Republic v AgunoyInterplaying in this case are two (2)
counter-balancing doctrines in the law of land titles: one, the
doctrine offraus et jus nunquam cohabitant,which basically means
that no one may enjoy the fruits of fraud,[1]and the other, the
doctrine that a fraudulent title may be the root of valid title in
the name of an innocent buyer for value and in good
faith.[2]Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeks to nullify and set aside thedecision dated
September 26, 2002[3]of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV No.
55732, which reversed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, in its Civil Case No. 831-AF,
an action for cancellation of free patent, original certificate of
title and derivative transfer certificates of title, thereat filed
by the petitioner against, among others, the herein
respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under review:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for
Free Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land identified
asLot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
containing an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of
Lands. On January 18, 1967, he was issuedFree Patent No. 314450by
the Director of Lands.
On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija
registered Free Patent No. 314450 and issued the
correspondingOriginal Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522in the
name of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio
Perez, represented by Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on the
said OCT of an adverse claim in their favor over a portion of
15.1593 hectares of the property.
On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal
protest docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n) with the Bureau of Lands
alleging that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical to
Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 which had been adjudicated as
private property of said protestant pursuant to a decision
promulgated on October 24, 1960 by the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija in Land Registration Case No. 430, LRC Records No.
14876.On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of
Lands, conducted a formal investigation and ocular inspection of
the premises and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and
its corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently
issued (Records, p.78)
On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr., Tomas, Lilian, Angelito and
Gregorio, Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale
in favor of Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by
the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs.
Said TCT No. 166270 was again cancelled by reason of the concurrent
sale to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT- 166271 was
issued.On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided
portion of three (3) hectares of the property described as Lot 1341
in TCT No. NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in consideration of
the sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (3,500.00)
The following day, he sold the property described as Lot 1342 in
TCT No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez for and in consideration
of the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) in whose
favor TCT No. N-166287 was issued.
On May 12, 1980,the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al.
annotated at the back of the OCT was cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija(Exhibit G).On January 16, 1981, Joaquin
Sangabol subdivided the property described as Lot 1341 in TCT No.
NT-166271 into three lots designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B,
and 1341-C of plan Psd-299875 duly approved by the Land
Registration Commission.
TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-168972 covering
Lot No. 1341-A was issued to spouses Fortunato Para and Araceli
Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and NT-168974 covering Lot Nos. 1341-B and
1341-C were issued in favor of Joaquin Sangabol.
On June 15, 1982, Virginia P. Jimenez sold the property covered
by TCT No. NT-166287 in favor of spouses Blandino and Josefina A.
Salva Cruz for Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P11,500.00)
where TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said spouses. On June
17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz effected the subdivision of the
property into thirteen (13) lots designated as Lot Nos. 1342-A t0
1342-M as per subdivision plan Psd-03-004756 thereby canceling TCT
No. NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT- 174635 to 174647 were issued in lieu
thereof.
On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his
attorney-in-fact Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the property covered by
TCT No. NT-168972 in favor of the Perpetual Finance and Investment,
Inc. in the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P125,000.00). The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was
sold at public auction. Thereafter, the corresponding certificate
of sale was executed in favor of Perpetual Finance and Credit,
Inc.
On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-174643
and NT- 174644 were mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Gapan for
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On February 25, 1985, the
mortgage was likewise foreclosed and the properties were sold at
public auction in favor of the said bank.
On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the property covered
by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo R. Dee for and in consideration of
the sum of One Hundred Twenty [Thousand] Pesos (P120,000.00).
Subsequently, TCT No. NT-168974 was cancelled andTCT No. 196579was
issued in the name ofEduardo R. Dee.On January 5, 1988, the heirs
of Ruperto Perez (oldest son of Eusebio), now represented by Sabina
P. Hernandez, filed a supplemental protest alleging that:
a) Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa Cadatre have
been exclusively occupied and cultivated by them and their
immediate predecessors-in-interest who have introduced permanent
improvements thereon consisting of irrigated ricelands, mango
trees, bamboo groves and other crops;
b) Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated said
parcels of land in the manner and for the period required by law;c)
Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of
87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the amended plan-47200 Amd. as
shown by the relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer
Deogracias L. Javier on July 29, 1977;
d) The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. were
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. (Records pp.
9-10)
The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and ocular
inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva
Ecija, and came out with the following findings, to wit:
a) Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija is
located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly Marawa), Municipality of
Jaen, Nueva Ecija;
b) Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on May 23, 1914 under OCT No.
125 issued in the name of Valeriano Espiritu, pursuant to Decree
No. 15733 issued on May 20, 1914 in Land Registration Case No.
9552;
c) On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in favor of
Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554 and the latter conveyed the same
in favor of the spouses Santiago Mateo and Leogarda Juliano;
d) TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
17471 was issued in the name of Santiago Mateo. (Records, pp.
13;78)
On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division recommended to
the Director of Lands that court action be instituted for the
cancellation of Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., as well as other subsequent transfer certificates of
title issued therefrom based on the foregoing findings
(Underscoring supplied).
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on May 24,
1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Gapan, Nueva Ecija petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed the complaint[4]in this case against several
defendants, among whom are the herein respondents Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., his children, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee
and the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In its complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 831-AF, petitioner Republic
alleged,inter alia, as follows:
30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 were procured by defendant Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation sincethe
property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) at the time the patent
and the title were issued was already adjudicated as private
property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu,
respectively. Consequently, the then Bureau of Lands, now Lands
Management Bureau, no longer had any jurisdiction and control over
the same. xxx xxx.
31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then Bureau of Lands in issuing
said patent.Since the property in question was no longer a
disposable public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. are null and void and should be
cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and
cultivated the land in the manner and for the length of time
required by law (C.A. 141 as amended; see also RA 782) (Emphasis
supplied),
and accordingly prayed for a judgment -
1. DeclaringFree Patent No. 314450and the correspondingOriginal
Certificate of Title No. P-4522in the name of Gregorio Agunoy,as
well as all other subsequent transfer certificates of title
emanating therefrom, i.e., Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
NT-168972, NT-168973, NT-196579, NT-174635 to NT-174647
(inclusive), including all liens and encumbrances annotated
thereon, null and void;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owners duplicate
copies of all subsequent transfer certificates of title emanating
from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the
aforesaid certificates of title;
4. Ordering defendants and all those claiming under them to
desist from exercising or representing acts of ownership and/or
possession in the premises (Underscoring supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996,[5]the trial
court rendered judgment for the Republic, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the name
of Gregorio Agunoy,as well as all other subsequent transfer
certificates of titles emanating therefrom(TCT Nos. NT-166270,
NT-166271, NT- 168972, NT-168973, NT-168974, NT-166287 and
NT-174634 to NT-174647, inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija) including all liens and encumbrances annotated
thereon;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner's duplicate
copies of all the said subsequent transfer certificates of titles
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to cancel the aforesaid certificates of titles;
3. Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in Free
Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 of the Registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, to the mass of public domain except the pieces of land
which were already the subject of land registration
proceedings;
4. Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all those
claiming under them to desist from disturbing the ownership of the
government over the said pieces of land, and
5. To pay costs of suits.
For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the
Rural Bank of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-Spouses Blandino Salva
Cruz and Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby dismissed without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED (Underscoring supplied).
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and
the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija went to the Court of Appeals,
whereat their recourse was docketed asCA-G.R. CV No. 55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a decision
dated September 26, 2002,[6]reversed and set aside the appealed
decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal isGRANTEDand the
decision of the trial court isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby rendered to read as follows:
1. Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have validly
and properly acquired Free Patent No. 314450 and the corresponding
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 over Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija; and
2. The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now covered by
TCT No. 196579 in the name of defendants-appellants Spouses Dee is
likewise declared valid for having acquired in good faith and for
value.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for our
resolution the following issues[7]:
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT
GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR. HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO. 314450
AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS. 1341 AND
1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE, NUEVA ECIJA.
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE TITLE OVER THE PORTION OF LOT NO. 1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO.
196579 IN THE NAMES OF RESPONDENTS SPOUSES EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA
MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR
VALUE.
WeDENY.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this
case.Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
meaning the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit,[8]a procedural rule reechoed in a long line of cases decided
by this Court. For sure, not too long ago, inShipside, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals,[9]citing earlier cases, we wrote:
xxx.Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest
and it may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the
defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2
of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest." To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the
present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer
Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.
The very complaint in this case,supra, filed by petitioner
Republic before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the
time Free Patent No. 31445 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr., the property in question (Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was already
adjudicated asprivate propertyof the heirs of Eusebio Perez and
Valeriano Espiritu, and that at that time, the property in question
was no longer a disposable public land. In fact, in paragraph 27(f)
of the same complaint, petitioner further alleged:
f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of Free
Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot 1341 of Sta. Rosa
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2) parcels of land
applied for by Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was already the subject of an
application for registration filed by the heirs of Eusebio Perez in
1958 before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, docketed as
LRC Case No. 430, LRC Record No. 14876, and wherein a Decision was
promulgated on October 24, 1960 adjudicating Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
Psu-47200as private propertiesof said heirs-claimants.The aforesaid
Decision was already final and executory at the time the patent was
issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. (Except for the
underscoring on as private properties, the rest are of the
petitioner itself).
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic
pleading that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are alreadyprivate
propertiesof the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and
are, therefore, no longer disposable public landover which the then
Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer had any
jurisdiction and control, we are simply at a loss to understand how
petitioner Republic can still profess to be the real
party-in-interest in this case, and insists that the disputed
properties are still part of the public domain. If ever, the real
party-in-interest could be none other than the heirs of Eusebio
Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the petitioner.
Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is
basically one for reversion of private property to the mass of
public domain, petitioner did not implead either the heirs of
Eusebio Perez or that of Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our
decision hereon were to be in favor of petitioner, the real
beneficiary thereof is not the State. And because, as no less
admitted by the petitioner, the lands subject of this case are no
longer part of the public domain, the nullification of Agunoys Free
Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-4522 would not result in the
reversion of the lands subject thereof to the mass of public land.
And the government, not being the real party-in-interest, is
without personality to institute reversion proceedings. So it is
that in an earlier case,[10]we had an occasion to say:
There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State
may bring an action for reconveyance of the lots in dispute. To
reiterate, Lot 2344 is a private property in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the Santiago family. The
nullification of its free patent and title would not therefore
result in its reversion to the public domain. Hence, the State,
represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party in
interest.
We could have, at this point, already writtenfinisto this
decision. Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of those concerned, we
have opted to address the second issue raised in the petition:
whether the appellate court erred in declaring as valid for having
been acquired for value and in good faith the title over the
portion of Lot No. 1342, covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of
the respondent spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee.After
sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting for
decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can longer defeat the better
right arising from the Torrens titles in the names of the present
transferees of the properties, unless and until anyone succeeds in
overcoming the presumption of good faith in securing their
respective titles.For one, even granting as true the petitioners
allegation of a prior cadastral case -LRC Case No. 430, LRC Rec.
No. 148- involving a portion of the lots subject of Agunoys Free
Patent, wherein a decision was allegedly promulgated onOctober 24,
1960in favor of the heirs of Eusebio Perez, which decision,
according to petitioner, was already final and executory, we are
greatly bothered by the fact that none of the heirs of Eusebio
Perez could show having exerted due diligence towards at least
attempting to accomplish the registration of the properties
involved in the said cadastral case, which properties, according to
petitioner and the Perezes, are identical to Lot Nos. 1341 and
1342. Verily, were we to believe the allegations of the heirs of
Eusebio Perez in their own protest with the Bureau of Lands dated
July 30, 1975,[11]there is an express order for registration in LRC
Case No. 430, as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the order of
general default heretofore entered and ordering the registration of
Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated in the Barrio of
Marawa, Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area
of 21.9284 hectares in the following manner:
xxx xxx xxx
From as early as October 24, 1960, when the aforequoted decision
in LRC Case No. 430 was promulgated, to as late as February 6,
1967, when OCT No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. was issued, or a
slumber lasting for more than six (6) years, the heirs of Eusebio
Perez had numerous opportunities to cause the implementation of the
said registration order. Inexplicably, they let this chance passed
by.Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law
aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.[12]And
speaking of rights, one may not sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity.[13]For another, Jose
Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector and Investigator of the Bureau
of Lands, made the following remarks in his certification
datedFebruary 28, 1966:[14]10. Remarks:Attached hereto is the
certification of the Clerk of Court and the Register of Deeds,
Cabanatuan City for ready references in connection with the speedy
issuance of patent in favor of the applicant.It is informed in this
connection that the survey claimants of these Lots, 1341 for
Eusebio Perez and 1342 for Valenciano Espiritu could not be located
in the locality. The lots were already abandoned by them so that in
the year 1941, the present applicant took possession of the land
thru his tenants.Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner
Republic claims that a more recent verification survey conducted
onFebruary 15, 1988by Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, also of
the Bureau of Lands, reveals an anomaly in the issuance of Agunoy,
Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450. Again, we quote from petitioners
complaint, particularly paragraph 27 (c) thereof, to wit:
c) The results of the verification survey conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau of Lands on February 15,
1988 on the premises confirmed the earlier findings of said Office
that Lot 1341 Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered
by Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in the name of
Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of
87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the amended Plan Psu-47200 which
was surveyed and approved on January 21, 1966 in the name of
Eusebio Perez. It was verified likewise that Lot 1341 is within
Barrio Marawa, Jaen, Nueva Ecija.
As between theFebruary 28, 1966certification of Jose
Mendigoria,supra,which led to the issuance of Agunoys OCT No.
P-4522 and numerous derivative titles descending therefrom, and
theFebruary 15, 1988verification survey of Geodetic Engineer
Melencio Mangahas, cited in the aforequoted paragraph of
petitioners complaint, which led to nothing, suffice it to quote
herein what this Court has said inPEZA vs. Fernandez:[15]xxx.
Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land
registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it and
provide finality to land disputes,and inHeirs of Brusas vs. Court
of Appeals:[16]The real purpose of the Torrens System of land
registration is to quiet title to land and stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered the owner
may rest secure without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting on themirador de su casa, to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. Indeed, titles over lands under the
Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends
the stability of the country's economy.Interest reipublicae ut sit
finis litium.
If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey
reports of Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be imputable to either
the past or more recent officials of the Bureau of Lands.
Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated inRepublic
vs. Court of Appeals and Santos,[17]that, generally, the State
cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. In that very case, however, citing 31 CJS
675-676, we went further by saying -
xxx.Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations
xxx, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individuals
In any event, the verification survey conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came almost
twenty-two (22) years after the February 28, 1966 certification of
Jose Mendigoria; more than twenty-one (21) years after the issuance
of Agunoy Sr.s Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967 and its
registration as Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 on
February 6, 1967; and more than eight (8) years reckoned from July
31, 1979 when, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.,
the heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in
favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the meanwhile, for about half a
decade thereafter, ownership over the properties transferred from
one buyer to another, with each and every transferee enjoying the
presumption of good faith. If only on this score alone that the
present petition must fall.There can be no debate at all on
petitioners submission that no amount of legal technicality may
serve as a solid foundation for the enjoyment of the fruits of
fraud. It is thus understandable why petitioner chants the dogma
offraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.Significantly, however, in the
cases cited by petitioner Republic,[18]as well as in those other
cases[19]where the doctrine offraus et jus nunquam cohabitantwas
applied against a patent and title procured thru fraud or
misrepresentation, we note that the land covered thereby is either
a part of the forest zone which is definitely non-disposable, as
inAnimas, or that said patent and title are still in the name of
the person who committed the fraud or misrepresentation, as inAcot,
Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del MundoandDirector of Lands vs.
Abanilla, et al.and, in either instance, there were yet no innocent
third parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioners own judicial
admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the
presumption of good faith. This brings to mind what we have
reechoed inPino vs. Court of Appeals[20]and the cases[21]therein
cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general
rule that the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot
be valid (on the theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its
source) cannot apply here for We are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration. The doctrine to
follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or forged document of sale
may become the ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of title
has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger.
It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger
to speak of. The remark of Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria about the
abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by
itself, be fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even
turn out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as fraud may be
nothing more than the differences of professional opinions between
Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio
Mangahas. But regardless of who between the two is correct, the
hard reality is that the properties in question are no longer
floating objects on aspring that cannot rise higher than its
source, as they are now very much ashore and firmly standing on the
high solid ground of the Torrens system of land registration.
Malabanan v RepublicSection 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.On20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan
filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identified asLot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2]situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,[3]and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
(RTC)Cavite-TagaytayCity, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the
State.[4]Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the
hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property
and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans
wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban andMagdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, includingLot9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that
was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not
cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also
[knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given
by Mr. Velazco.[6]The Republic of thePhilippineslikewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656on
March 15, 1982.[7]
On3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[8]reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of
Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienableanddisposableonlyon15March1982,the Velazcos
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Courts ruling inRepublic v.
Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;[10]hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of
the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our
ruling inRepublic v. Naguit,[11]which was handed down just four
months prior toHerbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion
inHerbietocited by the Court of Appeals is actuallyobiter
dictumsince the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed
the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first
place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only
after the hearing had already begun.Naguit, petitioners argue,
remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the
period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and
the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Courten banc,[12]and on11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1.In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of
June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under abona fideclaim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2.For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3.May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription?
4.Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court inNaguitis the correct interpretation of the
provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement inHerbieto, it
is submitted, should be consideredobiter dictum,since the land
registration proceedings therein was voidab initiodue to lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further
point out that inRepublic v. Bibonia,[14]promulgated in June of
2007, the Court appliedNaguitand adopted the same observation that
the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was
patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for
Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable as of12 June 1945. Apart fromHerbieto, the
OSG also cites the subsequent rulings inBuenaventura v.
Republic,[15]Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic[16]andRepublic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17]as well
as the earlier case ofDirector of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 yearsipso jureconverts the
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the
land sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of
the application, the property had already been converted into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling inRepublic v.
T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of
private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property
and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to
be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
lands.[20]Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are
further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural;
(b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22]Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
5452Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation
of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b)Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording
in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073.First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23]This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only
agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing
of the application to possession sinceJune 12, 1945or earlier. The
Court inNaguitexplained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register
their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
fromJuly 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that thebona fideclaim of ownership must have
been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date atJune 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No,
141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative
to the registration of property, including lands of the public
domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration
of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1)those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under abona fideclaim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree
and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under abona fideclaim of
ownership sinceJune 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of thePublicLandAct]. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor
than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to
presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing
the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it
is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title
by applying with the proper court for the confirmation of his
ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate
of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the
notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the Public
Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of
the possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12
June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original
registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an
imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section
48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within
which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section
48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by
Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002.It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section
are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020
within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter:Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does
not exceed twelve (12) hectares:Provided, further, That the several
periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands
comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall
not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive
right granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until31
December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree,
the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right
to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her
predecessors-in-interest be in possession under abona fideclaim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of 12
June 1945. Following the OSGs approach,all lands certified as
alienable and disposable after12 June 1945cannot be registered
either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of
such an implication was discussed inNaguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established sinceJune 12, 1945or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). SinceJune 12, 1945, as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict
or modify only the words or phrasestowhichtheyareimmediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located.[25]Ad
proximum antecedentsfiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we
adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable beforeJune
12, 1945would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect
even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable.The unreasonableness of the situation
would even be aggravated considering that beforeJune 12, 1945,
thePhilippineswas not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court inNaguitexplained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it
merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective
of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However,
if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section
14(1) is that which was adopted inNaguit. The contrary
pronouncement inHerbieto, as pointed out inNaguit, absurdly limits
the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility
since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is
able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under abona fideclaim of ownership long before that
date.
Moreover, theNaguitinterpretation allows more possessors under
abona fideclaim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be feasible underHerbieto.
This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory
passages fromHerbietoareobiter dictasince the land registration
proceedings therein is voidab initioin the first place due to lack
of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.
There is no need to explicitly overturnHerbieto, as it suffices
that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument
used therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeedobiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case
ofBuenaventura,[26]the Court, citingHerbieto, again stated that
[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject
[property was] classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession That statement, in the context of Section
14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
inBuenaventurashould again be considered asobiter. The application
therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence
submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of
possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the
application of Section 14(1). It is not even apparent from the
decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to
original registration following Section 14(1), their position being
that they had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim
of ownership for over fifty (50) years, butnot before12 June
1945.
Thus, neitherHerbietonor its principal discipular
rulingBuenaventurahas any precedental value with respect to Section
14(1). On the other hand, the ratio ofNaguitis embedded in Section
14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant
had been in exclusive possession under abona fideclaim of ownership
prior to12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to
which betweenNaguitorHerbietoprovides the final word of the Court
on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor ofNaguit.
We noted inNaguitthat it should be distinguished fromBracewell
v. Court of Appeals[27]since in the latter, the application for
registration had been filedbeforethe land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though pronouncesBracewellas the better
rule between the two. Yet two years afterBracewell, itsponente, the
esteemedJustice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling
inRepublic v. Ceniza,[28]which involved a claim of possession that
extended back to 1927 over a public domain land that was declared
alienable and disposable only in 1980.CenizacitedBracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the
attempt at registration inCenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and
disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per
map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980."This is sufficient evidence
to show the real character of the land subject of private
respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a
presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence,which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the
observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry
to contest the application of appellees on the ground that the
property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any
showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did
not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the
first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a
rule, we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals.
Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is
one of them.[29]
Why did the Court inCeniza, through the same eminent member who
authoredBracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five
(35) years and 180 days after12 June 1945? The telling difference
is that inCeniza, the application for registration was filed nearly
six (6) yearsafterthe land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while inBracewell, the application was filed nine (9)
yearsbefore the land was declared alienable or disposable.That
crucial difference was also stressed inNaguitto contradistinguish
it fromBracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to
belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect
to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2)Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court inNaguitoffered the following discussion concerning
Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do, to
beanobiter dictum,but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the
amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration
of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only afterJune 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under
the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule
that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later thanJune 12, 1945, and such possession
being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree.
Naguitdid not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike
in this case where petitioners have based their registration bid
primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively
establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It
is in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the
provision.
A.
Theobiterin Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on
prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible
of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription
are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself
proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code
concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription.
Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription
of ten (10) years,[32]or through extraordinary prescription of
thirty (30) years.[33]Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith,[34]as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for
the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law
that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private
lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus,
the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section
14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.
The Naguitobiterhad adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[36]Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period,
additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how
exactly it operates would emerge. Forthere are in fact two distinct
origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right
to seek original registration of alienable public lands through
possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty
years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x x x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of ownership,for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D.
1073, which made the date12 June 1945the reckoning point for the
first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior
to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least
by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the
Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.
Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil
Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through
uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of
title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period
rule,Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present,
the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on
prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2).
However, there is a material difference between how the thirty
(30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did
under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code
provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite
thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application
for confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether
the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and
continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is
neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38]similar to our earlier
finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b),
which now sets12 June 1945as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who
have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing lawsto apply for original registration.
Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on
extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime
of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold
true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the
principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are
impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set
forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2).
There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code
is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
The identification what consists of patrimonial property is
provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in thepreceding article, is
patrimonialproperty
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of
prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.[39]Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a
declaration by the President or any duly authorized government
officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public
domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be
converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative
definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State
may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State.It is this provision that controls how public
dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420
(2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and
reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of thebona
fidepossessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its
concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the State, although
declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be
used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of
the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance
with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law,
which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very
well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to
liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated
by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA
law.Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military
reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila,
includingFortBonifacioand Villamor Air Base.For purposes of
effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority (BCDA)[40]which in turn is authorized to own,
hold and/or administer them.[41]The President is authorized to sell
portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42]Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that themilitary
lands subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of
government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military
lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands did
not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds
for the conversion of the former American bases
atClarkandSubic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public
service or the development of national wealth under Article 420(2).
Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as
alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as authorized under
the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become
private property and cease to be property of the public
dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are
declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into
patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in
favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling
that the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before
it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription
according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration
under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of
prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession
during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency.Section
14(1) mandates registration on the basis ofpossession,while Section
14(2) entitles registration on the basis
ofprescription.Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under
the aegis of theProperty Registration Decree and the Public Land
Actwhile registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by
theProperty Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year
period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Article 1137 of the Civil Code.The period under the former speaks
of athirty-year period of possession,while the period under the
latter concerns athirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription.Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of
possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree is founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the
Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately
is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to
other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set
forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation.
Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but
no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth
today is seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with
our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the
modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This
is brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to
prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object
of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may
be acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in
the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription,
nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same
time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title.
The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code,[45]provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification.Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by
law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr.
Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission
of ownership, and which would have actually transferred ownership
if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one
cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange,
donation, succession, anddacionin payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily
precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to
patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that
the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership
to the possessor before the completion of the required period of
possession.[47]It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed
that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The
grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary
acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as
patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing
prescription. But after the property has been become patrimonial,
the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor.
Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events
ensue: (1) the patrimonial property isipso jureconverted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods
prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the property
by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the
owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is
the registration of the property under theTorrenssystem. It should
be remembered that registration of property is not a mode of
acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of
ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of
the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition
of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the
system accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought
about by the completion of a period of possession ordained under
the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942,
or since12 June 1945following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49]was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not
preclude such registration.[50]Still, the gap was lamentable,
considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership
over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the
prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed
with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration
in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the
Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such landsbased on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a)Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June
1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable
and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject
to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.[51]
(b)The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable.There must also be an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a)Patrimonial property is private property of the
government.The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b)There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least
ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject
property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis
for registration. While the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence
that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422
of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code.Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State and are inalienable.
Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also
presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to
wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application
needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicants possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed
all the conditions essential to a government grant arises,36and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect
or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased
to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified
or declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands
or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed
through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary
or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law
(Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues
to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1wphi1WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.