EP ID E M IC A LE R T A N D RESPO NSE Role of the laboratory in surveillance Sources: WHO Laboratory Training for Field Epidemiologists ECDC -EUPHEM Robert Koch Institute National Reference Center for Listeriosis, Paris Laboratory for Urgent Response to Biological Threats, Paris . Dubois, boratory for Urgent Response to Biological Threats, Institut Pasteur, Paris
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Role of the laboratory in surveillance Sources: WHO Laboratory Training for Field Epidemiologists ECDC -EUPHEM Robert Koch Institute National Reference.
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E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Role of the laboratory in surveillance
Sources: WHO Laboratory Training for Field EpidemiologistsECDC -EUPHEMRobert Koch InstituteNational Reference Center for Listeriosis, ParisLaboratory for Urgent Response to Biological Threats, Paris
Ph. Dubois, Laboratory for Urgent Response to Biological Threats, Institut Pasteur, Paris
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Learning objectives
At the end of the presentation, participants should:
• Understand how the laboratory contributes to epidemiological surveillance
• Understand the principles of laboratory-based surveillance
• Understand some concerns of public health microbiologists
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Laboratories and disease surveillance
Before the outbreak
• Early warning signals
• Outbreak detection
During the outbreak
• Outbreak response and management
In between outbreaks
• Trend monitoring
• Intervention evaluation
• Monitoring progress towards a control objective
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Expected results Laboratory:
• Confirmation of clinical diagnostic:
• Direct identification of the bug
• Serology detection
• Identification of the strain/isolate/subtype
• Identification of new pathogen
• Characterization of pathogen sensitivity to antimicrobials
• Identification of seroconvertants/carriers in populations
• Collection of data/information from patients with various / different geographic origins
• Collection of data/information from environmental or animal origin
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Expected results Surveillance:
• Early warning
• Outbreak detection
• Post-outbreak surveillance
• Environment and reservoir analyses
• Surveillance of eradication-elimination of a bug
• Surveillance of vaccination campaign
• Surveillance of notifiable diseases
• Surveillance of national drug treatment efficacy
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
I - Early warning signals
Detection of pathogens that have potential to spread
Sentinel events requiring early control measures
• Isolation of a single epidemic prone isolate (e.g. non-typhoidal salmonella isolated from a neonate in a hospital neonatal intensive care unit)
• Emergence of resistant strains in the hospital or the community (e.g. multi-drug resistant tuberculosis)
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Outbreak detection by the lab
Identification of a cluster of:
• Infections with an unusual pathogen
• Specific subtype of a pathogen
– Outbreak of antibiotic-resistant strains
– Subtypes of a pathogen (e.g. Shigella dysenteriae type I)
Reference centres may capture outbreaks disseminatedover a large area, or correlate events (food control-
cluster of human cases).
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Listeria monocytogenesGenoserotyping or PCR Group
Profile PCR Group Serovar
1, 5 IIa 1/2a ou 3a
2, 6, 10 IIb 1/2b ou 3b ou 7
3, 7 IIc 1/2c ou 3c
4, 8, 9 IVb 4b ou 4d ou 4e
11-16 LListeria monocytogenes 4a, 4ab, 4c or
other species of Listeria
ORF2819
lmo0737 1000
800 700 600 500 400 300
M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
lmo1118
ORF2110
prs
IIa IIcIIb IVb
Doumith et al. JCM, 2004Doumith et al., J Food Protect 2005
Multiplex PCR : simultaneous PCR on 5 different DNA fragments
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
II - Outbreak confirmation
Epidemiologist captures an increased incidence
Laboratory:
• Confirms the diagnosis
• Allows for a more specific case definition
• Detects a new pathogen
• Provides additional details on the pathogen (e.g., phage type)
Examples : detection H5N1, detection H1N1
Effective participation of the laboratory in surveillancerequires good communication between theepidemiologists and the laboratories
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Laboratory role during outbreaks
Laboratory confirmation of early cases
• On a subset of cases
Identification of new pathogens
Typing of the pathogen
• Link clusters when the epidemiological data is not sufficient
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing to guide treatment
Post-outbreak surveillance
Environmental investigations
Detection of carriers
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Laboratory role during outbreaks
For new and emerging pathogens:
•Identify the pathogen
•Develop laboratory tests
•Patient treatment/managementSARS
Courtesy:The University of Hong Kong
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
III - Monitoring endemic disease trends
Confirm diagnosis
• Case definitions that include laboratory criteria:
Monitor resistance patterns
Monitor subtypes of a pathogen
• Detection Flu viruses subtypes, such as H5N1, H1N1
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Monitoring endemic disease trends
Examples:
Circulating strains of bacterial meningitis
• Impact on treatment protocols
• Impact on immunization policies
Antibiotic resistance
• Methicilin resistant staphylococcus aureus
• Vancomycin resistant enterococcus
• Tuberculosis
• Monitoring of Flu viruses circulation, vaccination policies
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
Year
Num
ber o
f cas
es
C
B
A
Unknown
Source : InVS and NRC for N. meningitis, Pasteur Institute, Paris
Invasive meningococcal infection serogroups by year, France, 1985-2000
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
IV - Eradication/elimination monitoring
The elimination phase requires more specific tests aspositive predictive value decreases
The result of any laboratory test is only as good as the
sample received in the laboratory
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Packaging infectious substances for shipment
Triple packaging system
Infectious substance (BIOHAZARD) label
Container for the first suspected anthrax letter / Berlin
Prof. Matthias Niedrig, RKI
Packaging Specification Marking example: 4H’’/Class 6.2/94 GB/2470 The packaging marking consists of: The United Nations packaging symbol Type of packaging The text “Class 6.2” The last two digits of the year of
manufacture of the packaging State authority manufacturer’s code
• Laboratory biosafety: containment principles, technologies, and practices implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their unintentional release
• Laboratory biosecurity: institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins
• 1Laboratory biosafety manual, Third edition, World Health Organization, 2004)
• System or process to control safety and security risks associated with the handling or storage and disposal of biological agents and toxins in laboratories and facilities
• CWA 15793:2008
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
Developed by the Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response of the World Health Organization with assistance from:
European Program for Intervention Epidemiology Training
Canadian Field Epidemiology Program
Thailand Ministry of Health
Institut Pasteur
Role of laboratory in surveillance
E P I D E M I C A L E R T A N D R E S P O N S E
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
www.enivd.org
The ENIVD-CLRN project is funded by the ECDC under the Framework Service Contract Ref. No. ECDC/2008/011.