Roles and perceptions of senior officials in coalition governments in Slovakia

Staroňová, Katarína. 2003. “Roles and perceptions of senior officials in coalition governments in Slovakia”

In: Bryane, M., Kattel, R., Drechsler, W. (Eds.) Enhancing the capacities to govern: challenges facing the

Central and Eastern European countries. Bratislava: NISPAcee, 2003. Pp. 67-83. ISBN 80-89013-16-3

[Enhancing the capacities to govern : challenges facing the Central and Eastern European countries. 11th

NISPAcee annual conference. Bucharest, 2003]

Roles and Perceptions of Senior Officials in Coalition Governments in Slovakia

By Katarina Staronova

Introduction

The transition of Central European countries into modern democracies in the past

decade has led to many questions and problems connected with institutional redesign. The

majority of academic studies have focused on topics such as electoral systems, multi-party

politics, coalition governments and constitutional reviews. Studies by international

organisations have been more interested in the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ or

‘Westernisation’ of these countries and in the degree of adoption of formal frameworks

incorporating democratic standards. Part of the process of creating new institutional

arrangements involves the role of individual senior officials, and specifically the degree to

which there is a clear division between political or administrative roles. Although many

international organisations (such as the European Commission and the OECD) recognise the

importance of, and need for, establishing a Senior Civil Service, few studies have been

undertaken in this field.

This paper analyses formal and actual perceptions about the role of the senior civil

servants in Slovakia using a research methodology developed by Guy Peters and Tony

Verheijen, and is a part of a study on politico-administrative relations. As Slovak formal

legislation lacks a definition for senior official, all relevant formal documents – such as the

Law on Civil Service, Competency Law, Coalition Agreement – are analysed, in order to

obtain a clear overview of the official role of top civil servants in the Slovak context. The

second part of the paper presents data about the role perceptions of top civil servants from

their own point of view. This part draws from empirical research.

FORMAL ROLES

Immediately after the velvet revolution in 1989, the former Czechoslovakia engaged

in a democratic transformation. Public administration reform was initiated in 1990 and

envisaged two interconnected reforms: decentralisation (handing over responsibilities from

the state administration to territorial self-government) and civil service reform (defining the

new status of civil servants).1 Following elections in 1992, a new government was created in

Slovakia by a coalition of populist parties with national and social orientations (and some

authoritarian inclinations) led by Vladimir Meciar’s HZDS party.2 The only public

administration reform during this term (1994-1998) was a new territorial division, with a

slow process of deconcentration (transfer of competencies from top to lower levels of state

administration). The ruling government had made no effort to introduce decentralization or

1 Malíková and Staroňová (2001).

2 The HZDS led coalition brought about the split of Czechoslovakia in 1992. After premature elections in 1994,

HZDS (with nearly half of the seats in the parliament) again became the leading party in the coalition with the

Slovak national party and the Association of Workers. The party ruled the country for a full term from

September 1994 to September 1998.

any laws that would affect the behaviour of civil servants. As a result, the Slovak civil service

became more politicised during the 1994-98 era and the environment in which the civil

service was operating lacked transparency and ethical principles - this resulted in a high turn

over among civil servants.

The 1998 elections brought into power a broad coalition ranging from parties from the

right (Slovak Democratic Coalition, Hungarian Coalition Party) to the left (Slovak

Democratic Left and Party for Civil Understanding). This broad coalition led to internal

tensions, conflicts and ultimately led to the delay and compromise of administrative reforms.3

Administrative reform, including reform of the laws on relations among civil servants,

became a point of contention for the coalition parties and their power interests.

In July 2001, the Slovak Parliament passed two vital pieces of legislation for the

public administration reform that arranged organizational relations among politicians and

civil servants, namely the Law on the Civil Service and the Law on the Public Service (both

came into effect on 1 April 2002). The Civil Service Law regulates state employees who are

acting under public authority (such as civil servants in the ministries), whereas the Public

Service Law regulates support staff and employees of organisations financed by the State but

who do not directly exercise state authority, such as teachers and health service employees.4

The Civil Service Law aspired to make the civil service more professional, and to reduce civil

servant vulnerability to changes in government. Such regulation aimed at reducing the

previously unbounded ability of each incoming government to place its own people into all

key positions (sometimes even two or three layers down in the hierarchy) and the freedom of

ministers and heads of offices to recruit at their own discretion. The new law clearly

distinguishes between a political post (such as the president and cabinet members including

individual ministers) and a professional career post (such as head of office, director generals

of a section, unit heads and other ministerial staff). The Civil Service Law also contains

provisions for equal access to the civil service and the right of the civil servant to

administrative and judicial review in case of alleged breaches of his or her rights. In its

annual assessment for 2002, the EU/OECD based SIGMA Programme deemed that the legal

framework for the Slovak civil service was appropriate and contained the main civil service

standards which prevail in EU member states (SIGMA, 2003: 3).5

Structure of the Ministry and Definition of Senior Official in Slovakia

The Civil Service Law establishes a hierarchical system of subordination for civil servants

and clearly states the rights and duties of individual civil servant classes. Figure 1 depicts a

formal structure of a ministry in Slovakia, while Figure 3 outlines the main functions of chief

ministerial staff. The ministry is headed by a minister who is appointed by the winning

coalition and who is a member of the cabinet. Each ministry has one or two state secretaries

who are political nominees of the minister’s party. These political posts lie at the core of

coalition negotiations and are anchored in the coalition agreement.6 The distribution of

3 More information on the effects of the coalitions on the policy making process (including administrative

reform) can be found in Staroňová and Malíková (2004). 4 The Public Service Law is based on the Labour Law with some additional provisions to take into account the

special situation of the public service. 5 However, as will be discussed subsequently, some of this legal framework’s deficiencies have consequences

for its implementation. 6 See Staroňová and Malíková (2004) for a detailed discussion of similarities and differences of individual

coalition agreements (1994, 1998, 2002) on mechanism for the division of government and parliament posts,

such as prime minister, vice prime ministers, ministers, state secretaries, foreign delegations, heads of

parliamentary committees, etc.

political posts strictly respects the principle of proportionality, which stipulates that the

number of political posts (in this case ministers and state secretaries) is directly proportional

to the share of votes gained by each party represented in the coalition during the

parliamentary elections. A Ministry is usually divided into five to seven Departments

(sometimes called sections) that are responsible for a particular substantive part of the

ministry’s agenda. Usually, there are a few support departments (such as those focused on

legislative, financial, EU, information technology matters) that are either separate or

integrated into substantive departments, depending on the type of a Ministry. Each

department is headed by a director general and is further subdivided into units that are

managed by heads of units. A Ministry also has a Head of the Office who is in charge of

administrative and personal tasks in the day-to-day running of the office. The Head of the

Office, together with the director generals, report to the senior professional civil servants. In

practice, the executive team of each ministry consists of the minister, state secretaries, head

of office and director generals. This team meets regularly, once a week, to discuss all

important matters concerning policy development and to make decisions about such policy

development.

Figure 1: General Structure of the Ministry in Slovakia

The term senior official is not defined (and does not exist) in formal legislation as a

formal status or an official form of appointment (be it political or professional). Senior

officials in the Ministry’s hierarchy may be identified only with the aid of roles and task

definitions for various posts within the ministry anchored in the Act No. 312/2001 of the

Civil Service Law, Act No. 575/2001 of the Competency Law, and various Coalition

Agreements and internal ministerial regulations. From these documents, senior officials were

identified according to their formal status in the hierarchy (top layer), form of appointment

(political vs. professional) and degree of influence in decision-making and with regard to the

Political

Posts

Professional

Posts

policy making process (executive team of the Ministry). Given the prominence of the

executive team, however, they are considered to be senior civil servants.

The Civil Service Law is an extremely elaborate document, laying down in extreme

detail (over 160 articles) both processes and employment conditions. Among others it also

defines a “civil servant” and recognizes both political and professional career posts within the

civil service. The scope of the civil service is broadly defined to include posts with

responsibility to execute state authority. Although the law introduces a classification system

for civil servants (a hierarchical system of superiority and subordination) it does not provide a

clear distinction between top level civil service posts and lower level posts, including a de-

compression of the salary system and the creation of much improved employment conditions

for top level officials. The only hierarchical differentiation is introduced by the term

“superior” which is too broadly defined. According to the Law, a “superior” is a civil servant

who is authorised (in Chapter 9 of the Law) to give instructions to subordinate civil servants

in the fulfillment of his or her duties. The hierarchically highest superior in the professional

civil service is a “head of the office” (in Chapter 10 of the Law), who is responsible for

running the office, i.e., Ministry. Prior to the Civil Service Law coming in to effect, the head

of the office was a political post with direct influence on decision-making and policy

making.7 With the Civil Service Law coming into the effect, the Office Head posts were

required to become apolitical – either by officially leaving the party or withdrawing from the

office (as in the case of the Ministry of Justice). The law (in Chapter 5) defines political posts

as “those to which the nominees where elected or recalled by the Parliament or those who

were nominated or recalled by the a) president; b) Cabinet; c) head of the Parliament; d) head

of the Constitutional court.” The hierarchically highest political post is that of minister. The

Civil Service Law, however, does not specifically mention the posts of other political

nominations – notably of the state secretaries or ministerial advisors – and it therefore does

not regulate the number and roles of these political posts in the ministry. Indirectly, these

posts can be considered to be top political civil servants because the state secretaries are

nominated by the Cabinet and anchored in the coalition agreement.

The Competency Law defines the number of ministries, their basic competencies and

the basic structure of a Ministry (as previously discussed). The internal organisation and

division of roles within a Ministry is left for the internal regulation of each Ministry. The

Competency Law, as the only one, formally defines the role of state secretaries as a deputy to

the Minister during his/her absence and notes “…the minister may delegate some of his/her

rights and tasks also in other events. The state secretary has an advisory vote when

representing the minister at the Cabinet’s meeting.” Thus, the status and actual role of the

state secretary is unclear, depending on the particular minister’s delegation of tasks and

duties, as is the number of state secretaries. One or two state secretaries at each ministry has

been the historical norm, but the number is determined in the coalition agreement following

the principle of proportionality, rather than by any real need of a ministry, the scope of its

mandate or its current priorities.8

7 Prior to the new Civil Service Law, the head of the office was clearly a political post, usually from the same

party or affiliated to the minister’s party (given that state secretaries during 1998-2002 had to be from a different

party than the minister’s according to the coalition agreement. Given their political allegiance with the minister,

the head of the office often assumed de facto the role of a state secretary. 8 Such disregard for the needs of the ministry opposed the original intention of the establishment of the state

secretary post. Particularly ministries with a broad agenda should have two state secretaries so that the agenda

can be divided. For example, in the ministry of education, higher education is run by one state secretary and

primary/secondary education is run by the other state secretary.

In spite of the unclear position, three basic functions can be identified9:

- deputy to the minister internally and externally

- permanent running of the ministry or part of the agenda

- representation of coalition interests at the ministry

The first function, representation of the minister internally and externally, is the only

function anchored in the Competency law, however, the scope and extend to which the state

secretary functions as a deputy is left for the discretion of the minister. The second function,

running the ministry or part of its agenda, was the original intention when the post of a state

secretary was introduced in 1992 as part of the new institutional arrangements. Particularly,

ministries with a broad agenda should have two state secretaries so that the agenda can be

divided, e.g., at the ministry of education and higher education is run by one state secretary,

and primary and secondary education is run by the other state secretary.

The third function, representation of coalition interests, is directly related to the way

of political nominations made for this position. Each government made different

arrangements of post distribution, ranging from one party nominees present at each ministry

(1994-98), to a complicated arrangement when a minister was from one of the coalition

parties, and at least one of his state secretaries had to be from another coalition party (1998-

2000).10

In this way, each ministry had a representative of at least two coalition parties. The

current government abandoned this principle. Thus, the post of a state secretary is also a

source of influence as well as a source of control and (or) cooperation among coalition

partners. Whatever the arrangements were during each government, each agreement clearly

defines the ratio among coalition partners.

As a result, and as shown in Figure 2, each government has had a different (and

increasing) number of state secretaries. As also noted in Figure 2, there is an increasing trend

for state secretary posts to be assigned to the specialists with no political affiliation. During

the second coalition Government (2002 – the present) this practice was reinforced with more

‘expert’ appointments.11

Figure 2: Number and Distribution of Slovak Political Posts

Ministers

(ministries)

State secretaries

Party members Expert appointees

1994 - 1998 15 17 0

1998 - 2002 15 20 2

2002 - present 14 16 6

The absence of a definition for the post of state secretary leaves space for the minister

to ignore the state secretary – particularly during disagreements in the coalition – reducing

the state secretary to a purely formal role. Such space also allows the state secretary to

engage in discretionary activities, given the difficulty of the minister to control him (as the

state secretary is accountable to the Cabinet and not to the minister). Such space, in either

9 Beblavy (ed.) (2002), p. 40.

10 Staronova, Malikova, (2003).

11 Specific parties nominate an expert as state secretary as the distribution of state secretary posts belong to the

political parties.

case, results in a dysfunctional and inefficient ministry, as political tensions among the

coalition parties are reflected within the ministry (notably between the minister and state

secretaries).

The formal framework for policy making is set by the Constitution and laws,

particularly the legislative procedure of Government and Parliament. These regulate the role

of individual bodies in decision-making, coordination and the process of initiation of the new

laws and amendments, the process of law adoption and its promulgation. All processes that

are formally regulated are of a legislative nature and consist of a very formal sequencing of

draft legislation, particularly in the reviewing process. There exist no formal rules or

guidelines in regards to a broader policy process that encompasses the formulation of

problem or issue definition, design of concepts, strategies and policy analyses or design of

action plans, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The line ministries are responsible

for the actual design of policies, such as strategies, conceptual issues and draft laws. There

are three main means for developing documentation and materials in Central and Eastern

Europe: a) by an individual civil servant in the ministry; b) by setting up a working group

consisting mostly by outsiders - academics; and c) by outsourcing to an external body –

institutes and research centers.12

Substantive departments headed by the director generals

produce draft concepts, strategies, draft laws and any written documentation for the policy

making process. The first level below the director generals are composed of units which work

on the command of the director generals and who undertake the actual elaboration of the

material. Heads of units can be of a substantive nature or of a supportive nature (legislation

drafting, budgeting, IT). Every material prepared at the ministry is discussed at the weekly

meetings of the executive team of the ministry. Each document is then signed by the minister

responsible for the work at the ministry, and the document is then sent for the reviewing and

adoption stage. The legislative Rules of the government stipulate the subsequent phases of

material progress.

Each ministry has regular weekly meetings of the informal executive team in which

the minister, state secretary, head of the office and directors general participate. The political

posts, ministers and state secretaries, together with the highest professional posts, head of the

office and directors general, form the senior civil service and can be considered to be senior

officials in Slovakia (see Figure 3). The second part of this paper will investigate the

perceptions of the roles and duties of these civil servants.

Figure 3: Executive Team of the Ministry13

Minister:

Highest political civil servant in charge of agenda at the Ministry

Represents the Cabinet in the Ministry and vice versa (according to §4 of the Competency

law, he is entirely responsible for the activities of the Ministry)

Sets priorities and issues

Co-ordinates work at weekly ministerial executive team meetings

State secretary

Political civil servant, nominated by the Cabinet and agreed in the coalition agreement

12

More on the theory and practice of policy making in Slovakia, including the impact of EU accession on policy

making can be found in Staronova (2002). 13

The role of a state secretary is not covered by the Civil Service law and his/her duties are based on

assessmenty made by Beblavý (2002:40).

Deputy to the minister internally and externally

Management of the ministry or part of the agenda

Representation of coalition interests at the ministry

Head of the office (Ministry) Highest professional civil servant in the office

Reports directly to the minister

Responsible for personal, administrative and organizational run of the office

Director generals

Professional civil servants responsible for substantive issues and processes within department

jurisdiction (including smaller units within department)

Co-ordinate activities and supervise policy development and implementation, including draft

concepts, strategies, draft laws and any written documentation for the policy making process

Fully accountable to the Minister

REAL ROLES AND ROLE PERCEPTIONS

The interviews were conducted with the “executive team” (minister, state secretaries,

head of the office and directors general) – as well as heads of the units at the level below the

position of the directors general – during the period August – November 2002.14

The

ministries covered included the Ministry of Education (5 respondents), Ministry of Health

(1), Ministry of Labour (4), Ministry of Justice (7) and Ministry of Transportation (1).

Although Slovakia had elections in September 2002, only officials who were in their position

during the period of 1998–2002 were interviewed, although some of the interviewees did not

last the whole period, particularly in the political posts (see Figure 4 for survey respondent

characteristics).

All senior officials interviewed – including the Heads of the Office – started working

at their ministries with the change of the government in 1998, except for one general director

at the Ministry of Justice who has been in his position since 1992.15

The majority of political senior officials (including one head of the office) were career

politicians who were members of parliament prior to their ministerial nomination. Only one

state secretary at the Ministry of Health was not a career politician: prior to his nomination,

he was deputy director of Slovak’s main insurance institution and also a medical doctor.

Figure 4: Interviewee Professional Profiles

Ministers State secretaries Heads of the

office

General

directors

Heads of the

units

Number of

interviewees 2 4 2 6 4

Educational

background

lawyer (1)

engineer (1)

lawyer (1)

social scientist (1)

engineer (1)

medical doctor (1)

lawyer (1)

social scientist

(1)

lawyer (2),

engineer (1),

social

scientists (3)

lawyer (2)

social scientists

(2)

Arrival to the

ministry 1998 1998 1998

1998 (1 in

1992) 1992-1998

Previous

work

experience

(post-1990)

MPs 3MPs

PA (1)

MP (1)

PA (1)

researchers

professors

judges

PAs

Party

membership 2 4 1

0 0

The interviewee left this position because the 2002 Civil Service Act required heads of the office to

be apolitical.

Professional senior officials – before their appointment to the post of general directors

– had a long history of employment in their respective specialty. Director generals from the

Ministry of Justice are former judges. Director generals from the Ministry of Education come

from Universities or were teachers/directors in secondary schools. General directors from the

Ministry of Labor used to be researchers in their field of specialisation. Thus, the government

14

The interviews were conducted either by Katarina Staronova or Ludmila Malikova, Associate Professor at the

Political Science Department of Comenius University, Bratislava. 15

In 1998, the head of the office position was political and only with the coming into effect of the Civil Service

Act in 1 April 2002 did this post become apolitical, One of the interviewed heads who was at the same time a

member of the party left his position.

tried to depoliticise the level of professional officials by bringing in specialists, and as one

interviewee noted to “bring the work of the Ministry closer to the real world and practice by

appointing practitioners into these positions.” In 2002, only one out of the six interviewed

general directors are no longer senior officials (because of death). The majority of civil

servants below the senior officials (heads of the units) came to the ministries during the

previous governments from either subordinated institutions of the Ministry or from the NGO

sector – and none were involved in the political parties.

Both ministers perceive themselves to be key policy makers and leaders of their

respective ministries, managing the organisation’s internal and external aspects. Both of them

spend approximately half of their time on consulting, communicating and organising the

agenda of/within the ministry with the senior staff, and their main effort focuses on “making

things happen” (see Figure 4). Both of the ministers lead executive team meetings (minister,

state secretary, head of the office and general directors) at least once a week, usually on

Mondays, where all important decisions take place. The other half of their time is spent on

managing policy issues with external stakeholders – ranging from interest groups, union

representatives to political interests of coalition partners and members of parliament. Both of

them spend considerable time focusing on relations between the ministry and the political

leadership, particularly from the coalition partners. In this sense, both ministers perceived

extreme pressure from coalition partners for the development of certain policies and personal

representation in public agencies. One of the ministers confessed that one coalition partner in

particular exercised enormous pressure on him to fill the positions of senior officials at the

ministry from the ranks of the party.

Figure 5: Senior Officials and Heads of Units Role Perceptions (1998-2002)

External roles Internal roles

Other Broker

Interest

groups Leader Manager

Policy

advisor Administrator

Political

Minister 50 50 media

State secretary 15 5 20 60 public

events 30 40 0 10 20

Professional

Head of office 0 20 80

20 20 60

Directorgenerals 5-20 25 50 50-100 15 lecturing

Unit head 1 10-20 0 10 20-30 50

Note: Broker – focusing on relations between ministry and political leadership, inter-ministerial coordination,

building coalitions across ministries. Interest groups – dealing with outside interest groups. Leader – ‘a person

that can create followers’ rather than an attribute of position. Manager – pro-active orientation on personnel,

budget and internal organization. Administrator – passive administrative role. Policy advisor – professional

policy orientation

Two state secretaries perceived themselves primarily as managers – partly of the

ministry’s agenda and partly as policy advisors in that agenda to the minister. The two state

secretaries view this role as dominant – spending nearly their entire working time on policy

issues and internal management (including budget preparation and personal management).

Both state secretaries agreed that the division of the agenda and responsibilities between the

minister and him (whether each is responsible for own agenda or both are responsible

together for a common agenda) is the best and most efficient approach for dealing with the

broad tasks of a ministry. The particular division of labour between minister and state

secretary depends on the particular minister. Around 15% of working time was spent on

consultations in various governmental advisory bodies or with members of the parliament;

while negotiations for various interests represent another large area of working activities.

Two other state secretaries, however, perceived their roles to be minimal, as they were

responsible for only a very small, low priority part of the policy agenda. They spent little time

on management and policy issues and in their opinion, most, if not all, of the Ministry’s

policy issues were dealt with by the minister (and in one case mostly by a head of the office).

Consequently, these state secretaries spent more time in negotiations and consultations with

colleagues from the parliament and coalitions, as well as at various public events, ranging

from opening a conference to leading press conferences

These different perceptions of the roles of a state secretary only confirm the

ambiguity of the role of the state secretary. As one of the “weak” state secretaries – a deputy

ministry without formal authority or much responsibility – stated “the role and functions of

the state secretary are badly defined in the Slovak legislation." The state secretary is entirely

dependent on a minister and his delegation of authority, responsibilities and tasks –

reflecting the impact of a coalition government tensions reflected in the minister-state

secretary relations. All of the state secretaries, however, regardless of whether they are

strong or weak, felt tremendously the tensions among the coalition partners and complained

how they are reflected in the work of a ministry. One of them stated that “the instability

within the coalition and inability to reach a common decision was always present in a daily

work of the ministry which made the daily routine more difficult”.

General directors perceived themselves as leaders and managers of their respective

area within the ministry, as well as technically competent policy advisors. Four of the

interviewed directors generals were appointed in newly established departments that they had

to staff, set priorities for and develop activities for. One of the respondents noted that a lack

of a predecessor in the newly created department comprised the most attractive part of his

job, as he could establish the department according to his vision, was relatively free to

prepare policies under his supervision (except for budgeting), had given progress reports only

weekly, and could claim credit for his achievements. The majority disliked the

administrative/bureaucratic aspects of their post, particularly related to the exercise of

authority (such as signing enormous amounts of documents). All the respondents viewed

their relationship to the political leadership to be based strictly on their professional expertise.

Heads of the office perceived their role very differently – although such perceptions

have changed since the new Civil Service Law. One head of the office perceived his role to

be administrative (managing the office), while in the case where the minister and state

secretary conflicted, the head of the office assumed de facto the role of a state secretary and

that role was recognized as such widely. He noted that “my minister needs a trustworthy

person so that he can divide the work load and fully concentrate on his part of the portfolio.”

This office head could exercise independent leadership and managed his part of the ministry

(including personnel and policy making processes) while not intervening into inter-ministries

relations. 16

16

This head of the office withdrew from the office after the introduction of the Civil Service Law in April 2002

and publicly announced his planned political career. He urged all the other heads to follow his example –

claiming that withdrawal from the party membership is less transparent than withdrawal from office (and would

not help depoliticise the office). He is currently a minister in the current government, and the state secretary in

Both political and professional senior civil servant perceive themselves, as well as

their counterparts (political or professional), as playing an important role in the policy

making process within the ministry (see Figure 5). The state secretaries have their freedom in

priority setting and decision-making (if provided by the minister), which they perceive to be

the dominant part of their agenda. If such freedom is not provided, they are ignored and do

not take part in the policy making process. One of the state secretaries noted that she felt her

input took only 20% of her time. The director generals felt that they had enough freedom in

priority setting and decision making, particularly for substantive issues – yet had only little

influence on issues beyond their competence. Many of the director generals who came from

the “real world” and started their job only in 1998 perceived such involvement to be to their

advantage because they understand “real” problems and have developed a useful set of

contacts. While they recognized the role of the minister as a decision maker on political

issues, they claimed that ministers are not sufficiently prepared for this role.

Figure 6: Perceptions of Freedom in Priority Setting and Decision Making within

Ministry

Priority setting and Decision making within Ministry

Freedom (percent) Note

Political

minister 100 Pressure within coalition

state secretary 20 - 100 Pressure from minister

Professional

Head of office 20 - 100 Depends from minister

directors general 70 Freedom in substantive issues, priorities

unit head 30 Preparation of background material

Heads of the units stated that they are left out of the policy making and the decision-

making process. They perceive their legitimate role to consist of mainly the administrative

task of preparing documents for their superiors, and some would prefer to have more

professional freedom. These heads complained about artificial deadlines which prevent them

from producing high quality outputs, as well as the over-politicisation of priority setting at

the expense of dealing with the most pressing issues. All the heads of units agreed with the

statement that “for the good of the country, technical considerations must be given more

weight than political factors in policy making.” Perceptions of the heads of units towards

politicians varied among the ministries; some perceived politicians as good leaders endowed

with good management skills and comparable with the best talent in the private sector. Other

heads of units perceived politicians in the opposite light. The ministers’ and state secretaries’

personalities as well as their interaction (which was observed at all levels of the

administration) best explain these differences in perceptions.

Most of the senior officials considered the policy making process to be relatively

effective. The professional civil servants complained about the time pressure and bureaucratic

procedures under which they have to work. They were dissatisfied with the amount of

information at their disposal – particularly with access to information (as they are forced to

spend a long time searching for relevant data) and the lack of capacity to process and analyze

his ministry was also nominated by his party (even though she was not a member of the same party) based on

her technical expertise.

data adequately, and the quality and objectivity of existing analyses at the ministries.

Suggestions for improvement included systematic training that would increase civil service

professionalism, the introduction of a merit-based system of promotion and the introduction

of incentive systems. The improvement of the legislative process and its ‘humanisation’

(preparation of the draft laws based on public needs) were also suggestions for improvement.

Relationships among political and professional senior officials are perceived to be fair

on both sides and better than they used to be. However, both parties list low trust as a key

obstacle in the working relationships. The political senior officials blame professionals for a

lack of technical capacity, and professional senior officials perceive their counterparts to lack

necessary expertise for their work. One reason for low trust may be the continuing

politicisation of the senior official posts (even though both senior officials and also heads of

the units agree about a general decrease of political influence in the execution of tasks and

particularly after the adoption of the Civil Service Law). The majority of the interviewees

blame the weakness of the current Civil Service Law for on-going politicisation, and note that

the Law is insufficient for governing these politico-administrative relations. The instability

and tensions engendered by rule by a broad party coalition may be a second reason for such a

lack of trust. These tensions are reflected within the ministry and are noticeable at even the

third and fourth level of the hierarchy. One head of a unit commented on this situation by

noting that “the way how parties cooperate is mirrored by the co-operation of civil servants.”

A reason for the lack of trust between politicians and professional senior officials is due to

the ambiguous definition of the state secretary’s position – causing shifts in the ministry’s

hierarchy and differing powers between state secretaries (some are ignored and others are

very powerful). As a result, none of the senior officials feel that the government (and thus

also the ministry) works as a team the interests of political parties prevail. The majority of

suggestions for the improvement of relationships between politicians and professional senior

officials centered around creating conditions for greater respect for each other’s work.

Conclusion

The introduction of the Civil Service Law in April 2002 brought clear definitions into

the relations among Slovak political and professional civil servants, and helped to

depoliticize the civil service. The respondents of the public sector perceptions survey noted a

general trend towards building up civil service professionalism. A weakly formulated Civil

Service Law and missing definitions for civil servant responsibilities and roles in other laws,

however, encourage differing interpretations of some posts, most notably the post of state

secretary. As a result, the role of state secretary depends on the minister and his definition,

which can range from acceptance of a state secretary as his deputy, to the marginalisation of

this post. Senior officials and unit heads recognised that coalition government fosters

instability and conflicts between politicians and senior officials, influencing their quality of

work.

References

Beblavy, M. and A. Salner. Eds. (2002). Úspešná a úsporná vláda: Odporúčania pre budúci

kabinet [Policy Options for Efficient and Effective Governing]. Bratislava: SGI.

Final Report on the Findings and Recommendations of the Audit of Financing and Activities

of the Central Authorities of State Administration. (2000). Bratislava: INEKO.

http://www.ineko.sk/english/audit.htm

Legislatívne pravidlá vlády SR č. 241/1997 v znení Uznesenia vlády č. 1118 z decembra

1999 a Uznesenia č. 1130 z novembra 2001 [Legislative rules of the Government as amended

by the Government ruling No. 1118 from 1999 and No. 1130 from 2001].

Malíková, L. and K. Staroňová. (2001). Politico-Administrative relations: The Case of

Slovakia. In Verheijen, T. Ed. Who Rules? Politico-Administrative Relation. Bratislava.

NISPAcee.

Rokovací poriadok vlády SR a Smernica na prípravu a predkladanie materiálov na rokovanie

vlády SR. [Rules of Procedure of the Government and Guidelines for Drafting and Presenting

the Materials for Sessions of the Government of Slovakia].

SIGMA. (2003). Slovakia: Public Service and the Administrative Framework. Assessment

2002. SIGMA Papers.

Staroňová, K. and L. Malikova. (2004, forthcoming). Politico-administrative Relations under

Coalition Governments in Slovakia. In Verheijen T., Vass L. (eds.) Coalition Politics.

Bratislava: NISPAcee.

Staroňová, K. (2002). Developing Policy Making Culture in Slovakia. Research Paper for

Center for Policy Studies, OSI. http://www.policy.hu/staronova

Statutes of the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Heath, Ministry of

Labor and Ministry of Transportation.

Zákon č. 575/2001 Z.z. o Organizácii činnosti vlády a organizácii ústredných orgánov štátnej

správy (tzv. Kompetenčný zákon) [Act No. 575/2001 on the Organization of the activities of

the Cabinet and on the organization of the central institutions of the state administration (so

called Competency Law)].

Zákon č. 312/2001 Z.Z. o Štátnej službe [Act No. 312/2001 on Civil Service].