Roe Handbook Eng May 2011 Print Run

8/2/2019 Roe Handbook Eng May 2011 Print Run

1/99

SANREMO HANDBOOKON

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Prepared under the auspices of the International Institute of

Humanitarian Law, Sanremo

Drafting Team

Commander Alan ColeUnited Kingdom Royal Navy

Major Phillip DrewCanadian Forces

Captain Rob McLaughlinRoyal Australian Navy

Professor Dennis MandsagerCaptain, JAGC, U.S. Navy (Retired)

U.S. Naval War CollegeEditor and Project Coordinator

Sanremo, November 2009

This handbook does not necessarily represent the views of either the International Instituteof Humanitarian Law or the government of any member of the drafting team


2/99

ii

FOREWORD

The Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement is intended to continue in the same veinas previous well-known Sanremo publications such as the Sanremo Manual on InternationalLaw Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, published in 1995 and the Sanremo Manual on

the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, published in 2006.

Published by the Institute as a working tool, the booklet is not intended to state the officialopinions or positions of individual governments nor of specific international organisations onthe different issues considered. Its only aim is to guide the reader and in particular theparticipants in the military courses of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law through the intricacies of the generally accepted and widespread concept of rules ofengagement.

The Handbook reflects the results of a three-year project initiated by Professor DennisMandsager of the United States Naval War College, with the full support of the Institute, whoidentified the need for a common Rules of Engagement reference that could be used by any

nation for training and/or operations. The Handbook was informed by several workshopsconducted at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, plus numerousmultinational exercises and courses, which drew input from highly qualified experts fromdifferent regions of the world. The Handbook, in its current form, reflects best practice fromnations across the globe.

The text has been prepared by Commander Alan Cole RN, Major Phillip Drew, CanadianForces, Captain Rob McLaughlin, RAN and Professor Dennis Mandsager, Captain, JAGC,US Navy (Ret.). The final draft has been reviewed by a team of Council members of theInstitute, composed of Brigadier General Erwin Dahinden, Dr. Baldwin de Vidts, ProfessorWolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Professor Marie Jacobsson, Dr. Michael Meyer andProfessor Michel Veuthey, with the cooperation of Colonel Darren Stewart, Director of the

Military Department of the Institute.

There are no other Handbooks of its type in existence; it has been designed so that it can beused by any nation or group of nations without reference to security caveats or restrictions.Of course this was always the intent, to provide a tool that could be used to facilitate andenhance multinational cooperation and mutual understanding while ensuring that militaryforces are in compliance with national security and policy concerns.

As the political control on the use of force and with that, the use of Rules of Engagement toregulate the conduct of armed forces by individual nations, alliances and coalitions aroundthe world continue to grow, so too the need to be able to train on and understand Rules ofEngagement similarly gains importance. It is essential that a clear understanding exists that

whilst Rules of Engagement are often a mix of military and political policy requirements,these must be bounded by extant international and domestic legal parameters. Such legalconstraints may never be exceeded, but are quite often restricted further by the effect ofRules of Engagement. Too often national or multinational security classifications mean thatthe publication and sharing of Rules of Engagement experience and best practice isproblematic. The ability for militaries to share their experiences as well as for academics,


3/99

iii

students and the public to consider the subject is critical in order to promote awareness ofthe practical implementation of International Humanitarian Law through Rules ofEngagement.

The new Handbook will meet the requirements of our military courses, but it will be equallyavailable to other interested institutions and parties. It is my sincere hope that the Handbook

will find a use either in those areas of the world where Rules of Engagement doctrine doesnot currently exist or as a vehicle to aid in the creation of realistic and meaningful exercisesat the national and multi-national level. The Handbook is intended to be of assistance tothose working both at the strategic level, to aid in the preparation of clear and unambiguousRules of Engagement, as well as for those involved in their implementation in order thatRules of Engagement are issued in a language that is easily understood and that assistsmilitary personnels ability to accomplish the mission.

Given that this is an area which is constantly changing, reflecting the nature and manner inwhich nations participate in military operations, we fully expect users of the Handbook tocome up with suggestions to refine and hone the practice articulated in the Handbook infuture editions of the text.

I should very much like to thank Professor Dennis Mandsager, who was the originator of theinitiative, the Drafting Committee of the Handbook, as well as all the members of theInstitute (including Professor Natalino Ronzitti and Vice Admiral Ferdinando Sanfelice diMonteforte) who, on a personal basis, gave useful comments and suggestions. Finally, mythanks go to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Its substantial financialcontribution facilitated not only the fast publication of the Handbook and its translation intoother languages, but also allows the IIHL to distribute the Handbook to all interestedstudents and institutions.

Ambassador Maurizio Moreno

President, IIHL


4/99

iv

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAWSANREMO

COUNCIL MEMBERSPRESIDENT

Ambassador Maurizio MORENO (Italy)

VICE-PRESIDENTS:

Prof. Michel VEUTHEY(Switzerland)

Associate Professor, University of Nice, Sophia-Antipolis

Prof. Fausto POCAR (Italy)Past President, Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, The Hague

Dr. Baldwin DE VIDTS (Belgium)Former Legal Advisor to the Secretary-General of NATO, Brussels

COUNCIL MEMBERS:

Dr. Mohammed AL-HADID (Jordan)Former Chairman of the Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva

President, Jordan National Red Crescent Society

Prof. Mario BETTATI (France)

Professor of International Law, University of Paris

Brigadier General Erwin DAHINDEN (Switzerland)Chief, International Relations, Armed Forces, Bern

Prof. Yoram DINSTEIN (Israel)Emeritus Professor, University of Tel Aviv

President of the United Nations Association of Israel

Prof. Jacques FORSTER (Switzerland)Emeritus Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies in Development, Geneva

Chairman, Foundation Board of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva

Prof. Dr. Wolff HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG (Germany)Head of the Faculty of Jurisprudence, Viadrina University, Frankfurt

Associate Professor Marie JACOBSSON (Sweden)Principal Legal Adviser on International Law, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm

Member of the UN International Law Commission

Dr. Michael A. MEYER (United Kingdom)Head of the International Law Office, British Red Cross, London

Dr. Ndioro NDIAYE (Senegal)

President, Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development, Dakar

Judge Hisashi OWADA (Japan)President, International Court of Justice, The Hague

Prof. John SHATTUCK (USA)President and Rector, Central European University, Budapest

Ambassador Laura THOMPSON (Costa Rica)

Deputy Director General, International Organization for Migration, Geneva

MUNICIPALITY OF SANREMO

ITALIAN RED CROSS_________

Dr. Stefania BALDINISecretaryGeneral

Col. Darren STEWART (British Army)DirectorMilitary Department


5/99

v

PREFACE

The U.S. Naval War College, like many similar schools, conducts unclassified and classifiedresearch, teaching, war games, and conference and has an international student body.When the topic involves rules of engagement (ROE) and when the participants representmultiple nations, meaningful discussion is problematic. Participants often arrive with either

little knowledge of ROE, or with knowledge of a classified national set of ROE that is notreleasable to other nations, or with knowledge of a set of classified multinational ROE that isnot releasable outside a coalition. The goal of this ROE Handbook project was to alleviatethat problem by developing a realistic, comprehensive, and unclassified ROE Handbook thatis usable by all nations for training, education, exercises, war games, and real worldoperations.

The first step in the drafting process was to identify counterparts in Australia, Canada, andthe United Kingdom, with whom the College already had a close working relationship, to jointhe drafting team. The second step was to join forces with the International Institute ofHumanitarian Law (IIHL) and its large international student body to test Handbook drafts inteaching and workshop environments.

The challenges for the drafting team were considerable. Many questioned the feasibility ofdeveloping an ROE that would be acceptable to the international community. Nations havedifferent treaty obligations, different views on international law, different views on policy, anddifferent views on the authority and responsibility of commanders. Additionally, almost allreviewers believe that real world ROE must be classified.

The drafting team produced multiple drafts, which were critiqued at many varied venues,including two multinational ROE workshops and two naval operations courses held at IIHL.The result at each event was robust ROE play. After three years of drafting and testing, theIIHL Council approved publication of the Handbook in September of 2009.

The format of the Handbook is unique in that, in addition to ROE measures, it includesformats for a wide range of ROE-related matters, including ROE cards, warnings, responsesto warnings, and other matters. The drafting team recognises that many nations have theirown formats for these items; however, many do not, and students often do not have access.

The Handbook contemplates that, in a multinational force, higher authority in each nationwill approve ROE for its forces and that each multinational partner will comply with nationallaw and policy. Accordingly, the Handbook provides multiple, and often inconsistent,options for ROE measures. Consensus on each measure is not critical. Sharing ROEinformation with the multinational force commander, however, is critical.

The drafters request that users of the Handbook share constructive criticism, questions, and

comments, as well as any lessons-learned from ROE exercises. Please email them [email protected]

Dennis MandsagerU.S. Naval War College
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


6/99

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The drafting team expresses its thanks to the International Institute of Humanitarian Lawand to the countless students, workshop participants, and counterparts who have used theHandbook and have provided constructive criticism and recommendations for improvement.

Alan Cole thanks Commodore Neil Brown, Royal Navy for his support both through makinghim available from his staff and for his own personal contribution notably in the drafting ofsections related to pre-planned targeting. He also thanks Captain Andrew Jameson RoyalNavy who contributed on maritime security matters.

Rob McLaughlin could not have been involved in this project without the strong support ofRear Admiral Allan du Toit, Major General David Morrison, and Commodore Trevor Jones,to whom he expresses his thanks. He also expresses his thanks to the many operationsand legal officers within the ADF, and in particular, Wing Commander Ian Henderson, fortheir reviews and comments.

Phillip Drew would like to extend his thanks to the Commander of the Canadian Defence

Academy, Major-General Daniel Gosselin and the Judge Advocate General of the CanadianForces, Brigadier-General Kenneth Watkin, for their strong support from the inception of thisproject through to its completion. He would also like to thank his colleagues who assistedhim by providing advice and guidance, particularly Colonel Kirby Abbott, Lieutenant-ColonelTim Bishop and Commander Mary Gardam.

Dennis Mandsager thanks the drafting team for the many hours of writing, debating,negotiating, and compromising that went into the development of this Handbook. For theirsupport of this project, he thanks the leadership of the Naval War College, including formerand current Presidents, Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, USN (Retired) and Rear AdmiralJames P. (Phil) Wisecup, USN, former and current Provosts, Professor James Giblin andAmbassador Mary Ann Peters, and Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Professor

Robert (Barney) Rubel. Finally, he thanks his colleagues in the Naval War CollegesInternational Law Department and Naval Reserve International Law Unit, all of whom werekey players on the team that produced the Handbook.

Alan Cole

Phillip Drew

Rob McLaughlin

Dennis Mandsager


7/99

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD BY PRESIDENT, IIHL

IIHL COUNCIL AND OFFICERS

PREFACE

ii

iv

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS vii

TABLE OF ROE ix

PART I INTRODUCTION 1

PART II SELF-DEFENCE 3

PART III THE USE OF FORCE DURING OPERATIONS 4

PART IV POLICY DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES 6

PART V DRAFTING METHODOLOGY 6

PART VI ROE PROCEDURES 7

ANNEX A GUIDANCE ON PLANNING AND STAFFING 9

Appendix 1 Planning Procedures 10

Appendix 2 Environment-Specific Guidance 12

2.1 Land Operations2.2 Maritime Operations2.3 Air Operations2.4 Outer SpaceOperations2.5 CyberspaceOperations

Appendix 3 Task-Specific Planning Considerations 17

3.1 Peace Operations3.2 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations3.3 Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief3.4 Assistance to Civil Authorities3.5 Maritime Interdiction Operations


8/99

viii

Appendix 4 Guidance on Hostile Intent 22

Appendix 5 Escalation of Force in Self-Defence 24

Appendix 6 Targeting and ROE 26

ANNEX B COMPENDIUM OFROE 28

ANNEX C FORMATS FOR ROE AND ROE-RELATED MATERIALS 63

Appendix 1 ROE Annex to OPORDER 64

Appendix 2 ROE Request (ROEREQ), ROE AUTHORISATION(ROEAUTH), and ROE Implementation (ROEIMP)

Messages

65

Appendix 3 ROE Matrix for Multinational Operations 70

Appendix 4 ROE Cards 71

Appendix 5 Maritime Warning ZoneAnnouncements 76

Appendix 6 Requests for Identification and Warnings 79

Appendix 7 Responses to Queries, Warnings and Challenges atSea

80

ANNEX D GLOSSARY 81


9/99

ix

TABLE OF ROE

This table sets out the ROE Series headings found in the Compendium of ROE at Annex Bto this Handbook. The Compendium of ROEcontains the specific rules and notes that are tobe used for drafting ROE.

GROUP 10-19: USE OF FORCE IN THE DEFENCE OF SELF AND OTHERS

Series

10 Use of Force in Individual Self-Defence

11 Use of Force in Unit Self-Defence

12 Use of Force for the Protection of Others

13 Use of Force in National Self-Defence

14-19 SPARE

GROUP 20-29: MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Series

20 Use of Force for Mission Accomplishment

21 Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons

22 Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft

23 Warning Shots

24 Disabling Fire

25 Search and Detentionof Persons

26 Use of Force to Secure the Release of Persons

27 Indirect Fire(Unobserved Indirect Fireand Observed Indirect Fire)

28-29 SPARE

GROUP 30-39: TARGETING IN ARMED CONFLICT


10/99

x

Series

30 Engagement of Military Objectives Including Hostile Forces

31 Identification of Targets

32 Neutrals

33-39 SPARE

GROUP40-49:OPERATIONS RELATED TO PROPERTY

Series

40 Use of Force to Protect Property

41 Protection of Vital/Mission Essential/Specified Property

42 Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property

43-49 SPARE

GROUP 50-59: GEOGRAPHIC POSITIONING

Series

50 Geographic Positioning of Force Units and Cross-Border Incursions

51 Ground Reconnaissance

52 Aerial Reconnaissance

53 Relative Positioning of Force Units

54 Exercising in the Presence of a Potential Adversary

55 Diversions

56 Use of Obstacles and Barriers

57 Zones

58 Freedom of Navigation

59 SPARE


11/99

xi

GROUP 60-69: WARNINGS, HARASSMENT, SHADOWING, ILLUMINATION

Series

60 Warnings

61 Harassment

62 Shadowing, Surveillance, and Marking

63 Sensors and Illumination

64-69 SPARE

GROUP 70-79: CARRYING OF WEAPONS

Series

70 Authority to CarryWeapons

71-79 SPARE

GROUP 80-89: LAND MINES, CLUSTER MUNITIONSAND BOOBY TRAPS

Series

80 Use of Land Mines

81 Use of Cluster Munitions

82 Use of Booby Traps

83-89 SPARE

GROUP 90-99: MARITIME OPERATIONS

Series

90 Maritime Law Enforcement

91 Submarine Contacts

92 Naval Mines

93 Boardings


12/99

xii

94 Suppression of Piracy

95-99 SPARE

GROUP 100-109: AIR OPERATIONS

Series

100 Use of Air to Surface Munitions

101 Use of Air to Sub-surface Munitions

102 Air to Air Engagements

103-109 SPARE

GROUP 110-119: ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Series

110 Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including Law Enforcement

111 Search, DetentionandArrest of Persons

112 Treatment of Detained and Arrested Persons

113-119 SPARE

GROUP 120-129: CROWD AND RIOT CONTROL

120 Crowd and Riot Control

121 Riot ControlAgents

122 Riot ControlMunitions/Water Cannons

123-129 SPARE

GROUP 130-139: INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Series


13/99

xiii

130 Electronic WarfareMeasures

131 Computer Network Operations

132 Psychological Operations

133 Military Deception

134-139 SPARE

GROUP 140-149: OUTER SPACEOPERATIONS

Series

140 Interference With Satellite Communications

141 Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites

142-149 SPARE

GROUPS 150 PLUS: SPARE


14/99

1

PART I: INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

1. The purpose of this Handbook is to assist in the drafting of Rules of Engagement

(ROE) and related legal and operational guidance for use in training, exercises, war games,and operations. The Handbook is not a manual on the Law of Armed Conflict. TheHandbook takes into account the requirement to identify and manage the respective legaland policy positions of nations participating in a multinational operation and promotes anunderstanding of national ROE policies. The Handbook also sets out suggested ROE for anumber of selected environments and tasks, and procedures for approving andimplementing ROE in single service,joint, or multinational operations.

STRUCTURE OF THE HANDBOOK

2. This Handbook adopts the following structure:

a. Parts I to VI provide an introduction to the Handbook, the key legalconsiderations impacting upon the use of force, the concept of self-defence, thepolicy factors that influence the development of ROE, the ROE methodology adoptedin this Handbook, and ROE procedures.

b. Annex A provides guidance on the planning and drafting of ROE, specificguidance on ROE for selected operational environments and operational tasks,guidance on hostile intentand the escalation of force in self-defence, and informationon the relationship between targeting and ROE.

c. Annex B provides a menu of ROE provisions that may be tailored asnecessary to accomplish various missions.

d. Annex C and its Appendices provides sample ROE and ROE-relateddocuments.

e. Annex D provides definitions for a number of terms used in this Handbook.These terms are italicized wherever they appear (e.g. opposed boarding), thusindicating that reference should be made to the definition in Annex D.

DEFINITION AND STATUS

3. ROE are issued by competent authorities and assist in the delineation of thecircumstances and limitations within which military forces may be employed to achieve their

objectives. ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, including executeorders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives. Whatever their form,they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other things, the use of force, thepositioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain specific capabilities. Insome nations, ROE have the status of guidance to military forces; in other nations, ROE arelawful commands.


15/99

2

ROE are not used to assign missions or tasks nor are they used to give tacticalinstructions. Missions and tasks are assigned through Operations orders and other similarinstruments of command and control.

APPLICABLE LAW AND POLICY

4. International Law. The conduct of military operations is governed by internationallaw, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC) (also referred to as the law of war, orinternational humanitarian law), and applicable international human rights law. Bothnations and individuals are obliged to comply with LOAC. All nations are obliged to traintheir forces to comply with LOAC and with other provisions of international law that impactupon military operations. This Handbook is intended to facilitate the creation of ROE toprovide for the judicious use of force in compliance with international law. Nations arebound by Geneva Law and Hague Law. Nations may have different treaty obligations anddiffering interpretations and/or application of both treaty and customary international law. Inmultinational operations these differences need to be identified and factored into theplanning and conduct of operations.

5. National Laws. The armed forces of each nation must comply with their own nationallaws. For example, the national laws of some nations may restrict the ability of forces touse force, in particular deadly force, to protect others or to defend property. Accordingly,some nations may issue restrictions or amplifying instructions to supplement the ROE formultinational operations. To the greatest extent possible, such restrictions or instructionsshould be shared with multinational partners. It is particularly important to ensure thatcommanders operating in multinational operations are aware of any such restrictions so thatthey may employ forces in an efficient and effective manner.

6. National Policy. In the same way that nations may have different legal positions oncertain issues, the planning and conduct of military operations must take into account

differing national policy positions. Some military options, available under both internationaland national law, may not come within national policy intent, either generally or with respectto a specific operation. For example, some nations in some circumstances may limitpermissible levels of incidental injury or collateral damage to levels below that acceptableunder LOAC, while others may not allow their military to conduct law enforcement activities.In multinational operations, such policy differences need to be identified and factored intothe planning and conduct of operations. This Handbook allows for the creation of ROE thatprovide for the conduct of operations in compliance with national policy.

7. Multinational Operations. In multi-national operations participating nations shouldoperate under coherent ROE arrangements. Policy and legal differences can lead to

different ROE among the members of a multinational force. Different ROE can be a sourceof friction in conducting operations. Problems of this sort are best resolved throughnegotiations rather than through a process that leads to an ROE that reflects the lowestcommon denominator. If there are irreconcilable differences in ROE, those differencesshould be shared with other members of the force whenever feasible.


16/99

3

PART II: SELF-DEFENCE

8. Categories of Self-Defence. International law and the domestic laws of all nationsrecognise a right of self-defence, which is the use of force to defend against attack orimminent attack. Self-defenceis available in all situations, including armed conflict. National

laws differ on the definition and content of the right of self-defence. As a consequence,individuals and units will exercise this right in accordance with their respective national law.For some nations, self-defence is not governed by ROE. For some nations, the termshostile act and hostile intent are related to mission-accomplishment, rather than self-defence. The Handbook has adopted what the drafters view as the more generallyaccepted view, while recognizing that nations may have different approaches. In any event,the Handbook is intended for use by all nations. For the purposes of this Handbook, theright of self-defenceis considered on four levels.

a. Individual self-defence. This refers to the right of an individual to defendhimself or herself (and in some cases other individuals) from an attackor imminentattack. Some nations permit commanders to limit individual self-defencein the same

way as for unit self-defence(See Annex B, series 10).

b. Unit self-defence. Unit commanders have the right to defend their unit andother units from their nation in the face of an attackor imminent attack. For somenations, the concept of unit self-defenceis both a right and an obligation; whereas forothers the concept is only a right. Some nations permit the right of unit self-defenceto be limited by orders from higher authority. Unit self-defencemay be extended tounits and individuals from other nations when authorised by the applicable ROE.(See Annex B, series 11).

c. Protection of Others. This refers to the right to defend specified persons (whoare not part of the Force) against an attackor imminent attack. For some nations,

the right of individual self-defenceor unit self-defencemay not include the right touse force to defend another nations citizens. (See Annex B, series 12).

d. National self-defence. As recognised in Article 51 of the United NationsCharter, refers to the right of a nation to defend itself against armed attack, and formost nations, the threat of imminent armed attack. (See Annex B, series 13).Decisions on whether or not national self-defencewill be invoked are retained at thehighest levels of governmental or executive authority.

9. Hostile Actand Hostile Intent. For the purposes of this Handbook, the right to useforce in self-defencearises in response to a hostile act(attack)and/or demonstrated hostileintent(threat of imminent attack). Appendices 4 and 5 to Annex A provide guidance on the

determination of hostile intent and the magnitude and duration of force that may beemployed in self-defence. Higher authority may provide mission-specific guidance onindicators of hostile actand hostile intent.

10. Use of Force in Self-Defence. Subject to any limitations promulgated in ROE (eitherseries 10 or 11), all necessary and proportional means and actions may be used in self-defence. Where time and operational circumstances permit, military forces should warn thethreatening entity in order to give it an opportunity to withdraw or cease its threatening


17/99

4

actions. Military forces are permitted to use force in self-defence only if non-forcefulalternatives to prevent or deter the attackor imminent attack:

a. Have been exhausted,

b. Are unavailable, or

c. Are deemed insufficient to defend forces in those circumstances.

The use of force is generally authorised so long as the hostile actor hostile intentcontinues.The use of force must be proportional, which means that the nature, duration, and scope offorce used should not exceed what is required. (Note: The concept of proportionality inself-defence should not be confused with the concept of proportionality in internationalarmed conflict, which is related to attempts to minimize collateral damage.)

11. Pursuit. Self-defence, unit self-defence, protection of others, and national self-defence include the authority to pursue and engage forces that continue to demonstrate

hostile intent. ROE may limit the extent to which pursuit is authorised, depending upon themilitary and political situation. Pursuit in self-defence should be distinguished from hotpursuit, which, for the purposes of this Handbook, is a measure that applies only in amaritime law enforcement context and is defined in customary international law and inArticle 111 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

12. Relationship between Self-Defenceand Mission Accomplishment ROE. Individualsand units have the right to defend against attackand imminent attack. As a general rule,ROE issued for a mission do not limit this right. Because national laws and policies differ,there will not always be consistency in a multinational force as to when the right to use forcein self-defence ends and the use of force for mission accomplishment begins.Inconsistencies should be clarified in the planning process.

PART III: THE USE OF FORCE DURING OPERATIONS

13. Broadly speaking, during peacetime, the use of force is permitted in self-defence, inthe exercise of law enforcement authority, and to accomplish operations or missionsspecifically authorised by a higher national authority or other governing body, such as theU.N. Security Council.

a. It is universally recognised that individuals and units have a right to defendthemselves against attackor imminent attack. Nevertheless, because national lawsand policies differ with respect to the application of self-defence to military

operations, Series 10, 11, 12, and 13 of Annex B provide specific ROE intended toclarify the extent of the authorisations granted for the application of force in self-defence. For example, some nations permit commanders to restrict the exercise ofthe right of individual self-defenceand/or unit self-defence, while others do not.

b. Where the use of force is not justified by self-defence, but is nonethelessnecessary for accomplishment of an assigned military mission, reasonable force may


18/99

5

be exercised within the constraints of the relevant national and international law.Series 20 to 140 of Annex B provide measures for mission accomplishment.

c. Deadly force can be used against persons posing an imminent threat to life.National views on other circumstances in which deadly force is permitted vary widely

among nations. The Handbook provides multiple ROE measures, the use of whichwill depend upon national laws and policies.

14. During armed conflict, and in addition to self-defence, commanders may beauthorised to engage an enemy in accordance with LOAC.

a. The extent to which different aspects of LOAC might apply depends in thefirst instance on whether a conflict is an international or non-international armedconflict. Generally, the political leadership of a nation determines the characterizationof an armed conflict to be applied by its armed forces. This characterization is basedon a legal analysis of the factual situation. When planning operations and craftingROE for multinational operations, senior commanders and their legal advisors need

to be aware of how other nations characterize the conflict, as those characterizationswill affect which LOAC framework is applied by those nations.

b. In international armed conflicts situations, only combatants (unless hors decombat) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and military objectives may bethe object of attack. In non-international armed conflicts situations, only fighters(unless hors de combat) and civilians directly participating in hostilities and militaryobjectives may be the object of attack.

c. Commanders, planners, and legal advisors must recognise the fact that notall nations are parties to the same LOAC treaties. Further, even those who areparties to the same treaties do not all have the same interpretations of the law

embodied in those treaties. However, ROE language is generally crafted to reflect anumber of recurring LOAC rules and principles concerning the use of force:

i. Military necessity - the requirement whereby a belligerent has the rightto apply any measures that are required to bring about the successfulconclusion of a military operation and which are not forbidden by LOAC.

ii. Distinction - the requirement to distinguish between the civilianpopulation and combatants and between civilian objects and militaryobjectives and to direct operations only against combatants and militaryobjectives.

iii. Proportionality - the prohibition of an attack that may be expected tocause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilianobjects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation tothe concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

iv. Humanity - the prohibition of the infliction of suffering, injury ordestruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimatemilitary purposes.


19/99

6

v. Precaution - in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall betaken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.

vi. Weapon prohibitions - the prohibition of weapons that cause superfluous

injury or unnecessary suffering.

15. Detailed discussion of LOAC is beyond the scope of this ROE Handbook.

PART IV: POLICY DIRECTION TO MILITARY AUTHORITIES

16. Higher authoritywithin a nation or in a multinational forcewill provide direction on thegoals to be achieved when undertaking a military mission. This may include direction onforce posture as well as authorisations or limitations on the scope of action a commandermay take to accomplish the mission. Policy direction from government, including conclusionsof legal analysis, may limit the operational freedom of military commanders and prevent

them taking all the actions available to them under the law. Policy direction does nothowever provide a legal authority for use of force in the conduct of operations where suchuse of force is outside the law.

17. The ROE authorised for a mission will typically include specific instructions regardingthe use of force. In addition to self-defence, ROE will therefore generally reflect multiplecomponents, including political guidance from higher authorities, the tactical considerationsof the specific mission, and LOAC. Succinct and unambiguous rules are essential.

18. Political leadership may also provide narrative guidance on its policy aims andobjectives so as to enable commanders to respond appropriately as a situation develops.Such guidance should be explained in plain language, and supporting ROE should reflect

this guidance within the context of the mission. Such guidance may change as missionobjectives and ROE authorisations mature to reflect changes in policy and mission context.

PART V: DRAFTING METHODOLOGY

19. The ROE in this Handbook are drafted as a series of prohibitions, restrictions, andpermissions set out in the Compendium of Rules at Annex B. This Handbook adopts arestrictive approach to authorisation. This means that if an ROE measure is not addressedin the ROE, commanders must assume that they have no authority (beyond individual self-defence and unit self-defence) to carry out that action. In respect of the exercise offreedoms of navigation and overflight (e.g. high seas freedoms, innocent passage, transit

passage, and assistance entry), specific ROE provisions are not required unless thoserights are to be restricted. Nevertheless, measures that either authorise or prohibit suchactions are included to facilitate clarity.

20. Annex B provides a menu of ROE options that may be tailored to a specific mission.The nature of the operation(s) may dictate that planners or commanders propose rules notlisted in this Handbook. In such cases, the spare rules in the relevant series ora new


20/99

7

series may be employed. Sample ROE for an operation are contained in Appendix 1 toAnnex C.

21. When the term SPECIFY is included in the ROE measure, the term refers to a needto add specific parameters that focus the application of the rule. Such parameters might be

in relation to ranges, particular weapon types, specific nationalities, or certain actions orconduct. Accordingly, where this term appears, specific words must be inserted into theROE measure to clarify and tailor the meaning of the provision.

22. When the ROE authorise the use of deadly force, this authorises the use of all lesserdegrees of force permitted by law, up to and including deadly force. The actual tactics,techniques and procedures for applying force or utilizing non-deadly forcewill vary basedupon factors such as environment, weapons systems available, the prevailing threat, andapplicable law. The tactical employment of approved ROE is a matter of command

judgment.

23. Specific rules may be retained for activation by a specified command authority. This

means that the rule is only able to be used upon specific positive approval by the specifiedcommander. This approval will generally be sought and granted by the quickest appropriatemeans and confirmed formally. Furthermore, such approval may be on a case by casebasis, or given for a specified period of time, geographical area, or mission. Retention of arule is indicated by amplification to the rule that states the approval level. The formatadopted in this Handbook is as follows:

AMPN: This rule is retained by (SPECIFY level of authority e.g. ForceCommander).

24. While commanders may restrict the use of issued ROE measures, they cannotauthorise their forces to exceed them. Commanders at all levels who are uncertain aboutthe suitability of ROE must immediately request a change or clarification. Additionally, if the

ROE are considered unclear or insufficient, commanders must immediately seek clarificationfrom higher authority.

PART VI: ROE PROCEDURES

25. Approval. ROE are authorised either by national authorities or by the governingbody of an international organisation in accordance with its procedures and with nationalagreement (e.g. UN). ROE are developed and staffed as part of the operational planningprocess, either parallel to or as part of the development of the relevant operation plan(OPLAN) or operation order (OPORDER). They may be included in these documents orpublished separately by message or otherwise. The OPLAN or OPORDER will also set out

the geographical area (Area of Operations) to which the ROE apply. Some nations includetheir request for mission specific ROE directly in the draft OPORDER.

26. Review. ROE must be continuously reviewed to ensure that they are clear andlawful, that they are sufficient to address the requirements of the mission, and that theyprovide the commander with the necessary powers to deal effectively with the threat.Message formats for requesting ROE (ROEREQ), for authorising ROE (ROEAUTH), and forimplementing ROE (ROEIMP) are provided in Appendix 2 to Annex C.


21/99

8

27. Security. While ROE for training and exercises often may be unclassified, the ROEfor actual operations are generally classified at the same level as the OPLAN or OPORDER.


22/99

Annex A

9

GUIDANCE ON PLANNING AND STAFFING

1. This Annex provides recommended procedures for the development, staffing andpublication of ROE.

2. The following appendices are included:

Appendix 1 Planning Procedures

Appendix 2 Environment-Specific Guidance

Appendix 3 Task-Specific Planning Considerations

Appendix 4 Guidance on Hostile Intent

Appendix 5 Escalation of Force in Self-defence

Appendix 6 Targeting and ROE


23/99

Appendix 1 to Annex A

10

PLANNING PROCEDURES

1. The development and implementation of effective ROE is critical to missionaccomplishment. This Appendix provides suggested guidelines for incorporating ROE

development into operational planning.

2. ROE are authorised by national authorities (individually or collectively) or sometimesby the governing body of a multinational force operating under the umbrella of aninternational organisation (e.g. UN, NATO, AU or EU). ROE development should take placeas part of the operational planning process.

3. The establishment of an ROE Planning Cell should be considered. The Cell shouldbe led by operational staffs and include legal advisors, policy advisers and officers withspecialist expertise in land, air, maritime, outer space, and/or cyberspace operations, asappropriate. In multinational operations, early engagement with other multinational forcenations is essential.

4. Responsibility for drafting ROE usually sits with current operations or plans andpolicy staff, but this varies among nations. The legal advisor should play a significant role inassisting with ROE development and should serve as a principal assistant to the operationsstaff that drafts ROE.

5. Legal advisers will ensure that ROE are consistent with the relevant law and reflectthe political mandates and the national policies of nations contributing to the Force.Therefore legal advisors will need to analyse the legal basis for the mission and the legalframework that will regulate the application of force, taking into account the characterizationof the conflict. This includes identifying the nature of the operation, including whether it is anarmed conflict and, if so, the nature of the armed conflict (international or non-international).

6. Once ROE have been drafted and approved (see the ROE DRAFTING CHECKLISTat Annex B), they are published to the Force. ROE will normally be contained within orlinked to an operational planning document or order. In addition, guidance on the use offorce may also be contained or referred to in other sections of planning documents ororders. Where this occurs, particular care must be taken to ensure that different sectionscontaining ROE guidance are harmonized.

7. Consideration should be given to creating ROE products (cards, briefs, etc.) thatsummarize key ROE provisions for distribution to and training of operational forces.Additionally, an ROE matrix that summarizes the ROE of each multinational partner is auseful tool (see Appendix 3 to Annex C).

8. ROE should be continually assessed by both tactical and operational levelcommanders so that appropriate adjustments can be made as missions develop, as theintelligence picture changes (in particular, threats to tactical level units), and, whereapplicable, as the enemys tactics, techniques and procedures evolve. New measuresshould be requested or implemented as necessary so as to ensure the ROE remainconsistent with the mission, the operational situation (especially the threat), political andpolicy guidance, and the law. Proposing or implementing changes is achieved through


24/99


11

ROEREQ, ROEAUTH, and ROEIMP procedures (see Appendix 2 to Annex C). WheneverROE are believed to be unclear, clarification should be sought from higher headquarters.

9. Scenario based ROE training will ensure that ROE are understood and appliedproperly by all units and members of the Force. Multinational Forcecommanders should

meet with subordinate commanders to ensure a common understanding of ROE.


25/99


12

ENVIRONMENT-SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

2.1 Land Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of land operations is that they take place on sovereignterritory, with or without the permission of the sovereign government.

b. Legal Considerations

The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for land operations are:

i. The legal basis for presence and activities in the sovereign territory ofanother nation: in particular whether the military activity has the consent ofthe nation(s) in which it is taking place.

ii. Where the nation has given consent, whether or not the law of thenation in which the forces are present applies, in particular the extent of anyStatus of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)or other international arrangement.

iii. Whether there is a legal basis to arrest or detain.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, thefollowing ROE should be considered:

Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21) Warning Shots (Series 23)

Search and Detention of Persons (Series 25)

Neutrals (Series 32)

Use of Force to Protect Property (Series 40)

Inspection, Seizure, and Destruction of Property (Series 42)

Geographic Positioning of ForceUnits and Cross Border Incursions(Series 50)

Relative Positioning of ForceUnits (Series 53)

Exercising in the Presence of a Potential Adversary (Series 54)

Diversions (Series 55)

Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)

Zones (Series 57) Harassment (Series 61)

Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)

Use of Land Mines, Cluster Munitions, and Booby Traps (Series 80-82)

Assistance to Civil Authorities (Series 110)

Crowd and Riot Control (Series 120)


26/99


13

Information Operations(Series 130 - 133)

2.2 Maritime Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of the maritime environment is that it includes areas subject tothe territorial sovereignty of nations (national waters and national airspace) andareas not subject to the territorial sovereignty of any nation ( international watersandinternational airspace).


The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for maritime operations are:

i. The sea area where operations are to take place and the legal regimethat applies, including navigation and overflight rights, the duties and rights ofthe coastal and flag states, and the rights and duties of neutrals or other non-

participants.

ii. The legal basis for the operation, including any specific legal authorityfor conducting operations in national waters or for conducting maritimeinterdiction operations.

iii. The principle of sovereign immunity.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, thefollowing ROEshould be considered:

Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22)

Warning Shots(Series 23)

Disabling Fire(Series 24)

Search and Detentionof Persons (Series 25)


Inspection, Seizure and Destruction of Property (Series 42)

Geographic Positioning of ForceUnits and Cross-Border Incursions(Series 50)


Zones(Series 57)

Harassment (Series 61) Sensors and Illumination (Series 63)

Maritime Law Enforcement (Series 90)

Submarine Contacts (Series 91)

Naval Mines(Series 92)

Boardings (Series 93)

Suppression of Piracy(Series 94)


27/99


14

2.3 Air Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of air operations is that they take place in both national

airspaceand international airspace.


The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for air operations are:

i. The area where operations are to take place and the legal regime thatapplies, including the rights of overflight.

ii. The interception and use of force against civil aircraft or any otherspecifically protected aircraft, such as medical aircraft.

c. Applicable ROE


Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22)


Identification of Targets (Series 31)




Relative Positioning of ForceUnits (Series 53) Diversions (Series 55)

Zones(Series 57)

Harassment (Series 61)

Shadowing, Surveillance and Marking (Series 62)

Submarine Contacts (Series 91)

Use of Air to Surface Munitions (Series 100)

Use of Air to Sub-surface Munitions (Series 101)

Air to Air Engagements (Series 102)

2.4 Outer SpaceOperations

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of outerspaceare that it is beyond the sovereignty of anynation and that all nations enjoy freedom of equal access and use.


28/99


15


The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for space operations are:

i. It is prohibited to place conventional weapons on the moon andcelestial bodies and to station nuclear weapons and other weapons of massdestruction anywhere in outer space.

ii. No nation can claim jurisdiction or sovereignty over any portion ofouter space.

iii. The use of satellites for surveillance, communication and navigationfor military purposes, over-flight by missiles, and the stationing ofconventional weapons on satellites are not prohibited activities.

iv. The determination of where national airspace ends and outer space

begins is not yet settled.

c. Applicable ROE


Interference with Satellite Communications (Series 140).

Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites (Series 141).

2.5 CyberspaceOperations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of cyberspace is that it is a notional environment and beyondthe jurisdiction of any single nation. Computer network operations (CNO) are theprinciple form of operations in cyberspace and are often non-kinetic, making thedetermination of hostile actand hostile intentdifficult.


The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE for cyberspace operations are:

i. Domestic and international civil and criminal laws and national policiesvary widely on the legal aspects of CNO. Further, multilateral and bilateralcommunications treaties have provisions that impact the conduct of computernetwork operations.

ii. Despite being non-kinetic, operations in cyberspacemay constitute ahostile actor hostile intent. Factors in the determination of both include theseverity, immediacy, directness and effects of the operation.


29/99


16

c. Applicable ROE


Computer Network Operations(Series 131) Interference with Satellite Communications (Series 140)

Neutralization/Destruction of Satellites (Series 141)


30/99


17

TASK-SPECIFIC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 Peace Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of Peace Operations are that they involve a mixture ofmilitary forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed toachieve a peaceful resolution or other specific conditions.


The principal legal considerations when drafting ROE are:

i. The legal basis for presence in the sovereign territory (includingnational waters and airspace) of another nation, in particular whether themilitary activity has the consent of the nation(s) in which it is taking place.

ii. Where the legal basis for presence includes a UNSC Resolution,whether that resolution is under Chapter VI or Chapter VII.

iii. Whether any Chapter VII resolution gives the authority to use allnecessary means and whether the basis for the use of force is restricted toself-defence, which may include the defence of designated persons.

iv. The extent of any Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Memorandumof Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.

c. Applicable ROE


Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons(Series 21)







Diversions (Series 55) Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)


Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, Including LawEnforcement (Series 110)

Search, Detention, and Arrest of Persons (Series 111)

Treatment of Detained and Arrested Persons (Series 112)


31/99


18


Riot ControlAgents(Series 121)

Riot ControlMunitions/Water Cannons (Series 122)

3.2 Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations(NEO)

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) is that theyassist other government departments in evacuating nationals and selected othersfrom threatening circumstances in a foreign or host nation. NEOs are fundamentallydefensive in nature.



i. The legal basis for presence in the sovereign territory (includingnational watersand national airspace) of the nation from which the NEO istaking place; in particular whether the NEO is conducted with or without hostnation consent and, accordingly, whether the context is permissive,uncertain, or hostile.

ii. The extent of any Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Memorandumof Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.

c. Applicable ROE


Protection ofFreedom of Movement of Persons(Series 21)







Use of Obstacles and Barriers (Series 56)

Sensors and Illumination (Series 63) Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, Including Law

Enforcement (Series 110)




Electronic WarfareMeasures (Series 130)


32/99


19

3.3 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)

a. Introduction

The distinctive features of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) are that

they are generally short-term programs to alleviate suffering caused by natural orman-made disasters, and they complement the efforts of local civil authorities orother agencies with the consent of the host nation.



i. Whether the carriage of weapons is necessary and whether the hostnationhas given consent to do so.

ii. The extent of any Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other international arrangement.

iii. The operational restraints imposed by the host nation.

c. Applicable ROE


Freedom of Movement of Persons (Series 21)


Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including LawEnforcement (Series 110)




3.4 Assistance to Civil Authorities

a. Introduction

The provision of assistance to civil authorities involves domestic operations in whichmilitary forces perform civilian functions normally the responsibility of other

government agencies.



i. Whether the carriage of personal weapons is necessary.


33/99


20

ii. Whether a power of arrest or detentionis required.

c. Applicable ROE

In addition to the compulsory rules as set out at paragraph 3.d.i of Annex B, the

following ROE should be considered:


Authority to Carry Weapons (Series 70)

Use of Force in Assistance to Civil Authorities, including LawEnforcement (Series 110)

Search, Detention, and Arrest of Persons (Series 111)

Treatment of Detained and Arrested persons(Series 112)



Riot ControlMunitions/Water cannons (Series 122)

3.5 Maritime Interdiction Operations

a. Introduction

The distinctive feature of maritime interdiction operations is that they involve theassertion of jurisdiction by warships (and/or military aircraft) over the vessels and/oraircraft of other states. Each participating nation will have a national position onwhat they are permitted to do (both as a matter of law and policy) in internationalwatersand international airspacein respect of other nations vessels and aircraft.



i. The sea area where operations are to take place and the legalregime that applies, including navigation and overflight rights, the duties andrights of the coastal and flag states, and the rights and duties of neutrals orother non-participants.

ii. The legal basis for the operation, including any specific legal authorityfor conducting operations in national waters or for conducting maritimeinterdiction operations.

iii. The principle of sovereign immunity.

iv. Different national legal and policy positions on the right to visit on thebasis of a masters consent.


34/99


21

c. Applicable ROE


Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft (Series 22) Warning Shots(Series 23)

Disabling Fire(Series 24)





Zones(Series 57)

Harassment and Counter-Harassment (Series 61)


Maritime Law Enforcement (Series 90)

Boardings (Series 93)

Suppression of Piracy(Series 94)


35/99


22

GUIDANCE ON HOSTILE INTENT

4.1 Defining Hostile Intent

a. Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force. A determination of

hostile intent is based on the existence of an identifiable threat recognizable on thebasis of both of the following conditions:

i. Capability.

ii. Intention.

b. The right to use force in self-defencearises either when forces have beenattackedand/or when there is demonstrated hostile intent. Demonstrated hostileintent exists when there is a reasonable belief that an attack or use of force isimminent, based on an assessment of all the facts and circumstances known at thetime. Some nations permit the right of individual self-defenceand unit self-defence

to be limited by a force commander (see Series 10 and 11 in Annex B).

4.2 Ascertaining Hostile Intent. In determining whether an entity is demonstrating hostileintent, forces will use their best judgment and consider available intelligence, political andmilitary factors, indications and warnings, and all other relevant information concerning thecapabilities of possible threats in the area of operations.

4.3 Indicators of Hostile Intent. There is no checklist of indicators that will conclusivelydetermine hostile intent. The following are examples of actions that may, depending on thecircumstances, demonstrate hostile intent:

a. Aiming or directing weapons.

b. Adopting an attackprofile.

c. Closing within weapon release range.

d. Illuminating with radar or laser designators.

e. Passing targeting information.

f. Laying or preparing to lay naval mines.

g. Failing to respond to the proactive measures listed below in 4.4.

4.4 Proactive Measures that may Assist in Ascertaining Hostile Intent. In addition to theabove indicators of hostile intent, time and circumstances permitting, forces should takeproactive measures to assist in determining the intent of an opposing entity or force,including, but not limited to:

a. Verbal query (see Appendix 7 to Annex C).


36/99


23

b. Verbal warning (see Appendix 7 to Annex C).

c. Visual signals.

d. Noise signals.

e. Physical barriers.

f. Changing course and speed to determine if continuing to maintain an attackprofile.

g. Illuminating with fire control radar.

h. Firing warning shots.


37/99


24

ESCALATION OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENCE

5.1 Introduction. In all self-defence situations, when confronted with circumstances inwhich the use of force may become necessary, it is appropriate to exercise control over theapplication of force so as to ensure that the use of force is justifiable. Consequently, when

time and circumstances permit, use of force must always be graduated (also referred to asescalation). Escalation of force (EOF) may involve sequential actions that begin with non-deadly forcemeasures and may graduate to deadly forcemeasures. EOF procedures aredesigned to avoid unjustifiable use of force. EOF procedures also may assist in thedetermination of hostile intent(see Appendix 4 to Annex A).

5.2 Graduated use of force. Graduated use of force requires that individuals confrontedwith a need to use force should always aim to use the least harmful option available in thosecircumstances. Indeed, one principal purpose of graduated use of force is to createoperational time and space in the hope that there will be no need to escalate to use ofdeadly forcein self-defence.

5.3 Use of force options.A variety of options for use of force may be available in anygiven situation. The options available will often include:

a. Presence.

b. Verbal and visual warnings, including display of weapons.

c. Soft physical pressure.

d. Hard physical pressure.

e. Non-lethal weapons (such as batons).

f. Lethal weapons (such as firearms).

5.4 General Considerations. There are a number of general considerations that shouldbe taken into account in relation to EOF policy, options, and training:

a. EOF is concerned with employing the necessary option. Use of force optionsmust be read within their context on every occasion that is, the assessment as towhat the minimum first response shall be should be made on a case-by-case basis.Use of an excessive option, where a less harmful option could reasonably haveachieved the aim of neutralizing or removing the threat in the circumstancesencountered, may have legal consequences for individual users of force.

b. Where time and circumstances permit it is expected that less harmful options(for example, warnings or warning shots) will be exercised before more harmfuloptions are used.

c. On some occasions, for operational reasons, ROE may limit access to certainless harmful EOF options. For example, ROE may prohibit use of warning shots.However, it must be remembered on all occasions that ROE and EOF procedures do


38/99


25

not limit the right of self-defence. Subject to any limitations promulgated in ROE(either series 10 or 11), all necessary and proportional means and actions may beused in self-defence.

d. Forcepreparation should include scenario-based training in EOF situations

that members of the Force are likely to encounter during the operation, such ascheckpoint or access control operations.

e. Use of proactive measures to determine hostile intent(see paragraph 4.4 ofAppendix 4 to Annex A) and EOF measures are similar and may serve the samepurpose.


39/99


26

TARGETING AND ROE

6.1 Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching theappropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities,

applicable ROE, and LOAC.

6.2 The relationship between ROE and targeting is summarized as follows:

a. Forces may target only those military objectives permitted to be targeted inthe relevant ROE.

b. ROE may impose policy restrictions on targeting that go beyond therequirements of the LOAC.

c. ROE must never permit targeting that is not consistent with LOAC.

6.3 Targeting Directives for a mission may set out limitations such as restricted targetlists and no-strike lists. Additionally, commanders may be restricted from taking certainactions by their ROE.

6.4 In order to conduct targeting for any mission, planners, often referred to as atargeting cell, must have ROE for mission accomplishment (Series 20) that permit the useof force, up to and including deadly force. These ROE measures will reflect the effects thatthe commander intends to achieve. If there are no permissions under Series 20, thenattackscannot be conducted.

6.5 ROE will reflect the LOAC requirement that under no condition will an attack bepermitted where the expected incidental injury or death of civilians and collateral damage to

civilian objects is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantageanticipated to be gained by the attack. In exceptional cases, higher authority or acommander (through an operation order or statement of commanders intent) may direct thatmore restrictive standards be applied. For example, a commander may:

a. prohibit attacks in which any collateral damage is a foreseeableconsequence;

b. prohibit attacks where incidental injury or death of specified classes ofpersons (such as children) or a specified number of persons is expected;

c. prohibit attackswhere otherwise permissible collateral damage to specified

civilian objects is expected; or

d. direct that selected military objectives be disabled rather than destroyed.

The above restrictive standards, as a general rule, would be applicable to missionaccomplishment situations and not to use of force in self-defencesituations.


40/99


27

MODEL TARGETING CHECK-LIST

Target Description:

Grid Ref:

1 Do you have authority under ROE / Orders to conduct attack?

If yes proceed to 2. If noDO NOT ATTACK2 Is the objective on a No Strike/Restricted Target List?

If no proceed to 3. If yesDO NOT ATTACK3 Does the target make an effective contribution to enemy military action?

If yes proceed to 4. If noDO NOT ATTACK4 Will its destruction or neutralization, in current circumstances, offer a definite military

advantage?

If yes proceed to 5. If noDO NOT ATTACK5 Is the attack expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,

damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof (i.e. collateral damage)?

If yes proceed to 6. If no proceed to 11.6 Do your targeting directive and ROE permit collateral damage?

If yes proceed to 7. If noDO NOT ATTACK7 Is there an alternative military target available with the same military advantage, with

less risk of collateral damage?

If no proceed to 8. If yes return to 1 for new target8 Have all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a

view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury tocivilians and damage to civilian objects been taken?

If yes proceed to 9. If no, do so, and then reassess 8.9 Where circumstances permit, has an effective advance warning been given of attacks

that may affect the civilian population?

If yes proceed to 10. If no, issue warning before proceeding to 10.10 Is the attack expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,

damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive inrelation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated?

If yesDO NOT ATTACK. If no proceed to step 11.11 ATTACK PERMITTED - BUT CONTINUE TO MONITOR. IF CIRCUMSTANCES

CHANGE - DUTY TO REASSESS ATTACK.


41/99

Annex B

28

COMPENDIUM OF ROE

1. This Compendium provides rules for the drafting of ROE. The rules are divided intogroups that deal with different areas of military activity. Within these groups there are anumber of series of rules, each of which regulates a distinct activity. Individual rules areselected from the series as required. Spare numbers are provided for the drafting of rulesnot included in the Compendium. Some of the rules include the term (SPECIFY). Thismeans that detail must be inserted to clarify the meaning of the rule.

2. The Handbook is constructed on the basis that the right to use force in individualself-defence or unit self-defence is not limited unless a rule in Groups 10-19 specificallydoes so.

3. The process for drafting ROE from this Compendium is set out below andsummarized in the ROEDrafting Check List.

a. Analyse the mission. Pay particular attention to the policy, operational and

legal considerations that may affect ROE, including higher authority intent orguidance. Determine the character of the operation as involving armed conflict(international or non-international) or as falling outside armed conflict in order todetermine the applicable rules.

b. Identify tasks from Mission Statement in OPORD. The OPORD will containthe mission statement and military tasks that are to be completed to accomplish themission. These tasks need to be identified before any consideration can be given todrafting ROE.

c. Identify any current ROE. This is necessary to determine if changes will berequired.

d. Prepare the ROE. .

i. Identify Compulsory Rules. The first ROE to be considered are thecompulsory rules. The compulsory rules deal with matters that arefundamental to any mission and must be present in every ROE, even if therule selected is one that prohibits the military activity. Every ROE is toinclude a rule from each of series 10, 11, 12, 60 & 70. For any missionbeyond self-defence, a rule from series 20 is required. In situations involvingarmed conflict, measures from series 30 and 32 are required.

ii. Identify Environment-Specific Rules. Appendix 2 to Annex A providesguidance for drafting ROE for environments including land, maritime, air,

outer space, and cyberspaceoperations. The rules that are most likely to berequired are set out for each environment but are not compulsory.

iii. Identify Task Specific Rules. Appendix 3 to Annex A providesguidance for drafting ROE for specific tasks including peace operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief,


42/99

Annex B

29

and assistance to civil authorities. The rules that are most likely to berequired are set out for each environment but are not compulsory.

iv. Review remaining rules in Compendium. Each mission is unique sothe environment and task specific guidance will not always be sufficient.ROE drafters should check all the series in the Compendium to see if anyother rules are required to accomplish the mission.

v. Draft rules. The ROE message should be drafted with ROE listed innumerical order. It is possible, and sometimes necessary, to have two ruleschosen from the same series.

vi. Draft spare rules, if required. The Compendium cannot anticipateevery possible mission and rule that may be required. Where a rule is notprovided, it can be drafted under a spare number using the same format asother rules in that series or as part of a new group or series.

vii. Determine Retained Rules. Decide which rules, if any, are to beretained at a higher level. These rules will remain dormant until a ROEIMPmessage is issued.

e. Validate ROE by comparing to tasks. The ROE must be checked against themission and task to ensure that it supports mission accomplishment within thelimitations set out by higher authority. Rectify shortfalls, if any.

f. Obtain approval. Seek approval from the appropriate level of authority.


43/99

Annex B

30

ROE DRAFTING CHECKLIST

Analyse the Mission

Identify tasks from Mission Statementin OPORD

Identify any current ROE

Identify compulsory rules

Identify environment specific rules

Identify task specific rules

Review remaining rules incompendium

Draft rules, including spare rules ifrequired

Determine retained rules

Validate ROE by comparing to tasks

ROE do not support tasks

Identify shortfalls and rectify

ROE support tasks

Obtain approval


44/99

Annex B

31

GROUP 10-19: USE OF FORCE IN THE DEFENCE OF SELF AND OTHERS

Note: For purposes of self-defence, Forceincludes persons accompanying the Force, Prisoners ofWar, internees and detainees under the control of the Force.

Series 10 Use of Force in Individual Self-Defence

Purpose: To regulate the right to use force in individual self-defence.

Rule

10 A Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in individual self-defenceis permitted, except as follows: (SPECIFY).

10 B Use of non-deadly forcein individual self-defenceis permitted.

10 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in individual self-

defenceis permitted.

10 D Use of non-deadly force in defence of property where there islikelihood that destruction of, or damage to, that property will lead tothe injury of (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.

10 E Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in defence of propertywhere there is a likelihood that destruction of, or damage to, thatproperty will lead to an imminent threat to life of (SPECIFY persons)is permitted.

Note: Defence of property in such situations is an exercise of the

right of individual self-defence, unit self-defence, or the right toprotect the specified persons. Specified persons might includemembers of the Force, own state nationals, all civilians, etc. SeeSeries 40 for measures regarding the use of force to protectproperty where no imminent threat to life exists.

10 F-Z Spare.

Series 11 Use of Force in Unit Self-Defence

Purpose: To regulate the right to use force in unit self-defence.

Rule

11 A Use of force, up to and including deadly force, is permitted in unitself-defence, except as follows: (SPECIFY).

11 B Use of non-deadly forcein unit self-defenceis permitted.


45/99

Annex B

32

11 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in unit self-defenceof(SPECIFY groups or units, e.g. the Force, civilians) is permitted.

11 D Use of non-deadly forcein unit self-defenceof (SPECIFY groups orunits) is permitted.

11 E Use of non-deadly force where there is likelihood of damage toproperty that will lead to injury of persons in own unit or other unitsof own nation is permitted.

11 F Use of non-deadly force where there is likelihood of damage toproperty that will lead to injury of persons in (SPECIFY groups orunits, e.g. the Force, civilians) is permitted.

11 G Use of force, up to and including deadly force, where there is alikelihood of damage to property that will lead to an imminent threatto life in own unit or other units of own nation is permitted.

Note: Defence of property in such situations is an exercise of theright of unit self-defence in situations where the unit or persons inthe unit are in peril. See Series 40 for measures regarding the useof force to protect property.

11 H-Z Spare.

Series 12 Use of Force for theProtection of Others

Purpose: To regulate the use of force for protection of persons who are not members ofthe Force.

Rule

12 A Use of force for the protection of others is prohibited.

12 B Use of non-deadly force for the protection of others in (SPECIFYgroup) is permitted.

12 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, for the protection ofothers of (SPECIFY group) is permitted.

12 D Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent thecommission of a serious crime against (SPECIFY) persons is

permitted.

12 E-Z Spare.

Series 13 Use of Force in National Self-Defence


46/99

Annex B

33

Purpose: To regulate the use of force in national self-defence.

Rule

13 A Use of force in national self-defenceis prohibited.

13 B Use of non-deadly force in national self-defence of (SPECIFYnation) is permitted.

13 C Use of non-deadly force in national self-defence of (SPECIFYnation) when authorised by (SPECIFY authority) is permitted.

13 D Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in national self-defenceof (SPECIFY nation) is permitted.

13 E Use of force, up to and including deadly force, in national self-defence of (SPECIFY nation) when authorised by (SPECIFYauthority) is permitted.

13 F-Z Spare.

Series 14-19 SPARE

GROUP 20-29: MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Series 20 Use of Force for Mission Accomplishment

Purpose: To regulate the use of force for the purposes of mission accomplishment.

Note: Where there is no armed conflict, some nations will only deadly forceonly in self-defence.

Rule

20 A Use of non-deadly forceto accomplish the mission is permitted.

20 B Use of non-deadly force to counter force used to interfere with themission is permitted.

20 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to accomplish themission is permitted.

20 D Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to counter force usedto interfere with the mission is permitted.

20 E-Z Spare.


47/99

Annex B

34

Series 21 Protection of Freedom of Movement of Persons

Purpose: To regulate the use of force in providing freedom of movement of personnel.

Rule

21 A Use of force to prevent interference with the freedom of movementof persons belonging to the Forceis prohibited.

21 B Use of non-deadly force, to prevent interference with the freedom ofmovement of persons belonging to the Force, is permitted.

21 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to preventinterference with the freedom of movement of persons belonging tothe Force, is permitted.

21 D Use of force to prevent interference with the freedom of movementof (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.

21 E Use of non-deadly force, to prevent interference with the freedom ofmovement of (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.

21 F Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to preventinterference with the freedom of movement of (SPECIFY persons),is permitted.

21 G-Z Spare.

Series 22 Prevention of Interference with Ships and Aircraft

Purpose: To regulate the circumstances in which force may be used to preventunauthorised boardingor seizure of ships or aircraft.

Rule

22 A Use of force to prevent unauthorised boarding of ships/aircraft isprohibited.

22 B Use of non-deadly force to prevent unauthorised boarding of(SPECIFY ships/aircraft) is permitted.

22 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force to preventunauthorised boardingof (SPECIFY ships/aircraft), is permitted.

22 D-Z Spare.

Series 23 Warning Shots


48/99

Annex B

35

Purpose: To regulate the use of warning shotsother than in self-defence.

Note: For use of warnings other than warning shots seeSeries 60.

Rule

23 A Firing of warning shotsis prohibited.

23 B Firing of warning shots in the vicinity of (SPECIFY elements) ispermitted.

23 C Firing of warning shots to compel compliance with (SPECIFYinstructions) is permitted.

23 D Firing of warning shotsis permitted.

23 E-Z Spare.

Series 24 Disabling Fire

Purpose: To regulate the use of disabling fire.

Rule

24 A Use of disabling fireis prohibited.

24 B Use of disabling fire to compel compliance with (SPECIFYinstructions) is permitted.

24 C Use of disabling fireis permitted.

24 D-Z Spare.

Series 25 Search and Detentionof Persons

Purpose: To regulate the circumstances in which persons may be searched anddetained, other than in Assistance to Civilian and Law Enforcement Authorities(see Series 111).

Rule

25 A Search of (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.

25 B Search of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) ispermitted.

25 C Use of non-deadly forceto search (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFYcircumstances) is permitted.


49/99

Annex B

36

25 D Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to search (SPECIFYpersons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.

25 E Use of non-deadly forceto disarm (SPECIFY persons) is permitted.

25 F Use of force, up to and including deadly-force to disarm (SPECIFYpersons), is permitted.

25 G Detentionof (SPECIFY persons) is prohibited.

25 H Detention of (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) ispermitted.

25 I Use of non-deadly force to detain (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFYcircumstances) is permitted.

25 J Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to detain (SPECIFYpersons) in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.

25 K Use of non-deadly force to prevent the escape of (SPECIFYpersons) in (SPECIFY circumstances) is permitted.

25 L Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the escapeof (SPECIFY persons) in (SPECIFY circumstances), is permitted.

25 M-Z Spare.

Series 26 Use of Force to Secure the Release of Persons

Purpose: To regulate the use of force in securing the release of persons.

Rule

26 A Use of force to secure the release from custody of personsbelonging to the Forceis prohibited.

26 B Use of non-deadly force to secure the release from custody ofpersons belonging to the Forceis permitted.

26 C Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to secure the releasefrom custody of persons belonging to the Force, is permitted.

26 D Use of force to secure the release from custody of (SPECIFYpersons) is prohibited.

26 E Use of non-deadly force to secure the release from custody of(SPECIFY persons) is permitted.


50/99

Annex B

37

26 F Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to secure the releasefrom custody of (SPECIFY persons), is permitted.

26 G-Z Spare.

Series 27 Indirect Fire (Unobserved Indirect Fireand Observed Indirect Fire)

Purpose: To regulate the use of indirect fire

Notes:1. Definitions of the terms direct fire, observed indirect fire, and unobservedindirect fire vary among nations. Annex D provides generally accepteddefinitions. If national policy dictates a different definition, that definition shouldbe published with the ROE.2. For the purposes of this Handbook, direct fireand observed indirect firearepermitted unless restricted by a rule. Unobserved indirect fire is not permittedunless authorised by a rule.

Rule

27 A Use of (SPECIFY unobserved fire, observed indirect fire, or allindirect fire) is prohibited (in the following situations: SPECIFYsituations, e.g. populated areas)..

27 B Use of unobserved indirect fire is permitted (in the followingsituations: SPECIFY situations).

27 C-Z Spare.

Series 28 29 Spare

GROUP 30-39: TARGETING IN ARMED CONFLICT

Series 30 ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES INCLUDING HOSTILE FORCES

Purpose: To regulate the engagement of military objectives including hostile forces.

Rule

30 A Attackon declared hostile forcesand other military objectives within(SPECIFY area) is permitted.

AMPN: Declared hostile

Roe Handbook Eng May 2011 Print Run

Documents