RLin Propasderty 2014 (Wiener) Full Outline

8/10/2019 RLin Propasderty 2014 (Wiener) Full Outline

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PROPERTY, LONG VERSIONJ. Wiener, DLS Spring 2014

Whence forth came the saucy interloper! J. Wiener

I. Rationales, Evolution, and Institutionsa. Sticks in the Bundle: !!"e!ated, disa!!"e!ated, #i$ed,

#atchedi. Blackstone" Sole an# #espotic #ominion in total e$clusion of the right of

any other in#i%i#ual in the uni%erse%. Lan#" ad coelum et ad inferos" &f you o'n the surface, you o'n to

hea%en an# to hell. Woul# ha%e (een pro(lematic for airlines, lol&. US v. Causby)S*+S 14-" Lan# o'ners o'n only the airspace

they can reasona(ly use an# that airspace a(o%e that is a pu(lichigh'ay" fu//y (alancing test!

ii. ight to use, e$clude, t"ans'e", (ossess, en)o* '"uits, dest"o*+alte"iii. Li#its:eprinting (oos, (urning your property, /oning restrictions, use

in criminal acti%ity, statute of frau#s, consi#eration, rights of the state)police3Sfire in e$igent circumstances, selling your organs, etc

iv. Relational Ri!hts" 5ot a(out the thing itself, (ut the relationship (et'eenpeople an# the thing

v. Relative Ri!hts" 67s property rights as to 8 may (e #ifferent from 67sproperty rights as to *, i.e. * is the fire #epartment

. -o"#alis# v. Inst"u#entalis#: 9he la' must (e sta(le, (ut the la'must not stan# still :oscoe ;oun#

i. 8ac'ar#looing reliance )stailit*, ("edictailit* %. for'ar#looingincenti%es )ada(tailit*to changing circumstances an# %aluesii. *hoose a social goal, legal rules as instruments to achie%e goals, a#apting

o%er conte$ts

c. T"iadic Relationshi(: /han!e in one 0ill a''ect the othe"si. Institutions" *ourts, Legislatures6#min, arets9ransactions, Social

5ormsii. Resou"ces" Water, lan#, goo#s, etc

iii. /ultu"e" thers" 6utonomyfree#om, etc

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v. Lao" Theo"* 5Locke6:>ne o'ns oneself, therefore one o'ns one7so'n la(or. &f you apply your la(or to physical o(?ects, it gets transforme#into your pri%ate property.

%. E$a#(les" Disco%ery of lan#, culti%ation, i#ea&. Li#itations: Some aspects are not pre#icti%e )#on7t correspon#

'ith the la' as it stan#sa. Loce7s theory #oesn7t really specify to 'hat #egree an#

ho' much 'or is re@uire# to o'n something. 5o/icpouring his tomato ?uice into the sea #oesn7t mae the seahis!

i. Lao" vs. le!iti#ac*" 9he har#'oring thief %s.the trustfun# i#A

. What can (e sol#, an# 'hat is yoursA ilitaryconscriptionA Jury ser%iceA *hil#renA 8o#y partsA Se$ASelling yourself into sla%eryA

7. Locke8s Su''icienc* /ondition" La(or %ests o'nership 'here

there is enough, an# as goo# left in common for othersa. In easie" 0o"ds" &n#i%i#ual property is only ?ustifie# if no

one is ma#e 'orse off (y the taing into pri%ate property. P"ole#" esources are finite!c. -i$" >nly satisfies sufficiency con#ition if the la(or is of

pro#ucti%e social %alue, so that la(or must enlarge the pied. &f this is the case, then Loce7s La(or 9heory is utilitarian!

vi. Pe"sonhood Theo"* 5Radin6:;roperty la' shoul# promote the selfe$pression an# selfactuali/ation of an in#i%i#ual

%. Pe"sonhood9P"o(e"t* S(ect"u#"


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7. . P"ole#s:Whose %aluesA What is %alue#A =o' #o 'e measureA

a. ;ro$ies for &nterpersonal +tility *omparisonsi. ;TP 50illin!ness to (a*6" & 'ill (e 'illing to pay

$ #ollars for this thingattri(ute%. Statistically measura(le, re%eale#

preferences&. 8ut, limite# (y a(ility to pay, maret fla's

ii. ;T 50illin!ness to acce(t6" &f you gi%e me $#ollars, &7ll gi%e it to you

%. Limits" *ogniti%e (iases! ;ersonhoo#sentiment, loss a%ersion, en#o'ment effect)'illing to pay more to retain somethingthey o'n, than to o(tain something o'ne#(y someone else

. Selfinterest %s. alt"uis#an# other moti%ationsc. T"olle* ("ole#" 6ggregate utility ?ustifying cra/y stuffA

?. Posne"" C eal *on#itions of ;ri%ate ;ropertya. Ri!ht to E$clude" Without it, anyone coul# tae stuff,

anyone coul# reap 'hat she has not so'n, #isincenti%e toin%est

. Ri!ht to T"ans'e":3na(les someone 'ho %aluessomething more to o(tain stuff from people 'ho %alues itless, on mutually fa%ora(le terms. )Static, present %alue.&ncenti%e to conser%e )Dynamic, future oriente#

c. 3nive"salit*" *o%er e%erything %alua(le! ;osner gotpush(ac on self through

i$. dditional Pe"s(ectives: utono#*+-"eedo#"*ircle offree#om" insi#e, *iti/en is the master, an# state has to e$plain or ?ustifyintrusion

%. 3$pan# property rights )specifically, to go%t (enefits&. ;roperty maintains in#epen#ence, (ul'ar against the state

e. T"a!ed* o' the /o##ons 5@a"din6:>pen access yiel#s o%eruse(ecause *ost of #epletion share# (y all the users 'hile gains are all to thee$tractor

i. 3$ternality )harm" 9he impact (orne (y others that is not consi#ere# (ythe #ecisionmaer

ii. ain to in#i%i#ual" H1, Detriment to in#i%i#ual of a##e# use" 1niii. &ncenti%e" ace to capture! +se it or lose it, get the H1 an# the 1n

%. ule of capture is clear, (ut yiel#s commons pro(lem

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iv. Solutions"%. Ta$" internali/ing the e$ternality" ta$ on each tree cut #o'n&. 4ivideup into pri%ate property" Still not (earing the full cost

though" Loss of erosion pre%entionA >$ygenA7. Define property right as uota+uantit*, an# mae those

e$clu#a(le an# transferra(le" &n%enting ne' stics in the (un#le=. Rest"ict ccess" Legal fencing on %arious resourcesa. Di%i#e into spatial parcels )(oun#aries, fences. Di%i#e into use or access rights )@uotas, permits, tolls,

pollutionc. *harge a price for access )ta$es, lia(ilityd. +se social norms to #iscourage o%eruse )monitoring,

sanctions

'. P"ole#s 0ith Rest"ictin! ccess:i. 3tilita"ian" Don7t pri%ati/e if *osts I 8enefits

ii. ;ri%ati/ing lan# still allo's e$te"nalities);ollution, (io#i%ersity

iii. /ostsof restricting access" 3nforcement an# monitoring costs money, an#lost access itself is a cost. is of #iscrimination, unfairness.

iv. T"a!ed* o' the nti9/o##ons: 9oo much pri%ati/ation E un#eruse%. 9oo many hol#ers of splintere# rights, too har# to organi/e

colla(oration&. =eller" osco' ioss %ersus the storefronts" Storefront

o'nerships 'ere too strong an# splintere#, no #e%elopment7. 8iotech patents )=eller an# 3isen(erg" +pstream patents early on

increase #o'nstream prices an# #ecrease #o'nstream inno%ationv. The Bounded Sel' 5Nedelsk*6" 9oo much focus on separate in#i%i#uality

in 6nglo6merican property la'

%. 5ot (lasting utilitarian theory, (ut utility comes from +S3, toomuch personhoo# in current system, yiel#s un#eruse

&. &n#i%i#uals flourish (etter 'hen interconnecte# %ia community"Da%i# 8roos

7. Solution" La' shoul# foster interconnecte#ness )**, Wiipe#ia

!. 4o 3tilita"ian P"o(e"t* Ri!hts ;o"kAi. Roe"t 4eacon" Stu#y of forests, reater security re#uces #eforestation

(y promoting future %alue of the forest. *oups an# re%olutions are 5>9goo# for guaranteeing future property rights. St"on!e" ("o(e"t* "i!hts invest#ent

ii. ce#o!lu" Why 5ations


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&. T0o 1o"eas" Su(stantially similar, (ut then #i%i#e# into t'o %ery#ifferent policies a(out property rights

iii. @e"nando 4e Soto" 9he ystery of *apital,


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a. 5e' techmaret EI economic %alues change EI increase#nee# for internali/ation EI property rights longterm%ia(ility

=. 5ot e%erything 'ill (e pri%ati/e#, (ut things 'ere pri%ati/atione$cee#s costs of not pri%ati/ing 'ill (e pri%ati/e#

>. Bene'its o' inte"naliDin!e$ternalities )pri%ati/inga. 6s o%eruse gets se%ere, 'e a%oi# ruin (y pri%ati/ing. ae people nly 'hen small

closenit groupsA &ssue linage an# reciprocity" >nly 'hen thene' la' co%ers many #ifferent resources as a compromiseA Where

(enefits 369L e$cee# costs )Stronger %ersion of Dempset/A;o'ercoercion an# rentseeing )5ot the happycooperationDempset/ share#(enefits storyA

v. The O(ti#al


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. =iceringill7s acti%ity" Neeps #uc meat off the ta(les, (e a#ouche to Nee(le in retaliation for (uil#ing #ecoys.

c. Nee(le7s acti%ity is seen as more socially %alua(le than=iceringill7s. *reation of a maret economy, opinion7sutilitarian (ent reflects strong maret concern

d. Luring the #ucs a'ay is >N, scaring them a'ay is notv. Loste"s:Lo(ster gangs of aine )6cheson" egulate# (y social norms,not (y the la'! Self enforcement" cheap, effecti%e.

vi. 4ile##a o' -i"st Possession" ule for 3fficient *apture can cause&nefficient +tili/ation! 6llocation of esources, 5>9 (y first possession"


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. /onuest" 6t o##s 'ith utilitarian rationale for pri%ateproperty, nati%es 'ere using it alrea#y, at o##s 'ith or#ere#society.

c. 4iscove"*" 6merica is Loose fish" Disco%ery ga%e title tothe go%ernment (y 'hose authority #isco%ery 'as ma#e

i. Disco%ery ga%e title, an# the right to e$tinguish the&n#ian titles" See #ee$Hit$#on: +S coul# stille$tinguish the &n#ian right of occupancy

d. Othe" (ossile "ationales:

i. Occu(anc*:1stoccupancy is the root of titleii. /ultivation:Locean La(or 9heory" +tilitarian

%ie' 'oul# tae lan#, gi%e it to someone 'ho'oul# use it (etter

iii. Distri(uti%e Justice an# ;ersonhoo#" 9oo late!Woul# ha%e to un#o the country, 5ati%es gotcompensate# 'ith ci%ili/ation

vi. P"esent94a* Re#edies%. Go to the le!islatu"e" *ongress has a(solute po'er to recogni/eor e$tinguish &n#ian title, #ee$Hit$#on)1BB

a. e@uires 5ati%es to ha%e enough political s'ay in the firstplace

&. Go to the cou"ts"Passama%uoy v. !orton" &n#ian5onintercourse 6ct )1K0 nullifie# all sales, transference, etc of;assama@uo##y lan#, in recognition of help in the e%olutionaryWar. &n 1K2, the ;assama@uo##y ase# the Dept of the &nterior toenforce the act against aine )trustee #ue to unconsciona(le lan#transfers. *ourt hel# that Do& ha# #uty to enforce.

c. Oil and ;ate"i. Oil: T"iadic Relationshi("%. Institutions:*ourts institute# natural animal rules! ule of

*apture" ha%e to ha%e it in your han#s to o'n it&. /ultu"e" We nee# it for our =ummers.7. Resou"ces" >il" Difficult to fin#, costly to e$tract an# store,

mo(ile, nee# pressure to e$tract, nee# incenti%es to e$tractii. Oil: Rule o' -i"st /a(tu"e:ace to capturee$tract, creates trage#y of the

commons, #iscourages conser%ation especially if multiple e$tractors are'oring at the same reser%oir

%. P"ole#s:Slanthori/ontal #rilling" o si#e'ays an# tap your

neigh(or7s oil fiel#s, Spoiling of the surface, cro'#ing, #amage tolan#, o%eruse of e$hausti(le resource

&. Solutions:;rorationing, @uota for each 'ell, +niti/ation" Wholereser%oir has to (e o'ne# (y one entity, 'hich 'oul# internali/ethe costs of o%erpro#uction an# racetothe(ottom e$traction

a. Othe" count"ies:;u(lic o'ns the un#ergroun# reser%oirsof oil, 'ith uniti/e# leases

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iii. ;ate":'vans v. !erri(eather)1M42, &llinois" Ri(a"ian "i!hts, 5atural%. 6rtificial nee#s, (alancing test

%. 3%an7s employee (uilt a #am that #i%erte# 'ater to 3%an7s mill,erri'eather7s mill 'as out of operation #ue to lac of 'ater

&. Rule: Ri(a"ian Ri!hts, sha"in! o' "esou"ces

a. 6ll the 'ater can (e consume# if nee#s are natural,necessary to sur%i%al )inclu#es cattle, lol. Water cannot (e completely consume# for artificial

nee#s, such as manufacturing or other usesc. 6ffects Stics in the (un#le, limits e$clusion

iv. ;ate": Co))in v. e)t Han *itch)1MM2, *olora#o" Sca"cit*is the#ri%ing factor to moti%ate conser%ation an# #e%elopment

%. Left =an# Ditch *o. #i%erte# the St. Frain cree, another guymo%e# into the area of the St. Frain an# #estroye# the #am use# to#i%ert the stream.

&. Rule: (("o("iation doct"ine" ;riority of right if you get to it

firsta. iparian rights are less useful than appropriation #octrinein *>, (ecause it7s (etter that rights (e concentrate# in thefe' 'ho can mae use, than parcel out to too many, 'ho'on7t (e a(le to mae use of %ery #ilute# 'ater rights.

. &ncenti%i/e settling, #amming, #e%elopment

d. Intellectual P"o(e"t*: Patent, /o(*"i!ht, T"ade#a"kJ

-ai" 3sei. /onstitution "ticle I K:;romote progress of science an# useful arts, (y

securing for limite# times to authors an# in%entors the e$clusi%e right totheir respecti%e 'ritings an# #isco%eries

%. >ther normal property rights are 5>9 in the *onstitution&. ;romote the ;rogress of Science an# +seful 6rts" ;remise# on

some sort of utilitarian analysis, courts are %ery #eferential to*ongress

7. 8y securing for limite# times" erely not in#efinite" 'lrige"6s long as it7s some finite num(er! Neeps getting longer an#longer, lol

ii. 3tilita"ian "ationale" &ncenti%e to inno%ate %. #ifficulty of sharinguse%. &n#uce pro#uction an# encourage release to the pu(lic (efore time

is up

iii. T"ade Sec"ets" )State La' 3S/ K%% etc6 , must 6LS> #isclose in%ention to others&. ight to e$clu#e others from practicing the in%ention, for 20 years

from filing7. Stic in the (un#le" ight to practice, right to e$clu#e others

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=. *an (e o(taine# for any ne' an# useful process, machine,manufacture, or composition of matter, or any ne' an# usefulimpro%ement thereof CB +S* P101

a. *an patent life as a manufacture or composition of matterun#er CB +S* P101 if it is mare#ly #ifferent from 'hat

is foun# in nature an# thus a pro#uct of human ingenuity.. *an (e anything un#er the sun that is ma#e (y man4ia#ond v. /hak"aa"t*,uphol#ing patent on geneticallyengineere# oileating (acteria

c. +S;9>" . -ai" use e$ce(tion 5%M 3S/ K%M6, some copies o.


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a. ;urpose an# character of use )commercial or nonprofite#ucational

. 5ature of the copyrighte# 'orc. 9he amount an# su(stantiality of the portion use# in

relation to the rest of 'or

d. 9he effect of use upon the potential maret for or %alue ofthe copyrighte# 'or?. -i"st Sale e$ce(tion 5%M 3S/ K%6" ;urchaser of a copy can

resell that copyM. *ompulsory licenses for music" people can perform music 'ritten

(y others, compelle# to grant license (ut 'ill get pai#, 1K +S*P111, 11B

a. Way of resol%ing the #ilemma (et'een monopoly %ersuspu(lic access

vi. T"ade#a"k: /o##e"ce clause o"i!in, not IP. Lanha# ct,

%> 3S/ %>%

%. 6%oi# consumer confusion )if same in#ustry, protects (ran# fromnocoffs, encourages in%estment. ;9> egistration is useful.

a. 3nglish courts" 5ot reasona(le person, (ut moron in ahurry

. 6pple %. 6pple, Fictoria7s Secret %. Fictor7s Little Secret&. *an (e in#efinite, until let loose )term (ecomes common, or is

no longer use# for some timevii. O"i!inal and Novel:C*o(ney v. General +oos Cor,. )1K2" Jello

case, Jello 'iggles an# 'iggly is not no%elne', an# that 'or#7s (eenuse# alrea#y in a#%ertising!

viii. Polic* 'o" e$cludin! co(ies" *opying can (e reaping 'hat one hasn7t

so'n, 'here openaccess un#ermines moti%e to in%est%. 8+9, allo'ing similar i#eas an# (orro'ing may actually

encourage competition, inno%ation, pre%ent monopoly, re#uceprices, an# increase pu(lic access

&. Differences (et'een copying physical property or intellectualproperty" &; uses are nonri%al in consumption, lots of peoplecan use it at the same time

i$. ;hen is a co(* TOO closeA

%. ;lagiarism" Fer(atim or too similar to call your o'n&. 6rt 8uch'al#7s script %s. 3##ie urphy7s *oming to 6merica

a. Evidence" 9imingA 8a# faithA 3##ie urphy sa' the

scriptA. Le!al standa"d" *ontract" paper trail that S6S that

;aramount 'oul# pay 8uch'al# for any mo%ie (ase# on8uch'al#7s script

$. Ne0s:"-S v. P, &= 3S &%> 5%%6: @ot Ne0s 4oct"ine%. 6;" 9heft, &5S" >ne pu(lishe#, it7s common )loosefish&. /ou"t:9he ne's is common property, (ut the 'ay it7s e$presse# is

a @uasiproperty right

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7. &5S is ser%ing the maret an# con%eying information, 8+9 stillgot smace# (y the court"

a. -/TSof the ne's are common property, the TI. &n retrospect, this case is an a(erration" *ourts are reluctant toe$ten# protections, an# prefer to #efer to *ongress

$i. Ne0s:/arclays v. #he+lyonthe0all5&%%6: @ot Ne0s,

Toda*%. 9o %iolate rights, ha%e to copy %er(atim an# not gi%e attri(ution&. *loser to the =olmes #issent inINS v. AP

7. &nstant'i#esprea# technology has (een illing off the ne'spapers";retty much #oing 'hat the ma?ority inINS v. AP feare#

=. Search results, (logs, an# ne's aggregators" *onsi#er ho' much(usiness is (eing taen a'ay from the real content pro%i#er

$ii. -ashion:Cheney /ros. v. *oris Silk)1C0" *opyright la' #oesnot co%er #esign patents, &5S %. 6; is narro'. 6lso, *ongress coul#amen# the statute to co%er fa(ric, an# tren#s rely on imitators.

$iii. -ashion:Smith v. Chanel)1-M" *ourt" 9he imitator free ri#er ispro%i#ing a ser%ice to consumers (y competing, an# can mention *hanel(y name. *urrently, 5> copyright to fashion #esigns

$iv. Not P"otected * /o(*"i!ht:%. ;o"ks not 'i$ed in tan!ile 'o"# o' e$("ession)choreography,

speeches or performances that ha%e not (een 'ritten or recor#e#&. 9itles, names, sho"t (h"ases, slo!ans, 'a#ilia" s*#olsor

#esigns, mere %ariations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, orcoloring, mere listings of ingre#ients or contents

7. Ideas, ("ocedu"es, metho#s, systems, processes, concepts,principles, #isco%eries or #e%ices, as #istinguishe# from a#escription, e$planation, or illustration

=. ;o"ks consistin! enti"el* o' in'o"#ation that is co##on

("o(e"t*an# containing no original authorship )stan#ar#calen#ars, phone (oos, tape measures, rules, lists, pu(lic #ocs or

other common sources

$v. S(eeches: 1in! v.


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a. 3tilita"ian "ationale" ;romote pu(lic access an#pro#uction

7. Pe"sonhood" Woul#n7t the right to e$clu#e actuallyhampercontain the message Dr. Ning is trying to sprea#A

=. Suseuent" Estate o' 1in! v. /BS, court rules for Ning

>. ;ossi(le solution" *ompulsory licensing, (ut 'oul# ha%e to changestatute

$vi. Pulicit*+Pe"sona:%. Elvis P"esle* v. /"o0ell: 9he right to persona is lie other

property, can (e inherita(le&. Bette


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M. ;&=93&5S9693D

a. 14" *ongress harmoni/e# +S copyright la' 'ithinternational la' )8erne treaty,

. ecopyrighte# 'ors alrea#y in the pu(lic #omain in the

+Sc. Ginsu"!:The 0o"ks to )ust la(se into the (ulicdo#ain, not o0ned * an*one,(ecause original*opyright 6ct conferre# rights, an# 'hen those rights goa'ay the 'ors ?ust go (ac to (eing uno'ne#.

i. *opyright restoration conferre# rights on theauthors at a lo' price, (ecause the norm is that'ors are copyrighte#

ii. *opyright La' alrea#y has accommo#ation for the


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&. /o#(osin! o"i!inal tune into ne0 son! not O1" eorge=arrison y S'eet Lor# infringes =e7s So L.

. &n some states, you ha%e to pay property ta$ to 39a#%erse possession

c. uiet title" Lie getting #eclaratory ?u#gment saying 'hoo'ns the lan#

iv. Rationales:%. Lockean+Natu"al Ri!hts" e'ar# #iligence an# 'or&. Pe"sonhood" 6 thing you7%e en?oye# an# use# as your o'n for a

long time . . . taes root in your (eing =olmes7. -ai"ness" e#istri(ute lan# from large to small hol#ers=. 3tilita"ian" e'ar# %alua(le use o%er stagnation, re'ar# the user

a. ;unish the sleeping o'ner for not usingpolicing the lan#. e#uce stale claims an# #isputes

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i. Doesn7t mae sense to Wiener (ecause it intro#uces#isputes" Just auction off unuse# lan#, pu(licly!

c. e#uce the effects of mistaes in #ee#si. 6lso #oesn7t mae sense to Wiener, Just ha%e

person 'ho erroneously relie# (a# #ee# lose title,

easy!v. Ele#ents o' dve"se Possession: Stock ans0e": Like a t"ue

o0ne"C%. ctual Possession o' land o" chattels

a. *olor of 9itle e$pan#s 6; (eyon# the space actuallyculti%ate#occupie#! =a%ing an erroneous #ocument thattells you that you are the o'ner can e$pan# the scope of'hat a#%erse possessor 'ins, to 'hat the #ocument says!

&. @ostile 0ith a clai# o' "i!ht" 5> ;3&SS&>5, ust (eoppose# to original o'ner7s rights

a. Intent "eui"e#ent

i. Good 'aith" & o'n it (ecause & actually thin it7smine

%. Sometimes mistaes count )annillo %.orsi ma?ority

&. oo#


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ii. >riginal o'ner no's from ta$ recor#s thatsomething is 'rong! 3asier than sur%eying, morecommon in out 'est 'here properties are larger

vi. @o0 to inte""u(t adve"se (ossession" 9 open an# notorious, then as if goo# faithimpro%ement, an# then lia(ility rule payment if so.

ii. *ourt reintro#uces intent analysis, lol=. Result" eman# to fin# out if o'ner ha# actual no'le#ge or not

'. -inde"s:i. R9he title of the fin#er is goo# as against the 'hole 'orl# (ut the true

o'nerR

%. uali'ications" ultiple people fin# an# then lose the property"Who actually o'ns itA

ii. -acto"s:

%. ;he"e the ("o(e"t* 0as 'ound

&. Intent o' t"ue o0ne"

a. Ste(s the* took to "etain the ("o(e"t*

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i. @annah v. Peel" Sol#ier fin#s (rooch in house,o'ner of property #i#n7t no' a(out it, fin#er coul#eep it

ii. B"id!es v. @a0kes0o"th" 8un#le of cash in shop"fin#er o'ns it more than shopo'ner, shop floor

. Lost+#is(lacedi.


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v. 6s hierarchy got more an# more em(e##e#, there7s su(infeu#ation!%. 9o#ay, lie su(letting&. 9enants in #emense sometimes #i#n7t 'ant to stay on the lan#, (ut

initial hierarchy #i#n7t allo' mo%ement7. 120" Su(stitution, allo'e# for mo%ement, maret in lan#

a. Li%ery of seisin" 9he property right" =a# to (e e$change#'ith some sym(olic transfer in front of community )(eatthe i# so he remem(ers

vi. 3tilita"ian Polic*" estrict future uses of the lan#, #ea# han# control, an#protect %alue of o'n property 'hile con%eying parts to neigh(ors

%. 8+9, ains from tra#es" 9ransfer to higher%alue user&. &ncenti%e to conser%e %alue )anticipating future transfer7. o%e to recor#e# transactions, title searches, an# title insurance

replacing li%ery of seisinvii. @en"*


21/61

%. &ssac 8roa' (uilt a really sna//y house,&ssac has life estate, remain#er interest tosli(lings. &ssac 'ants to tear #o'n themansion an# put up apartment (uil#ings,remain#er parties sue

&. /ou"t:*an mae impro%ements an# nonpermanent in?uries" 'on7t change theinheritance. 8+9, any permanent changesare 'aste, an# 'oul# ruin the inheritance

7. Polic*" 6llo' #octrine of 'aste challenge toLife 3state hol#er, (ecause he can7t sell it orgi%e it to =&S heirs so there is a strongin%enti%e to ma$imi/e shortterm gains an#use up the inheritance (efore transfer

=. ''i"#ative 0aste" +se it all up>. Pe"#issive 0aste" ?ust let it lay there

?. #elio"ative 0aste" &s change for the(etter still 'asteAv. !elms v. Pabst /re(ing" *ourt 'as more tolerant

of impro%ements, >N if life tenant ma#e theremain#er parties7 %alue increase

%. 8roa' limits elms, (ecause theneigh(orhoo# in elms change# completely

c. -ee tail" *an7t sell out of family, en#ures until there are nomore lineal #escen#ents

i. ostly a(olishe#, see p. 1C of (oo&. Non'"eehold" Leasehol# )9o#ay" tenant

ii. Non9(ossesso"*%. 3asements, *o%enants, Ser%itu#es

d. 4e'easile -ee Inte"ests:rant has e$press con#ition,%iolation of 'hich lea#s to forfeiture. *an also ha%e#efeasi(le life estates.

i. -ee Si#(le 4ete"#inale 5-S46" > retains 'hat is calle# a possi(ilityof re%erter 'hich comes on the %iolation of the con#ition, automaticforfeiture

%. E$a#(le:> grants to 3 so long as the property is not use# as acommercial esta(lishment

&. &f 3 %iolates, then > gets it! > currently has a (ossiilit* o'"eve"te" -S7. *oul# get it (ac 'ithout no'ing it opens up to a#%erse

possession pro(lemii. -ee Si#(le Su)ect to a /ondition Suseuent 5-SS/S6" > e$pressly

retains a right of entrypo'er of termination an# can optionally reclaimupon %iolation of the con#ition. 9 automatic.

21


22/61

%. E$a#(le:9o 3, (ut if the property is use# as a commercialesta(lishment, then grantor retains the right of reentry

&. > is not the o'ner +5L3SS he e$ercises the right to tae it (ac7. ;rotecte# against a#%erse possession, lol=. >7s future interest is ight of entrypo'er of termination

iii. -ee Si#(le Su)ect to an E$ecuto"* Inte"est+Li#itation 5-SSEL6: 8recei%es an e$ecutory interest, the future interest is in a thir# party.


23/61

%. &f i an# ii are true, ut iii is 'alse:4e'easile, Vested Re#ainde" Su)ect to

/o#(lete 4e'easance, i.e. someone elsecan tae it a'ay!

&. 3$ample" R9o 6 for life, then to 8, (ut it 8

#oes not maintain the property as a farm,then to *R7. 8" Same as


24/61

ii. /o##on La0 RP:6 'utu"e inte"est in athi"d (a"t*must necessarilyvest, o" necessa"il* 'ail to vest, not later than &% *ea"safter the #eath ofsome person li%ing at the moment the interest 'as create#. >ther'ise, itTs%oi#.

%. Ti#e li#it ased on !ene"ational tu"nove"" lets the grantor

impose a future interest that lingers un%este# for no more than t'ogenerations" present generation plus the ne$t generation )e%eryoneali%e at time of creation, plus another 21 years )age to reacha#ulthoo#

&. -utu"e inte"ests in the t"ans'e"o")person transferring, grantorare not co%ere#, these can linger fore%er! S9+;&D.

7. &f the future interest is void unde" the RP, st"ike it thou!han#enforce the remaining clauses create# (y the transfer.

=. RP nal*sis:a. What are the inte"ests c"eatedA

i. &nter%i%os transfer )'hile ali%e or testator #ies

)transfer upon #eathA atters for 'ho the li%es in(eing are 'hen interest create#

. &s the interest at issue cove"ed * the RPAi. 3$ecutory &nterest, *ontingent emain#er, Feste#

remain#er su(?ect to partial #efeasancec. Who are the "elevant lives9in9ein!at the moment the

interest 'as create#Ai. Li%es in (eing are people 'ho can affect %esting

d. *an 'e (e lo!icall* ce"tain that the inte"est 0illnecessa"il* vest o" 'ail to vest 21 years after the #eaths ofthese peopleA

i. Easie" #ethod: -ind h*(othetical scena"io,ho'e%er unliely or (i/arre, in 'hich the futureinterest coul# still (e 'aiting to %est after the li%esin (eing plus 21 yearsA

ii. 4ete"#ine RP (e"iod:

iii. Dra' a picture of the initial property transfer)con%eyance or #e%ise, (y > to 6.

iv. ar the spot of the moment of the transfer,sho'ing 'ho is ali%e at that time )(efore the spot.

v. &magine then that hypothetically all of these people#ie soon after the transfer )?ust after the spot.

vi. 9hen a## 21 years after the last of these #eaths.vii. Then conside" 0hethe" the 'utu"e inte"est in athi"d (a"t* 5B, /, etc.6 could conceival* still e

lin!e"in!, neithe" *et vested no" 'ailed to vest,e%en after that 21 year perio#.

viii. EF/EPTIONS" rants to secon# charities e$empt);resent an# future hol#ers are (oth charities

i$. T@EN,strie out in%ali# portion, enforce rest

24


25/61

e. RE9%este#, cancel it! 5ot teste#cancelle# at the (eginning.

%. 6#opte# (y 2 states&. 9he perio# is typically either the li%esin(eing H 21 years, or 0

years after the creation of the interest.7. 9en# to eep a larger set of future interests )an# restricti%e

con#itions (ecause some future interests 'hich hypotheticallymight not ha%e %este# in time, actually #o %est in time.

=. Simpler to apply" Watch the real e%ents, a#min easeh. Rule a!ainst 3n"easonale Rest"aints on lienation:

Disfa%ors restraints on right to transferi. rant that prohi(its transfer is not o! Strongly fa%or marets an#

transfera(ilityii. T*(es o' Rest"aint

%. 4isalin!" Just canTt transfer&. -o"'eitu"e" 9ry to sellA


26/61

%. ationales" La(or, autonomy, personhoo#, fairness, utilitarianism&. 9ransition to mareta(ility" ho' far shoul# transfera(ility goA

ii. ;hat !oods+se"vices a"e li#itedA

%. 8o#y parts, se$ 'or, surrogate motherhoo#, #angerous 'or,'hole people, species

&. Sperm an# >%a" >N!7. 8o#y parts" +sually no=. 8loo#" >N>. Se$ 'or" enerally no?. Surrogate motherhoo#" enerally yes

a.


27/61

c. P"ohiition:Sales of certain things are #e(asing topersonhoo#. *ultural trappings that might change 'ithtime

i. ost intrinsic to the e$change of personal propertyfor fungi(le property )money

iv. ffer to pay E more people step for'ar# to #onateA3$ample" L>5 'aiting list for i#neys

M. P"o(h*lactic" 6%oi# coerci%e taing of cells, pressure frompo%erty

v. /u""ent La0 on O"!an T"ans'e"s, =& 3S/ K &M=e:

P"ohiition o' O"!an Pu"chases%. )a" 3nla0'ulfor any person to no'ingly acui"e, "eceive, or

other'ise t"ans'e" an* hu#an o"!an'o" valuale conside"ationfor use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstatecommerce

&. )c)1" 9he term Rhu#an o"!anR means the human )inclu#ingfetal i#ney, li%er, heart, lung, pancreas, (one marro', cornea,eye, (one, an# sin or any su(part thereof an# any other humanorgan specifie# (y the Secretary of U==SV.

7. )c)2" 9he term Rvaluale conside"ationR #oes not inclu#e thereasona(le payments . . . incurre# (y the #onor of a human organ

vi. "ve" v. 3S 5%%6: 9 in%oluntary ser%itu#eun#er 1Cth 6men#ment. S*+S" Supreme an# no(le #uty superse#es

in#i%i#ualTs autonomyvii. Butle" v. Pe""* 5%%?6: /onsc"i(ted lao")oa#'or, ?uries, etc"

*ourt" 1Cth 6men#ment only applies to racial sla%eryviii. 3S v. 1oD#inski 5%6: /onsc"i(ted "oad0o"kis fine

i$. Ivo"* t"ade:

%. 3tilita"ian" allo' sale of i%ory incenti%i/es lan# conser%ation, (utincenti%i/es poaching

27


28/61

a. South 6frica, am(ia" We nee# this! Lan# conser%ation, clash ofcultures, source of income

&. < &9 &S *L36L &LL36L$. Le!aliDed e$chan!es" ;ollution permits, loans, etc

). T"ans'e": Bu*in! Q Sellin! a @ouseJ


29/61

iii. ore mo#ern" Lien" right to reclaim?. /losin!:Seller transfers title )#ee#, 8uyer pays #o'n payment,

Len#er pays loan principal, 8uyer agrees to loan repayment,collateral, Seller pays agentTs commissions, Seller pays offremaining #e(t on o'n mortgage loan, ;ossession

ii. -ailu"e to Pa* Loan:%. Title Theo"*" Len#er has ha# title all along )until (uyer repaysloan in fullG len#er can e%ict (uyer

&. Lien Theo"* 5. nti9de'icienc*C la0:(orro'er o'es no #eficiency payment?. Ri!ht o' "ede#(tionC:perio# of time 'hen(uyer can

repurchase from len#er or from ne$t purchaser, at unpai# loanamount.

iii. & -inancial /"isis:

%. .


30/61

ii. +nity of title" interests must (e in the same grant,not #ifferent

iii. +nity of time" must %est at the same momentiv. +nity of possession" must ha%e e@ual right to access

an# use

c. 5>9 separately inherita(le" Sur%i%ing party gets the 'holed. 5>9 separately transfera(le" Se%ers J9, turns into 9 in *e. +nilateral se%erance" 9urns into 9 in *'. 4et P"otection:*re#itors can7t come after J9 property

unless all parties signe# off on it!7. Riddle v. @a"#on" *ouple hol#s property as J9, rs. i##le tries

to unilaterally se%er. 9ransfer to self is >N=. Peo(le v. No!a""" *ouple o'ne# house as J9, =us(an# (orro'e#

money unilaterally from parents, then #ie#. +nilateral mortgage#i# not se%er J9, it7s ?ust an interest charge! =is interest e$pire#,'ife gets 'hole property.

>. Ri!hts o' /o9Tenants:a. Possession" ;ossess an# use the 'hole property! 5o rightto oust the others, can7t complain if cotenantsuseprofitlease, can7t (ar lessees

. /ont"iution" ;ay e@ually for necessary e$penses )9a$,mortgage, reasona(le repairs

c. ccountin!"


31/61


32/61

e. Rationales in chan!in! T*E vs. liailit*for tort an#crime"

i. *ourts starte# taing War on Drugs more seriously,o%erri#ing property la' #octrineA

ii. 9(y3 acte# to shiel# the economically less po'erfulspouse )'ife, an# no' they nee# less protection #ue toincreasing economic opportunitiesA

=. T"ansition '"o# Status to /ont"act" ;renuptial 6greements areincreasingly recogni/e# (y courts! ;6" ust (e %oluntary, an# full#isclose of o(ligations, #i#n7t 'ai%e, #i#n7t ha%e a#e@uateno'le#ge

l. Landlo"d9Tenant La0: Lots o' chan!e in the la0 ove" the

last =9> *ea"si. ;resent interests, ;ossessory, 5onfreehol#" Leasehol#

ii. &n the past, tenant use# to (e fee simple a(solute, etc. 9o#ay, tenant meanslessee

TYPES O- LESES

T*(e /"eation Te"#ination

Te"# o' *ea"s 3$press )Statute >f During term, (y mutualagreement or eminent #omain

Pe"iodic

Tenanc*

3$press )Statute >f n reco%ation (y licensor

32


33/61

Occu(anc* at

Su''e"ance

9, 'ho 'as once in rightfulpossession, remains in possessionafter possessory rights ha%e en#e# +nusual, %ery temporary

LL must elect to hol# occupantfor another term or e%ict an#collect reasona(le rental %aluefor perio# of occupation

/o#(a"ison o' P"o(e"t* and /ont"act Rules Estate 5P"o(e"t*:

'i$ed "ule, not

a"!ainale6

/ont"act 5/ont"act: ein!

ale to cont"act 'o"

va"ious outco#es6

T8s "i!ht to "escind u(on

LL8s "each

6ll lease clauses, e$ceptco%enant to pay rent, arein#epen#ent

LL7s o(ligations aremutually #epen#ent 'ithco%enant to pay rent if theparties inten#e#

4est"uction o' P"e#ises Lease still intact, 9 must payfull rent

Lease is terminate# if#estruction is not 97s fault

3nconscionale Te"#s Lease enforcea(le Lease is not enforcea(le

ntici(ato"* B"each 'o"andon#ent

L may not sue for futurerents (ase# on anticipatory(reach

LL may sue for future(enefit of the (argain#amages

LL8s Ri!ht to Re9ente"

u(on T8s "each

LL can7t reenter 'ithoutcourt >N )no forci(le selfhelp, 9 can7t 'ai%e

9 can agree in lease to allo'LL to reenter on 97s (reach

LL8s dut* to


34/61

e. /ou"t: ;roperty rule, cannot 'ai%e rights&. Tenant da#a!es the ("o(e"t*: Be"! v. ;ile*)1KM" estaurant

lease" 9o 9, pro%i#e# no changes in (uil#ing structure, an# 9 mustoperate in a la'ful manner, or LL can retae

a. 9 reno%ate# premises, allo'e# %ermin, ignores LL7s

complaints. LL ga%e t'o 'ees notice, an# locs out 9, 9 sues forforci(le entry, 'rongful e%iction

c. /ou"t" LL may not engage in selfhelp, must see courtor#er for #amages an# e%iction (y sheriff. 9 cannot 'ai%e

i. Polic*" 3rrors (y LL, possi(ility of %iolenced. In the cha"t: Estate Rule, LL8s Ri!ht to Re9ente"

P"e#ises u(on T8s B"each,

i. 9enant protecti%e, (ut tenant might (e paying morefor the protection

7. Tenant holds ove" a'te" lease te"#:

a. LL may see #amages for hol#o%er perio#. LL may see to hol# tenant to another lease termc. *oul# (e F3 #ifficult to e%ict" *omplain of (reach (y a

lan#lor#, lan#lor# 'ants rent, lots of le%erage=. Tenant aandons the lease: So##e" v. 1"idel

a. 2 year lease, then marriage falls apart, ;ai# first t'omonths, forfeits this, #oesn7t mo%e in

. LL fin#s replacement tenant, maes lease, an# then suesNri#el for unpai# rent

c. ;iene":isnomer, this is actually LL7s #uty to mitigate#amages

d. 5ot that the LL has to tae reasona(le steps to fin# anothertenant, (ut that the LL can only as for #amages that areasona(le lan#lor# coul# not ha%e co%ere#

i. 5ot the 22 months rent, it7s the amount a reasona(lelan#lor# coul# not ha%e co%ere#

e. P"o(e"t* Rule" LL nee# not mitigate #amages, (ut maysue for rent as it (ecomes #ue, (ecause tenant has the estatein lan# an# is o(ligate# to pay

'. /ou"t: /ont"act Rule" LL must tae reasona(le steps tomitigate, can7t collect rent that a reasona(le LL coul#mitigate

!. Not su"e 0hat the hell this is ut it8s on the slide:

Re#edies 'o" aandon#ent:

i. 6ccept surren#er, sue for #amages limite# (y #utyto mitigate, an# relet on tenant7s account )in states'ithout #uty to mitigate

v. Tenant8s Ri!hts and Re#edies%. Sou"ces" ights state# in the lease, rights implie# an# protecte#

(y la', e%en if not in lease.

34


35/61

&. I#(lied Ri!hts, not in the lease:

7. Ri!hts a!ainst disc"i#ination

a. %=th#end#ent: Eual P"otection /lause

i. Buchanan v. ;a"le* 5%%M6" *ities may not /one(y race

ii. Shelle* v. 1"ae#e" 5%=6" ;ri%ate /oning (y race. /ivil Ri!hts ct o' %??, =& 3S/ K%&i. *ongress can regulate pri%ate sales to pre%ent racial

#iscrimination. +nimplemente# for a century, thenre#isco%ere# in 2ones v. l'"ed


36/61

ii. T"aditional Rule" LL not lia(le for Cr#partiesiii.


37/61

i. 4e#and cu"ve" *heaper the housing, the morepeople 'ant it

ii. Su((l* cu"ve" =igher the rent, the more lan#lor#s'ant to offer it

iii. Sho"t te"#"


38/61

7. 5>9 a(out placing moral (lame an# i#entifying a %ictim, (ut 'hat'oul# (e optimal for society! &nternali/e the e$ternality topro#uce the most efficient result

vii. /o"olla"* 7: The"e a"e t*(es o' t"ansaction costs in the "eal 0o"ld

%. Search, negotiation, an# enforcement costsG pportunism, (ilateral monopoly, 'ealth#isparitiesviii. /o"olla"* =: &n the real 'orl# of costly transactions, entitle#ents should

e allocated so that the hi!he" value use" !ets the entitle#ent 5the

"i!ht6 and the least cost avoide" ea"s the cost o' the ("ole# 5the

liailit*6

i$. /o"olla"* >: Structure the la' so as to "educe t"ansaction costs,("o#ote ("ivate a!"ee#ent, e.!. de'ine clea" entitle#ents, inc"ease

in'o"#ation

$. Illust"ation:

%. 9'o parties, 6 an# 8" 67s unfettere# use harms 8 an# 87s

unfettere# use harms 6&. 9o promote efficiency, 'hoe%er %alues the entitlement more shoul#'in

7. &f the transaction cost E 0, the higher %alue user 'ill al'ays get theentitlement, so use fairness as the rule

=. 8+9, 'hen transaction cost is high enough, it 'ill allo' aninefficient allocation to stay" 5ot 'orth the cost of maing thetra#e!

>. 9herefore, un#er real transaction costs, the initial entitlementD>3S matter

$i. 2acue v. Steene"! @o#es 5%M6" Shoul# Jac@ue ha%e an a(solute rightto e$clu#eA ets nominal #amages (ut huge puniti%e #amages

%. /oase: Steen(erg =omes coul# easily figure out 'hich la'ns they'ant to cross, an# negotiate 'ith those homeo'ners for passagerights!

&. Jury 'as saying that Jac@ue shoul# ha%e not (een an o(no$ioushol#out, (ut that the right to e$clu#e is important

$ii. /ala"esi and


39/61

P"o(e"t* Rule

*hoose if lo' transactioncosts>r, high ris of ?u#icial error

Liailit* Rule

*hoose if high transaction costs=elp negotiate (y setting the price>r, lo' ris of ?u#icial error

Entit* %:

Victi# o'E$te"nalit*

&n?unction a'ar#e#

*hoose if" r, on c. ;ile 'ins" ;e#ric must remo%e 'all

&. Pile v. Ped"ick II" i%e ;e#ric a year! ay(e they7ll 'orsomething out #uring that year

Pile v.Ped"ick

P"o(e"t* Rule*hoose if lo' transactioncosts>r, high ris of ?u#icial error

Liailit* Rule*hoose if high transaction costs=elp negotiate (y setting the price>r, lo' ris of ?u#icial error

Pile 5o0ne"6 Pile v. Ped"ick I

&n?unctionPile v. Ped"ick II

6fter one year

Ped"ick

5enc"oache"6

Pile v. Ped"ick II

8efore one year

3ntitlement is ;ersonal"Sentimental %alue, etc etc,high ris of ?u#icial error

3ntitlement is


40/61

c. ckno0led!es e$ce(tionsto a(solute property rights"3stoppel, laches, refusal to allo' other party on lan# toremo%e the offen#ing encroachment in reasona(le 'ay, #eminimis incursion

d. No (iece o' "eal state can e "e(laced 0ith a su# o'

#one*, ho0eve" la"!ee. So non9'un!ilethat money coul# ne%er compensate'. *ourt is concerne# a(out 'hat 'oul# effecti%ely amount to

("ivate e#inent do#ain

!. Note: 8ase# on %aluations an# costs, shoul# ha%e come toa *oasean (argain

Ge"a!osian

v 3nion

Realt*

P"o(e"t* Rule


Liailit* Rule


Ge"a!osian5o0ne"6 Ge"a!osian

Theate"

5enc"oache"6

9=3 3Z*3;9&>5S"De minimus stuff, etc


3ntitlement is r, high ris of ?u#icial error

Liailit* Rule


Raa

5o0ne"6

Not !ood 'aith: ("o(e"t*

o0ne" !ets the title

I' !ood 'aith: ("o(e"t* o0ne" !ets

da#a!es/as(e"

5enc"oache"6

I' !ood 'aith" enc"oache" !ets da#a!es'o" the i#("ove#ent, ut title !oes to

Raa


3ntitlement is


41/61

$iv. Nuisance: Non9(h*sical inte"'e"ence 0ith en)o*#ent o' land%. What 'e call [;rogress7 is the e$change of one 5uisance for

another )3llis&. T"aditionall*, in)unctionan# reasona(leness (alancing test

a. =arm %. utility7. 8ut to#ay, noise and (ollution a"e (h*sical

a. 4istinctions et0een t"es(ass and nuisance a"e

"eakin! do0n

. *ala(resi an# elame#" We shoul#n7t e%en (e thininga(out these as separate

=. Pulic Nuisance 5RS& To"ts6 K&%

a. 3n"easonaleinterference 'ith a right common to thepu(lic

. 5oise from (rothels an# (ars, pollution, usually ha%e to (e(rought (y pu(lic official

>. P"ivate Nuisance 5RS& To"ts6 K&&a. &ntentional an# unreasona(le, or. +nintentional an# negligentreclessa(normally #angerousc. 5egligence E unreasona(le E =arm I +tilityd. K&?5a6:3n"easonale" =arm to ; I +tility of D7s

con#ucti. Less (right line, more stan#ar#(alancing

e. K&?56:=arm to ; is serious an# compensation 'oul# notmae D7s con#uct infeasi(le" Sounds like st"ict liailit*

Nuisance P"o(e"t* Rule


Liailit* Rule


O0ne" Sustantial invasion

Intentional, and @a"#

3tilit*

3nintentional and Ne!li!ent

3tilit* ha"#, and:

K&?56: Se"ious, ut de'endant could

co#(ensate

Enc"oache" Non9sustantial

3tilit* @a"#

Non9ne!li!ent

3ntitlement is ;ersonal"

Sentimental %alue, etc etc,high ris of ?u#icial error

3ntitlement is


42/61

d. +tility I =arme. /o#in! Into Nuisance 4oct"ine:

i. -ai"ness" *oal plant 'asn7t #oing any harm until;laintiffs mo%e# here!

%. 8ut, fair to (ur#en the poorA

ii. 3tilita"ian" &f the party that 'as there first cannot(e sue# for nuisance, race to capture for no$iousfacilitiesA

M. Boo#e" v. tlantic /e#ent:4a#a!es Re#ed* 'o" G"ou(s o'Plainti''s

a. ;laintiff is looing for an in?unction, *ourt is 'orrie# a(outshutting #o'n the entire cement factory

. ;ro(lem" 5o in?unction H


43/61

7. *onflicting, nonreciprocal uses=. Difficult monitoring>. &neffecti%e sanctions?. 3nforcement of the official rules (rea up the official norms

iv. Schild v. Ruin" Ju#ge" 9his case shoul# not (e in court!

%. u(ins7 i# eeps 'aing up (ecause of (aset(all, #ouche(aggeryensues&. +nneigh(orliness" 9oo ine$pensi%e for la'yerneigh(ors to get

into the legal system, *onflicting uses, 3n# of relationship in sight7. o(ert . /lassi'ication

a. ''i"#ative" ight of 'ay, hol#er can use ser%ient

tenement. Ne!ative" estrictions )pollution, etc, agree# among the

parties, em(e##e# in property interesti. T"aditional" airflo', light, lateral support )a%oi#

collapse, flo' of artificial streamii. Ne0" *onser%ation easement

?. /"eation

a. E$("ess inst"u#ent" rant )& con%ey a right of 'ay %s.eser%ation )& reser%e the right of 'ay

. O(e"ation o' La0 5i#(lied6" 3asement (y implication)prior use, necessity )a%oi#ing the stran#ing of resources,

consi#er social costs of isolating that lot %s. costs onser%ient lot

c. P"esc"i(tion: dve"se use:;roperty ne$t to (each, an#neigh(orhoo# i#s cross lan# to get to (eachA 3%entually,easement (y prescription!

M. ;ho #a* en'o"ce

a. ((u"tenant:>'ner of #ominant lot o'ns the easemento%er the ser%ient lot, runs 'ith lan#

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i. ;ossi(le to ha%e easement su(?ect to con#ition,'here easement shoul# lapse or e$pire 'hencon#ition is %iolate#

. In G"oss" &n#i%i#ual person o'ns easementi. 3%en if the lan# conser%ation trust mo%es, the

easement is still there!. Re#edies availale" Damages, in?uncti%e relief. Te"#ination *:

a. E$(i"ation" 3n# of estate, %iolation of con#ition in#efeasi(le easement, necessity en#s, #estruction

. Ease#ent holde"" elease )gi%es (ac, a(an#onment,estoppel, e$cessi%e use )rare

c. Se"vient Tene#ent O0ne"" erger )com(ine #ominantan# ser%ient tenements, sale to (ona fi#e purchaser 'ho#oesn7t no' a(out it, prescription )tae (y a#%erse use

d. 7"d Pa"t*" *on#emnation )eminent #omain, mortgage

foreclosure )if mortgage 'as prior to easement7%. Sco(e o' Ease#entsa. E$("ess Ease#ent" Loo to clear terms, the primary

purpose, then 'hether (ur#en is reasona(le. P"io" use Ease#ent" Scope of prior use, then reasona(ly

foreseea(le future usesc. Necessit* Ease#ent" easona(le nee#s %. easona(le

(ur#end. P"esc"i(tion" Scope of a#%erse usee. -aus v. /it* o' Los n!eles: E$("ess Ease#ent, ("i#a"*

(u"(ose

i. rante# right of 'ay for purposes of an electricrail'ay to the city, L6 remo%e# rail'ay an# put in(us system

-aus v.

/it* o' Los

n!eles

P"o(e"t* Rule


Liailit* Rule


O0ne"


45/61

ii. 8ro'n (uys a#?acent tract 8, plus easement across6, from 8 to roa#

iii. 8ro'n then (uys tract * an# starts to (uil# a homeacross 68 line

iv. Foss" ou7re using easement to get to *! & only

sol# you easement to get to 8v. /ou"t" ;ractical" 9his is e$cee#s the scope ofeasement, lia(ility rule for Foss, nominal #amages

%. i%ing a property rule in?unction 'oul#mae it really har# for parties to (argain(ecause Foss is a #ouche

!. nce it stoppe# running therailroa#, it7# re%ert (ac to the +S

&. When +S sol# it to the 8ran#ts, +S ept there%ersionary interest

h. Reese v. Bo"!hi: Ease#ent * ("io" use v. Ease#ent *

necessit*

i. 8orghi (ought property, (uilt aroun# eese,e%entually surroun#e# eese, eese coul#n7t get toroa#

ii. 3nde" Ease#ent * ("io" use, eese 'oul# 'in apath through 8orghi7s house lol

iii. 3nde" Ease#ent * necessit*, eese 'oul# 'inanother path, least (ur#ensome to achie%e access

iv. 5ee# property rule, money #oesn7t fi$ this!i. I#(lied Ease#ents: &f it7s implie#, may(e that7s an

in#ication that the parties ha# #ifficulty maing an e$pressagreement an# shoul# get a lia(ility rule in court

i. @en"* v. 4alton" &t7s no har#ship to secure aneasement (y #ee#! ae them (argain, an# a%oi#confusing oral agreements

ii. /ont"astin! vie0: She(a"d v. Pu"vine" aeclose frien#s an# neigh(ors (argain on paperA3m(arrassing an# calling frien#ships into @uestion,this is a transaction cost! +se lia(ility rule.

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iii. /OVENNTS 5La06%. Ele#ents o' a Real /ovenant

a. ''i"#ative" ;romise to #o something. Ne!ative" ;romise not to #o somethingc. Se"vience and 4o#inance"

i. *an ha%e one ser%ing )(ur#en the #ominant)(enefit

ii. *an also (e (oth #ominant an# ser%ient"5eigh(orhoo# pact to not (uil# a syscraper

d. *an (e a((u"entant, run 'ith the lan#e. *an (e in !"oss, (elongs to someone'. /"eation:=as to (e an e$press instrument, Statute of


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iii. Touch and /once"n" ust reasona(ly relate to theco%enanting party7s use of the lan#

%. 9ouch an# *oncern re@uirement is areasona(leness test, e%aluating (enefits an#costs of 'hether to mae the (ur#en run

iv. 5otice to Successor is not re@uire#, (ecause it7ssuppose# to protect the successor any'ayv. 5o hori/ontal pri%ity re@uire#, as long as they li%e

there 'e7re gonna hol# them to the promise theyma#e

vi. T"aditional co##on la0" Successor must succee#to the same interest as the pre%ious party! >'ner too'ner

vii. Ne0 RS "ule" 6ny possessory interest! >'ner torenter is >N

k. Te"#ination o' /ovenant"

i. E$(i"ation" *an 'rite in a specifie# perio#, or%iolate a termii. 4o#inant Tene#ent" elease, (uy out #ominant

o'nersiii. Se"vient Tene#ent" recom(ineiv. 7"d(a"t*" *on#emnation (y go%, or mortgage

foreclosurel. Re#ed*:Just Damages

&. Ea!le Ente"("ises v. G"oss: Touch and /once"n

a. 6greement" >ne party supplies 'ater, other party pays CB ayear

. rosses" We #on7t 'ant to pay, 'e 'ant to #ig our o'n'ell

c. 3agle 3nterprises sues to mae them pay" 9hey promise#!d. /ou"t:8ur#en #oesn7t run, (ecause 'ell 'ater #oesn7t

touch an# concerni. ;hateve" the thin! is has to di"ectl* a''ect the

o0ne"shi( o' the land, CB an# 'ell 'ater #oesn7taffect it

e. Bette" a"!u#ent" *ommunity is (etter off if there7s onlyone central 'ell, less contamination, Scarcity of 'ater'oul# then actually affect the %alue an# use of the lan#

'. Toda*:9ouch an# *oncern re@uirement is a reasona(lenesstest, e%aluating (enefits an# costs of 'hether to mae the(ur#en run

iv. SERVIT34ES 5Euitale6" 3@uity, #o fairness an# ?ustice,in?unction

%. =as superse#e# real co%enants, (ut 'e still hear real co%enantterms. 9hese are enforcea(le (y in?unction, not #amages

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&. -e0e" "eui"e#ents, easie"to ha%e (ur#en(enefit run 'ith thelan#

a. ''i"#ative" ;romise to #o something. Ne!ative" ;romise not to #o somethingc. Se"vience and 4o#inance"

i. *an ha%e one ser%ing )(ur#en the #ominant)(enefitii. *an also (e (oth #ominant an# ser%ient"

5eigh(orhoo# pact to not (uil# a syscraperd. *an (e a((u"entant, run 'ith the lan#e. *an (e in !"oss, (elongs to someone'. /"eation:

i. *an (e e$press instrument, or implie# )pree$istingcommon plan

!. E$ce(tions"i. *hange# con#itions such that there7s har#ship for

ser%ient tenement, an# restriction no longer fills itsinten#e# purposeii. 6lso, racist co%enants are 5>9 o, along 'ith other

pu(lic policy e$ceptions )Shelley %. Nraemerh. Ele#ents 'o" Successo" on Se"vient Side: Bu"den "uns

0ith the land i':

i. Intent to ind successo"s

ii. Touch and /once"n" ust reasona(ly relate to theparty7s use of the lan#

%. 9ouch an# *oncern re@uirement is areasona(leness test, e%aluating (enefits an#costs of 'hether to mae the (ur#en run

iii. Notice to Successo"s:ae sure they no', an#


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iv. 7"d(a"t*" *on#emnation (y go%, or mortgageforeclosure

k. Re#ed*:&n?uncti%e elief7. Tulk v. 6 is the collecti%e representati%e of all the

people 'ho D> ha%e %ertical pri%ity!a. Legal inno%ation" 8eneficiary rights are no' represente#

(y the =>6 'hich can (ring enforcement action. *hanges" li(erali/ation of enforcement" =>6 is no' the

enforcer7. 4is(utes" >ften a(out fences, Spite fences, house colors=. Non9Reci("ocal /ovenants"

a. &f the #e%eloper is selling these parcels in se@uence an# notall at once, #oes the co%enant really (enefit lan#o'ners'ho (uy in (eforehan# an# thus are not one of theassigns (ecause they alrea#y o'nA

. /ou"ts" &f there7s a common plan an# (ur#ening(enefitingthe 'hole neigh(orhoo#, 'e7ll treat as an enforcea(lesimultaneous co%enant )instea# of re@uiring simultaneous'ith transfer of lan#

>. #urner v. /rocato: 3%en the one house not go%erne# (y =>6 isstill re@uire# to follo' =>6 rules, =>6 'ins (ecause there 'as acommon plan to go%ern the 'hole neigh(orhoo#, an# 'as on

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notice #ue to sign that sai# ;oplar =ill" 6 estricte# esi#entialDe%elopment

?. 2udicial ove"si!ht o' @O "ules" Which mo#elAa. /ont"act+/onsent #odel" &f the successor ha# notice that

co%enantser%itu#e 'as applica(le 'hen (uying into the

neigh(orhoo#, then it applies!i. 4e'e" to @O "ules. Local !ove"n#ent #odel" =>6 is acting lie a @uasi

go%ernment, 'orrie# a(out coercioni. 9he more ma?oritarian an# the less unanimous, the

less consensual it loos, less de'e"ential to @O"ules

c. d#in a!enc* #odel" easona(leness test, ar(itraryan# capricious

i. ight incorporate cost(enefit analysis, lessde'e"ential

d. /o"(o"ate oa"d #odel" oo# faith, #eference to(usiness ?u#gment rule, less de'e"entiale. T"ust:


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>. St"on! class ele#ent to his decision: ("otect ("o(e"t* "i!hts o'

detached sin!le 'a#il* ho#es

?. >pportunity to protect property rights (y pre%enting nuisances

Euclid and

onin!

P"o(e"t* Rule


Liailit* Rule


O0ne" Bth6men#ment" 6 taing ifnot for pu(lic use, go%can7t tae

Bth6men#ment" 6 taing e.g. (yeminent #omain, go% must pay

Gove"n#ent 3ucli#" 6#opt /oningrestriction!

;ay the go% an impact fee to (ypass/oning or#inances


3ntitlement is ptimistic story! 3ach interest group

represents some interest in society, preferences are alrea#y forme#a. ost optimistic %ersion" 6ny preference an in#i%i#ual can

ha%e is alrea#y represente#, an# in city hall, all thesepreferences are reconcile# an# an optimal #ecision is ma#e!

&. Re(ulicanis#" ;eople #o 5>9 start 'ith no'n preferences,opinions are shape# through #eli(eration an# interaction 'ith eachother!

a. ost optimistic %ersion" 9he 'hole to'n comes out to

participate, preferences shape# an# forme# together7. Pulic /hoice Theo"*" *riticism of &nterest roup ;luralism" Weshoul# 5>9 e$pect interest groups to reflect the interests in society

a. =ar# to moti%ate people to organi/e 'hen the (enefits go to?ust e%eryone

. &nterest groups are strongest 'hen the costs are o%ercome(y the (enefits of organi/ing

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c. &nterest groups form selecti%ely, 'here they ha%e the mostto 'inlose

d. Olsen: Lo!ic o' collection

i. La's gi%ing general (enefits get the freeri#erpro(lem, un#er(i# in effort

ii. La's gi%ing e$cusi%e (enefits #on7t get freeri#erpro(lem, strong effortiii. *oncentrate# costs an# (enefits create strong

interest groups, #istortion=. Tieout @*(othesis" ultiple ?uris#ictions 'ith #ifferent policiesA

Just choose 'hich ?uris#iction you 'ant to li%e in! 6ssumesinformation an# mo(ility

a. ;eople 'ill sort themsel%es to the policy pacage that suitsthem (est

. ;ro(lems" o(ilityA Longterm mortgageA 5oinformationA &ncomplete informationA

i. 6lso, 'hat if some actors ha%e more mo(ility, i.e.in#ustries are more mo(ile than the 'orersAc. ace to the (ottom to attract (usinessesA

iv. Should cou"ts e st"in!ent o" de'e"ential to local !ove"n#entsA

%. 3tilita"ianis#" &mpro%e social 'ell(eingA esponsi%e to theseconcernsA

&. -ai"ness" o%ernment preferences" 8u#get concerns E#iscriminate against the poorA *ut ser%ices to #ri%e them outA

7. Euclid v. #le" Realt*" Sutherlan#" 8e #eferential to localgo%ernment!

v. O)ectives and Inst"u#ents: ;hat a"e the o)ectives o' Donin!A

%. 1a"kkainen" *onsumer surplus )personhoo#, norms" Neep thingsthe same 'ay!

a. ;ro(lem" *osts high, antichange, har# for people to mo%ein

. ;eople hurt" ;otential occupants )(ut #on7t ha%e stan#ing,#e%elopers can sue on their (ehalf

&. O)ectives" 3$ternality control, consumer surplus, re#istri(ution)e@uity

7. Inst"u#ents: ;ri%ate o'nership, social norms, lia(ility )nuisancela', co%enantsser%itu#es, /oningregulationtaings, pu(lico'nership, tie(out competition

vi. 2udicial Role: s(ect"u# '"o# de'e"ence to st"in!ent "evie0

En'o"ce

54e'e"6

Rationalit*

Test

Reasonaleness

Test

Not en'o"ce

5St"in!ent

Revie06

onin!

5Politics6

3ucli#,5ecto',8elle 9erre,Dinan,

8aer 8uchanan %.Warley, 3.*le%elan#

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*le(urne

/ovenants

5r, high ris of ?u#icial error

Liailit* Rule


O0ne" >th#end#ent" &f thego%ernment 'ants to tae (utnot for pu(lic use, thengo%ernment 'ill ha%e tonegotiate for title as a regular

>th#end#ent" 9aing for pu(lic use iso if go%ernment pays o'ner ?ustcompensationE#inent do#ain)go%7t taes titleRe!ulato"* takin!)go%7t imposes

53


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(uyer

7"d#end#ent" o%7tcannot @uarter troops inpri%ate homes #uring

peacetime

restriction, o'ner alleges it7s so se%ere asto (e a taing

Gove"n#ent egulation that is not ataing

*onfiscation that is not ataing" N5>WSAA

c. The 4ut* to /o#(ensate:i. ;rotects pri%ate right to e$clu#e" ou W&LL reap 'hat you so'

ii. 8ut only %ia a lia(ility rule" 6t least it softens the (lo' of a go%ernment

taingiii.


55/61

%. 9he oral =a/ar# pro(lem of insurance, lol. Just go ahea# an# #ocrappy things, go%ernment 'ill pay us 'hen they tell us to stop!

d. -OR P3BLI/ 3SECi. Limit on po'er to taeA i.e. o%ernment can 53F3 tae for nonpu(lic

use!

%. 9his is the ma?ority %ie'ii. Why #o 'e nee# a pu(lic use limit on the po'er to tae, if e%ery taing

incurs lia(ility to compensateA%. 8ecause 'e still #on7t lie the go%ernment taing your stuff, e%en

'ith XXX. ;rotection for personhoo#, lie in Neloiii. Be"#an v. Pa"ke")S*+S 1B4" 8roa# array of pu(lic use purposes"

;hysical, monetary, spiritual, aesthetic, 'ell(eing, etc etciv. @a0aii @ousin! v. N! *oterminous 'ithpolice po'er, a sort of antitrust la'

v. 1elo v. Ne0 London)S*+S"


56/61

5B"i!ht Line6

Gove"n#ent


3ntitlement is 9 6 96N&5, ;enn *entral is stilla(le to use its property, The* still could !et a "easonale"etu"n on invest#ent out o' thei" "easonale

invest#ent9acked e$(ectations

i. This is the le!al standa"d

d. P"ole#: ho' can 'e conclu#e that ;enn *entral can onlye$pect that they7re going to eep the train station looingthat 'ay fore%erA

e. /"iticis#s:


57/61

'. Dissent" ehn@uist" *onferring a (enefit to the pu(lic is ataing

i. /ou"t holds othe"0ise in this case, and Donin!

cases

=. @adacheck)11B" M.> di#inution, not a takin!, ecause its

("eventin! a (ulic ha"#Without the po'er to protect thehealth an# comfort of the community, 'e 'oul# fi$ a city fore%erin its primiti%e con#itions.

>. Euclid)again" Gov can "e!ulate 'o" nuisance cont"ol?.


58/61

&. &mplicit limitation in the property right to(egin 'ith, e%en (efore legislature enacte#

7. 5ot a taing, (ecause it7s not remo%ing astic in the (un#le

d. 3nans0e"ed uestions"

i. 100 of 'hatAA W3 9+S9 9=3 S9693AA

iv. Ri!hts o' ccess%. 3$clusion has the cost of restricting access" What7s the right

(alanceA

&. pen to pu(licA 9hen o'ner7s right toe$clu#e is attenuate#!a. roup of Jeho%ah7s Witnesses 'ante# to #istri(ute

literature in a to'n, the to'n is o'ne# (y a company, thisis pri%ate property! ;olice arreste# the group an# (oote#them out of the to'n.

. ;ri%ately o'ne#, (ut no gates, open to pu(lic, functionallya to'n!

c. *ourt 'as concerne# a(out po'er relationship (et'een'orers an# company an# potential isolation

7. State v. Shack" e#ical an# legal ai# 'orers ha%e the right to

access!a. 5J farm'orers li%e on the farm, me#ical an# legal'orers 'ant to tal to 'orers, o'ner says 5>, pri%ate!

. 5JS*" e#ical an# legal ai# 'orers ha%e the right toaccess!

c. ore lie lan#lor# tenant relationship! 5o lease, (ut pay'as re#uce# so they 'ere implicitly paying rent

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d. 8argaining po'er is e%en lo'er here! igrant 'orers aree%en more %ulnera(le

e. &n arsh, the more pu(lic, the 'eaer the right to e$clu#ei. =ere, the more isolate# the 'orers, the 'eaer the

right to e$clu#eA

'. Inalienailit* "ule" *an7t 'ai%e access to me#icallegalai#, charities, %isitors, press, etc!. emara(le" tests ho' far courts can change the common

la' 'ithout it (eing a taing=. 2udicial takin!" &f common la' is e%ol%ing, an# there7s ne'

?u#icial property rule, #oes the go%7t ha%e to payAAa. *ourts alrea#y #efine common la' property rights. *an

courts change property rightsA. Do 'e trust the courts more than legislati%e politicsAc. 5> *L36 65SW3.

>. P"uneYa"d Sho((in! /ente" v. Roins:

a. Stu#ents 'ante# to set up ta(le to #istri(ute political lit.. S*+S" &t is 5>9 a taing for *6 supreme court to grantaccess to the stu#ents

c. W= 5>9AAi. ;hysical in%asion, or nonphysical in%asionA

ii. Degree of intrusion, (ur#en, #iminutionAiii. >penness of propertyA

%. 3S, consi#er these malls to (e lie the ne'to'n centers

iv. Degree of pu(lic (enefitAv. 5ot part of title to (egin 'ith )LucasA

P"uneYa"dv. Roins P"o(e"t* Rule*hoose if lo' transactioncosts>r, high ris of ?u#icial error

Liailit* Rule*hoose if high transaction costs=elp negotiate (y setting the price>r, lo' ris of ?u#icial error

O0ne" Ri!ht to e$clude, ("otect

a!ainst inte"'e"ence

Takin!: Lo"etto, 1aise" etna, Nollan

Pulic P"uneYa"d: State

/onstitution can !"ant

access 0ithout takin!C

("o(e"t*, su)ect to ti#e,

(lace, and #anne"

"est"ictions3ntitlement is ;ersonal"Sentimental %alue, etc etc,high ris of ?u#icial error

3ntitlement is


60/61

?. Ri!ht to Li'e v. a"on ;o#en8s /linic" ight to protest at familyplanning clinics, any of these cases turn on ho' much theprotesters are interfering

a. ight of ;ri%acy as e$tra stic %s. political speech. S*+S" 8uffer /ones

M. When shoul# ights of 6ccess trump the ight to 3$clu#eAa. Degree of intrusion, (ur#en, #iminutionA. >penness of propertyc. &nterference cause# (y granting accessAd. Special rights to e$clu#eAe. Degree of pu(lic (enefit from access'. >ther factors

v. E$actions%. ;@Y !"ant (e"#it ut e$act so#ethin! in "etu"nA

a. e#istri(ution. E''icienc*: 836 53Z+S (et'een the easement an# the #enial of thepermit

c. No ne$us" Denying the permit to e$pan# #ue to (locingthe %ie' of the (each has nothing to #o 'ith (uil#ing theeasement across the pri%ate (each

=. 4olan v. Ti!a"d"a. /it*:rant us floo#plain )#e#ication an# (icycle path

)linage. S/3S" 3$action" *ity can #eman#, (ut nee#s to (e roughly

proportionate to 'hat 'oul# ha%e (een accomplishe#)harm pre%ente# ha# the permit (een #enie#>. E$action 4oct"ine

a. Pe"#it:*an the go%ernment %ali#ly #eny the permit'ithout it (eing a taingA 3ucli#, ;enn *entral, Lucas

i. I' *es, can it e$act something in return for grantingthe permitA

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. Ne$us: Does the e$actioncon#ition ser%e the same %ali#purpose as a #enial of the permitA

i. De#ication, easement, impact feeAc. Rou!h P"o(o"tionalit*" &s the e$action roughly

proportional to the harm that 'oul# other'ise ensue from

?ust granting the permitA

RLin Propasderty 2014 (Wiener) Full Outline

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