestimated"

Precisel-y the sarne point can be ned.e with repsect to Nietzechere

notion that the philosopher must be Legislator" Nietzschers rejection

of al"l, foras of institutional authority, whether that of the State, Chutch'

or perty, leaves him with no me&ns of coercing msJì to overccme the

ilminatj.on of tratli.tionaL noral-ity. The philosoptrer is l-eft with

fev options, vhich options necessariJ-y attain greater significance.

In llietzschers opinion, tlie phil.osopher has a duty to be the social

conscience of his time, anal.ysing and. criticising not just the ectivities

of society, but questionirrg the fund.amental rnorel beliefs that und.erpin

and. sustain that social ord,er and its d.efinitions of reality. Moreover,

a-s soon a-s he cliscovers a val"ue that d,egenerates rather than improves

a

11

mankind., the philosopher must assr¡re the rofe of l-egisJ-ator, d'estroy that

value, altcl replace it '.¡ith one that is t'fife-enhancingt'.

.Ihe me¿¿ns for fuffilling that function is to be found in a specific

approach to e<lucati.on, ccmrnon to both Rousseau {rnd' Nietzsche. It is

not the eclucation associated. with consciousness-r'aising or teachin6ç.

Rousseau emphesises the importance of socialiseition, and. the inculcation

of beliefs of central- significance to the po1-iticeut system, suggesting

that the legis]ator must be capable of experiertcing end understancling

the socj-al- nil-ieu of the men he contrives to ctrange. Î\Ether, the

la*-s he constr..rcts nust be e,lucational in that'bhey should' facilitate

the expansion of human facul-ties and encourage virute, ind'iviclually and

socially. Ori the c¡+,,her hand, Nietesche seeks first to ed'ucate the

educators or Legislators themselves ' bec&usie he endOrses Rc'¡usseaurB

viev that the philosopher must be an extraord'inery being, able to feel

a¡¡d knov every possible hrnnan reaction to the cond'itions of life.

Clearþ-, I{ietzsche has & more demandirg coneeption' silìce the Legislator

mu¡t have a finn theoretieal und.erstand'ing of the genealogy of morals t

and be strong enough +'o tra¡tscend. the ]i-uitatiollË of hi$ time, at

l.east to sme extent" Nietzsche is arguing, then, that the soeial

critic, the philosopher a.s Legislator, is the sÍng]e nost importa'rìt member

of society becantse he al-one strives to produce resl a.nd' end'uring

change, in effect, to destroy his cr¡-n society"

The d.j.fferences betveen the tvo conceptions of the Legislator

are confír"med by abrief exsrnination of the ind'ividual an<l' his rela'tion

to the law after the respect j.r¡e legislative oper:ations. funin we find

that Nietzschets thought offers; a¡r insight into the d'eficiencies of

t2

Rousseaurs theory, insofar as the reifieation of the social being

by his Legislator is seen as the ereation of a, new eategory r¡ithin tra-

6itíonal morality. Nietzschers alternative is to bring into being the

sovereign ind.ivitlual. fn so doing, he reveals hie orientation tovrard

a society where crj¡ninality and pr:nishment unclergo a radical revision,

a¡¡d. Ìris vier¡s on these subjects inclicate the extent and. ctirection of

the changes to society he r*ished. to precipitate.

hhatever their visions of the futr:re o the thought of Rousseau

and. Nietzsche d,eserves to be compared, for their philosophies under-

score an importanù probl-em in poì-itical philosophy" Each thinker

attempts to overcqne the tlifficulty of locating the agency of change to

man and society wittrin a^rra,ngements of forces that are either outsicle

ra,nrs control , or must re\r on the exploitation of ma¡rle vee.lrneeses

rather tharr his strengths" And r¡hen S, having criticised, Rousseau

so round.\r, also aclopts the T,egislator as a solution to this problen,

ï.e sre forced to consid.er the efficecy of that solution, or derly that

their funda¡rental problen in fact exists.

o

J

I3Ci.IÂPTBR II

ROUSSEAU: TCWÂRD AN AI.ITI-RELIGTOUS MORA-LTTY

It ll¿ill be my business to make religion attractive; it wj-]lbe ny business to strengthen their faith in tirose doctrines vhicha-r"e rea)-\¡useful-, those which ever:r men rnust bel-ieve; but pleaseGod., f shall never teach them to hate their neighbour, to ssy toether men, You vil-I be damned.; to say, No salvation outsid.e theChurch. l-

Rousseaurs attack on estabfished religion should. not be viewed' in

isolation, e-E a trenchant social- criticism of an institutionalised. fonn

of d.crrinetion an<l ".pt""uiott.2 IIis critique of religion, however

accurate and significa¡rt, is only an arljunet to the cletailed. explication

of bhe moralism that is fund.a¡nental to the vhoLe of his political and.

philosophical vritings. Frcrr the outset, Rousseau emphasised the need'

for each ind.ividual personalþ to achieve v-irtue 8.s a moral being.

Ágai.nst this ideal-, Rousseau was confront,ed. by contempor8.ry religious

pr.actice, whereby a package of beliefs ar¡d. standards of behaviour are

foisted" upon the mess of people, withou! regard. to the possitility of

individua.l rnoral-ity. By inverting this practice, Rousseau concluded.

that consideration of the ind.ividual must heve prececlence over the

requirernents of arry religious institution, vhich ]-ed to the

construction of a morality for the ind.ivid.uaf. In the process' \{e atre

given an insight to the changes that occurred to manrs perception of

self in society, a.s he atteurpts to cì.iscover the tn:e self. Finally,

1. EmiLe, p.273.

Rous;seamrs cl-e¡rrest state¡nent on retigion is Contained. in a

section of EmiLe enfítLed. Profession de foi du uieaire ;qùoAæd'or "Cz,eed. of a SaUoyæri V'[r:cu.n The ideas therein are attributed.to a Cathotic prie"t in the cr:ntext of the conflict betveen hispersonal beliell a¡rd. his Church, based on the teachings of theAbbá M. Gaime, llovever, there is no cloubt that the vicarrssentiments are fuJ.ly enclorsecl by Rousseau, since the lessons ofthe Abbá providecl "& pSerrn of virtue and religion vhich was

rrev er choke<i. . " Conf , I , B(Þ 8I .

)

a

1l+

Rousseau u¡d.erscores the importance of moral-ity in his theory, and.

reiterates his anLipathy to the Church, l:y examining the political

ra¡nifications of his idea^s.

On the issue of' religion, Rousseaurs philosophical pred.ilections

r¡ere formed., in ccrnmon vith many of his contemporaries in the

eighteenth century, on the basis of the contributions of John Lockerf

Newtonia¡r science, and the anti-religious sentiments of the phiLosophes.

These infl-uences on his thinking vere in contrast to his upbringing

in the atmosphere of the strictly Cal-vinist society of Geneva, with itsemphasis on the Go<i-fearing man as a d,utif\-rl- and virtuous citizen.

Irrhile Rous:;eau continuecL to a¡lmire the pLece of his birth for itspoJ-itical- stnrcture long afte¡ his <leparture ,' n" experieneed. no

strong desire to stay within the confines of Prctestantism, and- was

soon conver-LecL to the cathoÌic faith. rn fact, his conmiünent to

either of tiiese religions vas of a sorb that al-l-or.¡ed hin to switch

allegiance almost capriciousþ, since he was unimpressed with revealed

religions, anci preferred to hofd. spiritual bel-iefs that were of his

own constniction.

Religi"on y'ns BJl integraÌ part of the society in which Rousseau

moved,, and. a-s such, religion in its institutionalised. forrrs cane

under attack as e supporti'¡e efement of unsatisfactory political

systems. The critique was pred.icat,ed on the betief that the

burgeoning moral character of mankind. hed been debílitateil by the

"progresstt of civil-isation, Bn arÉ+xï.ent put forward. in his prize-

l_ John Locke, hùo Treabises of Gouernment, published. 1690.

The strictness, virtue and. d.uty characteristic of Cal-vinistGeneva al-L reappear in tlne Social Cørttr.acú a¡d theConstitutional Project for Corsica., and. Iìousseau admiresSparta al.so for these qualities, q.Ð." AS, p. f0.

2"

u

r5

winning essay, the ùiscourse on'bhe Arts attã. Scienee, and. continued.

iir the Discanrse on Inequal¿W. Ilere Rousseau signall-ed, his ccnmitment

to a mix of ideas that vas to forrn the basis of the Ct'eeri of the

Sauogæd. Viecw ín í:rni'|,e, as wefl as estra¡rge him fron his fellc¡¡-

ph'ilosophes and religious authorities a1ike. Contrary to the

progressive philosophical ccrunurrity, Rousseau believecl that ff our

minds have been corrupted in proportíon as the arts antl sciences have

limproved."* Thris amounted to a chaflenge both to the ettenpt by

Enlightenment rationatists to overccme the hol-d. of official religions

on political- society, urd the burgeoning acceptability of materialist

vievs of a better society. ft vas Rousseours contention that the

clevelopment of society, manifested. in moralityo art, knowÌed.ge and.

phitosoFhyr constitr¡ted a progression in the d.ecadence of man rather

than his continued refinement and ennotrling. Rousseaurs antipathy

tcnrard. the effects of these ind,icators of so-called. human progress

can be contrasted. '¿ith the a.drniration that he hel-d. for high cultural

achievement, hovever. What clifferentiated, hirn frcni the rationalists

of his ciay vas his scepticism concerning the pursuit of progress for

its own sake. He dirt not share theirttfaithttthat reason should. be

the soìe architect of a better society and a¡r enhanced. nankind'.

AJ"though it might belong to Socrates and. other minds of thel-ike crafb to acquire virtue by reeson, the human race vould"J-ong have ceased to be, hd its preservation d.epended on\y onthe reasonings of the inclivitl,ual-s conposing it. 2

Rousseaurs real-isation - that metaphysical rationalism Ï¡as

conceptually inarlequate and unabfe to explain even the continuecl

I. AS, p. T.

?. 0I, p. 69. By virtue, Rousseau me&ns a perticular clisplsy ofmoral- goodness. fhere is al-so the implicit a.ssr:¡nption thatsociety will not "naturally" or inevitabþ allow ind.ivid.ual manto be virtuorrs .

L6

existence of species man - l-ed. to a cfose exanination of the

characteristic develo¡ment of man in society. Or-rtl-ini.,g a crud.e base-

superstntcture mod.el of society, Rousseau sought to understand the

means by vhich human institutions prevented. marr frcrn acquiring or

deveJ-oping virtuous behaviour.

all- hr¡man institutions seem at first gla.nce to befound.ed. mere\y on banks of shifting sand.. It is onþ by takinga closer look, and removing the d.ust and. sand. that surrotrnd. theetiifice, that ve perceive the immovabl-e basis on which it israised., a¡d learn to respect its found.ations. Now, withouta serious stu(y of man, his natural- faculties and theirsuccessive d,evelopment, l¡e shaLl never be able to make thesenecessary d.istinctions, or to separate, in the actual- constitutionof things, that vhich is the effect of the d.ivine vilI, frcrn theinnovations attempted by human art. l-

It is important to note that Rousseau does not deny the need. for

and rol,e of sociaL institutions. Rather, they need. to be assessed. '

critically for their impact on therfnatural- facultiest' of nan, vhich

are themselves deterrnined by t'a serious stuðrtr - a rational inquiry.

l{ovrever, Rousseau anticipates the resul-ts of such a stud.y - and makes

explicit the moralism of his philosophy - by equatíng hwnan nature ,

the basis of society, vith "the effecú of the diuine üilL.tl

Ttre glorification of Nature is preval-ent throughout Rousse&urs

works, and- reflects prinraril-y his bel-ief in the importance of God.

artd, a moral ord.er. Second., we are provid.ed. vith continual reminders

that society is an artifice ancl refraction of mants original or natural-

state. To d.emonstrate his point, Rousseau moyed. to the country in

L756, expressing both his disaffection vith the atmosphere of the

salons of Paris ancl the desire to ccrunune more close\r vith nature -

and its author. llhil,e fomulating his more notable political and,

1" Of, p. \2.

a

TT

philosophicaJ- vorks, Rousseau spent much time in solitarX¡ rcverie,

far¡tasising about rel-ations between himself and. two lo.-u..1

T no longer belonged. to myself for a single mcrnent. lrydetiriun never lefb me. After several fYuitless attempts tobariish all these imagina.ry creations fran my mind., f becemeat l-ast ccmplete\r sed.uced. by them, and. aJ-1 qy efforts verethenceforth d-evoted. to reclucing them to scrne sort of ord.erand. coherence, in ord.er to r¿ork them up into a kind. of rcnance. 2

The result vas the rcrnantic novel , La Nouttetl,e n6Loisø, which

brought him further fame with the generaÌ populace, along with

opprobriun frcm the seÌect group of the philosophie ccrnmuníty which

stil-l counted. hin among their numbero Even before its publication in

176I , the novel heral-d.ed a change in the rel-ationship between Rousseau

a¡rd. the intel-l-ectual- clique of Pa¡is, reflecting, accord.ing to Huizinga,

the divergence of opinion on the issue of the self in society.

His naturaJ- habitat was not so much the ivory tower of themind. as the wide open speces of the heart r+here he could. goà La reeherche du moi perdu, the natural"ly good. self, lost amongthe ravages vrought by J-ife in society, corrupted in the senseof having beccrne rOther-d,irected.t instead of f authentier, as thejargon of our d.ay vould. have it . 2

However, Rousseaurs indrrlgence in a fJ-ight of fancy, parb\y as

conpensation for his lack of success vith Madane d.tHoud.etot, was

augmented. by his attempt to enunciate and. reconcile two opposing

d.octrines. At this stage, Rousseau considered, Voltaire as the

und.isputed leader of the phíLasophes (¡otn men ha"d. contributed, to

Did.erott s L-ncgclopîa¿n vhich wa^s una.shanectþ atheist and. d.edicated.

to the advancement of Newtonian science and. rationalist philoso¡:hy).

L. These characters wer:e based on his benefactress, lvtne. dtEpinay,and her friend., Mne. d.tHoudetot.

2. Conf , l-1 , 8l+.

J. H, Fluizinga, The Making of a Scrinú, Hamish Hamilton (Lond.onlg76) , p. I9ll.

-{

a

1B

But as ve heve seen, much of Rorrsseauls thinking was predicated on

f&ith - a belief in divine vill- - an emphasis that Vol-taire a¡rd Did.erot

vere happy to see el-iminated. altogether. The furore that was created.

by the Churchts reaction to the publication of the nncyclopídùe pJ:ace,l

Rousseau in the difficutt position of sympathising with each sid,e at

the same time es he antagonised. the d.iametricalþ opposed. factions.

Accordingly, he used the novel- forrnat to try to d.efuse a vol-atile

situati on.

Besid.es rnoral-ity and conjugaL fidelity, which are radicallyconnectecl vith al-l- social ord.er, I had. another ancl d.eeper objectin view - harmony and public peece, an object greater anil perhapsmore inpÒrtant in itsel-f , and certainÌy so at the mcrnent.... . The tvo parties, let loose against each other with d.esperatefrenzy, T¿rere more Iike mad. r^rofves rea.d¡r to tear each other topieces in their ra¿e, than Christians and phiJ-osophers d.esirousof mutua.l-ly enlightening, convincing, and lead.ing each otherback into the vay of truth ... o f entirely failed to reconcilethe two parties, and- only brought them together again in ord.erto overwhelm me. 1

l{hiÌe La NouueLle UáLois¿ d.icl not succeed in the arnbitious, even

presumptuous, task of bringing the atheists a¡rd the Church "back into

the way of truth rtt it was spectacular\r successful- vith the general

populace, vhich reputedly formed. queues at the bookshops for thirty

minute read.ing ""="ion".2 However, it was not until J762, with the

l-. Conf, IL, B\"

Anna Attridge, "'Itre Reception of La Nout)eLLe náLnsertt Stu.d.ieson VoLtaire øtd the Eíghbeenth Cenhug, Vol. C)OO( (fgf\) , p.22'f ,tlillia¡n Mead afso ind.icates the nature ancì. extent of theinfluence of the novel-. "And. to d.o Rousseau the cred.it hed.eserves, the pubtic, the sud.den\r vast pubJ-ic of young l-ad.ieswith tear-stained. cheeks and fathers of famil-ies past fortybloving their noses into imrnense handkerchiefs arÌd of greatLadies and. of young men vith pale faces and. glittering eyes -the l-acrymose public of t76t wnich seemed., to the incredulousand die-hard rational-ists of the snl ons, to have sprung up outof nowhere, wel-comeð. La NouueLLe HáLots¿ vith an enthusiasmthat had never been seen before, artd. hes not I believe, beengiven to any r¿ork since that time, incl-ud.ing Itly Fain Lad7.t'\{. kd, "Lia NouueLLe HíLoíse end the PubLiõ of J'(6Ir" IakF,vench Sturlies, Vol-. XX[II]. (FeLl-lrinter 196l-62-), p, 18.

Z¡

19

publication of \l¡nile, 1-hat Rousseaurs views on leligion vere taken so

seriously that he vas forced into exile, even though t'the profession of

faith of this same HéIoise is exactly the same a-s that of the Savoyard

v lcar.

l. In<livi.Jual-s before Religions

Housseau rejects categorically the notion that a¡r individ.ual shoulrl

heecl the precepts of revealecl reì-igion prcrnuìgnted by the Church, or

accept the unsanctione<1 "facts" of philosophy and science. Instead,

rnan must regard hitnscLf es the source of truth as veII as its final

arbiter. To support this concept, Rousseau d.ravs on Lockean sensationalism

to establish that the foundation of certainty, all reference to reality,

a

fsa

t.

?"

totally ind.ividual concern.

I exist, and I have senses through vhich I receive impressions.This is the first truth that strikes me and T a¡n forced to acceptit .... Not only do I exist, but other entities exist also, thatis to say, the objects of my sensations; and even if these objectsirre merely icleas, stiÌÌ 'bhese ideas are not me. 2

Rousseau cqnpares the reaction that acccrnpanied. La NouueLLe U|Loisetthe ¿rl-most total l-ack of response to the SocíaL Contnaet, and theoutrageil reactions of Parisia¡r and Geneva¡ authorities, and. conclud-esthat he was the victim of a siniste4 plot. Conf, II, ,7. However,

"The Creed of a Savoyard. Vicart' ;n nwiLe vas onJ.y lightþ camouflagedby J-iterary device, in contrast to his eartier novel , anil mounted.

to a spi.ritecl ind.ictmerrt of the opposing doctrines of the Churchand the philosophes in a very eoncise form. In the process, Rousseauoutl-ined his religious beLief, d.eveloping the thought of PierreIìayle and. John Locke. Of particuJ,ar significance ws,s Baylef sTreatise on |JniuersaL ToLez,at'ton, publishecl in 1686, and. LockersLetten Concerming Toknation, published. three years l-ater' both ofr¿hich argued for reJ-igious tol-eration. Bertrand. d.e Jouvenel, inlris artiãÌe, "Rous"n*,r thu Pessimistic Evolutionist," YALe FrenchSbudies, Voi. XXUrrf (patt-Winter 1961--62), p. Ç\, notes that Bayleand Locke were major infl-uences on Rousseau, and Colm Kiernan, in"The Enlightenment and Science in Eighteenth-Century France rttSturLies on VoLtoire øtd blrc Eighteenlh Centutg, VoI. LIXA (fgl:)

'd.emonstrates the irnportanc" oil3ayle to Rousseau and. tine p/ziLosophesgeneralJ,y. Kiernan shor^rs conclusiveþ that Rousseau was ind'ebted-to Rayle for the use of historical ana1.ysi" (p. 20), adopted. his

"on"uption of evil (p, lOB), ancl that arguments for "a d'eist religion,for a god who created the worl-d , but against Jesus Christ as god.tt

coufd be attributed. d.irecti-y to the impac'b of BayJ-e on seventeentharrd. eighteenth century thought (p. 22). The close relationshipbetween the creeds of Rousseau a¡d Bayle is even more apparent inPreston Kingr s Toleratíon, George AfÌen and unvj.n (Lond.on L976),chapter Il, Part 'f , wliere lloylers thought is presented.. 0f mostinterest here is BayJ-ers use of reason in the quest for sound'

religious bel-ief (p. 9Ì) " and Ìris vier¿ of conscience. "Bayle was

certãin that a mants conscience va,s his c¡wn final court of appeal ,that every man must jud.ge the nature of truth for himself , that one

camnot simply reì-y upon am externally infal-fibl-e authority.r' (p. 9T) .E'mile , p. 2j2.

a

20

Íhe application of such a principle enabled Rousseau to reject

material-ist cl-aims that everything in the physical vorfd contained. its

orrn motive force. Also, it perrnitted. hirn to make a significant counter-

cl-aim. If motion was not an inherent property of matter, then aII

motion vas the activity that resuLted. frm specific impulses of uiLL.

The first causes of motion are not to be found. in matter;matter receives and tra¡lsrnits notion, but d.oes not produce it.The more I observe the action and reaction of the forces of natureplaying on one another, the more I see that ve must always goback frcm one effect to a¡rother, tiJ-l we arrive at a first causein scrne wil-l ..,. fn a vorcl , no motion vhich is not caused byanother motion can take pì-ace, except by a spontarteous, voluntaryaction; inanimate bod.ies have no action but motion, and. thereis no action withou! r¿il-l. This is rny first principle. I believe,therefore, that there is a r¿il-l- vhich sets the universe in motionand gives l-ife to nature. This is toy fi.rst d.ogma, or the firstarticle of my creed-. l-

Rousseau extend.s this natura-Iistic principte throughout his discussion

on religion, and it is reiterated in the political vritings in the

anal-ysis of the true nature of ma¡. His f&ith in nature serves to

d.ispJ-ace bhe need. for metaphysicaJ- rationalism, since Rousseaurs

theoJ-ogical- rationalism depicts nature with an order and. consistency

that bespeaks ftrnd.anental truths. TLris attitude d.iffers frcrn the

scientific approach, vhich sought to u¡ders,tand and. define al-l- the

physical- Iavs of the universe, instead. of being impressed soJ-ely by

consciousness of the glorious spectacle itself. Unconcerned. with the

mere details and intricacies of the universe, Rousseau felt moved when

he contemptated the extent and. essence of will required to produce and.

maintain such a system, provid.ing him vith an adequate justification

for belief in a Supreme Being.

ff matter in motion points me to a r.¡il-l , matter in motionaccord.ing to fixed laws points me to an intel-l'igence; that isthe second articl-e of qy creed. To act, to ccrnpare, to choose,are the operations of an active, thinking being; so this beingexists. 2

1. Ernil.e, pp. 235-236.

p. 23?.2. EnriLe ,

22

Rousseau opened the vey for comrnitteil Christians and. moralists to

chal.lenge the authority of the Church from within, since God bece¡re

id.entifieble ancl attractive, anrl salvation seemed aceessible to the

ord.inary person, thus und.errnining the need" for traditional dognra and

ritual. fn the place of institutional artifice, Rousseau proposed, a

sinple and whol-esome faith.

this being who wi-l-l-s a¡ld ca¡r perfor:m his will, this beingactive through his own po\{er, whoever he may be, who moves theuniverse and. ord.ers aLl things, is vhat I call God.. To thisname f add. the ideas of intel-ligence, power, will, which I havebrought together, and. that of kindness vhich is their necessaryconsequence; but for all- these things I know no more of the beingto which f ascribe them. I

If , as has been sr:ggested, Rousseaurs reductionist deism eqrntes

God. and. the tnre nature of man, then a faith in an inteJ-ligent, poverful

Coit that vills wíi.,h kindness constitutes an acceptance of the nature of

the inner being.2 Hoç¡ever, Rousseau points out that he does not, a^nd.

carìnot, know any more of the deta-ils of his God.. It is not sufficient,

therefore, to suggest that man is merely imago d,ei.3 In the quest for

l-. lr*Ln, p. 239,

2o This is borne out by Ronsseauts proposition, in the Diseourse onInequaLiby" 1cinat ma¡r is at base a conpassionate beíng. 0f, pp. hI,66.

? It is here that Rousseau is more a.dvanced. than Kierkegaard., vithregard to the political ranifications of religious individ.ualism.J.E. Snith, in his articJ-e, "Rousse&u, Rcrnanticism and the PhiLosophyof Exis'bencer" IaLe Fnench Stud.ies, Vol-. )flrf (Spring-Su¡uner 1951+) ,p. 5l+, suggests that Rousseau had not yet attaineci. Kierkegaardianexistentia-l-isn d.ue to L preoccupation vith or ttexcl-usive concernvith what is cmnon to the species." To support this view, Smithrefers to the following passa€e frc¡n Kierkegaard. t'For in theanimaf r¿orld rthe ind.iviclua-ì-r iç alvays less imporbant the¡ therace. But it is the pecularity of the ht¡¡ran race that just becausethe ind,ivitlual is created. in the image of God tthe ind,ivid.ualr isabove the race.rt Soren Kierkegaard., The JowmaLs of Sonen Kierkegaand,ed.. A-i-exander Dm, oxford U,P. (London 1938), No. 1050. As has beenshol¿n, however, Rousseau ha.d alrearJy gone beyond. such a d.erivativeconception of man, and wa¡: seeking to d.iscover nerd parameters toctescribe inclivid-ual- man. I(ierkegaardrs signification of Christianityin rel-ation to the development of the world. is atso at va.riarrce withRousseau. ttfhe vhol-e d.evelopment of the vor1d. tend.s to theimportance of the individuaÌ; that, and. nothing eJ-se, is thepri.ncipJ-e of ChristiarÌity." (No. 6lz). It vil-l- be shom thatRousseau d,emonstrated. the untênabil-ity of such a conception, Dideinfra, p. 2L.

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23

self-know]-ed.ge, a benign God is important insofar es it enables man to

examine himseZf further in or<ler to reveal the extent of his inner

faculties arrd" folsr decisions gbout his place in the world.. Ttre third.

principl-e of Rousseaurs reLigion marks this turning point.

The notive force of aLl motion is in the wil-l- of a freecreature; ve c€ìn go no further . .. . Either there is no originaÌinpulse, or evety original impulse has no anteced.ent cause, ar'd.

thãre is no vitl properly so-ca1led. vithout freed.crn. l4an istherefore free to act, a.I.ld as such he is animated. by e¡l

immateriaf substa¡rce; this is the third. article of ny creed-. I

That rnan is free to act establishes a prescriptive principle,

since it inplies that man has a d.uty to himself and the species to

exercise his pcnier - to perceive, comparer rea-son, ancl forrn jud'gments -

a¡rd act accordingly. This tenet of freedcrn and. responsibility of

action is a cruciaf facet of the social a¡d. political works, especially

with regard. to the nature and. importence of authority in society.

True happiness cornes with equality of pover and r^rill . The

on\r man vho gets his orm vay is the one who d.oes not need.

anotherrs help to get it: from vhich it folLows that the supremegood is not authority, but freedcm' 2

Rousseau d.educed that freedon is essenti.af to man through rrthe

perceptions of objects of sense and frcm oe r.IItg irurer consciousat"=srt'3

obtained. by the active agency of the will seeking the place of

individual man in the society of mar:. As Berrnan points out, the idea

that a person shoufd refer to ¡r¡ inner voice for solutions to the

problems of existence vês one quite alien to eighteenth century thought'

1" EmiLe, p. 2\3./

2. Érnrlu, p. 35. It shoulL be noted. that Rousseau is not referringto a moral "supreme good.r" but to a f\rnda¡nental characteristicof existence" Freedon is neither good. nor bail, but there is a

moral jud.gment required. to begin to attain freedqn'

3. EmiLe, p. 2\9.

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2l+

fhis vas a very d.ifferent rnethod. frcrn the methods used. sosuccessf\¡I1y by physical scientists in exploring the rest ofthe universe. Man d.id. not need. to t'get insidetrthe mul-titude ofphencmena in order to u¡d.ersta¡rd them; vhy then shoul-d. he haveto explore himsel,f frqn within? 1

2. MoreJity for the Ind-ividuaL

Despite his earlier insistence that society was the sou-rce of

falsity a¡rd d,iscord., Rousseau found self-examination necessary to

d.eterrnine those aspects of hrman behaviour that were most affected. by

sociaf existence. Thus the existential nature c¡f his thought highlighted'

both the positive and. negative facufties of i.n'd.iuíduaL man, ancl gave

d.epth to eighteenth century notions of the perfectibility of epecies

m¿ul a-s wel,L as di-rection tovard.s its attairrnent. Ttris belies the

suggestion that Rousseau d.epicted. hr:man nature as essential-ly and.

vholly good.

lfhiLe I med.itated, upon mants nature, f seemed to discovertvo d.istinct principles in it; one of them raised. hirn to thestudy of eternaL truths, to the love of justice, &d of truernorality, to the regions of the world of thought, which thevise d.etight to contemplate; the other ]ed. hin d.ownward.s tohimself, no"du hin the slave of his senses, of the pa.ssionswhich are their instruments, e.nd. thus opposed to everybhin8suggested to him by the forner principle. when I felt nyselfcarried &rl¡ay, distracted by these conflicting motives' I saicL,No, mant is not one e ¡. r 2

t_ Marsha^l-l Berrar¡ , The PoLítics of Authenticity, George Allen and

Unwin (Lond.on 1970) , p. 83. Tkre attempt on the parb of thephiLoeophes to establish a totalþ mechanistic view of the world-ì.t ora.i to "prove" the truth of their atheism includ'ed', accord'ingto Rousseau, the id.ea that instinct wag but "a secret habit ofreflection, acquired. by reflection.fr hmle' p. 2\pn.atmíLe, p. 2\L. There is good. reason to suspect that this ,r'ps.sssge has more autobiographical irport than it does logicalcoherence. Nevertheless, or perheps as a result, the d'istinctionbetveen tvo natures is one that Rousseau develops into animporbant principÌe.

2.

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2>

Leaving a^side the remarkabl-e dr¡alism of conscienee and. senses'

and. Looking at his first principle, ve see that man is d.isposed. toward.

scrne ty¡le of moral-ity, is a seeker of truth, antcl loves justice for the

happiness it wil,l bring. At first glartce, the source of these

characteristics stems from the replication of God in man. However, it

is Rousseaurs contention that man partakes of divine qualities in a

d.istinctiveJ-y human fashion. His Supreme Being ís ipso facto good and.

just, whereas man is oniry capable of goodness and. justice. This l-eads

to a specific ciefinition of these two terns that epply soJ-eþ to God.

The crnnipotent can on\r will what is good.. Ttrerefore he vhois suprunety goo<ì., because he is supremely powerful' must also besupremeþ just, otherwise he vould contradict himself; for thatl-ove of ord.er vhich creates order we cafl goocì.ness and. that loveof ord.er vhich preserves order ve call justice' I

Unl-ike Rousseaurs God, man l-acks cmnipotent supremacy and

conplete consistency of action, and- cannot be good or just in the

divine sense. Ttre earthly nanifestation of these qualities resid.es in

the norafity of a social- order, and, incorporates the logical opposites

of good.ness and justice: eviL and in.iustice.

O man! seek no further for the author of evil; thou art he.There is no eviL but the evil- you do or the evil you suffer, and.

both ccrne fron yourself. 2

This constitutes a further attack on the Church, und,eraining the

concept of originaJ- sin by a d.enial- that there is either en inherent

or an externaÌ force predisposing man to evif. But even more importartt,

ma¡r beccrnes responsibl-c- for, and. in ftlll conmancl. of, his moral cond'uct"

By implication, the structure r¡f society ís attributable to man also,

an¿ if society is d.ecad.ent and. r.ursatisfactory, then ma.n cannot blame

his misfortune upon s.nJr externality. Nor is it sufficient to emulate

Rousseaurs God. in order to attain a higher morality.

l. Êmile, p. 2\5. I'ire Sovereign State of the sociAL corttract may

usefully be regarded. as analopçous to the just and good Supreme

Being.

Emile, p. 2l+\.2.

26

If rna¡r is at once active amd free, he acts of'his own accord.;what he does free\y is no part of the system narked. out by Providences¡d. it c¿utnot be imputerj. to Provirlence. Providence does not willthe evil that ¡ne¡ d.oes when he misuses the freeclqn given to him;neither does Providence prevent Ìrim frrm cì.oing it, either becausethe wrong clone by so fecble e creature is as nothing in its eyes 'or because it could. not prevent it vithout <Ìoing a greater vronganrl degrarling his nature. f'rovidence hss rnade hin free that hemey choose the good and refuse the evil. l-

Rousseau contends here that his Supreme Being, whiJ-e inrnanent end

cxnpipotent, is uninvolved. with a¡d rest¡'ained frcrn interfer i¡g r,¡ith

the affairs of rnan, Counterposed against the etistence of God. as a

categorical moral- imperative, is the reduction irr lnís infLu.enee over

moral a.ctivity. This errdovs ¡nan vith a certain creativity of morel

thought and action, since there is no longer an eqrration of humen Bnd

d.ivine behaviour.

Ma.n is intell-igent vhen he reasons n but the Supreme Intelliiun""does not need. to reason; there is neither prmrise nor concl-usionfor hiur, there is not even a, proposition .... Martrs power makes

use of means, the d"ivine poTfer is self-active. God can becausehe vil-ls; his r¿¡il'l- is his power. God is good; th:'-s is certain;but man finds his happiness in the welfare of his kind', God-rs

happiness consists in the love of order .... God- is just, ofthis I am sure, it is a consequence of his good'ness; mantsinjustice is not Gotlts work but his own; that mo:ral justice whichseems 'bo the philosophers a presumption against Prov-idence, is tome a. proof of its existence. But marrrs justice consists in givingeach his d.ue; Godrs justice consists in.J"emanding frcrn each ofuE aJr accouut of that which ire has given us. ?-

For Rorrsseau, the chal'&cteristics of ma¡r that clifferentiate hirn

frml hís maker ere those properties that deseribe the moral nature of

ne.n, a::d. del-ineate the path tor¡ard. the atta.inment of authentic

inclividuality, or virtue.

In contrast to bhe Church, vhich offeired religion for its sal-vational-

prcrnise of release fran the rnisery of life, Rousseau proposes a quasi-

Ì lmiLe, pp. zl+g-el+b.aEm)Le, p. 2l+8. It might be observed. here that in the Marxistconception of justice, "manf s justice" and. "God.ts justicerrare conjoined to d.emonstrate vhat man can expect frcm society,and r,¡hat society expects frmr man respective\r.

2

a

2T

Rcma¡rtic search for an inner being as wel-J, as the means for its

real-isation. Ma,n must use his reason to d.iscqver his moral nature'

exercise his power over himself and his environment, &nd. follow his

conscience and. ccrnpassiona,te instinct for justice to prcrnote the

weLfare of mankind.. But, as Kingsley Martin points out, the moral

ind.i-viduaf must struggJ-e against himsetf (and not just the sed.uctive

corruptness of mod.ern society) , since he has the I'natur¡ltt capacity

for both gooò. qrvl evil..

Rousseauts owrì Puritan self-analysis easi\y l-ed. hin to thePauline conclusion that there are in every mart two natures, a

higher ar¡d. a fower, and. that to abase the lower and. surrenderto the higher is to be free.

The Pascalia¡ dual-ity of the rnind and. bod.y - reason versus pa.ssion -

is subjected. to a conpl-ex revision by Rousseau. The bod.y beccrnes

opposed to, not the mind., but what rnight be termed. ma¡rs spirituality

or his sa,rL, The soul of man appears as a loose confed'erative

association of the heart, conscience arrd. morality, ånd. retx¡on. Conscience

is particularl-y important to Rousseau becêuse it is based. uponrran

innate principle of justice and. virtue?f to be found in the hearb of every

man, permitting tþe judgment of the morality of actions.2 Although

conscience is ân aspect of man s.s o religior.r,s being, conscience must be

informed and activated. by the rrtvofoÌd. relation to himself and to his.)

felfow-men.ttJ OnJ-y then ca¡l it preside over the suppression of the

psssions.

f

Conscience is the voice of the soul, the passions are thevoice of the body .... Too often does reason d.eceive us I ve haveon\y too goo<] a right to doubt her; but eonscience never d.eceivesus; she ii tfre true guide of man; it is to the soul what instinctis to the bod,y; he vho obeys his conscience is foll-oving natureand he neerl not fear that he vill- go astray. l+

Kingsley Martin, French LíbeyaL Thoug\ú in the Eighteenth Centurg'Harper and Row (Nev York L962), p. 2O2.

2. Emíl,e, p.argument.

?r3. Dickstein, o¡r. cit., pp. \g-50, hÊ-B a simil-ar

3. EnriLe,

Errrt'Le,

P. 253,

pp. Zl+g-?.>o.){

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fhe deval-uation of reason in this passage is not irrationalist, however.

Against the philosophic trad.ition of Enlightenment rational-ity as the

highest good. and. authority, Rousseau believed that reason was B¡trong a

nr¡mber of mental- stnrctures vhich should. be ranked in e hierarchy of

hr:ma¡r faculties to establish a mutual-ity of morality ancl rationality

in the ind.ivid.ual.

Having asserte<l that man is a moral being vho is aware of his

capacity to choose the good. in himsel-f and in society, Rousseau re-

introcluces his first principle - that man viils. The free and' active

being must exercise his wilL in ord,er to overccrne himsel-f and be able

to foll,ow the prrxrptings of his higher neture. This is Rousseau at

his individualistic best, urging man to obey his conscience, his inner

voice, so that he may rise above veaknesses of his personal- ArrJ social

naking. f'l,ius vilL is tire cataþst in the attainment of virtue, vhich,

as Grimsley points out, is the final- stsge in manrs personal d-evelopnent.

Virtue is the greatest proof of our freed.cm a¡d. so of ourability to rise above the dema¡r<ls of rnecessityr by an efforbof wil-l-. Through virt,ue ve &re brought to the true ful-fil¡nentof our d.estin¡' a-s moral and. spiritual beings. I

The Church, on the other hand., ctainett spiritual leadership with

its insistenee that it was the only true way to heaven, md dictated'

institutiona.l means for the a.ssurance of forgiveness both on earbh

and. in a^r1y afterlife. Rousseau countered the threat of dannation by

characterising an unvirtuous life s-s the onl-y Hell man could knovr,

and. suggesting that his just ancl good. god' could not bub forgive the

triviality of earthì-y =in. 2 Likevise he rejected. revelation and' the

d,octrines of resurrection and. original, sin. In their place, Rousseau

proposed a cl-ose rea,rting of the Scriptures, cJ-assifVing as embroidery

1 Ronald" Grimsley, Roussea1 anå. the Relígiotts Quest, Qxfr:rcl u.P.(Lond.on 1968) , p. 6l+.

"What need. to seek a hel| in the future life? It is here in thebreast of the vicked..'r EmiLet p. 2l+7.

2,

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of the humøt authors anything that coufd not be exptained sufficiently

in theoLogical- rationalist tenns. Reason, therefore, 1ed. Rousseau to

d.iscount the occurrence of miracles, and. he sav Jesus not as the Son

of God, but as the outstand.ing example of a virbuous men tiving according

to his highest nature. His religion wes a r:niqueþ personal one, with

nobod.y between him and. his God.. Clearlyr sueh an expression of f&ith'

even if articul-ated. by a fictional Vicar, vas d.iametrical\y opposed.

to the interests of the Cburch. It is no surprise then that a warrant

r¡as issued in Paris for Rousseauis arrest, and. t]nat EmiL¿ lrasi publicly

burnt in C,eneva.l Hov¡ever, there is little tloubi that the anti-religious

sentiments of the Savq¡ard. Vicar conveyed vith great suasive force

Rousseaur s intention, for it became social-Iy acceptable once more to

be devoutLy Chrdstiøt" even in the Paris salons.

3. The Pol-itics of MoralitY

Although they are scrnetimes regard.ed. 8,s separate parts of

Rousseaurs thought, the d.erivation of religious beliefs has a significant

parb to play in his politicaÌ theory. I,lhen Roussea.u consiclered. man in

political society, he still- consid.ered. him in the context of a moral

being end.owed. vith the capacity to reason and perfect himself and. his

society. The Savq¡ard Vicar, vhen narvelling at the ord"er and harrnony

of nature, wers pronpted. to viev with d.isnay the confusion and chaos of

the hr¡ma¡r rac€¡ Sinilarly, as GrimsLey points out, it is the search for

the true seJ-f by the inciiviaual that must lead Rousseaur s sincere 8¡ìd-

v-ir-tuous ma¡r into a consideration of the social- a.spect of his existenee,

and. d.efine a¡y concfusions that he may make about it.

l. de Beer, op. eit. p. I18.

30

a

Like Descartes, Rousseau belie'res that the thinker must beprovid.ed. with some primary, intuitive certainty capabLe ofsupporting aIJ- his iubsequent intellectuaa arguments; thiscerlainty cannot be reached. by mere ratiocination, but is givendirect\y to consciousness. At the same time the stress upon

sincerity is intended. as a safeguard. egainst any me::elysubjective bias .. If B.nyone sincerely asks the questiontWhã a¡n I?r, he is asking it not only for himself but for thewhole hutne¡r race. I

Therefore, if man should. sincere\r d.ecid.e to be a virtu<¡us

ind.ivid,uaÌ, such a rLecision should not be negated. in the context of

the larger society. To overeome the d,ifficutty of the self-regarôing

individ.ual- in social- refations vhere the wel'fare of the vhole is

paramount, Rousseau gives a nev and. dynarnic dimension to the notion

of vil-l-. The GeneraJ- WilI becomes the ultimate soeial erpression of

justice and. virtue, vher-e each member of the society nay act in

accorda¡rce vith in¡rate prompti,ngs, be true to himself , and. yet create

the conditions vhereby all men may realise social, as against

individ.ual-, potentialities. fh¡s Rousseaur s trfund'a¡nentaf problemrl

is a moral- one - ind.ivid.rraL freed,om within political assoeiation -

end. he fou¡d its trsolution" in a¡ "act of association which ereates

a. eorps moral et colLecti¡.nz Such a¡ act of a-ssociation d'id. not

d,estroy the bal-ance of pover and vil-I that ccnstituted. the moral freed'crn

of the ind.ividual, since each participant in the corpus of the state

retained, his sovereign right, just as he ha.d. created. that positive

sovereignty by ccmprising himsel-f in the sociaL ccrnpact. The social

being is end.owed. r¿ith the power of the vho1e, vhich is brougþt ebout

by his creative involvement in the General, WitI. Moreoverr maJl as the

creator of ind.ivid.ual- rnoral- conduct realises virtue es a soe¿al

being vhen he became the author of the morality of the State conjointþ

with al-l others.

I. Grimsley , otr). (it., pp. lll+-lr:.

I 62. cafù\tt

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Ror¡sseaurs political prescriptions have long been taken as serninal

contributions to the cc¡nmunitaria¡¡ tra.d.ition of thought, but it is of

interest to note that his solutions are ba-sed on spiritual qualities,

rather than material-istic ones. It is not surprising, then, to find

the cool- advocacy of the Soeíal Contnact is scrner¡hat broken by the

chapter on civil religion. Rousseau points out that the mere act of

association did. not of itself d,efine the pro¡ler role for religion in

the just society, although it did secure it as en inrnutable part of

that society. The existential quest for values, and' the move into a

Rousseauian civil sôciety'meant that all action and thought must

have a moral basis and content. Hovever, religion, orga^nised- or other-

wise, is not seen s-s the source or guid.e to political cond.uct r even

though, as Cobban observes, Rousseau appreciated. the importance of such

guid ance.

Hov¡ever abstract or intellectualist his methocl may seem intl¿e COntrat SoeiaL, Rousseau never eegses to be aware of theba.sic necessity for establishing the satisfactory emotionalfound.ations for politieal society. I

Despite his trencha4t criticisms of existing institutions, and of

the Church in particular, Rousseau itid. not propose the inmediate

removal of those structures in his role a.s social engineer. He v'as a'

reforter rather the:r a revolutionary, predicting a century of turmoilr

Alfreä Cobban, Rousseøt ød. the Mú.enn State, âld E¿tition, GeorgeAllen and lJnvin (Lontlon 1961+) , P. 157.

L.

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but sadd.ened. by the prosp""t.l Accordingþ, religion in

institutional-ised. form is not proscribed, as night be expected. However,

it is altered radicaJ-J-y.

First he d.ivided religion into tvo cl&sses, that of the man, and.

that of the citizen. The religion of the citizen had. nerit in that it

provid.ed. a positive basis in lav for the d.ivine cult, engend.ering a

love of country and recognition of duty to the state, qualities of

citizenship essential for the political morafity und.erlying the General

1^Iil-1. On the other han<i., the religion of m€rn vas soeíalLy d.estructive

because it relied upon god.s and clogma, and ttd.row-ns the true cult of the

Divinity in empty ceremonial."2 Rousseau incfud.ed Christianity in the

category of reJ-igion of man. But his reJ-igion - personal , and. to him,

perfect - vas a¡r inc1ividual- affair, and. as such not veighed. d.own and

sull-ied by the ceremony that accompanied established religions.

There remains therefore the religion of man or Christianity -not the Christiariity of today, but that of the Gospel, which isentirely d,ifferent. By mearrs of this ho\y, subl-ime, and. realreligion al-l- men, being child.ren of one God., recognise one anotheras brothers, and. the society that unites then is not dissolvedeven at d.eath. 3

1 ttYou reckon on the present ord.er of soeiety, without consid.eringthat this ord.er is itsel-f subject to inscrutable changes, artd.that you ca¡r neither forsee nor provid.e against the revolutionwhich rnay affect your chil-dren .o.. Th€ crisis is approaching,and. we &re on the edge of a revolution.tt In a footnote he ad.d.s,

"rn 14¡ opinion it is impossible that the great kingd.crns of Europeshould last much J-onger." EtntLe, p. IrT. Williaur Hudson,Røtssean øtd. WaatraLism ín Life øtd Thought, T. and. T. Clark(Ed.inburgh 1903) , p. 2l+J, provides a more remarkable version ofthe prophecy. "We are approaehing a crisis and. a eentury ofrevolutions.t' Although Rousseau suggested radical change, hevas always careful- to avoid prcrnoting outright anned insurrection.In the constitutional vorks for Po1and arrd. Corsica, great emphasisis placed on the maintenance of the cul-tural- heritage of theccrnrnu¡ities that resided. in its institutions. trCorrect, ifpossible, the abuses of your constitution; but d"o not d.espise thatconstitution whictr has macle you what you are." PoL, p. 161.

2. - SC, rV, B.

3. rbid,

o

33

Here the distinction must be made betveen the spirituaf and the

more'l natrrres of marr. Rousseaut s Christia¡ity concerns itself only

with the spirituality of the ind.ividual, & connection through nature

with the Supreme Being that preceded. Le contTat soeía.L, and, hence

the emergence of the moral artrl socíal, being. As such, the spiz"ituaL

society of the t'child.ren of one God." has no prescriptive relevance for

civiL society.

We are told that a pecpl-e of true Christians woul-d. fol'L themost perfect society inaginable, I see in this supposition onlyone great diffj-culty: that a society of true Christians wouJ.cl

not be a society of men" I

For ltousseau, inã.iuidual monaLity even of the highest kind. is insufficient

as a criterion for citizenship, sincetttrue Christians are made to be

slaves, md they knov it and. d.o not much mind: this short l-ife counts

too l-ittl-e in thei" "yu=."2 While it may be sufficient for a men, it

is not enough for a citizen to d.o the ninimrun of evil to secure a

position in heaven for the coming Life. Instead. of preparing themselves

for death, Rousseau sought to ùeach men how to Liue' by making the State

the final- arbiter of religion. fn this he followed Hobbes and. rejected.

outright Christian trad.ition and the Church as e separate ímperíun'3

1. Ib¿d" "The Christie¡r religion, Bayle says' which urges us tosuffer insults, to be h¡mb]e, to love our neighbourr seek peaceancl return good. for euil, is quite incapabl-e of prod.ucing good.

sol-d.iers, just as al-l- the principles of the Gospel are illsuited.to governing the public good..tt Lucio Colletti , Fz'om RoLßsea.t tO[enin, Nev LefL Books (London f9'e), p. 175.

Ibid. It is this concept in Rousseauts thought that unclercutsKierkegaarcj.rs hol-istic notion of Christianity, since man existsas a sócial being by virtue of determinate social relations as

well- as expressing his r-rrique self as an individ-ual.

2.

3. SC, rV, 8.

a

3l+

B.nd naintained that reLigion und.erpinned but was strictly l-imited to

ird.iÐiduaZ morality.

'Io reconcil-e the f\r.ndamental- need. for man to be moraf both as an

'inclividual and as a social- being, Rou.sseau proposed. that a civil religion

shoultl exist in all political societies, in order to prepare man for

his accepta¡.ce of moral- d.uties to himself and" his fellow-men.

The right whictr the social compact gives the Sovereign overthe subjects does not, as ve have seen, exceed. the limits ofpubl-ic expediency. The srrbjects then ove the Sovereign anaccount of their opinion as they matter to the community. Nowit natters very much to the community that each citizen shoufd.have a reJ-igion. That r^¡ill- make him love his duty; but thecì.ognras of that religion concern the members only so far as theyhave reference to moral-ity and. to the d.uties which he whoprofesses tllem is bound to d.o to others. l-

Ciyil rcligi.on thus becomes €Lri institution for the maintenaJtce of the

state, a concept which may not be as benign a¡rd. Iinited. as Ror¡sseau

vould. have us bel-ieve. ile, Ìike many after him, d.oes not define those

"limits of prrblic expecliencyr" and it is clear that an tinterestf in

both inclivi.dual moral-ity and expresse<1 social intentions coul-d

conceivably encompass alf but the most innocuous d.etails of huma¡r

)behaviouri But any characterisation of Rousseau as total-itarian

thinker is nitigated. by the nature of the Sovereign itself, which

is not a monarch or a president, but the embod.iment or expression of

the vil-1, of the people as a moraJ- and collective body. Anct to object

1. rbid.

2 White it cannot be said. that Rousseau ever sufficiently resolvedthis problem, i-t can be interpolated. in his defence that Rollsseauf snotion of the citizen is a concept which by d.efinition precludesthe State interferring vith the singJ-e ind.ivid.ual-. It nay besafe 'to a,ssume that Rousseau acLopted a viev similar to that ofBodin - where the law stopped. at the fYont d.oor - since Rousseauwas infLuencecL by hirn in other significant respects. q.ü.t PEtpp. l-l+o, l\l+.

a

3'that such a Sovereign, however constituted, might becøte tlansformed'

and d.espoticaÌly misuse its powers is to miss the vhole point of

Ro¡sseaurs criticisns of contemporarXr society, where the enrphasis on

the need. to overcome injustice, inequality and. d.omination is stressed.

constantly.

A generous evaluation of this civil religion requires an acceptance

on the part of the reed.er of Rousseaurs conception of human natrrre and'

the true self. Frcrn this perspective, civil religion is a l-iberating

and. ¡notivating force that permits individ.ual ma¡r a free association

with -a personal god. that vill resul-t in ar¡ inrer pe&ce and sincere

virtue. At the same time, social- man is given confidence in his sociaJ-

and politicaJ- rel,ations, since his rnoral conduct as a citizen has been

defineated and. secr-rred. by his collective association with other free

meñ. Anci ve are remind,ed. by Osborn that, even when Rousseau is

consid,ering the pragmati.c cond.itions for the successful- organisation of

the state, the spiritual nature of man is never set asid'e.

It was in mants nature, therefore, that the real and. enduringbasis for society and. the state was found. Consequentìy, inRousseaurs politica-l phitosoPhy, the fuLfilment of manrsspiritual nature beca¡ne the supreme end of the state. F\rrther-ro.u, as he recognised in the desires of the intlivid.ual an

inerad.icable inrpulse toward.s the achievement of his orrn good,so also he fou¡rd in the life of society a sinitar impulse toward'sthe good of mankind.. I

Rousseauts society is ar¡ optimistic one, where civir religion

provides the link betveen being - thc itrner <:cn¡;ci-cusness of hrman

nature - ancl. existence - sociat r"elations d.efined by the politieal

society. The indiviclual emerging fron the eighteenth century is the

one which chooses to do the good accorcling to the impulses of his nature

Annie M. Osborn , Rousseca,L øtd Butke, Russell a¡:d' Russell (New York196)+) r pp" 130-131"

1.

36

a¡ld. the d.ictates of his conscienee, and. erplicitly rejects the evil

that nan creates. The spirituat being, in touch with his inner voice'

is endoved" with a, new power over moral conduct of his own making. ltris

power constitutes in his free egency, his capacity to wùLL, by vhich

he can translate bel-ief a¡¡d. understend,ing into virtuous action.

a

a

3T

CHAPTER III

ROUSSEAUIS COMMUNI TY FOR INDIVIDUAI^S

It is the weakness of men that makes thsn social beings.Or-rr ccrnmon sufferings incline our hearts to hrmra¡ity. Everyattachment is a token of insufficiency. If it r,¡ere not thatevery one of us had need of other people, we would- scarce.lythink of essociating vith them. Frcrn our very infirmity comes

our frai-Ì happiness. l-

The moralism of Rousseauts thought, most apparent in the religious

individualism of vritings on the spiritual inner seIf, seems incongnrous

r+hen contra-sted, vith the cool rationaì-ity of his consideration of the

structure of the State in the pragnatic political *o.k='2 At first

glance, we see that Rousseau cleveloped a radical- notion of perfectible

man - a spontaneous participant in a creative association to form a

sovereign State - by emphasising the irnportance of social- justiee,

liberty and equality. On the basis of this interpretation, he has made

substantial contributions to the ccrnmunitarian and. Iiberal-d.emocratic

traditions al-ike, especially vith regard. to their treatments of these

"esscntialþ contested concepts.t'3 ,to*"ar"r, Rousseauf s d'qtand.s for and

d.escription of a new pr:litical ord.er are und.erpirlned end. u.nified. not by

the expJ.anatory strength of those concepts, but by his overid.ing concern

for the happiness an<l moral character of man. Accordingty, his political

conclusions refLect and. augment the nature a¡rd scope of a fundanental\y

moraL philosophy.

L. EmiLe, p. IO2.

Z. These are generalJ-y regard.ed. a-s z A ùtseouvse on PolitícaL Eeononty;The Sosial Contract; Considerations on the Golermment of PoLøã.;Constítutional Pnoibú fon Co?sicø; puttished l-758, LT62, l-TB2,lT 85 respectiveLy.

3" W. B. Gaflie , PhiLosophy øtã. the HistoricaL Unå.erstaruiing' Chattoand Windus (London 196ì+) , p. 157 fl. Ttte I'essential-þ contested"concepts" to which he refers include liberty, equality, justiceand democracy.

38

1. Images of Human Nature

We have seen that, ín Emile' Rousseau argued. that the ind'ivid'ual ,

to be true to hinsel-f , hd to d.eve.Iop and protect his spiritual self

in opposition to an inhospitabl-e society. This reflects Rousseaurs

bel_ief that, given the existing social strrrcture, ar\y hope for

perfected. social relations Lies with the proper ed.ucation of the youngrl

using an individualistic approach that, in the meantime' m8y yet allow

each person to achieve his fuli potential.

To be scrnething, to be himself, and. always at one vith h:lmself,amênmustacteshespeaks'mustknovlvhatcourseheoughttotake, e.nd folÌo!¡ that course with vigour end. persistence. l{hen

f meét this niracl-e it will- be time enough to d'ecid-e whether he

is a man or a citiz-en' or hov he contrives to be both' 2

The d.istinctions that Rousseau d.raws betveen man and citizen and

images of true a¡d fal-se rol-es for the ind,ivid.uaL have as their central

expl_anatory and organising principlethis conception of human nature.

1t is perhaps for this reason Rousseau found' the First Ùiscotn'ee to be

I,,feebly argued., the nr:st deficient in proportion a¡rd hannonyrtt' since

this earfy and polemical critique of soeiety lacked a substantive

articulation of basic P.*oi""" 'h

q.Ð., ROusseauls a.d"viCe to mOtherS. rrTend.er, anxious mother, Iappeal to you. You can remove this young tree frcm the highway

enã shielòit frcm the cn¡shing forcè Of sociat conventions ¡..oWe are borrr weak, we need. strength; helplessr'we need- aid.; foolish'we need- rea.son. ALI that ve lack at birbh, ú1 that ve need' when

ve cc¡ne to meJìrs estate, is the ãift of ed.úcation.t' EmíLe' pp' r-6'At"o,ttlife is the tra.d.e I woutd. teach him. ltlhen he leaves me, Ig"*ri you, he will be neither amagistrate' a soldier' nor airiest-; hé witl be a man .... To 4y nind th.ose of us vho can bestend.ure the good, an¿ evil of ]ife are the best educated;tf EmtLe'

p. 9.

t-a

2. Ewile, p. B.

3. Ccnf" pp. 328-3?9.

\. Nevertheless, the subject matter and the ways that Rousseau chose

to frame his argument d.eserve more attention tha¡r is often awardecl'

tror instance, Cüarles E. Vaughan, in his Introd.uction to thepoLitieaL Wñtings of Jeøt-iá.qrn" Rousseau, (fgf:), Basil BlackweLl(oxford 1962), vär. i, P. B, pays onþ scant attention to the

Fit st ùLscotn'se.

a

39

Ho'u¡ever, Rousseau dicl succeed. in proviùing a piercing attack on

contemporary society, in she.rp contra-distinction to the popular be-lief

that socj.ety represented manrs most spectacufar achievements. Not

surprisingJ-y then, his attack on civil-ised. society is d.irected. at the

pur-veyors of high culture, to the rnost refined errd inteJ-J-igent of the

sal-ons of Paris, who ilictatecl the direction of Enlighterunent thought.f

Rousseau pointecl out the contrad.ictory nature of progress in the arts

and sciences - progress which resuftecL in the corruption of mankind. -

and. singì-ed. out the obscr.¡.re and. I'idlerr literati vho were the d'ay-

Labourers in this exercise.

Id.Ie, do f say? I^loutd. God. they were! Society would' bemore peaceful , an<1 morals l-ess corrupt. Rut these vain and-

f\rtil-e d.ecÌaimers go forth on all sides, anned. with their fatal-parad.oxes, to sap the for-rndations of our faith, md nuttif)rvirtue. TÌtey smile contemptuousì-y at such ol-d na¡res aspatriotism and. rel-igion, anil consecrate 'uheir talents a¡rdphilosophy to the d.estruction and. d.efamation of al-l that men

h c¡Id. s ac red. . 2

I

AJ-though sore commentators attempt to show scrne d.evelopment in

Rousseaurs thought, vith the early vorks archetypalþ individualistic,

and. the later equa*Ll-y seminally ccrnmunitari*r (or worse, totalitariuo) ,3

1. His reward for such trencha¡rt criticisms was to be lionised. by thatclass, vith offers of consici.erabLe materiaJ- provid.ing scrne sub-stantiation of his change of d.ecadence. Rousseau neverthelessaccepted, their patronage and interest for the rest of his life.Hov¡ever, he d,id. ccmplain of it (perhaps too loudJ-y) frcrn tine totine.

2 Æ, pp. J-5-l-:6"

The Saint-Simonia¡rs vere probabþ the first to classif)r Rousseaus.s one of many "d.efend.ers of ind,ividual-ism.tr Quoted frqrt" TheDoctrine of Saint-Sírnon: An Eæposition, First Yeay LBZB-? (L830)

'tr. G. Iggers, (Boston l95B) r pp. 1JB-BO, in Steven Lukef s

Indiuídualisn, Basil Blackwell- (Oxror¿ L973), P. T. ft remains apopuJ-ar misconception partly because Rousseau wrote with a pessionthat engend.ers in the reed.er a very personal al¡lareness of theina.rJ.equacy of existi¡g society, especialty in tlne Discouose onInequaLity. Vaughzur, (LgL;), Vol. I, p.2, states that Rousseau'"far frqn sr-rpporting ind.iviclual-ist theory, is its most powerfulassailant." For his proof , see nbid"r PP. 1\-16. J.L. Talmon,'Ihe ût"igit1s of Tot;aLitæicrn tþmocrdeU, Mercury Books (London 1966) ,pp.7 a¡rd 35, agrees that Rousseau is no indiv-id.ual-ist, classifiestri. "r a total-itarian of the Left, and. says that his notion ofsociety accepts "¿rll l-iberat premises a priot"i. " In the finalanalysis, Rousseau is too tliversely innovative to be irrevocab\yp.laced. in this scl1oo-I or that, especially when the terrns applied'to his thought belong to the nineteenth a¡d twentieth centuries.

3

a

)+o

Rousseau does not vary frcrn his fundamental- preoccupation wittr morality

e-s both personal sa-lvation and social- cement. I^Ihen the Dion Acad.erqy

al¡ardecl the prize to his essay, Rousseau felt confirmed in his moral

righteousness a¡d. outrage against a corrupt society.l In his nexb e¡td

most fanous essay, the Disecnæse on Inequalíty, he restrained his moral

fervour, and. prod.uced. a work that confomed. to the analytic methods of

enquiry of such thinkers as Hobbes a¡d Locke. This remarkable essay

shovs Rousseau to be one of the great contractarians, but also the l-ast.

a. Sanuag¿ Nature

Contract theory examines the objective cond.itions und.er which

primitive existence came to be repLaced. by ord.ered social systems, in

order to provid.e a theoretical J-egitirnation of concepts of obJ-igation

end d.eference to political authority. The principal assumption of this

approach that concerned Rousseau was the conception of Natural- Man, the

man of the state of Nature, as the starting point of all philosophical

enquiry. Signalling the end. of contractarian consid-eration of the

state of nature as a clearly id.entifiable ancl examinable epoch, Rousseau

d.enied, that man coul-d. ever provide conclusive and d.efinitive truths

about a perlod which may never have existed",2 This methodological

difficulty was overcome by Rousseauts insistence that his enquiry was

entireJ.y of a h¡rpothetical nature, thereby ernphasising both the substance

of Ìris thought, rather than its structure, and the criticisns that he

vas to make of the concl-usions of Hobbes and Locke.

I. Conf, p. 332.

2, "For it is by no means a l-ight und.erbaking to d.istinguish properlybetveen vhat is original a¡rd" artificial in the actual nature ofman, or to form a true iclea of a state which no longer exists,perliaps never did exist, and probably never vill exist; and. ofwhich it is, nevertheless, necessary to have true id.eas, in ord"erto forrn a proper jud.gment of our present state.tt Ibid' p. 39.

a

lrf

The philosophers, vho have inquired into the founrlations ofsociety, have all feLt the necessity of going baek to e state ofnature; but not one of them has got there .,.. Everry one of them,in short, constant\y dvelì-ing on wants, avidity, oppression,desires, and. pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideasthat r¡ere acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the savsge,they described the social- man. l-

Neverthel-ess, Rousse&u €.ccepted the ni:ceirsi-ty of providing a¡

edequate account of the state r¡f nature so that importent distinctions

between the original- nature of the sauüoge and. the evolved. nature of

social. man coul-d be ma¡.e. Drar.¡ing upon the increasing amount of

enthropologi-ca1 data that Buffon was making available, and the aeeounts

of travel-l-ers among prirnitive tribes rt Ro.l"**au sought to d.ifferentiate

between "v¿hat is original a¡c. artificial- in the actual nature of ma¡r.'l

By stripping social ma¡ of aIl- the faculties that he can on\r have

acquired. with the onset sr¡d. cleveLopment of society, so Rousseau hoped

to reveaL the sauuagc:.

"... if we consid.er hi¡nn in a vord., just as he must have conef¡'cm the hands of nature, we beholcl in hin an a¡rimal weaker thsnscrne, and. less agite than others; but, taking hirr aL1 round., themost ad.va¡tegeousþ organised. of ar1y. f see him satiefyíng hishunger at the first oak, and. slal'.irrg his ttrirst at the firetbrook; finding his bed at the foot of the tree which afford.ed. hima repast; and, vith that, aJ-l- his wants supplied.. 3

Whatever the merits of Rousseaurs ostensibly scientifie or

anthropological analysis, the influence of ancient Greek philosophy

should not be underestimated. Plato had attended, to this very question

of the state of nature and. the cond.ition of natural ma¡r within it. His

account of naturaf man in the Statesmøt, bears such striking resernblance

to the saÅ)age above that Rousse&uts theoretical approach rnight ind.eed,

fi. Ibid. , p. l+r. ', .

D For the breadth of Rousseauf s stud.ies, see John C. Hall-An Intrduction to his Political PhíLosophy, MacMillanpp.18-19.

Roussea,t:London L9T3),

,(

3. 01, p, \7.

t

l+zIbe no more than a servarrt to his preconceived. notions,

.... there were no forms of governnent or separate possessionof vcrnen and children; for afl men rose again frcm the earth,having no memory of the past. And although they hed nothing ofthis sort, the earth gave them fruits j.n abu¡d.ance, which grewon trees and shrubs unbid.d-en, and. were not planted by the hand. ofman. And. they d.we1t naked, and. mostly in the open air, for thetemperonce of their seasons wa-s nild.; ancl they had no bed.s, butlay on soft couches of gr&ss, which grev plentiflrlly out of theearbh. 2

0f most significance here in these vievs of the state of nature :-s

the absence of any social- relations, pre-empting any assessment of man

on moral grol-d".3 Rousseau, often criticised for iclealising natural

marr, cl-early attributed no properties to his sau'ùage that were important

in socì-ety. Moreover, Rousseanr is not, as Chcrnsky suggests, arrprimitive

t. This, after all, vas the criticism Rousseau had. to make of Hobbesand. Locke specificaì-l-y, and. Natural- Lav theory in general . ttModern

vriters begin by inquiring vhat rul-es it vould be expedient for mento agree on for their ccrÌunon interést, and. then give the name ofnatural lav to a coll-ection of these rules, without any other proofthan the good. that r¿ou.l-d. resuft frcn their being r.rniversallypractised.." OI, p. )+f . It is also of interest to note thatRousseaurs method.olog¡ has been end.orsed. by such thinkers B,s Claud.eLevi-Strauss, q.r.J for example, his 'Iz.iste lYopíques, Union GeneraledtEditions (paris 1955) , p. 353. ".... car le pensée d.e Rousseau,toujours &varce suráson temps, ne d.issocie pas Ia sociologiethéorique d.e -Ltenquête au laboratoire ou srlr a terrain d,ont il acompris l-e besoin. Lrhorune naturel nrest ni ant6rieur, ni extãrieurä ta société ....t' ttMais a modile - crest ]-a solution de Rousseau- est éternal et universal.rt

Pl-ato , Statesmø2, Steph " 2'(2a, ín The DiaLogues of PLøto, FourthEdition, Clarend.on Press (oxford 1953), Vol. IIf. of furtherinterest is Pl-ator s view that there was no evidence of properbyrefations. Roussea.u was to take up this point a¡rd d.evelop it intoa pre-materialist conception of society, with properby as thesoLlrce of social-, poJ-itical- and. econonic inequality in civ'il society.

2). "It appears, at first view, that men in a state of nature, hav-ingno moral. refations or determinate obligations one with another,couLrl not be either good or bad., virtuous or vicious ....tt0I , p. 6l+"

2

ind.ivid.ual-ist ,r' since the saut;age inad long ceased to exist,

l+3

if indeed

it ever did, and vas not intended as an archetype for mod.ern man" Such

a conception of a vafue-anteced,ent naturaf state and. a neutral natural-

man was at odd.s with the theories of Hobbes and, Locke, which set forth

a state of nature in ord.er to jud.ge them accord-ing to the stand,ard.s of

moral-ity and. sociaJ- obligation"

Above all-, let us not concl-ud,e, with Hobtres, that because manhas no id.ea of good.ness, he must be naturally wicked.; that he isvicious because he does not know virtue; that he alvays refuses '

to do his fell-or+-creatures services which he does not think theyhave a right to demand; or that by virtue of the right he just\yclaims to all he need.s, he foolishly inagines hinself the soleproprietor of the whole universe. 2

Hobbest pessimistic viev of human nature as essentia.fly badr pre-

d,isposing man to constant warring, led hinr to suggest that onþ a

government vittr absol-ute power over its constituent members coul-d. force

them to ccrnply to l-avs rnaintaining peace and ord.er. Arguing within

the confines of this rnethodological- ind.ivid.ualism, Rousseau pointed.

out that war itsel-f is a relation betveen men alrea(y in a state of2

society, ' such that Hobbesian marl vas, in fact, "unnatural .tt

... . he ought to have said. that the state of nature, beingthat in which the care of our own preservation is the leastpre jud.icial- to that of others , \"¡a.sr consequently the best calculated.to prcurote peace, and. the most suitable for marÌkind. l+

In Rousseaurs opinion, Hobbes v&s d.escribing a d.epraved. socia-l ma¡t and.

assuming him to tre exhibiting his true huma¡t nature, a nature that

would remain unchanged <lespite the d.evelopment of society. On this basis,

Hobbes saw that l¡ar was the inevitabl-e consequence of conflicting needs

as each r,ialì exercised his right in nature to al-l- things. On the other

I. Noam Chomsky, Í'or Reasons of State, Fontana/Collins (Lond.on I9T3) ,pp. 1BI-f82. Chcrnskyts conclusions appear to be based. almostentirely on the Second. Nscourse, vhich may account for thisparticular view.

I

a

2. OI, p, 65.

3. 01, pp. 87-BB , ar,ð Í)C, I

I+. or, p.6r.

l¡ .

a

\l+

hand, it r¿as frcrn this situation thab man wa^s to gain a knowled.ge and.

appreciation of the l-aws of ne,ture, instructing each man to seek peace

(for sel-fish reasons), and. naintain it by giving up liberty srìd rights,

and in so d.oing oblige themselves and others to obey natural l-**.f The

recipient of the l-iberty and rights of natural rnan vas to be the

Leviathan, dufy empowered. to restrict manrs naturally aggressive impulses

by the formaf exercise of absol-ute authority to uphold. natural lan¡,

Pointing to the ilJ-ogical-ity of man al,ienating natural rights, md

suggesting that Hobbes was depicting ear\y stages of political society

and not the state of nature, Rousseau believed. that the Leviathan could

not cl-airn to rule by the precepts of the laws of nature basecl upon B,

covenant or obligation of trrightstr from warring Hobbesian men.

Like Hobbes, Locke sal¿ the formation of a social- contract ¿rs the

birth of civil- society, creating power over ind.iuid.ual-s that vas to be

vieLdecl by a governmental stmcture. However, Locke insisted. upon the

existenee of a law of nature that prevented. man from hanning artotherr s

life, Ìiberty or estates. This vas the lav concerning p"op.rty,2 Natural

rights, then, derived. frør this Lav of nature, and. whereas Hobbes d.emand-ed.

that man aLienate ccxnpJ-ete\y all- his (quite different) natural rights

in a bind.ing and mutuaL contract, Locke based. civif society on the

consent of the members to a confining of naturaJ- rights in ord.er to

preserve the essential tiberty that obtainecl in the state of nature.3

Once again, Rousseau objected to a theory that purported to d.epict a

state of nature but only succeed.ed. in highlighting certain aspects of

f. Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes Leuiathcrt, (Reprinted, frcrn the ed.ition of16tl) , oxford u.P. (I-ondon r-909), Pt. f , ch. xvrrr.

John Locke, The Second IYeatise of Gouennmento (na. .1.W. Gough) ,Third. Ed.ition, BasiJ, Blackvell- (Oxfor¿ L973), fr. IX, Sn. L23.

2

3. rbid., ch. rX, sn. L29.

a

Ltj

an emerging social ord.er. In Lockers c&se, Rousseau sees the creation

of private property ss one of the principal- and. most important

d.eterminants of civit society, which vas itsel-f the result of nany

other develotrments of social relations beginning vith the fonnationI

of thé fanily.- Lockers civil government, contracted. by ind.ivid.ual-s

vho were so far removed. frsn the state of nature, could. not possibþ

be in accord.a¡ce vith natural l-av.

These criticisns of Hcrbbes and. Locke indicate the vays in vhich

Rousseaurs phiJ-osophy contributed. to an understand.ing of concepts of

scrrrereignty, liberty and equal-ity, as the problems ccmnron to all these

thinkers were ana\rsed.. It shoul-d. be noted., however., that Rousseauf s

objections to both method.ological- anc1, epistenological in<livid.ualism

(of llobbes and. Locke respectiveÌy) as bases for a political theory was

mitigated, by his partiaì- aeceptance of both d.octrines. In Emile,

Rousseau adrnits of the adequacy ancL efficacy of a doctrine that stresses

the importance of explanations of sociaf phencrnena that rrare couchecl

wholty in tenns of facts about individ.ua1s."2

Tt is true that the genius of men in groups or nations is veryd.ifferent frcrn the character of the individ.ual man, and that we

have a very imperfect knovledge of the hr¡na¡r hearb if ve d.o notnlso exanine it in crowd.s; but it is none the less true that tojud.ge of men ve must study the ind.ivid.ual man, and- that he whoha.d. a perfect knowl-ed.ge of the inclinations of each ind.ivid'ualmight foresee al-,1- their ccmbined. effects in the body of thenation. 3

Nevertheless , Rousseau d.oes not embrace method.oJ-ogical inclivitlualism

by satisfling the negativistic d.efinition given by Lukes, and- the

d.istinction d.ravn between men in groups and. individ.ual- man seln'es

simiJ-arl-y to frustrate the cl"assification of Rousse&u asi arl

l.

2

0f , p. '16.

Lukes, op. dt., p. ]lO,

Emil.e , p. 2O2.3

o

I+6

epistemological ind.ividuaList. Even though Rousseau edopted. Lockean

sensational-isn to support the existence of god, the spiritualist and.

sentimentaList aspects of his vritings prevented. total acceptance of

enpiricism. There is no doubt, however, that Rousseau ad.opts a central

feature of epistemological individualism "about the nature of knowled,ge,

which asserts that the source of knor+led.ge lies within the ind.ividual.ttl

But, as Lukes goes on to point out, Descartes held. the same view, end.

it is Chcrrskyts opinion that Rousseau drev much frcrn the Cartesiart

tradition with respect to the role of ideas and. the conception of

human natur".2

The state of neture that Rousseau outlined. in t]ne Ùiseourse on

InequaliLy depicted Le sønage acting according to his ovn nature,

r¡ithout the option to obey or disobey srry lav external to himself, end.

subject solel-y to physical circurnstances. Santsage nature, then, must

have its ovn unique motivation and ord.ering principle.

It is then certain that ccrnpession is a natural feeling,which, by mod.erating the activity of seÌf-love in each individ.ual,contributes to the preservation of the whole speeies. It is thisccrnpa^ssion that hurries us without reflection to the retief ofthose who are in d,istress: it is ttiis vhich in a state of natureeupplies the place of laws, morals, and. virbues, vith the advantagethat none are tempted. to d.isobey its gentle voice 3

But if it is conpassion that preserves the species, then it is othe'r

aspects of sønagc nature that ensure that the species wifl- d.evelop.

Rousseau betieved that the source, but not the form, of society 1ay in

the chan'acteristics of free B€ency and perfectibility that resid.e in

man I s o::iginal nature .

1. Lukes , op. dt., p. 107.

2. Noam Chcrnsky, Ccutesiøt Linguistics, Harper and ncn^' (Nev York 1966),p. P2, note !0.

3. oI, p.68. (ftaticsadded) .

Ò

\tNature lays her ccrnmand on every a¡rimal , arid. the brute obeys

her voice. Man receives the same impulsion, but at the sarne timeknor"¡s himsel-f at l-iberby to acquiesce or resist: and. it isparticularþ in his consciousness of this liberty that thespirituality of his souL is dispÌayed ....Yet, if the d.ifficul-ties attend.ing should. still- l-eave rocrr fordispute about this d.ifference betveen men and. brutes, there isanother very specific quality which distinguishes them, and. whichvifl adrnit of no dispute. This is the faculty of self-improvement,l¡hich, by the help of circumste¡ces, grad.ually d.evelops al-l therest of our faculties, ancL is inherent in the epecies as in theindivid.ual .... 1

'Ihis pre-social being is not the religious ind,ivid.ual to be found.

ín Lln'iL<t, nor is it a ltou¡esiar¡ egoist or a gentl-e Lockean natural- man.

Rousseaurs conceptiori of al original- hr¡nar nature presupposes the

inexorable emergence and continued. existence of a qualitativeJ-y different

soc+aL nature, on vhich a critique of contemporary civilisation cou1d. be

based.. Åt the same time, he is abl-e to maintain, vithout contradiction,

that an examination of sa,Lua.ge nature is essential- to highlight

fundamental, species-specific features of human existence" Hence the

ernphasis on liberty, for exunpJ-e, serves both as a causal factor in mants

develotrment , øtd provid.es a basis for a¡r attack on the legitimacy of

estabLished authority. Ttre distinctþ Cartesia¡r ffavour of this aspect

of Rousseaurs thought is pointed out by Chcrrsky.

It is striking that his argr:nent, up to this point, folJ-owsa familiar Cartesia¡r modeL. Man is uniqueþ beyond. the bor¡nd.s ofphysical explanation; the beast, on the other hand., is merely aningenious machine, ccnunand.ed by natural lav. Manrs freedcrn and.his consciousness of this freed.csr d.istinguish hin fran the beast-machine. TLre principJ-es of mechanical- explanation &re ineapableof accounting for these human properties, though they can accountfor sensation and even the conbination of id.eas, in which regard,tma¡ d.iffers frcrn the beast onJ-y in degree.r 2

The spiritual-ism inherent in Rousseaurs insistence on manrs free

B€ency al-so r..¡nderfies the other basic hr¡ran feature - the faculty of

l-. Ibid, p. 5l+.

2. Chansky, For Reøsons of State, p, 1]3.

a

l+8

self-ùnprovement. This notion incorporates the premise that man not

onþ d.evelops out of and. awey frun the state of Le sØ,Ðage, but that

such development can be an itnprouement. Such a concept ca¡rnot eesity

be dismissed as a med.iocre a¡rd predictable viev held in ecrnmon by most

Enlighterune¡rt thinkers, because Rousseau rejects the popular belief in

reason as the central- feature of hu¡nani'by and the source of aJ-l- progr"n".l

Reftecting a¡r anti- but not ir-rationalist bias, reason is made sub-

ordinete to perfectibil-i.ty in human nature, es Rousseau d.eparts sorne-

vhat frcnn the Cartesian tredition. Chc¡nsky sees this as a development

rather than a refutation.

There is no inconsistency in the notion that the restrictiveattributes of mind. r¡nderLie a historical-J-y evolving htman naturethat d.evelops within the limits that they set; or that theseattribrrtes of mind, provide the possibiJ-ity for self-perfection;or that, by providing the consciousness of freedcm, these essentialattributes of human nature give man the opportunity to createsocial- cond.itions a¡d. sociaJ- forms to mærimize the possibilitiesfor freed.crn, d.i-versity, a¡rd ind.ivid"ual self-reaLization" 2

fnd.eed., the attribution of perfectibility need. hardfy be d.escribed,

as I'restrictive," since it is a concept that is able to d.rar^r into its

a¡nbit a¡rd reconcile the rational and. conpassionate a.spects of eøtuage

nature, And as vith liberty, Rousseam is proviaea wittr a powerful

expÌanatory tool vhen he criticises society. Perfectible man vil-l- develop

und.er the constraints of the envirorunent in which he find.s himself, but

over vhich he general\y has littLe or no control. As the faculties

d.evelop, it is inevitable that imbaJ-ences will arise, errors r+il-L be made,

l. "Although it might beJ-ong to Socrates and. other mind.s of the likecraft to acquire virtue by reason, the hr:man race would. long sincehave ceased to be, had its preservation d.epend.ed on\y on thereasonings of the individ.ual-s ccrnposing it." OI, p. 69. Ttreinplications of this pa,ssage are exsnined in Chapters VT and. \l-II.

2. Chcrnsky, Fon Reaszns of Statc" pp. I7\-r.

a

)+g

and that nan wil-1 accept false premises as he gains sophistication in

reasoning. Perfectibility, then, takes man frcrn his original state

into successively higher stages of cultural- achievement, but is always

attend.ed. by the corruptions bhat continue to acccrnpar¡r unstmctured.

social- progress.

This paradox of progress is no bette:: revealed. than in his critique

of the aggrandisement of artistic a¡rd. scientific endeavor:r, then and. now

regarded. as the height of cuÌtu¡aI el-evation. ns ve have seen, Rousseau

first gained fame vith tlne Fírst Díseouyse precisely because it focussed

upon such a t'bril.lienttr and "darirrg" theme.J Rousseau would have us

believe that he und.ervent a deep mystical experience vhich inspired. him

to adopt this parddoxical. ap¡iroach.2 However, it rnay have been less of

an inspiration arrd. more of'a tj.me\y echo of Platonic thought, given the

simil-arity that l{endel shcn¡s betveen the two thinkersr positions erid.

rhetoric on the subject of the arts a¡ld, sciences.

For it was Pfato vho rouncLly condemned. all the artists and.little-minded rphiJ-osophersf or scientists, as detrimentaL tothe ed.ucation of youth an<i. the reconstitution of society. P1ato,too, had. hsnded. d.or¿n the ra¡rcient trad.ition vhich passed. out ofEgrpt into Greece, that scrne god., l¡ho vas ari enelqy to the reposeof nankincl, vas the inventor of the sciences.t The great masterof Pl,ato ( in his ApoLogy ) fraa eulogised. ignorance as preferableto the conceit of knor.¡l-edge so abound.ing among men of alL cla-ssesin society. 3

Since it has been claimed. that Rousseau won the prize principally&s & resul-t of his approach, it should. be pointed out that he wasnot the only contestant to adopt this perspective. One LordForbes of PitsLigo argued. along the sa¡ne l-ines, mod.estly butcorrectly seeing no chance of virming the prize, partly as aresult of his approach. Moreover, both Rousseau and. Lord. Forbeshad a remarkabl-y similar mov:aListíe orientation tovard. theprqgress of society and its cultural trappings. John Barker,"A Ræa auis in terrts?: Lord Forbes of PitsJ-igo as Entighter¡nentfigrrre ," Stud.ies on VoLtaiv,e ard. the Eigltteenth Centuny, l'loL. CLl(tgl6) , pp. 225-23t+.

2. Cortf , Jf , 3.

Charl-es W. llendel , Jeøt-Jocques Rctusseau ' MoraList, Oxford. U.P.(Oxfor¿ f93l+) , Vol-. I, p. 28.

l_

o

5o

fn contrast vith the conplexity and. falsehood of civilisation,

Rousseaurs state of nature is typified by in¡rocence, simplicity and.

order, and hís sanuage fol-l.ovrs in al-I respects natural l-av, uithout

sJìJr awareness that the l-av even exists. Designed. to filter out all-

vestiges of socialised. behaviour a¡rd. thror¡ into relief the basic and.

unrefined. characteristics of huma¡lity, the conception of a sa,u)age natvre

is a fiction that Rousseau maintains on\r to d.el-ineate more clear\r

the nature of man in society.

b" Social Nature

The natule of the social being that Rousseau d.escribes is of

interest on several level-s here. First, the facul-ties of rnind"

significant for social- man vi1l highl-ight the d.ialectical notion that

the d.egradation of man caused, through the disord.ered. development of

society in fact creates the cond.itions for the movement toward.s a

better society. A second but cLosely associated. point concerns the

el-ucid.ation of concepts of justiee, liberby Bnd equa-Iity as sæi.aL

categories, that gave rise to both a d.ema¡rd. for and a d,escription of

a nel¡ sociaf ord.er. Third, one aspect in parti-cufar of social nature

will be exmined. in scrne detail - the d.evelopment of månts moraL nature.

We have seen that, whiÌe principal\y interested. in the issue of

the origins of inequality, Rousseau provid.ed. insights into the most

flrnd.anental, nature of Lhe prinitive being. The ana\ysis of the move

into civil society provid.es on equally illtuinating d.iscussion of marrrg

ba-sic sosiaL nature, vith the ailded di-mension of his conceptions

concerning the political a¡rd. sociaL - as ageinst natural - environment.

For Rousseau, the emergence of the social being signaLled. the

end. of the state of nature as a human habitat. As Le eønlage csne into

contact with others more a¡d. more, latent hr¡man abilities vere revealed.

and refjned., vhich precipitated f\rrther changes to man a¡d. to nescent

social- relations.

a

5t

As id.eas and feel-ings succeed.ed. one a¡other, and. hea¡t and.head were brought into pley, men continued. to lay asid.e theiroriginal vildness; their private connections became every d.eynore intimate as their Limits extend.ed. I

Innguage and. abstract reasoning, for instance, are l-inked. to the onset

of'social- formations by Rousseau, although he ís equivocal aboutttwhieh

was most necessarXr, previously forrned society for the institution of

J-anguages, or previously inventecl J-angueges for the establishment of

s ociety ?tr-

Rousseau never attempted" to document firlIy the move frcnn the state

of nature'to the state of society in eny strict historicaL or

anthropoJ,ogical sense, but he d.id. indicate that the mor¡ement fron early

to advanced. modes invol-ved. a ccrnpLex inte4llay of forces, resulting

in the creation of the intelligent and. moral- being of societlr as

distinct frcxn the mereþ sentj.ent man of nature.

The savage a¡rd civilised. man differ so much in the bottcnn oftheir hearts a¡d. in their inclinations, that r¡hat constitutes thesupreme happiness of one voufd reduce the other to despaiT ¡...In real-ity, the source of all- these d.ifferences is, that thesavage lives within himself, vhile the social man lives constarrtlyoutsid.e himsel-f, and. only knows how to live on the opinion of'others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his ownexistence mereþ fron the jud.gurent of others concerning him. 3

This remarkable psssege estabLishes that Rousseau d.ifferentiated.

very cì-early betveen sØtuage and social- natures, amd. vas able to

articuLate such d.ifference in terus of eonsciousness of being as a

sociaL phencmenon. Social- man, therefore, gained. the faculty to jud.ge

others, forrn moral- opinions, ancl take account of the views prevailing

in the group. In so doing, man began to define his ovn being, but not

1.

D

Of, po

rbid.,

rb¿d..,

Bl-.

p.63.

p. Lol+.?

a

,2

in the rel-igious individ.ualist fashion suggestecl in Erm)La" Instead,

Rousseau indicates that civilised man has learnt that his meaning is

d.erived. from outsid.e himself, and is thus d.epend.ent on his social

refations to provide hirn vith an image of the self n ParedoxicallJ,

then, man, in a¡r examination of the ird'iu'íduaZ sel-f, must confront

and assess the extent of his sociality a¡d. ability to benefit frcm

a collectitse existence.

llad social relations been ba-sed. upon a respectful observance

of justice, morality and. obligation - the social nanifestations of

ms.rrrs irinate ccmpassion and. equality - then mants happiness and

emotional security woul-d. be ensr.:red.. But the fatsity of the r,¡hole

soCial- and, pol-itical- ord.er, as described by Rousse&u, '\.tas vitiating

rather than suppJ-ementirrg and perfecting msr.t?s natural qualities.

.. . . B.Iways asking others r¡hat r¡e are r snd never d-aringto ask or:¡sel-ves, in the mid.st of so nuch philosophy, hunanity,and civil-ization, and. of such sublime codes of morality, we

have nothing to show for oursel-ves but a frivolous and d.eceitf\rlappearance, honour without virtue ' res.son without wisd.om, anclpJ_easr.:.re vithout happiness. It is sufficient that I have provedthat this is not by any means the originaJ- state of meri, butthat it is mereþ the spirit of society, and the inequal-itywhich society produces, that thus tra¡rsform a¡rd. alter al-L ournatural- inclinations. I

By id.entifVing society as the source of personal meaning, Rousseau

makes several critical ad.ve¡rces in politicaJ- theory. He cLelineates the

central- featr:res of a social- nature, Ðd presents mod.ern man a,s a

sociabl-e, intelligent creature vho vi1ls the gootl. On the other hand.'

this is a description of erì inner nature, that will only be evid.enced

in thought and. action r¡¡d.er a supportive sociaf structure. In these

respects, Ro'usseau places hírnself firrnly in the communitarian trad,ition

that vas to becc¡ne so inportant in the next century, by stressing that

fu¡ther hr¡man progress vas only possible if men recogniseô their mutual-

sociaf d.ependency arìd fornecL constructive associations.

l. fbid., p. 1o5

a

53

Rousseaufs vision of the good society va^s not onþ positively

d,efined., however. In formulating a critique of contemporary society,

Rousseau was very successful in describing a society in terms of vhat

it does not províde for its citizens. His ana\ysis of social

institutions consistently highlights the systematic injustice,

inequality and im¡noral-ity of establ-ished. authority, even though

Rousseau ccrnprehencied. the inevitability of the continued. existence

of the institutions that he attacked.. tlhile tJne phiLosophes vere

extolling the virtue e¡d refinement of eighteenth century society,

Rousseau pointed out its abject fail-ure to live up to the facade of

achievement through rational-ity. Thus culturaf achievements of littte

worth to the general populace were counterposed. against the sacrifices

ma,n va,s forced to meke by society, that were a denial of both his

original a¡d. social natures.

lrr the Discourse ort fnequaLitU, 7z sa.nsage ha.s ccrnplete liberty,

and. equality prevail-s since incliviclual- clifferences are of no ultimate

significance. With the move into civil- society, morality an¿l property

rights inter,'¡ene and. disrupt the natura-l tend.ency toward.s ha:rtony.

.... al-l- the inequality vhich nov prevails owes its strengthend. growth to the d,evelopment of our facufties a¡d. the advanceof the hu¡ra¡r mind, and. becc¡nes at le.st perrnanent and legitimateby the estabLishment of property a¡rd lavs. Second.ly, it follorvsthat moral inequality, authorized. by positive right alone, clasheswith natural- right, where it is not proportionate to physicalinequaJ-ity .... l

fn society, ordinary man is d.enied. his free B€ency by the institution

of 1av, since positive right has replaced the natural right to red.ress

an injustice, and. thus d.emonstrate equaLity between men. However,

Rousseau had alrea.Sr esserted. that it vqq mants free agency, his

essentia-l l-iberty, that vas instrumental- in tead.ing man out of the

state of natu¡e and. rel-easing and perfecting hr:man potentialities.

I rb¿d.

a

,t+

Therefore, social justice, poJ-itical equality and. Iiberty urust

have been usurped. at scrne stage in favour of a particular cl-ass, vho

then preserved. their priviJ,ege by overt or institutionaliseil forceo

Such vas, or may vel-l- have been, the origin of society andl-av, which bound nev fetters on the poor, artd gave new pc,wersto the rich; which irretrievab\y d.estrqred. natural liberby'eternally fixed. the lav of property and. inequality, eonverted.cl-ever usurpation into unalterable right, anil , for the advantageof a few a¡nbitious individ.uals, subjected. al-I nankind, toperpetual l-abour, s1avery, and. l¡retchealness. 1

This portrayel- of a harsh, trnequal a¡d. iniquitous society that

ensfaves man is perhaps Rousseaurs most politically powerflrl image -

negativeJ.y d.efinecl - of the good society, since he conjoins with this

a passionate demancl for liberation, equality and. justice that pre-

supposes radical alterations to existing social organisatj-on.

once again, communitarianism olles at lea^st much of its

liberationist rhetoric to Rousseauian polemics, while the liberaÌ-

dernocratic tradition leys its ctaim to these concepts a-s the ul-timate

yardsticks against which to measure the merits or otherwise of a

soci al- stnrcture .

Ccmmrnitarien thought concentrates on Rousseaurs scathing attack

on private property Bnd its suspect legitimisation by the authority of

foree a¡rd- lan¡. Tt¡is materialist enphasis hightights the social

categorisation of the fev propertied a¡rtt the nany ctis-enfranchised.,

which categorisation is characterised. by the privilege of the wealthy

being d.epend.ent upon the eontinued, unjust sub jugation and. relative

poverty of the mass of people. fn this case, justice, equaJ-ity and

liberty are ral\ying calls to positive action to red.ress social and

econc¡nic imbalances.

fbíd.. , p. 89. Pages BT-gr inclusive provid.e a eoncise summaryof Hobbes I Leuiathcm.

l_

,

,5

Liberal--democratic thought, however, considers these concepts

in a negative a¡rd. political sense, and. only as they appJ-y to the

abstract individ,uaL. Thus Rousseaurs dema¡rd. for political- equality

is transl-ated. into a legal.istic notion, rÍhere equality (and. justice)

is specificaÌly permi'bted for al-l-, and regerd"ed- as technicalþ possible,

without regard- to its pr:ar:tical probatrility. Freedqn, too, is d.efined

in te¡rns of the individualrs freed.m frcmr IegaI restraint, rather

than the removal of obstacles to facilitate social change. These are

protective and. not creative conceptions of justice, ecluality and-

freed.crn, inctieative of a cautious and. wary attitude to chenge. This

is reflected by the adoption of the concept of the separation of

legisJ-ative ancl executive po\{ersrt on the negative assumption that.

abuse of power is bound. to occur anci. can best be frustrated by

arrarìgemerlts of cou¡tervaiÌing social agencies and forces.

I'b can be cÌaimed that the epigrannatic wríting sty1e, the d.azzl-ing

array of innovative id.eas, equivocations and the occasional outright

contradiction a1l- to be found. in the corpus of Rousseaurs works

contrit,ute to a situation where, iustifiabls, each school may regard

Rousseanr as theír champion (or bebe noín) alone. To scme extent,

contradictory meanings and. val-ues must continue to be escribed. to

parts of Rousseaurs vork. llor+ever, our consid.eratíon of the social

nature of ma¡ may provid.e a jud.gment on the val-id.ity of ccrnmunitaria¡r

end l-iberal-democratic interpretations of the concepts of justice,

litrerty and equality.

As we have seen, Rousseaurs criti,que of society is based. on

those aspects of human social existence that are d.enied. by the

t'cjvil-ised." environment. Mon, unable to liv'e according to intrinsic

irnpulses tor¡arcl sociability, reerson and. morality, becønes alienated.

J. SC, T'r, 2

e

56

from himsel-f and his feLl,ov-man, and- begins to ma¡rifest the

factitious and. hypocritica-i- tend.encies that are reguired. by impoverishecl

social- rol-es. ft is the conception of mants true social nature, then,

that l-eads Rousseau to propose a creative act of association that willgive each man his d.ue, establish equality of a poJ-iticar kind, and. make

manrs acti.ons ^o".1-.1 Lïntir- that time, however, social man cannot

exhibit his true nature, and- it is the consciorrsness of the d.isunity

betveen being and appeara¡rce that pronpts m.Ln to consid.er himself in

opposition to the social nil-ieu that fail-s to satisf! him. Ttris is

the source of Rousseaurs ind,ividua]- man, who can onry ccme into

e'xistence in socieLy, a¡rd. r¡ho is a contextual- classification that

bears special rel-atiori to the kincl of corrupt society that Rousseau

vished to see supersecì.ed. Thus, contrarr¡ to conventional- belief ,

fiousseaurs t'individ.ual-ismtt d.oes not provide the conceptuat franer¡ork

for a¡r eluciclation a¡rd d.efence of inclivid.ual rights in tine Seeond

ùi".or?sn"2 Rather, it is ilre und.erryins and f\rndamental- interest

in a true social nature that Lea.ds Rousseau to cor¡.nterpose ilre

j.ndividual- and social- beings, in er.der to convey the frustrations of

existing soeiety through the ind.ividuaf ts d.iLemna, and. throw right

upon the type of society that could. ful-fil socinl man. In this event,

equarity, justice and Liberty s.re not the aim of social engineering,

but the inevitable outccrne of a r¿e],l--ord.erecL state.

l. sc, r, B.

2. Rousseau denies this vhen <liscussing natural rights, vhich onrysociaL man can ccmprehend.. rf ind.eed sme rights are, natrrrarrthen, ipso facto, they can never be removed or alienated.. llhenRousseau talks of rights, he talks of posi.tive rights, whichmay be just or unjust on sociaL ancj. not in¿ivid.ual grounds.

t

57

Given thj-s interpretation, ccûrmunitaria¡r and. liberaJ--d.emocratic

cl-aims to Rousseauts intellectual- patronage - or¡ refl-ected. gfory -

vil-l rest on the d.ichotor,y of the ind,ivid.ual- and. social being. And.

sirrce we may d.efine one of the central dístinguishing features of

the tvo tra¡litions as the acceptance or not of "the ind.ividuattr as

the basic unit of vhich society is ccrrposed., it is clear that liberal-

d.emocratic thought is at odd.s with Rousseau, who salr not B. Sroup or

nation of individuals, but "the general- society of the human r&""."1

tr'rorn the cormnunitarian perspective¡ Marx rejected the notion of man

as en 'risolated." individ.ual who vafued. society fron without.

lnlan is in the most literal sense of the vord a zoortpoLitikon, not onl-y a sociaf animaJ-, but a¡ animal- vhichcan d.evelop into an individuaÌ only in society. 2

The liberal-d.emocratic school , fu"rthe'r'rnore, d.oes not agree with Rousseau

that the existence of society itself is the chief obstacle to individ.ual-

enjoyment of liberty, equality and. justice. On the contrary, it is

their opinion that these concepts can be appliecl analytically to eny

social system, to d.eterrnine vhether the ind.ivid.ual enjoys the minimum

amount of liberty and so on. Sxarnining a soeiety in this fashion

provides the ba.sis for dema¡rding that ttre La¡s of that society should.

be changed. by those in arrthority. In Rousseaurs political society,

however, a1l lavs are rnade by the sovereign people and can only be

l. t'.... let us think of the hr¡ma¡ r&ce as a corps mor'tL harring,together with a feeling of ccrnmon existence which gives iti-ndivid.uality and- makes it a unity, a universaÌ motive for'cewhich makes each parb act for a general end. relative to thewhol-e. " G;ÍIR, p. 157.

Karl- l4arx , fntroàuctíon to the Critique' of PoLitical Econqrq,ír¡ A Contributiott to the Critique of Polit¿cal Econotty,tr. N. I. Stone (chicago 1913) , p. 266.

2.

e

'Badjudged by them as just and. d.efensibLe. Communitarian thought,

similarþ, does not attempt to detail a legal system in ord.er to

ensure that citizens will- be equal before the l-ar.¡, receive just

treatnent and. retain their J-iberty a-s constructive m€rnbers of society.

Instead, it looks to the basic organisation c¡f society, upon which the

d.etaiÌs of social life are built. ft is in this that Rousseau and

cc¡rmrunitarian thought coincid.es - equality, justice and. liberty are to

be the outccrne of the nev political ord.er.

Notwithstantìing the not inconsid.erabLe Rousseauia¡r influence on

ccrnmunitarian thought, there is one issue of fundamental significance

where there is almost no explicit agreenent - norality. Rousseauts

notion of the man in the state of nature was characterisecL by the pre-

social- nature of sØ,n)age existence. ftre consequent develotrxrent out

of the natural into the social- state resufted. in manrs ennobl-ement as

wel-1 as dictating the structural- l-irnitations to that process of

perfectibility. Whil,e Le søluage vas value-free, or value-anteceilent,

sociaL ma¡l l-earnt to value hj.s thought a¡rd. actions as veII as those

of others. But iù vas not alvays true that man could judge the justice

of a case on material-is+. ground.s aLone. Rousseau introd.uced. his god. to

emerging social man, giving hin morality a¡d. the capacity to jufue

a,ctions as good or eviL. We have examined. this spiritual aspect of

the inner nature of ma¡ in the previous chapter, Ðd will confine our-

selves here to the consid,eration of the social implications r¡f man a.s

a moraL social being"

ll's we have seen, Rous$eau wa-s dissatisfied. with society because it

repÌaced. natural equal-ity and. tiberty rith social or political inequality

a¡rd enslaved. man. Theoretically, the construct of Le satuage giving

way to the sophisticated social- being was capable of establishing a

firm case for a ner.r s<;cial, orrl.er on the grounds of rationality end

equity alone. lìy attlîibrrti,n¿ç morality to man, Rousseau augmented the

scope of tn¡e social nature, such that man could. (antl therefore ehouT'd)

a

59

be virtuous in thought and. action. Associateit with this moral facet

of mants being was the belief that the quality of hr¡nan existence

could be measured in tenns of happiness. As vith other social- faculties,both morality and happiness share society a-s the ccrnmon constitutive

principre, just as it is the contemporary fotrn of society that eLicits

only their negative aspects.

.... the soul- and. passions of men insensibly change theirvery nature; ....our wants ancl pleasures in the end. seek newobjects i &nd .... the originar man having vanished by d.egrees,society offers to us onì-y an assembþ of artificiar men urtdfactitious pe^ssions, which are the vork of a1r these ner¿ rerations,and vithout any real_ foundation in nature. 1

Unl-ike the Lessou of Emile, vhere the tutor exhorts his charge to

resist the degralation of a¡r immoral- society and. attain his virtuethrough cJose ccrnmunion vith god and an awareness of onets responsibility

for personal- mora-l conduct, in the poì-itical- r+orks Rousseau eoncentrates

on morality ancl happiness as sociaJ- categories rather then existentialcrises.

Yet although there is no naturaL an<J. genera,l society flnongmen, arthough they beccrne unhappy and. wicked. in beccming sociable,. ... /êt we shoul-d not think thet there is neither virtue norhappiness for us ar¡d that heaven has abend.oned us vithout reme{rto d.epravity. 2

This divine prcrnise of virtue and. happiness changes the discussion

of mar¡ and. society frcm one of secular rationality to that of a

spiritual-ist revel-ation. 'Ihus it is Rousseaurs fervent d.esire to see

man achieve happiness a¡rd. virtue (¡otn of vhich e]ud.ed. hin) that brings

him to &rgue so stronéSþ for a ne-nr poritical orcler, md n<¡t the patent

utility a¡d worbh of his demand,s for justice, equality and riberby"

l_ 0f , p. l-O\.

GSHR, p. 16Ì,a-

o

6o

c. Return to Natnre?

Rousseau he^s J-ong been popr,rlarJ-y associateti with the supposed.ly

idylfic primitive existence conjured. by the phrase ttreturn to nature rtt

as if this vere an ad.equate surrnation both of his philosophieal- intenta.lrd practical- sugÉSestions. Tt¡is represents one of the criticisms most

ofterr -Levell-ed, at his politicaì- thought. An examination of thisargument, whiJ-e l-eading to a rejection of this charge against Rousseau,

is und,ertaken principalì-y to ill-uminate the relationship between the

concepts of perfectibiLity, progress, the ind.ivid.ual, and. cornmunity inhis thor-ght"

First, it shouÌd. be observed. that Rousseau anticipated. that he

wcruld be criticised. for suggesting a return to nature, after having

attacked. r+ith great bitterness existing society in t;ne Seeonå. ùùscouyse.

\{hat, then, is to be d.one? lfust societies be total\yabol-ishetL? Irfust mettm and, tuum be anninitated., and. must r¡e returnae&in to the forests and. l-ive anong the bears? This is a d.ed.uctionin the m€Lnner of my adversaries, vhich r l¡oul-d as soon anticipatea-s l-et them have the shame of d.raving. o you, vho have never heard.the voice of heaven .... retire to the wood.s, there to rose thesight ¡:¡rd. rernembrance of the crimes of your contemporaries ..,.As for men l-ike me . ... those, in shorb , vho are persuad.ed. thatthe Dívine Being has cal-l-ecÌ arl nanlcind to be partakers in thehappiness and. perfection of eel-estial intetrigences, dl thesewil-l- encle&vou-r to nerit the etennal prize they are to expect frcrnthe practice of those virtues, which they make themsel-ves forl-cÍrin l-earning to know them. They will respect the sacred bc¡nds oftheir respective ecu¡runiti.es; they rrill rove their ferLow-citizens,ancl serve them vith all their night .... 1

Clearly, Rousseau is defending himself with scme vigour af'ber the

phíLosoplteg' response to his critique of the arts and. sciences in the

Ftt'sb ùí..seou.v,se. Jn so doing, Rousse&u draws together those a.spects of

.L. Of , p. 1.L3.

t

6z

return to nature, such an indiviclual active\r seeks the social- fulfil:nent

of his feflows, and- is villing to obligate himsel-f and serve selflessly.

The concrete exp::ession of this disposition to sociabil-ity anct nee<l for

association is in Le contrqt; sociaL, described. by l,{arx as! a.n ttaesthetic

fi cti on . tt

This may be a¡r apt description, but it is e poör critique, however.

The sor.rrce of Marxts objection is in Book l, Chapter 6, of tlne Soeial

Contract, where Rousseau intimates that ind.ivicluals are constrained. for

reasons of preservation to leave the state of natu.re by forming a social

ccmpact. But this, al.ong vith the opening Iines of Chapter B, is a

clear - but stylistic -compression of the d-etailed. exposition of the

gradual move into socr'-ety provid.ed by the Seccnd ùLscourse" Consecluentþ,

the passages in quest.ion do not warrant the kind. of critical anaþsis

that is infl-icted- upon vhat is no more than an expedient literary

shorthand..

Rousseau uses the id.ea of a social cont::act as a positive move that

may be made by ind.ividua.ls vho are disaffected. by an unsatisfactory social-

ord.er. It is +-he essential-l-y social- neture of the ind"ivid.ual that l-eads

to poJ-itical d.emands for a nev social- structure, and. Rousseau attempts

to define a State that vill not on\r eonforrn to that nature, but miCht

per:n,it the proper expa.rrsion of hrunan faculties.

If possible, we must make up for the.l-ack of ar¡y generalassociation by creating new €ssociations .... Let us shcn¡ . n..that t,he art of living together csrlr as it d.evelops, repair bhe

evil-s , vhich, in its initia-l stages , it caused. to huna¡r nature.... l-

The bold.ness of Rousseau, as nev forms of sociaJ- relations are easily

touted., comes frorn his beLief that ma¡r mW nan have a social nature,

but that sociability is nol, natura'L'Lg endowed,. Since that social

nature arose from the d"isjointed. progress pf civilisation, Rousseau is

L, GSIIR, p. 162.

63

able to cl,ain Lhat aLL sociaì, relati-ons are fal-se, arid- that existing

forrns may be rejectecl vithout end-a4gering marìf s inner nature. Equalþ,

new fonns may be propr:sed, a^ssessed and. changed in accord.snce with'bheir

pcis:i-tive cr negative effect on the material and spiritual weLfare of

the peopì-e.

ft is not nerely thab Rousseau l-ookerL on the possib'il-ities of

future creative acts of assoc:iatj-on with optinús:n that prcnçts a

rejection of'the notion of retum to nature, Ìrowever. One of Rousseaufs

fund.a¡nentel assurnptions about the c¡ualities of man that seperated him

f.rom the anirnafs was hj.s faculty fr:r self-irnprovement, or perfectibility-

If it was the progressive sr:phistication of men through the expa;rsion

of this facuJ-ty that took man out of the state of naùure, then s, move

LJ.backwarcls is the only possibil-iLy d.enied. :nar," Perfectibility means t

tha'b m¿.n is still in the procesrì of d"eveloping subÌíme sociaZ clualities

of reasonn 1an65uage and morality" lulo::eover, it suggests tha'b man wilL

seek knovledge of hinself a¡; wel.l- as the physical- worfd., ancl use that

uncL,,:rstanding tc improve his existence, and thus bring about cheinges

that take him even further -ilr,'¡n the state of nature. Finally,

Iìousseaurs rel-igious interpret,atì.on of hr¡nan history cc¡lmrits him to

the pur:suit of bri.ngi-ng "a11 mankintL to be partaìrers in the happiness

and- perfectian of celesti¡r1 intefl^i.gences.tt

2. Conrnuriity for Individuals

iìousseau describes s.r: j-ndiviclual, uho is'by no mealls a¡r iso.l-ated or

abstract índivj.au*, but who j.nevitatrl-y reactr; to tire unsatisfactory

political- systems that fmstrate co¡rtinual-þ the free expression of

manrs true socia.l- and- moral nature. Tn proposing le contrab socúal as

an ad-vanta{3eous politica-l eËseciationn then, Rousseau is not concerrled

just with "thr: preservation arrd prosperity c¡f its memtrersr"f but must

.rì,so provide a souncl. enotion¿ù founcl¡¡,tion for the repressed individual-s

he seeks to uni.te"

r. sc, rrr, g.

a

6I+

As l¡e have seen, the religious need.s of ind.ivid.ual-s ere to be

catered for by civiÌ reJ-igion, md Rousseau attempts to ensure that

his political prescriptions, rvhile facititating the unfold.ing of true

sosial nature, might sti1J- per:nit each person tottobey himsel-f ¡l-oner

and. renain as free as beforer"-l b,y creating political and- civil right.

I'b is to l-av al-one that men owe justice and liberty" Itis this salutary orgen of the will" of al-t r.rhich establishes, incivil right, the naturaL equal-ity betr¿een men. It is thiscel-estial voice which 'Lictates to each citizen the precepts ofpubJ-ic reo.son, æd teaches hin to act aecor,ling to the rul-es ofhis or¿n judgnent, and not to behave inconsistentJy with hinsel-f . ?

Liberal-clemocratic theory still l-ooks to a quasi-utilitarian soeiety

composed. of individuals pursuirrg personal interest, and. seeks to

preserve this, in principle, hy the institution of politieal rights

by the rul-e of l-av. Rousseau, howerrer, is suggesting that law, made

by the pa::ticiparits in the social compact, need. not resbrict the

interest of the coromunity in the affairs of the ind.ivid.ual-. On the

contrary, each ind.iviclual ís assisted óy the l-aw to act in concert

vith his trrre self, an individual benefit that arises only out oft'the to'bal- alienation of each associate, together uittr all his rights,

to the whol-e "cr*rrrrity."3

Even in the technical- d.escription of the social co:rpact, Rousseau

does not subsume the intlividual in the new social- order. Contrary to

the interpretation of the Roussear-Lian State as totatitaria¡, Bousseau

managed" to strengthen rather than d.ininish his notion of a social nature

necessarily underpiming the ind.iuid.ual.

f. Ib¿d., Ir 6. There remains, of course, the question as to howfree man vas before. The sort of freedcrn Rousseau vould. tike toretairr is the freedcur to be himself - a critic of society, butprotected by that society. fn any event, freed.cm after thecontract is redefined- as "obedi-ence to a law we prescribe ourselves."

2. PÌi, p. 12\.

3. SC" rr 6.

a

6j

¡..o e&ch man, in giving himself to all, gives himself tonobody; and as there is no associate over vhich he d.oes notacqr,r-ire the sa¡ne right as he yieLcls others over himseJ-fo hegains an equivalent for everything he Ioses, and an increaseof force for the preservation of what he has. 1

The paradox of giving to a^11 and to nobody a¡rd. receiving simultaneously

from al-l is peculiarly illuninative of Rousseaurs contribution to

poli.ti cal- philos opl-ry.

first, Rotmseau vievs the social- contract as a creative ect of

association by men n'lrea,ly in society. This was contrar¡r to the

thougþt of Hobbes and. Locke, vho proposed. that the soc:l-al- contract

marked the transition from the state of nature to a civil society vhich

coul-d. only operate successfull,y through either: the strength of a

Leviathanr ori the obJ-igation to a governrnent that ruled accord.ing to

Natural- Iøw. fn both cases, it was assuned that the essence of mar¡f s

nature hacl remained unchanged., arrd, viril-e Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau

were agree<l that in tire state of nature men 'hrere equal , am<3- aware ofD

their libertyr'- it was Rousseau who rejected, the static conception of

hr¡¡nan nat,ure and introduced. the fbrther d.imension of perfectibility to

manrs in¡¡er being. Society, then, l¡€rs a¡ artificia,J-ity that, imposed,

on men, brought about changes to the bread.th and. d.epth of human faculties,

thus dispensing with the notions that na¡¡ shoul-d. be governed. accorcling

to this or that rendition of Natural Law, or with respect to this or

that set of NaturaÌ Rights.

ft is this clifference betveen Rousseau. and. his preclecessors that

forms the basis of the second. significant issue. The nature of Le êauÐa.ge

having beLn supersed.ed., the resulta¡rt sociaL nature resid.es vithin not

only artificiaÌ but al-so ina,dequate sociaJ- forrns, in Rousseauts opinion.

1. rb¿d.

2. c.f.s0f , p. 39.

c

66

Or¡r visdcrn is slavish prejudice, our customs consist rncontrol-, constraint, ccrnpul-sion. Civilised. man is born a¡rd. d.iesa sl,ave. fhe infar¡t is bound. up in svad.dling cl-othes, the corpseis nail-ed dom in his coffin. Al-l- his life long man is imprisoneclby our institutions. l-

fn consequence, the true soeiaJ- nature of man is alienated., and can

only be manifested in the form of an ind.ivid.ualistie reaction against

the repressive aspects of sociaL existenee. EwiLe, based. on the

assumption of such al,ienation, ís not d.irected toward.s ed-ucating man

to be a citizen, but to be a¡r individual of sufficient strength so a,s

to be able to vj.thstarrd. the moral- d.ebilitation of corrupt French

society. By irnplication, then, Roussear¡-iarr man has a quite complex

nature. As ve have seen, he has d.eveloped a true social- natrrre, but

its al-ienation has given rise to a true indiuicltnZ nature, in turn

al-ienated frcm itself by estrangement frcrn god" Rousseaurs Christianity,

conceived and. presented, vith no other than the private nature of the

reJ.igious individual j"n rnind., couJ-d have littfe relevance to manf s

secul-ar sociality, as the vritings on civil rel-igion anply d.isplay.

Therefore, if man was bo rea-lise his luLL sociaZ potential-, the

existing pattern of institutionalisecL inter-relations required a

d,ramatic tra¡lsforznation that coul-d. only be achieved. by totat invofvement

in the contrat sosiaL.

These tvo points demonstrate that Rousseau succeeded. :'-n provid.ing

concepts, categories and. analyses important to both cor¡rnunitarian a,rrd.

liberaJ--democratic views r:f society. The notion of the ind.ividual -

abstract, free ancl rational - underpins tiberal--d.emocratic thought, even

though Rousseau mokes it cl-ear that such a conception is of limited.

useful¡ress, and shoul-d on\y be used. to emphasise the d.eficiencies of a

given society. That same Rousseauia¡ ind"ivid-ual - frustraterl by society -

l-. tÌnrtLe, p. 10,

a

6T

is present in the communitarian approach, usualþ regard,ed. as hostil-e

to the individ.uaf. As we have seen, !!arx sees the Rousseauian inaividualas the prod.uct of historical- forces, as boungeois man, and. is critical-of theories that a^ssume such a¡r existence to be valid.. Conmunitarian

thought is ( in theory at l-east) Ìrostile not to the bourgeois

individuar setf, but to the phirosophica] ttnystificationstt - likeboi:rgeois indivi¿ual-isrn - ancl vj.er,¡s of society that ignore the

objective conditions that underl-ie and give rise to the factitiousexistence that Rousseau d.escribed.. Thus the Rousseauian perspective

is incorporated, even if presented. as original ancl different.

fulother shared but contested co¡rception is the notion of a hrmran

nature that, given the freed.om to express itself, vir] resul-t in a

progressive o¡rcl ful-fil-ling society. rt is here that the threads of

Rousseaurs contributi-ons to the opposing streams begin to separate

themsel-ves, although this is by no mea.ns as cl-eer a"si sorne writers r¿ou,l-d.

have it. When Rousseau cl.emancì.s that al-1 men alienate themselves ancl

their rights in favour of the community, liberaJ--d.emocratic thought

suggests that power viÌl be wiel-d.ed. absolutely by a monolothic state,

that Ìiberty will be denied, and. med,iocrity enforced - all- lead.ing to

the d.isappearance of the creative, self-rel-ia¡rt inttivid"uar.

Conrnu¡litarian thinkers, on the other hand., vho see the ind.iridual only

as a secondary prod.uct of society, regard. eny linitation on the function

and. infl-uence of that socie-t nil-ieu as irrationaJ- and. counterprod.uctive.

As colletti says, referring d.irectry to Rousseaur s eont:rat soc+al,

To create a society is to create û. cclnmon interest, enassociation or real socia"lization of interests. If the ccrunoninterest is restricted. to the agreement of contract by which allagree that each shall- folLow his private interests, society doesnot exist (it is only rformal-r), md the social-tzation of man hasnot taken place: he has remained in the tstate of naturer withthe sol-e acldition of the safeguard. of the State. I

l-. Lucio Co-Lletti, IYom Iloussectu to Lenin, lJew Left Books (Lond.on1972), p. 173.

e

6B

Nor does either trad.ition have a monopoly of concern for the freed.om

of mano Fousseau, a¡d the communitarian trad.ition afber him, emplq¡

a conception of freed.om - indeed. an offer of liberty that is also the

rationale for change to society - that hinges upon the famous opening

remark of the SosiaL Contract - t'Man is borrr free, and everywhere he

is in chains.rf Rousseauts notion of the State and the Sovereign, both

created by and in the conmand of the people, promisecl an escape frcrn

oppressive institutions through a positive restructuring of socia.l

rel-ations. Once aga-in d,emonstrating that no retr:.rn to nature is

envisaged, Rousseau erphasises that man must give away a ilnatural-tr

right to l-iberty, in ord-er to gain full- benefit fron the more numerous

ad.vantages of poJ-itical society.

What man -Loses by the social contract is his natural- libertyand an unl-imited right to everything he tries to get and succeedsin getting; vhat he gains is civil l-iberty and. the proprietorshipof all- he possesses . . G.

We nr-ight, over and above al-l this, add, to w'hat man acquiresin the civil state, moral liberty, which alone malces him trulymaster of himself; for the mere impuJse of appetite is slavery,whil-e obedience to a lav r¿hich \{e prescribe to or:rselves isliber-ty. l-

Such clains for civil- liberty and, the proprietorship of alì-

possessions are generalþ associated. with the l-iberal-democratic

trad.ition, and, Rousseaurs accent on moral liberty conflicts with a

materialistic view of society. Neverthel-ess, the strongest of the

anachronistic accusations of incipient totaLitarianisn has been leveIled

against Rousseaurs attenpt to secure li.berty. This charge cannot be

naintained without some misrepresentation of Rousgeaurs thought, however.

Ivhn, as he moves into society, does not have ttan original- natur€ or: .r..

a system of universal forms to be unfold.ed as the artifices of social

organization are done avayr" *" John E. SrLith would have it.2 If this

1.

2.

sc', r , yIrI.

Jolin E. Snith, "Rousseau, Romatrticism and. the Philosophy of Existe.rìcer'IaLc FYench Stuàies., VoI. XTII (Spring*Slrnmer t95\), p. 5T.

C

69

vere sor then that government which governed. the least would. certa-inþ

minimise forrnal "artifices an<1 social organizationtt, thereby becoming

the rrbest'r in l-iberal theorl¡ as it d.eveloped from Locke. However,

it is the very artificial-:',ty of society a¡rd. the relative recency of

mants social- nature that prcrnpted. Fousseau to propose tine eontrat

soeiaT. as the most appropriate reaction to these rea-lities. Ttris vas

not merely a reshuffling of social- forces, but involved. every personrs

a€reement and cr:rnpì-iance vithin the total social- context"

fn order that the social cc,rnpact may not be an empty forrnula,it tacitly includes the undertaking, vhl'-ch alone can give forceto the rest, that vhoever refuses to obey the general will shal_lbe cornpell-ed. to d"o so by the vhol-e body. This means nothingl-ess than that he vil-l be forcecl to be free; for this is thecondition which, by giving each citizen to his corrntry, secureshim against al-l- personal d.epend,ence. J-

It is the startling pararlox of freedcrn being ttforced-t'upon man

that attracts much opprobrium, er offence against liberal

sensitivities that is exacerl:ated. by Roussearr t'giringtr citizene to

the State. fn the contert of the stated intention to have man as free

afber the contract as he was in the state of nature, it wouJ-d seem that

Rousseau had either undergone a rad.ical change r-¡f attitud,e on this point,

ol worse, vithin the space of a few pa€es had. contradicted. himself

fund,amentally. Both expla¡ations, by mistaking literary excess for

J-ogical error, rmd.erval-ue the significance of the d.istinction between

fal-se social rol-es and the expression of true social nature. For

Rousseau, man receives his mearring fron, and. needs, others. It is

therefore incumbent on all vould.-be members of a ccr¡munity to reject an

atcrnistic view of the social being, and. to d.evol-ve ind.ivictual rights and.

the control of sociaJ- existence. Al-thoueh it is unl-ikeLy ttrat aLL

ind.ividuals woul-d. actually give up their rights, it is the conrlition

1 sc, r, yrI.

a

7o

that Rousseau incl-ud.es, making it theoreticalþ defensible to assert

that no single contractee could suffer a net l-oss of freed.crn, whiJ-e

al-l- benefittecl frcm a¡. increase in societarXr security. As a corollary,

Rousseau is l-eft vith no option but to d,emancl of each cít'izen tlnat

he "no longer regard.s hi¡nself €ts one, but as a part of the whole, and.

is only conscious of the csnmon 1ife.t'I

Hov¡ever, this socialisation of men d.oes not necessarily lead to

the total subsumption of the individ.ual in the social vortex, as

critics of Rousseau woul-d have it. On the other hand., cqmnunitarian

thought considers that his vorks are stiLl tainted by liberal.

ind,ividuali-sm, and. point to the chapter on civil reì-igion a¡rd. the "stiIl

inevitably libertarian a¡r<i. indivitìualistic ( and. hence insufficiently

egalitarian) character of the ùiscourse on InequaLityn2 as exampJ,es of

his limitations. O¡l bal-ance, Rousseaurs philosophy is in the rurusual

position of attracting both pra-ise and. defamation fron the two main-

streams of political theory to vhich he contributed. so much. This may

be ex¡llained by the idea that Rousseåu tras attempting to formul-ate a.

d.octrine with a radicaJ-Iy d.ifferent intent to sociaL theorists of the

nineteenth century, and. that the ccunplexity of his intent was not fu1J-y

ccmprehended.

It is inadequate to define this in'bent by recourse to the anaþtic

shorthBrìd of phra^ses such a-q rrreturn to naturert or rrchampioning

ind-ividuaJ- rights," which have on\r a linited. interpretative applieation

at best, nor can it be claimed. that Rousseau only d.esired. a vell-

organised" ecxnmunity vhich moxirnised justice and. equal-ity. Political- theory

was, for Rousseau, a total-Iy monaL issue vhich gained. prcrninence €Le a

l. Enrt'|,e, p. T.

2. Coll-etti , op. cit,, p. 193.

7r

resuft of his rejection of the view that marl ïra-e originalþ and.

natural-\r good. rt vil-t be recall-ed, that tt'e rputraL nattsyal man

deveJ-oped- the capacity to ¡ærceive the distinction between good. and.

evil- with the onset of society, and. tesrnt arso that he had the free

vi11 to choose the good and reject ev-il. Ttre virtuous man in civilsociety, therefore, vas not expressing a ttnaturarrr serf , but was

exercising personal ancl public d.iscipline in ord.er to manifest the most

sublime qual-ities of a true inner being - hr.¡man nature exhibitect by the

individ.ual in the community.

At base, it is this moral element in Rousseaur s thought that has

been least acknowled.ged and. understood by his successors. The most

notabl-e exception, ve would. argue, is Fried.rich Nietzsche, because his

thought offers a comprehensive account of the nanner in r+hich political

thought is structr¡.red, end. shaped by moral belief . Nietzschets critique

of Fousseau, then, offers an interpr.etation ba.sed. upon an exeninetion of

Rousseaurs moral- assunptions. At the same time, it can be observed. that

Nietzsche himself was infl-uenced by Rousseaurs thought.

a

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T2

CTIAPTER IV

NTETZSCI{EIS CRITIQIJE OF ROI,JSSEAU:

FRO},I MORÂL TO EXTRA-MONAL

God is a gross-fisterÌ ansver, an indelicacy against usthinkers - I

f f , as has been shovnn Rousseaurs political- a¡rd. philosophical

arguments reþ upon the assumption of a Supreme Being, then Nietzschets

pronouncement that "God is deadrr represents a firnd.anental- d.ivergence

between the tvo thinkers. It is by examining this difference, and.

el,aborating Nietzsehef s thought on Christianity, moraiity and society,

that critiques of Roussearrfs philosophical system can be established..

The devel-opnent of these critiquesrwhile informing us of scrne ba.sic

Nietzschea¡r concepts, inclicates that in many respects Rousseau vas

revised. rather than refuted.. Both agree that establ-ished. religion is

a force in ar¡d of society that should be overccrne, arid. both appeaf to

the power of the individual to reject the self-rLegating practice of

total deference to an extra-terrestiaL authority. The significent

difference consists in Rousseaurs continuing attachment to his personal

Christianity, since, for Nietzsche, the ability to create onels own

moral- concluct rests entiy,eZy vithin the ind.ividualrs "will to powerr't

and. he rejects any reasoned I'prooftr of the existence of god.. As a

stylistic convenience, Nietzsche often presents Rousseau in caricatr.rre,

to express general vievs about ma¡r and. societl." 0n the other hand.,

such caricatures bear l-ittle rel-ation to Rousseauts actual position at

times. On one particular issue of central- importance in Rousseaurs

thought - the state of nature a¡d natural man - Nietzsche misunclerstands,

or at l-east equivocates on¡ +,he so-cal-led. Rousseauian ttReturn to Naturer"

only to produce a d.ual,istic conception of man a.s he is and man in society

that ha-s a striking ressnblance to Rousseaurs own notion. And. as a

l-. L'it rI , 1".t

a

T3

critjc of contenrporarXr society, it is ironic that Níetzsche, re¿çar.c1ec1

as a nineteenth century Rousseau, should castigate him as L|ne ex,eatoy'

of nod-crn *u¡l.f

1. 'Ihe Death of God.

There is rnore tha¡r a passing sinilari.ty betveen Roussesurs

examination of the spirituality of m¿.-n and Nietzschef s d.iseussion on

the same +-opic. As pointed. out in chapter rr, Rousseau set out to

defi"ne those quaì-it ies cf ma"n that d.ifferenti.abed him frc¡r mere animals,

and. ena'bled hin to i.nrpose an ord.er on nature. Nietzsche ad.opts the

sanie plincipal point of cLeparture try the assertion that a sensationalist

approach al-one is capabre of prod.ucing basic t¡uths about the çorld-.

Al-1 creclibility, al--l good, conscience o d_1 evi<lenee of t:rrthccrne onþ frcrn the Eenses. ?-

This l-ed him to the conclusion that only by reference to the individual

courd the universe be explainecì". This is very much in the manner of

Rousseau, but Niet;lsche attributes this rliscoverlr to Kant and

Slchopenhauer, vh.o

1,

.... have authoritatively rejec'bed" sciencefs claim touniversaL vaU-dity and" to the attaínment of universal 6çoa1sand expJ-oded for the first tirne the belief that man may ptumbthe universe by means of the law of ceusqli,oÌ. 3

'Ihe first of the folJ-owing opinions vas vritten s, yea,r beforeNietzschets death in t9@. Ttre second. is circa I9l+I. "WhetherNietzsche is only a meteor, or whether it ib correct to regard.him as the Rousseau of our time, is a question which the f\rturemust sett.l-e"'r E. Ad.ickes, ttGerman Philosophical- Lite::ature duringthe Years 1896-98," T'ke PhiLosophíc¿tL Reuíeu), yol-. VIII, No. 3(l4sJ lB99), p" 2Bl+. "A$ a critic of the existing worlcl, Nietzschewas to the nineteenth century vhat Rousseau harl been to theeighteenth. lle is a Rousseau in reverse: a lìoì.rsseau, because ofhis equally penetrating criticism of European civilization, and. inl:everse, because his r:ritical stand"e¡d.s are the exact opposíte ofRoussearrf s icleal- of man.t' KarJ. L'ór+ith, Fran HegeL to Nt)etzsehe"(Tra¡rs. D. E. Green) Cons-bable (Lond.on l96r), p. 260.

2. BGE' , l-3li.

BT, p. l-LL. "The reverse sicie of Nietzschef s insight into theProþesta¡rtism of Gerrnan philoeophy r*¡a-s his c¿uick eye for thephiÌ.osophical atheism of phiì-osophy, but only half vay, oo thatit rernained. hal-f theotogy and half philosophy." Lö,with, ep. e'ít;.,p' 3Tl.

)a

a

Tll

llhus the epistemological- individual-ism inherent in the initiaLstress on Loekean sensational-ism is offset by Nietzschetsran¿ before

him Roirsseaur s, rejectio¡r of empiricist scientific claims. Of ec¡rral

methodologicaÌ significance is the irnportence Nietzsche attaches tothe existence ancl, lunctiorr of a human tnilL. Unl,ike Rousseau, however,

Nietzsche does not postulate wil-l- as a separate faculty or an ad.d.itional-

abiJ-ity that stmctures furtherbheoretical- conclusions about the

existence of god. fnstead. of wil-.L a^s a spiritual- capacity of free agency,

Nietzsche tied the concept of wil-l firstly to sensation and. seconrtþ to

thought, ' ,

'rhird, the vill is not onþ a conprex of sensation and. thinking,but above al-t. it is an af fect, and- specifical\y the affect ofcdLnend. That r+hich is terrned- "freed.on of the will-tr is essentiallythe affect of superiority in rel_ation to who must obey: "I a¡nfree, rhet rnust obey" - this consciousness is inherent in everyv¡itt .... A ma¡r vho aiLLa cornmand.s scmething wíttrin himself thatrenders obed.ience, or that he bel-ieves rend.ers obed.ience. l-

Ab thi.s point, Itlietzschers divergence frcrn Rousseau is funclamental .

Roussearr had hel-d that it !¡as mants abil-ity to virr freeJ_y which red

him to the concl-usion that such a sublime facuÌty coul-d. onty exist by

v-irtue of a supreme Being. certainþ, man hacl gone into himself to

d.iscover such a truth, but that truth l-ed. him outsid.e himself once againo

in the belief that his value as e huma¡ was at least ir pa"'b due to a

personal god. But Nietzsche, by insísting that wil-l coulcl onþ be

regarded as the affect of a complex of entirery hu¡ran facufties -sensation in particufar - overuled. the neecL to posturate a god..

1. BGt:, 19. "Nietzsche brames Rousseau for introd.ucing into ourculture a dangerous principJ-e of subjective illogicality r^rhichit coul-d. not bear, for cultivating tsentimentrt r¿hich, thoughitseif healthy, ì-ed to revolution a¡rd. ronanticism. But hisargr,ments a¿çainst Rousseau eppÌy largely to himself too, s,s hehad aJready half-ad¡nitted. For his otrn vier¡ is just as rirrational ,rhis own emphasis on instinct and. will- a¡rd, the u¡knowabJ-e problematicinaiviauaf personality is .just as marked. as Rousseauts, and. his owninsi¡;tence on the human vill- is ecrnparable to Rousseauf s on thrunarrnaturer.rr w. D. Wil-lis¡ns, Nietzsehe øtd the Fyeneå, Basil Blackvelt( oxfor.rl l-grz) , p. J29.

a

T'God. is a conjecture; but f desire that your conjeetures be

Ìiniited. by what is thinkabl-e. Coul-d yau think a god? But thisis r¿hat the will- to truth should. mean to you: that everythingbe changed into what is thinkabl-e for man, visible for malr,feelabJ-e by man. You shoul-d. think through your crern senses totheir consequences. 1

'Ihat Nietzsche re-ord.ered scrne basic Rousseauian propositions has

important implicatì.ons for the u¡d.erstand.ing of the thought of both men.

Rousseau can be regarded as anticipating the d.eath of god. ( in the

conjectural- sense of a gocì) , but at the l-ast instant withclrawing frorn

this realisation. In this case, Rousseau d.eserves some measure of

praise fron Nietzsche for at least containing the lger:n of trutht.

Grad.uaJ,ly it has beccrne cl-ear to me vhat every philosophy sofar has been:.name\r, the personal confession of its author a¡rda kind. of involuntary ancl unconscious memoir; also that themoral- ( or irunoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted. thereel- gèrm of life from which the plant had grcrwn. 2

The rreal germ of tru'bht l-ies in Rousseaurs belief that man d.oes

create much of his moral- conduct, that he al-one is responsibl-e for his

gooct and his evil-, and. that the 'tmoral-itytt governing ì.nter-relationships

in a cormpt society prohibits man frcm attaining his true potential.

For Nietzsche, these insights ar+aken man to his intrinsic ability to

be master of his existence, and. point up the temporary and provisional

nature of any conception of a social- rnoraJ-ity. However, Rousseau

backs away frcrn vhat are, in Nietzschers opinionr logicaÌ extensions of

these notions by postulating a Supreme Being - a¡ admì ssion of r¡eakness

on the part of Rousseau as r+el-l- as an urn¡arranted nystification. Nietzsche

antagonism to mystification shoul-d. not be seen in the conte*t of "rry

d.esire for truth or trust in logic, but in the context of the cultural

significanee that this or that n,ystification may have. Here Nrietzsche

d.ifferentiates betr¡een a myth that is of central significance to a people,

and a nlystification that onJ-y serves to hind.er the d.evelopment of a

society.

1o TSZ, p. l9B.

2. jffi, 6.

a

T6

Yet every cul-ture thab has l-ost its nlyth has lost, by thesa¡ae token, its natural, heaÌthy creativity. Onty a horizonringed. about with myths carr unif} a cul-ture. I

Rousseaurs gd d.oes not qualiflr as a r¡yth on the grounds that he

d.id. not propose a god either prinariì-y or solely as a cultural entity,

or a provisional social- bel-ief convenient in a unifying role and.

valuabl-e to both inclivid.ual and society. Rousseaurs firnd.amental belief

is that the ratiocinated, existence of the Supreme Being should. not only

be incorporated. into individ.ual- and. social- behaviour, but shou-l-d, provid.e

the principal- structures of our und.erstanding of the true nature of man.

Nietzsche rejects the notion that man has any responsibility to a god.,

even if that goci were to be the creator of l-ife itself.

There is no being that coul-d. be held. responsible for the factthat anyone exists at al-I , that ar\yone was born in certaincircumstances, in a certain environment. - It is a tremend.ousrestorative that such a being is lacking. 2

This view, whiJ-e it brings into serious c¡uestion Rousseauts religious,

and. therefore poÌiticaL, concfusions, does not conflict with the basic

notion that it is man much more ',han a god who is the subject of

exanination in Rousseaurs thought. On this account, Rousseau has

el-ucid.ated the psychotogical preclispositions of man for ccrrplete self-

mastery, a-nd. decided that there is a gcxl who has made everything possible.

For Nietzsche, this is proof of e¡r internal contradiction, for it is

man who detennines the posers of a supposed.ly mnipotent god, prescritres

his sphere of influence, and. then man hold.s that it is suclt a gotl that

(for Rous;seau) provid,es the basis of meaning.

Man, raised to titanic proportions, conquers his owncivilization and. ccrnpels the god.s to join forees with hin, sinceby his autoncrnous wisd.crn he ccmrnand.s both their existence and. thelimitations of their sway. 3

1. B'I , þ. 136 .

2. htP, T 6r .

3. BT, p. 62.

a

7B

t'whither is God" he cried. ttI shall terl you. We hauek¿L'lÊd hím - you and I. Al-l- of us a.re his murd.erers ø...God is clead.. God remains d.ead, Ðd we have kiIIed. hirn.

.... This deed. is still more diste¡rt frcrn then than the mostdistant stars - aruL yet theg haue done it themseLues. 1

It is at this point that Nietzsche dsnonstrates the limitations of

Rousseaurs thought. 0n the one hand. ve have seen hov Rousseau writes

of the individuaÌ as having the alrescme power to create huma¡r morality,

but on the other hand he retreats, not to established. religion, but to

ê persona-ì- Christian bel-ief system. fn this respect, Rousseau is art

example of one rnrho d.oes not realise the implication of his own d.eed -

he is stiLl- too d,istant frcrn it - and, much to Nietzschers d.ismay,

Rousseau d.enies manrs ulique humenness.

Frcrn the start , the Christian fa-ith is a sacrifice: asacrifice of all freed.crn, all pritle, all sel-f-confid.ence ofthe spirit; at the same time, enslavement and. selfztockery,self-rnutilation. 2

As far as Nietzsche is concerned., Rousseau ty¡rifies thinkers that have

rsacrificed.r the most subl-ime features of human existence, and who have

constrr.¡"cted. a State and. society in accordance vith a d.estructive and.

self-negating faith. Rousseau is only the most recent example of a

tend.ency that stretches into antiquity.

And since Pl-ato, all theologians and phiJ-osophers are on thesane track - that is, in moral mat'bers it has so far been in^stinct,or what the Christiar¡s cafltrfaithntt o"ttthe herdrtt u" r put it,that has triumphed. 3

l_. Gg, r2r.

2. BGE , I+6.

3. fbid., ]r92. "Error is spread, unnecessarily when moral d.octrines,vhich are vitiated" by personal bias or a conprcnise with Stateor Church, &re al-l-oved. to becone the ba-sis for netaphysical orepistemological- consid.erations.tt walter KaufÌrann, Nietzsche,3rd. Edition, Princeton U.P. (Princeton 1968), p. 85.

t

79

Rousseau, hovever, s€lw his d.octrine as a.n attack on a mora115i

bankrupt society that degrad.ed. manf s true ne,ture. To him, it w€xi ar¡

il-l--conceived. social- stmcture that rna.de evil- (of ria¡lrs creation)

d.crninate human inter-rel-ationships.f Thus vhile he attacked.

contemporery social- mal , he bel-ieved that in a tmly moral social- ord.er,

forrrafised into a poJ-iticaJ- State, man vouLd be as good s,s godts

creativity mad.e possible, and. be simiLarly t'tr-ue to himsel-f ."2 But

for Nietzsche, this was at best a-rl error, amd at vorst a trick.

The d.efense of provid.ence by Roussear-r ...o he needed God.in ord.er to be abl-e to cast a curse upon society a¡rd civil-ization;everything had to be good in itsel-f because God. had created it;only møt has cottupted men. The ttgood. me:r" as the natural manr.ras pure fnntasy; but vittr the dogma of Godrs authorship it seemed.probable and. wel-l--found.ed.. 3

2. Rousseau ancl the Nineteenbh Century

Nietzschers suggestion that Rousseau regard.ed. man as naturalJ.y goocl

r¿ilt be deal-t vith in detail shortly. Of interest here is the "curse"

that Rousseau vas supposed. to have J-aid" upon society - the conception

that it is the social and poì-iticat gnvi.ronment that is the source of

aLl- human oppression, frustration anci injustice. F\¡rther, Nietzsche

impl-ies that Rousseau bequeathed such a notion to political theory,

thus affecting civil-isation, present and. future.

fn Rousseaurs thought, the roLe of na¡¡kind, is paramount vith equal

corrsistency both in the critiques of society and in the progranmes for

refort. It is me¡rkind that must take responsj-bility for creating evil

institutions, and then must act to correct its own past abuses by

instigating a Republic,ttnot merely an aristocracy or a democracy, but

l-. "Rousseau, in fact, shares an outrage against the moral developrrentsof his d.ay; he understand.s al-so that moraJ-ity is conterm.inous witha ccrnrnunity and, that moral- principLes d.o not transcend. the group.ttTracy B. Strong , Friedrich Níetzsche øtd 'bhe PoLítíee of Tnøts-figuz'atïon, CaLifornia U.P. (Berke\y IgTr) r Ep. 1l-l--II2.

2. Emile, p. 2\7.

3. t/P, foo.

a

8o

generally eny government d.irecred. by the general- will-, vhich is the

l-aw."f SimiJ-arJ-y, Rousseauts dernand.s for equality antt Liberty are

made in the context of the jud.gment that on\r man has corrupted. men,

and. its corolIary, that man may be improved by his ow-n efforts. Should.

mankind foLLow the generaL vil-Ì, then the Iar.¡s it makes coufd in no way

d.eny ar¡r single menber his freedcm, nor could it d,ifferentiate between

members unfair\r.

.... lrhen the whole people decrees for the vhole people, itis consid.ering only itself; a.nd if a relation is then fonned., itis between two aspects of the entire object, without there beingany division of the vhole, 2

The populerr sovereigny inherent in this view, enilorsed- equally but

interpreted. d,ifferent\y by liberal--d.emocratic and. ccrnnunitarian thought,

constitutes a persuasive argurnent for at fea.st the reform of any

political society that denies organic involvement in the lav-making

processes. While it is not suggested. that Rousseau precipitated. specific

political- d.emend.s along these fines, his thought clearþ is consistent

vith sc¡ne of the clai¡rs of the French revolutionaries - a point not lost

on Nietzsche.

Iþgte, Rousseau, even in t'he Revohrtion itself : the lattervas the historical expression of the hybrid. of itlealist and.ccmqiLLe. The bloody farce vhich this Revol-ution ultinately becane,its 'rimmoralityr" concerns me but slight\y; vhat I loathe howeveris its Roussean¡esqtue mor.al¿tu - the so-callerl. fttruthsft of theReyolution, by means of vhich it stil-l exercises power and- d'rawsal-l flat e¡rd med-iocre things over to its sid.e. Ttre doctrine ofequalityl .... But there is nomore deadþ poison than this; forit seems to proceed fron the very lips of justice, vherea.s inreality it d.ral¡s the curtain d.owr on al-I justice. 3

Tt¡is is e ccrnpl-ete inversion of the analysis usus-lþ assoeiated.

with Rousseau anil the French Revolution. fnstead of d.efend.ing or attacking

r. sc, rr, 6. '

2. rbid.

3. Tr' l+B (r,evY) .

o

Br

Rousseau on the basis of the extent of his responsibil-ity for thettbfood.y faïcett of the Jacobin Reign of Terror, in place of en assessment

of the reLative irnportance of Marat and. Robespierre quoting the SoeiaL

contraet, or the significarrce of the civit cel-ebration of a supremel

Being r- Nietzsche criticises the still- popularJ-y-hetcl justifications

for such a revol-ution - ì-iberty, equal-ity and. justice. euite against

the assumption that Rousse&u was correct to concern hirnself r¡ith the

a¡nel-ioration of the econcrnic and. political real-ities as they affected

the poor, Nietzsche chal-lenges the uoy,th of the ttRouseeauesque moralityrt'

that liberbyn ,justice and. equaJ-ity vourd naterially or spirituarry

improve either man or society.

Nietzschers questioning of these Rousseauia¡ concepts and.

. assumptions is of fund.a¡nental significance to our understand.ing of the

rel-ationship betveen the two thinkers, and our exanination vill cover

three broad. areas of particular interest - return to nature, norrna,l

norality, and nessentimen'b.

3. Nietzsche on the Return to Nature

Although Rousseau never used. the tera, Nietzsche more than once

attributes to him a d.esire torrreturn to nature.tr Trris is a prime

example of a Nietzschian caricature of Rousseau, representing e clifficult

point about the nature of man that both ptrilosophers wish to put in

essentialJ-y the sa¡ne tenns. In the ùLscourse on fnequality, Rousseau

paints sn idyl-lic but hypotheticaJ- picture of man in the state of

.tatute.2 NaturaL man, in this sense, is the pre-social, pre-moraf men-

1. Sir Gavin de Beer , JeørJacques Rousseau ard. nís Woz.l.d, ThqnasHudson (London LgTz) ¡ pp. I'f, Ì13f1.

Just as Rousseau criticised his pred-ecessors on this point(q,u., p. 33) , so too d.oes Nietzsche. "OriginaL ercor of thephiLosophen. AII phil-osophers share this ccrrmon( error: theyproceed. frcrn contemporary man and think they can reach theirgoal 'bhrough an analysis of bhis man.tt HM, 2.

)

a

8z

animal that has a"s yet und.eveJ-opecì. potentialities for a higher form of

life. Such a natural state of harmony s¡d innocence ceases to exist

with ttre irrcreasing ccmplexity of natural ma¡rrs existence üis-æü1:s

other natural men, at which point social rel-ations begin to form, anil

marr becmes charrged. irrevocably into a moral and. social being,

l,Iith this, Nietzsche has no fund.amental- d,isagreerrent, but d.oes not

acknowl-ed.ge that for Rousseau, too, the original cond.ition of man is

not so benign as might first appear. Rousseau points out the danger and

hard.ships of the state of nature as he sees it rl "ha"r"terising it as

Itharrnoniousttonly to the extent that the natural state persists in

essentially the same forrn over time.2 Of more importarrce is Nietzschers

fulL end.orsement of Rousseauts notion of a pre-moral epoch of ma¡rkind..

During the largest part of hu¡ran history - sæcaIl-ed. pre-historical- ti¡res - the val-ue or d.isvalue of an action wasderived frcrn its consequences. The action itself vas consid.ered.as l-itbl-e as its origin "... Let us call this perid. tTte pr,e-tnoraL perioa of mankind.: the imperative ttknow thyselflt' l'as a-g

yet unknol-n.

In the l-ast ten thousa¡rd, years, however, one ha-s reached.the point vhere it is no longer the conseguences but the originof an action that one al-lovs to d.ecid.e its vaIue. 3

For both Rousseau and" Nietzsche, then, the prehistorical period -

when no valuations or jud.gnents vere made before the consequences of

eny event - is a |tnaturaltr condition that has ceased, to exist. Reflecting

his interest in the d.evelo¡ment of man into the moral ancl social being

to be found. in Rousseaurs works, Nietzsche sees that the evolved. system

of valuation presupposes an active metaphysical content in me¡ that

va^s previously absent - of great significance since trit involves the

1. OI , p. l+8.

2. "The face of nature beccrnes ind.ifferent to him as it grows fa¡niliarto hin. He sees in it aÌways the same orrler, the sane successions:he ha.s not understand.ing enough to r¡onder at the greatest miracles:nor is it in tris mind that we can expect to find ttrat philosophyma¡r need"s, if he is to know how to notice for once what he seesevery d.By.tt Or , p. j6.

3. IIGE , 32.

a

83

first atternpt at seLf-knovledge."l fhus Nietzsche traverses the

central issues in Rousseauls thought. As we have seen, Rousseaurs

recognition of man in a. pre-moral- state and. the slow d.evelolment

tor.¡ards a sel-f-regarding being prohibit the imposition of a moraL

i:nperative on man, that man should revert to o, naturaÌ state. HBd.

Rousseau used. the termtrreturn to naturertt it would. have referred.

to the DeJ-phic inscription t'know thyselfr" such that man might live

according to his recently aequired. soeial nature.

The image that Rousseau uses is of the statue of Gl-aucus a€i marrrs

nature. overl-a.id successive\y by the deposits of civitisation, giving

rise to tlie need. to peel away the incnrstations of corrupt society'bo

reveal the true nature of man.2 t¡ietzsche is correct j-n saying that

there can never be a return to nature, in the Rcmantic sense of the r¿ord

nature, but this can be seen as a criticism of Rousseau only if we accept

Nietzschets caricature of him.

i. "Return to naturetr u¡d.erstood more and. more d.ecisively in,theopposite sense of Rousse&uts. Æ'tq fz,on idgL Øtd opena!

2. more and. more decisiveþ anti-iAeaListic, more concrete, morefearl-ess, incì.ustrious, mod.erate, suspicious against sud.denchanges, anti-revolutionary .... 3

The second part of this quotation ind.icates that Nietzsche saw

Rousseau as the d.estroyer of order e¡rd. an incipient revolutiorr"rar.[

Ttris is alrnost certainly an overstatement, given the rel-ative lack of

importance of Rousseau to the French Bevolution, aniL that he becane

increasingly d.isinterested. in the overt poJ.iticat activities of the

phiLosophes. Nevertheless, it is clear that Nietzsche abhorred. any

l. rb¿d.

2. 0f, p. 38.

3. WP,1r7.

r'llietzsche sees Rousseau alvays as the real cause of the Revolution,and this he never forgives. ft is truer to say that Voltaire wasthe cleterminative force in the creation of the revol-utionaryatmosphere than that Rousseau 'nras.tt Willia¡rs, p. 6l+ nJ-.

l+

Bl+

philosophy that implied. a reversion to earl.ier states in the clevelopment

of ma¡r. l,ike Rousseau, he did not befieve that there was anything i-n

the past tlrat can either be rega-ined., or that d.oes not exist vithin man

in the present.

/Vol. rrreturn to naturett - îor therehunanity. The scholasticisn of un- a¡rd.

the ru1e, is the beginning; mân reachesstruggl-e - he never trreturns" - Nature;l-ike nature. I

never ha.s been a naturaløtti-natura1 values isnature only after a l-ongi.e., d.aring to be inrnore-L

a

Nietzschef s use of the worcl t'naturerr in several senses here

juxtaposes a ccrnplex variety of positions. Irirst, he reiterates the

impossibility of returning to t-ine sa.tÐage nature of Rousseaurs d"escription.

implying that such t'natural" "humanity" is a contraÅ.íeti in adjecto. In

this case, "nâ.turettis prehistory. Second, Nietzsche charact,erises the

rise of ancl preoccupation with va.l-ues as both unnaturaf a¡rd a¡rti-natural.

It is unnatural- insofar as mora.l- consid.erations are exclusive of nature,

and. anti-naturaf because, as Fousseau also pointed out, the increasing

influence of noral vafuations eventually d.estroys the naturaf state.

This antagonism, however, is only the beginning of the process by vhich

man "reaches nature,t' in the third. sense. T?ris time, nature is hrunanity,

the developeð. sociq.L nature. The fourth conception is of ttNaturertt the

regulative mecha¡risms overseeing the operation of the material vorltl,

and beyond any moraf assessment. The non-judgmental attitud.e toward

this definition of nature is that which Nietzsche wished. to foster in

mants unci.erstancling of his t'nat:ural-" activity.

Ctearly, this conception of man at a postrnoral stage of develognent

goes

L.

far beyond. Rousseauls thought. Hovever, Rousseau d-oes highJ-ight

W: l_20. ttRousseaurs d.ionysiac return to nature, his moral pathos,and. his aband-orment to the el-emental forces vhich make revolutionsand may ruin states - these vere the traits vhich constituted. thevery dangers of Nietzschers or.¡'¡ temperament a¡d. phitosophy. Hence,he general-ly revitec1 Rousseau." Kauflnann, Op. eit. , p. 1l+2. Tttismay suffice €rs Bn eeplanation of Nietzschers vitification ofRousseau, but it is in terms of Nietzschers philosophy, and.-doesnot relate to Rousseaurs. The above ps.sssge, w¡itten in tBB5, isa good exomple of l,lietzschers own viev¡ that his earlier works mustbe und.erstood. so that meaning can be extracted. frcrn later pieces.It also affects Ìris econcr\y of expression that ha-s close affinitywith ssne of }ìor¡sseauts stunning parad-oxes.

a

B5

an issue that Nietzsche must adcLress also. For Rousseau, there is a

fundamental- d-ichotcrny between man as he nj.ght , ind.eed , oughl; to be, and.

man as he is in a cor¡rrpt soci.ty.f To go into the seff to d.iscover

onels trle nature, therefore, is not a return but a progression toward.

a real-isation ancl knovledge of oners highest capdci'bies, a position that

Nietzsche appears to end.orse.

![hen one speaks of humøtity, the idea is fund.amental thatthis is scmething vhich distinguishes man frcn nature. In reality,hovever, there is no such separation: t'naturaltt clualities and-those caJ-l-ed truþ t'huma.n" are inseparabl-y grown together. Man,in his highest and. noblest capacities, is whol\y nature erìd embod.iesits uncanny d.uaì- character. 2

Tkris coulcl indeed. constitute a defence of Rousseau?s argument concerning

humar nature, since Nietzsche points out that the social nature of man,

his hunanity, owes its el-emental- structure to prehistorical- nature, md

is augmented by the acctruisition of qual-ities that are d.efinitional-þlunnaturalI and ta¡ti-naturafr, but must inevitatrty be pre-selected, by

martrs original clisposition. Thus both Rousseau and. Nietzsche look to

manrs behaviour being brought into conformity with his t'n&tuïs'1 " sel-f ,

without at the same time pr'oposing a retreat frcn mod,ern socialised

existenci: "

Were Nietzsche to foLl"ow Rousseaur s method.ological approach, at

this point, one would expect to finrl a d.iscussion of ma.n as ttwholly

nature rtt followed by prescriptions for society that voul-d be in

accord-ance with the ccurpl"ementarity of hl.man and. natural qualities. This

is not the case, however. ft wilt be recal-l-ed. that Rousseau emphasised.

1. tt.,.. it is certain that man has not ccrne close to that t'naturettof whj-ch Roussea.t speaks but has progressed. another step incivil-ization, whieh Rousseau abhorred.tt W, 120"

Ilomev,ts Contest, p. 32. "Like most opponents of Rousseau in thenineteenth century, Nietzschets thought follows purely Rousseauisticpatterns ; the text starts r"'i bh a contrasting parallel betrnreennature and. cr"rlture that stems directly frorr the Second Díseouu,seon the Origins of fnequaLifu. The restlessness of human society,in contrast to the piacid state of nature, of the animal hercl, isd.iagnosed ¿ì.s marrs inability to forget the past.rt PauJ. de Man,Blindness øt<7 I'nsighL, Oxford. U.P. (New York 1971) , p. th6"

D

a

86

manrs free agency, his norality, ancÌ sense of justice creating a d.emarrd

for a society ensuring liberty and. equal-ity. Nietzsche regard.s these

concepts as rraffectsrr of man in a particu-l-ar society, and not as intrinsic'l

quatities.* fn place of a seriation of human characteristics, Nietzsche

proposes one basic psychotogica-I drive - the will to power.

For example, r.rhereas Rousseau d.escribes self-preservation as one

of t'the first end. most simple operations of the human soul-r"2 and. as

part of human na.ture that is fundamentaJ- a¡rd. uncha.nging, Nietzsche regards

this as mereJ-y a"rr expression of sonething far more basic, that refates

neither to species nor socialisation.

A living thing above al-l- seeks to d.ischarge its strength -l-ife itself is uiLL to paner; seJ-f-preservation is onþ one ofthe indirect ar¡d. most frequent z,esuLts. 3

By red.ucing alJ- affects of huma¡ behaviour to this single d.rive,

Nietzsche rejects especiall-y the phiLosophies of Hobbes a¡¡d. Locke, In

relying on the principle of self-preservation to construct societies,

they, as empiricists should., speak only of vhat man dæs, a¡rd. not what

ma¡r is. The will- to power concept, however, answers the essentialist

question (in terrns of this drive), md is therefore capable of expl-aining

the first - nameþ, resultent actions. ff man is r¡ill to pover, ancl

seeks to discharge his strength, it is impJ-icit that he wil-l not always

neet vith success, md that the resul-ta¡.t human activity wil-l reflect

the inevitabLe frustration a¡d. d.iversion of this basic clrive - in effect,

subl-irnation, as Nietzsche coined. it, vill o""rr".\

l. q.ú., Bæ, 13n.

2. 0f , p. \1. I'he other is ccrrpassion. For Rousseau, both preced.ereason. l'or Nietzsche, these ttoperations" are affectations oraffects d.eveloped. by the man &s he beccrnes socialisetl .

3. BGE , .L3.

\. qffi, tB9.

a

BT

Nietzsche thus conmits himself to a critique of society based. on

a Rousseauesque dichotcur¡r of true and. fal-se ""1-.r.".f simirarly, it is

the constitution of contemporaneous society that must bear the

responsibil-ity for perpetuating this unfortunate dual-ism. lhe aspect

of cul-ture, of civilisation, that is strong enough to perwerb the

individua,l-ts vill to power is the moraJity that is d.cminant at arqy

particul-ar time. Thus Nietzsche speaks of

.... üora.lity ... . the feeting for the whole quintessence ofmores und-er vhich one lives and. has been brought up - brought upnot as an individuaJ- but as a member of the whol_e, as a d.igit ofthe najority. - Thus it happens constantly that a¡r indirrj.d.ual-brings to bear upon himseJ-f, by mearìs of his moral-ity, the tyrannyof the majority. 2

l+. "Nornal" Morality

Such a conception of noral-ity becomes a very po^rerl\rJ- anatytico.l

tool , since it can be extend.ed to encornp&ss an explanati.on for obligation

to a society ancÌ political system, consensus, resistance to change

outside traciitional- for:ns, and. the socialisation of every ind.ividual,

Significantly, Nietzsche refers to the "tyrerrny of the majoritytt without

inp.lying that the individ.ual is helpless against a power vielded. by the

mass of people. 0n the contlary, and in a d.epartr¡re from Rousseaurs vier+

of an overtly repressive society, Nietzsche makes the individual

ul-timately resÞonsibfe for accepting or rejecting the rnorality of the

majority. For Nietzsche, it is not merely the structuraL viol-ence of

society that restricts individual- expression, but the principal- assumptions

underlying the particular moral-ity perpetuating that society,

l-. Kauflnann has pointed. out tl-ra'b such a dichotorny exists. ttThe

dichotomy of the two selveso an enpirical sel-f and a ttrue selfrrreappears in Nietzschels account of nature: nature has a purposebut carries; it out inefficientl-y and requires our aid.. This du¿rlismis mitigated by the conception of cul-ture as a¡other an<i. transfiguredphysis ....,, Kautnann, op. cit., p. l5O. Ilowever, the d.istinctiorrd-rawn betveen nature a¡d man seems to be a fal-se one. It is notan inefficient nature bhat need,s our aid, but inefficient, pliableman that rectruires the cliscipline, the harshness and. ttinrnora.lityilof ldature.

2. MM, Bg.

t

B8

It may be observed. that Nietzschers critique of current morality

for its d.ebilitating effeet on man is rerriniscent of Rousseaurs first

tvo ùiseouraes. Hor¿ever, while Rousseau still- l-ooks to a valid and.

high moral stanclard. in ord.er to prod.uce virtuous behaviour in ind.ivid.ual-

and sociaf man, Nietzsche questions the uorth of ¡norality to society.

In Kathryn Parsonrs opinion, Nietzschers approach to morality here

satisfies the Kuhnian methodological cond.itions of the "no::rna1 sciencert't

paradign.* As Kuhn r^¡as to do with science, Nietzsche does vith morality,

assessing rather than accepting the conventionaL meanings of the supposed.Iy

clear-cut terms, in this case, "mora.ltt and. t'immor&l ,"

Being moral.. or ethical- means obeying ancient established. Iavor custqn . .. . "Good.t' is what one cal-fs those who d.o what ismoral as if they did. it Uy nature, afber long hered.ity - ....

Being evil is "not mora.Ztt (immoral), practising irnmorality,resisting tradition, hovever reasonable or stupia tra¿ition maybe .. .. Now every tradition becqnes ever more venerable the morermote its origins are and, the more they have been forgotten;the veneration shown it is accunulated., generabion upon generation;finally, the tradition beccrnes holy and. inspires reverence .... 2

The wid.esp:lead social acceptance of moraL valuations, then, has

l-ittl-e to do with the explanatory or utilitarian depth of word,s l-ike

good. and- evil (or Ua¿) .3 Thus, the very use of value-l-ad.en worcls entraps

the morafist (Rousseau, for exampJ-e) in the I'nottnaf moratity" paradigm,

r.¡ith ttre resuft ihat aqy social criti-que and. associateilrsolutionr will

be as lirnited. a,s the originat moral-istic premises. In.Nietzschers

opinion, alJ- philosophers, especial-ly Rousseau and Kant after him, had

l-. e.1).¡ Kathryn Pyne Parsons, ttNietzsche and Moral Changertt itNietzsche: A CoLlecti.on of CríticaL Essqs, Robert C. Solonør (n¿.),Anchor Books, Mod.ern Stud.ies in Philosophy (Nev York I9T3) r PPol:69 rr.

2. HM, 96.

Nietzsche uses these tvo sets of terts - good and eviL or good. andbad. - vhen he d.iscusses sl-ave and master morality respectiveþ, inord.er to show, once again, that moral veluations d.o not owe theirmeaning to a transcendent being or to spiritual qualities. Rather,they are tied to the group which d.ravs benefit frcrn such val-uations"

3.

o

Bq

accepted, the precepts of "norrnal" moral-ity, faiJ-ed. to qrrestion their

origins sufficiently, and. tried. to raise rnorality to the level of arr

organising principl-e of society, rather than seeing morality as mere\y

an affect of that society. The moral-ity of the generaL lril-l- in Rousseauf s

State d.id. not refl-ect the actual- nature of man, because he nistook trei.itiorfor tr'.rth, .:-llcl inferred that morality vas to be a kind. of social eement.

Karìb' on the other hand, postulates categorical imperatives on moral

bases that themsel-ves have no substance. In both cases, these phiJ-osophies

rrhich are intend-ed. to enhence a moral vorl-d. ord.er onþ advance the interests

that particul-ar morality serrres.

How the traclition or+ginated is indifferent; in any case itr+as vithout any regarcl for good" a¡d evil or any i¡m.anent categoricalimperative, but sbove al-I in ord,er to preserve a eoïrlrurnity, a people.... l

Therefore, just ".* ttnorrnal sciencetr protects the scientific

establishment frccn ttnon-scientific" criticism, so does t'norrnaltt morality

provicl.e a set of val-uations that cannot function as tools of criticalanalysis upon that moraJ-ity. This concerns Nietzsche because the

ccrnmunity protects itself by imposing its set of ttmoraltt val-uations upon

irdioiduaZs, whose attempts to "d.ischarge their strength" and. realise

their r"¡ill- to pover are frustrated.. But the wil-l to pos¡er, since it is

ft¡nd.anental- and. must continue to operate, respond,s defensively and.

"ggressiveJ-y to the pressures that social- morality is able to exert.

In tenns of the reactions that are typical of inctivid.uals respond.ing

to society, Nietzschets d.escriptions are very simil-ar to Rousseaurs.

corrupt a,nd farse social rerations, for Rousseau, were the result of a

d-eveJ-oped social existence that had gradualþ ceased. to be contiguous

vith rna¡l!s true rnoral nature, vhereas for Nietzsche, it was manrs will

to power attenpting to realise itself uncLer ad.verse conditions that

brought forth unsatisfactory modes of behaviour. Although the two thinkers

1. HAH,96.

a

9O

d.escribe the camsal factors in d.ifferent terrns, they both hightight the

dichotcmy betveen being and. appearance, a-s is ind.icated. by Nietzschers

use of terminol-ogy that is evocative of Rousseauts.

The intel-Lect, as B. meaJls for the preservation of the individual ,unfofds its chief povers in simuJ-ation; . ... fn ma¡r this art ofsimulation reaches its peak: here deception, flattery, þing and.cheating, talking behind. the back, posing, Iiving in borrowed.splend.our, being masked., the d.isguise of convention, acting a ro-ì-ebefore others a¡rd. before oneself - in short, the constent f.l-utteringaround, the single flame of vanity is so much the ruJ-e a¡tL the lavthat almost nothing is more inconprehensible than how a¡r honestand, pure urge for truth coul-d. make its appearance among men. L

A dcrnina¡lt social moraLity, therefore, is not only responsible for

repJ-acing authentic individ.ual- expression r+ith simulation, but also

operates to maintain itself by inhibiting any questioning of both the

role of any mora^Iity, and its authority to va^ìue. Zarathustra exhorts

man to understand. rather than to submit to rnoral valuations.

Verily, I say unto you: good and. evil- that are not transitory,d.o not exist. Driven on by themselves, they must overccrne them-sel,ves again and. again. \^fith your values and. words of good. and.

evil you d.o viol-ence when you value ... . 2

In this caq€ r there are no facts about morality, iust as there are no

scientific facts. I,fan rnust always be prepared. to aecept that to value

(in moral tenns) is damaging to the self and. contributes to the falseness,

to thettnormstt of civilisation. On the other hand., there is a d.ial-ectical-

el-ement to Zarathustrars vord.s. Since ar¡r valuation that is signified.

by notions of good and evil cannot be said to exist absolutely. val-uations

can onJ-y be d.eemed. to exist in a provis:i,onal. a¡rd, transi,ent sense. This

proposition is Brnply supported. by numberless historical examples of

contradictory ttmoraì-'r jud.gments. Therefore, any moral val-uation, once

made, creates the cond.itions for its own negation - or as Nietzsche puts

it, each valuati.on vill inevitatrty be ttoverccnnet' by another, equally

temporary valuation.

l. PN, Þ. l+3. cf., AS, pp. 6, ÌB rrnd O/, pp. 86, 105.

2. TSZ, p. 228.

a

9r_

MoraJity, thenr may be treated on two important 1eve1s. First,Nietzsche d.evel-ops a critique of moraríty per se by d.emonstrating itsgeneric weeknesses. second., he is abl-e to estabtish a typoi-og¡ of

moral-ities in ord.er to make ccrnparati.ve anaþses and. assessments.

Given the sel-f-negating aspects of moral valuations that Nietzsche wishes

to emphasise, it is implicit tha'b one type of morality may be preferred-

to another. Tl¡is l-eads Parsons to a.d.opt the view that, ir tne concept

of t'nornalrt morality has a valid ex¡llanatory function, then

.... if we think in terrns of Nietzschean epistenoJ_ogy, or interms of Kuhnian parad.igms, ve bee that in science and. rnorality,it is a continued. state of revolution that expresses our hr.unarritybest. l-

Hovever, Parsonsr description of Nietzschets epistemorog¡ is only

'partíally accurate. It is true that Nietzsche proposes a rad.ical and.

ongoing critique that justifies to some extent the label- of ar?moral

revolutionarx/'." But Nietzsche is no revorutioncuxr in the sense of

vishing to produce a ttbettertr morality. on the contrary, Nietzsche

seeks the urtimate destruction of al-r morpl varuations, to the point

vhere val-ue.tions a¡re ma.d.e, trct to express ttoul: huma^nity bestrtt but on

the natural-istie principle that the vill- to power should. not be frustrated.

I reduee a principle to a fornula. Every natural_ism inmorality - that i.s, every healthy norality - is dcminated. by a¡instinct of life; scrne ccrnmandment of life is fu1filled. by ad.eterminate canon of trshalttt BJrd. ttshelt not"; scrre inhibition andhosti-le element on the path of life is thus removed.. Anti-naturaLrnoral-ity - +-hat is n aìmost every morality r+hich has so far beentaught, revered., and. preached. - turns, converselg, against t}rreinstincts of life: it is a cond.emnation of these instincts, noirsecret, now outspoken and impud.ent. 2

L Parsons , op. cit., p. J-}2. AJ-so [rP, 101 ,a.s tte. moral fanatic à Ia Rouss€&Lr.rt

for a d.eseription of Kant

2. TI" rtMoratity as Anti-Naturertt l+.

o

92

Whil-e Nietzschers use of the tenn trhealthy moralitytt seems to ind.icate

that a¡r ideal- set of moral stand.ard.s rnight exist, his quest for anti-

supernatu.ral- or anti-spiritual- naturalisms is antagonistic, l-og:ica1ly,

to ØLA moraf cod.e.t O, prime imporbance is the contrast that Nietzsche

vishes to highlight beLween types of moralities, on the ba.sis of their

effect on the instincts of life. Frcm this naturalism, a t¡ryolory of

norality emerges that ca¡r make sense of Nietzschers claim that Rousseau

vas moralJ-y mend.acirr".2

5. Ressentiment

As a critic of both the individual- and. nineteenth century socÍety,

Nietzsche characterises al-l that is und.esira'trle as the legacy of Rousseau.

It is one of Nietzschels most strident t'Nors.t'

lv$ struggle against the eighteenth centr-u-¡r of Rousseau, againsthis t'naturer" his'rgood, manr" his beLief in the dominion of feeling -agailst the softening, veakening, moralization of man: an iileal- bornof ltatred foz, æistoez'al;ie anLture, in praæi, the donination of thefeelings of unbrid.Ieð. ressenl;'iment, clevised as a banner for thestruggle (- tfre morality of guilt feeJ-ings of the Christian, themoraÌity of ressentinent a posture of the mob). 3

AJ-thou¿;h Rousseau was as highly critical of his own society e-s Nietzsche

ever l¡FIì, the forrnerrs phiJ-osophical, conclusions vere based., r:s we have

seen, on the belief in a Supreme Being and the consequentialJ-y moral

nature of man, pred.isposing him to goodness tor¿erd his fell-ows. Rousseau

fel-t this to be the true nature of social man, and he built his theory

of society upon this principle in ord.er to bring justice and. equality

to social- inter-relationships, and. hqpiness to ind.ivid.ual na¡r.I

1. 'tTlte netural, task and. utility of every virtue is systematically husheclup; it is of vnlue only vith reference T,o a diuin¿ ccrnmand., a d,ivinemod.el, onþ vith reference to heaven\y and spiritual good.s."w, 203.

2. HP, 62"

3. þß, l-o2 l.l+. Nietzsche rejects Roussealrf s pr:rsuit of "happinesgtt for maJr. "411

these rnoralities that arld.ress themselves to the in¿iviaual, for thesalie of "happiness r" as one says - vhat are they but counsels forbehaviour in rel-ation to the d.egree of døtgerouaness in which theindividual- fives with hirnself; recipes against his passions, hisgoo<1 and. bad inclinations insofar as they have the vil-I to pcrhrer

and wa¡lL to play the n¡rster ...." BGE, I9B.

o

93

Rousseauts concern for the disad.vantaged. and. the weak is d.emonstrated by

his attempt to ensure that men, t'aJ.though uneclual in strength or intellect

..., beccme equal by convention a¡rd. legal right.ttl But for Nietzsche,

any theory that seeks to LeueL, and brings aLl nen under a single rubric

ofmoral or potitical equality, is a clevaluatíon of the higher and- nobler

aspects of man, which cou1d. only be seriously desired. by those lacking

such nobl-e capacities.

'Ihis is the mea¡ing of I'lietzschets criticism of a Tessentíment

expanded. into a morality. Ressentiment, the reaction against adverse

or d-ifficuft conclitions of l-ife which is acccnpanied by a red.efinition

of those conditions as "evilrrt is a posture ad.opted. by those that cannot

accept that suffering must remain as a part of Life.2 For Nietzsche, the

inat'ility to hand.l-e the harsher real-ities of life means that rrweakness

is being Lj-ed. into scraething meritotiou,s by "men of z,essen'b'ítnent.'t

tWe good. men - üe æe the just'- what they desire they calJ-,not retaliation, but rthe triumph of justice'; what they hate isnot ùheir eneÍ\y, nol they hate t injr:,stice ,

t they hate I god.lessness t ;what they beLieve in and. hope for is not the hope of revenge, theintoxication of sveet revenge "... but the victory of Go<1, of thejust God, over the god.less . .. . 3

Nietzsche goes on to point out that "these weak people ril while they

nJ.ght ùisguise or der¡r it, have the d.esire to be strong. Nietzsche

repeated.Iy hold.s Rousseau responsible for the ma¡rifestation of such a

desire for povrer in the d.oninance oî nessentíment-based. civil statee,

and. notes that mod.ern man is "characterisecL by two apparently opposite

traits: individual-ism and. the demand. for equal rights."b Both of these

are attributabl-e to Rousseau, since his politicaJ- vritings focus on the

l-. sc, r, g.

2. (1.u., (;M, I; J-I, 13, I\i hrP, 16T.

3. GM, r, l-h.

)+. wP, TB3.

a

9l+

d.isencha¡tment of the econcrnically and. politically unenfranchised.

Rousseau is a symptsn of self-contempt and heated vanity -both signs that the dcrnineering will is lacking: he moralizesand., as a man of rancor, seeks the cause of his wretchedness inthe ruling class. I

This creates a d.ichotcrny between the morality of the rufing class -

ma.ster nrorality - and. the mo::afity of ressenl;tment - the slave morality.

In this view, Rousseau is a ped.agogu.e, giving voice a.nd. d.irection to

claims for equality an<i Ìiberty on the basis of religious ind.ivid,ualism.

fhe outccme of the eighteenth century of Rorrsseau, then, is the tend.ency

of mod.ern civil-isation to move toward. meeting the moral outcry of the

non-ruling classes by arìopti.ng the vafue orientations of slave norality.

The slave revol-t in moral.ity begins vhen ressentiment itseLfbeccrnes creative a,ncl gives birtñ to values: the ressent¿ment ofnatures that are <lenied. true reaction, that of deeds, úd ccmpensatethensel-ves with an ima6inerJr revenge. lihile every noble moralitydeveì-ops frcrn a triumphant affirrnation of itself r slave moralityfrcrn the outset says No to vhat is ttoutsider" what is |td-ifferentrt'r¡hat is ttnot itself'r; arrd, this No is the creative d-eed' .... inortler to exist, sJ-ave moral-ity always fj-rst neeals a hosti]e externalworl-d.; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in orderto act at al,I - its action is fund.a¡nenta1ly reaction. 2

Sfave mora-lity rests on the assumption that there are tvo natures

to be found in mankind., und" indeed in ma¡ individ.ually.3 The slave men

and" the noble man are to be distinguished. fron the empirica-l end true

sel-ves, however. For Ni.etzsche, the slave mar has absorbed. the ind.ivid,ualiE

of Rousseau and. the Ìate eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but

has not yet learnt, to be the ind.ivid.ual within him in lnís actions.

IndíuiduaLism ís a mod.est and stilÌ unconscious fozrn of the"vill- to powertr ; here it seems suffi-cient to get free fr<rn an

overÌ.rol¡¡ering dcminati on by society (vhether that of the stabe orthe church). l+

r. hP, gB.

Z. GM, I, 10. I'Nietzsche is interested in investigating hor.r and. why,for exarnple, the bel-ief ir¡ God. shapes the moral, politicat and,

Iogical- life of a cufture. ttslave moralitytr should not.thereforebe consid.ered. as a form of soeiety d.crninated. by ttslaves"; ratherit is a structure that, if accepted, serves as the basis for thecorrespond.ing systems of society a¡ril culture.rr Strong, @. eít.tp. 29.

3. BGE, 260.

l+. I^/P, 78 l+ .

e

9'

Freed.crn is what Rousseau prcrnised by excoriating the repression of

existing state a¡d, church authority, but, as Nietzsche points out, this

is a reaction rather tha¡r a¡r autoncmous action - a plaintive insistence

for sønething a pæticuLæ individ.ual might attain, but that sl-ave ma.n

cannot toke. The d.crninance of a slave rnorality means, then, that society -

the tote.l-ity of social- inter-retationships - rnust be based upon the lcywest

common d.enqninator, so that no one can attain the heights d.enied to scrne

but vouchsafed. to others through the incid.ence of inequal-ity.f As an

example of ressentiment in slave rnorality, inequality is reinterpreteri.

as "eviLntta-s "unjustrttir order to absolve the veakness of slave manrs

reaction to one of the conrlitions of Ìife, which, as Níetzsche sees it,

is itself

.... essenbíaLLy appropriation, injury, ovezpowering of whatis al-ien and. veaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of onetsown forms, incorporation and at l-eest, at its mildest,exploitation .... 2

Slave morality, therefore, is the effective inversion of valuations

that accept hard.ness and. expl-oitation a.s essential to life, and- consequent

upon the activity of the wilJ, bn p*,"r.3 Although tine d.omínürce of

sl-ave morality is ccmparabively recent and. traceabfe to Rousseau through

TSZ, p. 2I2. t'f d.o not vish to be nixed. up and confused. with thesep::eachers of equaÌity. For, to ne justice speaks thus: ttluÍen a.renot equal.tr Nor shall they beccrne equal-l What woul-d. ny love ofthe overma¡l be if I spoke otherwise.r' Ib¿d., p. 213.

2. B@ " ?59.

.) Ibid. Nietzschets emphasis on the dcrnination of weaker forrns hereis reminiscent of the Hobbesia.n ïrar of aII aga-inst all . However,llietzschefs aecount is quite differentiable fror Hobbesr, in thatNietzsche does not seek to empc,wer a Leviathan to suppress thebrutality of existence. On the contrary, Nietzsche wishes thatman be strong enough to accept that life will be a struggle, what-ever the form of society"

1

a

96

Ithe Christian and, socia-list urge, Nietzsche regard.s ancient Jeury as

the source of this type of inversion of val-ues.

It va^s the Jews vho .. .. dared. to invert the aristocraticvaJ-ue-ecluat i on ( g ood=n ob le=p owe rful=b e auty=h appy=be love d. of God )and. to hang on to this inversion vitn t¡reir teeth, the teeth ofthe mc¡st abysmal hatred. (ttre hatred- of impotence), seying "thewretched. aJ-one are the gcocl; the poor, impotentn J-ow\y aloneare the good; the suffering, deprivec! sick, ugly alone are pious,alone are bl-essed. by God, blessed¡ess is for them afonê .. ¡ . 2

It should. be interpol-ated. her:e that l^lal-ter Kaufìnann, ever-watchful

Iest his reader shoul-d, mi-sinterpret Nietzsche, anrl conclud.e that he was,

after all-, an anti-Semitic proto-Nazi, includ.es a footnote d.rawing

attention to other passages in the r¿orks that provid-e scrne balance to

this criticisrn of the Jevs. Also, he refers to Chapter Ten of his

N'tetzsche, vhere he d.iscusses in det¿lil- l{ietzschers image of the Jevs.

Of interest to this anaþsis is that the ttmiraculous feat of an inversion

of values ," ttthe beginning of the sl-ave rebefl-ion in mora-lsil effected- by

the Jews also fonns the basis of Christianity - "the misca.rriage of

Juclaismr" i^ Kaufrna¡rn's vord.s.3 KaulÌrann goes on to defend. Nietzsche by

asserting that ItNietzschets anti-Christia¡rity wa^s not rnotivated, enti-

semitica-lly at bottcnT a¡rd bhat he d.id. not derelop a social interpretationL

of history."*

On the other hand., Conor Cruise OrBrien takes objection to the

excessive sanitizing of Nietzschers vork by the "gentù,e Nietzscheansrtt

and, points out that

l. ".... the socialist, the anarchist - inasmuch as they find' theirexistence scrnething of vhich sflneone must be guiLty, they are still-the closest relations of the Christian, who also believes that hecan better end.ure his sense of sick¡ess and- iIl-eonstituted¡essby find.ing someone r¡han he car nake responsible for it. The instinctof revenge a¡rd ressen'bínent appeats here in both ca.ses Br¡ a meansof end.uring¡ æ the ins'binct of self-preservation: just a.s in thepreference for al-truistic theory and practice.tt WP, 373.

2" Glrl, f , 7.

3. BGE, Ip!, and Kauflnann ¡ cp. c'it. " p. 262.

l+. Kaufrnann s op. eib. , Fp. 263-h.

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97

... wha,t Nietzsche d.id r¡a-s to encours€e the substitution ofBn Øtt;i-Christíøt anti-ssritism for the old bunbling self-contra.d.ictorlChristian anti-semitism. Nietzschean anti-semitism was an anti-sernitisn without inhj.bitions, more, an anti-senitism in the contextof a cul-t of prid.e, severity, strength, hatred., revenge, antl a cultof the state vhich lets loose these emotions." 1

There are several- obsey.wations to be made on this criticism of both

Nietzsche a¡d. Kauflnann. First, OtBrien d.oes not prove that Nietzsche

had a racial- interpretation of history, vhich supports Kauflnar¡nrs view

by clefault. Second., OrBrien uses Nietzschers worcls - such as pricle,

severity ¿¡nd. hatred - in the context r¡f a cuft, which is a concept and.

a phenonenon that Nietzsche consistent\y rejected.. TLre terrn frcuJ.t of

the statert' too, is an unwenanted juxtaposition of terlrs, given

Nietzschets strong critique of øty state.2 On the other hand., the

emphasi-s on the harshness of I'lietzschets r^¡ord.s and. thoughts effected. by

OrBrien is wel-I placed. in the l-ight of Kauflnan¡rrs interpretation. Nietzschr

certainìy cl.id. vish to transcend. "the inhibitions of the tra.d.itional ethict'3

even if the consequences might seem d.isastrous to Liberal thinkers " Such

consequences , however, carìnot be explained. avay by Kauftnann, ar\lr more

than they can be interpreted as vicious a¡rd fascistic by OfBrien.

Final-ì-y, the d.ifferences in interpretation can be best d.isplayed by

reference to the use made of Nietzschers l-ast letters. At the same time,

it can be shor¿n that the d.iseussion on Nietzschers enti-sernitism reveals

a more fu¡id.a¡nental point about his thought. To Burkhard.t, Nietzsehe

vrote: "wilhel¡r l3ismarck and al-l- anti-Sernites d.one away withl"\ and. to

û¿erbeck; ttf am just having aJ-I anti-Semites shot."5 Kaufharur takes this

1. Conor Cruise OrBrien, The Suspeeting GLøtce, Faber and tr'aber( Lond.on I9T2) , p. 60,

2. q.Ð., Chapter V, I'State and. The Genea.logr of Mora-Is.t'

3. OrBrien , op. c'it., p. 60.

\. F. Nietzsche,;{ Self-Portnøit lYart Hís Letters, Ed. by Peter tr\rssand. llenry Shapiro, I{arvard. lJ.P. (Cerntriage, Mass. 197I) , p. I\\.

5. PIl, p.687.

a

9B

as more proof that what Nietzsche "repucliates more thorough\y than

arrything else is a¡rti-Semitism.t'I For otBrien, however, t'their trump

card. is actua.l\y a central- weskness in their systemrtt since Nietzsche

vants to use anti-Semitis¡r I'as a tooL for arousing anti-Christianity,

and. a^nyone who beccmes a¡rti-Christia¡¡ by his route wil1 aJ-so be a hater

of Jews."2 r\:rther, his real ccmrptaint against the vulgar anti-semites

of his d"ay vas thatrrthey vere not anti-semitic enough; that they d.itt not

rea^l-ize that they were themselves the carriers of that semitic infection,

Christisnity.tt- If OtBrien is correct, then Nietzsche hinself is

an erÌti-Semite (but not, we must presune, so ulworthy as to be shot).

fn our v-iev, Nietzsche was not an anti-Semite (of the lvulgar, infectecl

Christiant variety) , but an anti-Senritist, one conmitted. to the extinction

and. d.estruction, not of Jevish races cnã Chrístian races, but of the

daminøtce of sLøue rnoraLity vitnin groups, races øtd inð.ivid.ual-s that

is rnaintained by religion.

In Nietzschers v-iew, "good" qual-ities are those that maintain the

ccrnpliant subservience of man by assuaging his suffering. Hence ttpity,

the ccrnplaisant and. obligi.ng hand., the warrn treart, patience, industry,

hr.rnilíty, md fliendl-i.ness a.re honoured.."L "Evilr" or the other ha.nd,

is not ôel.ineated, a.s the opposite of these quaU-td-es, but as a f\:¡rction

of ressentíment against ttpower and. d.arrgerousness, a certain terribleness,

subtlety, ancl strength that d.oes not perait contenpt to d.evelo¡1.'t5 ,rr,

thisrreviltt is therrgoodrr of master morality, vhere one counterposes

1. Kauflnann, op. dt., p. 262.

2. orBrien, op. ci'b., pp. 58-59.

3. rbid.

\. Bffir 260.

5. rbid.

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99

good, anò, bad, not good and. evil.

... the nobÌe ma.rl . o. o conceives the basic concept |tgood.tr inadvarce and. spontaneousþ out of himsel-f and only then creates forhimself the id.ea of rrbad" ! Ttris rrbadrr is of noble origin and thatof t'evilrr out of the cau]-d.ron of unsatisfied. hatred - the forrneran afLer-production, a sid.e issue, a contrasting shad,e, the l_atteron the contrary the original thing, the-begin::ing, the distinctivedeed in the conception of a sl-ave morality- .... But it is not thesarne concept trgood.tr: one shoul-d. ask rather preciseì-y uho íe evíIin the sense of the morality of tessentinent. Ttre answer is, inal-l- strictness, precisely the noble, povrerful man, the ruler, butdyed in another color, interpreted in arrother fashion, seen inarrother vây by the venanous eye of nessentíment. I

In contrast to sLave rnora-tity, ma-ster norality is seen as a life-

affirming and. positive mode of val-uatio.r.2 Nietzsche prowisionarþ

apprct\,res of this a¡is'tocratic aspect of a hr-¡ma¡r nature, and places it

above the cringíng ressentiment of slave moral-ity. But this preference

is not meant to impJ-y that one is absol-ute\y better or vorse than the

other. GeneaL.ogically, they both exist as moral systems, and. it is

cl-ear that Nietzsche believes that a certain kind of ma¡ existecl, prior

to a:ry (slave- or master-) nroral d.escriptions of him as good., evil or

bad. I¡or llietzsche, "it is obvious that moraJ- d.esignations were first

applied to humøt beings and. onÌy later, d.erivatively, to actio.r"."3

Moreover, in modern society master morality anti. sl-ave morality d-o ftoccur

d.irectþ atongside each other - even in the same human being, within aì,

singÌe souL.ît*

Without provid.ing much hard evid,ence, Kauflnann, md Rcyce beforec

himr' assert that Nietzsche clicl not at all endorse ma.ster morality, and

that his continual references to the superiority of ttnoblett or ttma.stert'

rrirtues should. not be seen as a¡ ind.ication of Nietzschers position

f. GM, r, fl.

2. GM, r, fo,

3. BGE, '260.

)r. Ibtd,

Kaufbrann, op.MonthLy , Vol".

ait., p. 260, and Josiah Rq¡ce, ttNietzscherrf AtLø.tieCXIX (Jan - June 1917), pp. 321-31.

5

100

uis-a-uis any concrete social- proposal.s that arise frcrn his thought.

Cer"tainly, Nietzschers critique of the concept of "morality" presupposes

thab master moral-ity must have end-emic shorbcønings. However, there can

be no doubt that Nietzsche is cluite aws.re of the implications of his or.m

crj.ticisrns of moral-itj-es in generaJ, and. that he is equalJ-y €n^rs.re of the

utiLíty of arry mor¡'l valuation.

., , . there ãre altogether no mor.û.'L facts . . . . Mor&lity is merelyan interpretation of certain -ohencmena - more precisely, a mis-interpretation .... Mor¿ìl judgrnents a¡:e tìrerefore never to be tahenliterally: so unclerstoocl , they alvays contain merr: absurdity.Semeiotically, hovever, they remain invaluable: they reveal, atleast for those r+ho kncn¿, .bhe most val-uo.ble reali-bies of culturesand invard-nesses which clid not knov¡ enough to "und,erstand-t'themsel-ves, l'{orality is inere sign lerrgüagÊr nelle s¡rmptomatolog¡

One must assume, then, that Nietzsche was quite deliberate in his praise

of certain aspects of maste:: rnoraì.ity, and thet such preference that he

held. for the rrrnasters" of the worJ-cl is not a subtl-e d"isplay of

equivocation, but is insteacì just as informed and j.nstructive as his

criticism of the sl-ave.2

iqo¿est, inclilstrious, benevolent, temperate: is that hcrr^r youvould have men? god nenT But to me that seems on\y the ideals;l-ave, the sl¿rve of the future. 3

For ì'iietzsche, this rrid.eof. sl-ave" is the res'"rlt of the veakening of

mân aJrd'che frustration of the vilt to pol/er such that man is no longer

"naster" of himseff. it j.s no sur¡qrise to fincl'bhat Nietzsche is highì-y

critic¿¡.1- of zury potit;ical- system that is b¿rsecl on ¿r slave morality borne

ol ressentimcznt, given that "a sovereign <lisposition, great inventiveness,

heroic purposiveness, noble being-for-onesel-fr' - master qualities afl- -

f. I'f n t'Ttre tImproverst of Mankj.nd," I"

2. There is perhaps a further rea.son for a lack of arly systematic critique'of naster morality in Ni.etzschets r,¡orks. I{is attack on slave moral-ity.his etteck on Rousseau, was largely in response to the prevalence of,Jucleo-Christian moral valuations with regard to conceptions of thesocia,i bein¿¡, the jnclivicluo-l , and the Stateo 'Iherefore, it isappropria.te tira.t the rìc"rmin¿urt nor:al systen receives most of NietzschetE¿r'u'bention. tiad l,lietzsche envisagecl the re-emergence of mastermoralL'.ty, then it, woulcl be reasrxable to expect an exposition of anyend.eniic sìrortcornings. llut Nietzsche pred.icted. the nihiltistic clestructícof a'[.2 current mor'¿r-Liti.esj, a.s onl-y the first step towards eæt;ra-mora'Lval.uations, thus obviati.ng the need for a frrtl- d.j.scussion on masternorality.

3. trP, 356.

viLl- be countemined by an orgonica,lly conceived state.

6. i\ietzschc on Rousseauls State

Ì0.1

^

One such conception of the s-bate, in Nietzschets opinion, is to be

fourrd in F,ousseanlrs version of Le contrat sociaL. Here al-i individ-uals

are rerlui::ed to give up their socj.al* freecloms in the a:lm and. hope of

creating ir. new ancl total- free<ì.crn endorsed by laws and potitical rights,

with'btre scwereign people the arbiters and. protectors of the new destiny"

Rousseau!s insistence that the sovereignty of each contracting party is

indivjsible anil ina-'l-ienable does represenb a significant aclvance over

the contract theories of ilob'bes a¡rcL Locke. In this respect, Rousseaurs

contribution to mod.ern poJ-itical theory has been ad.optedr'although

differenti.ally interpr:eted, by both the ccrn¡nunitarian a¡d. l-iberal--

d.emocratic traditions. For Rousseau, it is the tlcoypa rnoraL et eoLLeetíft'

conceived as a Sorrereign bocl¡. tha.t reconciles the existence of the ind.ivichl

man and social- m&n: "as a member of the Sovereign he is borrnd to the

individual, and as a member of the State to the Sovereign.t'I However,

it is prec:'-sely this funda¡nental- tenet of Rousseauts political theory

that Nietzsche rejects, on the basis that the State will come to exist

indepencìentì-¡r 6.p¿ at the expense of all individ.uaJ-s.2

1. SC, rr 61 7

D It is trrre that Rousse:au was &vare of the problem of the people losingcontrol of the State, ancl th¿rll; Nietzsche objects to a theoreticalpoint on pragnatic ground.s a,lone" Ror:.sseau d-id. place a practicalliürit anthe absoLute size of any state to all-cn¡ for the fragilityof the Republic so constituted.. Nietzsche seems to endorse Rousseaursv-iew of the Reputrl.ic grad"ually decaying, and. once again, size iserl.l--irnportarit, "A state that cannot attain its ultimate goal usuallyswel-Is to a¡r unnaturalì-y .Iarge size. The worl-d.-wid.e empire of theRomans is nothing suìrlime canpared. to Athens. The strength thatshoul<l go into ùhe f'l-over: here remains in the leaves a¡rd. stern, whichflourish"rr PN, p. 32.

)

102

State is the col-desb of aII cold monsters. Cold.1y it teuslies too; and this Lie crawls or:t of its mouth: "I, the state,am the people.tt ....

"O:: earth ther:e is nothing greater than I: the ordering fingerof God a¡tr It' - thus rosrs the monster . . ..

Ëtate I ce.tl it where aJl- d.rink poison, the good and. the wickecL;

state, where al-L lose themselves, the good- and.^.the wicked; state,r+her:e the slow suicid.e õr att'is cal-leti "life.tt 1

Nietzschets criticism of the state in these terms brings together

the critique of Rousseaurs moraf philosophy arìd belief in the Supreme

Being as contributing to slave morality. Rousseau i's vilified' beeause

he denies the full pla¡" of the índ.ividual-f s wiJ.l to porrer just when it

should b,e affi::ned. nçst strong\y. Having asserted' that ma¡ is the author

of all- eviln Rousseau capitr.rla+-eso an¿ says that me¡r is merely cqable

of good", moral cond.uct, because Cd. ís good" And. having establ-ished. in the

clearest and. most, powerful fashi.on the importance of manrs free

ind-ivid.uality, Rousseau capitulates again, md requires that man give up

all rights over his social existence to ttre curnipresent generaÌ will and.

the State.

Above all , Rousseaufs attempt to set rlowtr a contract, a fornal d-esign

to improve the lot of mal, is proof to Nietzsche of arrlack of integrity"'2

Basie principle: only individ.ual-s feel themselves responsible 'ItuItipticities *.ã irr.rurr-bed, in ord.er to d.o the things for which theind.ivid.ual Ìacks the courage. 3

Thus Rou-çseaurs intention f'or mankind., his vi.sh to make men ttbettert'by

making him conforrn to an increa^sed. an¿areness of his nore.lity, is

contrary to Nietzschets imsge of man.

I. TS'¿, p. 160.

2. 'I',I , r.r 26"

3. þ/P, T16.

<D

c

a

_r03

Not t,o make men ttbetter ," not to preach norality to them inany form, as if I'morality in itself ,tt o. any kinil of id.ea1 rnanvere given; but tro cz'eate conditíons ttrat requ'tre stnonger men v]no

. for their part need., and- víi-I høue, a morality (nore clearly: aphysical*spiritual discipline) that makes them strong! l-

This pa,ssage underscores three essential a^spects of the critique

of Rousseåurs moral.j.snt that.have been brought out in this chapter"

First, Nietzsche rejects m!üro.lity as e supêrordinate id.ea-t against which

man must assess and. align himseLf. Second-, although Nietzsche understands

rnorality to be historicall.y a social phencrnenon in the same manner as

d.icl Rousseau, it is }lietzsche alone vho goes on to ad.opt antrextra-

nor&f" standpoint with respect to the moral content of all social

eriticisn. Finalty, we see that Nietzsche is just as interested as

Rousseau in chenging man fror that which he is into that which he might

be. The principles underlying their d.iffering concepts of charrge vill

be ex¿unined. in Chapter W. I,Ihat next concerns us is Nietzschers attempt

to establish a critique of the natuye and, eristence of to"*lity, with

particular reference to state and. society.

1" wP, gB1.

l-Ol+

Ci{APTËR V

STATE ANÐ T}IE GENEALOGY OF MORAI,S

For ¡:s we are mere\y the resulte-nt of previor,rs generatíons ' lreare al"so the resultant of their errors, passions, a,ncl crimes: itis imposr;ibl-e to shake off this chain. Though we cond.emn theerrors and- thi.nk ve have escaped. tltem, ve cannot escepe that rçe

spring frcm them. At besto it ccr¡les to *, confl-ict between ourirrnate , inherited, nature a¡d ou-r knowled.ge, between a stern r newdiscipline an,L an a¡rcient tra.dition; and we plant & nelr way ofJ-ife, B. new instinct, a seconcl nature, that rrhithers the first.... The consofation is the lcnou¡l-ed-ge that this ttfirst naturettwas once second-, md that.every- ccrnquering "seconrl naturerr beecrnesa first. L

llíetzschets criticlue of Rousseau, established, on the rejection of

moratity &r-Ì arr essentiaJ- fe'ati.rre of man, brings into focus Nietzschers

objections to political, developments in Ïris own d.ay. His attacks on

<j.emccracy and. socialisrn refl.ect the belief that political a¡¡d mass

authority carurot succeed in resolving the confl-ict between the empirica.t

a¡rd true ¡lel-ves that eme::ges in society. On this issue, Rousseanr is

cont::acl:'-cted specifically and fund.amental\y, but there are nevertheless

occasj-ons vhen Nietzsche arlo¡:ts a v-ì"ewpoint that is intended. to refute

Rousseaurs thought, but onl¡' nalages to reiterate it. Of particuJ-ar

interest here is I'lietzschefs analysis crf state anC. society f::on the

perspective of his genealory of' morals, md his attack on estabtished.

religiclns genernJ.ly ancl Christianity specifically. Ttris Lead.s us to a

d.escription of a soeiety both stateless a¡ld withor-rt religious authority.

l" State urcl Society

h?iatcve.r the epistemolog;icaJ- a¡cl metlloclological found-ations of

Rousseauri; political thought, it has long been held that he is the

f owrd.ing father of the modern cÌeuiocratic movement, and" ind.eed. the

precursor of socialism. Atternpts to crea,te mcd,ern poLitical constitutions o

l-. Mcrks, VoI. V, pp. 2l9-3O.

a

105

during the America¡t and- French Revolutions and more recently in srxne

Afri c ¿n st ates, typi cally irrcì-ude es senti al-\y Rous seaui an principles .

F\rnd.amental to all- of these is the twin d.emancl for freedcrn ancl equality,

and the belief that this is to be attained ini+.ial-ly by the creation of

State political authority, overseen by the sovereign p"oplu.l

But for Rousseau, these goal-s, admirable though they were'

constituted on\r the pra.ctical- details of his philosophy. llis prine

concern centred. on the need. to change the moral character of al-I men as

pr.ivate j.nd-ivid.uals rmd citizens of the Etate, in effect'r'to establish

the reign of virtue."2 Justice, equality and, freedon were not secufar

expressions of ma¡!s inner needs in Rousseauts opinion, but were moral

concepts that cLescribed manrs relation to the Suprerne Being. As such,

he searched. for a pol-iticaì system that prørised the most in terrns of

u.Lrtuer'belì.eving that such a state vould. necessariþ d.isplay and. ensure

egalitarian and, l-ibertaria¡ icleals.

Hovever, the ri se of democracy in the nin,eteenth century d.id' not

ad.here to the mo::a.lism mad.e explici.t j.n Rousseaqrs theory. The

libertarian an<l equalitaria¡i aspects of his thought were taken up Bs a

populist cal-l- for political and social reforms13 rabher than a rnove

tolrard. a wholesal,e :,eorgariisation aimed. at enhancing the necessari\r

collect]ve but f\rnclamentally inri.ivj.d.ualistie social mord-ity. Hhile it

is not suggeste¿ that Nietzsch€.r came to the defence of Rousseaurs theory,

it is interestir¡g to rrote that Nietzsche is & severe critic of the

]. sc, rr, 3.

2. PIl, pp. 127-8.

3. Enge-ls testifies to tlre importalce of Rorrsseauts influence to the

"oãi*ti*tist, moùements, as distinct from socialist theory, in theeigh.teenth dn¿ lineteeirth centuries " " . . .. the id'ea of equal-ity.... vhich esperciet¡"ly than-ks to Rousseau playecl a theoretieal , and-

during an¿ since the great r:evol tion a practical political- role,anil t"ven t'x1ay still Praù's an import erft agitationaL role in thesocialist movLment in-every "orrrriry." Fred.erich EngeLs, Antí-lhhr.[.ng" Mac]4il1e.n (London f969) , p. I2)+, Emphasis added."

t-06

cteveloping democratic movement, as Ror-rsseau may have been. Rousseau had

alread.y clismissed. clemocracy as "perfectrttbut fJ,t only for "a people ofI

god.s."- Even thor.lgh Rousseanr did not envisage Btr1y attempt on the part of

perfectiirle man to strive for this type of ccmmunity, his recognition of

the clernocratic i<i.ea-i is ba.s;ecl upon a moral interpretation of the çorfc1 '

Nietzsche, too, assesses democrscy frcxn the perspective of its implicit

mcrra,Iíty,u anrJ is prcnptecl to rejec'b the clemocratic movement for rea,sons

which have particu1.il' Televance to Rousseaurs thought.

MoraLitg in Ew,ope todq ts hend øñmaL moraT:ity - in otherword.s , as we understand. it, nere\y oræ tpe of morality besid.ewhich, before vhich, ancl after l¡hich maqy other types, above all-highey noralities! are, or ought to be, possible. But this moralityresj.st¡; srreh a t'possibilityr" such a¡r trou6;httr with al-l- its power:it sa¡'s stubbornl-y and inexorab\r, "I Bm morality itself , and.

nothing besid.es is morality." Indeed., with the help of a religionwliich incJ-urlerj. and fiatterecl tìre most subl.ime herd-animal d.esires,ve hllve reached the point where we firrd. even in politicai institutionsan ever rnc¡re visible expression of this morality: the democratíeno.¿ement is the heir of the Christia¡ movement. 2

T\,'o points are of principal interest here. The first concerns

Nietzschets rrt'uitirde tovarcl the'mod.e of vaLuatÍon that her believed. to be

clc¡ninar:rt in nineteenbh century lìurope. "Herd'-" or slave-morality i.s

criticised not necessarily for its dcxninarlce, und.esirabfe as Nietzsche

rnight find. that clcflrinance. Of greater significance isthe attack on the

Rorrsseauesque aspects of the morsfity adc,pted. by the herd. Rousseau sav

but one mor.al. system, <ì.r:veloperf over tine but exclusively vatid" through

a valuat.ing frarnework that wa-s to be fou¡d in the col-lectivity, the mass

2of iricìj,vid.uafs.r l{ietzsche negates such a conception of morality by'

l_.

c

2-)¡

sc, -l-rr, L.

R í:h- 1^At)vu t L-vL.

".. " " 'bhere never e;<istí'd a sOciety, hovever corrupt scrne may havebeccme, where no difference v€.s ma.de between the good. and the bad.;

and. r¿iin ¡egard to mora.Ii'i,y, vhere no measures can be prescrilea Uy

.Lav ey,ac'b enough to serve as a rule for a magistrate . .. . the prrblicis the truest jpa¿3e of moral-s and is of such integrity and penetratiorlorr this hea,-l , i¡t*[ *tti,ough it m'y scrnetj-mes be deceived', it cannever be corrupted.." 0I, þ. lOOn. It should. be stressed' that thispasssge preOeLtes the Socí.n,L Contracrú, making it clear that Rousseaui" noî r.f.r,ring to the neç "prrblic personl of the bod.y politicstìlat r¿as to appe ay j.n late¡ works. FLrthermore, the püssage d-emonsbra'¿

Rousseauts Uel-ief tþat l-ar¡s a-lone cemot tiope to be the soÌe gu-ide toman in society, a:rd tliat mor.:al-ity has a specifie role to play'

â

107

denying that only one rnode and- code of valuation exists. AJ-so, Nietzsehe

inverts Rr:usseauf s notion of a people being the arbiter of a mora'l cod-e

by srrggesting that it is the people, the herd., that is iJne recipíent.of

a moralit¡¡ iar its rrtil:'-ty"

The second. and a-ssociated íssue is the relationship that Nietzsche

sees betveen morality a;rrl Cemocracy. It is irnporta¡rt to note that

neither thinker equabes d.emocracy a¡d Chris'"ianity. In his chapter

on civiL religion,l ,oo""*au poin-bed out that a falLibl.e Christian had.

en inappropriate attitude tor^¡ard. social responsibil-ities, and by

implicat:ion also fell far short of being godlike and- capable of creating

and. living in the perfection ol a d,emccracy. Nietzsche d.ispJ-ays similar

caution, ald refra,ins f:'cxn asserting tìnat, democr,ãcA (as distinct frcm

the democrati.c mo.¡emerr+-) is the "heir" to Chri.stianity. Instead, he

confines himsel-f to an c'xsnination of broad social mo)ements - formeJJy

Christian but now clenlocratic - irrd-icating the significance of an unrl.er-

pinning ccrmrnon morality, And for Nietzsche, it is that morality he d.eems

responsibLe for the decline in stand.ard.s in both mari Bnd. poliùical society.

We have a clifferent faith; to us the d.emocratic movement isnot on\r a form of the d.ecay of political organization but a formof the deeay, nameÌy the ctiminution, of mari, making him med.iocreand. lovering his val-ue . 2

It is here that Nietzschers criiicism of democracy reflects a

critique c¡f the prínciple of equality and bhe existence of mass society.

In the absence of any chalge in the nature of man such as Rousseaua

described,r'urry eclual-ising of me¡ through a forrnal- State structure is

l_. sc', rv, B.

2" BGE,203,

Thj-s is not to sr-rggest that Nietzsche a6reed. vith the changesRousseau proposecl" Ttre point here, which will ¡e discussed. inChapter IV, is that neither: Rousseau nor Nietzsche saw any valueìn trying to charge politica-l- and. social- or:ganisation r.¡ithout a¡r

s.eccmpÉurying change in nlr-rn.

.?

t

108

to Nietzsche a tevelling, a.n averîagirg of men th,at can only reduce higher

t¡4pes of nren to the l-owest common <i.encrninato:r of hr-rmarrity.

'Ihe c,ùt:r*alL degeneratt,on of ntcm dowrr to vhat toclay appearsto the sociafist dol.ts anci. flathea.d.s as theirrrman of the futurer'-ac tireir i.dea,l - this degeneration and. diminution of man into tireperfect herd. animat (or, a^s they say, to the man of thettfree society")this ani¡a-l-ization of m¡ur into the dr¿arf aninnal of equal rights and.cl-aims, is possible, there is no doubt of it. 1.

t{ietzsche dra.vs into question the aim as ruell as the function of

the clenocr&Lj.c state. The stand.ard.s, i.n his opinionr ü'e set in

accoroa,nce with sl-ave-uoral valua.tions of gocxl ald evil. The percepti.ons,

aspirations;, beliefs arid associ¿rted. socio-econcmic cond"itions of most

of the peopie are thr:s rlef:'-ned ir^s "goocl ,rrancl then enforced. upon aLL ofÒ

the people,'- fherrher:d ar-rimaJ." is the name llietzsche gives to the mass

of people who cennot sur:v-ive ',¡ithor-rt she.Ite::ing alnong others who are

si:ni-tarty fearfi-rl- of l-ife itself. When this mass is given poqer via a

d-emocracy, the actual aim of the clemocratic state is reveaJ-ed.: it begins

to red.efine reality in its owl lirnited., self-interested. terms.

IJemocracy represents the d.isbelief in great humari beings and.a-n elite soci.ety: t'Everyone is equal. to everyone else." ttAt

bottcm we &re one ancl aJ-l- se.tf-seeking cattle and. mob.'r 3

But Nietzschers aristocra-bism j,s not aimecl mere\y at preserving the

rights ancl privileges r.¡hich a "highert't¡¡pe c,f ma.n night enjoy for their

naterial- val-ue alone. He d,eems it much more important that any j-nd.ividual

be permit+-ed. to efevate hj-nself above the hr:rcl , without autcriaticaJ-þ

being'lrrancled. as "evil" by the herd he has tr¿rnsce.rd.ed..L l-or Nietzsche,

the clemocratic movement mistake¡rl-y rer{sons frcxn the generaJ- to the

l_. tsffi,2o3,

2. Rousseau also had. a fov c,pinion of majority ruJ-e, as wel] asrlifferenti-ating bet.^reen tlie sum of particul-ar wills and. the General-\,/i:r.r.

3. WP, 752,

h. BGE j zor,

a

ro9

particuJ-ar o md assumes that eacìl individual must erpress his hrmaniby

in ess;enti8-tly the same, species-d.efined. fashion. In short, since aJl

aretrequ.slLy" members of the species, then they nust have equal rights.

On a practical- Iev'el, Nietzsche sees the danger of a ðcminant slave

moral-ity suppressing the unusual a¡rd- remarkabl'e'

Tod-ay ..,. vhsrì only the herd animaf receives and d'ispenses

honors iir llurope, when "Lquality of rights[ could at]- too easilytre changed" intã equality in vioÌating rights - I mearì' j-nto a

cortrnon war on att ttrat i" ""tu, strange, prirtileged., the higherman, the hi8her soul, the hißher d.uty, the higher responsibility,and the abuirda.nce of creatj-ve power amd. ma-sterfufness. I

ft sho,¿LL not be imaginecL, clespite the increasing importance of

vritings on cfass in the nineteeuth century, that Nietzsche was referring

to the vorking class or even the urt¡an proletariat when talking of the

herd. Feflecting an al{areness of the existence and- role of a working

el-ass in capital-ist economy, thit: "impossibfe classrt' the "workers in

factory slaveryt' and. "stc.,pgaps of human inventi-veness" (as he rrariously

<l.escribes them) ,' or. rega::d.ecl by Nietzsche as ttre object of abuse by

capitalism- But this class is a-Iso in d.anger of abuse by the lure of

political rhetoric.

Piiew! 1,o believe that higher pay couki' abolish t}:'e essence

of tTreir mise'y - I mean: their impersonai serfdcrnl Phewl tobe tal"ked. into thinking .b?rat an increuse in this impersonality,vithin the machine-Iikã vorkir'4çs of s. nel¡ society, could.transformthe shame of slavery into a]riitue! Phewl to have a p::ice forwhich one remajns a-person no longer but beccmes a gesr! 3

while Nietzsche acknowleclges the er¡lloitation of the working class,

he sees no solutj-on either in capital-ists pJ-acating this class vith higher

wages, or ïJy sociatists proposing a nev society vi"bh' once again' a

I BÆ, 2f.?.

D, 206.

lbí,C,

a

)Jo

1r_o

continuation of vork as an institution of socôety"f These types of

conservative or rad.icaJ- remecl-ies take his breath al^Iay, it seems. ft is

not surprising, therefore, to find" that Nietzschers interpretation of

ancl prescription for the working cl-ass is fundamentally non-material-istic.

.... the vorkers of littrope should. ci.eclare that henceforthaß a cLo,ss they are a. hunan inpossibility, a¡rd- not on1y, as iscustr:rnary, a harsh and purposeless estab-lishment. They should,intrr:r1uce B.n era of v¿¡^st swarming out frc¡n the European beehive

and v¡ittr this act of ernigration in the grnnd m8nner protesta¡lainst the machine, against capital, and. against the choiee withvhich they are nov thr:eatened,, of becc¡ning of neeess¿ty/ ei.therslaves of the state or slaves of a revolutionary parby. 2

In effect, llietzsche is claiming that the "working cl-assrt is

beyoncl redernption, since it has been n:ined, by a conscioì.t.sness of itsel-f"

Tntenclerj. for slavery but educatecl for mastery, the Europeart r¡rorker represenl

jn Níetzschef s opinion, the L¡wnatt inpc.,ssibiLib'y of reconciling the demand

for his iabour s¡d hj.s urge to clcrninate.

1" llietzschels attiturl.e +,o wolk is of more i-nterest. He sees it as

¿ì cleìsire to keep the Stater stable end. secure, bY inhibiting thed.evelopment of general nnd inj"j-vid.ual- abitities for reason and.

ind.epe¡¿,ence" "For it uses u.p a tremen<lous amorlnt of nervous energl¡a.ncl it takes arlay fïftn ref,l-ection, brood.ing, dreaming, uorry, love,and. hatred.; it alvays sets a smal-I goal before oners eyes andpermits easy an¿ r.egulgr satisfactions." D, 1.73. It is this d'u}Iingeffect on each factory vorke¡ that Nietzsche sees a^s providing a

rreasu.re of secr.rrity in Lhe Stnte, through the inactivity ancl fackof arlventut'ousness j.n its people. l{ietzs(lhe sarcastically notesthe flav inherent in the mechanistic repression of the ind-ividual," " . . n a socie'r,y in which the members continually vork hard lrill- have

more security; ancl security is nov Bdored. as the 6upreme god'dess.And nor¿-horrorsl - it ì-s preciseþ the "worker" who has beccrne

dnnge¡ous. "Dangerousrr indiviaual-s are swarnting alL arorrnd. And

bc¡hind them, the rlnnger of d.rngers: the inrlividual-. ftid.Ibicl. Whether rnigration can seriously be regarclecl as a solutionfor the vorking

"1o^ç" (st that ti-¡ne) is at l-east open to sympatheti'c

consiileralion. .¡\s Nietzsche puts it, the l¡orkers Lrere to reiectthe al.ternatives of Ì¡age-sL¿ive a¡rd. revolutions.ry worker. Conceivably,migr"ation has operat,ed. effectively as 8. safety release for Europeanind.ustriat d.evel-opne¡|; rtcJ-ayi-ng, at best, i.ncreasing pressuTe on

thc vorking class to accept ::J-avery either to a par-ty or the State.

Lt

a

111

.,.. the insti¡rct try virbue of ¡^rhich the woi:ker beccrnes possib-Leas a cl-ass, possibl-e in his eil¡n eyes, have been d.estrq¡ed. throughand. thr.ough r+ith the most irrespor:si.bJ-e thoughtlessness. The workerlnras qual-ified. for r,ri-litarlr serrice, grar:ted the right to organize¿ud. to vote: is it any vorrder that the worker tod.ay experiences hisor+n existence a^s clis'bressj-ng - moraì.þ spealing' as an injustice? I

Iìy implication, then, an appropriate theory of society voul<l nr:t provirle

the vorking cla-ss r¡ith a fut¡rre, r:ather|inars designing a fnture for j-t

simply on the basis of its existence. Äl-so, Nietzsche ind.icates that,

shoul-¿l the ]atter course be a.,lopt,r:d, it viü be inspired, by the d.esire

to remove tlie "injusticetr perpetrated. on the vorking class '

Whi.le not end.orsing sr-rch a judginent for its:iroral- contenb, Nietzsche

nevetthel-ess c'tisplays his d.isaffection vith st¿¡.te and. society in their

contempc:raJX¡ Ês vel.l as historical forrns on two levels. First, existing

forrns of state a¡id. society are held. to be responsible for the creation of

the vorking c1.a^ss anrl for its subsequent degeneration into a hu¡nan

responsibili.ty, as ve have seen, thus provicling another facet'bo the

critique that Nietzsche build.s of nineteenth century civilisation. At

a seconC. BJìd more ñrnclanent:rl- Ìevel, however, he mekes a cl-ear d.istinction

betveen state a.¡rd. society. Nietzsche rejects the notion that ¿r reorganisecl

or reconstitutecl state migh'b achieve the aims of, for example, rationality,

hrrnanitaria¡ism, or justice, Quite apart fron the relative merits - more

precise\y, the defects - r:f these valuational principles: alry state must

be conceived" vith scrne explicit ci:: i-mplicit teLcs as a basis, which

Nietzsche takes to be errotteous. Society, oD the other hand., may exhitit

rnore ol^ Ìess justice a¡d rationality, but such occuruences are subject

to neithe.r approbabion nor approbrir,lu since they have teleoì-ogical

ranification" Thus Nietzsche can criticise society without having to point

out the woys it shoulrL be macle, by 'bhe poner of a state, to improve.

I" Tf , "Ílkirmishes ,'r !0.

trz

u

l'his has inportant implications for the ind.ivid.ualrs conception of

Ìris place in the vor-l.d, and-the ind.ivid.ualrs belief, fostered a¡d re-.

inforcecl by rnateria-l-ist sociology, that society and. state in whatever

forrn have valid.ity by virtue of their existence. The in¿ivid.ual is

sed,uced into thinking thab all meo.ning comes frcm society, end. is expressecl

through the manners and. norafs of that society. In Nietzschets cpinion,

this represented. no less than a belief in the insignificance or the

improbability of a powerful and. creative ind.ivid.uality. Eehoing

Rousseaurs sentiments of the first Díeeota,se, Nietzsche held- that such

a belief nust uftimately red.uce the effectiveness of the ind"ivid.ualr s

r¿i l-1.

Today the taste of the tiue and. the virtue of the time ¡,¡eokenand. thin d.own the will; nothing is a.s time\y as ÌÍeakness of thewil-1" rn the philosopherrs icleal, therefore, precise\y strengthof the vil-I, hardness, artcl the capacity for long-range d,ecisionsmust belor€ to the concept of "greatness.tt I

irlietzschets reference here to d.ecisions for the future should. not

be mistaken for a tel-eological anaþsis, hourever. By ernphasising long-

range considerations, Nietzsche concentrates most clearþ on overcming

the d.eep shadow of past morality over the present. Tk¡e "philosopherrs

id.ea1 ,tt it this sense, is the facil-ity of seei.ngttbeyoncltrweakness of

the will- å^s ain irrmutabl-e fact and. thus perrnitting a higher und.erstand-ing

and appreciation of life. To universalise this in the social sphere

requires ind.ivid.uals to be re-acquainted. with the pctt'er and. utility of

their cnr¡r r¿iIIs, a^s well a¡; awakened. to the constrictions they a1lowed.

society to place upon them.

L Bffir 2i2, c.f., AS, pp. L8,22r 25.

f

rr3

It is l,e 8.1one who have ri.evised. cause' sequ'ence, for-each-other,relabivity , constraint , number , Iaw, freedcm, motive ' -

g^rìi[ purpose 'and vhen ve project aná niix this s¡nnbol world into things 8s if itexisted t'in itsetfrr''Ìfe act once more as we have always actecl -,Ulnotàg"eaLLy. Tlre "'¡rfree vill" is mythology; in real- life itil only a matter of s'brong and' ueak' vills ' I

Tn Nietzschels ter:ng, the par:ad.ox is that man has separated himsel-f

f:.cm creative efforts to make the world. intelligible. Having constmctecl

a series of hermeneutical concepts crut of a need for convenient and

manageable explanations of the vorld.r mgrl ceme to regard such concepts

as objectively val-id., e.s d.istinct frcmr their hunan source. By default,

then, ma¡r relinquishecl his control over the entire 1ùrencmenal- world' in

favour of that depository of vaiuations, society'

Such a d.evelotrrnent was far fron benign, hcwever, since soCiety' once

in possession of hunan values and s¡rnbols, used them against ma¡' Rousseani

had ccrne to the same conclusion with respect to morality in particular,

ar¡d he bel-ieved., J-ike Nietzsche, that society had gradual-þ perverted'

uro::ality, rrntil that morali.ty came to donj-nate and subseqtrentþ pervert

its human creators and agents " In response to this, Rousseau wished' to

ehange the moral nature of ms,n and make it coincid'ent with a moraf ity of

the gtate, in the hope that both vould provid.e mutual support. As has

been pointeô out o l{ietzsche s€tw such a course as frarrght wittr d'anger rather

than pronTise, and. rejected. the notion that man shoulil undergo the ehanges

l. BGFI , 2r.

lIl+

t-

a

thab Rousse art mootecL. By contrast, Nietzsche concentrated. upon ùì

attack on, not any particul-ar expression of morality, but on the trfact"

of nora-li*uy itself. I

A ¡noral,ity, a mod.e of living tried. snd. pr'û)ed Uy long experienceand testing, at tength enters consciou-.tness as a lal¡, as døninating -And tlierevith the entire group of relateð values and- states entersinto it: it becomes ve¡ter¿rb-le, unassailable, holy, true; it ispart of its d.er,'elopment that its origin should. be forgotten - thati.s a sign it has beccmne master - 3

The impti.cation of this, as fel,r as Ror¡sseauls vork is concerned', is

that his eGn'bTab socit¿L l{a.s conceived. r^¡ithin the ccnfines of etisting

socia.l morrrlity, md therefore coul-d. nt:t sllcceecl- lln creating e ne\)

morality of the State at a*Il." Lf this is true, then, Rousseaurs theory

in effect per¡retuates both the existing valuational moð.e and the und'er*

lyitrg principles that give ri.se to any set of mores.

The origin of mores may be found. in two thoughts: trsociety isr+or-th more than the inclividuaì.r" and t'enduring ad.vantage is to bepreferreci to ephemera-L a¡lva¡rtage" - frcrn vhich it foll-ows that theãn¿tp:-ing ad.'rra.nì;a.ge of society must be given preced.ence, unconili.tionallyover the aCvarrtage of the ind,ividual , especial\r over his monetarywej-.L-being but also over his end.u::íng adve.ntage and. even hiscontinued existence. l+

These ttr.¡o thoughtst are indeed prersent in Rousseauls insistence that

the sovereign peop-Le subsr¡mes each incì.ividual , e-nd. in the creation ofç

tlre State to establish and rn*intain liberty and. equalít'y,' l'ìee rejection

l_ Tracy Strcng offers this explanation of Nietzschers position. ttFor

him, because trs¡.itional philosophy did more or less accurate\y¿esóriUe peoplers lives, it is to be :'ejected., along with those lives.Hrrnan moral reasoning did speak of huma¡l moral concerns" It is thenoral corrceïns themsel-ves a¡rcl the lives which gave rise to then thatl{ietzsche is conce¡ned to attack.r' Strong, oP- eit., p. 15.

?_

L

2J.

Þloral.ity ie a "facttt in the mythoì.ogical sense, whereby ma¡r createsmoral-ity, then forgets it is his creation.

W,5Il+.

\ffi, 89. Also "a moral system then constitutes for Nietzsche an

organised. abtempt tc legitimíze a pan-ticul-ar strrrc'bure of behaviour'.It is anal-ogous to vhat we mig¡t caLl ideology tulay, a d.efense ofthe ul-timatã vatiaity of a tcrnporary a¡d restricted- system of action'In r¡ncovering a moral system Nietzsche seeks to reveal what preciselyis beirrg ius'bifieri, Strong , oP. ct',t., p. 33.

.'i" sc, r, 6.

a

1..r5

of Rousseaurs attempt to incorporate a new civil norality is augmented

by Nietzschef s betief that rrthe moralist d.isintegrates the moral

instincts, however much he msy suppose himself to be their restorerr" f

and. is of particular relevance to Nietzsche?s viev of state and society,

s¡d. the rel-ationship between the tvo thinkers in the fotlowing respects.

First, despite Ernir equivocation about the worth of ind.ir¡iclual

thought, Nietzsche makes clear his attitud.e to both state and society.

Ttre state, vhether actual or ploposecl, is totalJ-y unaccepteble to Nietzsche

on the ground.s that it cannot fail- to irùibib the development of the

single iird.ividual as vefl- as arrest the p:'ogress of ma¡kind. in general.

Society, on the other hant1, recej-ves pointe<L criticisns on\y in the

Iimitecì con'bext of its fonn at any particular time" Thus Nietzsche is

able to go into scare detail c¡¡er the merits or othervise of civitisation

in his and. the preced.ing tpo centuri"u.2 Aiso, speeific ind.ications of

boLh the futu.re for society ancl the d,irections in which Nietzsche believes

it should. move toward that future are provid.ed..3

As r+ith the state, l{ietzsche expresses his concern in terms of b}re

individuaJ-, sgain invití-ng conperison rvith Rousse&u, and. bringing us to

the seconcl and l-ess obvious issue, even though we are met with- a contrast

rather than a ccmpa:'ison. Rousseau maðr correctly be id.entified. as a

moralistz whose e-in vas to re-estatrlish virtue ín private ancl social life.

For Nietzsche, ìrowever, the pursuit of such an id,eal- is not onþ docrned.

to failure, trut the vork of a moralist wi-I1 in effect exacerbate and.

'rd.isintegrate" whatever moral instincts might be extant. If this is the

case, then Rou*sseau, a-l-beit unintentionally, contributed. to an increasing

l-" WP, l+23.

I^/P, 95 r "1'lle I'lrree Centuries.'r

q.ü., üh, vrl .

2.

3"

t

LI6

clisaffection with noralistic interpreta'bions of the world. hrith this

aspect of lìousseauis effect on ninetr-'enth century society, Nietzsche

sees on\ positive results, ond. in fact more tha¡r endorses ar¡¡ veakening

of the hold- of morality over society.

O rny brotherri, a¡n T cruel? lSut I sey: what is faLl-ingr weshoul-d. still- push" Everything today falls and <lecays: who '^¡ouldcheck it? But I - I even vant to push it. I

2. Geneal-oglf of Morals

Thus Nietzschets questioning of the concepts that underpin Rousseaufs

philosopliy becones changed, in many ""=pu"i", into a concerbed. attempt

to clestroy those concepts outri6ht. To achieve this, Nietzsche tr:rned

to an historical exanination of ma¡r and mo::al-ity - a genealog¡ of morals -

vhich was al-so capable of clemonstrating the valid-ity of his thought as

2a vnoIe.

However, there is much in {ie-,,zschef s ionception of morality as it

r"e-l-ates to mr.rnrs nabure thst is reminiscenb of Rousseau. Even though

Rousse¿ru resorbed^ to a belief in a Supreme Being, he establ-ished. that

nan l¡as the creator of his mor¿r-L cond-uct. I'f,en may not be good. as god.

vas good., but manlÍas ccryoble of good., and. eould. choose to be so.

Sinilarly, ngn was capabte of ancl could choose to create evil. In both

cases, Boussearrt s god was vitliout the ability or responsilifity attached

'b,: such choices, ancl Rousseeturs; incliviclual man r¿as lefb entireþ to his

own devices to decid.e upon the nature of his nors,l behaviour" There is

cfose a,.ffiní.ty between these notions of menr god, and. evi-l. and.

Zarathustral s o

I TSZ, p. 32f.

l{ietzsche wrote a book entitled GeneaLogy of MoraLs, to which we

vil.l::efer, but we éì3"e l.ess co¡rcerned with its genealogical orsocioJ-o¡4ica-L accuracy as ve &re vith the important link it providesin the d.eveJ-opment of poì-i.tical theory fr<xn Rousseaur s time toirlietzsche I s.

2.

t

rl_?

ve:.iì-y, mån gave themsel-ves al-l- their good. Bnd evil. verily,they d.icl not take it, they did not find it, nor did. it cone tothern as a voice frcrn heaven. Only man placed values in things topreserve himself - he al-one created a meanin¡ç for things, a hunart

meaning. 'Iherefore he calls hinself ttm8l.l,t' which means: theesteemer. I

Vlhat d-ifferentiates Nietzsche a,s Zarathustra frcxn Rousseau of the SoaLaL

Conl.nact is bhe clirection of anatytical perspective. Rousseau is concerned

v:'-th an internal process, assuming that each man is in, constant touch

vith a moral- nature, vitling the good. in accordance with that nature ' or

chcosing evil against his natur:e. Nietzsche, on the other hand, refers

to manj EIs a, species in social groups, deciding the value of external

matt,ers in ter:ns of good. anÔ evif, rather tha¡r assessing his personal

behaviour. T1ìe resu-l-t js that Nietzscl:e must deny any belief in a mora^l-

nature.

hne hecønes ntoraL - not bectanse one ís motaL" Submission tomora.ì,i'vy can be slavish or vain or selfish or resigned or obtuseþenthusiastic or thor-rghtless or sn act of clesperation, like thesubmission to a prince: in itsel-f it i-s nothing moral-. 2

Irlietzschers tmclerstand.ing of morafity, hor+ever incipient in

Rousseauts conceptj.on of a self-created. morality, provid.es a powerful

revision of the moralistic viev of hr¡lan nature, and d.iverts attention

from the {p¿ivi¿ua-I to e. wid.espread social- phencrnenon. Since Nietzsche

cer s¿ìy that ttthere aJe no moïal phencnnena at all , but onþ a moral

inteqpretatiorr of phenornenor"3 all phiJ-osophy the,t exanines morality

es an c¡ssential-, spiritual cupacity of man is mistaken. In Ror::sseauts

ca-se, while be <lescribeicl a ma¡lifestation of social moralityr and even

criticised. its contemporary forrn (¿rs Nietzsche vas to d-o), there was no

real appreciation of the causal factors und-er\ying its continuing

1. T57,, p. }Jl.

0,9T.

BGE:, rOB.

2.

1r-B

inf:Iuence.l l,l1etzsche takes up this task in I-BBT, rv-riting on the GeneaLogy

of lfuor7Ls, asking t'unrl.er vhat condj.tions did man d'evise these vaJ-ue

judgmenLs good- and. ev-il-? orl utLtat ualue d.o t\'tey themseLues possess?"Z

By this str-rd.y, Nietzsche confirms the existence of two major tapo's of

rnorality * slave and. ma^ster norc-Iity - abtaching the first to the behaviour

of ilre hercl , and. master moral.-i.ty'bo what might be clesignated' as the

sristocratic viev of human natur-e. lYacy Strong points out that these

genealogical categorisa;bions shoufcl be regarded. only in their specific

d.es criptive context .

Genealogy is the analysis of that which makes "things'r intofacts for usl- it rrn more pu.'sues the enpirical tha¡ does, forj-nstance, th; elaboratian of the trmod-e of prociucli9n" in ì44'rx orthe ilgenár,aL v¡il_1" in Rousseau. t'Slave moralityr? is for Nietzschenot ¿r description of what "si vestt do, but rather the name of thatmoral- systerr-whose con,sti-r,uting elements color most activities vith,,slave *orJity.tt 'Ihe ttcontextr" so to speak, gives a particularactivity a slavely moraJ- meaning. 3

sl"ave moraì-ity has a speciaJ- sigrrificance in Nie'Èzschets writings,

because lre associ.ates it r.¡ith the rise of democratic movements enrl' the

increasi-ng ri.crninance of the herd.. Rousseau is seen to be in part

responsibl-e for this d-evelopment because he popul'arisecl notions of equality

and. tiberty, givi ng a pol-iticaf voice to the z'essent'Lment of the mob, and-

t I

¿.

Rr¡usseaurs d"esire to procluce a profould. political analysis was based

upon h ations of the government of venice during his time

ai nmb L secreta'y. In the space of fourteen yeers, however,

Rousse s "harl ¡ectne great\y enlarged. by the historical-study ." Cortf, f , 55. ttlre i= án inportnnt d-istinctionto he een a .i.t-,ay of the hie bong of morals and' a"n hístoricalstu(y. only in the former csse can origins and. causal factors be

sought and. anaJyserl" An historical stuay, on the other hand'' rnight

demärstrat* *. irrufutab-Le Link betveen politics and morality,*it¡o.tt provid"ing an adequate expla,nation of hÕr¿ this caate about,or vithout canvaãsing ar4¡ a-Lternatives 'uo such a tirù'

&lo trPreface rtt rr1 '

Íitlong, op. eít." pp. \f-8.)

,

llg

aì-l,owing them to cfa-im uniuersaL value in their crwn existenceo For

Nietzsche, claims based. on tì.enocrabic principles ind'icate the ecceptance

of a mod.ern and. seculeriseå form of ol-d.er moraf systems of thought.

Such a secul-s.risation. then, call be said to be due to the trend ofþr (^,rr!a ) orr - ?,

Rousseaurs tho¡g,ht, and the inftuence he he.d. on the history of political

thouglrt. 11s von Rj.ntctlen sees it, mants u¡rderstand.ing of the world ha8

gone through successive clevelopnental sbages, each more secular than the

l-a*st. lJ'hiÌe he regard.s Rousseau as having d.escribed. the most recent of

those developrnents, it cs.r¡ be seen that Nietzsche, by examining and- rejecti

the cornplete process, actuelly provides the next logical step.

Accord.ing to the old. faith all things depettd.ed on a Being,absol-ntel-y d.ivine yet capable of being apprehend'ect by way of arralog¡,by whom the v6rl-d. ha<1 been created.. This fìrndamental conceptionÌ¡as pïogressive.ì.y el-iminated. by the secularization of the mode::n mind.t,lia¡ irnalineo that he coul-d solve the rid.d.le of the cosmos, firstthrough mathematics e¡rL mechanics ( rationalisn) , then throughsenses and experience ( sensualisrn) , through measuring nature(natqrat-ism) , or: throu6¡h the subjectivity of the irrd-ivid.ual ego(rom¿¡nticism)" I

Like Il.ousseau, Ni.etzsche rejected. the claims of rationalism,

sensualism and empiricist naturalism to prov-id.e the final solution to the

cosmic riad.le, even thor-rgh some el-ements of each of these are to be found'

in bo'bh thinkers' woi'ks.2 fhe säne cennot be said. of rcrnanticism,

hcn¡ever. By assessing public reaction to his La Nouue'Lle HâL'ise, ay

ccrnparing his efforts with those of Richardson (art ttinsipidtt rrxrence

vriter) r' Hour="au ilemonstrated an &wareness of his contribution to a

Iiterary movement subsequentþ' classifiecl. Rcnnanticism' Further, Rousseau

a¿mits that he vas in'ra s'bate of most feverish ecstesyt' a.ndrrinflame<l

t J. von Rintei:et, Begr-ntd Et.istentúaLism' Trans. Hi-Id'a Graef , George

Al-l-en 8r Unwin (Lontlon 196I) , P" 19.

For cxomp-Le n both lìousseau ancl Nietzsche are anti-rationalist, butn<¡t irralionalist, botlt accord sone significa¡rce to the explanatorrystrength of sensua-lisro, {rnd Nietzsche in par-bieu}ar stresses thei.mportance of naturcrLisn in man, WP, 73.

t'il) r 62.

La

2

l20

¡,

imagirtatiotr"I evitlellce of a' d'eliberate intention to

subrnj-t vholehearted.-ly t,o the f sub¡ectirrity of tlre ind-ivid'ual ego'l

Nietzsche cond,enns romzutticism, b'.rt this is offset to scme d'egree by his

recognition of the fur^cla¡nental impo::tance of the inclivid'uel- ego' expressed

jn his terms as the will to pswer. Hovever, Nietzsche cannot a6gee that

subjectivity, a mere facet of the ego, shoulrl be elevated as a principle

in itself'. To Nietzsche, Rousseauts glorification of subjectivity is

both d.estructive of man and proof of the perpetratorrs noralisticD

nienclaciousÊe ss.'-

Ilanantieisma]'aRc¡usseau:passion(''thesovereignrigtrtofpession,,);-irr*f,.ou.l-,'""n"; lfr. faåcination .f madnees (foffy j-ncluded-

in greatness); the a surd- vanity of the weak marl; r&lcour of the

mob as jud-8ie ("for ¿¡ hunCred years no\r! a sick me¡r has; been accepted

as a lead-er in Politics") ' l'

Al.bhor,rgh Rc,usseau is once again the object of vilification, Nietzschers

criticism is not so much aimerl at him per 8e, as it is against the uses

that was mo.de of his vork. "What va:; sick in lìousseau v&s a'ùnired' a¡rd'

.i mitated, r[ost."3 For l{ietzsche, Rousseau was claimed' by the herd- as the

chanpion of the common mart, r-esulting in a strengthening of slave mor:afity"

But Rousseau va.s by no mea¡s entirely responsibte for the degradation

clf níneteenth centul:Y mån"

8.o ChristianitY

,llhe d.ilenna. 8.s I'lietzsche saw it is that any morality is preclicated

upon the existence of a gocl frour vhcrn nan receives his understond'ing

of good a¡rd erril. No+.vithstand.ing the irrereasir€ importance of secul-sJ'

vorrd.-vir¡ws since the Fenaisseuìce, christianity continued' to d'crninate

l.

2.

rbid", l-oo, ro2r.

wp,6¿"

rb¿d., t@, 1o2l-.J¡

t

l-2I

manrs bel-ief that moral clesi.gnations r¡ere hand.ed. dovm, artcì. could not

be questioned.. As Robert Sol-omon points out, Nietzsche attacked all-

systems that accept this basic religicrrrs belief "

Nietzsche attacks ìrnder the seme rubric all moralities thathave universal principles, vhich appeal to universnl reason ratherthan ind-ividual- d.esirãs and |tvirtu.€sorf TLre conneet,ion between

christian morality, Platonic metap\ysics, Kant t s practica-l reason,and ttherd. mo::alityti is their mutual- d.ema¡rd. for universal and'

suprapersonal values. L

These obserr¡ations ca.n be rel-ated. to Rousseaurs thought on two l-evels.

First, his pirilosophy of the State and. the concept of the general will

represent a reconciliation of the Pl-atonic conception of m8.n as zoon

poLitikon and. the reJ-igious ind.ivid.ualisn inherent in Rousseaurs personal

forrn of Christianity. Seconcl , Christi*n though he vas, Roussea'u rejecte<ì

the d,octrinal- clains of the major reJ-igions by reference +'o his in<liviclual-

d.esires a¡d- virtues, as str:ecies man. This represents, Nietzschets

criticisn not withstand.ing, an important step away frcm received- moralityt

hancled, d,own frqn a god by a mediating religious in.gtitution' Nietzsche

took this clevelopment to its logical- concLgsion to der¡¡ categoricall-y

that norality we-s anythi.ng but a soeial-,nod.aIity. Ttre greatest obstacle

to be overcüne vas Christianity itself.

I call_ Christia¡rity the one great curse, the one greatinnermost corruption, tire orr" g""ãt instinct of revenge, for which

no means is 1:oilonous, subtu"""nut', smaLL enough - I calL it ttreone iromorta-l bl.emish of mankind. 2

Aì-thougtr we nTight expect Nietzsche to be critical of chrisbianity

on the grounds that it constitutes a folîtral-ised, social morality, an¿l

protects and. extends the influence of that morality, this particular

religion is singled out for speciaJ" attention to end speculation about

prime causes external to the individuaJ-. By provid-ing a genealogical

I. Robeït C. Sofcmron, r'Nietzsche, Ilihilisn, and. Moralityrt' inNietzsche: A CoL-Lection of Critieal Essqs, oP' cit', p' 22O'

2. A, 62.

a

l.22

examination of the Christia¡r church in particul-ar, Nietzsche sets

hfurself the task of reachirig a ìretter understan<ì.ing clf the inner core of

mo^n, the inner: core that Rousseau cfaimed. to have discoverecl in his

politicat vritings ancl, more specifical.ty, in }-ís Confess'iorß. At

t¡e same time, & cl-ose anaþsis of Christianity voul-d reveal its roots

anct the l:eason$ for its clccninant r"cle over the centrrries. Whatever its

inffuence en<l importsnce in the pasb ancì. the present, Nietzschers ultimate

re.,¡el-ation is that the furd.amental presuppositions of the Christian

r:eligion are irre.Ie.¡a¡t to mo<lern society"

cerbainþ the christiarl refigion is an antiç¡uity projected.:'-nto ou,r times frcrn remote prehistory; and. the facb that thecl-ain is be-ì-ieved - wher"ea^s one is otherwi-se so strict inexamining pretensions - is perhaps tire most ancient piece ofthj s heritage. I

Iiere l,fietzsclre is incli.cating that, d.espite aJ-1 previous works on

reJ-igion, ib is he al-one who actually poses ques-bions, not for religion

to zu.¡swer, but al¡out reì-i.gion itself, that cennot be answered- in a

religi.ous fasliion" This appr:oach l.ea.d.s lùietzsche to perce:ive that the

strengtlr of Christia-riity lies in its appeal to i;he üeakness of its

ailherents -ttth¿, drcrss a¡ld. refu:;e el-ements of every kind'tt - a principle

that applies equally to his view of slave mora1,ity.2 Such a religion,

hc¡weverr cBJr only perpetuatelreakness, rather than mitigate o:: remove it.

perhaps nothing in Christianity is as venerabl-e as their art9f t,eaching even the lol¡l-iest h<Yç¡ to pla,ce themselves throughpiety in añ il-Iusory ord.er of things and, thus to naintain theircontentment with the real order, in vhich their life is hard. enough -nnd prc-cisely th-ls h¡arclness is necessary. 3

llietzsche augnents his insights into Christianity with a method'otogica

critique, revealing a vhole series of contrivances - rlonsense vithout

stilts even - that are mai¡rtainecl because there are no means by which

the¡' qen be tested.

l_ n üAll , rl_3 .

?. Rolsseau seems v:i llingl.y to irave converterl hj.s weakness into spirituaìcertitucle. "The best lse I can make of my reason is to resign itbcfore thee; rny rnincl cleiights, r1y veakness rejoices, to feel myselfov'e.n¡he-lmed blf thy greatrìess." EmiLe' p. ?-\9.

3. DGE, l¡-L. C)r, ers Mar,', vou-Ld. iL, Chris'bianity f\rnctions ûfJ 8n

opiai;e,

a

r23

In Chrj-stianity neither rno.r:ality nor reJ-igion has even asingl-e point of contact vith reality. Nothing but imaginarycürt{:i€s (ttGod.rt' ttsou-Lrt' tt"gortt ttspirit rtt ttfYee r¿illtt - for thatmatter, I'unfree vi1l") , not,hing but imaginary effecte (ttsinrttrr reclempti on ,tt tt gr:a,cÉì ,tt ttplmisirment ,tt tt f orgiveness of sinstt ) . I

By distinguishing between retigion on the one hand and. morality on

the ottrer, Nietzsche d.ravs attention 'bo the relationship betveen the

institutional a-spect of Christianity and" its l-ess apparent infl-uence

on mora-l- belief. This characterisation of Christianity as a highty

comp-l.ex anci eff,eetive structu-ral pretence, whereby &n erroneous re-

d.efj¡ritj,on of reality is su'stained by imaginarXr causes anil effects,

brings into question the forrnclatl'-on of tirristian religious worship -

fs;ith.

From the start, the Ctiris'bian faith is a sacrifice¡ as:acrifice of a,L-l freeclcxn, all- pride, all self-confid.ence of thespirit; at the same ti¡ne' enslavernent ancl self-rnockerXr, seJ-.f-mutifatíon. 2

llut this cle::ogetion of fa.ith is not confined" to jud.gmentr¡ concerning

the spiritr-ro.I r¡eakness of the believer a¡rd- the destructive effects of

taittr on ir¡clividual-ity. \Ihite llietzsche sees the ramifications of the

practice of faith, he also challenges the id.ea that faittr in Christ,

as the nost significant exarnple, vilJ- actually prod"uce a Christian.

It is false to ttre point of nonsense to finrl the mark ofthe Christian in e "faithr" for insterìce, in the faith inred-empti"on through Christ: only ühristian pnactice, a life suchas he líued who d.ied on the cross, is Christian. 3

Nietzschers attiturle to the existence of Christ is of interest here,

especia-l-Iy with respect to the vievs that Rousseau heLd" Rousseau

diverged from est¿bl-isherl rloctrine by remaining entirely sceptical as

to vhetirer he shouJ-cl accept scriptual insistence that Christ vas Godrs

son, Ie-b ¡¡Ionethe notion of the resur:rection. Also, he was quite

satisfiecL to bel-ieve that it was Christls dÊti.,Jns that mad.e him Christ-

1ì.keo a¡rd that he r+as bu'b +¿h¡: livi.ng example of Plators imaginary goocl

L. A, ]t.

?-, BCE , \6.

3. A, '39.

]

12ì+

már:, ancl nothing to...l Sirnilarly, Nietzsche points out that a simple

bel.ief in r+hat Christ did, or: w&s srrpposed. to do, couIcl never mske one

a Christian. By implication, then, for both Rousseau and Nietzsche,

faith vas not as inrportant as living accorcling to that irurer nature of

man to wliich both al-lr:d.ed., but vhich neither enunciated ful-ly"

It j-s cl-ear, Ìrowever, tha;b Rousseau and. Nietzsche are suggesting

that each life has a ruriclpeness that preclud.es the ind.irrid.uaL abst,racting,

th::oug,h "f¿,rithrtt Lury intrinsj.c povers of sel-f-expression. fn this

ï€ìspe-ctu Nietzsche echoes lìousseaurs cr:i.tique of established- religion,

since both reject the notion ihat fhristianity, as a cu-ltural heritage

of ,,^iestern civilisation, shorlld be fgrmalised. and. pressed. into the

ser',,'í ce of seJ,f-seek;itrg L-hurch institutions.

It is the srrre sign of the d.eath of a retipçion when its nr,ythicpresìr"pposi.tions beccxue systemabised, under the severe, rational -

eyes of rur orthoctox ilogmati.sm, into a rea.d¡r surn of historiealevents , and vhen peopie begr1n timid.þ defend-ing the veracity ofmyt,h but a.t the sarne time resist its naturaf continuaJrce -wtren +.he feeting for my:th r,¿ithers nnd its place is taken by areligi on cl aiming hist oricaJ.. found-at ions . 2

Rousseauts athorrence of Church tloctrine, however, implies i.rhat marly

r,¡orrld:.egan:d. &s an eclually inclemonstrable faith: the belief that man ca¡r

fincl h:Ls tlre sel-f thror.rgh rxl exzutrination of his place in the world,

natural- and supern¿:,turs.f, sc that he may cone to B¡I understand.ing of

himself and" est..¡b1ish control over his bod.ily passions by the exercise

of his conscience - å, balance of reason and. emotj-on. Christianity, in

tbis event, is in Roussear-r.ts philosophy an affirmation that man is a

mora.L creature, hrhose goodness had beccrne innate trut rema¡Lned, corruptible

in contemporary society, ancl yet corrigilte in a just anci good State.

T¡us a civj-l- religion, proposed by Rousseau as a moral support for the

State, implies that ma¡l is 1,o be clefined. by a ccrnbination of ccnm.unitarian

construct,s governl'.ng nìo^n s,s a social- being and supernaturaf propositions

retati-ng to rnan as a"rl indivi.clual .

To Nietzsehe, this is ¿ur r"rnacceptabfe ro¡anticism, and. he coul-cl see

1. . iln'iLc , 26r, ?,'(r"

2. BT, p. 68.

t

r25

only negative res;ul-ts flowing from Fousseaurs modernisation ar¡d

secu"l-arisation of rt-'Ìigion b;y red.ucing it to the reaLm of the individual.

As far as Nietzsche ves concernerJ., the soci¿rl aspect of religion must be

questioned. and- indeed. d"enied.; maÌ1 no longer need. bel-ieve that any

superordinate bein¡g other than rnan presently exists. Man shoul-d. therefore

be freecl , not only fron religion ¿r.s L repressíve instit;utíon, but also

fron tlre ::epressive force ot '[nr]iuiãuaLly-hdld beliefs that man is not

the sole, motj-vating entity for life, Here Rorrsseau is appropriately

criticisecl trecause he, like Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel-, and, Kierkegaerd

efter hirn, stiJ-l- insisted on ma^i-ntaining a goC. \^Ihat vas'¿orse i.n

Nietzschets viev vas that lìousseau seemed. to succeecl in his intenrl,ed. aim

of mal<ing religion more attractive by giving a very personal version of

Christianity that i¿on ",,¡icl-e a.ppeal-.t n"u Rousseanl been content to give

onl-y a critique of institutionalised reli.gion, and- not atteinpt to entrench

the basic moraL and, r'el.i6;ious presuppositions of Christianity in a

modern fashion, I'lietzsche may have treen less vitriolic against his

eighteenth centr.ry preclecessor. RoL¡sseaurs efforbs notl¡ithstanding,

Nietzsche is certain thab the J-ong reign of Christian dominance in the

'vtrestern phrilosophical. tradition is at l-ast cøring to an end..

It seems to me-bhat bhe onþ appro¡rriate response is a carefuf,consid,ered vithdraval-: I hc¡nor religion thereby, though it is ad-ying religion o... Christie¡rity will very shorb\y be ripe for acritical- history, an autopsy. 2

1. ".... it is probable bhat the aspèct of the vorb (EmíLe) wlnídnrna.d.e the most immeri.iate impact on Rousseaurs contemporaries was. " ". the d.iscussion on religion." t'But his influence certainl-yseems to have been for rather than against religion, even theÇhristian reJ-igj-on: aithough refutations continued to couple himvi.'bh the ra.tiona-list opponents of religion, the main appeal oftL: Professíon tle foi vas a spiritual if not religious one,contrasting vitlÌ the increasing popul.arity of materialism, enilit lrr.i-s even been seen as an irnportant preparatory catlse of theCabhclic revival of ',,he c¡rrly nineteenth centurXr"" P.D. Jimack,Intro<l.uction to EmíL.e, I97\, pp. xx, xxiii.

?. Qr"rotetl ín l,övittr, op. *it", p. 370.

].26

3. Society vithout Religion

Although prepared. to Ìionour reli-gion, llietzsche does not mourn its

irurninent d.emise, for re¿lsons which are importa¡t to our anadysis, since

it can be sho¡m hov Rousseauls thor"rght relates to Nietzschers on three

issues, First,llietzsche regarcì.s a¡r historical outfine of retigious

val-uational pred.clninance ín a steedy d.ecl,ine as necessary t'therapytt

for nociern ma.n, as he ccrmes to be reLeased. frør the valuations of

arrtiquity. Secon<1, mÍLrì €rs B-n inctj.vidual is al-so faced, by the d.eath

of god, giving nev mennin6¡ to the supremacy of the self. Finalþ,

Nietzschets d.evel-opnent of these points brings into perspective his

genealo63' of mornl s &s arr element of both a critique of mod.ern society

anc] the vision of future society peculia^r: tc' Nietzsche¡s philoscphy,

".Iith regard. to the waning influence of Christianity, Nietzsche

vas vel,l avsJe that both jnd,ividuals and. society, while cognisant of

the change, vere un.c;ure of vìrat it meant. This brings hin preciseÌy to

the pararlox that faced Rousseau a century earl-ier - society reflects

both the wcrst fears and. the greatest hopes of mankintt.

In surwna: the r¿orfd as it ought to be exists; this r,rorl-d-,in which we l-ive, is a:r error - this r¡orld. of ours ought notto exist. l-

Roussean:, who saw himself as "a skille<1. anal¡¡st of the hrrnan heartrt'

r,¡as forced to the ssme conclusion, no better exemplified. then by his

r¡ithdrar.¡a.t frcrn the Paris safons into sol-itud.e to write tracts cled.icated.

to the betterrnen'b of his beloved. felfow man. Both writers were struck

by the rlj-fficulty of searching for the irner core of marr arrd. concluded.

that, a-Lthough one may 'be said to exis+, , such a tttruet' nature l¡as

continual-Iy frr-r.strateci and distorterl , and- that ma¡ls t'naturetr does not

csne to f::uition ttnatrrrally.t' lhe recognition and. attention that

Rc.¡us;seau and I'lie'tzeche give to this problem distinguishes them frcrr any

claims that they are br-¿t higii priestg of ind"ividualist plrilosophy. Both

,'rP, 585 (n) .

2a

I

ít Cont, p.5O)+, (ilohen 'i;i:anslation) .

+

I2T

sought to explain the "chnjns" that restrict the hr-rman spirit.f

Su¡:plementing his earl-ier indi.vidualistic stance, a.s expressed. in the

second Ùiscottrse, Iìousseau stressed the sociaì- aspects of rnants

existence that seem to him to suggest a ccrnmunitarian solùtion. As

pointed out in ürapter TI1., Rousseau pr:oposecl. a strong, supportive and.

therapeutic ccr¡ununity that wor-rld. protect and nurtu¡e the essential-l-y

weak sociaJ- sentiments in ma¡kincì., thus changing ind.ivicluals into

d"utifl.rl , moral- r:nd just c:'-tizens.

By contrast, Nietzsche abjures such a solution on the grounds,

first, that catering to srrch a lreakness viil only serve to mainta-in

jts; exj-stence, perhaps even to reinforce it. This premise unrlerpins

the conceptir:n of slave and- m¡-Lster rrc,ralities, and. the criticism of

pcpular d.emocratic novements with their ernphasis on equality and-

individ.ual hrunan rights.

The sjngle one, the t'incliviclual ,t' as hitherto understoodby the people ancl the philosophers al-ike, is an error afber aII:he j-s nothing by himself , no a,tor, no "link in the chainr" nothingmerely inherited .fron former times; he is the vlrole single lineof h,¡manity up t,o himsel-f " ?-

Íthis remark¿bLe reclefini'Lion of the individua.l- - the cur:rent expressi.on

of one progressing -ìineege j.nstea¿l of ar autoncrnous entity possessing

certain qualities and rights - allov¡s Nietzsche to dista¡rce hirnself

even rnore frcun other pliiJ-osophies that incorporate a conception of the

individ,ual. lfietzschers understand.ing of the individ-ual cuts across the

conventional- notion of att mankin<1. fitting into the category of ttbeing

an ind.ividuaf'r at sqre time or other, whether that may be through his

sr.¡cia} activity B.s per Mrrr'x, or in the tegatistic sense of liberal-

democratic theory. Iror l{ier¿zsche, it is not so much ttman as arl

individuaJ-r" but inclivid.ual man ¡r,s a thread. cf hurnanity" Âny collection

of inri.ividlrals or "thread.sr', then, will go to make up the ttfabric'r of

I. (i.u", SC, In Ii anrL try'orks, VoI. V, p" 29.

2. I'f " "skirrnishes," 33.

a

L28

society, as it \"rere, and it is as threa¡1s in such a fabric thot Nietzsche

assesscìc the worth of each incliviclual , ffi e representative of either

an ascenrJ-irg (strong) or d-escend.ing (weak) rlevelopment of humanity.

This presentation of the ind"ivid,ual a-c a marrifestation of humanity

rather than as a unique and single life brings us to his second point

r:crrce rnj.n¿1 society" I{ietzsche is unvil-Iing to accept that therapeutic

d.omination anri- d.irection of a wealç social being by a Rousseauía¡t

cornmunity is either possibl.e or d,esiraì:le.

The single human Ì:eing is a piec e of fatton frcrn the front a¡rafrcrn the ïear, one lav more, one necessit¡' ¡¡6tu for al-l that isyet to ccrne and t,r be. To say to hi:n, "Charrge yourselflrt is to<lema¡d. that everythirrg be changeil , even retroactively. l-

In genera,I , the past irnpinges upon the present ¿rnd- upon the creative urge

of ma¡rkin,å to re-forîn continr-rally hj-s social conditions. fn particular,

ind-ividuals experience fl.l-ierlation frcrn themselves as creative agents

beca,use they are .lockecl within the framevork of a mora-l id.eolog¡.

AJ-though llietzscire cloes not d.etail a strict phylogeny of one nature

being overcane by a second- nature, he did believe that there existed a

clr¡se connection betr,reen i.rurate characteristics a¡d the forrnation of

social- systems, jus'b as +uhose innate characteristics were affected. by

the env-ironment j.nto vhich they carne. In this respect, Nietzschers viev

bears renarkable resemblance to the critical portions of Rousseaurs

historico--anthropologicaÌ vj.ew of the development of man from the state

of nature into civi-l slociety, particr.r-larly his íd.eas of the nature of

:na¡ ¿urd. the most funcler¡entai facul-ties cqnmon to all . It va,s Rousseauls

conten+,ion that the original. state of man has been changed and augmented.

by successive sta4çes, chiefly as the resul-t of the capacity for sel-f-

improvement, "inherent j.n the speeies &s in the ind.ivid.ual."2 Ïfhen

1. IT, "l4orality as /ul+.i-N¡rture ," 6,

2* Of , p, 5\. For sr:rne of the significant changes, e.f., Of, Pts. I,'rr, q.t)", especiafly pp. 17, 5, , 6\, 82, 86, and 98-

ú

r29

Rousseau. refers torrhruna¡r n¿¡.trirer" tlten, it shoul-d. be taken into account

that he i-s at times scrutini'sing the rJ'eveloperd' and' refined humanttna'ture"

'bo be found. in conternpoïary ind.ivicluals, whi1.e also wishing at the same

time to point out that, since the greøt changes to hr:man nature have

in,¡ol-vec1 speaies rnenhind., tliere must be certain base eletnents upon which

subsequer¡b <levelopments rest. This base material , P.ousseau suggestst

shoul-d. be ciiscoverecl and assqyerJ. by the moral philoscpher so that future

stages in the grorrbh of the human species will- not be prejudicial to

the'ri'eal- nat;r:rer" the "i.nner coreit of ma¡rrt olra wiJ-I only hasten the

ad.vances of * perfectiì:ie ms^ïrkind..2

Rorrsseaurs concluslon here concerning the futr.rre for ma¡kind'

ilemons'brabes that the argreement between RouESeau B.nd. Nietzsche on this

issue of a d.eveloping human nature, r.rhiJ-e substantial , is by no mee¡s

total. certainþ, both sha,re an important presupposition - that the

"originaÌr' nature of m¿m has beerr rend,ered. unrecognisable by continual

cr-evelopment, but the.t each sta4;e hes been given a focus and. framevork

b_v its predecessor, vìlich j-n turn 't ransmits its source. Hcrwever,

Nietzschers unclerstand.ing of progress is at sone variance with Rousseaurs"

'Ihe notion of each "naturet' being supplantetl and. succeeded. by a tunewtt

ancl secÕrrd nature, vhich itself ultimabeþ becones submerged ancl eventuall;

crbsol-eteá amounts to a rejecbion of Rousseauts conception of

perfectibility as infinite clevel<rpment,al progress along a lineal?

conti¡uum.J For liietzsche, the transition fron the trad.itional nature

to a nev nat¡r'e is not *ìirst a question for the ind"iviaual, but for the

f . en).5 }lc¡usseauts reference to Gl¿tucus , O.f , Þ. 38.

2 " .:Jbid. ¡ pp. 5l+ , T\ .

-?" Enge.ls eu-logised. Rousseamts critique of contemporarJr society, ar}d-

took it to ue d.iaiecticaf. EngeÌs, oPn cit., po L66. Ttris isan opinion not shru'c:cl. by lrlietzsche.

a

t30

species. In general-, I'lietzsche sees each transition process (or

transva-ì-uation of val-,"res) as an inccnplete one, where the nev natu¡e

is never entirely abl-e to srrpplant the ol-d or tradj-tionally accepted-

nature" This is because âr "stern, ne.n¡ d,iscipliriett is subject to

cluestioning by arlherents and. dissid.ents alike, and. wil-l- be d,iluted, by

followers r¡ho ca¡not l.ive up to the new d.ema¡rcls. By impJ-ication, there

vifl exist, betveen inri,iriduals ancL groups of inclividua-ls conftict that

viII persj.st for some time, as the old. nature is t'withered.'r i.n the

presence of the new. WtLil-e srrch a scenario of hunan d.evelopment is jr-rst

as h¡'pothetical- as Rousseaurs historico-anthropological viev, in

l{ietzschets opiniorr there B.re sorne chan¡çes to manf s conception of himself

which result frsn dranatic adr¡ances in human understand.ing. These

chimges vi 1l- be diffe¡.'entia.ted from rurremarkable, s1ü,r or t'normalt'

progressiorr, because they <lemand. a, revolutionary transformation of

conventiona-1" wi.scLom. Nietzsche san+ hilnsel-f as both the herafd and

participant of one such revcllution, vhen he proclaimed. that God. is

d,ead.

Ive phitosophers ancl "free spiritsil feel oursel-ves to bechone upon by a new davn with the nevs that God is dead.. Ourheart ffows over with thanlilìrl-ness, Bn&zernent, presentiment,erpectatíon. Fina1.l.y! our ships can embatk again, and, gofo::th to every d.eurger. Every hazard. is again permitted. theinquirer, Perhaps there never vas so open s. sea. l-

I'lietzschers ime4ery is a. rrseful key to a better understand.ing of

his philosophical- insight. The d.eath of God. suggests something nev

a¡rd fresh for humanity as ve.l,l- as for philosophers, and. Nietzsche

ant;icipates philosophical voyages to new frontiers of knowl-edgu.2

.l-. GS, 3)+3, frcrn Arthur C. Dauto u Ni,etzsche øs PhiLosopher,Macltlllerr (tJev yorx f96)) , pp, I93-l+. A-Iso, I'Dostoevski vrote,tIf C/od. does not exist, everything i-s permitted.. t Zarathustrasays that God" is cleacl.. And. I'lietzsche wrote, in vhat must sureþbe a paraphrase of the Russian novelist he so ad.mired., rNothingj.s t::ue, ever¡rthing is permitted..ttt Ib¿d.

2" f'or exa;tpJ,eo llì.etzsc.he indicates the pointl-essness of provingtìrab God htts neoe! exisbetl. D, 92, 93.

a

131_

fmplicit -bo this view is the questioning of ultimate truth. If C,od

is d.ead"o then man cannot see himself as a moraL a¿ent in the

Rousseaui€.n senseo ile ca¡not juclge the morality of his actíons in

tenns of lrgood.trancl t'evil.rt'since these terms rely rr¡ron the existence,

orbhe bel-ief in the existence of a Supreme Bei,ng. Nietzsche is proposin¿g

that "truth" as it applies to huma¡r society resides only in the morality

of that society, and- is sanctioned. by the al-most defu¡ct l^Iestern religious

trad"ition of an omnipotent Gocl. The passing awaðr of God., therefore,

has a¡r impact on indiv-id.ual-s and society of profound proportions because

responsibility for the ve1ues that are hefd rests with the people and.

insLit.ru"ior:s that-have been taught and. created- respectiveþ as if those

va-lues were unquestionabLe curcl true.

Far fYom vishing to negate the worth of the past, however, Nietzsche

believed. 'bhat the long trad.ition of rnorel-ity has been the training grormd.

for the noraL incl.ivid.uaJ, giving to mankind. a certain rrniform plateau of

d.evelopment, from vhich man msy progress and beccme rrmore tha¡r norrral'f

a,nd. tru-ìy autoncmous. fhus, Nietzsche l-ooks tol¡ard a higher category

of man, pitted. by Nietzsche against the d.orúriant moral trad.ition that

persisted into the nineteenth century. In effect, he is suggesting that

moratity, even without the sanction of a gd, vill continue to operate

as i-f no el-ternative to a moral r¿or1d. orcler couLd. ever occur.

- We see how mora-Lity ( a) poisons the entire conception ofthe world,, (U) cuts off the road. to knov¡Ied.ge, to science, (c)d-isi.ntegrates and" undermines aIL actual instincts (in that itteaches that their roots are irnmoraf ).

We see at work before us a dread.fu]. tool of d.ecadence thatprops itself up by the tioliest na¡nes and. attitud.es. I

l-. WP, 581t.

132

By pointing out that rnorality was a facad"e that need.ed to be

destroyed., Nietzsche unclermines the fr¡rdamental- theme of Rousseauls

vork. l"loreover, the issue of man himself is brought into question.

Specifical-ly, it can be seen that the ways in which nan mi-ght change

r,ril-t bi¿ rrieved differentia*Lly by Rousseau ancl l{ietzsche, because on\r

Rou.sseau hol-d.s the a*sswrption of a definable morta-Ì nature.

o

J

1.33

CI{APTER \tI

TTIEORIES OF CHANGE:

PERITCI'TBI LrTY AND TRTANS FI C.URATI ON

Gocl makes all things goorl; man med.dles with the¡n and theybecone evil. I

Aga.inst Rousseau - If it is tme that there is scrnethingcontemptible about our civil-isation, ve have tvo al-ternatives:of concl-uding vith Ror¿sseau that, "This despicable civilisationis to bla¡ne for our bacl moralityrtt or to infer, contrary toRcrusseauf s viei,¡, that "Our good. noralíty is to blame for thiscontemptible civilisation "...t' Thus l-et parad,ox be opposeclto pararloxl It is quite inpossi.ble for the trrrth to l-ie withboth side¡i: and ca¡ ïre ssy, indeed,, that it lies with either?Decide for yourseif. 2

Noli,vithsta:rd.ing Nietzsche I s successfut challenge to Rousseaur s

optinristic moral.ism and preference for the classical- form of the stabe,

there remains a princip.le' of fundamental- imporba¡rce to the thought of

both men - the concept r:f change. ,fust as Rousseau and Nietzsche are

the great critj.cs of civiÌis¿rt;.icrr in their respective centuries, so

too are they the visj"onaries, arguing for great changes, to man in

particuler, in succeed-ing centuries. fn so doing, each thinl.-er ccnunits

hi¡rse 1f to emphasi.sing specific aspects of his viev of human nature,

upon which bobh the scope ancl cLetail of change to man must be based.

fn Roussearrs ca^se, free wil.t and. the perfectibitity of ma¡kin'i

are stressed. Nietzsche, on the other Ìrand", presents two similar, but

significantþ d.ifferent aspects of man - will to power and, tra¡¡sfiguration.

Iìousseaurs notion of fr:ee wil-l exple.ins ho¡¿ each person may be

rnotivated. to irnprove individu¿rl- existerrce" luloreover, individ.ual will-

is for lrim the ba-sis of a social witl - the general .,¡itt - which inforrrs

man ¿ìsj a member of sc-rciety of llie manner in vhich that society might be

condrtcted for the benefi.t of afl . Having provided. theoretieaL mea¡s for

l-" [IntiLe, p. 5 .

D, r-63 (I",ny) .L.

131+

divini.ng the practical need.s of social man, Rousseau also invests the

general r^rill vitir an eclucutive function, sr.rch that each citizen continues

to be enlightened. ercl improved by his social activityo In Nietzschef s

thought, Rousseaurs conception of hrmran motivation is revised. by

reference tcl the specífic ancì active quality of the will to posrert

i¡ùrerent in al-l living creatltres. trliJ-Iing, in this sense , is seen on\r

in the context of action ancl reaction in respect of the cond.itions of

life as mûn perceives them. 'Ihe choice for Nietzsche .Iies not betveen

action and inaction or the free and unfree wil1, but between types of

action that any individ.u¿rl. uright choose. The d.istinctive feature of

Nietzschers preci,se d"efinition of human motj-vation as the a,ctivity of

the will'bo pover is not merely the ramificatj-ons for psychologicat

ex.plar:ations of human behaviour, however. Of mcre importance here

are the impJ-ications for tìle notions of consciousness and progress

emerging in nineteenth century thought, ancl on the und.erstand.irrg of

tmth itself. On these issues, Nietzschers thought goes far beyond

the scope of Rousseamrs philosophy, and these clifferences are moàt

apparent vhen Nietzschefs concept of the ete::naÍ recurrence - the id.ea

that everything recurs - is considered..

It is the eternal recurrence as a theory of charrge that finalþ

destroys Rotisseaurs no'bion of perfectibility in favour of Nietzschers

principle of transfiguration, tr'or Roussear:., perfectibl.e men not onþ

sees his ferrlts, but feels a duty to improve hinsetf, society, and'

the 65eneral- welfare cf ma¡L<incl . I{ovever, euch a. man v-ievs the future

strictì-y in terms of his irresent understa¡cì.ing of hi-rnself a¡d the worll.

Niebzsche reveals the c-'onservative nature of this id.eal , atrcl offers

transfj-gu::ation as, a notion of change appì-icable equaJly to man &s arÌ

ind.ividual. rurrl nìan â^s a species. Unr"'illirrg to ccrmit hinself to such

a lj:nited- viev of hr:mur futrrrr: &.ùi suggested by Rousseau, Nietzsche opts

fs¡r tran$fi¿5ur:atiolr of m¡¡¡¡ fronr one l-evel of development to arr entireþ

o

135

nelr and. inconparabJ-e stege. -I-n cì.oing so, Nietzsche is d.enyi.ng the

rol-e of truth and. conscic¡usness in the deveì-opment of man, ald. rejects

any theory that purl:orts to klov the path that liunerr progress wilJ-

take.

f* Free Will- in Rousseau

l']le moral- b*,;is of Rousseauts thought rests, es r,rill be reca1led.,

upon assunptions concerning the relationship between man, nature and.

Gocl bo be found j n the Cv,eed of the SaaoyatC Priest. Central to that

ar6gr-ment for a¡ irratione-1. bel-ierf wes Rousseaurs insistence that onl-y

vil--l eoufd, give rise to notion"l This principle is ainerl specifical-ly

at the atheistj.c scj-ence of the philosophes, but it is more tha¡ a

refutation of the j.d.es that natter exists and acts independerrtly of

exterior and. supernaturaf fo.rces. It is a metaphysical- proposal,

a^sselrbing that God provides the motive force of the universe through

the activity of his vill,' ,n Iìousseaurs opinion, this is a d.ivine

pcr\{er, vhich ma¡l has in ccrnmon vith t}re Supreme Being, but w}rich,

pera,loxicalJ-y, differentiates nan frcrr that Being. The belief that

maJì caJr e,rrercise free vill a,ncl choose the good. is a sentimental and

optimistic image of man in society. In one sense, man as a free agent

has the responsibifity for choosing righteously, for his good- ancl

that of soeiety. On the other hand., Rousseau infers that me¡r may be

rmab]e to aci, freeì-y, and that society is to blame.

In lrlietzschers opinion, this caveej to bhe liberating principle

of no-nrs abiJ-ity to wil-l the good and. improve mankincl actually negates

the acuity of Roussea,u.rs insighl: into ma.n a.s a totally responsible

individua.-l , since free will js s, mere rcrnanticism if one can simultarieously

ËmiLe,

rbid.,

I ^^r ^^/PP. ¿J>-¿Ja "

p. ?-1]:,.t

a

cl-aim that society frustrates its practice.

136

For this reason, Nietzsche

s¿rw that the f.ike\y outccxrr,e va^s that successive societies woul-d. applaud"1]'., \¿: I t,,.1r,r'.1': 1,.' 'i'

in Ror.rssenu only that r+j.th vh:lch it tett rnost ccrnfortable, so creating

the concì.itions for the pred.crninance of a rrweak mar."

l.ì:is kind of rna¡r fi¡rd"s the trelief in a nerrtral , free-choosing'rsubject't necess(il?! frrrn a"n irustinct of self-preservation, of self-a.ssertion, in which every lie is fain to sanctify itself. Thesubject (or, to use popuì-ar lernguage, the soul) has perhaps proved.itself the best d.ogma i¡r the worId. simply because it rend.ered.possible to the horile of mortaJ-, weak, ar:d. oppressed. individ"ualsof every hind, that most slrbl-ime specimen of self-decep'bion, theinterpret,ation of vea^lcness as freeclc¡n, of being this, or beingthr'rt, as ney+t. L

The identification of Rousseaurs "good mantt witfr t¡ietzschers t'weaÌ(

mân" pro./ides the key to r¡¡d.erstanrling the interrel-ated but opposing

criti.ques of society and the state that the tvo thinlcers present,

Rousseau, having asserted" that man h¿¡s the cluaì-ity of free agency,

clevel-ops a theory r:f society'ousecì upon the extension of ttre notion of

inci-¡iau¡¿l- '.¡iIl- into a socie.J-þ-mecliated. anrL ccrnmrrnity wil-I - the

genernl vill" But this general will" is not d.esignecl entirely to supplant

the free will- of t;he inCiviclual-n which must remain a.s att essential part

of humanity, gr.riding the citizen tc¡,¡ard, virtuous behaviour as a social

being.

The¡:e is cnly one man who gets his ovn way - he vho can getit single-hanCecl; therefore freerlcrn, not po$rer, is the greatestgood. Tt¡at man is tru-ly fr:ee who d.esr'-res what he is able toperforni, and. d.oes what he d.esj.res. 2

It is .bhjs prínciple j-n }ìoussearrrs Lheory that mediates and. resol-ves a

mereþ superficia-l confliet betveen individ.ua.l- freecLcrn and. subjection

to a co.llective power structure, 'r,ltrat Rousseau values here most higþfy

is thetugreatest gocxl," and the achievement of that goal is visualísed.

in ter:rrs of each indiviri"iia-l- effort. Althor-rgh this night wel.l- be regard.ecl

I. Gt'!, I, l-l+. (Le.it¡ .

EmíI.e, p. hB.2.

I3T

B.s a¡other instamce of abstract inclivirLualisrn in Rousseaurs thoughtrf

his empùia^sis on freedon in preference to power should- be seen only in

a sociaL context. Thus, "every ma¡r is virtuous vhen his particrr-lar vitt

is in all. things conformeble to the genera,J, wil.I, a¡<1 ve voluntarily

vil-l what l'-s l¡ill-c-rd by tlrose vhcm ve love""2 'I'hroughout the SoeiaL

Con.tract, for example, Rousseau rnskes quite clear that the frightsf of

freed.cEr and equal.ity just did not exist in eighteenth cen'bury Europe,

¿urd thab only an a-ssociatj.on of men woufd. be able to trarsl-ate such

ideaiist .lesires irito positive ¡rttributes enjoyed. by all ind"ivid.uat

lnembers of a political- socir.:ty. Hence, the constar¡t vill of al-l the

members of the State j.s the gSeneral wilì-; by v-irtue of it they are

citizeni; ancl free.3

Gene::al vilì-, 'bherefore, is a cfassicalþ d.emocratic piece of

socj.al engineerirìg, or, we m:'-ght riay, socia.l ed-ucation. The in¿iviaual-

vil-]- rem¿.rins sovereign in the creation of the general wi1-l , l¡hich in

turn inforrns the individ.ual as to the actions Ìre shoulcl uncLertake as a

citizen" In effect, each incLíviclual- continually instructs hinsel-f in

all things, srxletimes a.s a pr:i.vate person, and sc¡netimes as a part of

.bhe l-arger r:rocia.f grouping - a process of fonnattort, in the edueational-

sense of that term.L O,u general wiII has j-ts vaLue as a. theory becar:se

it establishes a confluence between in<i.ividua.L and. social heings whil-e

¡naintaining both f'acets of hr¡nanity as val-id. j.n their own right.

fhe theoretical attractjveness of the general will resides in the

recognition of both ind.iviciuality and, socjability, conjoining the two

on a logical- anù mutually clepen<ì.ent basis. Liberal--democratic thought

l-. (1".ù. j Steven Lukes , .Tnd'LtsíduaLt'.sm" Basil Bl.ackr¿ell (Oxford 1973) ,p. 75. Lukes avoids a final classification of Rousseau, preferring1,o rrote his contril¡ution to vsrious types of ind;ividualism.

2. PE', þ. 130.

3. SC, rV, 2.

[" FotmcZbiorz is vir'buaJ-ìy a synonym for t'educatiortt' in Frenchn asevincecl , for exrunple, j-t "first fcrmrtt "fi.fbh fomr" etc.

t

13B

has often pressed. the general viIl into service in a more practical form

asttconsensus-L" polities or in attempts at a "social contractr'r proposed.

in the main to pJ.acate countervailing power groups which, due to their

Ii¡rited. a¡rd vul-nerable-' infLuence, Fgree to ccrnprcnise to secure restricte,

benefits. Ifowever', these examples of a plr.rral-istic view of society shoulcl

not be confused with even a dil-ution of Rousseaurs notion of the general

will- (vere that possibte).

For Rousseau, the general wiIl is relevant only in respect of the

coumon intei:est clf the members clf the State, ancl t'cannot pronounce on

a ma.n or s fact.t'l' 'Ihus, ís not Rousseauts intention to prcnrid.e d.etail-ed

raechanisms for conflict resolution or consensÌrs reaching. The d"istinction

betveen particular vills anrl their sum and the ticonstelt, unalterabJ-e,

arrcl- pure" general wirtl fulfill-s the significent function ot permitting

Rousseau theoretically to fonerctaLL the possibíLíty of confliab øtd

conmtpt politicaL pnactice. This cl-aim cen be supported by referring

to the moraf eontent of Fousseauts theory of the State and his belief

in the individ.ual- as a moral- and social being.

First, it must be re-iterated tinat Le cot'Ltrat sociaL creates

le corps moraL et eoLT,ectíf. lt is this sssociative act that gives

rise to a State r "a. mo?sZ person r,rhose l-ife is in the rrnion of its

members r!' a¡rd" which ttmora-l person" possesses the general- wil.l - the

impetus for the acLva¡rcement of the ccrnmon good..3 ,o this point, we

appear to be deaJ-ing soleþ r^¡:ith collectivist ideas, but it is Rousseau

who reintrocluces the ind.ivid.ual-, the single one, into the discussion by

putting forward., aÐparentþ, the notion that the prrrsuit of ind.ivid.ual

self-interest must enhance the general velfare.

f. sc, rr, \.2. rbid", lv, 1.

3" Ibid."r II, 11. (nnpnssis adrled.).

a

139

Ttre r.rnrler-bdrings vhicl-r bind. us to the social bo{r areobligatory onl-y t¡ecause they are mutual-; and their nature issuch th¿rt in fulfilli.ng them we eannot work for others withoutworking for oursel-ves. \,,Iiry is j.t that the general will isa.Lr+ays uprighb, sJrd. that atl continual-ly wiì-J- the happinessof ee.ch one, u.nless it is because there is not a marr who d.oesnot think, of reaclir ns mea.ning him, and. consid.er himself invoting for al-I? Thi-s proves that ec¿uaJ-ity of righbs and theid.ea of jrrstice which such equality creates originate in thepreference each man gives to himself, ancl accorðingly in thevery nature of rn¿r.n. l-

IIor¿er¡er, thi.s is nore than a pre-utilitarie¡r and liberal-democratic

principle, since Ilousseau vas deepþ concerned. with ttre adequacy of

partic:".pat-i.ng j.ncì.ivid.ual-s to 'pass jud-graents on their particular interesbs

Having described" the Stat,e &s & mora.l person, and. the general -^rilf as

pllre ! Rousseau impÌ:'-es that it remains for the incLivid-ual- to i:nprove

himself moralLy in ord.er to establish a confluence betveen his

pa-rbi':ir1ar vilL e"ri<l. the general wilt vith any consistency.

f f you vould. have the general r+ill acccrnplished., bring aI1the partícular vil"l-s into conformity r¡ith it; in other word.s,a,s virtue is nottring more than this conformity of the particularwills vith the general vill, establish tlre r:eign of virtue. 2

Rousseaurs j-mage of a good. society is thus doubly optimistic, since

it envi"sages an icle¿rl-ist and populist political soeiety of manrs

creationo vhich soci.ety is clesigned. to bring about thetrreign of virtue.t'

The attention of such a society wil-f not be clirected. toward. the

successful resolution r-¡r rninimisabic¡n of conflict, but l¡i-tl be aining

to enha¡rce the noral activity of man ¿¡-s ind-iviCual and. citizen.

The individ.uals see the goc.'c1 they re,ject; the putrlic willsthe gocxì it cloes not see. ¡11 stand. equa,Ìty in need- of guidance.Tt¡e forner must be ccrnpell-ecl to 'bring their wills into conformitywitir tneir re&son; the ,i.atter must be taught to knov what itviu-s. 3

].

¿.

rbid.

P./J, pp. l:2T-L28.

5C, rr, 6.?

o

ll+o

Hovever much both liberal-democratic end cc¡.rununitarian thought

ha^s neglectecl , chosen to ignore, or d-owngrad"ect the moral-ism of Rousseauts

thought in favour of its rationaL.ity, the salne cannot be saj-d of Nietzsche

In his opinion, Rousseam r+e-s most successful at the level, by d-int of

his irnmense popularity in eighteenth century Europe, of giving to

nineteenth centrrry lìuropeans a moralistic self-image in which they self-

righteousj-y rejoicerl and. u¡-ron vhich they basecl political- claims.

'IJher"e is no d.enying that frcrn the end of the eighteenth centurya current of moral- ar,raker:,ing flowed, through Europe. Then onlyVirtue found again the power of speech. She learnt to d.iscoverthe unrestrained. gestr-rres; of exaltation and- emotic¡n, she T/a"s no1-r:nger ashmnecl of hersel-f , anC she created. philosophies and. poemsfor her crwn gì.orification" If we lock at ttre sources of thiscurrent, \,¡e c$ne upon Rousseanr, bub the mythical Rousseau, thepl.rontcxn formed" frcrn the impression lefb by his vritings (one mi.ghtsay his nlythica-tìy interpreied r'rriting") and. by the indicationsthat he provid.ed himseLf . He and his prrblic consta¡tly vorked.¡rt thr: fashi,rning of this iclea.l- figure. l-

Nietzschers objection to Roussearr is most strid.ent vhen nineteenth

century civilisation is consiclered, vieved iri the context of therrhord.e

of morta-I , veak, amd cppressed individue*l-s of every kindt' ad-opting

subfime Rousseauian tenets, errd. perverbing them in the process of

agitating for a non-mcral-Iy based, sociaJ- structure that Rousseau r.¡oul-cl

have escÌtewecl". ¡ls vith Roussesu, Nietzsche could. not have known to

what extent hín writings vould. be misused by succeed.ing generations,

anri" in particular, Gerrnan National Sociatisrn. As far as Nietzsche was

concerned, herd. man began to d.eina¡d. equal-ity as a right that shoLrld be

bestowed. upon alJ- men in society, on the basis of Rousseaurs moral

phiJ-osophy. l.n this marrner, the valuations of Christianity vere

trc¡rsl.ated into pol.itical demaricLs "

IIAII , 216. The poems to rrhich Nietzsche refers are those ofT. S. lJliot, a great arimirer of'Rousseau. llietzschef s passageherr: provides a clear ind.i cation of his avsreness bhat his anti-Rousseauian sta¡lce was sGnetimes rhetorical a¡d. scrnetimessubsta¡ltive. A,s u'e have seen, there are many instances vhereI{ietzsche revises rat}ier: thzur refutes Rousse¿¿uian concepts, and-

indeed he pqys tribute to Le c:iL;o1¡ett de Geneue as one of theeigirt thinkcrs urost iinpt:r'tant to ttre rleve-Lopment of his thoughLand. argurnents. e.i).5 lM" )+CB.

l_.

o

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Ì,trietzsche outl-ines the transition of the Christian concept (ttrat

Rousseau espouses) ínto what he takes to be the conventionaf wisclcrn of

contemporary society,

Another Christiait concept, no Less ctãz:Y, has passed evenmore deeply into the tissu.e of moclernity: the concept of the"equality of soul-s befr:re God.r' fhís concept frrrnishes theprototype of a1l- theories of equal rights: mankind was firsttaugh+' to sta¡rner the proposition of eqrrality in a religiouscontext, and- onþ J-aLer was it nade into morality: no wond'erthat nerì end.ecl by takin¿¡ it seriously, taking it practically!- that is to soy, politicalþ, democratì.catþ, socialistically,in the spirit of the pessimism of indignation. I

The consistetrt attacks tha,t, Nietzsche makes upon the herd., the liord-e

or the mo'b is clifferentiatecl fL:crn his attaclç on Rousseauts thcrught

in o¡re importar.t wey. When'bhe rnob c::ies out for freedcrn and equality,

it does so without any ontoJ-ogical found.ation to such d.octrines, and

reacts 'uo its conditions by acroptì.ng poJ-itical principl-es on 0, basis

of expecliencyo This is not necesseril-y a criticism of the princíples

thert are a.d,opted. iìather, i{ietzsche is saying that mere d-issatisfaction

vith oners conclitions wil-l not of itsel-f lead. to 8n avareness of

effective proposal-s to overccrne those cond.itions. Itre slogans of the

mob, therefole, onJ-y reflect the psychological state of that group ancl

the particular value*orient¿ttions it has accepterl. ft gives the

political phiiosopher no reason for attachi.ng ontologicaJ- inportence to

their clairns. Níetzsche d'oes not, ho.rever, imply that the philosopher

should take no account of manifestatir:ns of discontent. Instead, he

chooses to regarcl them as plrencrlnena th¿r.t shoutd. be subjected to a subtl-e

diagnosis of the types of rnor¿rlity that are given voice in these social

rnovercents. Thi.s "genealogy of mora-lstt that must be u¡d.ertaken in the

examination of (poputar) poliLicrl--L and moral cfai:ns leads Nietzsche to

thinkers such a^s Rousseauo for it is in such moraf theories, scrnetimes

poprrlarised. beyr:nd. recognition, that a-ssumptions about the nature of

moJr aïe set forth, simplifiecl , ¿rnrL renrlerecl avail.able for p;eneral

articul-ation.

t. w" ''(65.

t

l.I+?

The nssrmpti-on about human nature that interests us here is

Roussean-tts bel-ief in fi:ee vil.I. Its importsnce ùo Rousseauf s overall-

philosophicaL strategy is that the viIL fu1fills the ro-le of fostering

irope - hr:pe that the unpleasantness of life may be overcone by

concerl;ed ind.ividual and. social- action. possessing free vill , ít is

theorebica.l\y possi.trl-e, no matter how practically inprobable, to achieve

oners a:nbitions. such a beÌief may sustain sction l-ong after its

rabional"e has c1-i.sap¡rc"arecl , and. the blaue for any failures may easily be

externalised. and. imputed i;o the social ancl pol-itical- environment. It

is not surprising, then, that lrlietzsche seeks'bo und,ermine the notion

of free wj-Ll- as Rousse¿¡u pr:esented. it.

2. Will to Po.¿er in Nietzsche

T'he first articl-e of Ror-rssea.trrs iì.ogma - that motion is always

preced.ecl by scrne witl-f - is rejected by Nietzsche-

I'hrz beLì.ef ín utiLLing. To posit a belief as the camse of amechanistic rnotio¡t is to believe in miracl-es. The consist,ency ofsci.ence d.emamds bhat, oiìce ve have marl"e the vorl-d. thinkable bymçe¡s of ÌittJ-e imnges, ve shoul-d. nake the affects, d.esires,wiìl, etc., thinkabl-e, i.u,, d,err,y them a¡rd. treat them as errorsof the intel-lec b " 2

f'his conri'bj.tu+'es a particrularly sharp critieisûl of Rousseou, who cn the

one hand, r¿oul-d" not accept the ar¡thenticity of the bibtieal- mirecLes,

but gli.bly pa.ssed. off a beLí.ef in uil-l preced.ing motion as a scientific

h¡ryothesis. Nietzsche i¡iverts the Rousseauiarl concept of the activity

of natter by postul"ating that action is not a creation of the wiII, but

that arry motj.on or *ctjon must be possible befone it is d.esired..

AII- actions must firs'b be mad.e possibJ-e mecha¡ícal1y beforethel' ¿r" vil-ted. Or: the "purposeil wuaLT,y comes into the mind.onìy after everything has been preparecl for its execution. Theenci is an ttinnertr trstimul-ustt - rlo more. 3

Certainly, Nietzschers anaþsis, eualified and abstruse as it is,

fails to satisf$ our idea of a scienti.fic approach, but he d.c¡es maks

one important point vith süne success. llhen tleal-ing wittr human ttwill-rtt

Nietzsche d.emonstrabes th¿rt this is a quarity that man, historically,

s€rv ¿rs il. spiritual capacity, al-ong vith other feeì-ings - vhat Nietzsche

Ò

q.u", Supr"a, ll'i, p.3.htPs 67O..Lbi.d"", 6'lr.

l_

3"

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ca-11.s "a,f'fects.t'I Hou¡ever, with the burgeoning acceptance of psychoì-ogica

explanations of hu¡nan behaviour, Ni.etzsche cal-Is into question any

methodol.ogical- approach trat cloes not treab çilt a¡d, affeets as phencrnena

to be exan-ined. in d.etail. InsteaC of providing a scientific theory thab

the viIl exists, as d.oes lìousseau, Nietzsche calls for scientific encluiry

into the ma¡rifestations of hr¡nan behaviour that we eaLL víl-l-. Thus

Nietzsche re;jects Rousseal, 1s belief in free sgency aa an abstract ancl

creative force, revealing i-t as only a clumsy generalisation about huna¡t

nature. l{ietzschefs emphasis, therefore, is not on will as a human

quality, but on r¿ill ES an activ-ity.

lr{y pr:oposition is: that the vill of psycholory hitherto is anunjustified. genera.l-iaation, that tlris wi.lL does no'b etis'b of aLL,tìrat instead of grasping r¿he id,ea of the deveì-cpment of oneclefj.nite r¡il-I into març. forrns, one has el-iminated ttre character ofthe viÌI by subtractin¿¡ frcrn it its content, its trwhl'-ther?t' I

This sr-rggests that instead c'f seeking to esteblish a wil] as a first

cause as lìousse¿iu ciid, at'benticxr sliould. be focused upon tine ae'bion ol

willing itse-lf . Wil-l as the abstract motive force to bring about an

id.ea,l- or d.esirecl state no longer being the quesiion, Nietzsche concentrate

upon wiÌI in the context of the fo:rns of action that it might take, as

rr\^¡íl.I to, rr

ttwil-Iing" is not "desiringrtr striving, d.ernand-ing: it isd,isting,uishecì frcrn these by the affect of command-ing.

'Ihere is no suc[ ^lhing as t'villing ril but on\y a wiilingsome'!;hír47: one mrrst ¡S'eübr,'e the ain frcm the total- condition -as epistemologists do. "Willingtt as they und.erstand. it is as

li.ttle a reaì-ity as "thinking": it j-s a pure fiction.

It is part of wil.l-ing that scxnethi-ng is ccrnmand.ed (- r¿hichnaturally does not mear: that the will is |teffected'tr) . 2

l-. Ibt.d,,,

Ibicl. "

692.

668.t)

â

th6

beliefs, generatJ.y of a spirituaf natureo

'lliIling seems to me to be above e.lf somethíng eonqLieabed,sonething that is a unit only as a voril - and. it is precisely inthis one vord. that the popul.ar prejud.ice l-urks, which has defeated-the a-lways inadequate caution of philosophers" So let us for oncebe more cautious , Iet us be ttunphi-losophicalrt; let us say that inall- Hil-ling there is, fir:st, a plurality of sensations, name\r,the sensation t'a'tay fncm uhíclzrtt tlne sensation of the stobe¡¡tancwds uhich"tt the sensations of this "frr^" anð, ttta¡rnds'lthemselveg o ¡.. I

Directì"y associated. with these sensations is the function of action, of

doing, vithout vhich there is no villing scurething. In Nietzschers

opinicrn, Rous$eauts thought seeks to ereate a false d.ichotcnny between

vilting end doing, md it; j.s tiris d.ichotorny that ha¡ passed into popular

bel-ief of the self as a¡ authentic bei.ng that i.s scrnehow frustrated" and.

pre'rrentecl f::c,r,r acting âu'uhentical-ly, anC that such a self nust will- itsel-f

into being &nd d"oin6"

ooe . popu.lar morality .oo" sepÐ.1îates strength frøn e:cp:lessronsof str"engbh, as if there ï'ere a substratr¡n behincl the strong man'nirich wa:: fnee to exp::ess str"ength or not to do so" But there isno such substratum; 'bhere is lro "being" behj.nd. d.oing, affecting,beccrning; t'the doertt is mereJ¡r a fiction aclded' to the deed - thed"eecl is everything, ?.

fnstead. of l-ookinË for a being behintl a¡ action, I{ietzsche sees action

a"s a manifestation of vill bo power in that action. Thu,s there is no self-

consciou.s srrbject expressing an inner self by a d.eÌiberate choice of

aetions. Rather, it is the surn of actions that constitutes being, revealing

the orientation of the irme:: sel-f 'boward. life. A variation of this

principle appties to ¿lroups as vel-l as single inriividuaJ"s. Nietzsche

rlifferentiates betveen the strong sr'ìd the weak on the basis of the abil-j.ty

to re¡rlise the vitl to porrer ttrrough either incliviaual or social action"

l_, BGþl, 1,9.

Gl,al, I, ll"/)

1\7

Ior one should not overl-ook this fact: the strong a.re asnaturalJ-y inclined" to sepctnate as the week are to eongregate;it ttre fonner rurite together, it is only with the aim of enaggressive col-lective action ancl col-lective satisfaction of theirvil-l- to pover, ald- with much resistance frøn the individualconscience; the l-atter, on the contrary, enjØ precisel_y thiscaning together . " .. I

The contrast with Rousseaurs reasons for suggesting coll-ective meaJls

to col,l-ective end,s re.¡olves around. his assumptic¡n that men shou7d. cørle

together, for thc.ir or.m improvement. Rousseau escher.¡s specifical\y

the notion that separateness is a d.esirable cond.ition for ^^nrz a¡d. in

so d.oing places a l-init to the power of eterg ind.ividual as well as

over-enphasising the threat of contemporan¡ society to manrs existence.

J. suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacl-esin the way of their preservation in the state of natu.re show theirpover of resistance to be greater than the resources of eachindivi¿ua-L for his maintenance in that stab€ . ¡ ".

But, as mendirect existingthemselves tliangreat enough tobring into playact in concert.

cemnot engender new forces, but only unite and.ones, they have no other means of preserrringthe forrnation, by aggregation, of a sr.mr of forcesoverccÌne the resista¡rce. These they have toby means of a single motive power, md cause to

3

t

This aspect of Rousseau! s political- thought comes und,er strong

chaì-lenge here, since, having suggested. that man shouLd associate (for

moral- benefit), ho goes on to assert that they rntst aggregate - the

onþ opticln being the power of colLective action uncler the guid.ance of

the general- r,rill. Nietzsche, on the other hand., exarlines congregation

as a cornmon social phencrnenon, not as an id,ealist political- act, and. makes

1. l-bLd,, III , lB .

r) l,ie nright object here, a"s cl.icl Dider.ot (q,u." Conf, II, 103), thatRousseaurs retirement to the peace and. solitud"e of the countryrepresertts at Jea-st a prc-veu.ication on the need for an entirel"ysocial existence. However, Rousseau felt justifiea in what wasa syrnbol-ica-l rejection of the society of vhich he was so critical.l\rbher, the Confessions establ-ish that Rousseau harl quite a fuIlsocial calend.ar, where he was either visiting or being visited,(q.ü., Conf, If, pp. I\8ff.). Tn support of Rousseauts beliefin the innate sociability of man, it is significant that Rousseaupreferrecl and even extoll_eil the simple virtues and. unaffected.atti.budes of the country peasants. (q.u., ErniLe, Bk. I).

r 63. SCr

Ò

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tvo critical observations that bear d.irect\y on Rousseaurs notion of

as s oci at i on.

First, Nietzsche agrees r¡ith Rousseau that scrue sggregation of forces

may be an acceptabfe and. practicable response to a given situation. Tllus

!/e see Rousseauian terrninoì-og¡ - 'f collective action for collective

satisfactiontt - used. in what appears to be a sense ccrnnon to both

Rousseau a¡rd l{ietzsche. }lovever, Nietzsche valid.ates collective action

only for "tlie stronp¡r" who, by d.efinition, vill resist relinquishing

their au-bonany, arrd. who see col-l-ective action strictly as a. meens to

satísfy the vill to power, and- not as an erpr.essíon of their r¡ill to power.

Ttiis brings us to Nietzschets second. observation of congregration -

congregation of itthe weak."

Nietzschers endorsement of provisionaL and. li:nited. unity among

strong rnerr reveal-s tlie basis of his critique of Rousseauts notion of

association of aLL men. In Nietzschets opinion, the weak ind,ivid.ual-

d.oes not seek the solution to a particular problem by congregating, as

d.oes the strong man. Rather, the weak man rrniversalises the function of

congregatíc>n, enioying it as an end. in itself, and. therefore attempts

to maintain the group, the herd, at all times. In so d.oing, the herd

may use its collective poì.¡er to ínfluence and even d.øinate society and.

its val-r"res.

Thus in the history of norality a wil-I to power find-s expression,through vhich nor,¡ the sLaves and. oppressed., now the ill-constituted.and those who suffer fron themselves, now the necliocre attempt tomake those value-jud.gments preva^il- that are favorable t'o them. I

llc¡¡ever, i*u is not Nietzschers intention to arrogate the right of the

veak to a^ssociate for their mutuaL protection and. enjqrment. His criticism

concerns that grouprs tenctency to sct as íf onLy the weak exist or are

important. It is this fal-se assunption, for Nietzsche, that had been

1. {'/P, l+oo "

e

rl+9

experrrded into a theory of political society by Rousseaut s contrat sociaL,

r^rhich required. "the total- alienat,ion of each associate, together with

his rights, to the whole couunlnity"l. ond to a "singl-e motive powerrt'

the general will-.

In 'berms of Nietzschers geneaJ-ogical- schema, such a conception of

association ensures the expression of the witl to po\{er of the hend, but

militates egainst the satisfaction of the índiuiduaZts l¡ilI to power -

a proposition that has ssne affinity r"rith the charger put forr+ard. by scrne

wr.iters, that Rolrsseau is a total-itarian thinker.2 While we reject such

an interpretation, it should. not obscure Rousseaurs role in provid.i-ng,

l-. sc, r, 6.

?_. Rousseau has been labefl-ed. a total-itarian, in one forrn or another,by: J. L. Tal-mon, The )rigins of Totalitæiøt Demoez'acy, MercurXrBooks (Lond.on 1966); Bnd Jud.ith Shklar , Men ttd Cítizena - A Studyof Rousseatts SocíaL Theory, Cambriclge tJ.P. (Csmtridee 1969). Itis not our intention to ( a) provid.e any endorsement of theirinteqpretation of Rousseau, but, (¡) to highlight an importantaspect of Nietzschers thought. Dealine with (a) first, Rousseaudistinguishes betr,¡een the ind.ivid.ual- and. public d.omains, and. pointsout that neither need, or: shouLd encroach upon the other (q.D., SC,IV, B), liowever, whiJ-e it may be said that such a d.istinction existsin Rousseaurs thought, it is importzurt to note that Rousseau doesnot give it the s;arne formàl- status of other concepts which execentral- to his theory of the State. In an historical context, thisis harcÌì-y surprising since Rousseau was not attempting to answertv¡entieth eenturXr critics of totaJ-itarianism. Rather, he waspresenting those aspects of his political philosophy most faithfulto a pragmatic, if optinistic vision of the good. society. As such,Rousseauts insistence on the absolute, continuing, and" inalienablesovereignty of each party to Le contra.t sosial must have been, tohis mind, an enormous aducttee ín terms of ind.ivid.ual rights and.

freeclc¡ors ?i¿thin the stqte, and not just a principle of assocíation.Moreover, Rousseau makes clear i-n both the Confess¿orls ancl thepolitical r¿orks his attitud.e toward. his in¿ividual sel-f in - Ìre ca.nassume - ØtA political system. He regarded. himself as a Yery specialkind of ind"ivicluaÌ, but one r¿ho had a strong desire to be a parbof a functioning republ-ic . q.D., AS, Preface, p. 2; 0I, Ded.icationto the Republic of Geneva, €sF. pp. 28-29; and Cmf, I, 1.(t) t*'. are suggesting that Nietzschets interpretation of Rousseauianthought is more accurate and useful than that of the opponents oftotal-itarianism. Nietzsche perceives the d.anger of the Stater butnot in the conventiona-l-, ì-iberal-enpiricist sense of the State as anuncontrol.l-ab1e force over intlividuals in society. For Nietzsche,it is preciseì-y those ind.ivid.uats a¡ti-totalitarians wish to protectthat I'fietzsche attacks for their sl-ave morality sn¿l consequent in-cornpetr:nce to assume conrna¡d of politicaJ- society. Here , Nietzsche t s

genr:ra1 point is that giving pover to a weak and. powerless moss ofindivid.ua-Ìs cannot, of itself , ensure that the actions and. thoughtsof tlrese individuals vill autcrnaticaì-þ cone to be based upon andcharacteri.secl by strength and povrer.

t

150

theoretically at least, the means by vhich the trpeoplerr or (for Nietzsche)

the rrherd.r', couId. estabfish pol-itical- tegitimacy snd impose their

eolfective vill upon society. The general- wil-I, infallibl-e a¡rd.

ind.e'strrrctible, constitutes the justification for Rousseauf s id.eatist

ccrnmunitarie¡isn and ful-fil-ls the practical function of transnitting the

goals that man ar¡d society should. pursue toward. a better futureo In

response, Nietzsche equates the notion of a genera-I wil-I vith a

justification for a type of herd mentality that strives to legitinise

the exj.stence of a mess of weak ind.ivid.uals, who attempt to project their

ideals onto the structure and, fr¡nctioning of the entire social ord.er.

At everry point, then, Rousseaurs presentation of ttwilltt in both its

inclir¡idual- and. social contexts is d-rar.rn into serious question by Nietzsche,

who rejects first Rousseaurs religious ind,ivid.ualist assrmrptions anil

second his r¡oralistic and. quasi-rationalist conclusions about society.

On the other harrd., Rousseaurs emphasis on will" as a facilitating and.

motivating force of hurnan nature is endorsed- fu-lly by Nietzschers re-

interpretation of vil-1 as r"¡ill- to pa)er. This shared. first principle,

hc¡v¡ever', serves onty to accentuate the clifference between the two thinkers

on issues such a*s consciousness and. progress.

3. Consciousness and. Progress

In Rousseauls opinion, ttas long El.si severel men in assemb\y regard

themsel-ves as & single bo(y, they have onþ a single will which is

concerneil vith their coinmon preservation a¡rd. general welÌ-being.ttl The

general vill, then, can be said. to exist ind.epend.ently of ar¡y citizenfs

€wareness of it, making it possible for Rousseau to adva¡ce, or even inpose,

his theory of the State as "good" and|trighttr for mankind, arrd. as the

correct path along which society should. progress. However, this use of

the pgenera-l- i¿i1I as a clevice to solve the problem of progress in his

poJ-itical thought creat,es anather, more d.ifficult problern. Rousseau ís

l-. sc, rv , l_.

a

151

ccmpell-ed. to provid.e an ad.equate explanation of the means through which

manfs perception and consciousness of the general vill are effected..

Rousseauf s technique, at this point, involves scrne circul-a¡ity of

Iogic, a:; he reiterates or altud.es to the basic qualities of manr s

nature as they are evineect in the religious ind.ivi¿ual of the Creed of

the Sauoyæd Príesl;. This a.l-lor¡s Rousseau to suggest that ma¡r must

strive to be virtuous not only to be true to himself, but to be an upright

citizen "

Ttre first ar¡d most important rule of legitimate or potrlulargovernment, that is to say, of government vhose object is thegood, of the people, is, therefore, as f have observed., to followin everything the general wiu. But to follow this r^¡ilI it isnecessaïy to know it, and. above all to distinguish it from thepart,icuJ-ar vill, beginning with onets self : this d.istinction isalvays very d.ifficult to make, ertd. only the most sublime virtuecan afford, sufficient ilh¡rnination for it. I

the cListinction mad.e here between the ind.ivirtual and. social- aspects of

vilÌing highlights the roLe that reason nust play if virtue is to be a

pre-requisite for conforrnity vith the general- vill, which ísr "ín each

irdiuiduaL, a pL$'e act of the undevrctøtã.ing uhieh vedßons, uhen the

passions æe síLent, about uhat a malt cØt øsk of his feLLa'ts øtd" uhat

his leLLa¿s haoe'the night t;o ask of him."2 Rousseau is suggesting, then,

that ma¡r can and should, be enlightened- by participation in potitical

essociation. As a corolLa^r1¡, the raising of consciousness of each member

of the eorT)s møyaL et coLLectíf constitutes a virtuous activity, since it

viIJ- supposedly lead. to the wid.esprearl acceptance of the neeil for action

along a partieular and prescribed. path. For these reasons, Rousseau

bel-ieved. that it va.s necessary to creete a poì-iticalIy society filled.

and sustained. by social- beings d,minated by a consciousness of themsefves

as a part of the collectivity.

1. PE, 123"

?, GSHR, p. 160.

,

r52

Nietzsche, however, denies that society can ever progress and improve

itseLf under the impetus of socially-conscious political activity. For

him, such a reification of the social being places a l-imitation on a

fulfy hrunan existence.

ff ve wished to postulate a goal ad.equate to 1ife, it cou1d. notcoincide with any category of conscious Ìife; it would rather haveto explain all of them as & mearls to itsetf - 1

This does not imp\y a circular or merely nentalistic consciousness of

consciousness. The r¡ill tcr power operates to bring a person into a

position of power oÐer scmething, in the proeess of vhich that person

charrges. But one d.oes not exercise viIl to power vith strict teleological

intent, in Nietzschers view, as if the rritl were a guiaing consciousness

rrbehind.t' action.

The funda¡nental nistake is simply that, instead of und.erstandingconsciousness as a tool and particular aspect of the total life, veposit ít as the sta¡dard. and. the condition of Life that is of=rrpr*" value: it is the erroneous perspective of a parte ad. totwn -which is why all philosophies are instinctively tryine to imaginea total consciousness, & consciousness involvetl in al-1 l-ife and.

vill , irr al-l- that occurs, a ttspiritrtt ttGod..tt 2

Whereas Rousseau used. the free will of ma¡r to provid.e the means by

which the informed. ind.ividual could achieve his private and. civit virtue,

Nietzsche offers a bleakly eloquent vision of the non-teleological wiII

to power to emphasise that it is irnpossible to say *hat man should. d.o

and- beccrne. The chasm betveen the tvo thinkers could not be vicler.

To beccrne r¡hat one is, one must not have the faintest notionof vhat one ig ....

The whole surface of consciousness - consciousness is a surface -rnust be kept clear of all great imperatives. 3

L. wP, 7OT.

1D'1-.4.

EH, tt\'lthy I am so clever ,t' 9.

2

3

0

r53

This is a di.rect refutation of the oldest a¡rd stiÌ1" most popular imperative

of the Delphic oracle - ttknovr thyselftt - and its mod.ern d,erivative - ttbe

tllyself.t' Such imperatives require consciousness and extol it e^g the

onþ means to bring about ind.ivid.ual human a¡r<1 social virtues, but it is

Nietzschers'yier¡ that the attempt to know thysetf only through the

affective surface of consciousness will inhibit the role of consciousness

as pæt of a ralge of hr¡ma^n quaì-ities.

In rel-ation to the vastness and. multipl-icity of collaborationand mutual opposition encounterecl in the life of every organism,tlrc eonseious vorld of feelings, intentions, and. vafuations is a

smaÌf section. we have no right whatever to posit this piece ofconsciousness €LS the aim and vherefore of this total phenorenonof l_ife: l¡eccrning conscious is obviously on\r one more meang

toward the unfolcì.ing and extension of the pov¡er of life. I

Consciousness is thus relegated. fran a position of power over

in¿ivid.ual and coll-ective action and progress to a second.ary utíLity of

the prj.mary force of viLl- to power. On another level, Nietzsche goes

so far as to suggest that consciousness, even in its utilitarian a.spect,

may not be equated. necessarify witfr a¡l accr:rate appreciation of

reality.ttgonsciousnesstr - to what extent the itlea of a¡r id,ea, the

id.ea of will, the id.ea of a feelirg (knol¡n to ourselves alone)are totall-y superficiaf ! O¿r inner worl-d, too, ttappearancettt 2

If thj-s is the case, then Nietzsche by implication rejected. the possibifity

of one of the cen'braJ- aims of poLitical theory, nme\r, its capacity to

raise consciousness in order to structure and. direct political action.

Against this rationalism, Nietzsche proposes that conseiousnees provid'es

only a non-prescriptive, if perceptibte, pæt of the range of huma¡t

.3exper]-ence.

Ì vP, 7O7.

2. WP , '476.

"..." thert noú tincrease in consciousnessl is the ai¡r, butell¡aneement of pceler - e¡d in thís er¡hancement the utility ofconsciousness is includ.ed ...." þ8, Trl .

?

a

151+

fn sunvna: everybhing of which ve beccrne conscious is a terrninalphencrnenon, Brì end - and. causes nothing; every successive phenonenonin consciousness is ccnpletely atonistic - And. we have sought tound.erstand the vortd. through the reverse conception - as if nothingwere real and, effective but thinki-ng, feeling, willing! - 1

The d,eval-uation of consciousness as a precursor to positive action

highlights the subjective, value-l-aden cloud.iness of rational thought

processes es they strive for metaphysical ccrnprehension of telos anð.

essences. Actions that sre based. on reflection afone cannot fail to be

marred. by the subjectivi.ty that rational- thought is presurned to overccme.

However, it is not Nietzschers intention to prcnote thet blincl rcrrerÌticism

of the eighteenth century, and- perrnit aIl- actions to be the result of

trfeelingil and. the chaotic prcrnptings of the subconscious. For him, the

act of beccrning conscious is but a midpoint in the process of action

being perfected., anil beccrning autcrnatic, "it such a way that we are

conscious of a condition onþ vhen the supposed causal- chain associated

wittr it has entered. consciousness."2 Consciousness-related. action,

therefore, vill- be contrived and imperfect in the sense that such ,action

is not autonc¡rous and. independ.ent frcm value-orientations eurrentþ held.

at t"he conscious Level. It is onty when consciousness reced.es a¡rd action

'becqnes unconseiotrs, that one achieves "a perfect autcmatism.tt3

All perfect acts are unconscious and. no longer subject to will;consciousness is the expression of an jrnperfeet and often morbid.state in a person" Personal refl-ection as conditioned' by witl,as consciousness, as reasoning with ctialecticsr'is a caricature,a kind. of sel-f-contradiction - A degree of eonsciousness makesperfection impossible - Foln of play-aeting. l+

Nietzschets d.eprecation of the introspective and self-aware ind.ivid.ual

ilLustra.tes how ra¡licaI a departure is his explanation of conscÍousness

l-.

2.

3

r^rP, Llg.

w, \lg "

WP, 523. trA matter tbat beccmes clear to us ceases to concern us.- what vas on the mj.nd. of that god. who counselled.: f knor,¡ thyself ! t

Did" he mearr: tCease to concern yourselfl Becone objective!t - And.

Socrates! - ¡n¿ rscientific ment? - BGE, BO.

h. [iP, zB9 .

o

þ5\{hen ccmpared. to the image ancl function of consciousness implicit in

Rousseaurs thought. ft is l¡orth noting, however, that Rousseau and. Nietzsch

have in ccrnmon a concern for uirtu¿ that underpins this d.iscussion of

cr:nsciousness, In Rousseaurs case, vi.rtue presents itsel-f several\r as

a pre-condition for socisl progress, a necessity for individ.ual- happiness,

and a fulfiLl¡nent of manrs moral- nature, as tre have seen. To attain virtueon each of these l-evel-s, Rousseau l-ooked. in the first instance to create

the rnaterial. conditions, in the form of an organic ccrnmrxrity, by which

socia-l maÌl vould beccrne virtuous. Second, Rousseau attempted. to ed.ucate

ind.i'¡id.ual man for virtue, d.espite the hostile social environment d.escribed

ín Emile and. the Second. Discottz,se., I u.rd. thirct, he sought to convert man

to his personaì. Christian bel-ief and" accmpanying virtuous life. Each

of these categories of virtue require an enhanced. consciousness of man,

his sociar worId, and. his go<1 , in Rousseaurs system, which presupposes

that man could" and. should. be tre¡rsformed. within these pararneters.

Nietzsche, too, ha-s a positive conception of virtue, but it is quite

d'ifferent to Rousseaurs. As we vouLd. expect, Nietzsche d.oes not equate

virtue with the t'goodt'of sl-ave-moraL valuation, nor d.oes he tlefine

virtue as those qualities that any people or moral system elassifies

e.s superior or desirabl-e.2 rn terns of conscio\rsness, Nietzschers

in'berpretation of virtue amou¡ts to a rejection of Rousseaurs

und'erstanding of tine roLe of virtue, since vhat Rousseau might have wished

t,o term I'enhancedtt consciousness J-ead.ing to virtuous behaviour is

better d.escribed in Nietzschean thought as aLtered consciousness. The

sema¡rtic distinction between enhancement and al-terationo and. Nietzschers

overalL ùisaffection with moral- phiÌosophy, rea.d.s him to make a general

poini that might be applied. with more than a little aceuïêcy to Rousseau.

I "Life is the trade r would teach him, llhen he reaves me, r grantyou, he vilI be neither a magistrate, a sol_d.ier, nor a priest; hewil.f be a man.t' Emile, p. 9.I'The virtues of the ccrnmon man rnight perhaps signify vices and.r¿eaknesses in a phiLosopher." BGE, 30.

2.

a

f)o

AncL ind.eed. there have been consietent moralists who vanted.man to be different, that is, virtuous - they vanted. him remadein their own image, as a prig: to that end., they negated, tlneworld! No smal-l- madness! Wo mod.est kind of irn'nodestyl 1

Rather than attempting, immod.est\r, to ttraisett consciousness in ord.er to

eLicit hís delínition of virtuous behaviour, Nietzsche suggests that a

causal re.'L.ationship also exists between unconsciousness (i.e. un-affected,

behaviou::) and. virtues of , for instance, tliligence, ambition and

acuteness,

IJnconseious u¿ntues - Alt qualities in a ma¡r of r¿hich he isconscious - and. especially vhen he presumes that they are visibleand. evid.ent to his environment also - are subject to quite otherl-avs of d.evelopment than those qualities r¿hich are unknown tohim, or imperfectly knor.r-n, by vhich their subtlety ce¡r alsoconceal- themselves frcm the subtlest observer, and. hicle as itr¿ere behind. nothing .. . . 2

Thus the unconscious, alrea.d¡r styled. as the executive force behind.

aLl I'perfecttt acts, beccrnes as r,¡ell- the separate and. ccrnparativeJ-y

inaccessibl,e d.oraín for certain types of virtues. These facets of virtue

inclicate the ccmplexity of Nietzschers anal-ysis of virtue in shar-p

contrast to the simplistic understand.ing offered. by Rousseau.

ilowever, it shoul-tl not be assumeil that Nietzsche downgradecl the

imporbarrce that Rousseau attached. to the eristence of virtue. fn fact,

Nietzsche enclor:ses, in his ovn tenns, the vafue of the card.inal virtues.3

The good fottz,. Ilonest with ourselves a¡rd. with whatever isfriend to us ; eotß'a,geous t,ol¡ard. the eneqy', gene"ous toward. thevarrquished.; polite - always: that is hov the for:r card.inalvi¡tues wa¡lt us. ll

This recognition that virtues exist, on the eonscio-rs level, is most

reminiscent of Rousseaufs position, but Nietzsche attaches a different

signification to such a thought. Whereas Rousseau referred. to the need.

for both publ-ic and. private virtue, and. for social systems arrd individ.ual

1" TI , "Moral-ity as Anti-Naturertt 6.

2. GS, I, B. (tcvy¡ .

')Jo the four cardinal virtues are general\y regard.ed to be; justice,prudenee, temperance, and fortitude. In Nietzschels arrangement,honesty rnight well be equivalent to Polemarchus I d.efinition ofjustice. q.u., Plato, 'Ihe RepubLie of Plato, (Trans. AL1an BJ-ocrn) ,Basic Books (New York 1968), Book I, Stph. 332a.

Dct'tn, 516" Whil-e Nietzsche ¡nainte,ins, probab\r for literarJr reasons,the notion of four virtues, he d.oes not alvays refer to the sanefour. For insta¡rce, he arso rists them as "courage, insight, s¡rmpathy,and. sol,itLr<ie.rr BGI'..., pBlr _

h

o

15T

beÌief-structures to bring about virtue, Nietzsche emphasises that the

kind, of virtue which he recognises is rel-evant solel-y to the individ.ual.

A virbue must be our oum invention, o1,¿! most necessal¡¡ setf-expression and self-d-efence: any other kind of virtue is mereþ adanger. Whatever is not a cond,ition of or:r life hæms ít: avirtue that is prcmpted. soteJ-y by e feel-ing for the concept oft'virtuertt * Kant fand. Rousseau] woultl have it, is hazrnful. I

The hierarchy of sub-conscious, conscious, and. autornatic sbates

that Nietzsche develops is cl-osel-y related. to his concern for the self in

society, and. suggests that there must be a red.efinition of the ontological

d.evelopment of ma¡r. It is frankl-y a move away frcrn the conception of the

individual- as a unified. subject progressing toward. perfectibility as

Rousseau r¿oul-d have it. Having stressed the importance of virtue for

the indivi¿ual-, Nietzsche underscores his point'by includ.ing as a virtue

the d.esire to cl-eanse oneself of social inter-relationships'

For solitude is a virtue for us, a.s a sublime bent and urge forcleanliness which guesses hc¡r^¡ all contact betveen man and. man -t'in societytt - involves inevita¡le rrncLeanliness. All ccrnmunitiesmskes men - scnrehow, scmewhere, scnetime ttccxnmon.tt 2

fhis attack upon the popular Rousseauia¡ viev, that man con only advance

through society, and. vil"I continualJ-y impro¡re &s & result of meaningful

socia-l- relations, is based. on Nietzschets disagreement with the d.etails

of Rousseaurs ma¡r (exercising free vi1l and. ord.ering his passion and- reason)

and, the rejeetion of the notion that these concepts d.esqribe the vorkings

of a sirrgle subject.

'I'he assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessa^ry;perhaps it is just es permissible to s.ssume a nrultiplicity ofsubjects whose interaction and struggle is the basis of orr thoughta¡rd. our consciousness in general-? A kind. of aristocracy in t'cellsttin which dcrrain resides? To be sure, an aristocracy of equaJ-s,used. to mting jointþ and. und.erstand.ing how to cc¡mrand.?

l.

Mp¡ hypothesis: the subject as nultipl-icity. '3

A, l-l-, Although a¡ldressir)g on\y Kant in the text, Nietzsche isreferring to him a^s a moralist. This, and. the d.ebt that Kant cn^red. toRousseaurs thoug,Ìrt, ful-Iy justifies the conclusion that Nietzscherscriticism applies equally to Rousseau.

¿ BGI:',, 2Bl+.

w), \ç0"3

a

158

This hypothesis u¡<i.ermines, again, the trfaithrr that Rousseau seems

to pJ-ace in the realm of conscious rea.soning, a¡d. by implication, truth

itsel-f. If the subject is a mul-tiplicity that defines our consciousness 'and. not vice-versa, then the d.emand. of the hitherto rrationalr mind. for

certainty is frustrated., or, more accurate\r, d.iagnosed as a chirnera,

a fa-r:tasy. In Nietzsclrets opinion.' this problen has been avoid.ed. in

several- våys, notably in the belief in either a trsaving gracetr of

inrnorba-Lity after death, vorld. historical- processes, or the perfectibility

of mankirlrl .

"Nothing has any meaningtt - this melancho\y sentence neans"Au. meaning lies in intention, and if intention is altogetherJ-acking, then meaning is altogether lacking, too.tt In accord.ancewitn tfiis valuation, one was constrained to transfer the valueof l-ife to a t'l-ife alter d.eathrtr or to the progressive developmentof id.eas or of nankind. or of the people or beyonct ma¡¡kind.; butl¡ith that rnan h€d arrivecl at a progressus in ùnfiníh'un ofpuïposes: one was at last constrained. to make a pla.ce for oneselfin the "vor.l-d processt' .r.. L

l+. Eternal Recurrence

Having recognised, and. rejected., attenpts to inject rneaning into

existence, Nietzsche d.oes not refrain frcrn proposing a¡ al-ternative

explenation - the theory of eternal- recurrence. This is, on his orn

a.dmissionn a restatement of the l{eraclitean concept that the wbole world.

is invol-ved. in constant change, and. that charrge alone is changeLe"=.2

For Níetzsche, the concept as he statee it d.emand.s of man that he learn

not onty to accept things as they are, but to be able to cope with a

futr:re'bhat l¡il.l- consist of things occurring øs they haÐe. Thus man must

know that he is never an end. tovard which he must strive. Rather, he

mus'b continue to strrrggle toward each nev beconing. Struggl-e, therefore,

features as aJr und.eri.ying principle both in Nietzschers presentatic,n of

I w,666.

"Tne d.octrine of reternal recurrencerr that is, of the uncond'itionale¡d. infiniteJy repeated circul-ar ceurse of a1l- things - this d'octrineof Zarathrrstr¿r, might in the end. have been taught already byHeraclitus." EH, ttBirth of Trage{r r" 3.

2.

a

l-59

vill to power and. in his theory of eternal recürr€ncê¡ Tkre vi1l to povrer,

as we have seen, is art affect of becøing, imposing trautcrnatismtf on

being. This beccrning is not then an end., but a neϡ begiruring and. a nev

beccming of recurring will to power. Above aII, Nietzsche bel-ieves

that eternal recurrence a¡d. beccrning underscores the ephemerism of all

valuations, ancl the perniciousness of moraL valuations in particular.

'Ihe pred.omi.nance of moral valuations in the I^lestern philosophical

tradition is consistentþ e,ttacked by Nietzsche. He saw his philosophical

objections echoed. by nihilism, which he regsrd-ed. as a social phencrnenon

rather than a consistent or coherent social theory.

Extreme positions are not succeed.ed. by moderate ones but byextreme positions of the opposite kind.. Thus the belief in theabsol-ute in'nnoralíty of nature, in ain - and. meaninglessness, isthe psychologicalþ necessar1r affect once the bel-ief in God. and.

an essentially moral or<i.er beccmes untenable. Nihilism appearsat that point, not that the d,ispleasure at existence has beccrnegreater than before but because one has ccrne to mistrust arry

"meaningtt in suffering, ind.eed in existenee.

Let us think this thought in its most terribl-e form: existenceas it is, without meaning or aimr ¡ret recurring inevítabþ withouta.ny finale of nothingness z "the etermal v'eeLLTTenee.tt 1

Thus Nietzschets essential,ly unccxnpronising attitude tc,Lrard.the

inevitably of suffering, of rrhardnessrtt is jr:xbaposea wittr this clearly

cptimistj-c rejection of exis'bence a.s necessari\y aimless and, meaningless.

Rebelling a¿lainst the stud.ied negativism of nihij.isn, Nietzsche attempts

to incorporate, theoreticaJ-ly and practical\y, the positive aspects of

nitril-ism into his revital-ising celebration of existence itself. In this

way, Nietzsche vas careful- to d.ifferentiate hinself frcrn nihilism, and

al-l popular social and. philosophical movements, vhite stilL being able

to valitlabe scme basic nihil-istic propositions. For example, the

negativism of nihilism rvas at Ieast functionally progressive since it

learl to the d.estruction of current moralities, a process Nietzsche regard.ed

l- W, ,5.

a

r6o

as a necessary cleansing therapy for man. On the other hartd., nj-tril-isrn

'l¡€r.si a t'No-saying'r not onty to the conditions of l-ife, but to life itself .

Ttre nihilist, who a-ssunes that life is. neaningless, establishes power

over his existence onþ at the point of carrying out "i"|ne deed of nihiLism

which is suicid,e -."1 Nietzsche appreciates the resolute beauty of such

an act, vhen it is counterpoised. against alternatives of ttthe id.ea of the

irunortal private person: likewise through the hope of resr:rrectionrt offered'

by Christianity, vhich trsubstituted. slov¡ suicide: gradually a petty'

poor, but durable life¡ gradualJ-y a quite orclinary, bourgeois, mecliocre

?Iife" etc."" For his part, Nietzsche was a. practising nihilist insofsr

as he too vished to exorcise Christia¡r norality, with the thought of

suicid.e as a sustaining reminder of his power over a genuinely rlifficult

exist.nce.3 But Nietzsche d.id. not succumb to the appeal of the ul-timate

existential act, preferring to bel-ieve that nihil-ism was not an end' point

or a mere d.isintegration of existing things, but a prepera.tion for the

future.

I pereeived that the state of clisintegration, in whichind.ivi,lual natures con perfect themselves es never before -is an image and isolated exanrple of'existence in. general. To

the paraþsing sense of generat clisintegration and incornpletenessI opposed. tine etewtaL reetpnence. \

fn effect, Nietzsche shows the nihilistic critique of Christia¡r

norality to be & necessarlr, but not eufficient, cond.ition for the

understanding and. aceeptance of hr¡man existence. Sti1l on this

method.ofogieal pJ-ane, Nietzsche can then introd.uce the theory of

eternal Iecllrrence as yet a fr¡rther, neceSS€LlX¡, therapeutic process,

'*hich must remain - in the J-ong tern - equally insufficient for the

r. wP, ?\7 .

Z" fb¿d.. c.f. Rousseauf s conception of the Christian as d-istinct frcrn,and. sone ways inferior to, tñe virbuous citizen. SC' fV, I'

3, r'T'¡e thought of suicicl.e is a powerf\r1 cørfort: it helps one throughmany a, d"read.ful ni,6ht"" BGE' ]-57,

\. l"[P, htT .

a

161

tLeveJ-opment of the sovereign ind,ivid.ual. Such a paradoxicaf ccrnbination

of nihifism and. the celebration of the apparent meaninglessness of

existence is a position ad.opted on the personal leveL as well as in his

vritings, attested to by what must be a:r autobiographical influenee in

his d.escription of Zarathustra ín Ecce HØno.

The psychological problem in the type of Zarathustra. is hol¡lre that says No and. does No to an unheard.-of d.egree ' to everythingto vhich one has so far said. Yes, c€rl nevertheless be the oppositeof a llo-saying spirit; how the spirit vho bears the heaviest fate,a f atal-ity of a task, can neverthel-ess be the lightest a¡rd- mosttranscendent - l-

The a¡chetypaÌ Zarathustra, Nietzsche rejoices in the task he set himself

of d.estroying the holcl of noral-ity over ms.rr, end. in thisr'\,¡e csrlnot help

but to be reminded. that this is very much rn¡hat Rousseau llas saying and.

d.oing in the Confessiorts" Unl"ike Rousseau, however, Nietz,sche d,itl not

wish to supplant contemporary valuations vith conmunitarian id.eals basecl

upon reJ-igious inrlividue-lism anr1 the possibil-ity of a just ancl well-

ord,ered Sovereign State. Although Nietzsche gives søre ind.ications that

his ideas have specific ramifications for the future structure of soeiety,

out attention is focused. repeated.\y on the inclivid,ual a-s one important

first principle. He shares this concern, at l-east, with Rousseau, who

d.enonstrated his progression frcrn Platonic thor-rght by stressing the

significance of the ind.ividual- a.s d.istinguished. frcm the elemental zoon

poLiti,kon of the poLís.2 Tni" is more than a method.ological proposition.

Ib is an iltr:stration of Rousseaurs appreciation of the individ.ual a,s,

in e¡ irnportant sense, a whoIe, as symbolised. in Plator s reciprocal

metaphor that the poLis j.s (ind.iviaual) ttman writ lerge.'r Ind.eed.,

EII , Thus Spoke Zarathr.¡stra, 6. Tt¡is passage, and the referenee toJ-ightness and. transcend.ence, should be taken into account whenconsidering the sub-titl-e of one of Nietzschers last books,T'tiLight of the IdoLs, or" Íla,t One PhíLosophizes úí,th d. Hamnet. The

"hammer" is not a tooL of destruction a¡ld. brute force, but a tuningfork, capable of testing, not smashing, hitherto unchallenged. orunchallenge able value-orient ati ons .

I

2. Enn Lrz, p. 202 .

a

l.62

Rousseaurs conception of hr¡narr nature is a statement of the potential -

civic, rnoral , and aesthetic - of man in ccnrnunity. Against this is the

Nietzschearr critiqur: of ail views of hr¡man natr¡re offering specific and.

vell-defined" sets of characteristics that, alfowed. their free play'

vou.ld. constitute pretend.ecl descriptions of hr¡nan beings.f Nietzschers

concept of continual- becc¡ning insists upon the impossibility of aqy

original notion of what man vill , much less shc'uld, eventual\y be.

The study of ind.ividual man, the cønperative\r new phencrnenon of

Western civitisation, is constructive, in Nietzschers opinion, insofar

as l¡ cLel-imits our knowl-ed"ge of what man is a¡rd d.oes, virtually forcing

us to avoid. systematic manifestos for the future of ma¡kind,.

This world: a monster of enerry, without beginning and, withoutencl; a firrn, iron megnitude of force that does not expend. itselfbut only transforrns itself; .... & s8& of forces flowing and-

rushing together, eternal-J-y changing, eternalJy flooding back, withtremend-or¡s years of recurrence, with a¡r ebb and. flow of its forms;. ,. . stil-I affirrning itself in this r:niformity of its courses andits years, blessing itself e.s that which must return eterna-1ly'as a beccr¡ing tha'b knovs no satietV¡ no itisgustr no weariness:this my Dionysiot vorld. of the eternalþ self-creating, the eternallyseLf-d.estroyiug, this mystery vorld. of the twofold. voluptuousdelight, my "beyond good. a¡d. evilrtrwithout god, unless the jqrof the circle is itself a goal; vithout a will-, unless the ringfeefs good vitl tovards itself - do you want a nøne for this world-?Thi,s uorI.d is 'bhe uíLL to paier - ØLd nothing besídes! And youyourselves are al-so this t¡i[ to polrer, md nothing besid-es! 2

5. Transfiguration and Hrman Progress

Nietzschers characterisation of man as vill- to power in aworld. of

energf i-n continuaf ffi:x creates a denanding and. unccrnprcmising position

frcm which to view human d.evêlopment. Basical-þ, he is suspicious of

any attempt to structure hr¡nan progress through rationalistic or

moral-istic prescriptive theories, ancl regards the need. to belong vithin

or create an orclered system as a moral (or phil-osophical) capitulation

ancl a cornplete l-ack of integrity. f n this context, the emerging nihil-ism

1. For F.ousseau, these specific characteristics are; ccmpassion' reason,perfectibility and. free agency.

2. líP, to67 .

a

),63

of the nineteenth centur¡r, with its suggestion that there exists a

certainty that all is uncerta-in a¡rd. false ¡ may have been treated.

cheritably by Nietzsche as a¡ und.erstand-ably pessimistic reaction to

Enlightenrnent attitudes tor.¡ard. existence" On the other hantì,, Nietzsche

rejeets the pessj-nistic reaction irr principle, on the grounds thatItmodern pessimism is ¿rl expression of the modern world. - not of the

vor1d, of ex:ìster,"u."f Nietzschets partial acceptance of nihilism is

thus largeþ on the basis that it can bring about the necessu.rlr

d.estruction of the val-uations of the modern world., end. the cleansing

of mod.ernity of the faLse and facil-e prescriptions of Christíaníty øtd.

contemporary sociaJ- theory - both d.emocratic and. sociafistic.2 Nietzsche

ca¡ corrd,one nihilismrs cathartic negativism, therefore, in ord.er to

d.emonstrate more cJ-early a contrarXr and. more sophisticated. r¡nd.erstanding

of mari. It is Zarathustra vho inforzns us of a vital- and, positive a-spect

inherent in overccrning the modern vorld.

A¡d l-ife confided. this secret to me: ttBehol-d.r" it said., ttI am

that uhich nust aTs,tays oùercdne itseLf. Ind.eed.r you catl it a will-to procreate or a drive to a¡ end,, to scrnething higher, farther,more manifold; 't¡ut aÌI this is one, and. one secïet.rt 3

Thus Nietzsche conjoins vill to poerer and. the eterrral recurrence,

by ernphasising that man is life, implying that ma¡ is in a continual

struggJ-e egainst life and therefore hínseLf. Of even greater signifieance,

however, is Nietzschefs perception that in such a struggle a¿ainst these

inseparables of Life a¡rd, self man wilt be transfigurect by the process

of constant\r overconing at l-east sme of the cond.itions of self and.

Iif'e confronted. at each mcrnent. ttWhat is g::eat in marì is that he is a

L þlP,3\. For Nietzsche, the nihilist is a special t¡4pe of pessimist."A nihil-ist is & ma.n who jud.ges of the vorld. as it is that it oughtnot to be, and. of the vorld. as it ought to be that it d.oes not exist.t'[^rP, 585 (A)"

tt.... inpnari one retains the falsificetion of history in favor ofthe rgood- mant (as if he afone constitutecl the progress of man) andthe socia-l-ist icleal- (i."., the residue of Christianity and. ofFousseau in the cle-Christiar¡ized vorld")." WP, IOI-7.

3. TSZ, p. ?27.

a

161+

bridge and not an end: vhat can be l"oved in ma¡t is that he is a¡r

otsertatre and. a gcrLng urder."I By expanding the notion of or¡erccming to

incorporate the deueLopment of man, rather than seeing it simply as an

aspect of behaviour, Nietzsche conceptual-ises ttmant' not merely as species-

man, but ma¡ within a cul-tural-biological ty¡rol-og¡ of civilisation. ft

is Nietzschers suggestion, therefore, that man as he knows himself wiII

d.isappear at each overconj.ng, to be repJ-aced. by a. new being. The act

of overcoming uill, continue, since it is fund.a¡nentaJ- that each new being

vill- strive to overcome itself, even though it can have no conscious

or unconscious perception of a firture state.

Put briefJ-y: perhaps the entire evolution of the spirit is aquestion of the body; it is the history of the d.evelopment of ahigher bod.y that emerges into our higher sensibiì-ity. The organicis rising to yet higher Level-s. Ou.r lust for knowl-ed.ge of natureis a means' through which the body desires to perfect itself ... "In the J-ong run, it is not a question of manbat all-: he is to beovercome. 2

Whife l{ietzschers articulation of this ttnev ma.nrr' EJrd. the vocabuì-ary

he uses to evoke the process of transforrration are obscure and firnd.amental-ly

cLifferent fron the idicnns of EnJ-ighter¡ment perfectibilitaria¡ism or lt4arxist

material-ism, it is worth noting that Nietzsche is engaging in quite ttre

sa¡oe theoretical- optimism, namely, that ¡na¡r in history shall- presid.e over

his om re-creation. The transformation in Rousseaurs sovereign State

presupposes, for example, a singJ-e process of improvement frcrn the false

man of an inhunane society toward. t'authentictt man of civic virtue. But

for Nietzsche, this is a seriously J-irnited.'riew. It assrmes the existence

of a true human rrnaturetrthat, aÌthough nor"¡ repressed by social strictures

and. structures r ma,y be liberated. and. pernitteA its fuLL d.isplay vhen these

repressions are eliminated.. Nietzsche concrlrs with Rousseau that the false

ma¡r of contemporary society must be tra¡scend.ed., but Nietzsche stresses

the tra¡rscencl.ence, the beconring, rather tha¡ the new or emergíng form of

being"

l-. Ib¿d., D, LZT.

2. ["/P, 676 .

a

,ú5

..,. vhatever exists, having scnehor cone into being, is againan<1 again reinterpreted. to nev end.s, taken over, transforrned.t and.

red.irected by scrne power superior to it; all er¡ents in the organicvorfd are & subd.uing, a becorning ma'sten" and. all subd.uing and.

becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaption throughvhj.ch any previous ttmea¡ingtr and ttpulposett e^re necesserily obscured.or obliterated.. t

The emphasis on becøning selves, then, Bs a criticism of Rousseau

or srry theorist l¡ho uses *ã "r*t""is of a particular society to fornulate

prescriptions for & new society and. to project the behaviour and. beliefs

of its constituents. Rousseaurs rrgood ma.nrr a¡d. I{a.rxts itvhole matrrrr eJ-ike

are presumptions about man and. the state after rad,icaJ- changes to society

have taken place. Nietzsche denies that there ca¡ be such knowled-ge

beyond. any one tra¡sforrnation of mart, because each change d.emancls an

entirely fresh e'¡aluation of vhat ma¡r is - in effect' e new ttgenealo4¡

^of morals.tt'- Such an evaluation, sinee it is in the context of 8. new

being, is unrelated. to arqr prior set of valuations that went to form the

basis of the initial social eriticism, and. the val-uations that go to make

up a social criticism have no autonatic relation to future states of man.

Rather, aI1 valuations concern man as he is beccming a nev being, applying

to the transfig¿rative process as it unfold.s, md not to the nev being

when it occurs.

l. Beconing d.oes not ain at a finaL st6te, does nob flow: into ttbeing.tl

2, Becoming is not a mereþ qpæent s'bate; perhaps thewhole vorld. of beings is mere appeararìce.

Beconing is of equivalent value every mcrnent; the sum

of its values always remains the same; in other vord'E¡'it has no value at a1I, for anybhing a€ainst vhich tomeasrl.re it, and. in rel-ation to which the vord ttvaluett

woul-d. have meaning, is lacking. the totaL uaLue ofthe uorld calLrtot be etaLunted; consequently philosophicalpessimism belongs anong cøicaf things. 3

?

l-. GM, IT, l,2.

I'his constitutes the new tasks and rrnev horizonst' for philosophers.

w,708.

¿_

3.

o

166

Ttrus Nietzsche rejects al-l- id.eality and. tel-eolog¡. In d.oing so,

he appears to be offering, vith no apolory to those interested. in

certitude or scientific method., a vision of recurring d.ifferences of

beconing, and. so red.efining our worl-d. a.s attfabfe and approximation on

the basis of a meager sum of observations."f Ttle false vorl-d, that is,

the one seen and. lived in, is the one to which manrs will- to power is

opposed., anil seeks to overcome. Failing to oppose this r¡orId., and.

every definition it offers of itsel-f, is to col-l-aborate r¡ith that fab1e"

As a social crític anrt philosopher, what Nietzsche sought to achieve r^ras

a, red.efinition of on¡ 'ractua.lrr worl-d..

To impose upon becoming the world. of being - that is the supremevill to po\rer.

TVofotd fal-sification, on the part of the senses and. of thespirit, to preserve a vorld- of that which is, which abides, whichis equivalent, etc.

Tttat eue'ryt/ting recLLl,s is the closest approrímation of a L)orAof becorrnng to ct uorLd of being: high point of the med-itation. 2

Nietzschef s antipathy to the trfabl-efr of the mod-ern rnrorfd here prov-ides

e¡l il-l-uminating juxtaposition of core id.eas in his thought. As we have

seen above, the concept of transfiguration is based upon both the notion

of man es wil-l to power, md the id.ea of eternal- recr¡rrence. At this

point, however, Nietzsche extends his ana\ysis by irnplyi.ng, in the use

of the vord. Itapprocimationrtt that there exists a practical and theoretical

equivalenee betveen eternal. recurrence a¡rd. the as yet distinct worlds

of beccrning and being. First, it d,emonstrates that eternsl recurrence

was indeed. intend,ed. by Nietzsche to be only a theory, to assist man to

trecome himself at every rncment. The second., and- more important point,

consists in the logical conjunction of the activity of ¡.¡il-L to power in

its supreme fo¡rn a¡cl the irnposition of ord.er end. meaning upon the ephemeral

world. of continuat change vhich Nietzsche describes. Conecrnitantl-y, the

+. t,/P,616.

2. tP, 617.

a

L6T

eternal recurrence is a theoreticaJ-,proposition d.esigned. specifical-þ

to assist man to achieve supreme will- to poÌ{er. TLrerefore, Nietzsche

unifies the apparently disparate categories of rril-I to power, the rn¡orl-cl

of becoming, the world of being, and transfiguration, by his use of

tine theoz,y of eterna-i recurrence - thisttapproximation to the truth and

reatity of exister,.c.."I For his Ftrtr Nietzsche by no means und.er-

estimates, on both theoretical- and. practical Ievels, this subterflrge,

e¡d its necessíty for life. Not onì-y does Nietzsche d.eny that there is

absolute tn:.th, but he positiveþ values the existence of untruth for

l1 Ie.

'Ihe fal-seness of a judgment is for us not necessari\y anobjection to a jud.gment: in this respect ollr new language maysound strangest. lhe question is to what erbent it is life-promotin6, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cuJ"tivating. o. r To recognise untruth as a cond-ition of tife - that certainlyme&ns resisting accustcrned val-ue-feelings in a dangerous vay; and.a philosophy that risks this woul-tt by'that token alone pJ.aceitsel-f beyond. good and. evil. 2

5. Individ.ual-ism

Such a use of the theory of eternal recrrrrence d.oes not seem to fit

the image of Nietzsche as the high priest of nineteenth century

individualism, hcnrever, especial-ly when viewed. in the light of Rousseauts

much vaunted. cont::ibution to ind.ivid.ualistic theory.3 ta is elear that

Nietzschers analysis of the ind.ividual rests upon basic assumptions c¡uite

different frcrn the religious individ-ualism of Rousseau. Rousseau outlined.

the characteristics of attbetterttperson, æd then sought to create a

political society th¿t vou-l-d prod.uce the good. man. As a perceptive socia-l

critic, he gave a crxnprehensive picture of the morally degraded man of

contemporary civilisation, and. as a philosopher, he contrasted, this with

1" It shoul.d. be noted. that the General !¡ill ful-fills a sirnitartyunif)ring fturction in Rousseaurs political- thought.

2. 9ffi, )r.

Reference to Rousseaur s ind,ivid.ual-ism is usualþ based" on the hiBhlyind.ividual-istic tenor of' the Second ùtseourse. As we have seen inChapters fI ancl fIf , however, a thorough examination of the impì-ication:of Rousseaurs thought prohitrits so easy & classification of him assimpty em ind,ividue-list - orr for that matter, a totaliterian.

?J.

C

168

an hypothetical- image of the natural- man" From this, Rousseau conclud.ed

that there existed. an objective set of criteria by vhich to judge all

hr¡nan action arrd. thought. As we have seen, however, Rousseaurs criteria

are far frorn objective.

It is c.Iear that Nietzsche werrt beyond. the reJ-igious individuatism

of Rousseau, but Lukes goes so far as to suggest that Nietzsche ad.opted.

the logicaL progression from lìousseauian individ.ualism - nameþ, ethicàI

indivirlualism - by putting forward. "a new and, higher forrn of morality,

the morality ernbedd.ed in trre tlbertnenseh.tìI Ihis interpretation d.oes

víol-ence to both the concept of norality ond. tlne valuation of values,

since it ccrnpresses each into a d.efinition of the other. For Nietzsche,

morali.ty ís orte system of ve-lues that eane to be imposed. lrpon a people

or a cfass of peopì-e, whereas the revaluation of vafues encapsul-ated

a critique of moral-ity, once it ha.d. becone arfsystemtt of values, rather

than an expression of development of human existence.

Quite unl-ike Rousseau, then, Nietzsche views man in the context of

his orientation, not to nature (norality), ¡ut t,o eristence lthe affect

of will to power) . fhis goes beyond. valuations of manr s behaviour a.s

real or u¡reaJ-, natr.ral or unnatural , socieJ or unsoeial , moral or

irnmroraJ. Hhereas Rousseau regard.s al-I men equatly, that is, as a

single category of i.nd.ividuals for whom his id-eas may be applied, universally

Nietzsche differentiates betveen types of man as wel-l a.s ty¡les within a

singl-e inci.ivid.ual. Just as he noted. that slave and master moral value-

orientations viLl, exist sid.e by sicle within the one psyche, he makes his

appeal- to higher men a^s a category, and. the higher man within the ind.ivid.uaf

to overcome false interpretations of himself e.nd the modern vorld-. Thus

Nietzsche avoid.s the need. for a c1a^ss ana\ysis. If various representations

of humarrity are present wi-ttrin a single ind.ivi¿ual-, then that in<livictual

is responsible for his existence, and. it is not just the social milieu

which d.ictates his -l-eveJ. of humality. Moreover, Nietzschets thougþt at

this point constitutes ¿ur attack on the objectification of ind.ividuals

l- . Lukes ¡ op, cit. , p. l-03.

lt69

ancl socie^I forces, as if they can be separated a¡rd. then arralysed.

That things possess a constitution in themselves quite apartfrcnn interlpretation and. subjectivity, is a quite iate hypothesis:i'b presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are notessential, that a thing freed. frcrn all rel-ationships would. stillbe a thing. I

'Ihe irnportance of interpretation coupted. with subjectivity unclerscores

Nietzsche?s d,issatisfaction vith the view that consciousness represents/l c

ma.nrs reason coming to terms with ttobjective realityrr of the r¡or1tl,

For Nietzsche, arcfose exa¡nination of human reasoning ca¡tnot fail to

reveal- that there al'e potent but, non-ratíorlaL influences which structure

our ostensitly trobjectivett concÌusions. His rejection of the notion of

a "thinyin-itselftt cari be applied l¡ith sclne success to those aspects

of Rouss.ea,uts thought vhich intimate the existence of an abstract

ind.iviAuaJ-, and. Nietzschets criticism is ind.eed highþ reminiscent of

Mancts critique on this i"".l".2 Nietzsche irnplicitly, ancl Marx explicitly,

perceive the ictea of the inriivid.ual- abstracted. frcm the social environment

to be a f\ndamental impossibility. Any agreement is short-l-ived., however,

since Nietzsche al-so rejects the "objectivityrr inherent in Marxrs

materiatistie a^ssr-¡mptions concerning the d.evelopment of ind.iviclual ma¡r.

Conversely, the apparent obiectíue character of things: could.i.t not be nnere\y a d.ifference of degree within the subjective? -that perhaps that vhich chonges slowly presents itself to us as

"objectivelyrr end,uring, being, ttin-itselfr' - that the objectiveis only a false concept of a genus a¡d. an antittresís uithin tlnesubjective? 3

From this angl-e, Nietzsche succeed.s in ccrrplete\r repud.iating

Rousseaurs notion of hwnan nature, where each inctividual is assrmed. to

possess characteri"stics of ccrnpassion, reason and sensibifity, vhich,

l-. t^tP,560,

e,1).5 Lukes, op. ait., pp. 75-TT.

WP, 56O"

2.

t

?

a

170

coupled vith his innate perfectibifity, vouJ-d. enable hirn to achieve moral

errd. social- goodness in a just society. If ma¡r changes slowly, through

transfigrrration of the self, then that which Rousseau saw a-srrobjective\r"

irurate an<L irnnutabl-e, becorned for Nietzsche the provisional constructs

of the subjective. On the other hand., Nietzschers methodolog¡, such as

it can be saicl to exist, clearly stresses, for example, basical-ly

individuaJ-ist notions of egoism and- autoncrgr, which, a.s Lukes points out,

are rnost popul-ar1y associated. rrith the phi.losophy of Spinoza"I It is

Nietzsche vho informs us of the great significanee of Spinoza to his

own work.

I lrave a preeursor,, ancl what a precrrrsor! f hardly knevSpinoza: that I shoul-d tu.rn to hin just ncu, rías inspirect by"instinct"'t Not only is his overall tend.ency tike mine -maJring knovrJ-ed.ge l-lne ¡nost pa'tenfuL affect - but in five mainpoints of hi.s doctrine f recognise rryself; this most unusual and.l.onel"iest thinker is closest to me preciseþ in these matters:he d.enies the freed,cnn of the wi1t, teleolog¡, the moral worldord.er, the r"uiegoistic, the evil-. 2

Nor is Nj.etzschers ca-ll to higher men to be confused. with Rousseaurs

appeal to the natural gooclness of man (were it to exist, even subjectivefy),

since higþer men aim not at the notion of improving themsel-ves, but at

overcoming thenselves, at tine Uhermensch ab1e to withstand. the terrible-

ness of life proriised. by the eternal recurence.

Meams of enduz,irry it: the revaluation of a-11 values. No longerjcy in certa.inty but in uncertainty; no longer ttcause end. effectfrbut the continual-Iy creative; no longer will to preservation butto pover; no ionger the hr¡nble expression, tteverXrbhing is ïereLAsubjeetivert' but "it is ai-so our vorkl, - Let us t¡e proud. of itlrr 3

Only at this stage in the development of man is it possible to

&ssess the t¡rpes of changes tha,'u Nietzsche regard.s as condueive to progress

for mankincL. As the wil.I to power creates the d.isposition of man to conquer

l-. Lukes , op. ait", p. 5I+.

2. Postcarti. to Overbecko JuJ*y 30, Ì8Bl-, PIU, E). 92.

3. I^/P, 1,059.

a

171

the cond.itions of life, arrd the theory of eternal reeurrence gives him

a consciousness of his strength so that he may use it more and. more

effectively, so the ol-d. valuations of morelity, and. essociated. acactemic

orientations, must be d.isplaced..

Fund.ønentaL innottatiorts.. In place ofrtmoral valuesrt, purelynaturaJ-istic val-ues. Naturalization of morality.

In place of "soci,ofogrrrt a theory of the forrns of d.cminabion.- fn place of "societyrrr the culture complex, as r\y chief, interest (as a vhole or in its parts).

Tn place ofrrepistemolog¡r" a perspective theory of affeets( to which bel-ongs a hierarchy of thã afiects; the affectstra¡sfigured.; their superior ord.er, their "spiritualityr') .

In place of trmetaphysicstt and. religion, the theory ofeternal recurrence (tnis as a means of breed-ing and sel-ection) . 1

Initia-Ìly, the terrns trbreeding a¡rd. sel-ectiontr are offensive, because

they conjure up visions of eugenics , a Nazi-sty1e master race, or at l-east

e perversion of Dan¡inism.2 On Nietzschers or^rn tenrs, this reaction can

be avoicLeil on the groun<ì.s that he placed. eternal recurrence in the context

of end opposed. to metaphysics and. religion. rn so d.oing, Nietzsche is

pre-enpt,ing the tend.ency to founder in tbe void. of existenti.al nausea

that is evid.ent in his suceessors, by transfor:ning the need for meta-

p\ysical explanations throughout history into a positive, ttcoura.geous

becon-ing-conseious and affirmation of what has been achievecl - a liberation

fron the slovenly routine of ol-d. vaJ-uatiørs that dishonor us in the best

a¡d. strongest things we have achieved..tt3

Notwithstancling the vibrant oracularism of his presentation of new

and. challenging id.ess, Nietzschers concern remains fir"mly within the

d.crnain of the problem of change in society. Essentia-lJ-y, Nietzschets

I. l,/P, l+62.

o4a fn fect Nietzsche provid.es his or¿n &nswer to these elaims, referringto those who suspected. him of Da.r-r+inism as I'scholar\r oxetì." EH,"Why T r¿rite such good. books rtt I.

3 w, 1007.

t

r72

d.esire to reinterpret the modern conception of history and its usefuL¡ess

to existence in general and. the future in particul-ar is no d.ifferent to

the d.ir"ection of Rousseaurs thought, apparent in his early and. rad.ieal

proposal that |tour mind.s have been corrupted in proportion es the arts

an¿ sciences have been improved.t'1 Both thinkers, witalþ interested'

in ond. convinced of their posthumous importance to society, attenpted'

to present ma¡ r¡ith an inage either of himself (in Rousseauts case),

or of life (for Nietzsche), in order to precipitate necessary and-

progressive change in the rn¡orld'"

Rousseauls contribution marks in an irnportant sense the zenith of

contract theory, within the context of a notion of a perfectible humen

nature. Without human perfectibility, Rousseaurs th,rught vould be devoid

of its id.ealist yet prescriptive articu-Iation of ma¡ in society. For

Rousseau, marr rmrst always be abLet b'¿1; in a highly specific fa'shion, to

improve himsel-f and. his society. Nietzsche, on the other hand-, rejects

the certaj.nty about the nature of man that fund.arnentally und'erpins

Rousseaurs theory. Instea¡1 , Nietzsche preaches a d,ifferent aJ]d. d-elimiting

viev of the hr¡nan cond.ition notable for its absence of an essentially

static d.escription of mafi. [4an is, as with Rousseau, still abLe to improve

hi¡nsel,f , but Ni.etzsche refrains frcm confining that developrnent to a

tineal an<1 naffow notion of perfectibility. For Nietzsche, ma.n is by

d.efinition eonstantly r.md.ergoing change' and an accurate descriptic'n of

ma¡r should reflect such a process. Transfiguration, therefore, is the

concept that best conveys the sense of ma¡ continually becoming something

which he is not afreaEy - a process that rnust remain non-teleological,

infinite , anil even d.angerous "

l-. AS, F.7.

rT3

Whatever the d.ifferences of substance and interpretatior¡t it is

the existence of a theory of cha^nge in the thought of both rriters

that is significant. Rousseau was quite specifie ae to the kipct of

eocia.l being he wished. to see emerge in the good. society, just as Níetzsehe

is ad.anant that the principal concern is the marn'er in which ¡¡an

changes" Neither, however, considers that a theoretical outline of

eha.nge to na¡r a¡d. society is sufficient to prod.uce that chamge. As

we sha-lL see, ßotrsseaut s solution to thie problem is ,a-lso ado¡ltect by

Nietzsehe, proritting once egain insights into the rel-ationship between

their political thorrght.

t

a

ul+

CHAPTER \TIT

THE PH]LGSOPHER AS LEGTSLATOR

The Legisl-ator is in all respects an extraord"inarf,¡ manin bhe State. If he ought to be so by his genius, he is not lessso by his office. It is not magistracy nor sovereignty. Thisoffice, which constitutes the republic, does not enter into itsconstitution; it is a special ancl superior office, having nothingin cornmon with human governnent " 1

Fund,amental thought: the ner¿ values must first be created -we shall- not be spared this task! For us the philosopher mustbe a legisl-ator" 2

By incorporating a strong cond.ennation of contemporary men and his

society irito their philosophies, Rousseau and Nietzsche provid.e either

expJ-icit or implicit guiaetines for the ind.ivid.ual a¡d. social enhancement

of ma¡¡kind" Their critiques ar:e not, however, based. on the assumption

that there exists a necessary and. sufficient impetus, vithin ma¡ or in

the structure of society, making progressive changes and. ultimate

improvement inevitable. Instead, Rousseau artd Nietzsche forrn a

bridge betr¡een critique and. prescription and. impose coherence on their

thor-rght by the role ancl function of L,egisLatov's to the hurnert rECê ¡

Ì¡or them, bhe Legislator is the most powerful a¡¡d transcend.ent force

in society, by virtue of a¡ extraord.inary, even superhuma¡, ccnprehension

of the intricacies of human existence" Such insight, hol"rever, carries

wittr it the cluty to und.ertake the singular task of re-ed.ucating hunanity

toward, its as yet unperceived. but l-atent futures, vithout recourse to

the rnanipulative ancL coercive strength of the authority and. power

structures cenmon to political- society. fn Rousseaurs thought, the

Legislator is presented in a relativeJ-y straightforward marìnero He

has a specifical-ty d.efined funetion to frme lan¿s for the institution

of k contrat soc'[aL, It i.s only impLicit t¡at Rousseau has acceptecl

that it is hís task to thus enlighten men. By contrast, Nietzsche cloes

1 sco u-

2 - ÞIP, 979 .

7

Ç

r7,

not discuss a third person - a Legisl-ator, as Êuch - in order to convey

his intent, becan:se he accepLs explicitly the principle that a philosopher

can only properly be d.efined, by the act¿D'¿tV of the legislative a¡d.

educative function for" society.

Houever, this makes our cornparison more interesting and useful,

in tirat the obscure and cønplex prescriptions that a.::e to be found. in

Nietzschets vorks cån be examined and. assessed in light of the precise

arrd. overtly politicaì- aims of Rc¡usseaurs ptrilosophy"

l-. Rousseau as Legislator

If Rousseau is assessed onJ-y upon the basis of his most famous

vork, t}re SoeiaL Cont:ract, one should. concfud.e that his nost significant

contribr-:.ti.on to political theory rests in the area of soeial architecture.

As ve have seen, Rousseau is concerned. with moral stature of the

inclivi¿ua1 in cqnrnu.nity, and., given that contemporåqr society was d.ebili-

tating to man, nev social- forms required a strong innovatory element

capable of transforming ma¡r from a repressed. inclividuaL to a confid.ent,

self-regarding, but whole pet:son, awa,re of his d.uties to all fellov citizens

and" not just himseJ.f . But, as Nietzsche repeated.ly claimed., the morality

that und.erpi.rc Rousseaurs thought is uncritical- and one-sid.ed., because

he assumes moral-ity to be a part of'the inner natr¡re of man" Granting

that a pet:sonts mornl behaviou¡ is subject to the influences of the social"

oriler at the time, Rousseau does not eæønine morality" Instead he

foL\oos its history in orcler to anticipate the next stage. For this

reason, Rousseanl creates a concept of a cømunity that is aimed

specificaJ.ly at ehanging the mora^l atti-tude of each participant, within'

however, the conte.xt of enduring moral precepts"

Such changes that Rousseau did. t'¡ish to bring about nevertheless

a

LT6

necessitated. widespread redefi.nj.tions of traditional notions of the

reL.ationship between sel-f and. society. Central to this task was the

need. to embellish befiefs about the moral natr.¡re of man by iincorporating

ttre language of civic virtue and. d.uty reminiscent of e¡rcient Greece"

ttre importa¡rce of this principle is attested to by the first rule for

popuJ-ar governnent by Rousseau in tìne DiscauÍ'so oll PoLitíeaL Economy.

Make men, therefore, if you would cømarìd men: if youvould have them obed.ient to the J-aws, make them love the laws, and.then they wiLl need. onþ to know vhat is their d.uty to d.o it"This vas the gleat art of ancient goverrnnents, in those distanttimes when phil.osophers gave laws to men, and. made use of theirauthority only to rend.er thern wise and" happy. Thence a.rosenumerous surnptuary lavs, the many regulations of morals, and. allthe public nrles of cond.uct which vere admitted. or rejected. uiththe greatest cere, 1.

In this pa.ssa€e, vritten as earþ ss LT55, Rousseau gives a clea¡

indication of hj.s u¡id.erstsnding of the paradox of the notion of popuì-ar

soverei-gntyr æ vel-l- as intimating the for¡n of his sol-ution. First,

Rousseau recognises the d.ifficulty of obed.ience to the l.aw, even if tnat

lav is of the sovereign peopì-ers orrn naking. Seconcl, he admits that

men must be ccrnnanded'bo obey lavs, as the onJ.y means to true free<lqn

a^s social- beings. The ideat os lìousse&u sees it is to posit man a.É¡

true to himself only when he accepts the lavs as parb of hinsetf a¡rd

therefore val-id.. Und.er bhese cond.itions, consciousness r Ae vre might

expect, must pIBy Brr important role" But Rousseau, unlike Marx, d.id.

not coricentrate his efforts on establishing or raising consciousness

for its ovn ed.ucative or revolutionary sake. Instead, Rousseau sought

not to change menrs mind.s or the material cond.itions of their existences,

but to change men - "to make them what there is need that they should be".2

f. PE, I2'r .

rbid.2.

6

T7T

It is not until 1762, with the publication of the Socíal Corttraet,

that Rousseau provides an expì-icit and. systematic solution to the id.eas

foreshad.oved in the earlier works. Having outlined' the form of a

republican constitution based on the inalienable sovereignty of the

people, Rousse&u restores 'the Greek Lawgiverl to proninence in the

institution of the nev State. The appearence of the Legislator

highlights an importanb aspect of Rousseaurs thought, first developed

in the Secctnd. Iliseourse. I{ere , in his challenge to the contraetarians

Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau argued that the once natural ma¡r, Le SAnÐage,

ceased. to exist with the onset of civil society. fn consequencg the

fonl of sOci-ety consisted of a si¡m and mix of social conventions t some

longsta-nding, scrne cluite recent in the history of man, but al-l- of which

could. be juclgerl according to their benefit or detriment to the

more.l- nature r¡f man. The s¡rtificiality of society, then, and its effects

upon the ind.ividuaf a¡rd. social- being, augments Rousseaurs conviction

that any social structure could. and. shoul-d l-ead mankind toward moral

perfectabifity. Far frcrn a rreturn to naturer, Rousseau scknovtled'gecl

that his vision was designed. to enha¡¡ce an und.erstand.ing of the

unnatura-l¡ess c¡f man in society, and focus creative attention on the

mea¡1s through vhich mankind. coulcl. becc¡ne sublime, rather than alienatecl ,

in his artificiality. And- it is the Legisl-ator that is given the role

of rguidingr the single indi.¡id.ual a¡¡d the public as a whole into

enlightennent ancl conforuj-ty vith the general will" 2

L.

¿

The Legi.sfator therefore should not go by vhat he sees, butby what he foresees; he should stop noL so much at the statein vhich he actuaLly finds the population, as at that r¿hichit ought natr.rratJ.y to attain. 3"

Arj-stotl-e , PoLitics, Traris, Ernest Berker (Ortor¿, 19bB) ' Bk. 1Ir Ch.l't'Individuals see the good which they reject; the public d'esires thegood. whict¡ it cloes nc¡L sec " A-l-1 alike have need of guid'es " The

former must be conpelled to confo:m their vil1s to their reason;the people must be taught to knov what they,require " l{ence

arise.s the neecl of a Lãgislatoro" SCt 1l-, 6.

sc, l_l , 10.).-)¡

t

178

Ttre Legislator, therefore, is not introd.uced. by Rousseau simply

to d.esign rules and laws of society and. its institutions that vil-1 be

suitabLe to contemporary mBn, but to take account of the advancements

of species man, that, fffi exarnpler were being revealed cons'barrtly by

Enlightcnment scientists and philosophers. Fu-Ïther, the Legislator

vhile made in the ima4ge of rnagnifícent examples frqn a¡rcient civi-Lisations,

is inforrned. by the effo::ts of more recent philosophers of statescrafb -

particularly Machiavel-li, Hobbeso Locke and- Monte=q,ri",r."l The

Legistator is by nature a¡rtl function a hybrid. of noble ancestral

endeavollrs and a radical- proponent of en optimistic view of future

societies" Ctearly, Rousseau has in mind. an unique persons€e"

In ord.er to,liscover the rul-es of association that are mostsuitable to nations, a superior intelligence would be necessarywho coul-d see al-l- the passions of men without experiencing a:ry ofthern; vho vould. have no affinity with or¡r nature end' yet know

it thoroughly; whose happiness woul-d. not d.epend on us and who

rvou-Lrl nevertnåtess be quite vill-ing to interest himself in ours;and, lastIy, one who, stori.rg,.p for hinself çith the progress oftime a clistent gl-ory, eould, Iabour in one age ancl enjoy in another.

Thus the Legisla,tor is aifferentiated. frm the legistative function

of bhe Sovereign people within Lhe State apparatus " Given the primary

and. most important role in the institution of the nev society, the

LegisJ-ator is shown by Rousseau to be transcendent only by virtue of

a vitaf interest in the welfare of the people.

Recognising that arry attempt sirnply to use rational argrmrent to

enÌighten the people and. Ì¡ave them forn the laws of a new social- ord'er

is doaned to failure, Rousseau emphasised the need' to instil- in ttthe

people", a supra-rational ccrnprehension, expressed. by the general r^'il1 .

T,Ìre incorporeâI nature of the general witl, coupled r'¡ittr its significance

1" sc, ll. , T.

Lb'L{l "t)

a

L79

in maintaining a just and' good' state, pronpts Rousseau to impose

great restric.bion on the Legisl-ator" He cannot, without invalid'ating

his frrnction, use ally institutionaf or coercive mea¡ts to establish

the reign of virtue and. the prmtinence of the general witL. 0n the

other hand., Rolrsseau also restricts the people frqn any active involve-

ment witlr the creation of fundamental socia-t laws, lest they infect those

tavs vith the petty demand-s of their prioate wiLls '

I{e vho frmes lavs, then, has or ought to have' no

Ìegislative right, mð trre peoite cannot, even it ttrey wished'

d.ivest themsefves of this i^ncotununicable right, bg"&use'. according

to the r,rtã*u.rtal- pact, it is only the general will ttrat binds

inclivid.uals, an<1 ve c8n never be st¡re that a particular vill isconformab]-etothegeneratvil].untilithasbeensubmittedtothefree votes of the PeoPleo I'

The clemocratic i¿ea1, inherent in the notion of the rfree votes

of the peoplet, remains therefore in tension with what Rousseau sees

as the practical- d'ifficulties of constituting the republic' And'

it shoul¿ be noted., Rousseau d-oes not vish to conprcrnise arÌy of his

ideal-s" Trhe inalienabirity of sovereignty, posed. both es a critique

of Hobbes ancl Locke a¡ld a fund,amental politicaJ- belief, the d'ernand

for the ind.ivid.ual and' social freed'cms, and' the confid'ence in the

perfectability of man, aII ccrnbine to exclude solutions of Leviatha¡r-

l_ike absofute a'thority or elite dcrnination of society. rt is this

that forces Rousseau to ad.opt the Legislator as the on\r available

technique l-eft to him. And havirg clone so, openry admits that the

refusal_ to ccmprcrnise, even in parb, sJly of his id'eals, transforrns

the Legisl¿rtor into an impossible notion - another tdeaL"

Thus ve find. simultaneously in the work of legislationtvo .bhings that seem inccrnpati¡ré: B¡ enterprise surpassing

hunan pol¡ers, and to execute it, an authority ttrat is a mere

nothing o 2"

l. rb¿d.

J D,I.CI.¿-

t

180

As we sha1l see later, however, Rousseau when 6iven the

opportr:.nity to be such a Legisì-ator to Corsica and PoLand' attempteri"

to ful-fiI the. ideal-.

2. Nietzsche as Legislator

The cøpLexity of the Legislator and. ¡is importance to Rsusseaurs

theory are ind.ications that he saw himself as a philosopher with

knowlerJ.ge, vision a¡rd a sense of d.uty, declicating hiurself to the

improvement of mankind.. It is perhaps even more obvious that the

aims and the sa¡ne philosophical elements can be observed in Nietzschers

work, in his attempt to ttransfigurer man. As we have cqne to expectt

however, Nietzsche ad.d,resses the central concern in both thinkersr

vork - morality - frcrn & more adva¡ced and. critical perspective.

Nietzschers d.issatisfaction vith contemporary moral valuations l-eads

him to disegree fund.øtentalty vith Rousseau,rs attempt to make man

morally virtuous, and. he concentrates instead. upon the task of guidin8

man toward eætv'æmoral defínitions of self and society.

In so d.oing, Nietzsche provicles a critique of philosophy in

general and. Rousseau in particuJ-ar by pointing out that the quest for

truth is not a¡r admirably objective philosophical ideal, but itself

a motal assr-mption. Having esteblished. through genealogicel analysis

the unsatisfactory nature of the ttmor&l interpretationtr, Nietzsche

brings into question the philosophers I motives.

3" Morality' no\^r vithout arçr sanction, no longerknor¡s hør to maintain itself " Eventualþ one dtops tlnemoral- interpretation (echoes of the Christian value juclgenentsstitl fill ¡rents feelings) "

LBI

\. But it vas upon moraf judgements that üalue was

baserl so far; above aJ-J-, the vclue of philosophy ("of thewi]l- to truth" ) . I

Philosophers val-ue their vork, therefore, on the basis that

truth exists and must need.s to be found. For Nietzsche, thio is an

exercise for and vithin the existing moral framework of society,

end he attacks the notion that philosophers ' frcm Socrates and' Pl-ato

onwarcls, have ever actually attained or produced a xeLeoøtt

unrlersta¡d.ing of man ancl society.2 By constructing an ttimaginBrytt

vorJd. of present realities, philoso¡rhers in Nietzschets opinion,

cormrit themselves to the straitjacket of methodolory, the will to

a system, as if so man¡¡ prerequisite elements for a better future

are knovno and. need. to be ordered"

W.t 6pn, Section three of this passage is quite a mod.est admissionby l,lietzsche that his thought is not so much creetive of thecln.bral issues in human society as it is reflective of 'bhem.

Nietzsche is driven to eJl extra-moral standpoint by socialIeality, amd. not by d,esign" He believes that the d"crnination ofthe t^teáiern pol-itit*f t"ÁAition by the Judeo-Christia¡ ethiehas persisteã for so long tha',, the nyths of religion have ceaseilto 'be coruected. to the concLitions that gave rise to them" Intlre absence of those conditions, and a recognition of the roleof myths themseLves, norality becmes graclualþ d-iminished' inimportanee and. effeótive strength" It is also interesting tonote that, even though moral interpretations are supersede¿l'Nietzsche recognises that feeL'inge remain the last refuge formorality" Suðn a persistênt anâ objectivety unfound.ed infLuencemust have hel¡nd, convince Nietzsche of the need. to push lrhatvas already falÌing.

êo If one is a philosopher as'-men have always been philosophers r one

c¡¡nnot see vhat has been and becøes, one seee on\r r'¡hat one

is. But since nothing is, all that r¡as left to the philosopheras his ttworLri.rt

'aas irnagina-ry. hlPt 57O.

I

Ò

,

182

Tkie bel-ief that the wor1d. as it ought to be is, realÌyexists, is a belief of the unproductive who ð.o not desine to æeatea uorLd as it ought to be. They posit it as a-lrea{y available,they seek vays and- means of reaching it" ttwill to truthft -as the írnpotence of the uiLL to ereqte. l-" .''

At base, then, philosophers of al-l kind.s are interpretecl within

the context of a psychoLogìcaL perspective. For Nietzsche, philosophy

is a profound and.tttyranniceJ-rt ùrive, the ttmogt spiritual witl to power,

to the f creation of the v¡or1d.t, to the eø,tsa príma."z As such, the

refusal- or inabiLity to actual-ise this drive reven'ls the itimpotencerr

or ind.icates suhLxmatíon" of the philosopherls spiritual creativity'

Accord.irrgly, Nietzsche must reject any d.efinition of the philosopher

as the lover of r+isd.crn, one who researehes, analyses, synthesises, and.

perhaps ccmprehends. These queJ-ities nay well be usefu-l in thenselves,

but for Nietzsche philoso¡rhy must be an activity, a struggle, not

e¿ainst ignora.nce but against vhat is discovered. His studies

produeed an awareness of the facede of norality that helps to create

and naintain the d.ivision between the true and empirical selves. fn

Nietzschets opinion, it then beeame his åtty as a philoso¡rher to

create new values for man to replace the traditionaL and unsatisfactory

val,uations ond. indeed to LegisLate such a change.

It is this further, clrematic challenge to man a.s philosopher that

is in ironic contrast to his criticisn of Socrates anal Plato. Nietzsche

cl-aims that Socrates ushered in a per:iod of philosophical decaden""r3

a¡rd. that Plato brought about "the d.enatr¡ralisation of moral',r*l-.le"."L

htP, 585 "

BGE, 9 "

,IP, \Z'r .

w, l+28.

1.

2.

JT

lr.

a

183

But, as Danto points out, Nietzsche, &s s. philosopher-legisJ-ator,

reiterates one of the central- themes of Platonic philosophy"

. o . whereas the chief single inffuence upon niêtzsche wasthat of the pre-Socratics, there are a nr¡nber of points which, asve have seen, he is more nearly related. to Socrates and Plato:although Ìre is a fervent critic of their work e¡rd. its effects,yet his bel-iefs concerning the role of phiJ-osopher in civilization,ancl his arnbitions to fiLl that role, a.re such as one would. onlyexpect to finil in their pupil. fn

Given the importance of the Legislator in Rousseaur s thought, it

may vel-l be more accurate to d.escribe Nietzsche, not as a stud.ent of

Plato, but as continuing a'bradition of fundamental significance in

Rousseauian philosophy. Just as Rousseau pointed. out the unique

chalacteristics that a lavgiver shoul-d ex¡iUit, Nietzsche d.etails

what he sees as necessarJr requirements, so specific and. d.ema¡d.ing as

to be al-most impossibJ-e to real-ise"

Why the phiJ-osopher rarely turns out well-. His requirementsinefude qualities that usuaLty d.estroy a man:

l-" a tremend.ous mu-l-tipJ-icity of qualities; he must be a briefabstlact of man, of all ma.nrs higher and lorrer d.esires:danger frcrn ertitheses, also d,isgust at himself;

2" he must be inquisitive in the most various d.ireetions:danger of going to pieces;

3. he must be jr:st r¡¡rd. fair in the highest sense, but profounatin fcrve, hate (end injustice), too;

l+" he must be not only a spectator, but also a legislator: jud.gea¡<l be jud,ged. ( to tne extent that he is a brief abstract ofthe world); D

5. extremeLy nul-tifarious, yet fir"m and hard.. Supp1e.'

As I{ousseau d.id. before him Nietzsche is d,escribing himself when

he refers to the lawgiver, and it is the irrood.esty of both men that

in this case is the vehicle for e.¡r und.erstand.ing of their thought"

O¡r several- points, it can be seen that Nietzsche arnplifies in a

particuÌar lray aspects of Rou,sseaurs thoughts. There is total

t I)anto, OP, ûi'b, IB3"

wP, 9T6 "2.

a

18l+

sgreement tha't the lawgiver is rare, with the strong suggestion

that he must be superhrmrart. Present, too, in both conceptions is the

notion that man hes a higher and l-ower nature, and the id.ea of justice

is atso prcrninent" But Nj.etz,sche, in line with his acceptance of the

inevitabil-ity and desirability of both good øtd, evlr, d.oes not

preclude the innportance of base nature or injustice, whieh Rousseau

found so abhor:rent. Being rra brief abstract of mantt, the Lar,rgiver

carr only by 'tthe instinct of societyttl if he encompasses and. represents

alf that is¡ hu¡ran' as a col-l-ection of d.ifferent but not antitheticaLcimpulses"- the Lavgiver is therefore extremeþ perceptive, but not,

as with Rotisseau, u)t)se, because such wisd.crn is a moraJ-Iy contamineted.

notion" ft is these d.ifferences in enphasis that most clearl-y d.istinguishe

the tvo conceptions of the Legislator" Rousseaurs Legislator, separated.

frc¡n the sovereign peopte by his roLe and. intent, is above juclgement.

His ef'fec-biveness is only as*sessed. insofar as he is able to constructtgoodt 1avs. For Nietzsche, hcnrever, the Legislator must jufue and.

be judged, because he is at once the manifestation of merr in his

present fomt qnd the d.evel-opment ned.itu for manrs aspirations and.

possiuitities. This is a much more dynamic and. involved. eonception

of the philosopher as legislator, who must remain intimately eonnected.

vit¡r the process of life for species ma¡r, md at the same time be

avare that the legis]-ative activity is a sinilarly specific and.

trans figurati.ve proces s ó

1" r"/P, 889 .

"c.hte¡ uiøapoínt.' estabrish rì.ifferences, but create no antithesesoDissolve t'he {ntemediate forms and. red.uce their influence: chiefmeans of' preserving d.istances " W, B9l_.

2

o

185

AIl great things bring about their own d.estruction throughan act of self-overconing: thus the law of life will have it,the Lar,¡ of necessity of ffsel-f-overconingtt in the nature of life -the lawgiver himself eventualJ-y receives the call: rpatere legem,quam ipse tul.istir. l-"

0n the other hand,, the lar¿s that Nietzsche preseribes lack the

overt political content of Rousseauts SoeiaL Contraet, and. it nay

be argr.red that the two thinkers are uJ-timately distinguishabl-e in tenns

of intent and. method on this ground.. It will be remembered., hovrever,

that vha'uever Ror-¡.sseauf s desire for a republ-ican form of goverrunent,

he bel-ieved. above alL in the importance of the ind.ivictualts will being

conjoined. with others to create the general- will. This was the real

task of the Legislator, vhose suceess was imperative if any new political

structures lrere to emerge and. prevail"

Nietzschers Lawgiver is pred.icated on the same kinds of assrmptions

ancl is concerned. to achieve very similar types of changes, even if on

a much more sophisticated. Ievel. With respect to wilI, Nietzsche

insists that free r¿i 11 d.oes not exist but that the ind,ivid.ual has a

will úo sunething. As a resu-l-t, manrs will to be or d.o must be released.

and. d-irected. towa¡d. the d.estruction of values that restrict man as r,¡ef1

as tov¡arcl the ereation of new firtures for man" Certainly, Nietzsche

d"oes not bel-ieve that those fut\:res will- appear as democratic movements,

and. he also d.iscounts most of the political movements of his d.ay, but

that dces not mean he had. no concept of a f\rture. In contrast to Rousseau,

then, Nietzsche d.oes not assert that the Lavgiver shoul-d. seek to precipitate

a neû constitutional social order, because that is too narrow in its

outlook.

GM" 27 " "Subnit to the law you yourself proposed.tt c;f"Rousseouf s bel-i.ef that trobed.ience to a faw which ve prescribeto oursclveç: is Ìiberty" " SC, I, B.

1..

a

r_86

llhere, then, must úe reach r,¡ith our hopes?T'ov¡ard. neu philosophies; there is no choice; toward

âpirits strong and. original enough to provid.e the stimuli for oppositevãluations and to revalue and. inverttteternal vaLuesfr; toward'forelunners, tova^rd men of, the futr.rre who in the present tiethe knot and. constrairt thá, forces the r¿ilt of millenia uponneü tracks " 1..

Thus the phiì-osophel: must create and. change the value-orientations

for individ.ual-s a¡d. society, to eonform with the belief that species

mqn is chars.cterised. by a vill- and. d.rive to overccnne itself , and that

such a.',ril.t is accr¡nulated. in the history of the species. This should'

no! be confused vith a vorld-Ìristorical process, however, for Nietzsche

d.id. not admit to the mechanistic inevitability of specified improvement.

An¿ in his theory of change, the Lawgiverrs paramor:nt importance is only

equalled by the difficulty of the task.

More and" more it seems to me that the philosopher, beingof necessity a man of tomorrow a¡rd" the d,ay afber tomorrov,has alvays found. himseLf, and" had to find. himself, in contrad-ictionto his today: his eneqy vas ever the id.eal of tod.ay. so fara1l these extraordinary fu¡therers of man l¡hcm one calls philosopherso . . hr¡ve found. their task, their hard., ur¡wanted., inescapable

task, but eventually the greatness of their task, in being thebad conscience of their time. 2.

3. Legislators and Education - Rousseau

Ttre d-iste¡ce that Ror:sseau and. Nietzsche wish to preserve betr¿een

the activity of the philosopher as Legislator and. the ad.ministration

of poJ-itics in the state pJ-aces great restriction on the nature and-

scope of the legislatorrs function. Having mad.e the philosopherrs

task a superhyman one, it is clear that whatever means chosen to

i-rnplement new laws, that means itself must be endowecl with extraordinarlr

qualities and effectiveness " At thì-s point, both thinkers remain

t_. BGT:,

BGE "

203.

2r2.2.

a

187

within the cLassical tractition of Platonic and Aristotel-ian thought,

and. select educatíon es the only viable tooJ- avail-able to the lawgiver.

Education, in their view, must be ained. at the ul-tirnate ailvancement of

mankind' through a change in the valuational bel-iefs concerning selfa"nd society" But where Rousseau augments the principtes of a sound.

social organisation with the overarching role of the Legisrator,

Nietzsche rejects the notion that a specific political structure can

be d.elineated for man, and. praces prinary errphasis on the necessity

for the phiJ-osopher, &s Legislator, to reconstruct the moral and.

political image of man"

Deniecl most of the practical means of persuasion by which peo¡rte

may be ttforced. to be free'r,t *o*""auts Legisr-ator remains wholly

responsible for bringing about the most profound. changes to man,

such that he may love and accept his moral- d.uty to himserf and

his social- d.uty to his fellow man. clear about the end.s proffered

by Le eontv'at soc:iaL, Rousseaurs problem was satisfactorily to ccmplete

mants d.evelopment avay fYom the state of nature, to remove the

remnants of satnsag¿ nature that were contrad.ictory to mod.ern social

existence o

He who und.ertakes to give institutions to a people ought tofeeÌ himself capable, as it vere, of changing hr_man nature; oftra¡sforrning eaeh ind.ividual, who in himser-f is a ccmprete and.independent who1e, into part of a greater r¡hole, frcm which hereceives in scrne mar.ner his tife a¡d. his being; of altering mantsconstitution in order to strengthen it; of substituting a pa^rtial.and. moral existence for the ind.epend.ent and. physiceJ- existence whichwe have al-l received. frcrn nature. Z.

t ùL¡ Tr,2n SC, rr, 7"

t

189

since ceased- to exist. The enti.re aim of Rousseaurs phiì-osophy is to

teach ancì facil"itate, to assist man towar<l a wholly wtnattu,aL goodness

in his ind"ivid.ual and social, deatings.

Second, Rousseaur s belief in the perfectibJ-ity of man through the

ad.vancements offered by society 1ead,s him to secr.rre the realisation of

manfs potential- in the l-iberating sphere of a cornnunitarian soeial- ord-er,

in bhe hope that further progress, of a positive kind, wjLl br: ensured."

It is this aspect of his thought that is d.evel-oped in the Utopian and.

I'larxist thoup¡ht of 'l,he succeed.ing r:entury" rn parbicuJ-ar, Rousseauf s

suggestion that semi-søutrage mar. should. finally integrate his experience

of shared. scrial existence into a nev perception of sel-f in society

merely points out, in crude form, vhat r¡a*s to becqne a f\r1þ

nrticul-ated a"nd. und.erlying featr.rre of Marxrs critique of political

society.

Tlird, l-iberal-d,enocratic theory is much influenced. by the

attention that Rousseau focusses upon the tension between the ind.ivid.ual

end, unsatisfactory social systems. Prior to, and. even concurrent with,

the presentabion of the principì-es of the good. ccmmunity that would

subsune much that lras previoì.ìrìl.y cc¡nsid.ered. to be ind.ivid"uality, Rousseau

forrnul-ated. social- criticisms by an eraboration of the individ.ualrs

suppression a¡rd. estrangement frcrn sel-f and others. But the

ind-iviaualistic tenor of those criticisms does not, by his om

aùnission, anount to a compJ-ete and satisfactory methodological

found.ation for the anaþ'sis of that sociuty.l In effect, Rousseau

is sqying that such a technique may be necessary bo provide an eppreciation

anil awareness of the ill-effects of scciety, so that the eonsequentiaL

1. Ibi¿[. zo?

190

,

need fc'r en ad.equate examination of the true found'ations of po3-itical

society mught be highl-ighted. As Ewile d.emonstrates, ind.iviclual d-is-

affection vith society arnounts to a corrpletely justified' condemnation

of that society only when the ind.iviaual is ful-fy ê ltrarl. Far frcm pro-

moting ind.ividualisn, then, Rousseaur s e.nalytical perspective

presupposes a notion of species-ma.nr not a col-lection of sel-f-interested

individ.ual-s. Once again, Rousseau is d.isposed. toward. the communitarian

rather than the liberat-d.emocratic trad'ition. Neverbheless, it is

cl-ear that a selective synthesis of first, the powerf\r1l-y argued.

ancl obstensi.b\y ind-ivid.¡alistic sections on the artificiality of society,

a¡d seconcl, the virtues of a democratic republic and' po¡rular sovereign

authority, has done much to inform and strengthen libero] -d.emocratic

theorisi ng.

UJ-timately, it is the use made of the concept of the Legislator

that distinguishes Rousseau frcrn these three trad-itions of whieh he is

so rnuch a part. What was necessal?., in Rousseauts opinion, was a

ccurplete change in manrs perceptions of self snd, society, md the creation

of a nev being through the efforts of the Legislator. "He must, in

a vord., take away fron ma¡r his olrn resources and' give hin instead' new

ones alien to hirn, and incapable of being mad-e use of without the help

of Other ^en."I Those nev resollrces llere tO be engend'ered' via the

nedium of a parbicu-l-ar kind. of nationalism, and the legistative tactic

capable of achieving this coul-d. only be ed"ucation. Ttris was to becsne

one of the strongest themes in the constitutional t¡ork' The Gotezryrnent

of PoLøtd"

1 sc, rÍ, 7"

û

lgr

This is the inportant question. ft is ed'ucation thatnust give sou-Is a national fortation, and. clirect their opinionsand. tástes in such a vay that they vil-I be patriot by inelination,by passion, by necessitYo I.

2Using as his examples the legislators of antiquity, as weII ag

suggesting that Ptato and" Machiavelli alike produced' work that vas

fundamentally ed.ucationaLr3 *or-,"""au urged his Polish audience to create

a d.istinct:'-ve and, d.istinguishing national cui-ture and character.

The ed.ucational- effects of games, ceremonies and. spectacles, for example t

vould., in Rousseaurs opinion, bring about a twofold. change in alt incliviaua.

and. so prod.uce B" peopLe. First, each perscrl woulcl ccrne to regerd. himself

not as a private ind.ivid.ual, but es 8. eib¿zen - a privileged. member of

the canmunity antt a participant in the wisclm of the general r'¡i11.

Second, nationalistic inclinations, vhen strengthened a¡ld, embellished',

vould form a¡ inerad.icable barrier against successf\rl external

dcmination.

Of even more significance is the harshness of Lycurg¿sr rule

that had such e profoun,d effect on m8,n" He|timposed' upon them an ironL

yoke, the lilte of vhich no other people ever borett , ' but macle them see

it as alr essentiaL cond.ition of existence in their society. It is

this, for Rousseau, "vhich turned. them into beings above the level ofq

htnnanity,"2 Ttris is in contrast to the viev, shared by Nietzsche,

that Rousseau sought on\y to free man, and' all.ov¡ hirn simply to be"

fn fact, Rousseaur s arg¡nent is l-ess idealist than it first appears,

for he is sug¿çesting that a peo¡rle rnust be dcrninated and d.riven' even

I GP, 176.

Moses , Lycurgus , e¡d Nr.una, GP, f63-f66.

Enile, B, SC, rrr, 6.

GP, ]6\. .LþLd.

2

a3

l+

5

a

l-92

if'that aubhor:ity and impetus has its source in the people themselveso

His rationale, of cotrse, Ìras the total social-isation gi each member

of societ¡¡r so that civic d^uty ancl virtue could. be instilled and.

maintaj-necL, and the wel-fare of the whole conmunity enhaneed..

This thene is apparent even ín Enn,Le, vhere it may be ima,gined

that Rousseau was concerned onJ-y to pronote and. permit the fulI

development of inã.iuíduaZ maÌr, against t'the crushing force of social

eonventions".I In fact, Rousseau set out vrtat eøt be acccrnpl-ished.

at the l-evel- of ind.ivid.ual (personaJ-) experience, for good or ill,

ratlrer th¡rn what ought to be attempted, by society as a whole,

Bub that is not to sqy that j.ndividual man wouÌd" be pitted. against

society pera eeÞ The authentic in<lividual- taught to listen vith his

hea¡"t to tlie prcmptings of justice an<I virtue, and. thus act in

accord.ance vith his true self, wgs not the equivalent of a self-

regarding aJì.d autoncrnolLs being" Authentication, for Rousseau, consists

of ma¡ d.iscovering within hjrnself his essential hr.uanity" Thus the

education of ûnile as an individ.ua-l focusses upon the need. to transcend

fafse social roles in unsatisfactory political and. cul-tural ord.ers"

0n the other hand., the ed.ucation of Enile as representative of

mankind. emphasises man I s fun<i.amental sociality.

The natural man lives on}y'for, himself ; he is the rurit,the whole d.ependent onJ.y on hinself a¡d. on his like. The citizenis but a numerator of the faction, whose value depencls on itsd.enr:ninator'. his value d.epend.s on the vho1e, that is, the con'munity"Goorl social- institutions are those best fitted" to make man unnatural,to exehange his ind.er:end.ence for d.epend.ence, to merge the unit inthe group, so that he no J-onge:. regard.s himself as one, but as apart of the vhol-e, ancl is only conscious of the conmon life" 2o

1. EmiLe" J--2"

rbid. T,2,

193

Wratever Rousseaurs intent, his programe - part reforrn, pad

revol-ution - must incorporate effective means for its real-isation"

To ed.ucate ma"rr, on either the abstract personal or concrete political

Ievel, requires a Legislator vhose infl-uence is d.isproportionately greater

than his actual. power. Rousseaurs solution to this problem is a

direct acknowl-edgement of Machiavell-its contribution to politis¿f i;theola¡.

f'he great educator, they argue, must employ a subterfuge, akin to the

Platonic Inobfe Lier "

Because the Iægislator cannot employ either force orreasoning, he mrrst have recourse to on authority of a differentorder, vhich can ccmpel without vio-l-ence anil persuad.e withoutconvincing.. o

The Legislator puts into the mouths of the inmrortalsthat slrbLime reason vhich so&rs beyond the reach of common men,in ord.er that he nay vin over by d.ivine authority those whomhuman prudence could. not move. But it does not beLong to everyrTlan to make the god.s his oracles, nor to be believed. when heproclaims himself their interpreter. T.tre great souJ. of theLegislator is the real- miracle r,¡hich must give proof of hismission. I.

Tt is at this point that the superstructural aspects of Ror:sseauts

political thought are most evicì"ent. His principal assr.mption, that

ma¡ is a moral and social lieing, is embellished by the notion that the

structure of society must bear the responsibifity for hr.una¡r shortconings.

This leads to his argrrnent that there exists a particuJ-Br end. id.eal fonn

of social orgernisation, vhich, for the ennoblement of mankind, must be

instituted. Coupled. with this is the view that ma^n, long subjected.

to repressive societies, has not developed. the capacity sud.denly to beccrne

the beirrg that Rousseau supposes him to be. Accord.ingþ, man must be

Lf. SC" II, 7, Rousseau adds in a footnotetttft is truer, saysMrachiavelli , I that there rìevel: was in a nation any prcnnulgatorof extraordinary lavs vho had not recourse to God., becauseotherwise they coutd not have been accepted.; for these aremany ad.vartages recogni.sed by a vise man which are not sosel-f-evident th¿¡.t they ceri convince others.t (Discourses onTitus Livius, Bh. I, Ch. I.l)."

a

19\

ed.ucated. tov¡ard. fu-lJ- expressions of hr-manity wittrin a new sociaÌ ord.er

that has been created. by the Legislator. For a.It his insistence on

the true moral and social nature of ma¡r, holrever, Rouseeau Lra.s not

abLe to provid.e an adequate accowrt of its real-isation, even though he

believed that man progressed. as a d.irect result of hr¡nari perfectibility.

ft is for this rea-son that Rousseau is forced. at last to capitulate,

and. exploit a belief in Gocl, rather than pose such a belief as a

logical presupposition. We see the Legislator, therefore, putting vord.s -

Rousseatts word.s -rtinto the mouths of the imrnortalstr, not only to

sr¡bstantiate his claims, but also to impress theln upon the peo¡1Ie.

At the same time, Rousseau vishes to l-init the use of this Machiavellian

subterfuge by utilising a,n even more suspect notion, that ttprooftt of

the Legislatorrs legitinate capability resides in his (and. therefore

Rousseauls) rrgreat soul-fr.

fn practicaJ- d.etail , however, the Legislator has a, more narroÍr scope

than the theoretical proposa-ls imply" fn lnís Considerations on tlø

Goueynment of Poløtd and the ConstitutionaL Proiect for Coraíca, written

in t765 and. l-TT2 respeetive\r, but published posthurously, Rousseau is

hi:nsetf cest in the role of Legislator. Here the ùifficulties of

changing man and. society are set forth and. tackled., and Rousseau appears

to be und.er no illwions a,s to the extent of his possible influence.

fn the SoeiaL Contnaet, Rousseau had. already pointed out that any

vould-be Legislator must have not just a knowledge of the human heart,

but must intiraately be acquainted. with the material cond.itions of the

society in question, a.s well as a fìrIl appreciation of the prevailing

cul-tura1 forces. In realist vein, then, Rousseau ecknowled.ged. the

t

l-95

the futility of frarning a ne̡ constitution basecl on & conplete but entirell

r¡¡rfemiliar set of moral val-ues.

o . . ilre wise tegisl-ator d,oes not begin by d.rawing up lawsvhich are good in themselves, but first investigates whether thepeo¡r1e for vhom they are intended are capable of bearing them" 1"

AIso, Rousseau lras by no means prepared to aecept that arry nation

or peo¡rle is able to create for itsel-f the freedcm and justice of a

new social order. Some countries, in his opinion, having Lost their

freedcg, could never regain it, since the pe.ople have been so corrtrpted"

that they \,¡ere no longer abl.e to forswear the inauthenticity of a

refined but shal-l-ow existence in favour of the re-establishnent of

moral rectitud.e .2

In fact, Rousseau suspected. that Poland. vas in such a situation.

In a significa¡rt departure from his respect for ancl admiration of the

co¡nmon people, Roussean: ca¡rre to the stern but perceptive conclusion

that the Poles were inured. in their serfd.crn, and. vere therefore

incapable of suddenly transcending servite attitud.es a.nd' habits.

ft was in the context of this nsbion that Ror:.çseau geve his actvice

to the Polish noblemen tl¡ho approached. hin for a ccnrstitution.

I sense the ctiffieulty of freeing your ccrnnon people.I em afraitl not merely of the bailLy understooti self-intereÉt,the self-eonceit, md the prejud.ices of the mastersi if thesevere surmounted, I should also fear the vices and cor¡ard-iceof the serfs. Liberty is a food' easy to eat, but hard tod.igest; it takes very strong stonachs to stand it. 3'

I

2

3

sc, rr, B.

rh¿d., rr, l.o.

æ, \86.

a

196

'Ihis qualifieation demonstrates, at the least, Roussea,¡rs cønprehension

of the gap between his idealism, on the one hand, eoncerning the nature

of man, anci the al-most intractable social real-ities that militate againsb

chalge on the other. He does not, hovrever, give his reservations the

status of a theme or principre, as did Nietzsche, e^nd. characterise

serf-l-ike orientations as an entreneineð. hunan, rather than social,phencrnenon" rn effect, Rousseau attached. a great dear of weight tothe pre'va.iling curtr-rre of poland and not just the existing power

structure, important though it may have been in creating the serfs

vho were both spiritual-þ and physical-ry unfree. Accord.ingly, he

refrainecl fron suggesting that the entire social- edifice be d.iscard.ed,

and preferrerl. instead a gradual transition frcrn f.'eurial society to a

federalist r:epublic, in association vitli the cultural en¡ichment

of the populace. rn political terrns, then, Rousseauf s proposal-s

vere in essence very conservative.

, Never shake tl¡e rnachine too brusqueJ-y. r have no d.oubtthat a good. plan, once adopted, wirr change the spirit even ofthose who played a part in govern:nent und.er another system.since new citizens c&nnot be created alr at once, you mustbegin by making use of those vho exist, and to offer a nerrroad for their snbition is the vay to make them r¡ant to fo11oq¡it. f.

Thus Rousseau maintained. his faith in the idea that society

is responsible for the quarity of hr.unan existence, but d.id not have

too high an expectation of a nev regime being irnrned,iately

efficacious and- successful-. Moreover, Rousseau as Legislator

valuecl. and vas informecl by his principles of l-iberty, equality, and.

justice, but appriecl them rather than imposing them upon the people"

rri this vey, he hoped that a gener.al u¡derstanding a¡d respect for

I. Il,tt,d J p. 275.

a

T9T

such principles could be engend.ered. - ftto make the serfs who are

to be freed worthy of liberty and capable of end.uring it."I

As far as the people of Corsic& were concerneil, however,

Rousseau had a radically d.ifferent opinion. Here he saw trone

country capable of being given rav'srt, because they remained free,

arid. dwett uneasily und.er foreign administration,t ,or this reason,

Roussea¡r eontended. that a cønplete restructr¡-ring of the politieal,

eeonqnic and. social- oriler couLd, be achieved.. The detail of this

constitutional project is remarkable in the history of political

thought, because Rousseeu provid.ed a cr-ear insight of his vision

of an egrarian society based. on equarity, whene property r+as almost

totally socialised., and. the people shared. in the material goods of society

€Ls much as they participated. in its organisation a¡d a.dministration.3

rt anticipated., in both practicar and. icleologicaJ- terms, much of the

anarchist and. socialist writings of the succeeding century, while

rmaining vithin the liberal--d.emocratic trad.ition, by virtue of

Rousseaurs strong emphasis on the highry d.enocratist notion of the

need for a fed.eralist system of goverrment that could ensure maximr¡n

political rights. Ihis constitutional project remained. unccmplete¿,

however, and the Oorsica.ns vere unable even to attempt to put these

id.ea.s into praetice vhen trþanee assuned cnrnership of the isra¡d. in

t76B anrl put clorn the rebeltion.[

L. Ibíd, 186.

2. SC, rI, 10.

3. Con, 308, 317"

\. F. Tüatkins, Introd.uction to Roussecnt:Nelson (London lg53), xxxvii,

Political Writings,

a

1gB

The practical. nerits and. deficiencies of Rousseaurs poì-itical-

prograrrunes f'or: reforrn most interestingly revol-ve around his insústence

upon a simpJ-e agrarian society. By relying on an agricultural nodel

of a subsistence econcrl$r, Rousseau shovs himsel-f to be un&ware of the

econcrnic and poì-itical ra¡nif ications of a d.evetoping capital-ist mod.e

of procluction. He assr¡¡recl. that al-l- r,realth, aIJ- val-ue, hd its source

in t,he land, and he algued. that it was sufficient to restrict cmmerce

as much as possible, rather than change the und-erlying mechanisms of

expl-oitation. T'hus, in the Ùlarxian frane of reference, Rousseau faile¿

to ccrnprehend that the l-iberty anct self-d.etennination so i-nportant to

his theory could not be ensured. whitst particuJ-ar, capitalist, relations

of production were perriittecl to exist" His ernphasis on agrarianism,

the¡efore, amounts to an eve.sion of the need. to provide a ccmplete account

of the econcrnic base of society.

rn his d.efence on this point, hcnrever, one need. d.o not more than

rebatril,i.tate Rousseau to his historical- context, He did, after aIr,

reject tlie concept of a money econcrny. fn ctoing so, he chalrenged.

clirectþ bhe econcrnic gurus of his d.ay, the Physiocrats, '!,¡ho suggested

that every increase in the wealth of the nation, measured by the amount

and, velocity of money in circirl-atic,n, necessarily resulted in an increase

in the velfare of atl- members of that soc:'-ety.t o.r the other hand.,

Roussesurs d.ivergence on a point of econonic theory is not based

on a¡y empirica.l fal-sj fication of the Physiocratic proposition,

Rather, Ìre believed, the.t wearth brought i"rith it altL fostered. the

undesirabre sociaL effects cs.nva^ssed, in tlhe Discourse on the k'i;s *tdSc'i-ences, ¡.¡hich, for him, va^s reason enough t,o vìlify wealth accumulation,

j ncliviciuai-ly or socia1ly.

1, Lrr.cio coll-etti, F?øn Roussean to Lenín, New Left Books (LondonrgT2), 165.

a

l-99

Rousseaurs policy of coll-ectivisation and the creation of smal-L

rural ccrnrnunities is, however' more than an econcrnic structure that was

capable of catering for the material needs of the populace while main-

taining fibert-y and- equality. It is his contention that a cl-ose

and prod.uctive a.ssociation with the l-a¡rd., an âssociation that i-s not

profit-oriented., is instnunental in attaining the virtue of the inaivid'ual

and the strength of the co¡ntry as a wþo1e. His adviee to the

Corsica¡rs is directed. tovard politicising all rnembers of the State'

and proviriing d.efences a¿;airwt the dcrnination of bpreaucracy and' the

concentration of politics"l power "

You vill 8.sk ne ir it is by till-ing a field. that one acqulrestire tafents needed. for governing. I ansver yes , in a goverrmentas simple and. upright as ours . " mahe the people fove thec(f,ilnouves.l-th, seek virtue, anrl <1o not concern yourself wibh greattalents; they voulcl do nore harm than good.. The best motiveforce for a government is a love of country, Ðd this love j.scultivaterl together with the lend.. I

It is by no mes.ns ambitious to suggest that Maoist China pr:rsued just

such a policy or political- stratagem for the very s€une reasons that

prcrnpted. Rousseau to propose it' And' the Gang of Four, it seems,

vere at least as Ì¡ary as Rousseau of the itecarLence that accornpanied' Life

ín the cities, an<l sought tÔ d.eflect refinement in the established'

arts by reptacing them vith a revolutiolany - orr in Rousseaurs tenls'

educationaf - culture.

underlying 8fl- of Rousseauts notions of the good. society, however,

ve still- find. that it is ttre Legislator who must provide both the impetus

for charrge as rrefL as its successl1¡f reaLisation" Not onþ does the

Legisl-ator have to forrn the Ìavs as a guide to political action, he must

also engenci.er in the people the vil-i to adopt such measlrreso

I. Con, J29

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200

To stimulate the activity of a nation, ther.efore, you mustoffer it great hopes, great desires, great motives for positiveact i on. l_ .

I'l'hatever the apptications of Rousseaurs legislative thoughts an¿

gestures , his theory of the Legislator ha.s inherent, limitations, whích

rest on tr¿o associated. beÌiefs. First, Rousseau is of the opinion that

the phil-osopher as Legislator must be, by definition, a truly remarkable

individual , a t'miraclet' among men, to be abre to perform the raw-giving

task" Second., he stressed. that a specific historical cond.ition must

be met - that men ancL country shoul-d. be prepared and. able to a.d.opt the

a¡lvj"ce of such a Legislator. He d"oes not provid,e sufficient guidance

on hov that state rnight ever be aehieved..

cJ-ear1y, the cletail- of Rousseaurs ser-f-conscious critique of

eighteenth century civiLisation demonstrates the unlikelihood of either

of these condibions occì.rrring, much r-ess coinciding. society, forRousseau, actively nil-itated age-inst the potential of each inttivid.ual,

and. convt:ntiona.l philosophícal pursuits only eonfinned. clecadent tendencies

in mod.ern thought and. action. By implication, no Legislator couId,

elnerge frcrn a nilieu vhich operated. to maintain and. extend. the dcmninant

ideologies. The sel-f-edueatecl Rousseau, of course, counted himsel-f

as the notabl-e exceptiorr, and. d.emonstrated. this belief by cleliberately

removing hinself frcrn the intel-lectual environs of his day, both

physical-ly and. in the progression of his id.eas. rf the structure of

society coul-d, therefore, render the emergence of a lægisl-ator almost

i-urpossibte, then his anaþsis provid.es ample evid.ence for the view that

rbíd-, 32r. Again, the Peoplers RepubJ-ic of china put such anidea into the daily practice, \,fitness sr.rch pro8r&runes and" theiraccqnp8r\)ring slogans such a^s "The Great Leap For-r.rardrr and" theCul-tural Revolution.

1.

a

201

the people e.s & vhole vil1 ¡e even less like\y to be prepared. for

the types of substantial- changes that Rousseau held to be essential.

Even vithout the ari.d.ed. canrplication of the d.enand.s for popular anil

inal-ienable sovereignty, ancl the creation of the general wi11,

Rousseaufs d.eseription of factitious men of base anbition filring

fal-se social rol-es constitutes the strongest argument against the notion

that the members of such a society could. ever acccrnmod.ate to a regime

with Rousseau as Legislator.

It shoul.d be observed., however, that Rousseau goes some vay to

resorving such a difficurty. By equating moral and civic d.uty with

patriotism, Rousseeu \,¡a.s abl-e to circumvent theoretical a¡rd. practical

obstacÌes. Patriotism in the first cese beec¡nes e talgible and. und.er-

stand.abLe expression of the much-vaunted social morarity. second.,

patriotism provid.es the ba-sis for a ccnmon appeaJ- to the people, uniting

othenrise d.isparate elements into a rationalistic whole. Conceptually,

such a grouping may constitute a people ready and. viuing to aece¡rb a

Rousseeuian LegisJ-ator" Thus, a patriotric movenent may make certain

dema¡rd.s on or against a¡¡ existing politicaì- system, hoÌd. cer-bain ideals,

and agitate for s. ner¡ society on the basis of those icleals. But, as

Rousseau himself pointed out, it is the ability of such a peopÌe or

patriotic movement to malage fYeed.qn that is of equal importance.

Rousseauts theory does not contain the d.etails for naking such assessments,

hovever, iust a,s he fail-s to prod.uce an ad.equate accor.l.nt of why patriotisrn

can be equated. r.¡ith social norality" rt is not suggested., on the other

hand, either here or by Rousseeu, that the grievances of eny oppressed

group are rnade any less valid by this viev, or that those in a position

a

202

of threatened. privilege can d.efend. themselves by reference to the itl-

prepared.ness of the unfr.ee.l Thus, Rousseaurs views on a peoplels

capacity for freed.<xn is but e¡ intimation of a central feature of

Nietzschers doctrine of slave morality.

A-s Rousseau presents it, then, the concept of the philosopher 8^s

LegisJ-ator seems seriously deficient, and. it woul-cl appear that

Rousseaurs mistmst of uninforrned revolution a¡d refor-m led. hin to adopt

a method. of imptementing real- change r¡hich is not onJ.y i:nprobabl-e, but

impossib1-e. It can be shown, however, that the notion of the philosopher

fulfilling the most important and decisive role in the d.evelopment of

society retains its usefulness, by reference to Nietzschets presentation

of this doctrine.

\. Legisl-ators and" Education - Nietzsche

Just as Rousseau regarcled, education as the necessary conccrnmitant

to the legislative flurction, so Nietzsche recognised that ed.ucation must

be the tool of the genuine philosopher. As r.¡e shal1 see, however,

Nietzsche di¿ not accept the Rousseauia¡l viev that the true Legislator

woul¿ necessarify be an unique ancl rare occurrence. fnstead, he invests

in the role of philosopher the pover, the privil-ege, even t]ne duty,

to fu1fil the most important function in society - that of d.irecting

ma¡ùin¿rs futr:re. Such a conception is much broader in scope than the

Rousseauian notion of merely setting out the Lavs for & new political

system. In essence, the difference in emphasis betr¡een the two

thinkers is novhere more f\¡nd.a¡nental. Rousseau sought to improve social

l- For a detail-ed analysis of the argument concerning freed.ø thatRoussean.r anticipates, see Erich Fronm , The F'eæ of Fneedorn,

Routledge ancl Kegan PauI, (Lon<lon f-960) .

203

a

rel-ations by prescribing a particular poLitieaL arrangement that would.

perrnit only a certain kincl of interaction betveen men whose sociaLíty

vas assru"ned.. Nietzsche makes no such assumption, a¡d. rejects, LE¡ B¡t

wrsatisf,actory technique, the principle that huna¡r existence sharld. be

blucJ.geoned into a specific shape through the imposition of a political

structure that can onJ-y clumsily reflect the moral prejudices of the

thinker in question.

tr\rnd.amental instinctive principle of all philosophers a¡rd.

histc,rians a¡rd. psychologists: everything of value in man, arthistory, science, rel-igion, technolog¡¡ must be proved to be ofrrtovaL üaLue, moraLly cond.itioned., in aim, means and. outccrne.Every thing understood in the light of the supreme value:e.g. , Rousseaut s question concerning civilisation: t'Does manbeccme better through it?t' - an anusing question, since the reverseis obvious ancl is precisely that r¡hich speaks ín faoon otc ivil-is at ion. 1,

l'leis quite stunning inversion highl-ights tvo interesting things.

First, it clemonstrates that in Rousseaurs thought, social man and.

inAiviaual man lrerìe lìever given independ.ent status, notwithstand.ing

his or.v-n arnbiguity on this point. Rather, Rousseau applied. to ma¡r and

his socj.al mil-ieu alike the externat star¡d.s,rd. of a certain norality.

Seeond., Nietzsche cl-earþ rejects this approach, and. in d,oing so, signals

his ccrnmitment to the viev that man alone is responsible for civilisation.

By implication, civilisation is only secondarily affected. by material

forces, ild the primary and most significa¡¡t impetus must always be man

himself. To jud.ge of eivitisation, then, is not to perceive the meuìner

in which me¡ is restrained. vithin the confines of that civilisation, but

to cì.iscover the extent of manrs principal shortcmings" Thug Rousseau

snd Nietzsche are critics o:f society in their respective centr:ries, but

Nietzsche cLifferentiates himsel-f from Rousseau by not believing that

civilisation stan<Ìs in the woy of man, but that civilisation is

íntpouer"t shed by con'bemporary msiì"

1' w' 382'

20\

e

Thetaskofthephil-osopher,therefore,istomakema¡capable

of deriving the maximum possibte benefit frorn individual existenee'

Confronted'withtheworld.ofl'moclernideas'',whichvoulclbanish everybo(y into a corner å¡d 8. "specialitytt, a philosopher -if there "oïrãi. any phiÌosophers today - would. be forced. tod.efine the greatness of tt", ih" "oo""pt

of trgreat"?=:tlt.i"

termspreciselyofman|"".,np'"hensivenes:"''dmultiplicíty'in his vholeness in manifol-d.-ness: he woufd even d'eter:nine vorth

and ra¡lk according to hov much a¡d' how many things a person

couLd ¡"* urtã-iJ" "po" hin,self , how far a person could octend

his responsitititY. I.

Rather than a¡r inage of marr needing the support and security of

id.eal-ist political structures, Nietzsche represents humanity as truly

capabìe of extreme cr:rnpl-exities such as worfd' override the practical

d.etails of a given social existence' It is for this reason that

Nietzsche refrains frcrn articufating t specific conception of hr'man

nature. If man is whol-e only when he is at his most manifold, then

to search for a pætianLot set of cha¡acteristics and' label it as manrs

fundamental nature is both misguided a.nd' unproductive' For Nietzsche'

then, there is no,,role" for any one hr.man being fulfil-ling his nature'

just as there is no id.eaJ. to vhich the individ.ual nay a-spire a¡rd

approach.Contrarytosuchaclosed.viev,a¡rdinaccorila¡cer¡ith

hisnotionofthe,,¡illtopowerrNietzschesuggeststhatmanmeybe

mea.suredbyvhatheactualirydocs'Moreover'theextenttovtrich

any inctivid.ual may ertencl his responsibirity indicates that the

possibilities for man are exceed.ingty oPan, since there is no moraL or

prescriptive standard against vhich to judge the efforts of the single

indivicLual. The striving of ma]l, therefore, is a non-socíaZ activity'

since sociBty cannot presume to d.ictate the terms and' nature of rmanrs

ccrnprehensivenessajrdmultiplicity'-societycannotIknow|whatto

expect of any indiviclual or any grolrp' even though it may be a

benefi.ciary of inclivi<1ual and' group action'

1. BGE , 2l'2.

a

205

To appraise the vafue of man according to how useful he isto men, or hov much he costs, or what ha¡:m he d.oes to thaa - thatis as much - or as littl-e - a-s to appraise a work of art accord,ingto the effects it produces. But in this way, the value of aman in canparison vith other men is not even touched. upon . Ð .

Moral valu¿rtion has resulted. in the greatest obtuseness ofjudgement: the val-ue of a man in himself is und.errated., alrnostoverl-ooked., al-most d.enied" Remnant of naLve teleolory: the valueof marl only in rel-ation to men. 1.

On the other hancì., Nietzsche clearly believed. that manrs efforts

cou.ld be veighed and jufued in the light of the efforts of others. It

is frcrn the twin premises of ma¡rrs will to power and. manrs ability to

take on responsibitity that Nietzsche developed the notion that the

worth of inÅ.iuiduaLs coufd, be assessed., and. then ranked., broadly, as

belonging to the ascend.ing or descend.ing line of hr:manity" ïlithin

these cate6¡ories, too, Nietzsche thought that ind.ivid,uals could be

ranked. according to their vorth, Iea.ding him to sone of his more

outrageous suggestions concerning the means of ensuring the future

improvement of the hr-man ra,ce.' nu d.id., aflber all , value hrmanity

very hr'-ghIy, and vished. to minj:nise the predcminant influenee of

the herd elements of man and. reptace it vith a social arena that

pemitted the existence of tire higher marr, who would inevitably advance

the species.

t-. r^/P, BrB.

2. For a documentation of Nietzschels worst excessesr see Keufìnann,op.cit., ch. lO. Kauflnann argues that Nietzsche Ìras no progenitorof Fascism and. its associated. genocid.eso In this respect, KaufYtannrsinterpretation ca¡rnot substantially be fauLted. However, he goesfurther, and. attempts to placate l-iberal- sensitivities by anpha.sisingthe spiritua.l-istic intentions in Nietzschets harsh vord.s. This,ve argue, is mistaken, Liberalism, in theory and practice, isthe archetypaÌ mora-l vindnill- at vhich Nietzsche consistently tilts,and he couf<1 not have wished to present att his ideas in a fonnacceptable or even uncLerstanclable to such an auclience.

t

206

To achieve this, Nietzsche eschews the notion that the herd-t

d,emocraticalìy conceived. or otherv¡ise, shoul-d. be in cøunand. For

hirn, that must be the task of genuine philosophers. As with Rousseau'

Nietzsche sees himsel-f as the onì-y living example of the true philosopher-

Legislator, but j-s not content vith such a conclusion. Instead' of mere\y

vaiting or hoping that a Legislator might emerge r¿ho eould ed-ucate the

people tovard. a neï¡ existence, llietzsche seeks active\y to prod'uce the

men, the l.ea.ders, of the vorld., at the same ti.ne having no illusions

about the enormity of such a¡ undertaking.

To ed.ucate ecl.ucatorsl But the first ones must ed'ucate

themselvesl And for these I write" 1o

.Ihe imptication here is that there is a d.istinction to be made between

t1ryes of phi.losophers as vell as types of philosophies. Nietzsche does

not believe that philosophy per 8e is the means to his end., even though

it na.y well- be regarded. as the enbodiment of manf s rationaL endeavour

tovard. a pæticy.'l,ar enð,. To ill-ustrate his point, Nietzsche pays

tribute to the quality of the enterprise Ka¡rt and. Hegel and' a.cknowJ-ed-ges

thej.r contributi-on both to philosophy and. to his own thought, at the

same time suggesting that they failett to transcend. their role as

tttrùrilosopliical laborerstr .

Those philosophical laborers after the noble mod.el ofKaJlt 8nd Heg,el have to d.eterrnine and. press into fonnul-as, vhetherin the r".l- o1 Logíc $ poL¿tieaL (mora]-) thowht or Øt' some

great d.ata of vatuãtions - tir*t is, former posdt¿ngs of -values,

creations of values vhich have beccrne d.orninant e¡td are for a timecall-ed. "truthsr', ft is for these investigators to make everythingthat has happened. and been esteemecl so far easy to look overr easy

to think o.rä", intetligible an¿ manageable, to abbreviate everybhinglong, even t'timett, and to overccme the entife past . . o . 2.

1" PN, 50.

BGE, zLl-.ée

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207

The importance of such vork in Nietzschers schema is revealed. by

the inclrrsion of several- of the themes d.iscussed- in earlier chapters.

Here r¡e h¡rve reiterateri. the proposition that political thought is

chan:acterised. by a certa&t kiná. of moraL thought, which d.ominates and.

structu.res poJ.itical- thought. AJ-so, that moral thought consists, in

Nietzschers opinion, of no more than a particular set of posítíngs

of value vhich, through time and. exped"iency, are given the status of

trutir" ifhird, ltrietzsche deems it essential- to oÐereane those

valuations - the heritage of the past which d.oninates both present

ancl future - by an objective anaþsis of the val-uational genealogy of

hunan existence. If these are the principal facets of Nietzschers

thought", then, the phiì-nsopher as legislator mrrst adc,pt this

orientation tovard. knovledge, arrd. then be educated.

It nay be necessa.q¡ for the ed.ucation of a genuine phitosopherthat Ìre himsel-f has also once stootl on all these steps on vhichhis servants, the scientific laborers of philosopþr, remain standing -haoe to remain stand.ing. Perhaps he himself must have been criticancl skeptic and. d.ogmatist and. historian and. also poet and collectorand. traveller a¡rd. solver of rid^d.l-es and moraList a¡d seer and"free spirittt and almost everything etse in ord.er to pass throughthe vhole range of hunan values and. value feelings antl to beable to see with many d.ifferent eyes and, consciences . . o o Butal-l these are precontlitions of his task: this ta.sk itself d.emand.s

sunething different - it d.enands that be cneatps úaLuet. 1.

Although Ni,etzschefs conception of the Legislator is much more

severe and demanding than Rousseaur s, in one respect there is an

identical belief - that the Legislator rmtst be capable of kncrr^ring and.

experiencing all varieties fo hrma:r valuations and. feelings. Such a

principle is interpretecl clifferentialty, however. In Rousseauts case,

as ve have seen, the Legislator concentretes on the possible, and. attempts

1. Ib'Ld.

a

208

to draw out a¡rd empha^sise the as yet incorplete socialisation of ma.n,

and. make him into a totally social- being, who is also able to f\rlfil

private individ.uality vhere it d.oes not conflict with the d.uties pertaining

to the Sovereign State" In practice, Rousseau d.oes no more than to

suggest that his moral view shoutd. be impressecl upon men vith the

authority of , once a.gain, a clernocratical\r conceived. but moral social

structure, thereby confirming Rouriseaurs image of mants future mod.e

of existence.

lVietzsche, on the other hand., white certainly looking to the

futu¡e, d.oes not vish to confirm ertd. extend. the ofd. moraf valuations.

l{hen he looks at nan as he is, it is on the basis that man as he is csrì

only be the syrnptun of a d.ecl-ining morality. Consequently, Nietzsche

consj-clers not men in society, but hurnanity in l;oto, vhen he d.eterrnines

the future for man. It is for this re€Lsion that Nietzsche does not

require a strict account of human nature" lfere he to have one, as

Rousseau does, Nietzsche wou}1. attempt to nanipulate specific changes

vithin men, so that their behaviour would conform to a prescribed set

of characteristics, ínstead of the transfiguration of møn. Since

Nietzsche attaches the highest value to hr¡ranity, arrd. not simpþ a notion

of hurnari nature, it is his opinion that the Legislator has the duty to

deciã.e vhat the future is for man.

Genuine phiLosophers , ffi€ eonnØI¿ers úLd. LnWuLators:they say , thus íL sha.LL be!t' They first d.etennine the Whither and.

For What of rnan, and- in so d.oing have at their disposal the preliminaryfabor of all, philosopilical laborers, all vho have overcome the past.With e creative hand. they reach for the future, arrd. all that isand. has been becqnes B. meens for them, an instnment, a hamer,Tneir "hncrwing" ís areating, theír creating is a legislation, theírvil-1. to -r,ruth is - uiLL to paser. l-.

r." rbid"

a

209

By relating the activity of the philosopher a.s Legislator to the

personal exercise of the r+ill to povrero Nietzsche achieves what Rousseau

fail-ed, to - erì explanation of why any person, regardless of capability,

r¡ould. uøtL to seeure a future for hr:nanity. It is the J-ogical extension

of any j-n<1ivid.ua1 vishing to íncrease his influence over the conditions

of his existence, and. over other indivicluals. At the trighest leveI,

that of the true phil-osopher, the witl to pcrlrer operates as the basis

for one ind.ivid.ual acting in the interests of the species, given that

Nietzsche ha.d. assrnned that the phil-osopher woulcl have the trenenclous

range of intellect, knovled.ge, and Ebility to experience and, understand

Itthe vhole rar¡ge of human values and. val-ue feelingst'. fhe Legislator,

then, is onì-y the highest representatj.on of prevailing forrns of hr-rmanity,

ancl not, a,s vith Rousse¿lu, an al-nost supernatural being vho can have

no Lastinpg relationship r¿ith the society of his own construction. By

rejecting the Rousseauian interpretation, Nietzsche pJ-aces the

phil-osophel a.s legislator firmly within the context of human society

once more. ft is, for him, the single most important sociaL, role' 8,

rol-e that he hinself r¡ished. to fulfil, ancl perhaps tlid.. fn Nietzschers

opinion, the position of the Legislator is fex above conventional\y

definecl spheres of political polrer, which themselves are manipulated

by the philosopher as legislator.

fhe higltest men tíve beyoncl the rulers, freed fron allbonds; and in the rulers they have their instrwents" 1.

If his genealogical exeminations Ied. hin to the d.etail of a

critique of contemporary society, against vhich he counterposed. the concept

of the vill to pcrwer, the need to clestrcy JudeæChristia¡r moratity, the

id.ea of transfiguration of seÌfo and the theory of eternal recurrence,

l_ [^/P, gg8 "

o

210

then his study also l.ed. to an und.erstand.ing of a more fundamental aspect

of human society. There may be arguments about the reductionist nature

of his psychological insights and his troublescrne views on breeding and.

sel,ectiono but overricling these issues is Nietzschers interpretation

of the problem of a developing human society, regard.less of its valuational-

code. Nietzsche discerrrs a nev truth, one which even he might regard.

as unconcÌitional - that society, r.rhile it inevitably creates the conditions

that reqtrire change, operates simultaneously to deny change, and that

íl nwst d-o so, for the survival and. spiritual vell--being of its membersn

Tn effect, Nietzsche is suggesting that contemporary society must

always be a "medi ocre" form of the genus lh¡man soeietyr . That a

given society should be described as mediocre, hovever, has less of a

perjorative eLement than is at first apparent. Med,iocrity is not seen

as a fundanental fail-ure of arry society (although it is a most important

r¡eakness), Uut is seen &s & conconmita¡t of existence. In Nietzschels

schema, then, med.iocrity is a terrn which endorses his particular evolutional

viev, and presupposes bril-l-iance and. excelfence in hunan society-the

aim, or the standard of, the Legislator.

Hatred for med.iocrity is ur¡wortt¡y of a philosopher: it isa1most a cluestion mark against lnís "riçJhú to philosophy". Preciselybecau.se he j-s an exception he has to take the rule under hisprotection, Ìie has to keep the med'iocre in good' treartn lo

Nietzsche, then, cloes not want to clisturb the hierarchy he perceives,

vhj.ch places the phiJ-osopher above and. beyond. the great mass of hr.nnanity,

and. ind.eed. gives the Legislator his greatness through his rarity. On

the other hand, that very med.iocrity is al-so the source of the Legislatorts

moso, impo::tant chalJ-enges. This is in accordance with the philosopher

fulfi:l-ting a specific ancl special social role" He must function within

l1

:

1. lE" Bq¡.

a

211

society to enable it continue.Ily to overccrne itsetf, which it cannot

do a1one. We nay infer frcm Nietzschers thought that, without the philo-

sopher, scrciety might l¡eII und.ergo revolutions ancl superstructural

changes , but that the und"erlying valuational base r¡oulcl remain intact,

and. no real progress, no transfigrrationr l¡oufd take place. fhe

med"iocre vould. always attempt to d.efine the wor1d,, en¿l to create ideals,

as if ttrey alone (or their collective d.ecision-malcing capecities)

vere the highest expression of humanity. In this respect, the

philosopher must, and. vilf continue to be, opposed to the hercl"

More a¡d. more it seems to me that the philosopher, beingof neeessìty a man of tcrnorrov¡ a¡rd. the d"qy af'ter, has alwaysfound. himself , anil had to find. himself , in contratliction tohis today. So far atl these furtherers of man whø one callsphi.losophers . . . have found their task, their hard, unwa.nted,i.nescapable task, but eventuat\y the greatness of their task,in being the bad conscience of their timeo I.

Nietzsche I s statement here raises several points that are

interrefated. in an interestin¿; fashion. ftre philosopher is placed.

in the context of the present by virtu.e of his opposition to the

realities ri.efined by that pres"rrt.2 TLris concept is very much in

accorclance with Nietzschets viev of the provisional, transitory nature

I Ùffi,2L2"

"Advantage of detachrnent frcru one t s a{3e. - In a state of detachmentfrcm both movements o in<ì,ivid,ualistic a¡d collectivistic norelity -for even the forrner does not recqgnise order of rank and. wogld.grant one the sane freed'cat as aIL. tt{t icteas do not revolve around'the <legree of freedcrn that is grantect to the one or to the otherat all, but around. the d.egree of patlelr that the one or the othershould exercise over others oT over ell, and to what extent a

sacrifice of freed.on, even enslavelnento provid-es the basis for theemergence of a hígher t'yrpe.t'

?.

a

2r2

of truth, because it is implied. that the phil-osopherfs reactions are

only as relevant as the conclitions that give rise to then" At the

sarne time, it ís suggested that phitoscpher has a particular vision or

grasp of tire future - mey be |j¡e future - and as such has a duty to

improve mankind.. Nietzsche seems to accept, too, that there have been

such t'f¡rtherers of ma¡ltt in the pæt, whose existences lrere similarly

und.erpinped. by the ccrnmitment to cluestion the least questionnecl tenets

of the present.

Historical- precedent for the philosopher as Legislator, and the

inability of the herd. to be their own "ba.d. consciencett, to thirìk

critical-l-y about their most previous id.eals ' aïe important factors in

I,lietzschets definition of the function of the Legisfator. He end.orses

Rousseattrs viev that the Legislator must be an unique educator in

the P-l.atonic inage, becamse Nietzsche d.eems it essential to utilise the

herdts i.ncapacity to ccrnprehencl the l-imitatious of their valuational

cod.e.

Assr.ming th¿it one thinks of a'philoscpher as a great ed.ueator'powerful- enoupEh to drar¡ up to his height a long chain of generations,th"n o.r" must grant hin the unca¡rqr privileges of the great ed'ucator"An educator never says vhat he hi¡nself thinks, but always only whathe thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he

ed.ucateso He must not be d.etecteil in this d'issimulation; it ispart of his mastery that one believes in his honesty. He mustbe capable of emplqfing every me€rns of d'iscipline . ; ' o Such an

e¿.ucalor is beyona good. an¿ evil , but no one must know it. f.

Nietzsche does not uish to justif! sueh a juxtaposition of d.issimulation

end honesty. f nd.eedo in his opinion, no defence is necessafX¡ or possible

vithin the existing valuational system which contrasts truth and untruth.

Once a,gain, Niet,zsche at+.acks as irrelevant to nanking the med'iocre concepti

of honesty"

1. W, gBO.

213

Our ed.ucated. people of tod.ay, our "good. peo¡llett, d.o

not tell- lies - that is true; but that ís not to their creclitlA real J-ie, a genuine, resolute, tthonesttt lie (on whose vafue oneshould consul-t Ptabo) l¡ou1d be scmething far too severe and. potentfor them: it voul-cl demand of them what one may nol d.emand. ofthem, that they should open their eyes to themselves, thab theyshou-ì-cl. knorr how to distinguish |ttruerr and. "falsett Ltithinthemselves. 1.

l{ietzschets t'honest" Iie, it seems, \rB-B the theory of eternal-

tîecnrrenceo This r^'as to be liis contribution, as B, Legislator, to the

futule of mankinrl," EternaJ- recurrence, then, is a notion imposecl upon

indir-i.duals in the present that vorrld have the effect of bringing about

changes wittrin ma¡ as & p¡erequisite for change to hunan society, just

as nihrilism was regarded. by Nietzsche as essential to change soeiety

in order to facil-itate man che.nging himself. It is these orientations

vittrin I'lietzschef s thor-rght that give rise to his ultimate and most

d.ifficult problem.

Inexorably, hesitantly, terrible as fate, the greattask and, question is approaching: hov shall the earth as avliole be governed.? And. to r¡hat end shaIl ttmantt as a whole -and no longer as a peopJ-e, a race -, be raised. a¡rd. trai¡ed.?

It is this passa4e which maJces clear that Nietzeche was not simply

concerned. with the creation of a politicaL society vhich confoi::led. to

any particular betief about the natr:re of man as a social animal.

lüietzsche did not believe that the philosopherrs taks was to emphasise

and d.evelop one aspect of man, and. in this case, he rejects explicitly

the notion that the future for man c&n be d.efined. prod.uctively by

concentration upon one insufficiently d,eveloped. characteristic.

Nietzsche goes on immed.iately to apply his knowled-ge of moral-ity and.

its importance to rnankinil.

l-. Gtl, III, L9,

2" t'/P, g5-( .

2

,

J

21tt

Lav-giving rnoralities are the principal neans of fashioningmarr aecording to the pleasure of a creative and. profound. wiJ-J-,provid.ed. that such an artist t s witl- of the first rank has thepoll'er in its hands and. can maÌ.e its creative will prevail througnl-ong period.s of time, in the f'om of laws, religions a¡rd. custons.Such men of great creativity, the real\y great men accorcLing tomy understanding, will be sought in vain tod,ay and. probably fora iong time to ccrne . . 1.

Despite l{ietzscher s wel-l--d,ocunented- d.issatisfaction with the pre-

vailing Jud.eo-Christian morality in its various for:ns, he cmes, afber

aIL, full circl-e to the point vhere he confirms that moraÌity and. its

associatecl, mecha¡risms constitute the proper and onJ.y concern of the

philosopirer as Legislator. .¿\t, the same tine, he implies that such a

far-rear:hing task is beyor:d. even him, and it may r*elL be that the ful-l-

realisation of this admission hastened the onset of his eventual

breakd.ovn. The essential and. most imporbant difference to Rousseau'r s

schema remains " however. ft is the great pov¡er of rnorality to shape

and, d.irect mankind which convinces Nietzsehe that the true philosopher

cannot assume that man eonsists of e special set of cha.racteristics and.

so create n society to suit then" What is tenued. hrman natr:¡e, then,

is only a clescription of i-lne effect a particular set of moral val-uations

has on man, in the most general way, and. that such a d"escription can

never be given prescriptive status.

5. fne Individ.ual- and the Law

The l,elgisl-ator, in Rousseauts thought, has the clearly d.efined.

task of producing the basic tega,l framer¡ork for a political camunity,

fully to socialise every j.ndividual by instilting moral and. cirric

rectitude, Non-ccxnpliance with the requirements of the Law, then,

Ibicl. Nietzsche remeined. avare of the dangers of such a proposition,hovever, especiaJ-þ vith regard. to the tend.ency of an authoritystructure to be defl-ected. frcrn its original course. ttOnLy where thegreatest d.r-¡ration is secureþ established. and guaranteed. is continualcLevelopment ancl ennobling innocul-ation at all possible. Of cor:rse,authority, the cl''gerous ccrnpanion of all dr:ration, wil1 usually try t,oresíst this process . " IIÂll , 221+.

I

a

2L5

constituted. a breach of contract for Rousseau, and. coufd. be net with

ba¡rishment or death.l fn Nietzschers thought, however, crimes against

society ancl the law and pubistunent in particular are concepts which are

treated. quite differentfy, as we shall see. The d.ifferentiating factor

is the fu-nctj-on of Nj.etzschets Legislator, vho is regarded- as working

tov¡ard. a specific result vith respect to ma¡kincl. The Legisl-ator

attenpts to free man from the repression and. subl-imation substituted.

for the unencumbered. functioning of his will- to power. The

reinstatement of the psychoÌogical "i-nstincttt as the basic ordering

principle for ind.ividuaL life is j-n Nietzschef s terrns superioi: to a sociall.

d.etermined existence ancl is in fact the realttreturn to na'burert - a

naturafism that is potent ancl mea¡ringf\J- because it al-one is capable

of proclu.cing progress for mankind".

The unfinished. problems T pose anew: the problem ofcivil,ization, the fittre betveen Rousseau and Voltaire arounill-760" l,{an trecomes more profound, mistrwtful , ttiûmoraltt,

stronger, more confident of himsel-f - and. to this extentt'more natural-tr: this is "pr:ogresstt. 2.

Nietzschets nat¡ralism is a harsþ and. demand.ing one, and. is in

sharp contrast to Rousseaurs notion of provid.ing a potitical society

in and through which perfectibl-e man might truly attain moral and social-

selfhoocl" By preferring Voltairefs to Rousseaurs image of m&n' Nietzsche

sets Ìrirnself against the entire ccnnmunitar:ia¡t trad.ition, vhich, it is

l. "There is therefore a purely civil- profession of faith of whichthe Sovereign shou-Id. fix the ayticles, not exactþ as religious<Ìognas, but as soci¿rl sentiments without vhich a msn cann<¡t bea goorl citizen or a faithfuJ- subject . . If anyone, afberpubJ-icì-y recognizing these d.ognras, beiraves as if he d.oes notbelieve them, l-et him be pubished. by death: he has ccrnmitted. thevorst of all- crimes, l-ying before the lan¡"" SC, IV, B.

2. lD, 123,

o

2l:6

implied, received a major impetus vie, Rousseaurs influence on theeighteenth and- nineteenth centr.¡-ries. Antagonism for Rousseaurs thorrghtis based' on Nietzschers argunent that the strong a¡ld. rvidely-herct beliefin the social nature of man ís a. mo*a/ va]ue that is damaging tohumanity. on the other hun<], the reification of the eocial beì-ng inpolitical philosophy represents, dialectically, u stage in the progress

of nankind, which tras val-idity irrsofar &s it m'st be overcome" It isat l'ast possible, Nietzsche argues, to see that the id.ea of the socialman has served. its suecific purpose for nature and. for ma¡r.

To breed en animar- uíth the r"íght to make pz,orníses ísnot this the paradoxica-l task that nät.."u has set herself in thecase of ma¡r? rs it not trre ree.l probr-em concerning man? r_.

The importance Nietzsche places upon the possititity of the rrright

to maþ'e prcnises" is particul-arJ-y representative of his contributionto en und'erstanciing of the r¡orr-cr. A-r-though Ìre craims to have

confronted the ultirnate probl-en of existence, his analysis can produce

no certainty, no ord.er upon vhich to base sociar existence. 0n thecontrary, Nietzschers viev i.s restrícted to a d.emand.ing reappraisar ofthe prerequisites for rear- arrd. encluring chan¿çe in the vorld., rrithsinguì-ar refere¡rce to the ind.ividual. This approach, however, sho'ld.not be confused r¡ith individ.ualism, because Nietzsehe is referring tothe ind'ivicluat as a represeutative of mank-ì.nd., and not a col-lection ofabstract entities. For this reason, individual-ity cannot be a.ssessed.

in tems of autonou¡y and. freed.om vith respect to the requirements'bhat society im¡roses" rnstee.do individual.ity is a¡ achievement ofthe species ma¡.

l. GM, rT, l-

t

2r7

. man must first have learned to distinguishnecessary events fron chance ones, to think eausally, to see and.anticipate distant eventual-ities as it tney belonged. to thepresent, to decid.e ri+,h certainty what is the goal and. what themeans to it, and. in general be abl-e to caLculate and- conpute.Man must first of atl- beccrne caLct¿Lable, neguLat, neeessdW"even in his olm image of himseLfn if he is to be abl-e to stenalseeurity lor h'is oun f\,tkne, which is what one who pronisesd.oes ! 1.

The individual, theno is not given autonorgr and. freedon vithin a

sociaf structu::e, but clevelops the capacity for aetiort that is

arrtonomous a¡rd, ind.ependent fYqn vhat are seen as physical a¡rd social

real-ities. Nietzsche rs ideas on this issue, ild his presentation

of those id.eas, €Lre difficult to interpret and paralùrra.se in the terns

of the ontological- u¡eLtøtschø.,tung he strove to overcc¡ne. Most

difficul-t of all is the notion that man can, in an age of pragmatic

social- theorising, knout his goal-, prcrnise to achieve it, and be atrratre

that atl- succeed.ing events masú produce that goaf. Nietzsche does not

succinctl.y justif)r this proposition, or attempt to allay criticisn by

invoking faittr or bel-ief in f'ate - he insists that the ind.iviaual is

the sourcs and provider of absol-ute cerbainty regard.ing himsel-f end his

actions. The right to make pronises is no more than the logical

concl-usion to his entire phiJ-osophic labour on man, morals and. society.

It leads him to argue that the s,:rvereign individ.ual has been made

possibl-e by the very social artd moral- proeesses catalogued. ancl

cond.enned throughout the major vorks.

. the Jabour performed by man upon himself d.uring the greatepart of bhe existence of the hr¡nan race, his entire pre-híetov'iel-abor, fincls in this its meaning, its great justification, notwith-standing the severity, tyranny, stupid.ity, and. idiocy invol-ved. init: vith the aid of the noral-ity ofmores and the social straitjacketmarr Ìras actually rnade cuLculabl-e.

1. Ib1¿,

a

âIB

If ve place ourselves at the end. of this tremend.ous process,vhere the tree at last brings forth fruit, vhere society and.custcrn at last reveal what they have si-np1y been the means to;then we <l.iscover that the ripest fruit is the souere¿gn indðVíduaL,IÍke onþ to himself, liberated. agêin frm morality of custør,anrtoncrnous a¡rd. suprsmor€.l (for |tautononougtr a¡rd. ttmoralll aremutuaì-ly exclusive), in short, the man who has his own ind.epen¿lent,protracted vill and. the rtght to make pz,øníses . . . . 1.

The sovereign individ.ual, then, represents the resul-tent achievement

of the overccming of the neeessary foundations of social morality.

Such a.n inrlivid.ual beccrres strong in accorrd.a¡rce with his d.egree of

independ.ence frcrn external- sociat and. moral constraints, ancl it is at

this point in hi.s thought that Nietzsche reintrod.uees the concept of

r¿ilI ( anrl. not vill- to pover) . It is the will of the sovereign

indiviclual vhich enables Ìrim to master the cond.itions of his existence.

fnsteaci. of nerely possess¿rlg free will , however, he ccnrma¡ds the

vill, and. makes it a servant to the totally huma¡r activity of valuing

and. creating values.

The ftfreett man, this possessor of a protracted. and. unbreakablewiU-, also possesses lnis measure of uaLue.' looking out upon othersfran hjmself , he honors or d.espises c . . , The proud awarenessof the extraord.inary pr:ivilege of tespons¿b¿LitA " the eonsciousnessof this rare freed.crmo this pover over eneself and. fate, has in hisca,s¡e penetrated. to the profoundest d.epths a¡rd. beccme instinct,the ctørinating instinct. 2.

l_. ffi, IT, 2,

2. Ibid. In the context of the sovereign individual, the ¡.ritt ismost importa¡¡t. 1o nake a pronise, to wiÌ1 soßething reguires"8" reFl manorv of the udLL: so that between the originÊl rf wiIlr,f f shal-I d-o thisr and. the actual- discharge of the wiÌl-, íl,s act,a vorld of strange new things, cirer:msta¡rces , even acts of willuray be interposed vithout breaking this long chain of will"rfGÌul, If ,1.

â

2r9

rn this respect, the vil-I cannot be fyee, because the wi]r cannot be

separated. frcur its resolution, nor ca¡r it ce&se to function until the

witted action has been effected,. Para.d.oxicaJ-1y, the unfreed.crn of the

wifl gives rise to the freed.cm of the sovereign ind.ivid.ual, who knor¡s

that he can ma.ke and fuLfil prcmises concerning his existence. I^Iith

that freed.crn, moreover, cûres responsibility as a privilege and not

just a d.uty. Nietzsche l-c¡oks forvard., as the philosopher-LegisJ-ator,

to a future characterised, by great men of power, vilL and. responsibility.

Despite his criticisms of contemporery society and the state, itshoul-d not be inagined that his thoughts on the future of man preclude

the necessity for the shered. existence of the eonnunity with lavs,

custqns and values.

One lives in a cormunity, one enjoys the adva¡tages ofB. ccmmunality (oh r¡hat adva¡tages ! we scmetimes und.erratethem today) , one dwel,ls prøtected,, cared. for, in peace and.trustful¡ress, without fear of eertain injuries ar¡d hostiteacts to vhich the man outsíde, the |tma¡ vithout peacett, isexposed . since one Ìras bound. and pled.ged. oneself to theeørmunity preciseJ-y with a view to injuries a¡rd. hostiLe acts. 1.

The Hobbesiari fl-avour of this passage nust be viewed. in the context of

a ccrmnunity of sovereign ind.ividual-s. Nietzsche is not euggesting

that those inciivicluars are motivated. a¡rd. d.irected, by fear to join a

ccnmunity" on the contrarxr, the sovereign inaivid.ual is in a special

rel-ationship with the 1ar.¡, a relationship not proposed. by any of the

contract theorists.

Ni.etzsche insists that the sovereign individ.ual rnight eventually

attain the status of Legislator, even where cri:ne and pr:aishment is

concerned.. rn ctoing sr:, Nietzsche examines the psychological and

GM, If, 9. Nietzsche is not endorsing the eontraet theory ofcivil society. "T think that senti¡rentalisn which wourd have itbegin vith a reontractr has been disposed of." GM, ff, 1?.rn fact, Nietznche fol-rows Rousseouts interpretation scmewhat,by arguing that the mass vere forced. by those more poverful tha¡r'bhey to form a state.

1.

220

teleological content of the various conceptions of punisltnent, and

d.ismisses them a.s ineffective or unjustifiabl-e on their own grounds.l

The reasons for. an ind.i.vid-uerl breakine a lawo or stepping outsid.e

the ccnrmunal- l-imits, clo not concern Nietzsche, since the most

signiti.cant event must be that a sovereign ind.ividual- has broken a prcrnise

he hed. mude to himself. If Nietzsche placed so much emphasis on the

importance of the itri6;ht to make prmises", then the social reoctions

to criminality must, for him, be of a quite ne$ di-mension.

A possible future. - Ts it impossible for us to imagine asocial state in ',¡hich the cri¡inaI vi]-l publicly d.enounce himselfand clictate his om punish¡nent, in the prclud. feeling that he isthus honor:ing the lav vhich he himself has mü.¿le ' that he isexercising his power, the poi.fer of a la¡vmeJrer, in thus punishinghimself? He rnqy of'fend for once, but by his vo}:ntary punishmenthe raises himself abcve his offence, ancl not onÌy expiates it tyhis frankness, greatness n a^ttd. calmness, but ad.d's to it a publicbenefit. - Such wou-lcl be a crininaL of e possible future, acriminal vho voul-<i., it is true, presuppose a f\rture Ìegislationbased. upon this fu¡rd.urnental idea: "I yieId, in great thingsas vel-l- as in sne.l-L on\r t;o the ]a,l¡ which I myself have nsdeott 2n

Tt is this truLy radical proposal which goes far beyond' the

Rousseaui.an notion that the great ma.ri, the Legislator, must never

be subject tcl the lav he cjutl-ines for: the Sovereign State. The

sc,vereign ind.ividua]-, in eviclence before the legislative acto does

not traltsfer his pover in the act of lawmaking to the overreaching

authority of the State, nor d.æs he aceept that his laws scmehow

(through ¿r. contract, for instance) beccrne the property of the coll-ectivity

Thus lÍietzschef s formul,ation of the theory of the legislator has more

strength because the sovereign ind.ivid.ual, the architect of the law,

enacts that law, and neecl. never be subject to, in Rousseauls terms,

the rna.joriby view of tlte general. v¡il-l- of his c<Nrmunity.

l- QD, G1,1, l:T, f3.

D, rB7.Ò

a

22r

The theory of the philosopher a^s Legislator, then, is a.d.vanced.

significantly by Nietzschers thought" He fi:rthers Rousseaurs

ergi:nent - that the legislative task for hr:manity must be separated

frcrn institutional authority structr¡res - by suggesting that the

Legislator shoul-d eoncern himseLf with the behcuiour of the participants

of eny society, and. not the constitutional forn a¡rd. J-egal practice ofthat society. Thus the Legisrator remains for both thinkers the

nost subl-ime critic of conternporary society, as well a.s fulfil-Ìing the

most important a¡d. far-reaching soeiaL role - that of a.dvancing

humanity. What d.ifferentiates Rousseau and Nietzsche metho<lologieally

is the distinction betveen manipulating society for the improvenent of

manking, or manipurating manlçind with the knowled.ge thet this wirrproduce a ttbettertt society. The first proposition permeates Rousseauts

system of thought, an<1 as such as rejected, by Nietzsehe. rn so d.oing,

he attempts a conplete red,efinition of the aims a¡¡d practice of politicalphilosophy, and wishes to eclucate men beyond. current philosophical

end.eavor¡r. While Nietzsche accepts that a particuLar society may have

positive or negative effects on contenporary man, effects which he d.id

much to reveal, he d,oes not concrude that the philosopher-regislator

rnust therefore ccrmrit hinsel-f to the era.ctication of the r¡orst appects

of society as dcztt'ttn, and. of littl-e practical consequence for the trulygreat ta-sìts a¡d futr:¡es for hrmality. The Legislator, therefore, can

on\r concentrate upon the fundamental and encluring aspects of hr.man

existence - the striving for power and the need. to establish and hol-d.

moral bel-iefs - it ne is to be abl-e to create the possibility for mankind.

to expand. and. extend. itself" society, for Nietzsche, is only ever

underpinned and shaped by tlre nature of hr:man existence, an¿ eannot be

regard.ed aç the instigator of tife-prcmoting values and, processes.

t

222

CO}ICLUSION

Counprring arlC contrasting the thoright of Ror¿sseau and. Nietzsche

reveal-s contributions to poJ-itical theory that are as cliverse and.

enigratic as tlre thinkers the¡rselves. On several l-evel-s, however, we

have beeri able to d.emonstrate that a special relationship exists between

the two men, on specific points a,s vell s.s are&s of generat significertfce.

The ccrnmon concerns are religion, bhe ind.ividual , societY, md the state.

Although theee are the topics broached., d.issected. a¡d. anaþ'sed by nany

poJ-itical. theorists , this stu{y has establ-ished- that the content and.

form of Nietzschers work eonfoms, in scope a¡ul. considerable iletail,

to tÌre rnethod.ologicaL orientation implicit in Rousseaure thought.

That orientation is evid.ent frcrn the outset, where the und.erlying

conrl-itions of a¡rd assurnptions about ma¡ in soeiety are d.iscussed., just

as confh¿ences can be obser,¡ed throughout rrhat are quite clivergerrt

interpretations. lieverbheless, an account of every d.etail nf agleement

betveen Roussean¡ and. t{ietzsehe has not been attanpted,, since a contra-

puntal- presentation of their id.eas proves more interesting and.

informative, ancl is capable of givirrg rise to broader points with respect

to contemporary social and poli-tica-I theory. Moreover, it is the ultimate

forrn of their conclusíons about man and. society r^'hích confirrns the notion

that their philosophies are of a ty¡re, ertd. con.sequentþ share generic

strengths and. veaknesses.

Moral-ity rqrains a centrs1 feature and organising principle of

their thought. For Rousse¡.r.r, moraì.ity is a basic (but social.) huma¡r

characteristic, which can and shoull be d.efined and d.escribed in sqne

d.etail. Aclopting such Ðn epproech, an important theme is thue introd.r:.ced

a

?23

d.eveloped. ar¡d reiterated - that human activity consists in the search

for the inner beir¡g a-s the true source of happiness, spiritual well-being

and. right action. Such a view necessarily involves a bel-ief in a

unique se't of moral- values unclt--rþing existence and. meaning, just as

it implies that the self in society energes through increasing intlivid,ual

awareness of moral- related.ness to the vorl-d.. As an importeurt social

and. political corollary, it j.s the attainment of virtue - to beccme

noral-ly good - that must be the ai:n of ma¡r a¡rd. his society. It is in

the context of, first, estabJ-ishing the moral foundation of human existence..

and" second", bringing pragmatic pcJ,itical practice i.nto conformity with

his noraLity, that Rousseau?u thought is most successf\llly and. prod.uctively

nqsessed,.

In the earÌy part oll our zuralysis, the most, significant aspect of

Nietzschers treatment of the issue of noraJ-ity concerns the self in

society. T'he clevelopment of the concept of self , to which Rousseau

contributed so much, is given further impetus by Nietzschefs more

edvaitced arrd. critical- perspective on mora-l-ity. ltrietzsche accepts as

given that r¿hich Rousseau l-al¡ourecL to achieve, narne\y, a cqnnunity that

is conceiveri., st,r-rctured., arid. rnaintained by moral betief and. action.

De¡ronstrating that po)-itical philosophy had progressed. far beyond. the

contractarian notion that eivil societies are created. relativr:þ

sviffly, in historica] terrns, I,lietzsche sees much ccnplexity in the int,er-

tvining of morality and- society that origins, even if tney be d.iscerned.,

voufd. be i.rrelevant. And. in <lirect opposition to Rou.sseau, Nietzsche

argues that attnevtt society, in conforrnity with "moralitytr, cannOt be

logicatly conceived. or created. because existing societies iteuitabLy

refl-ect and. en<1orse that rnorality. Moreovel:, the self in society,

t

2214

in Nietzschers opinion, suffers precisely because the Judeo-Christia¡t

mor.ali*,y perrneates and. clc¡¡inates afl spheres of political. aJld- social

life. Where Ro¿sseau criticised. the explicit hol-d of the Church over

man, then, Nietzsche revea.ls the ¿eeply entrenched. bUt ínpl.icLt

colitinuation of re!-gious infl.uence within the ind-iviaual and soc-lety.

It is fron this posì-ticn that Nietzschers challenge to modern

politi.cal rnovements is mountecl" ì{e is able to d.oronstrate, with convictior

an¿ force, that the phil-osophical ju.stifications for these movstents

disguise the source and content of their moral und,erpinnings by proclaiming

rational-it,y in the cause of justi.ce, equality and. liberty. Ttrese

concepts , however, a^Te socis-l- equivalents of individ.ually-hetd. moral values

vhich values must alvays be a^ssessed not on util.itarian grouncls of pleaslre

rnaxi¡risation, but whether they eonstitute a necessity for a cond'ition

of life i+-self" Ttris form of argunent is ccxnpletely at od.d's vith

Ror.rsseau, his conteurporaries, artd. mod.ern poÌitical thought, 'because

Nietzsche brings into question the notion of rnan a.s a soeial being.

Specifically, he suggests that the proposition that man is essentialþ

a social beíng is but anrother bel-ief within the Jud.eo-Christia¡r moral

trartítion" What i.s uost significant about this statem.ent is that

Nietzsche ¿ismisses the princi.pal idea ccrnmon to aLl forrns of commnitarian

thought, md cuts avay the teleological intenb of reformers and revoluti.on-

aries afike" It shoul-cl be noted, however, that the reification of the

social being in contenpora,ry social theory has not been d'iminished. by

Nietzschers argument.

The r:amificntions of his contribr,rtion to a critique of political

theory are best d"isplayed. in the <Liscussion ccmparing the two theories

2

225

of change to men in society. Here the Enlightenment view of perfectibte

man is eounterposed. against an image of hr,:¡nar nature that does not allow

for the tineal progress of mankind. by means of historical forces or ideal

impul-se aJ-ike. At first glance, Nietzsche appears to adopt a pessimisti

stard.point by rejeebing the cerbainty of the good. society and the good.

meLn through ti¡e sgency of concerted. political action. llowever, he

remalns qrrite optimistie wi.th respect to at leest ttre chøtce for the

improvement of mankinql.. Dispensing with Rousseaui.an - and. therefore

simplistic - sol-rrtions to the problem of existence for the in<i.ivid.ual

and. socie'by, llietzsche pr:efers to argue for the d.evelopnent of the

species by sriccessive transfigurations and. the concommitant d"estruction

of prevailing moral val-uati.ons. At this point, Nietzschef s thought

beccrnes most cornpl-ex and. d.istinctive. Even though his syerall analysis

continues to be basicaÌIy firm an<l critical-, his attempt to bring

togethe:: bhe thanes of his vaniors works fe.l-ters at times, and. he

lapses into an oracular style that cloes nob succeed. in replacing the

neecl for a closeJ.y argued account. Notwithstand.irrg this lack of a¡r

entire\r adequ.ate theory of chalge, Nietzsche <loes, however, establish

that the n"otion of the perfectibility of man can be d.iscarded., and. his

eonclusion on this issue should. not be minimised..

Fi.na1ly, the rel-ationship between the thought of Rousseau a¡rd.

Nietzsche is demonstrated. at the very sts€e l¡here their theories

appeau most d.istant. Rousseau, the social architeet, strives to create

e political society of distinctly cunnunitariar¡ proportions, rrrhere

irrdividuat and. socieil virtr.¡e is of pararnount importance. Nietzsche,

the impLacabl"e critic of the State and. all- politì.cal organisations

that are mass-based, seeks the nihilistic cleistmction of contemporary

Ð

226

forrns .of society a-s a necessa.ry precondition for the ennoblemertt of

ma¡. Tll}rat brings the tvo thinkers together is the concept of the

phil-osopher &s Legislator" Ilaving articutated mankindrs path for progress

both men are forced. to provid"e a nerìns for moving towa.rd the future t

because, in the final- enalysis, neither theory incorporates any firm

propositions or evidence to justify their optimism. TLre Legislator,

then, must t¡e regerried. as a phiÌosophical d.evr'-ce vhich both men are forced"

to use since their vork is of the same basic fo¡m.

That Roussearr a¡rd. Nietzsctre were ettracted to the no'bion of personal

educating hr:rnanity and creati.ng new lalrs for ind.ivid.ual and. social life

is an ind.icabion that the Legislator is nore than a iheoretical convenience

however" Quite apart frcrn its significanee on the leveL of the history

of ideas, we gain an ínsight to these thinkers themselves, an<l. the rol-e

of the truty outstancLing social critic of any age. In sinilar fashion,

Rousseau and Nietzsche remove themselves frcn their respective societies,

and. eschew direct political activity and" involvement T.rith the d.ecad.ence

of society and. the problems for nran that they describe so well . Rventual-f:

hovever, they ettempt to re-enter the social ar.ena at a very specifie

and. u¡:pemost Jeve:l-. 'ihey ecnne to regnrfl thenselves a,s men of the

future, &s men who nust fLllfil- a role that is far abcrue conventi.onal

positions of power" They r^rish not on\y to be the eonscience of their

time, brrt the notive and. directive force behind. the present eonstruction

of the future "

A.s his constitutional works attest, Rousseauts willingness to

be a Legj.sletor cannot be c¡uestione<1 ( although his suitability can) .

On the c¡ther hand., his opinion that the Legisl-ator mrst remain outsid.e

the polit,j,ca.l. ccrnrnunity he ci:eates diminishes the force of hj.s clain

t

227

to be legislativeþ effective, because it irnplies, contra.d.ictory to the

tenor of this thought, that society cs.n never provid.e a stable and. morally

sound. existence for alr manner of men. rr1 contrast, Nietzsche, who

is much more eriticar of society at every stage of his analysia than

Rousseau, d.emancls that the true ¡frilosopher rmtet be Legíslator to his

strciety, in ord.er t,o monitor charrge ar¡d. eonsistently to influence social

a¡rd inti.ividuaL develolrnent. ftrrther, his r¡ge of the tool of edueation

is directed. not only tovard. changing rna¡r (as with Rousseau), but is

designerl to create more Legislators, so that even Nie'bzscheen conceptions

of the world. and. of man crilr be criticised. an¿l tra¡:scend.ed_.

The irony of the concept of the Legislator is its most patent

weakness. f f the true phil.osopher ie required, to ccraprehentt the faults

a¡rd, neetls of ma¡ and. society, then it is ilifficuLt to envisage the

fornal institution of the Legislator into a necessarily unernpowerecl

position of pri.me importance in politieat society, which eannot be

saia to be noted" for or characterised. by a ilisposition towerd. a rule

by abstract imperative ar¡d. non-teleological ection" The very force

of their critiques, then, prohibit the inclusion of the philosopher

es Legislator into an active soeial ro1e.

S EUÌCTED IìIBLT OGNAPI{Y

Ð

1

Works by Roussea,t

Cønfessíons J"M" Dent and. Sons (nveryrnanrs Library) (Lond.on 193f), 2 voJ-s

Ihe Confess¿one of Jeæt-Jaeq'u.es Roussean (Trans. JoM. Cohen) PenguinBoohs (l{armondswor.th I953) "

Dzt Contrat SosiaL (nd. Ronald, Grimsley) ùcford U.P. (LoncLon l)T2) "

EmíLe (trans. Barbara Foxley) J.M. Dent a¡ld. Sons (EverymantsLibrary) ( Lond.on ]911)

"

The PoLitícal Writings of Jeøz-Jaequ"es Rousseø..t (Ed." C.E" Vaugha,n)Caarbrirtge U"P. (C¿m¡ri¿ee l.!62), 2 vo1s.

Rousseat: Polt,tieaL Writittgs (Transo ard. Ecl. Fred.erick Watkins) Ttrc¡na^sNel-son a¡d. Sons (Nel,son Philosophical Terbs) (Lonaon1970) .

The Social, Contraet ütd lliseol¿tses (Trans" G"D"H. Cole) J"M. Dent andSons (Everymarirs University Library) (Lond,on I9T3) .

The SociaL Contract of E\4ncipL.es of PoLítíeaL Right (Trans" ancl Ed..C.M" Sherover) Merid"ian Books (Ner¡ York I9T\).

hlorks by Nietzsche

Basie trtritingç of Nietzsehe (Trans. a¡rd, Ed." Walter Keuflnann)Library (Nev York L966).

Mo<lern

a

Níetzsche: A SeLf-Portraít fYan His tetters (Trans" and Ed. Peter F\¡ssand. Henry Shapiro) Harnrard. U.P" (CarnUriage, Mass 1971)

"

The Birth of lYagedy ørd ?he GeneaLogy of MoraLs (fra^rls. Francis Go1ffine)Doubled.ay Anchor Books (Nerr York 1956)

"

The Cæy Science (Tre¡s. Walter Kauftnann) Vintage Books (Nev York19?l+) '

T'he PortobLe Niet.zselæ (Írans" r¡Ialter Kauflnann) Viking Press (t¡ewYork J.!68) .

The WùLL to Pa¿ez, (Trans" ïIeJ.ter Kauflna¡rn a¡ral R.J. Hollingd.ale) (8d,. W.Kaufhann) Vintage Books (New York 1968).

þlorks (tyans" Oscar L"u-y) George A-LIen and llnl¡in (Lond.on 1909-I92T), 18 vo1s.

11.

Seconãcuy Sources

Al-lison, Daviri. B. liclitor.I'nterpretati.en,o

Barker,

Bennan,

'!'y'te I'Jr.¿t) Niet¡:sche: ContentporæA Sl;yLes ofDel-ta Books (New Yorlt fgTT).

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