Rosaldo_ThingsWeDo

8/8/2019 Rosaldo_ThingsWeDo

1/36

The Things We Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and Speech Act Theory in PhilosophyAuthor(s): Michelle Z. RosaldoSource: Language in Society, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Aug., 1982), pp. 203-237Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4167311

Accessed: 07/11/2010 18:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toLanguage

in Society.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4167311?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4167311?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup


2/36


3/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

mutualrelevance of technically linguistic and more loosely social and contextualconcerns. Speech act theorists seek to comprehend he fact that to talk about theworld "out there" will of necessity involve not only propositions o be judgedfor truth, but something more: communicative ntentions. The meaningscarriedby ourwords must thus depend not just on what we say, but who we are and whatwe hope our interlocutors o know. Yet in focusing on the ways "intentions" areembodied in all acts of speech, speech act theorists have failed to grapplewithsome of the more exciting implications of their work. They think of "'doingthings with words" as the achievement of autonomousselves, whose deeds arenot significantly constrained by the relationshipsand expectations that definetheir local world. In the end, I claim, the theory fails because it does notcomprehend he sociality of individualswho use its "rules" and "resources" toact. Stated otherwise, it fails because it construes action independentof itsreflexive statusboth as consequence andcause of humansocial forms.These limitations are clarified, I suggest, througha considerationof the waysin which it does, anddoes not, prove adequate n grapplingwithspeech amongapeople who think about and use theirwords in ways thatdiffer fromourown.

THE ILONGOTSOne strikingfeatureof the Ilongothouseholdswheremy husbandand I lived, forclose to two years in I967-69 and again for nine months in 1974, was thesalience, in daily life, of brief and undisguised directives. Althougha sense ofbalance and reciprocity obtained in what appeared o be quite egalitarianrela-tionsamong bothchildrenandadults,demands orserviceswere so commonthatone quicklylearned o turn o others rather hanobtaindesiredobjects by oneself.So, for example, Bayaw, who finishedeating momentsbeforehis wife washeardto issue this directive:6

ta denum Sawad ya, 'aika 'egkang "That (implying, 'over there, uncon-nected to you') water, Sawad c'mon, come and get up now."And 'Insan, wanting a bit of lime in preparationor his betel chew, remainedseated while he told his wife to move:

tu tangtangmuDuman, rawmu "This (implying, 'it is yours, is notfar,alienfrom you') your lime container, Duman, go get it."Duman, already occupied, did not challenge his command, but instead re-sponded by communicatingthe father'swords to a young daughter:

rawmudtu 'umel "Go get it over here, little girl."Again, Tepeg, a middle-aged man, desired to share a roastedsweet potatowith his senior companion; thus, his wife became the object of this briefcommand:

204


4/36

ILONGOT SPEECH ACTS AND SPEECH ACT THEORY

Midalya 'irawimsi kabu nima 'ula ya "Midalya, go get my friend here asweet potato, c'mon."But then Midalya, much like Duman, found a child to do the job:

'irawimnu sit nima'ulaDelali "Go get one of thosesweet potatoesforthem,Delali. "What is involved here? Lacking such institutions as the office, church, orcourt, most Ilongot social life took place within large one room houses. Eachfamily in these simplehomes was aptto storeits goods andconcentrate or sleepandeating in the vicinity of a single sunken hearth- the numberof hearthsper

household (between one and three) serving as a reasonable ndex of its compo-nent family units. Hearth and family space were located on the "edges" -usually raised platforms- that surroundedarger, undivided"centers," whereyoung childrentalkedandplayed, andadultscooked and then apportionedoodfor regularhousehold meals where individualizedplatesof rice and viandwouldbe distributedequally to all. Characteristically,ife at an "edge" was calm andquiet. When positioned comfortablyon a platform,the whittlingmusercouldignore much of the bustling life aroundhim, andenjoy the silent pleasuresof awindow that might serve to ease and "open out" his burdenedheart.Within the house, no single space was delegated to a single category ofpersons. But it was not long before I found it all too clear thatadult men alonewere regularlyprivileged to enjoy the "lazy" ease of platforms. These menwouldpass requestsforbetel, water, andsupplies to youths, and, in particular,owomen. And women, when themselves at rest or else engaged in their routinedomesticchores, would either move orelse command, in turn,their"children,"to "get up" and "fetch" things in quick and relatively unorderedmovementacross the common floor.Although it is not difficult to find exceptions to the rule - men ask childrendirectly; uniors make demandsof seniors;women call on men to help with theirdomestic tasks, to join in garden work or hunt- one can, in general, say that inthe household men enjoy a relatively silent space and are rarelythe objects ofdirectives. Women, engaged morefrequently hanmen in daily household tasks,areboth more likely to receive commandsandto command theirchildren. Andchildren, following hierarchiesof age, receive andthen pass on directives fromtheir seniors - unwittinglydisrupting hingsand so confirming theirsubordinateplace throughtired pleas of laziness and lack of skill, or else through abruptmovements thatcontribute o an ever-present ense of chaos on the centralfloor.Adults, by contrast, rarely challenge a request, unless to state that they areoccupied (and so, cannot conceivably comply) or question a subordinate's heershamelessness in voicing inappropriatedemands.These Ilongots, who in manyways appearedmoreflexible and egalitarian hanany people I have known, recognized and apparentlyenjoyed in their domestic

205


5/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

life a hierarchy of commands blatant and (to me) unjust. In laughter, theyremarkedon how my husbandoften "moved" for me and typicallyjoined withme at the river to wash clothing. I, in turn,would argue that all husbands houldrespect and try to ease their wives' incessantwork. They would answer, "so theydo, we all must eat," but then again that women should "respect" and bereluctant to command more "angry" men because the latter have, in travels,hunts, and taking heads,7 displayed superiorenergy and poise. Contrastingmenand women, Ilongots would say that female hearts were "vague" and lacking"focus.'"Of children, they declaredthatall youth "'knew" was "how to play,"andso, that youngsterswere dependenton adultsto channel wild energiestowardwork. Unlike adults (and in particular,of course, men) who stooped to cross theroom in their infrequent rrands,childrenmoved too frequentlyand all too often,"'withoutpurpose." And unlike men - both men and women would recount-most women often failed to "know" what was demandedby the social situationpresently at hand.Thus, at much the same time that they recognized that commandedpartiesneed not (and do not) necessarily comply - thatchildrenmust be coaxed to heeda parent'swish and women often answer men's commandswith an unhearingsilence - Ilongots also seemed convinced that throughcommands they botharticulatedand shaped ongoing forms of social order. Women would, for in-stance, readily explain that they rarely urged domestic chores upon a spousebecause they knew that men were "lazy" andcould not be moved when in thehome - and even more, because they felt "respect" and "fear" towards anaccomplished husband's "angry" force. The goaded husband would, Ilongotsclaimed, occasionally beat his taunting wife; although men, recognizingtheirdependenceon a good wife's work and care, declaredas well thatthey were"fearful" to estrangea spouse throughviolence. And yet more generally, I1-ongots suggested thattrue tuydek,or "commands" - unlikebege, "requests"(see below) - wererarefromyoungto old or womento men, because"respect"and the display of "care" and "'reticence"or "shame" appropriaten asym-metricbonds, were typified by a readiness o riseanda reluctance o stirotherstounneeded tasks.But if commandstypically move in lines associatedwith age- and sex-linkedsocial rank, Ilongots insist as well that children may direct their parentstoprovide them with snacks, mend clothing or supplies, prepare heirthings fortravel. And men, who issue tuydekto their wives within the home, may becommandedby theirwives in turnwhen a discussion concernstheneedforforestfoods. Commands,in short, involveparticularand limitedideas of social rank.They areconstrainedby everydayconcernsfororderlycooperationandexpecta-tions thatdecide what differentpersonsought to know and do.Thus, while tuydekvary considerably n linguistic form, it would appear hatdifferences - in such things as manner,mode, aspect, and focus of the verb -have more to do with what Ilongots see as reasonableexpectationsandaccounts

206


6/36


of theirobjective needs thanwith desires to accommodate hose whose relativestatus differs from one's own.8 A command in (what I tentativelygloss as)incompletiveaspect, brief, imperativeform, such as:'ekarka "get going";mambeyuka "start pounding rice";pilisim "squeeze it (e.g., vegetables, to see if they are cooked)";nangasim "pour it out (for them, into containers,to be distributed)";

although most common in directives to the young, is used primarily, Ilongotssay, as an efficient tool that wins immediate and limited responses. No rule ofetiquette would lead the busy woman to attemptto qualify these simple verbsshould she desire a man to look and see if vegetables are cooked, or pouroutwater for a thirstychild. Again, commandsin the subjunctive:lengraw'uka 'enakdu 'enginumak "'if only (i.e., hurry and) you'd fetchwater, I want to drink";'enakduw'ukama denum "(while you're there), would you fetch wateratthe river";tunur'u muy tan "if only you would (would you please) light this."

can be used eitherto plead or to complain. They are most likely in interactionswith such maturepersonsas can claim competing goals andneeds;but the formappearsmuchmore concemed with the "impersonal"fact thatsome desired acthas yet to be performedthan with assumptions about status. And finally, it issignificantthatIlongots, in reflectingon the differencebetweenstraightforward:

rawka manakdu "go and fetch water,"and

'engraw'ukaenakdu "if only (subjunctive) you would go fetch water";'irawim 'itakduwi "go fetch water (for him)";mangkerawkamanakdu "just (make a little effort to) go and fetch water";durutmudeken 'itakduwi "just quickly, go fetch water for me",orany of a variety of ways of issuing whatare often seen as "softer," "'slower"tuydek orms, pointout againthat choice is shaped,primarilynot by differentialrank, but rather by the sense of speed and likelihood with which the speakerseeks compliance.9What this suggests, of course, is that for Ilongots the social expectationsrealizedin how they use commands do not in any simple sense defy their notionthatall people, ultimately, are "equal" or, as they put it, 'anurut"the same."Commands o menor childrenmay be equally "abrupt"('u'awet "quick") or"soft" ('uyamek). It all depends on what is wanted;what commanded partiesmayreasonablybe askedto do; and whatsorts of helpersareavailable. And yet,to speakof flexibility does not deny a sense of rule. Rather, t is to argue that thehierarchies associated with Ilongot commands are social facts that must them-selves be understoodwithin the context of folk views about the natureof their

207


7/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

local social world. In particular, it would appearthat llongot hierarchiesofprerogativeand respectmust be seen ultimately as mattersnot of power, defer-ence, or control, but ratherof particularpersons' needs and skills and of thereciprocities (and inequities)that grow through regularperformanceof sex/ageappropriatechores.This point needs stressing. Attention to universal "features" such as"'power," "dominance," and the like will be misleading if the social relation-ships so described go unexplored. Inequities exist for Ilongots; they are articu-lated and negotiatedin the social uses of commands. But an understanding fwhat Ilongot directives mean requires an accountnot just of rank but of ideasdefining social roles andbonds. ' Thus, Ilongotswill sometimesclaimthatmaleadults rarely need be the objects of commands because men tend to "know"(beva, see M. Rosaldo I980) whatchores arereasonably heirs, and realize these(such things as hunting,killing, joining oratoricaldebate)in relatively indepen-dent actions that removethem from domestic contexts. Similarly, they say thatwomen typically receive commands within the household because the placewhere people concentrate s the place wherewomen work. But then, they claimthat women - who are thoughtto have less differentiatedor "focused" heartsandthoughtsthanmen - areapt to needdirection n order o bestcompensate orsocial "knowledge" that they lack.

Those who in general give commands, are said to have a "knowledge" thattheirobjects need, and to deserve "respect," because, in giving food (or joy,through taking heads), they have provided theirconsociates with life. Further-more, Ilongots say that those who most receive commandsare "lightest" and"'mostquick" to stirandstand: he womanwho "knows" littleof theworld andyet takes pride in her agility around the home; the child who, still lacking"shame," appears inclined to constant movement. Not simply do unmarriedyoungstershave an energy and readinesslackedby moreconstrainedadults;asevidencedby theirdisruptive aste for noise andplay, most childrenneedformaldirectives in order to prevent their causing stress.When asked why they want offspring of theirown, llongots often say thatchildrenaredesired so thatadultscanhaveyounghandsto work- or, as theyputit, "be commanded."But llongots believe as well thattuydek erve to guaranteethatchildrenlearnto recognize and respectthe "mothers" and "'fathers"whogave themlife; to follow them, and thusachievean active consciousnessregard-ing work, and from this, to attain the sort of "heart" that can direct and focusspeech and action on its own. The child needscommands,llongots say, becauseits heart lacks "knowledge" of the world. And it is throughtuvdek,or com-mands, that adults first shape the movements of young hearts, thus teachingyouths to think of things that should be done, and speak in knowingwords.ICommands, in short, are significant not only in organizingthe energy andlaborof the powerless or immature. They formcriticalmomentsin the child'seducation. For Ilongots, the tuvdek, "fetch me that" is what instructsyoung

208


8/36


children both in their relationships to adults, and in their knowledge of whatlanguage is and how it should be used. Where we incline, I think, to regardlinguistic learning as a matter of acquiring phrases that identify and describe,Ilongots would often claim thatchildren learnto speak by learning tuydek.Infact, my own desires, when in the field, to help by fetching things that mycompanions sought were seen as testimony to linguistic youth- explicable withreference not to innergenerosity or grace but my quite sensible attempts o learnto use their words.Tuydek, then, were seen as the exemplary act of speech. As significant inordering domestic life as in the socializationof the young, directiveutteranceswere, for my Ilongot friends, the very stuff of language:knowing how to speakitself was virtually identical to knowing how and when to act. Languagewas, inthe llongot view, a paradigmof thought. Thoughtswere seen as utterancesof theheart.And human choice and effort were themselves construedas a response tosilent tuydekthroughwhich the knowing heartcould give directions to unknow-ing hands.Thus, when Ilongots told stories, a brief imperative:"So I said to my sister/wife/mother, 'pound me rice for I am going off'," emergedin almostevery textas an introduction o core protagonistsand their actions. In the same way thatIlongots think children requiretuydek if they are to learn to act, commandsthroughwhich the heart informs the hand: "And I said in my heart, 'Draw thebow', andI drew it," appearrecurrentlyn recollectionsandreportsas a descrip-tion of humanactivity itself. Similarly, when Ilongots were asked to illustratethrough sample sentences the use of words that I had writtenon vocabularycards, close to 50% were cast in utteranceframes associatedwith directives. 2And finally, in magical spells, a pairing of evocative imagery and directivespeech:

"Here is a plant called 'meeting', hand, meet the game, hand ."Here is a plant that springs up after floods; so may this body springup inhealth . . .";"Make my body like a spinning bug, dizzy with the thickness of thisharvest . . .";

appeared o link desired outcomes to suchwordsandimages as were able both toname, and change, humanactivityin the world. Magical spells couldbe success-ful if practitioners managed to "hit upon" appropriatecommands.In short, for llongots, domestic scenes elaboratinghierarchiesof commandarenot embarrassments o universal equalizing rules. If anything, Ilongot uses ofcommands arerootedin theirviews of human actionandof humansocial order.Ilongots value "sameness" and yet assign to differences a necessary place. Ifadults failed to use their "knowledge" to direct the "energy" of theyoung, or ifadults among themselves were not concerned to "reach" and equal theachieve-ments of their peers, then human life itself would fail for lack of energy and

209


9/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

cooperation. Ideas of "sameness" for the Ilongots are not like legal notions thatdescribe what people "are," but images that speak to their desires. Young men,for instance,strive to be "the sane" as moreachieved adults; acking sameness,they are "envious" and try to provethemselves throughshows of "energy" and"anger." Lack of sameness - or its threat- is whatencourages adultsin dailywork. Conflict resolution is a matter of acknowledging and discarding ack of"sameness" among persons who are either "similar" to or "angry" at theirfellows. And yet, the irony, from our point of view, is that the ordering ofmundane ife requiresa recognitionof difference, of hierachy, and complemen-tarity. For Ilongots, such orderis achieved when people recognize themselves askin, and thus as personswhocooperateand share ndailylife and abor.Yet, giventhe ability of autonomoushumanbeingsto insiston sameness anddenytheclaimsof kin, it is precisely in the proferringand acknowledgmentof commandsthatIlongots are able to displaycommitment o ongoing kinshipbonds. Forenemies toturnkinsmen they must provethemselves to be "the same." But then, forkintoact as kin they must acknowledgedifference, show "'respect,"using not "envy"but the "knowledge" of adults to organize the "energy" in young hearts.Statedotherwise, Ilongotsocial life - like thatof many peoples in the world-is organized in termsof normsof sex, age, andrelation,whereinkinship s whatpermits people to make age/sex appropriate laims. But equally, kinshipitselfdependsnot on a set of jural fictions binding futuresto the past, but on repeatedshows of care, cooperation, andrespectin everydayaffairs.Thus, kinare thosepeople who arrangesex/age appropriatedivisions of labor. And similarly, theyare the people who articulate heir relations n mundane ervices and commands.Thus, if most Western linguists have been primarily mpressedwith languageas a "resource" that can represent he world (and thatthe individualcan then"use'' as a tool to argue, promise, criticize, or lie), 13 the Ilongot case pointstowarda ratherdifferent view of speech and meaning.Forthem, wordsarenotmade to "represent" objective truth,becauseall truth s relative to the relation-ships and experiencesof those who claim to "know." 14 We maywell recognizethe context-boundednessof speech - andyet tendultimately o thinkthatmean-ing grows from what the individual "intends" to say. ForIlongots, I think, it isrelations, not intentions, that come first.SPEECH ACT THEORYJ. L. Austin was, of course, an heir to Wittgenstein,who stressed connectionsbetween forms of social life and formsof meaning.LikeIlongots,whoseview oflanguage-as-commandinks speech to socially expected modes of knowledge,energy, andskill, his writings arguethatwe would do well to think of languagefirstas anactivity, conventionallydefined, andsubjectto normsoperative n thevarious situationswhere we speak. And yet, the very fact thatAustin's notionshad their roots in language bound to relatively limited and ritualizeddomains

210


10/36


permitted aterthinkers o beginto questionhis concerns,abandoninghis interestin the institutionalconstraintson talk in favor of more universalizingviews ofwhat it means to say that utterancesare acts at all. '5Thus, most recent writers have come to concentrateon how our deeds - orutterances areshaped by what the individual "intends" or "means," withoutattention to the social and cultural contexts in which meanings are born.'6Linguistic action is construedmuch less in terms of "where" and "how" thanof just "what" is said and "why" - as if it were, in fact, thecase thatonly in thecourtroomor in church is subjectivity constrainedor shaped by situationallybound norms. Unlike Austin then, such recent writers as the philosopher,JohnSearle'7 tend overwhelminglyto view familiaracts of speech not primarilyassocial facts, but as the embodiments of universal goals, beliefs, and needspossessed by individuatedspeakers.And whereasAustindiscovered illocution-ary force in speech by concentratingon conventional acts thathave the powertochange the world, Searle uses "promising" - in place of Austin's oath ofmarriageor the Ilongot command - to serve as paradigmaticof our ways of"doing things with words."I argue later that the act of "promising" is alien to the Ilongot repertoryofkinds of speech. Moreimmediatelyrelevant,however, is thequestion as to why,and with whatconsequences,the act of promisinghasbeen used as a paradigm ntheoriespresently available. 8 To think of promising s, I would claim, to focuson the sincerity and integrity of the one who speaks. Unlike such things asgreetingsthat we often speakbecause, it seems, "one must," a promise wouldappearto come, authentically,from inside out. It is a public testimony to com-mitmentswe sincerely undertake,bornof a genuine human need to "contract"social bonds, an altruism that makes us want to publicize our plans. Thus thepromiseleads us to think of meaning as a thing derivedfrominner life. A worldof promisesappearsas one where privacy, not community,is what gives rise totalk.Not surprisingly, then, when Searle (I965; I969) describeshow speech actswork, his "constitutive rules" - when the promise is defined as a sincereundertaking,by the speaker(S), of a commitment o do A, where A is somethingS would not ordinarilyundertake,and something, furthermore, hat S believesthathearer(H) desires - do not reveal that thereis morethan a commitmentandsincere intent to please involved in issuing a promise. WhatSearle forgets, andyet to me seems clear, is thatthe good intentionsthat a promisebringsarethingswe only offer certain kinds of people, and at certain times. Introspectionsug-gests, forexample, thatpromisesto one's child aretypicallydidacticandtenden-tious. A promise to, or from, a candidatefor publicoffice is aptto proveneithersincere nor insincere but in equal measure suspicious, significant, and grand.Sincere promises to my colleagues are typically no more than that: sincerecommitments.To a high administrator,my promisesmay seem peculiar. And Icannotescape a sense of awkwardness n imagininga promiseto my spouse.19

211


11/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

There are, in short,quite complex social "rules" that circumscribehe happy"promise" - althoughour ideology of promising eads one to focus not on thesebut on the "'inner"orientations and commitmentsof the speakingself. More-over, it would appearthat Searle, by focusing on the promise as a paradigmaticact of speech, himself falls victim to folk views that locate social meaningfirst inprivate persons- and slight the sense of situationalconstraint who promises towhom, and where, and how) that operates in subtle but importantways inpromising, and in yet more salient ways in the case of a directive, like ""com-manding," or suchapparently xpressiveacts as "congratulating,""greeting,"and "bidding farewell." The centralityof promising supportsa theory whereconditions on the happinessof a speech act look primarilynot to context, buttobeliefs and attitudes pertaining to the speaker's private self.Searle argues that we recognize the significanceof psychologicalconstraintson acts of speech in observing, for example, that it makes odd sense to say, "Itell you X, but don't believe it" or similarly, "I send condolenceswith joy."We cannot conjure a linguistic world where utterancesbear no relation to as-sumptionsabout truth;ust as we fear that "thank-you's" becomeempty without"'gratitude,"and yet more generally, that conversation s untenable f speakersprove entirely insincere.Throughnegative arguments uch as these, Searleclear-ly shows thatthe acknowledgmentof certain contrarypsychological statesmayunderminean act of speech. But what he fails to see is that such observationsdonot provethe positiveclaim thatif performativesare to work, thenthepresump-tion of a given psychological orientationis required. "Sincerity," and suchrelated terms as "feeling," "intention," and "belief," may well be thingswhose absence is impossible to conceive. But to the analyst sensitive to thecultural peculiarityof such words, more thana negative argumentwould seemnecessary to define them.20In brief, by generalizingculturallyparticular iews of humanacts, intentions,and beliefs, Searle fails to recognize the ways that local practicesgive shapeatonce to humanactions and their meanings. Ignoring context, he discoversthatlinguistic actioncan be classified in universal(and essentiallysubjective) erns,but in so doing he projects misleading patternson our categories of speech.SEARLE'S BIASES AND ILONGOT NAMES FOR ACTS OF SPEECHI now compareIlongotnotions about actsof speechto thefive categories(assert-ives, directives, commissives, expressives, declarations) proposed by Searle(e.g., 1976, I979f) as the foundations or a cross-culturalypology of linguisticaction.2 While Searle's categories providea reasonableheuristicfor introduc-ing speech act verbs, the rationale that he details proves unsuccessful as a glosson Ilongot materials. Some of Searle's limitations are methodological:Oneimaginesthat a comparable nvestigationof culturalorderingamong Englishactsof speechwouldpresentcomparablepointsof challenge. Butmostimportant,he

212


12/36


Ilongot data show that accounts of verbal action cannot reasonably proceedwithout attention to the relations between social order, folk ideas about theworld, and styles of speaking.22Assertives.23 Searle's first category grants "propositions" the status of anact, one of asserting somethingtrue or false about the world. Assertiveacts, toSearle, may range from "boasts" to "answers," "explanations," "state-ments," "arguments," and "claims." Theirnames are such familiar "referen-tial" verbs that form the stock-in-tradeof politicians, legal witnesses, and aca-demics who are professionally concerned with certainty and proof. And I

imagine that this fact itself may be related to their philosophicalsalience. 4Surely, the manycomparableIlongotnames for acts of speech - 'upu"word, totalk"; petpek "to explain"; siber "to answer"; reteb "to guess"; ta'en "tothink, to say, to resemble";tudtud"story, to tell a story";tadek"story, to tell astory"; beita "gossip, to gossip, to report";purung "oratory,to orate"; 'aked"to give (words), to speak, to advise" - are associated with quite differentinstitutionsand conventionalconcerns. 5Thus, much as in English, Ilongot assertive verbs are sometimes used as trueperformatives,that can announce assertive acts:'eg ki pa 'entudtudek "don't speak, I'm going to tell a story";'upuluwengkudiyu petpeki tuy ma 'en'ara'anden "I'll telf you in full, ex-plainingall, what they are doing";rawengkudiyu 'akedituyma 'u'likinbeyaknun . . . "I'm going to give youmy little bit of knowledge, to the effect that

And yet, far fromaddressinga concern for truth,my understandings thatwordslike these are used with different purposes and in different sorts of contexts.Heardmost frequentlyat the beginningsof encounters,or in oratoricaldebate,Ilongot verbs describing statementsand accounts clearly have less to do withascertainingtruthsthan with ongoing formulationsof relationshipand claims,througha discussion that alludes repeatedlyto the characterof discourse:26'awayberita'engku ay bi'ala legem "I have no newsto tell, it's just thattheold lady . . .";ten tuma'enakaynawengkudiyu 'upuwinunagiata "don't think I amgoingto speak bad, aggressive, words to you .lawanapurung, legema 'entudtudek "this isn'toratory,I'mjustgoing to tella story."

Ilongots will, of course, make clear at times that some of what they say ishearsay, some experiencedtruth. But they will rarelydwell on argumentsde-signed to ferretout an undetermined act, or clarifythe accuracyof an assertion.Ratherthanpursuingtruths,Ilongot speakersseem inclined to granteach otherprivilegedclaims to things thatall, as individuals, may claim to "know." Andso - much less concernedwith factualdetail thanwith the questionas to who213


13/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

withholds, and who reveals, a knowledge of well-bruited fact - Ilongots usedenial and assertion n discourse as a device for the establishment f interactionalroles.27Thus, for example, I have knownIlongotsto deny that they hadtakenheadsofkin of interlocutorswho in fact had been theirvictims in the past, and then, whenchallenged, to pronounce a readiness to undergodangerousordealsand oaths inorder to test the mettle of accusers who appeared ess certain,or more fearful,than they thought themselves. Clearly, at times like these, my secretive friendswere not concerned with telling lies or telling truths. As always, what theyclaimed was "true" depended less on "what took place" than on the quality ofan interaction where what mattered most was who spoke out and claimed theprivilege to reveal or hide a public secret hitherto clothed in silence.To "be the one to tell you that," "let outa secret hidden n my heart," "go atyou with my words," "share knowledge," or "tell stories" are, then, in mostIlongot speech, a matter ess of representing acts aboutthe worldin words, thanof articulating relationshipsand claims within the context of a history that isalreadyknown. Or statedotherwise, assertives used in a performativemode -especially in formal speech - appearequivalentto a varietyof devices used totalkabout allianceand oppositionin particularocial groupsby talkingaboutthecharacterof spoken words. Thus, artful oratory s repletewith cautiousqualify-ing verbs:bukudma sa'usa'ulengkudimu 'upuwa "well, whatI will just, uncertainly,say to you";'ebtarengku aws as away . "I guess, wildly (what you want to hear)";verbs marking boundariesand relations in discourse:

nu 'alagam 'iman "if you are finished there";'etu'etuydengengku uduwala maman "I'll extend that(idea) withjust twowords";lawana rawengkuma rawenmu 'engara'i 'empupurunga "I will not go for(address)the things you are going to get at in your oratory";and metaphorsdesigned to qualify the speaker'sactions:

siya'ak ta 'umuribumugkut en betar nima lapura "I'll be the one to runahead again (and speak out) since it's the way with young dogs";pebtuwenta 'ipani'ungip'ungiptan upu "(let's talk until) we are filled up,contented, from handfeeding one anotherwords";'aligsi nud ma ke'ewengtu 'awaytulanitu egema renerekbuta "(my heart ssomething) we can compare to a new plant ('eweng?), without roots orthorns, and so easy to pull up (i.e., I hold nothing back)."And what these sharehas less to do with ways certain wordscan represent heworld than with the fact thatspeakers'naminganddescribing heirassertive actsitself becomes the stuff of verbal duels - becomes a mediumfor the construction

214


14/36


andmanipulationof social bonds. Assertiveverbsappear, n short,as counters nconfrontationswith one's "same" or equal men. As such, they help to shapediscourse.Theirpower seems much closer to the force thatSearleassignsto our"declaratives" than to assertive acts like "arguing" and "stating facts."Directives. Unlike assertives, Ilongot namesfor their directive acts are rarein oratory or in speakers' own accounts of their ongoing speech. Where theyemerge, instead, is in the conduct and the criticism of everyday socialinteraction:ngaden 'itu 'ed metuydeka anaka "what kind of children are these, whowon't be commanded";nii ta sinengtengku dimu "now (don't forget) what I orderedyou to do";'enngadenanmuwakbet "are you naming, ordering, accusing me?"

Along with tudyek,or "commands," directive acts include as well: bege "toask, request";tengteng "to order, warn, instruct";and tukbur"to forbid." Inaddition,there are a set of verbs more limited in directive sense: 'ungi'ungi"tocoax, plead"; tawaw "to call, summon"; maiw "to ask to stay, stall"; andcompounds like pekamu "to cause, tell to hurry," formedby linkingthe causa-tive prefixpe- to the root kamu "hurry, to be fast."All directive acts have multiple possible realizqtionsin everyday Ilongotspeech, although (much as in English) few actually appearas first person in-completive aspect performatives,of the form, "I order you . . ." or "I com-mand . . ." But while overtperformativesarerarelyheard n Ilongotdiscourse,the "force" intendedby particulardirectiveacts is characteristicallymadeclearthroughuse of recognizedandstereotyped inguisticformulae.Thus, the typicaltuydek, or "command," makes use of modal verbs like raw "go and," geptay"cut off an activity and," durut "hurry and," legem "just":rawmu ma denum "go for the water";'irawi itakduwi "go and fetch water for me";legemka raw 'engriyak "just go get some rice from the granary";geptaymupa deken 'iya'den "interruptyourselfa moment to go up the hillfor me (and see if . . .). "

Stereotypedtukbur("prohibitions") - heardboth in daily speech and in theformulaic lines of magic - employ imperativenegation('edi'eg mulkaVb.):'eg kin 'anak 'en'upu'upu "don't keep talking, you children";'ed musu dedengera "don't listen to him";leg kanpagi mendedesidesi pagi "don't, rice, act foolish (lose yourfertil-ity), rice."

And tengteng ("orders, warnings") - found in magical spells, in daily saluta-tions and goodbyes, as well as oratorical encounters - typically use ten,"because," plus an incompletive verb to issue words of warning:215


15/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

ten mita'engka "don't let yourself fall";ten tuma 'engkay'amungadimayukami "don't thinkwe have becomelazy,silent, unwilling to talk";ten rawenmu'ipeka'kanamkanama'i "don't go makinga lot of this, speak-ing more than is necessary."A general reluctance to assert unequalbonds in words may well explain thefact that while one hears, "I ask you to . . . ," performativeuse of most direc-tive verbs seems odd. Ilongots in generalunderstood, but tended to correct myefforts to performdirectivesthat began, "I forbid ...," I summonor "I warn . . ."In Ilongot, as in English, one can formulatedirectiveacts with referenceto aspeaker's wants. But while one can say, for example:kermakangkuma denum "I want the water";say ramakkuma 'u'ursige 'upu "1 want (you to speak in) straight,non-contentious words";kermakangkunem 'enakduka "I would like for you to fetch water,"

with a recognized directivesense, it seems to me thatutterances ike these, muchlike overt performatives,were rarely heard, and that in general, they impliedmuch less sinceredesire than an unwarrantedlaim to precedenceon the direct-ing speaker's part.28Again, Ilongot speakers questioning if hearers could or would performasasked ("can you take out the garbage") did not use the verb giwar "can, withreference to ability or skill," but medarum"'can," implying "is it possible,would it be appropriate o act," as in medarumarawenmydekenma panak"'could you go and get my arrow," (althoughhere too, my data indicatethateven this directiveformwas seen as awkward).Certainly,only childrenspokeintermsof giwar, and they did this not in issuing commands but in attempting oevade unwanted asks: awana giwarengku"I can'tdo it (i.e., I will notperformas asked)."

What these and the facts discussed above suggest is that, while Searle'scategoryof directivesmayhold in Ilongotas much as in English speech, therulesand the significancesassociated with Ilongotdirectiveactsare, in most importantways, quite differentfromthe ones thatSearleproposes.Like us, Ilongotsvarytheirdirectives by speakingof the mode or mannerof an act;describingthingsthat should be done; questioning the appropriatenessof tasks; or otherwise,appealingto the expectationsthat decide prerogativesand claims in everydaycommunication. But where Ilongots may differ most significantly from our-selves29 is that, for them, overtdirective ormulaeare not construedas harshorimpolite. And this, I would suggest, is true because directive use is seen ashavingless to do withactor-basedprerogativesandwantsthanwithrelationshipsaffirmed and challenged in their ongoing social life.30216


16/36


Reflections on Ilongot may thus highlight an apparentlyuniversal fact thatSearle is blind to. Directive acts, unlike assertives, tend to be characterizedbyuptake-demanding erbs.31 Or, statedotherwise, directive acts arevacuousun-less acknowledged.To "ask," of course, demandsan "answer," andto "com-mand," insofaras one is "heard," is to require"compliance." Ilongotdirectiveverbs thus form a class with such Ilongot acts as 'amit "to demean, belittle",bengen "to insult," maduran "to voice disappointment,"pakiw "to criticize,find fault," in thatthey typically initiatewhat Sacks (1973a) has called "adja-cency pairs" - routineswherein the utterances hatfollow them arenecessarilyheardas "answers" (siber), "agreements"(teber); "acknowledgments,accep-tances" (telu), or else "counters, denials" (sima'lad).As Searlewould argue, then, directiveutterancesmay generallybe seen as anattempt o matchthe worldto spoken words. But theirpower to do this dependsupon theirplacement in socially organizedconversationalcontexts. Not only istheir happiness dependent on the relationships and expectationsparticular n-teractantsclaim; their social significance itself is indissociablefrom their vul-nerability to disregard.

Commissives, Expressives. Not surprisingly, given my remarks above,Searle's categoriesof commissiveand expressiveacts differ from the assertivesand directives previously discussed in that they lack substantialIlongotexem-plars. One cancommunicatea firmintentto actby addingan intensifying /-VI-/)affix to first person incompletiveverbs:upuluwengkuma 'eg kusuke'weri "I say (andmean) that I won't forget(todo) it'";'arale'engkutuy ma 'embege'enmu "I'll really do what you are asking."

But utterancessuch as these could also mean, "I say it over andover . . . " or"I am intenton, exertingmyself in doing . . . ,'" whereno element of "commit-ment" is involved. Similarly, numerousenclitics can be used in somethinglike"expressive" acts of speech, wherein, for example, 'anin "oh dear," maysignal acts of dimet "pity," and ngu'dek "unfortunately," communicatesafeeling of kide'ri "sympathy, desire to help." Butoverwhelmingly,expressiveacts like these appearconcernedwith only fleeting recognitionof suchthingsaslimitation,longing, misfortune, anddistress.Rather hancommunicatea feelingone might then expect to find sustained in subsequentshows of empathyandregard,theirmeaning seems the relatively "phatic" one of indicatingawarenessof, perhapsconnectionto, disturbing acts atonce associatedwith anddistancedfrom, oneself.To Westerners,taughtto think of social life as constitutedby so many indi-viduatedcells, prosocialimpulsesanddrives may seem a necessaryprerequisiteto social bonds, andso the notionof a worldwhereno one "promises," "apolo-

217


17/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

gizes," "congratulates," "establishes commitments,"or "gives thanks," mayseem either untenableor anomic. Certainly, when in the field, I was consistentlydistressed to find that Ilongots did not appearto share in my responses to suchthings as disappointmentor success, and thatthey lackedexpressive forms withwhich to signal feelings of appreciation,obligation, salutation, and regret, likeour "I'm sorry" or "good morning." Repeatedly, I was outragedto find thatfriends who hadarrangedo meet and work with me didnot appearat the decidedtime - especially as they would then speak not of commitmentsbroken,or ofexcuses and regrets,but of devices (such as gifts) thatmight assuagethe gener-ally unexpectedand disturbingangerin my heart. To them, it mattered hatI wasannoyed (a dangerousand explosive state), but not thatsomeone else, in care-lessness, had hurtand angered me by failing to fulfill commitmentsI had under-stood as tantamount to promises.My pointis not, of course, to claim thatIlongotsindaily life do notcoordinatetheirplans or thatthey fail to recognize varying degreesof reliabilityof peoplewith whom they live andshare. But what Ilongots lack froma perspectivesuchas ours is something like our notion of an inner self continuous through ime, aself whose actions can be judged in termsof the sincerity, integrity,andcommit-ment actually involved in his or her bygone pronouncements.BecauseIlongotsdo not see their inmost "hearts" as constantcauses, independentof theiracts,they have no reasonsto "commit" themselvesto futuredeeds, or feel somehowguilt-strickenor in need of an account when subsequentactions prove theirearlier expressions false. 32In linguistic terms, what seem to be the Ilongot equivalentsclosest to our"expressive" and "commissive" acts will most often function more like themembersof Searle's "declarative" class, whereinwhatmatters s the act itselfand not the personal statementit purportedlynvolves. Thus, apparently"ex-pressive" acts include, as we have seen, dimet"pity," de'ri, kide'ri"to expresssympathy, to help," as well perhapsas takit "love," 'imanu"greet formally"and turun "bid farewell." As with directives these acts tend to be associatedwith stereotyped expressive forms. And further, as with all Ilongot acts ofspeech, it is clear that words of "pity," "sympathy," and the like are apt tohave much more to do with social roles and bondsthanwith the innerfeelingsthey apparentlysignify."Love," for example, is characteristicallyexpressed by "naming" one'sdesiredobject in a dream.And suchexpressions,in andof themselves,canserveto "call" theother'sheart,so thatit will beginto "love" - by interactingwith -oneself. Expressionsof "sympathy" may similarlyassert,and thuscreate,newsocial ties. One does not begin by "feeling" sympathyandthendecide to act;instead, it is throughshows of careandhelp that "sympathy" is known. Infact,it is because "'expressive"acts in wordor deedcan, in and of themselves, giverise to social bonds, thatthe Ilongot fearof "'pity"from the deadmakes sense:only death can come of sustained links with the departed.

218


18/36


Thus, for dead ancestors to say 'anin "oh dear," in pity for still living kin, asfor adults to voice a sense of "pity/longing" for once youthful bodies, or thenagain, for killers to pronouncetheir "pity" towardsthe victims of headhuntingraids- involve, in every case, the forgingof new kindsof ties throughrecogni-tionof their lack. Andjust as headhunters anhopeto be envigorated hrough heestablishmentof mystic bonds to theirpoor victims' lives, so the old may feelenlivened by theirreminiscencesof youth- andliving peopleordinarilywill fearincreasedinvolvement with beloved departed.Finally, we can begin to under-stand why "farewell" (turun) songs from women to young headhunterswhenthe latterleave on raidsappearto make a very special claim uponthe would-bekillers' hearts:accomplishedheadhunters ecount thatthey were "shameful" toreturn without successful boasts to answer women's words, and further,thatbefore attacking,they requiredspecial rituals to expungethe weighty thoughtsand feelings born of their connection to the female dirge.Apparentlyexpressive acts do not, of course, in every case, have social andaffective implications of such weight. But while at times statementsof feelingseem no more than revelations of affective truths, it seems in generalthat asIlongots give voice to aspectsof their innerhearts,they arelikely to be engagedin something we would see as a "declarative" and creative act, which holdsimmediateconsequencesfor the characterandqualityof social life itself. Feel-ings are not the sorts of things one nurturesand then, necessarily, reveals. Ifsilenced, they will typically have no effect. But if evoked in an expressiveact,they can well change the world. I can think of only one "expressive" - the'imanu"formal greeting" - for which this characterizationdoes not hold. Andsince 'imanus are, like tauntsand insults, devices used primarily o announce astalwartpresence and then call for a response, they should probablybe dis-tinguishedfrom "farewells" and sounds of "pity," as "expressives" thatre-semble not "declaratives" but "directives" in their force.A similar argumentcan, I think, be made for the two Ilongot verbs with anapparently ommissivefunction.33 The closest Ilongotequivalentto our "prom-ise" is calledsigem, a formulaicoath by salt, whereinparticipants eclare that iftheir words prove false, their lives, like salt, will be "dissolved." But Ilongotoaths aredifferentfromour "promises" in the centralfact thatsigem speaks notto commitmentspersonallyassumed(and for which subsequentviolatorsmight,as individuals, be held in fault) but to constraintsbased on external, "super-natural" sorts of law.Some years ago, for instance, an old man accidentallydropped his load ofgame upon a gun (not his own) that fired and killed him. Because of circum-stance, his death was construed as punishment for the breaking of an oath ofpeace by a young nephew who, in killing enemies sworn as friends, providedsupernaturalcause for the loss of the unfortunateold man. And yet, to mysurprise, mmediatekinof the deceased did not seek recompensefromthe youngman whose violent actions had apparently"caused" the accident in the first

219


19/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

place. WhereasI thoughtthatblame belonged to the young manwho violatedtheoath, my friends declaredthat '"angry"vengeance would have turnedupon theinnocent owner of the accidentallytriggeredgun, had he not subsequentlydied.Thus, where our "promises" assume that things like blame, intention, andresponsibility are all intimately linked, llongots in a case like that describedabove ignore the very issues we find necessary in deciding obligation,wrong,and right. They fixed their"anger"on the man whose gun occasionedharm, andsought, not an acknowledgmentof "doing wrong," but a repayment,on the onehand, from the man who owned the gun, and on the other, from the one-timeenemies who had been party to the now disastrous "promise."In subsequentyears, the Ilongots concerned made known a sense of warinessand distrusttowardthe oath-breakingyounger man. But only when their one-time enemies asked thatgifts be given in exchange for kin of theirs whom theunrulyyouthhadkilled, was he made answerable,notto the "broken"oath, butto the enemy death he caused. In short, within a world in which "intentions" arenot understoodas "cause," no agreement s quite like the "promise" we knowbecause the involved partiesneed not ask who is "'responsible" or subsequentevents as long as all can recognize the objects and the perpetrators f loss.Of course, most peoples' actionsbear some resemblance o theirwords. Butinthose rarecases where a violationdoes in fact occur, appealis made, not to the

obligations particularpersonshave assumed, but to dynamicsin whichdamagedpartieseitherdamageothers or demandsome recompensefor hurt. "Blame" isthusdissociated from one's "disappointment"with another'sfailure to performas hoped. Violations have much less to do with breachthan with the sufferingoccasioned by one's (innocentor guilty) deeds. And friendlydealings are estab-lished throughdeclarative "oaths by salt," thatprovidea context whereinen-emies can hope to forge a sense of kin-like bonds.As a last and related example, I would remark that regularappeal to anexternal(althoughnot "supernatural")constraint s used by llongots to secureagreementsthat they forge by tying knots in strings to count the days untilencounters getur). Whensucharrangements ail, blamewill most likely fall, noton the individualsinvolved, but on the stringitself. As with the sigem promise,then, getur-agreements forged in knots are not properly "commissive" acts,because a string - external to the actors' selves - is seen as bearer of theexpectations, plans, and bonds that it evokes.Declarations. Thesespeechactsare,forSearle,allcaseswheremere"sayingso" can really change the world, by virtueof the fact that, given interactants'roles, some one of themis privilegedto declarethe others"married," "guilty,""innocent," "cursed,"or "fired.'' Utteranceswherethesupernaturals evokedmay, similarly,have this sortof "strong" illocutionary orcebecause transform-ing actionis (atleastpotentially)performedn themereutteringof theappropriatewordsthemselves.34And in a somewhatdifferentway, declarative orcebelongs

220


20/36


as well to numerousmetalinguisticacts, like "I define" and"I conclude," whichin and of themselves decide the nature of ongoing talk.Of course, traditionalIlongots do not enjoy such things as churches,court-rooms, offices, andschools, all institutional orms,wherein hepowerof wordsasactsis indissociablefrompositionsof recognizedauthority.ForIlongots,thereareno roles or contexts wherein individual speakerscan expect, definitively, tochange theirworld, at least in partbecausetheir ives arefartoo fluidto assure hatanyutterance s certain obe "heard." Thus, it is hardly urprisinghat heIlongotspeechactsmostobviouslyrelated o Searle's "declarative"class arethosewhosepower depends noton a human nterlocutor's ar,but the attentionsof diffuse, yetever present, supernatural orces. And though in every case, effectiveness de-pends upon one's luck in "hitting" the "right words" in speech, a varietyof"invocations" (nawnaw) - including "magical spells" (nawnaw, 'aimet),"curses" Cayu)and "boasts" (eyap, which are, at times, capableof causingharmto less accomplishedfellows) - provideclear instancesof "declarative"acts whereinformulaicexpressions, if uttered n the appropriateones, may leaddirectly to more joy or suffering in one's immediate environment.Consideringstrictly "supernatural"or "invocational" verbsalone, the set ofIlongot declarative acts appearsquite small - a fact one might associate withtheirrelativelylow level of institutionaldifferentiation.But such a characteriza-tion would, I think, prove far from adequatein light of facts discussed above,where all but Ilongot "directive" verbs were characterizedas "declarative" intheir force. Thus, I suggested that apparently "assertive" verbs, used mostfrequentlyin oratoricaldebates, are like "declaratives" in thatthey operate as"metalinguistic"glosses on politicalrelationships hatareforgedin a discussionwhere the speakers areconcernednot just with "what took place," but with theway the pastwill be describedandused in presenttalk. Innamingverbalactions,assertiveverbsare thusin factemployedmuch less to clarify, than to impose, thetermsthrough which debateproceeds; they help create/definea social world bystressingits unfoldingformin ongoing politicaldiscourse.The same, of course,is true of much English assertive speech: in saying what the world is like,authoritativeigures manageto impose theirversionsof reality. Butwhereas t iscommon practice for English speakersto confront an assertivestatementwith adiscourse honed to test its claims to truth, Ilongots seem much less concernedwith what is said thanwho it is who gets to name which point of fact, and how,given relationships mmediately at stake, the statementof that pointof fact is tobe relationally construed.Again, although for ratherdifferentreasons, I have argued that most of thepossible members of Ilongot "commissive" and "'assertive"groups shouldactually be seen as "declarations." Although in English, too, it seems that theexpression of emotions can be a way of making claims, Ilongots differfrom us ina tendencyto focus less onfeelings harboreddeep within the self, than on theway that feelings spoken may - like tears that bring disaster in their wake -

221


21/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

themselves shape human worlds. In fact, it makes but little sense to speak ofIlongot "expressive" acts because longots do not think in termsof inner "feel-ings" needing to emerge, but ratherof social contexts in whichpeople do or donot take for granted previously asserted claims and bonds.

OF CULTURE AND CLASSIFICATIONSMy review of Ilongot categories of acts of speech might lead modern philoso-phers to conclude that Ilongots, unfortunately,have not evolved the subtletiesenjoyed by us - perhaps because of "supernatural"orientations(or "under-differentiated" social forms) that preclude our psychological grasp of humanpersons.35 And yet my point has been very a very different one of challengingour common sense, so as to better think about relationshipsthat link a set ofcategories of forms of action to the sociocultural world where they are used.Although one can, in Ilongot, discriminateverbal actions in termsof categorieslike those proposedby Searle- anddemonstrate,n English, thatdiscriminationssuch as his may be misleading for the analyst concernedwith interactive unc-tions - the cultural limitationsof Searle's categories andhis assumptionsaboutindividuatedhumanselves appearpreciselyin thefactthatIlongotsdo notappearto find in one another's speech appropriate ircumstance o talkaboutor querySearle's concerns. Ilongots lack "our" interest in considerations ike sincerityand truth; their lives lead them to concentrate, instead, on social bonds andinteractive meanings. And so, where Searle proposes speech act categories thatcorrespond o speakers' states, for Ilongots I suggest insteadthat verbalactionsbe divided into those which roughly correspond to social situations whereinnorms of "sameness" and autonomyprevail, and those belongingto relation-ships defined by continuity and hierarchy.The division is a crude one. Interactantsmix their modes. But what I amproposingis that, just as sameness andhierarchycan be seen as interdependentmomentsin Ilongot social life, so Ilongot speechacts maybe grouped, roughly,into two categories. The first - including Searle's apparently"expressive,""commissive," "assertive," and "declarative" sets - maybe distinguishedbythe fact that they can "act" upon the world without demandinginterlocutorresponse. The second - clearly recognizedas a categoryin Ilongot folk reflec-tions upon speech - involve "directive" speech acts wherein relation, evenhierarchy,is characteristicallypresupposedand utterances ncludedemandforuptake from one's fellows. The clearest case of acts belonging to the first,"declarative" set, are those in which mere saying so createsa challenge, merelonging makesone's fellows ill - those cases where, in short, the act of speechitself creates a bonddefiningthe relationsof potentiallyautonomousanduncon-nected selves. By contrast,verbalactions like directivesthatrequirea responsedepend upon, as they articulate,ongoing daily patternsof cooperation,careand

222


22/36


talk. The tuydek, or command, is thus, as we have seen, at least in part aparadigmaticact of speech because Ilongots use directives to articulateanddisplay ongoing kinship bonds.In separatingtuydekas a category from all other acts of speech, I may bemotivated, in part, by the universal presence of imperativeand interrogative(i.e., "directive") verbalmodes in humanlanguage.But I would arguethatforIlongots the special status of directivesmakesgood social sense as well. Ilongotinterest n directivesis derived, I wouldsuggest, firstfroma sense thatspeech isof necessity embedded in and so dependenton a patternof (often asymmetrical)relationalbonds;andsecondly, from anawareness hatthehierarchies hatdefinetheireveryday cooperative affairsare also daily undermined, o thatthe order ntheirworldis not a thing accomplished for all time, butan achievementneedingconstantrecreation.In general, the analyticaldistinctionI have drawn, between "declaratives"and "directives" among llongot acts of speech appearsconsistent with theirways of organizing - and understanding social action. And categories ofspeech acts thatthey recognizewith distinctiveverbal names reflect indigenousconcerns with order in their social world.In orderto illustratethis point I focus again on directives. Dimensionsneces-sary to a graspof how Ilongots differentiatedirectiveacts at once confirmmypreviousobservationsconcerningIlongot sociality, andhelp me demonstratehesense in which varieties of action are themselves the productsof the waysrelationshipsare organized and understoodby native speakers.In general, Ilongots claim, "commands" or tuydekshould be distinguishedfromrelatedacts of speech - like "prohibitions"(tukbur),"orders,warnings"(tengteng), "requests" (bege), "appeals" ('ungi'ungi) and a variety of un-classified directives that include such things as "awakening" (pabengun)and"hurryingup" (pekamu).And even though they were aware of ambiguityanddifficultyin discriminatingamong suchacts as these, informants oundit reason-able to assign directiveutterancesdifferentdirectivenames- and in so doing, toreflect on meanings implicatedin their names for verbal deeds.How then were various directive acts distinguished?Neither grammarnor aconcern for things like deference and "face" emerged consistently in Ilongottalkaboutdirectives. "Is theresome waterhere" and "give me water"werenotdistinguished as a "soft" request versus a "hard" command form. Nor didemployment of grammaticallydistinct imperativescorrelatein any simple waywith the varieties of directiveuse. 36 Certainformulae,illustratedabove, provedunambiguous markersof such things as "warnings," "supplications," and"'prohibitions."But, as will be seen in discussion of directivecategoriesbelow,the issues thatconsistentlyemergedas most salientin indigenousdiscussions ofvarieties of directivesused hadless to do with ourconcernfor thingslike properforrnand indirection, deference and politesse, than with llongot views of thecooperative activities that a directive act evoked.37

223


23/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

ILONGOT DIRECTIVE ACTSi. Tuvdek"Commands." As already indicated,raw "go and," as well ascertainothermodal verbs, appearto markthe prototypical uydek.Further,andnot surprisingly,Ilongotsasked to give examplesof tuydekcharacteristically seraw-formsin conjunctionwith verbs thatname routinedomestic tasks. In addi-tion (and again as seen above) the use of different modal verbs, subjunctiveforms, andverbalfoci, may serve to "soften" a command'sintended orce, buttheydo not themselvessuffice to turn nstancesof tuydek ntounambiguous asesof "appealing/pleading"or "requesting." Instead,commandsare singled outfrom otherdirectiveforms in termsof the kindandcharacterof actionthey callforth.Whatseems distinctiveabout tuydekare, thus, threethings:(a) the call for anactivity markedby interruption/movement;b) appeal to social hierarchiesandexpectationsof unequallydistributedknowledge, energyandskill; and(c) con-cern for finite, easily realized, sorts of tasks.(a) First- as is suggestedby thecultural actthattuydek ypicallyarereceivedby those most likely to "'getup" and move (and similarly, by those thoughtgenerally to be least "focused" in their "concentration")- "commands,"unlike "requests," requiremotion. Imperatives re not in generalseen as tuydekif they do not requireaddresseesto interrupthemselvesand move. In fact, themodalverbs used characteristicallyn tuydeknot only raw "go for/and",butothers like durut "hurry and," legem "just (go ahead)and," as well as ra'mut'"unhesitatinglyo and," lipalipa "cautiously,slowly do it," 'ai "'come,orienttowardme and" - all seem concerned with qualifying motion, and so either"softening" or specifying the qualityof the activityin whichthe addressee s toengage. By contrast, a directive that begins, "ask/tell him . ." is seen ingeneralas an "order, instruction";and "give me . . . (somethingnearyou, orsomethingyou alreadyhave)" is usually construedas a "request." Directivesseen as tuydekthus requirepublic manifestationof a quality- mobility- that

signifies both the energy and the lack of knowledgethattogetherfigurepromi-nently in Ilongotjustificationsof hierarchicalizeddirective use.(b) Second (andas againmakessense given my earlierremarks n how chainsof commandfigurein age/sex hierarchies) he typicaltuvdekcalls for services inwhich one person "moves'' out of "respect" or deferencetowardssome other.Thus, not only:nangatka "pour it out (into a container)";'edemta "take, carrythis";

but also:nangasi "pour me some";nangasim "pour some (for someone otherthanspeaker)";'i'de'imuwak "carry it for me, bringit to me";

are all instancesof tuydek.But interestingly,cooperativeactions:224


24/36


'aika deken 'ememekmek "come with me to chop shrubs in the field";pemen'ara kisi "let's work together(in one another'sfields)";'edemdekenta "carrythis for me (with implication hatI havealreadybeencarrying it for a while)";

are seen as instances of "requesting," as are imperatives ike "eat" or "drink"in which the beneficiary is not the giver, but the recipientof the command.(c) Third, tuydek are concerned with finite, easily realized sorts of labor.Characteristically,one fulfills tuydeknot by "promising"or "assumingobliga-tions," but by engaging in requiredactions in immediateresponseto the direc-tive utterance tself. Thus, imperativesdemandingno particularask or action -like "hurry up," "be cautious," and "wake up" - are seen in general asunclassified directives. Imperativeswhich specify the time, or place, or personslikely to be implicated n an action (e.g., "fetch me waterover there"; "ask himto come") are usually "orders, instructions,"as are imperatives hat makeuseof incompletive verbs. And, as already indicated, imperatives in which theaddresseeis not expectedto workfor an inactivepartyare not "commands," ortuydek, but bege "requests."2. Bege "Requests." The class "request," or bege, is easily specified giventhese comments. In contrast o the Englishspeaker'ssense of the "request" as amore indirect, less hierarchical, variety of "'command," Ilongots typically as-

sume thatwhatdistinguishes "requests" is, first of all, tie quality of movementthey evoke, and secondly, the sorts of social relationshipsand claims that theyimply. Thus, unlike "commands," Ilongotbege, or "requests," will only rarelyinvolve a majormovement from or interruption n the addressee'songoing ac-tion. To aska womanto preparea meal:panganmutX "feed, preparea meal, forX"; or fix a betel chew: pakibi'enmuwak"fix me a betel chew," are actionsrecognized as "commands," or tuydek. But people saw the following as in-stances of "requests": pakanmutX "'feed,give (some of the prepared) ood toX"; pabi'enmuwak "give me some betel, supplies"; panabakum"give (some-one) some tobacco." Commonly recognized as "requests," again, are suchimperatives as employ the verb 'aa "to give, to hand" - suggesting thatmostacts of "giving" do notrequire headdressee o move:nara'imta sabitmu'embi'enak "give me your betel pouch, I wantto chew"; nu waden man ta denummadkudilya 'inara'i "if there is waterin the cup, give it to me"; 'aampa ngu dekenta "come on and hand thatto me." In fact, one woman told me that "respect"due to an affine keeps her from either "naming" or "commanding" her hus-band'ssister. "'AllI ever say," she told me, "is so-and-so, now give me that.'"Significantly, however, when "giving" requires "going for," the directive isclassified as a "command": nara'im 'irawi ta dJnum"go and get some watertogive me."

A second characteristicof requests is that- to the extent thatthey in fact callfor some kind of interruptedaction - the goal is either one of securing theaddressee'swelfare (as is the case in "eat this," "'come in," "watch out") orelse of winning his or her cooperation with a person who seeks help. Thus,225


25/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

Ilongots often use a superficiallyexpressive verb in the imperative orm, kaWe'-de'rika "have pity, please," in uttering request directives; and at still othertimes, verbal affixes (meki-,pemen-) and pronouns(kita "the two of us," kisi"all of us") implying collective orreciprocal ormsof action may be used to turn"commands" into acts recognized as "requests for cooperative aid":

'aika deken mekitakdu "come and help me fetch water";'entalabakukisi ngu "let's get to work."3. Tengteng "order, warning." While those imperatives marked unam-biguously with a completive verbalaspect arecharacteristically een as tuydekor"commands," directives classed as tengteng are associated eitherwith notions

of futurityor with incompletiveverbs. Thus, "warnings" may, as we have seen,use ten + incompletive verb to warn against an undesiredfutureaction:ten tuma'engki . . "don't think . . ." (-um- marks incompletive aspect);tenrawenyudeken . . . "don't think . . .'" (-en here indicates continuity, inmarked contrast, e.g., to the rawmu, "go and," of commands).

And - almost surprisingly ike "wamnings"38 most "orders" also appear odiffer from "command" directives in termsof the (implicit or explicit) verbalaspect they evoke:manakdukamad denum "go fetch water at the river" (mang- prefix +

takdu, "to fetch water" maymark ncompletiveaspect,orelse, the senseofincompleteness may belong to the fact that locative informations stressed);(when I leave) mampepedegkid u "when I leave, you stay here" (mang-prefix plus reduplicated pe- together suggest continuity);(when you are in the lowlands)'itaiwmudekenta . . ." (whenyou are in thelowlands) buy me . . ." (here incompletive aspect seems a function of theintroductoryclause).

In addition, those imperatives which tell the addressee to "ask" or "speakwith" some third party are more likely to be understood as "orders" than"commands":'ibegem nud X 'ungkitur nu mawa wa "tell X to come downstreamtomorrow";mekibege'impuy nitu beitatu "ask her, for me, what is new";mambegekanud ta'u nima lapit "ask uncle for a pencil."

Quite possibly, what makes "orders" of directionsof this sortis something ikethe open-endedness of the actions that they call for. To ask someone to asksomeone, is, I wouldsuggest, to focus less on finite tasksto be performedwithina circumscribedsocial context than to chart a course of future action with stillundeterminedimits. By projectingtheir desireson a yet untestedperson, place,or context, tengteng-giversnecessarilyextendtheir view beyondthe confilnesofimmediate relationsand look instead towardsituations whereinpresentprojectslose theirrelevanceandthe presentspeakeris unlikelyto retainan instrumentalrole.

226


26/36

ILONGOT SPEECH ACTS AND SPEECH ACT THEORYIn this respect, pairingsof tengteng-utterance lus responsemay well appear,

in fact, to have a force resembling that of Searle's commissives. And just asIlongots may confirm theirdates andplans by tying knots in stringsto count thedays until projected meetings, so it makes sense that many acts of "order/warning" areaccompaniedby the tyingof a stringonto the orderedparty'shand.Clearly, the use of such external marks designed to guaranteethe force ofspeakers'words upon another's actions is far from necessaryin the case of themore certain, and situationally constrained, "commands."In summarythen, threeculturally situatedconcernsemerge as necessaryto acharacterizationof differences between directives. First, because divisions oflabor in terms of sex and age are (as we have seen) conceived by Ilongots intermsof differences in "knowledge" andcapacitiesto "move," directivesaredistinguished in terms of their concern with interruption/movement.Second,because directives concerncoordinationof tasks and services in a world wherehierarchy s balanced by parity, and autonomy by cooperativework, directivesare distinguished in terms of hierarchicalas against more mutualor reciprocalchains of service andcommand. And third,because directivesfigurecentrally nthe articulationof a kinship orderthat is experienced,most of the time, as given,and yet in fact requiresrepeatedrealization in concrete cooperativedisplays,directivesdiffer with reference to the action context that a directiveact evokes.In short, indigenous views of human actions and interactions- concerns formovement;for social hierarchyandcooperation;andfor the temporal ragilityofsocial bonds- provenecessaryto an understanding f conventionsthatdiscrimi-nate among directive categories that Ilongots recognize as such.CONCLUSIONSIt is a social science commonplace that the ways the natives talkabout behaviormustbe recognizedas differentfromthe analysts'accountsof how andwhy theyact the way they do.39Thus, it seems thatanalysts more astutethanI might welldismiss the bulkof what has been said above as evidence of the confusions thatare born from an undeserved love of Oxford. We need not dwell on men likeSearle and Austin if what we really want to know is how real people, notphilosophers, manageto "do their thing" with words. But my difficulties with aset of categories like thoseproposedby Searle are notsimplythose of a behavior-ist who claims Searle'sdata is limited as an accountof how realpeoplereally act,butthose of an anthropologistwho insiststhat actionis somethingconstitutedbysocial beings who, in acting, implicate theirunderstanding f the worldin whichthey live.Surely, Searle's categoriesare versatileenough to be applied to otherpeoples'acts of speech. But at the same time, they can be criticizedfor undue emphasisupon the speaker's psychological state, and coffesponding inattention to thesocial sphere.40 The fact that "we" stress propositionswhereas Ilongots seedirectives as a paradigmaticact of speech reflects, I think, our relatively indi-

227


27/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

vidualistic (and sociologically, problematic)view of humansociality and com-munication.If social relationshipsareto be recognized in analyticalaccountsofverbalacts, it will prove necessaryto grasp the differentways that social worldsshapethings thatone can do or say with wordsby shapingnotions aboutperson-hood, society, and speech. Thus, the difficulty with such categoriesas "asser-tion" and "expression" when appliedto Ilongot acts of speech is thatthey donot help us comprehendthe common Ilongot understandings f the designatedacts - as these, in turn, are documentedboth in Ilongot namesfor verbalacts andin the ways they use these names and understandand answer to each other'sspeech. Ilongot notions lead, instead,to my proposalthatIlongot speechacts bedistinguished as "declaratives" and "directives." And furthermore, longotmarkingand differentiationof the categoryof directive acts is somethingwhich,we see, makes sense with referenceto the ways they think about andordertheirongoing social bonds and deeds.One reason to attend some of the ways in which Ilongot notionsof linguisticaction differ from the select Westernnotions documentedby Searle is thus toshow thatcertainof ourculturallyshaped deas abouthow humanbeingsacthavelimited our graspof speech behavior,leading us to celebratethe individualwhoacts without attendingto contextualconstraintson meaning. llongot views oflanguage - and, in particular, heir emphasis on commands- suggest alterna-tives to the philosopher'saccountof referential, ndividuallydeployed, systemsof speech. They help display the problems thatinherein all attempts o construeaction in universaland subjective terms, withoutregardfor how societies andculturesshape our selves, our motives, and our activities. Searle uses Englishperformativeverbsas guides to somethinglike a universal aw. I thinkhis effortsmightbetter be understoodas an ethnography however partial of contempo-rary views of human personhood and action as these are linked to culturallyparticularmodes of speaking.In sum, thereis no questionin my mindbutthatIlongotsconductsocial life inways quite similar to and yet quite different from ourselves - and that thesedifferences are revealed, at once, in how they think about and categorizeeachother's acts, and in the forms throughwhich theirinteractionsactually proceed.The differences between Ilongot tuydekand comparableEnglishdirectiveactsare indissociable from our respective ways of thinkingabout labor, language,humanskill, andhuman action, andsuch social facts as "sameness," hierarchy,cooperation, and prestige. And I would argue that these differences, in turn,prove consequential on the one hand, for an analysis of our distinctive so-cioeconomic forms, andon the other, for a technicalunderstandingf the wayswe use our words in speech.Reflectionson Ilongotnotionsconcerningacts of speechshouldserve, then, asa reminder that the understandingof linguistic action always, and necessarily,demands much more thanan accountof what it is thatindividuals ntendto say:because, as Ilongots themselves are well aware, the "force" of acts of speech

228


28/36


depends on things participants xpect; and then again, because, as our compari-son makes clear, such expectations are themselves the productsof particularforns of sociocultural being.NOTES

*One of a series of papers commemorating a decade of Language in Society.i. This paper was writtenwhile the authorwas a Fellow at the Center forAdvancedStudy in theBehavioralSciences, partiallysupportedby a grantfrom the National Endowment or the Human-ities. Gregory Accaioli, A. Becker, Eve Clark, Jane Collier, Jean Comaroff, Paul Friedrich, IanHacking,Dell Hymes, BeatrizLavandera,FredMyers, CarolPateman,MaryPratt,RenatoRosaldo,Gillian Sankoff, Michael Silverstein, and ElizabethTraugottare all to be thankedfor theirhelpfulconversations and comments.2. This goal - essentially, of characterizing he necessary interactionbetween action and struc-ture, instrumentality nd meaning- is more or less explicitly recognizedas a centralproblematic nmuch modem social theory. See, e.g., Giddens (1976), Bourdieu(1977), or the recentpolemic byThompson (1978) against Althusser (1971).3. The claim, of course, is not a new one. It has been developed in a variety of ways in theliteratureassociatedwith the Ethnographyof Speaking(e.g., Gumperz& Hymes 1972; Bauman&Sherzer 1974). Recently, M. Silverstein (1979) has made a suggestive, and relevant, argumentconceming the relationshipbetween culturaltradition, inguistic form, and dominant heories aboutlanguage, insisting that our representational iew of linguisticphenomena s at once the productofour ways of speaking and the cause of a certainconservatism in our conceptions of how languageworks. For an earlier andstill important ormulationof the interdependence f conceptionsof action,personhood, moral order, and modes of speech, see K. Burke (e.g., 1950).4. Although reference to "speech acts" is found in the work of quite diverse authors(e.g.,Voloshinov 1973; Hymes 1972), and was not, to my knowledge, used by Austin - the notion of"'speechact theory" tends to refer to developments initiatedby Austin's discussions of the "per-formative/constative"distinction and of "illocutionaryforce" (1962, I963), receivingtheir fullestformulation n the writingsof the Berkeleyphilosopher, John Searle(1965, 1969, 1976, [979a). The1970S saw the adoptionof speech-act-theoreticconcepts by linguists (see, Cole & Morgan 1975;Saddock 1974), literarycritics (e.g., Fish 1979; Pratt1978; Searle t979d) andanthropologistse.g.,Ahem 1979; Tambiah 1973), as well as numerousphilosophers largely, I think, because of theirpromise to relatethe formalstudyof languageto questions of the use andeffectiveness of speech. It isbecause of the wide-rangingappealof the theorythat I think it worthwhileto tryto clarify - fromasympathetic, aindyet empirically orientedperspective- one critical(andlargelyunnoted)areawhereit goes wrong.5. Research among the Ilongots of NorthemnLuzon, Philippines, was conducted by RenatoRosaldoandnmyself ver a period of nearly two years in the lAteig60s andagainin I974 (underthesponsorshipof a National Instituteof Health PredoctoralFellowship and a National Institute ofHealthResearchGrant,5 Fl MH-33, 243-02, BEH-A, and a NationalScience FoundationResearchGrantNo. GS-40788). Foradditionalsources on Ilongotlanguageandculture,see M. Rosaldo 1972;1973; I975; 1980; and R. Rosaldo I980.6. For a detailedsketch of Ilongot phonology (and aspectsof llongot grammar), ee M. Rosaldo1980. In reading the examples to follow, the following conventionsshouldbe noted: e/ is a low midvowel; /el is a lengthened,highmid vowel; Irl is a voiced velarfricative; ' is a glottalstop; il and u/are frontand back vowels respectively, with high and low allophonesdetermined, n largepart,bythe precedingconsonant.7. The interrelationsbetween headhunting,violence, genderconcepts, and notions of obedienceand respect in everyday affairs are developed in M. Rosaldo (1980; n.d.b). Collier & Rosaldo (inpress), provide a model for interpreting hese and other aspects of Ilongotsociety and culture.8. Recently, some extremelysuggestive work has been done on the relationshipbetweensyntacticalternatesandPoliteness phenomenacross-linguistically,wherein t is suggested,e.g., that "indirec-tion," the use of passives, and of qualifications as to name, modality, and so on, may all figure incomplex attemptsby speakers to appearat once effective andpolite (for different, butnot unrelated

229


29/36

MICHELLE Z. ROSALDO

inquiries, see Ervin-Tripp1976; Brown & Levinson 1978; Searle 1975, 1979b). Partof my purposehere and in what follows is to point to some of the limitationsof our(implicitly,I think, universaliz-ing) ideas of politeness - by suggesting that concerns for "politeness" themselves aredependentonlocal forms of social inequality and hierarchy, forms which differconsiderablybetween such rela-tively "egalitarian" peoples as the Ilongots and ourselves. Consequently, I would argue, llongotsuse and elaborate linguistic resources in ways that do not correspondwith our categories; thesemantics of their linguistic varieties is not random, but it cannot be understoodwithout someappreciation of the distinctive conceptual and relational shape of Ilongot society.9. That variation in directive forms may be concemed not just with etiquette but urgency andspeed is indicated in Lavandera's 1977) discussion of Argentine Spanish,suggestingthat some ofthe considerationsraised by my llongot analysis may well have cross-linguisticanalogues.Infact, itmay tum out that emphasis on simple notions of "power" and "solidarity" in muchsociolinguisticanalysis reflects the poverty of our analytical grasp of human social life.IO. Stated otherwise, it seems to me that we cannot understand longot acts of tuydekwithoutsome graspof the ways thatIlongotsthemselves construetheir social context;ourunderstandingsfspeech acts cannot be linkeddirectlyto our views of universalhumannaturewithoutsome attempt oreconstitute their immediate "world." In a relatedvein, see P. Ricoeur (1971) who argues that"inscribed" human behavior (i.e., social science data) is like a literary text lacking an ordinarycommunicative context, and so requiringsome sort of situating n a world or context if the thingsit"says" are to be "understood."II. A more detailed study of children's linguistic-learning-of-relationships ould include anaccount of "learning to plead" (kide'ri), which is almost simultaneous with "learningto obeycommands." These reflections were occasioned, in part, by considerationof Ilongot similaritiesandcontrasts to the Kaluli described by Schieffelin (n.d.). Kaluli childrenleam about (by learningtoperform within) a special sort of sibling bond in which one party's "pleading" guarantees hattheother will obey.I2. Michael Silverstein points out (personal communication) that, as directive verb forms areoften unmarked, his result maybe an accident. I think not. Whenasked, forexample, for a gloss on"to cross a river," one schoolboy wrote, "the game I killed is across theriver, go across andget it";for a gloss on "to belittle", I received, "I am your equal, do not belittle me." Most instancesresemble these in having a clearly intended directive sense.13. "Most" here refers to dominant themes in "generative" (or structural) inguistics. Surely,there have been other- and more sociological - schools of linguistic thinking,from Wittgenstein oWhorf, Sapir, Malinowski, Hymes, and Halliday. At the same time, it seems to me fair to say that"functional" linguisticshas not enjoyed the centralityof more "structural" chools, and thatmanywould-be sociological or cultural linguistic thinkerstend in fact to see issues of "use" and "func-tion" as things "added on" to a proposition-makingore. Surely,this characterizations appropriateto all theoristswho are concernedto differentiate,e.g., "utterance/sentencemeaning"from"speak-er's meaning" or "statement meaning" (e.g., Searle 1969; Graham1977), in a manner hat con-strues the relative stability of the former as a condition for the latter.Althoughhis formulation ssomewhat different, Grice's work is based on rather similar views. Thus, Grice argues that ourconversationalmaxims areformedwith reference o "the particular urposes . . . that alk is adaptedto serve . . . . I have stated my maxims as if this purposewere a maximallyeffective exchangeofinformation; his specification is, of course, too narrowand the scheme needs to be generalizedtoallow for such general purposes as influencing or directing the actions of others" (1975: 47).Whateverthe difficulties with his argument see, e.g., Sapir 1979), M. Silverstein's work(1976) issignificant for its suggestionthatanalysesthatbegin in a Griceanfashion will neverachievethe sortof generalizationthat Grice himself finds desirable.14. Here as elsewhere, constraintsof space requirethat I make general ethnographic tatementswithoutelaborating heir ethnographicbasis. To demonstrate, or instance, the "relativity"built intoIlongot views of truth, I would cite their readinessto acknowledge differences in, e.g., botanicalnaming practicesamong adultswho "grew up in differenthouses"; their ackof interest n ascertain-ing "the facts" when engaged in legal argument; heir use of the word beya, or "knowledge" incontexts where what seems to matter is knowing how rather hanknowingthat.x5. Withthe exception of a few anthropologists e.g., Finnegan 1969; Foster1974), interested nhighlighting ritualand oratory contexts where speech takes on a special sort of force, none of therecent commentators on Austin (e.g., Graham 1977; Holdcroft 1978) seem to pick up on the

230


30/36


sociological perspective implicit in his account. Partof the problemhere, as Paul Friedrich 1979,and personal communication) points out, is that the transformationalist's tress on freedom andcreativityhas led to a distrustof conventionand a systematicdiscountingof regularized inguisticandsocial expectations concerning speech. The significance of routinesfor our grasp of memory andmeaning (e.g., Tyler I978: 229-48) or for an understandingof communicationgenerally is, ofcourse, a central insight among ethnographersof communication(e.g., Hymes I972: 57). And itseems ironicthat those theoristsmost weddedto freedomand inventionseem willing to accepta verynarrowview of the sortsof "intentions" likely to be realizedin speech. Infact, I would suggest thata good deal of what people like Searle see as inconsistency in Austin's speech act classificationderives from the latter's attemptto retain a sense of interactionalrelevance in his categories; thecasualcharacterof Austin's typology is, in part,a testimonyto his own scepticismof ever realizingadefinitive classification of all formsof action, or all ways of doing thingswith words. If my reading scorrect, Austin remains in spirita good deal closer thanhis followers to the (moreor less) Marxistclaim that forms of action cannot be classified absolutely, but must be analyzedwith reference tosocioeconomic contexts in which activities are performed (e.g., Giddens 1979; Asad I979; Vol-oshinov I973). It also seems to me thatAustin's explorationsare much closer to Derridian nquiry(e.g., Derrida 1977) than Searle (1977) allows.i6. See Anthony Giddens (1976, 1979) for a particularly lluminatingdiscussion of the conse-quences of anunfortunatedivision of laborbetween social scientists, concerned o understand uman"behavior" as the productof unintended"forces," andphilosophersof "action" who tend to stressagency at the expense of any grasp of social and cultural factors shapingwhat we do and mean.I7. A progressioncan be traced in Searle's publishedwork, from a concern with delimitingthenotion of "speech act" and "illocutionaryforce" by offering illustrative sets of "rules" (1965,1969), to one with speech act typology or taxonomy(0976, I979a, 1979f). The two converge, ofcourse, in that many of the "rules" constitutinga successful speech act in Searle (essentialcondi-tions, propositionalcontent rules, preparatory onditions) are paralleledby the dimensions of histaxonomy (essential, words/world,psychological state). Furthermore, believe that it is this con-vergence thatgives him confi

Rosaldo_ThingsWeDo

Documents