Role of Ethnicity in Civil War

GV517-International SecurityStudies

Spring Paper

Assess the role of ethnicity with reference to the outbreak of one recent civil war.

Abstract

From 10th December 2012, Central African Republic has been in a state of turmoil and undeniable unrest. In this paper, we will look at the opposing sides of the current government and the rebel groups in this civil war. We will assess the impact of the Seleka groups and the counterbalance of Christian rebels and investigate if this civil unrest has purely come from the difference in ethnicity. This paper will focus on the CAR conflict and assess the validity of the idea that ethnicity is the cause of recent civil wars.

Key Words: Central African Republic, civil unrest, Seleka, conflict, ethnicity

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1.Introduction

It has been unmistakable that the post-Cold War era has seen a rise of intra-state conflicts; ‘The end of the Cold War has further weakened many third world states as superpowers curtailed their commitments of military and other state-strengthening resources.’1 Thus, highlighting that we are in an era of instability within a nation and that third world countries may suffer from the lack of resources to secure sovereignty. There has been a increase of those rising to power via usage of ethnicity as a tool to mobilise. This paper will focus on the hypothesis that the role of ethnicity is not the cause ofthe conflict itself but more as a tool to mobilise those to support conflict. By understanding causality to civil conflict, it increases the chances of highlighting the symptoms to a full outbreak of civil war in this modern era.

For this paper, we will investigate how influential ethnicity is to the outbreak of a civil conflict-taking place in the 21st Century. Wimmer, Cederman et al. (2002) claim that ‘ethnic and nationalist claims play an important role in many of today’s most prominent civil wars.’2 This paper will assess whether ethnicity plays a role in today’s conflict and if it does how significant

1 Brubaker, Rogers, and David Laitin. "Ethnic and nationalist violence." Annual Review of sociology 24 (1998): 424

2 Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. "Ethnic politics and armed conflict: a configurational analysis of a new global data set." American Sociological Review 74.2 (2009): 316

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is this role. We will also look at the mechanism of ethnicity and focus on the appropriate literature review to examine if ethnicity is a tool for mobilization (Cederman et al, 2007) or whether it is a causation to conflict (Gurr et.al 1994)

For the purpose of this paper, the empirical testing, we will examine the recent Central African Republic conflict3. It is a conflict that has many factors, which include ethnic segregation, rebel militias and extreme poverty. Thus, the paper will look at the root of this conflict and whether a state with a majority of Christians and a minority of Muslims can impact on the rise of civil unrest4. The argument here is that could a population of only 10 percent of another ethnic group cause a conflict with more than 2000 deaths within a year.

The hypothesis of this paper will be the thesis that civil war occurs not only because of the role of ethnicity but the influence of other factors, which in the case of Central African Republic, is the mismanagement of state resources (Horowitz, 1985), impactof violent neighbours (Baldwin, 1993) and the role of armed non-state actors (Bruderlein, 2000). Nevertheless, there is evidence that ethnic segregation and ethnic tension has mobilized the fear of threats to civil society, thus, causing the conflict to endure for longer.However, it would be naïve to believe that ethno-nationalism does not take place in politics today, but

3 The Central African Republic conflict, for the purpose of this paper, started in December 2012 and is still ongoing today.

4 According to the 2003 census, the total population was 3,151,072; out of which only 10% were Muslim (Kettani, Houssain. "Muslim Population in Africa: 1950—2020." International Journal of Environmental Science and Development 1 (2010): 137)

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the question is whether it is the sole cause to intrastate conflict.

2.Terminology: Understanding Civil War

In this section of the paper, we will investigate whetherethnicity plays an important role to the political elitesto take advantage of this symbolic power for political gains to territory and power (Cornell and Hartmann 1998) or whether the role of ethnicity has become ‘politicized’5

and is a causation for civil conflict.

To understand the importance of ethnicity as a factor of civil conflict, it is an imperative to understand the terminology itself. Horowitz’s (1985) explains that ethnic groups are defined by particular differences, whether it is ‘colour, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof… This is an inclusive concept of ethnicity.’ 6 It is also significant to understand that not all conflicts that increase the use of the terminology of ‘ethnicities’ is a form of ethnic war (Sambanis 2001).

Firstly, it is important to understand the criteria for civil war. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) de ne a civil war asfia con ict that (1) has caused more than 1,000 battle fldeaths; (2) has challenged the sovereignty of a state; (3) occurred within the boundaries of a state; (4) involved the state as a participant; and (5) involved rebels who launched a campaign that opposed the state and5 Roessingh M.A. 1996. Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension. Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 5

6 This coincides with the notion of tribes, races, nationalities and casts (Horowitz 1985, 17-18), which is particularly important as it corresponds with the imperative study of the CAR conflict.

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could in ict casualties. This is important to note as it flcould be the difference from ethnic hatred crimes and thestate overpowering opposition. For the purpose of ethnic conflict, this would entail that a particular ethnic group has claimed opposition to the current government and more than 1000 battle deaths have occurred from both opposing ethnic groups.7 3.The Role of Ethnicity in Civil War

In recent literature, there have been on-going papers claiming that ethnic conflict derives from the thesis of calculations being made on succession. Collier & Hoeffler(2000) Fearon & Laitin (2000) highlight the view of civilwar as rational actors making rational decisions8 to proceed to war. This is a measurement that accounts for the cost of potential rebels evaluating ‘their expected gains from war, given their grievances, and compare theseexpected gains to the expected losses, which include the opportunity costs of foregoing productive economic activity.’9 Collier, Hoeffler, Fearon and Laitin (2000)

7 In the case of the CAR conflict, there has been a reported 2000 deaths, 400 000 people have been internally displaced compared to 94000 in the year before. Also to note, 65 000 have fled to Democratic Republic of Congo. In reference to Doyle and Sambanis (2000), there have been campaigns from the Muslim rebel militia, Seleka as well as the campaign launched by the Christian rebel group,Anti- Balaka. Therefore, there is a credible threat to the fear of genocide occurring in Central African Republic, due to these ethnic clashes. By using the understanding of Doyle and Sambanis (2000) in classification of civil war, CAR conflict understandable meets the criteria. [seen in UNHRC figures]

8 In this neo-realist perception, it explains the concept that not all-civil conflict arises from ethnicity, as it is a calculated decision and those fearing much bigger losses than gains will refrainfrom creating civil conflict.

9 Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.3 (2001): 268

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emphasize on the notion that this could explain particular ethnic wars.

As Moynitian (1993) claims, ‘the world was entering a period of ethnic conflict,’ and as there has been a loss of large ideological structures, ‘people would revert back to more primal identities.’10 An argument for ethnicity playing an important role to conflict is the idea that there is a joint ‘social and cultural characteristics11’ to one group and the idea of ‘belonging’12 to a certain group. This builds on the senseof ethno-nationalism and protecting this group against any threat to their power. The notion of fear is portrayed within civil conflict and that fear derives from another ethnic group with political power. The crux of an ethnic conflict is that there is ‘cultural incompatibility of groups coupled with a sudden rise of awareness of one’s identity,’13 which entwines the notion of access to information and use of propaganda of ethnic division.14 Thus, it creates an ideology of being in conflict to protect the ethnicity not the nation. Therefore, if an ethnic group is discriminated against, persecuted or there is propaganda against this group,

10 Vuckovic, Gojko. Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Disintegration: the Case of Yugoslavia. Ashgate, 1997.

11 Cornell S. & Hartmann D. 1998. Ethnicity and race: Making Identities in a Changing World. Pine Forge Press: London, 7

12 Kellas J.G. 1998. Second edition. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Macmillan Press Ltd:London. 6

13 Roessingh M.A. 1996. Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension. Amsterdam University Press: Amsterdam, 17

14 This loyalty to a certain ethnic group could build on the sense that the citizens have a closer tie to the ethnicity than the nation itself. (Moynitian 1993)

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this will create a breeding group for civil conflict and could lead to civil war.

To review the role of ethnicity in civil conflict, an important concept to understand is ‘ethnic grievance.’15 This comes from the notion of Grievance/Greed model suggested by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) where ethnic andreligious fractionalization occurs; ‘inter-group hatreds must be greater in societies, which are fractionalized than in those, which are homogenous. However, such hatreds need not be monotonic in fractionalization because polarized societies may generate more tensions than highly fractionalized societies.’16 This introduces many concepts of the impact of societies where social unrest has a greater risk. It highlights that the likeliness of war is likely in a state with ethnic bipolarized communities,17 where there is directly two competing groups for the control of resources.18 Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also heighten the argument of 15 Wolff (2006) highlights that in the case of Kosovo, the Albanian population fought for ‘their right to self-determination’ and to not feel like second-class citizens in their homeland, which highlights acause for ethnic division within one nation. This builds on the senseof irredentism and that sense of not belonging to the nation.

16 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and grievance in civil war." Oxford economic papers 56.4 (2004): 580

17 A clear example of ethnic bipolarity is seen in Rwanda before the 1997 Rwandan Genocide. Afflitto (2000) points out that Hutu nationalists tried to ‘point out the perceived dangers of Tutsi domination’ therefore there are two ethnic groups clashing for political power. This is a grave issue as it causes civil conflict and in this case, it had caused genocide to a terrifying level. [For more information see in Afflitto, Frank M. "Victimization, survival and the impunity of forced exile: a case study from the Rwandan genocide." Crime, Law and Social Change 34.1 (2000): 77]

18 Taras & Ganguly (2006) highlight that ethnic grievance is a notion that if an ethnic group is demised, it allows another ethnic group to become the ruling elite.

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polarization, 19 and its effect on the impact of civil war. A theoretical argument presented in this paper is that if bipolarity or fractionalized society occurs with a resemblance of weak political institutions, this greatly increases the role of ethnicity in civil conflict. Thus, making the role of ethnicity within a warring nation greatly to increase.20 Collier and Hoeffler(2004) build on a sense that ethnic grievance can increase tensions within a society and thus increasing the risk to civil conflict as it creates a threats to rights and builds on the sense of fear.

Civil society21 is also a concept that should be developedin this paper with regards to ethnic tension and ethnic civil wars.22 Collier and Hoeffler (2001) highlights that a civil society reduces the chances of ethnic-driven conflict as it protects ethnic identities. To agree with this, Colomer (2001) suggests the importance of inclusiveness in the political system. This builds on therights of political and civil rights and protecting this will reduce the risk of disputes. Sambanis (2001) 19 This is when one ethnic group has 50 percent of the majority in one civil society.

20 To add to this, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argues that highly polarized societies tend to have radical changes in economic policies, which results in uncertainty and, therefore, in low levels of investment as those who come to power is through sporadic and volatile means. In addition to this, macroeconomic policies are in favour of benefitting the elite’s self interest, hence, the increase in instability of the decision-making process.

21 For the purpose of this paper, ‘civil society’ is the term used todescribe ‘to refer to a rule-governed society in which the ruler putsthe public good before his (not usually her) private interest’ which is found in Kaldor, Mary. "Civil society and accountability." Journal of Human Development 4.1 (2003): 6

22 This is because civil society enables the protection of citizens regardless of their ethnicity, wealth, gender or religion.

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suggests that this is due to the fact ethnic grievance isexacerbated by the lack of political and civil rights. There is an absence of unity in the political system withall ethnicities and also the lack of a platform for all views to be expressed. To build on this further, Wolff (2006) explores the impact of direct ‘discriminatory political institutions’ 23 that oppose the concept of civil society. Another cause for concern is the regime type of the country in question; the key argument is thatby failing to protect democratic rights by an effective regime, there is a threat to individual’s identity.24 Thus, the thesis being that it could be perceived that ethnicity is a factor in civil conflict, however in actual fact it is the regime type causing a failure to protect certain identities. This is to pursue policies that deliberately disadvantage members of society from a particular ethnic group. This treatment of a particular ethnicity could cause ill feelings and hinder the progression towards equality and peace within a nation.

4.Other Grievances

It is important to feature that although there are multiple reviews regarding ethnicity playing a big role in civil conflict, it is naïve to believe that there are 23 Wolff, Stefan. Ethnic Conflict. Oxford University Press, 2006. 69

24 This can result in being a flawed democracy, Hegre et. al. (1999) explains war as the result of political grievance and opportunity forviolence. They show that countries at the middle of the autocracy-democracy spectrum are ‘most at risk of civil war because they are neither autocratic enough to suppress any opportunity for rebellion, nor democratic enough to prevent significant grievance.’ This indicates that the regime of a given state has an impact of the civilunrest and that could have more of an impact that ethnicity. The regime itself heightens a breeding ground for civil unrest as it allows a mobilization of opposition to the state and yet civilians are repressed.

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no other arguments regarding civil conflict; ‘The combination of creed, greed and grievances exacerbated bypoor leadership, particularistic interest and spill-oversfrom conflict in neighbouring countries.’25 Therefore, underlining that there are multiple causes for civil conflict. In this section of the paper, we will discuss the influence of other leading arguments from political theorists to the causality to civil wars other than ethnicity as the main role. The following sections will discuss the impact of weak institutions, the impact of the political regime and the influence of warring nationsthat a state is bordered to. This should develop the argument further on the impact of ethnicity and other potential causes of the outbreak of war.

I. Weak Institutions and Impact of Political Corruption

Many scholars identify a key factor to civil conflict to be the effectiveness of institutions, which specifically looks at the Executive, the judiciary and the bureaucracy. (Persson et. al 1997) The idea being that ifthese institutions fail to work effectively, forms of corruption can occur. 26 There are multiple forms of corruption that can take place, however, for this paper we will identify particular forms of corruption that can marginalise certain sects of the population (Miyint 2000). The reason being that many scholars such as

25 Wolff, 2006, 63

26 For the purpose of this paper, we will look at political corruption which accounts for any transaction between private and public sector actors through which collective goods are illegitimately converted into private-regarding payoffs (Heidenheimeret. al.1993). To build on this further, it is the term used for when ‘political decision-makers use the political power they are armed with, to sustain their power, status and wealth.’ (Amundsen, Inge. "Political corruption: An introduction to the issues." CMI Working Paper (1999; 3)

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Johnston (2005), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Knack (1995) argue that corruption can cause huge inequalities within a society via marginalising the weak and favouring the elite. This in turn can cause disparities within a state,which eventually will cause unrest and mass dissatisfaction.

To further this argument, Nye (1967) argues that the increase of inequality caused by corruption heightens theplight of social revolution27 or military coups with people dissatisfied with their current political regime. This directly highlights the argument that weak institutions cause an increase to corruption, which decreases political development.28 Although Nye (1967) indicates that social revolution increases political development there is a clear indication that military coups29 hinder political development as it gives the powerto those who are unelected, known for being aggressive and obtain military power.

27 An example of this occurring in the recent era is the Tunisian revolution that started 17th December 2010 highlighted tension raisingso much over corrupt officials that the people demanded change after Mohamed Bouazizi ‘set himself on fire outside the building of the local officials who had abused him.’ Highlighting that there is a limit to the level of abuse the population can take. (Huffington Post; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cobus-de-swardt/a-year-after-corruption-i_b_1174219.html; accessed 05/02/2014)

28 From the works of J.S Nye (1967), political development will mean the ‘growth (or decline) in the capacity of a society’s governmental structures and processes to maintain their legitimacy over time.’ It could be argued that political corruption hinders the perspective of democracy by reducing the legitimacy of its institutions and thus,that is a devastating effect of political corruption.

29 Nye (1967) argues that in the case of Ghana, corruption had playeda role of being the causation to military coups where the corruption had hindered the economy so greatly that real wages had fallen drastically, especially for the soldiers

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To understand this theory and its merits, it is importantto highlight examples of corruption. Political extortion is the term used to describe ‘politicians [that] may maximize returns by threatening expropriation of existingprivate rents and then forbear implementation of the threat in exchange for a payoff.’ 30 McChesney (1997) further highlights that political extortion ‘need not be cash’ 31 and it could be in the form of buying voting support or suppressing future opponents from running in elections.32 This rent-seeking, predatory policy deliberately targets the weak, which can cause mass anguish and harms the national identity. Thus, highlighting a form of corruption causing marginalization.

A final form of political corruption is the use of patronage33 and nepotism.34 Arguably, this is more likely to take place in those states that lack in strong institutions and are recently formed states.35 The reason 30 McChesney, Fred S. Money for nothing: politicians, rent extraction, and political extortion. Harvard University Press 1997.

31 McChesney 1997.

32 Extortion plays on the insecure individuals that have very little option but to comply, it is at its worse when it is from the highest level of public office. It could be said that flawed democracies and non-democratic states have a risk for this occurring as it lacks in the rule of law.

33 For the purpose of this paper, ‘patronage’ is the use of state resources to reward individuals for their political support. It is not only inclusive to monetary funds but also could be the reward of security, job prosperity or high public official roles.

34 Nepotism is the term used for favoring job positions not based on merit but based on close family, kinship or clan ties.

35 Alence (2004) argues that this is the case as these states have ‘the strongest temptations for governments to jeopardies their own countries' developmental prospects are rooted in political

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for this being that states that are ‘facing imminent threats to their hold on power often have shorter time horizons and are more preoccupied with placating the specific groups most pivotal to their survival.’ 36 An argument to bear in mind is that if the ruling elite belongs to one ethnic group, patronage and nepotism will deliberately increase job opportunities to those of this particular ethnicity, thus, there is an argument that corruption can cause ethnic tension to increase.

Nevertheless, a more compelling argument about the consequences of corruption is that corruption greatly hinders economic development. Fearon and Laitin (2000) argue that the determinants of insurgency are mainly economic and not political; ‘the outbreak of internal wars is commonly attributed to poverty.’ 37 This grievanceis in regards to the development of that given nation andthe empirical evidence to poverty and lack of employment;‘individuals should choose to allocate their time in between working in the legal job market or working in criminal activity in such a way it maximises their utility.’38 Therefore, causing a greater number of recruits to armed non-state actors.39 With this extensive

insecurity’ in "Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa." The Journal of Modern African Studies 42.2 (2004):

36 Alence, Rod. "Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-Saharan Africa." The Journal of Modern African Studies 42.2 (2004): 166

37 Blattman, Christopher, and Edward Miguel. "Civil war." Journal of Economic Literature (2010): 4

38 Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. "Does poverty cause terrorism?." The New Republic 226.24 (2002): 28

39 In the case of Yemen, it is clear to see that poverty caused by water depletion increases the power of terrorist organisation and theinflux of recruitment of rebel groups as Yemen has very low economic growth and prosperity. It also has the highest death rate per 1000 people with seven deaths. In consequence of this is the fact life

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study highlighting that poverty may have a greater impactthan cultural differences highlights the counter-argumentto ethnicity having a vast impact to the civil war. With greater levels of economic development, there is a sense that this will increase the cost of war, which entails would make war less desirable. However, if corruption affects economic growth, there is an underlining cause todecrease the cost of war. Thus, increasing the likelinessof civil conflict. Very high corruption not only damages institutions even further, its main consequence in regards to causing civil conflict is that it increases inequality and hinders civil society and without this basis, the chance of civil unrest is imminent. Also, the level of poverty will increase if there is a misallocation of resources and a direct misuse of power.

II. Warring Neighbours

It is also important to highlight that the region itself can have an impact to the outbreak of civil war, which isfar more significant than just the ethnicity alone. Collier (2003) suggests a key concept that civil wars have a ‘ripple effect’40 to the region and this can affectthe likeliness of the outbreak to civil war. Neighboring ethnic groups in particular may become involved in ethnicconflicts in other countries (Lake and Rothchild 1996), such as omnibalancing41. Therefore, although ethnicity

expectancy is also the lowest in the Middle East with only 64 years old. This could be the cause of the rising number of armed non-state actors in the region.

40 Collier, Paul. Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. WorldBank Publications, 2003.

41 Reinhold (2001) best describes omnibalancing as a process where a state balances the power within a region via assisting non-state actors causing a threat to power domestically to foreign powers. A case of this occurring is seen in Pakistan and the alignment with Taliban in Afghanistan.

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plays a role in civil conflict, a more compelling argument is whether there is regional stability (Forsberg2009; Conversi 1993; Deutsch 1969) A compelling argument to the assessment of ethnicity within a civil conflict is to assess whether it is a country that borders other conflicting nations. This tests the theory of the domino effect,42 contagion and theimpact on ‘bad neighborhoods’43 on the impact of civil war. It is important to note that studies have found neighbouring civil wars increase a state’s risk of civil conflict44 (Sambanis 2001, Gleditsch 2002 & Hegre 2003). Collier (2003) highlights that ‘neighboring con ict may fltrigger previously dormant grievances between domestic groups, inspire domestic groups to start making more extreme demands (similar to those of one of the ghting fifactions in its neighbouring country),’ 45 which is shown by Bosker (2010) where there was significant evidence that we nd that ‘neighboring ethnic civil war increases fithe probability of a civil war onset by 4 percentage points. There is no evidence that non-ethnic civil wars

42 For the purpose of this paper, ‘Domino effect refers to a movementof structural and international changes brought about by the emulation of successful independence movements,’ [as seen in Conversi, Daniele. "Domino effect or internal developments? The influences of international events and political ideologies on Catalan and Basque nationalism." West European Politics 16.3 (1993): 246]

43 Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.3 (2001): 259-282.

44 This is due to a number of factors, which includes mass exodus to neighbouring countries, an increased refugee intake within an unstable country and the added balance of threat to that given state.

45 Bosker, Maarten, and Joppe De Ree. Ethnicity and the spread of civil war. Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2010.

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carry any spill over risks.’ 46 This shows that there is significance in the thesis by Collier (2003), Hegre (2003) and Gleditsch (2002) that conflicts can spill over.47

Nevertheless, it is important to note this is only significant if there is an ethnic role in the civil conflict. As Bosker (2010) highlights, this could be a consequence of the triggering of domestic ethnic grievances and the heightened campaign efforts to demand change. The fact that if there is a weak state already, problems will be exacerbated if neighbouring states fall to the hands of civil war. Sambanis (2001) also highlights that the level of democracy in neighbouring countries lower the probability of war as there is interference to stop the progression of an outbreak of civil war. This is partly down to a democracy’s own self-interest in economic growth and prosperity. The cost of war is greatly increased to a democratic state due to economic inter-dependence and if there were a neighbouring nation at the brink of war, there would be agreater sense of urgency to mediate talks.

5.Empirical Study: Central African Republic

46 Bosker, Maarten, and Joppe De Ree, 2010.

47 To further this argument, the Kenyan-Somali conflicting zones could suggest this. For example, More than 560,000 Somali refugees are estimated to reside in Kenya at present (Sheikh, 2010). The increase in refugee populations coincided with several conflicts in the Northeast region of Kenya, predominately in areas relatively outside of governmental control and close to the Somali border. Laos,to note, weak governmental structures have hindered security and had witnessed an even more porous border (particularly due the demise of the Somali nation-state). This led to becoming heavily militarized and influx of the illegal arms trade. [See in http://www1.american.edu/ted/ICE/somalia-rainfall.html; accessed 04/03/2014]

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To test this hypothesis effectively, it is crucial to analyse the literature with empirical evidence. For the purpose of this paper, we will examine the current Central African Republic conflict and assess the factors involved within this civil war. Although we could date back further, for precision, this paper will focus on theconflict linking to this civil war. By assessing the CARconflict, it is important to understand whether violent clashes have occurred sporadically or whether there have been specific attacks to particular ethnicities. For thisempirical testing, we will evaluate whether ethnicity, regime type, effectiveness of institutions or regional disputes have played a role in the CAR conflict. Finally,we will examine the impact of ethnicity and evaluate whether ethnicity was the main factor to drive this tragic conflict.48

II. Factors in the CAR Conflict

48 Overview of the current CAR ConflictIn November 2012, a loose alliance of roughly 5000 namely Muslimrebels known as Séléka overran the northern and central parts of theCAR; by March 2013 they had reached the capital, Bangui. They seizedpower and installed the first Muslim leader in the Christian majoritycountry. Séléka-appointed Michel Djotodia took over power in March2013. He suspended the constitution and the parliament and ran agovernment of rebels. In September 2013, Djotodia announced that theSéléka dissolved. However, most rebels refused to disband and disarmwhich led to more violence and chaos. Ultimately, Djotodia steppeddown and was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui.She faces the difficult mission of bringing warring faction todialogue, while also containing the humanitarian crisis, which isaffecting more than half the population. It is an estimated 10percent of the 4.6million people had to flee their villages andtowns. This crisis is said to have affected nearly every member ofthe CAR. In November last year the UN warned that the country was atrisk of spiraling into genocide; within a month the Security Councilhas backed a mandate to “restore order in CAR by all necessary means”as the sense of a region spiraling out of control was occurring.

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Firstly, it is an imperative to underline the fact that the opposing sides of this conflict are the Muslim and Christian militias. Therefore, at a glance, there is clear evidence of an ethnic divide. The UN have reported that 130,000 to 145,000 Muslims normally live in the capital, Bangui, however, that population had been reduced to around 10,000 in December and now stands at less than 900. Thus, clearly highlighting segregation based on ethnicity.49 This clearly indicates a conflict arising against particular ethnicities in CAR.

To understand this further, we should examine the eventsleading to the outbreak of the civil war. Under PresidentPatassé, in 2001, there had been an unsuccessful coup attempt50 by the Yakoma group. This had led to a ‘wave of extra-judicial killings by security forces’ 51 of the Yakoma ethnicity, which spread the fear of persecution for the Muslim community in the southern region. As highlighted in the literature, ‘the crackdown on the rebels took the form of a brutal and largely indiscriminate attack on Yakoma in general.’52 This

49 It has also been reported that Bangui neighbourhoods such as PK5

had a Muslim population of 7000 that after the outbreak of civil war has dwindled down to just 1000. [see David Smith, ‘Christian militias take bloody revenge on Muslims in Central African Republic,’ The Guardian found in http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/10/central-african-republic-christian-militias-revenge (accessed: 03/03/2014)

50 On the night of 28-29 May 2001 President Patassé’s residence was attacked by up to 100 heavily armed rebels. (As seen in Agence FrancePresse [Bangui/Paris], May-June 2001)

51 Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Droitsde l’homme en République centrafricaine: discours et réalité: un fossé béant, Paris, 13 February 2002

52 Melly, Paul. "Central African Republic–uncertain prospects." UNHCR Emergency and Security Service, WRITENET Paper 14 (2001).

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underlines ethnic grievance, which led to the rise of François Bozizé who in 2003 had overthrown the governmentand became the first Muslim leader.53 This assessment highlights that the persecution of the Yakoma men in the southern region caused segregation and an increase in mistrust to the state. To build on this further, minorities are at risk of being disenfranchised if they are ‘systematically deprived of their status and denied access to public goods- jobs, education, healthcare,’ 54 which had occurred of the Muslim minority in the Northernregion after the persecution of Muslim men in 2001. However, as quoted in the literature, the rise of one ethnicity due to the demise of another will in fact causeproblems for a later period (Collier 2003), which is evident in today’s CAR civil war as Christian militias attempt to eradicate the Muslim population. Those who hadbeen oppressed by a Muslim leader are now attempting revenge on the Muslim community and caused an outbreak ofcivil war.

Nevertheless, it is also important to note to influence of resources in connection with ethnicity in CAR.55 Since 2001, rebels from Seleka have controlled the output and flow of the diamond industry56 in northern CAR. The Muslim53 As Cornell S. & Hartmann D. (1998) highlight, the sense of belonging to one ethnic group builds ties and if that group feels threatened, many will react to this threat and cause social tension.

54 Wolff, Stefan. Ethnic Conflict. Oxford University Press, 2006. 67

55 Greed/ Grievance: Peak danger of a country at risk is at 33% of GDP produced by resources. The risk of conflict will be at 22% whereas without resource dependent, the risk would be at 1%

56 It should be noted that the diamonds are alluvial, which means they are easily extractable. Also, it is recorded that 80,000-100,000unlicensed minors are in CAR using simple tools such as picks and shovels to extract diamonds. This required little capital to invest in and are easy access to rebel militias.

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rebels control the diamond industry by taking the diamond-producing areas around Sam Ouandja, Ouadda, Ndele, Bamingui and Briaand. It has been claimed that by enriching a particular ethnicity with resources can in fact increase the duration of civil conflict and also acquire rebel militias with funds to obtain weaponry and arms.57 This is further developed by the actions of Bozizein keeping ‘control of the diamond sector to enrich and empower his own ethnic group but does little to alleviatethe poverty that drives informal miners to dig in perilous conditions.’ 58 This highlights that the level ofpolitical corruption that has taken place under Bozize increases the likeliness of conflict, as there is enormous disparities of wealth and allocation of resources to the population and his policies leading to ‘jealous individuals and disenfranchised groups to take up arms for a bigger slice of the cake,’ 59 heightens the argument that ethnicity has had a role in the outbreak ofcivil war in CAR. There is a high level of corruption for one particular group under Bozize and as shown in theliterature, which causes hindrance to political development and extends the consequences of a misuse of power and emphasises social tension.

Nevertheless, an overriding factor is the level of poverty in this state and the state of the economy60 to 57 To underline this further, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), which is a Muslim militia group, have expanded their illegal diamond mining in an attempt to control the entire diamond industry in CAR.

58 International Crisis Group; Dangerous Little Stones: DIAMONDS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Africa Report N°167 – 16 December 2010

59 International Crisis Group; Dangerous Little Stones: DIAMONDS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; Africa Report N°167 – 16 December 2010, i

60 The population is now facing a food crisis; the UN estimates thata quarter of the population urgently needs food aid and more than

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effectively assess this impact to the outbreak of civil war. CAR suffers from poor infrastructure, high inflation and is classed as a low-income state. In 2001, life expectancy was at World’s lowest of 49 years old,61 51 percent of the population had access to clean safe water and 62 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. 62 For a country that is enriched in naturalresources and has a small population of 4.525 million, this is extremely worrying as it highlights the state of the economy and the mismanagement of resources. Fearon and Laitin (2000) highlight that when the opportunity costs are significantly low and ethnic grievance occurs, there is a correlation with an increase to civil war. This indicates that there is a concoction of factors taking place for civil war. By the standard of living being so low in CAR, the opportunity cost to civil war isconsiderably low. CAR clearly suggests the Greed/ Grievance model where individuals are motivated by grievance63 at a widespread scale and there is high opportunity to be recruited. These economic factors

half require humanitarian assistance. Medicins Sans Frontiers hasreported that many of the children displaced by the conflict arefacing malaria and respiratory problems as a result of unacceptableliving conditions. At the moment, casualties include almost 1 millioninternally displaced persons, out of which 60% are children. TheAfrican Union is set to deploy 3600 extra troops by early 2014 butthe international community has been accused by aid organisations ofarriving too late.

61 CAR is one of the least developed and poorest countries in the world, holding the title with the lowest life expectancy between 2009and 2012. [World Bank Data]

62 World Bank Data, http://data.worldbank.org/country/central-african-republic (assessed 10/03/2014)

63 People are not dependent on the state’s stability for their livelihoods, which suggests there is an opportunity as well as low cost to entice the population to mobilize and attempt to overthrow the current regime.

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suggest that those on a low-income wage have higher grievance and there is very little job opportunity to change this level of poverty.

Another factor to note within this conflict is the authoritarian rule and the lack of strong institutions.64 With CAR consisting of 60 ethnic groups, authoritarian rule greatly hinders the equality of each individual. Theconstant turnover of power by armed militias heightens the argument that by lacking democratic structures and equality of the political power to individuals hinders civil society. By announcing political suppression, thereis a constant threat to power to autocratic leaders. Thisin fact leads to constant suppression and few attempts toco-opt. In the case of CAR, by failing to meet the requirements of the Seleka group, such as the agreement to recognize Seleka and had disbanded the group,65 Bozize lost his legitimacy to rule. This severely exacerbates ethnic division and although ethnicity has a role, the lack of legitimacy and power of the political elite heightens the outbreak of civil war. Not only does this affect civil rights, it also affects the rule of law and decreases chances of prosperity. Armed rebels can use weak institutions as a tool to de-stabilize the country further and remove leaders.

Finally to note, is whether violent neighbours have an impact of the CAR conflict. It could be argued that this has had a major role in the combatting of the war. By 64 Since independence from France, CAR has experienced ten coup attempts, several military purges and mass corruption in the high ranks. [see ;Decalo, Samuel. "Military coups and military regimes in Africa." Journal of Modern african studies 11.1 (1973): 105-27]

65 This event led to an outbreak of war and by lacking in stable institutions, the military and armed non-state actors threaten the right to rule.

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being land-locked by Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and Sudan, there has been an influx of refugees.66 This would not be a factor if this population remained neutralto the conflict however many peacekeepers from the African Union belonged to Muslim ethnicity from Chad. This has further intensified the conflict as the Christian population witnesses an influx of ‘Muslim fighters.’ By CAR being in a volatile region, the lack ofstable neighbours causes interference to the conflict andthe lack of control between borders increases the chancesof contagion and spillover effect.67 The northern region of CAR is also ungoverned territory, which allows training to take place for recruiting armed militias.68 Sambanis (2001) highlights that ‘uncontrolled domestic ethnic antagonisms’69 occurs with warring neighbours, he highlights that ‘good neighbours, by contrast, are able to help neighbouring states overcome their political problems, offering guarantees and mediation that preventsconflict escalation’70 but in this case Chad had in fact sided with the Muslim militias and had escalated the conflict. It could also be argued that economically, a 66 By the end of 1979, 1000 Chadian refugees had entered Central African Republic in the same period 97,000 had entered Zaire, also another neighbouring state. [see in Adepoju, Aderanti. "The dimension of the refugee problem in Africa." African Affairs (1982): 29]

67 An example of this is the fact that after being overruled, Bozize received sanctuary and support from Chadian government.

68 By having an ungoverned region in the state bordering a conflict zone would only but hinder the process to peace and increase the duration of conflict as it supplies recruitment and increases the opportunity to fight in conflict. (Rabassa 2007)

69 Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.3 (2001):

70 Sambanis, Nicholas. "Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the same causes? A theoretical and empirical inquiry (Part 1)." Journal of Conflict Resolution 45.3 (2001)

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warring nation in close proximity would hinder economic development and growth, thus, decreasing the cost of war to an armed non-state actor.

6. Evaluation

To evaluate this empirical study effectively it is important to identify the causes of the CAR conflict. This section will evaluate which factors had in fact caused the conflict and whether ethnicity plays the biggest role.

The evidence highlights that there were many causes to the CAR civil war outbreak. The greatest issue that is clearly shown is the misuse of power and the consequencesof grand corruption. In each political regime in CAR, there had been vast corruption and grave inequalities. This came in the form of the political elite favouring the few and neglecting the mass, which the consequence being the disparity of rights in the country. It heightened fear between ethnicities in the society and itangered many by disenfranchising the mass. Political corruption purposely weakens institutions and therefore, the evaluation of this paper is that political corruptioncaused the trigger for this conflict with failing to address regional concerns, building strong institutions and developing the country economically.

Nevertheless, this is not to say that ethnicity has not played a role in the outbreak of civil conflict in CAR. The role of ethnicity in this conflict is the fact that it was used as a tool to mobilise those who have been angered by the regime. The mass marginalization of Muslims and Christians in CAR has been devastating to theindividual. The reason why this paper does not agree withethnicity being the main reason for conflict is due to the fact the Muslim community only makes up 15 percent of

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the entire country. Therefore, bipolarization has not occurred, which has been seen in places such as Rwanda and DRC. However, instead due to the poor autocratic leaders and their lack of consideration for weak institutions, ethnicity was used to increase recruitment to armed militias. Therefore, ethnicity is a tool not thecause for the conflict.

Also, the empirical evident suggests that neighbouring countries, such as Chad and Sudan, have weakened the region dramatically. Warring neighbours weaken prosperitythus causing a decline in economic growth in CAR. This hinders trade and yet again decreases the cost of war to the individual. Omni-balancing has also been used in thisconflict, which fuels tensions even further. If there hadbeen stable neighbours, it could be suggested that this conflict would have had a platform to mediate opposing views rather than fighting. Deliberation has not been used and thus, causing a civil conflict.

7. Conclusion

To conclude, it is clearly shown that ethnicity has a role in particular conflict; however, it is not the biggest factor to civil conflict. The empirics show that the role of ethnicity is a powerful tool to recruit soldiers, fighters and illegal miners to fund arms. In this case, to some extent, ethnic grievance has occurred and this had led to a mobilization of the Muslim population as well as the Christian population, which is shown in the literature. However, it is not down to the ethnicity of its people that solely caused civil war. Very weak institutions, the impact of the diamond industry and the level of political corruption taking place show the causal effects for the CAR conflict. Thesedeep-rooted problems have led to grand scale disenfranchisement and escalate the steps to civil war.

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Therefore, although ethnicity plays a role to the fighting of this war, it is not the cause of the war. At a glance, it could be argued that this is an ethnic war and genocide is a grave concern however, the main cause of this is the lack of economic and political prosperity in Central African Republic.

A policy recommendation for this paper is that crucial mediation talks are required for those who are marginalized to reduce the risk of civil war. It has beenproven that once Seleka had been given the right to be recognized, there had been periods of peace and prosperity. However, without those strong institutions toensure equality for all and allow mediation, conflict will always arise. It is also an imminent fact that corruption on any scale will further risk development of peace. Not only will this decrease economic growth and stability of the economy, but also in the long term it will lower the effectiveness of the state and ensure security. The evidence highlights that if the cost of waris so low, war will be likely. Therefore, a recommendation is to ensuring peace is to decrease grievances and increase the cost of war. This involves stopping illegal arms trade, punishing those who are violent and criminalizing political corruption. The use of co-optation will ensure that there is a reduced opportunity to combat in war, which can be achieved via investing in education, health and standards of living. By moving passed the idea of ethnicity being the main factor, this could solve to the deep-rooted issues ratherthan touching the surface of civil conflicts to reduce the opportunity for this to occur again.

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