Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893â€“99: The Transformation of German Colonial Policy

RIVALRY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1893-99

Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99 The Transformation of German Colonial Policy

MatthewS. Seligmann Lecturer in Modern World History Nene University College Northampton

First published in Great Britain 1998 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndrnills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

First published in the United States of America 1998 by

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Seligmann, MatthewS., 1967. Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99: the transformation of German colonial policy I Matthew S. Seligmann. p. em. Based on author's dissertation. Includes bibliographical references and index.

I. Africa, Southern-Relations-Germany. 2. Germany-Relations-Africa, Southern. 3. Germany-Colonies-Africa, Southern--Administration. 4. Germany-Foreign relations-Great Britain. 5. Great Britain-Foreign relations-Germany. I. Title. DT1105.G3S45 1998 303.48'268043-dc21 97-46091

CIP

©MatthewS. Seligmann 1998

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1998 978-0-333-69572-2

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ISBN 978-1-349-40191-8 ISBN 978-0-230-37988-6 (eBook)DOI 10.1057/9780230379886

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ISBN 978-0-312-21153-0 (cloth)

Contents

Acknowledgements

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

PART I INFLUENCES ON SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY

The Official Perspective

2 The Public Perspective

3 The Commercial Perspective

PART II THE COURSE OF GERMAN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY

4 The Background to Conflict

5 The Emergence of Conflict, 1893-96

6 From Crisis to Disengagement, 1896-99

7 Epilogue

Conclusion

Appendices

Notes

Bibliography

Index

v

vi

vii

9

11

22

32

49

51

60

113

137

141

144

147

182

195

Acknowledgements

The idea for the dissertation that became this book originated with my supervisor Professor John Rohl. His help, encouragement and thoughtful criticism played a major part in this undertaking and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for all the assistance that he provided. Thanks are also due to my two examiners, Professor Keith Middlemas and Professor Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, both of whom provided me with valuable suggestions for improvements. Additionally, I would like to express my appreciation to all those who afforded me the opportunity to examine and publish the sources on which this book is based. These include Mr Brian Crowe, the Earl of Kimberley, the Bodleian Library, Rhodes House Library, the British Library, Yale University Library, the Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, and the Bundesarchiv Abteilungen Potsdam. Crown copyright material is reproduced by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

I am also indebted to all those who read drafts of the manuscript and offered suggestions for improvements. Particular mention should be made of my colleague Dr Matthew Hughes and my wife Dr Cherry Chang, both of whom became more familiar than they would otherwise have chosen to be with German South African policy. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed in this book.

VI

Matthew Seligmann Nene College Northampton

List of Abbreviations

ADM ADV BA(Potsdam) co Die GroBe Politik

DKG DDR FO PA(Bonn) PRO RKA RMA

Admiralty Alldeutscher Verband Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam Colonial Office Die GroBe Politik der Europaische Kabinette 1871-1914: Samm1ung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswartigen Amtes Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft Deutsche Demokratische Republik Foreign Office Po1itisches Archiv des Auswartiges Amtes Public Record Office Reichskolonialamt Reichsmarineamt

Vll

Introduction

On 30 August 1898, following the signing of a secret agreement with Britain, the German government, which until then had been a conspicuous supporter of the Transvaal, fundamentally altered its attitude towards both the Republic and the territories around it. As Baron Oswald von Richthofen, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, succinctly put it: 'We are letting England have South Africa.' 1 This statement, an explicit declaration of Germany's abandonment of her claims and interests in the peninsula, is not only the key to understanding Reich policy in the aftermath of the Anglo-German convention, it also serves to indicate the nature of German attitudes toward the region in the years that preceded the treaty. Put simply, this comment makes it plain that in the view of the Reich government, Germany had interests there to surrender. This opinion, one not shared by the British authorities whose grudging acquiescence to the treaty was accompanied by remarks about 'blackmail' ,2 was, nonetheless, the basis for much German activity over the course of the period between 1893 and 1898. During these years German warships regularly plied the waters of the region,3 German diplomats built extensive ties there, German companies established branches there and German people emigrated there, founding businesses, schools and newspapers in the process.

Given this substantial body of activity, it is not altogether surprising that the German presence in southern Africa has regularly aroused the interest of historians. The historiography of Wilhelmine Germany's involvement in southern Africa is extensive. Over the years, much has been written by a variety of different authors about a multitude of different facets of German South African policy. The literature on this topic has appeared in three distinct phases.

The first period of major scholarly discussion took place during the interwar years. The nature of the times and the political imperative that then dominated much of Germany's historical research, namely exonerating the country from the charge that prior to the First World War its foreign policy had been aggressive, provocative, grasping and dangerous, permeated much of this early work. Conscious that it was German South African policy that, in the form of the Kruger telegram, had produced the first major and open breach in Anglo-German relations, German historians went out of their way to show that their country's intentions, which had

2 Rivalry in Southern Africa, 1893-99

appeared so unfriendly to the British, had in fact been both miscast and misunderstood. Two of the first evaluations, Friedrich Thimme's article on the Kruger telegram, a piece that supplemented his co-edited volumes of documents for the German Foreign Office,4 and Johannes Wild's published doctoral dissertation, both attempted to perform this task and so refute the belief in Germany's aggressive purpose.5 To achieve this end,6

carefully selected and edited source material was advanced as evidence of Germany's fundamentally peaceful and commercially orientated policy_? Concurring in the importance of economic factors, if not the protestations as to Germany's innocent intent, was George Hallgarten's article on German Consul Franz von Herff.8 Published in French, during the author's enforced absence from Germany in the 1930s, this forerunner to the writer's monumental work on imperialism,9 stressed the interrelationship between German economic interests and imperial goals, thereby contradicting the absolute exoneration from this charge offered by Thimme and Wild. Also sceptical of Germany's intentions, albeit for slightly different reasons, were three English language studies by Raymond Bixler, Reginald Lovell and Cornelius Penner. 1° Concentrating on the question of Anglo-German rivalry, they were more sympathetic to the British belief that competition over South Africa's destiny, in more than just the economic sphere, had, indeed, taken place and that this had been instigated by Germany.

The immediate post-Second World War era formed the second period of interest in the German-South African connection. First came the study by the South African historian Werner Backeberg. 11 Taking a fundamentally political line and drawn largely from documents available in South Africa, this substantial article differed markedly from the highly significant work published a few years later by German author Werner Schmidt-Pretoria. 12

This monograph, a sequel to a study of the German contribution to the cultural development of the Boer people in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that had been published just before the outbreak of the Second World War,U looked at German-Boer interaction on a cultural and social level. However, its inclusion of discussions of migration, business issues and the exchange of diplomats, made it an important forerunner to some of the works that would follow. Amongst these was a major essay by Jeffrey Butler. 14 The author of a detailed monograph on the impact of the Jameson raid on British domestic politics, 15 Butler also turned his attention to the role of Germany in British imperial politics in South Africa. His conclusion, emphasizing the major impact of German participation in the region's politics, included the notion, long accepted in Britain, of a serious German interest in the peninsula. Between them, Backeberg, Schmidt-

Introduction 3

Pretoria and Butler clearly signalled the scope for further research on this topic. This was to be taken up when the question again came under scrutiny.

The most recent period of inquiry into the German-South Africa connection began in the late 1970s, when three studies came out almost simultaneously. These comprised an article by Holger Nissen offering a review of the topic and the issues raised in relation to Anglo-German relations, 16

and two new studies of the economics of German aspirations in the region. The first was a collaborative effort by the two East German historians of German expansionism, Helmut Stoecker and Eberhard Czaya. 17 Taking an orthodox Marxist approach to the topic, they posited that Germany pressed imperialist goals in the region as long as the dominant monopoly capital groups considered this desirable. Concurring in the importance of economic issues was Jean Jacques Van-Helten. Arguing that German policy was based on the promotion of business interests, he also suggested that political involvement was the product of commercial pressures. 18

The importance of bourgeois interests, both economic and nationalistic, was also stressed a few years later in the doctoral dissertation by the East German historian Jochen Laufer. 19 Based on extensive research in the then Zentrales Staatsarchiv, this dissertation, notwithstanding its ideological constraints, is a pioneer work that has been unduly neglected. This is in spite of continued interest in the subject matter, which has been demonstrated recently with several further publications. First came a general survey of the German-South African connection by Hildemarie Griinewald. 20 This was followed by an extensively researched monograph on the role of South Africa in the genesis of 'the Anglo-German antagonism'. Written by Harald Rosenbach, this major contribution to the literature on Anglo-German relations in the run-up to the First World War is also of seminal importance to the study of German southern African policy in the period following the Kruger telegram of January 1896. 21 This message of the Kaiser's to President Kruger of the Transvaal has, itself, consistently attracted public interest and attention. The most recent demonstration of this came shortly after its centenary, when an article by Gerd Fesser celebrating this anniversary appeared in Die Zeit. 22 His summary of current scholarly understanding of the events surrounding the creation of this document is the latest expression of interest in the German-South African relationship.

As this survey of the existing literature demonstrates, there has been a lot of work undertaken with regard to German involvement in South African affairs. Nonetheless, despite several important studies, the results have been more circumscribed than would be suggested by the range and


volume of the literature. Hence, it remains the case that there has been no major examination of the genesis of Wilhelmine Germany's policy in the region based upon a broad coverage of the available sources. In the first instance, this was due to the selective access to the archives that was accorded to historians, a situation that derived initially from the Weimar Republic's policy of allowing only 'patriotic' scholarship and then, in the period following the Second World War, from the restrictions imposed by the DDR on the use of material located within its borders. With regard to more recent works, to which these stipulations do not apply, the authors have either chosen to focus on specific, narrower issues, such as business concerns, or alternatively have selected different chronological boundaries. Hence the admirable work by Jochen Laufer is restricted by its exclusive use of East German archival material, while the searching monograph by Harald Rosenbach, owing to its concentration on the period after the Kruger telegram, only covers the years up to 1896 in outline form. 23 A thorough treatment of the period before the Kruger telegram, the time in which German South African policy first came into being, is still lacking. This gap in the literature is one that this study seeks to address.

While the foremost objective of this book is to offer a comprehensive examination of the origins and development of German South African policy from its inception in 1893, through its various transformations, until Germany's disengagement from the region in August 1898, this is not its sole goal. A further intention of this study is to engage with and contribute to the broader debate on German expansionism, a topic that, after many decades of scholarship, still contains several unresolved and controversial issues. Amongst these are two areas that are especially pertinent to the examination of German South African policy.

First, there is the question of how far the socio-economic structure of Wilhelmine Germany influenced the process by which its foreign policy was developed. Attempts to answer this question have engendered two conflicting hypotheses. One argument, centred around the 'Primat der Innenpolitik' theory, is that the Reich government's diplomatic conduct and overseas objectives were largely determined by domestic considerations.24 Wilhelmine Germany, it is suggested, was a country with class divisions and political antagonisms so severe that the government was desperate for a means of diverting the attention of the general population away from the domestic arena. The obvious choice, given the failure of such previously attempted expedients as progressive social insurance and the overt and outright repression of Catholics, socialists and ethnic minorities, was a dynamic and distracting overseas policy of the kind that had

Introduction 5

delivered Bismarck from the impasse of 1862. According to this theory, therefore, structural flaws inherent to prewar German society led the government to use foreign policy as a means of ensuring social integration. In opposition to this argument there stands the view that the overseas policies developed and put into practice by Germany's leaders, far from being a product of the country's social make-up and internal political disputes, instead reflected the Reich bureaucracy's transcendence from the rest of society. As a result, in Germany political authority remained above popular concerns and was deployed to make foreign policy decisions that were based solely upon diplomatic criteria. 25 This 'primacy of foreign policy' outlook, while by no means ignoring the importance of outside influences such as political ideologies, popular ideologues and pressure groups, nonetheless seeks, in its modern form, to locate their influence within the framework of individual decisions on the part of the members of the elite. 26

The second area of contention concerns the geographic delineation of the Reich government's imperialist goals. This debate has also seen the crystallization of two contrasting theories. One argument is that the character of German expansionism was determined by the Reich government's failure to develop specific territorial objectives. Instead, the German leadership sought to acquire land wherever and whenever it could, not for the sake of the territories in question, but rather to enhance its overall position in the international world order of great power politics. This representation of German policy was expressed as early as 1912 when Rohrbach observed that 'the main reason why our position sometimes makes such an uncertain, even unpleasant, impression when seen from outside Germany lies in the difficulty of presenting any easily comprehensible, as it were tangible, aim for the policies demanded by German ideas. ' 27 Since then, it has been reiterated by a number of prominent historians. 28 Contesting this viewpoint are a number of historians who maintain that German imperialism had very particular territorial goals and who, in support of this assertion, have undertaken examinations of German aspirations in specific areas of the globe. Though these studies have encompassed a variety of regions, including for instance the countries of the Far East,29 most illustrative of this research is the work carried out on South America, where, it is argued, plans were developed to make Germany into a colonial power. 30 The focal points of these schemes were manifold and encompassed South Brazil, for which region German emigration laws were rewritten so as to encourage settlement there, 31 and Venezuela, a country subject in 1902-3 to an Anglo-German naval blockade.32 Moreover, ultimate backing for these plans was provided by the German


navy which, in anticipation of American objections to what would have been a clear challenge to the Monroe doctrine, had drawn up operational strategies for war against the United States.33 From evidence such as this, scholars like Fiebig-von Hase have concluded that German imperialism was anything but unfocused. 34

Against the backdrop of these controversial issues in the history of Germany's overseas relations, the development of the Reich's southern African policy in the period prior to the Boer War is an uniquely revealing guide to the dynamic behind German colonialism. The primary reason for this is the character of the time period it covers. Over the course of the Reich's involvement in the region, Germany was a nation in a state of flux. The government, for instance, dominated for two decades by a single powerful figure, now saw a succession of Chancellors and Foreign Secretaries; in a similar fashion, the public, unused to anything but the most basic ideas in pluralism and participation, saw the rise to political influence of a number of pressure groups and the crystallization in the popular arena of the techniques of mass agitation and propaganda; finally, the economy, which, since the founding of the Empire, had turned from boom to depression, now saw the moderate downturn of the years 1890-94 replaced by a period of national and international prosperity. It was in the context of these shifts in the composition of the elite, in the nature of public expectations and in the economic cycle that German involvement in the region took place. As a result of this overlap, South Africa is one area of German overseas activity where it is possible to look for a correlation between policy change and the fluctuations in government, society and the economy with a view to determining the relative importance of these three factors to the nature of the country's diplomatic stance and hence, to assess the validity of the different theories of the structural motivation of German imperialism.

In a similar fashion, South African policy also has the potential to be revealing in the context of the controversy over geographic delineation. Once again, it is the chronology of the policy's development that is of significance. This is because the Reich's involvement in the region occurred at a time when Germany's perception of her position in the world order was changing. The transition was between two opposites: the Bismarckian and Caprivian belief that overseas policy should be dominated by Continental considerations, and the ideology, signalled by the Kaiser's announcement of 'world empire' and Billow's declaration that the Reich sought her 'place in the sun', that Germany now had aspirations to colonial greatness. Significantly, it was while this transformation was taking place, during the transitional period so to speak, that Germany was

Introduction 7

most active in southern Africa and consequently, the major German interventions in the region, of which the Kruger telegram is the best known example, precede both of these speeches and fall instead into the period most commonly associated with German preoccupation with the European alliance system. The implications of this fact cannot be ignored. In strictly chronological terms at least, South African policy was both an end to continentalism and a prelude to Weltpolitik. Yet, as a precursor to a world policy, it was one strictly limited in its geographical range. This presents the possibility that the demise of Germany's involvement in southern Africa and the inauguration of Weltpolitik were linked events and that the character of the latter, so far as geographic delineation is concerned, can be clarified with reference to the territorial scope of the former. Hence, if investigation were to show that South Africa was abandoned in order to pursue more extensive, worldwide goals or if, alternatively, it could be demonstrated that German disengagement from the peninsula left the regional nature of German aspirations unaffected, then one would be in a position to provide weight to one or other of the theories that make up this controversy.

Placing the examination of German South African policy into the historiographical framework provided by these controversial issues has played a considerable part in determining the organisation and structure of this study. This is reflected in the nature of its two parts. The first of these, comprising three chapters that examine respectively the official, popular and commercial bases of German activity, addresses the issue of structural motivation by investigating the separate impact of each of these components in determining the direction of policy. By this means it should become clear which element or combination of elements was the primary driving force behind the Reich's involvement, information that will provide grounds for a judgement concerning the validity of the arguments either about the primacy of domestic political considerations or about those of diplomacy. Similarly, the second part, consisting of a chronological examination of German involvement in South Africa in the period before the Boer War, when the status of the two Republics was still contested,35 seeks not only to reinforce the conclusions of the first part but also, by means of reference to events outside of the region, to show how the development of circumstances in South Africa both influenced and was, in turn, influenced by consideration of matters further afield. By placing southern Africa, in this way, in the context of the development of German foreign policy as a whole, the territorially focused or unfocused nature of German aspirations should be thrown into relief.


Examining southern Africa in the light of these key historiographical controversies is not, of course, the only goal of this study. As was detailed earlier, the genesis of German South African policy is a topic that, in its own right, is worthy of investigation.36 To this end, the primary objective of this account is to uncover the origins of German involvement, the nature of that involvement and the way it developed from its inception. While this goal encompasses the historiographical framework described above, it by no means limits it to purely those ends.

I Influences on South African

Policy

1 The Official Perspective

Under the German constitution, authority for executive action in all Reich matters resided solely and exclusively with the Kaiser. Within the purview of this framework lay the conduct of foreign and colonial affairs, the formulation and implementation of which was the responsibility of the Chancellor, who was assisted in this task by the State Secretary and the officials of the German foreign office, the Auswartiges Amt also known as the WilhelmstaBe. Technically, therefore, a very small and elite group of people, in no way accountable to any elected body, 1 had full control over all aspects of Germany's external behaviour.

If, on the face of it, Germany possessed a simple and rational structure for overseas policy making, one devoid of apparent contradictions, internal complications and conflicting interests, the actual situation was much less straightforward. In reality, the Reich's constitutional structure was considerably more complex than it appeared and incorporated a number of unusual administrative arrangements capable of exerting a significant influence on the nature of Germany's international behaviour. This situation was to have a considerable bearing on the development of official attitudes towards southern Africa.

One institutional consideration of some importance was Germany's unique organizational arrangements for the conduct of colonial affairs. Unlike in Britain or France,2 where responsibility for foreign and colonial policy was divided between separate ministries, in the Reich, all overseas matters were handled by its Foreign Office, which had its own colonial department, the Kolonial Abteilung. 3 This situation, indicative of the subordination of colonial concerns to those of diplomacy,4 was further compounded by the hierarchy of the Auswartiges Amt which was organized as four divisions - the Politische Abteilung (Political Department), Handelspolitische Abteilung (Trade Department), Rechtsabteilung (Legal Department) and Kolonial Abteilung (Colonial Department) - of which the Kolonial Abteilung was both the newest and the least highly regarded. Hence, though the institution was headed by its own director, its work, like that of the Commercial and Legal Departments, was entirely overshadowed by that of the Political Division, an institution which, though in theory responsible only for diplomatic affairs, in reality contrived to have a say in almost all aspects of government policy, including the activities of the Kolonial Abteilung. This hierarchy had significant consequences for

ll


the development of German colonial policy as it conditioned the German government's outlook and approach to colonial questions. Given that the department responsible for managing the colonies was a minor division of the office encharged with orchestrating the Reich's worldwide relations, the tendency naturally developed of seeing colonial policy not as a question of detail, but as a question of grand strategy. As a result, insufficient thought was given to practical matters, such as the running of the colonies, with the consequence that until the establishment in 1907 of a dedicated and professional Colonial Office, Germany's overseas territories were more ineptly administered than those of any power with the possible exception of Portugal. By contrast, broader concerns, such as the acquisition, maintenance or even disposal of colonies, were considered in greater depth. As a result, German policy makers often took an ideological position on colonialism and attempted to apply this global stance unaltered to all colonial questions. Both Caprivi's liberal hostility to colonies and Biilow's enthusiasm for the colonial aspects of Weltpolitik, for instance, were firmly grounded in political and economic doctrine. In the case of Caprivi, he was much inspired by the progressive liberal-economic views of his old school friend Karl Goering, a counsellor in the Foreign Office Legal Division whom he promoted in 1891 to the prominent position of Chief of the Reich Chancellery.5 In a similar fashion, Biilow was strongly influenced by the nationalist and social Darwinist beliefs of Heinrich von Treitschke,6 whose emphatic advocacy of colonialism was echoed in Biilow's assertion that 'the question is not whether we want to colonize or not, but that we must colonize whether we want to or not. ' 7 So far as southern Africa was concerned, this imbalance in favour of more global political considerations served to minimize the role of the Colonial Division and its director Dr Paul Kayser8 in the formulation of German policy. As the British diplomat Martin Gosselin observed, on this question, German behaviour could not ' ... be attributed to the advice of the Colonial department, which, I believe, has nothing whatever to say to German relations with either the Transvaal or the Portuguese colonies. ' 9

This assessment was essentially correct and, consequently, German policy in this area was based more upon global diplomatic and ideological criteria than upon narrower colonial concerns.

The particular direction given to colonial policy making by the structure of the Auswartiges Amt was compounded by a decision-making process that, because of the limited number of those involved, gave considerable scope for individual input to leave a disproportionate mark. Nothing, for instance, needs to be said about the way in which Bismarck dominated and shaped both Prussian and German external affairs. However, it is

The Official Perspective 13

worth emphasizing that what was true for the Iron Chancellor was also in some measure true for his successors who, though not as domineering as him nor as fortunate in their relations with the monarch, were nonetheless able to contribute, even if only by omission, to the nature of the Reich's overseas relations. Thus, for instance, during Caprivi's tenure of office, foreign and colonial affairs were clearly affected by the fact that the new Chancellor, in defiance of the stereotype of the aristocratic Prussian general, did not own even an acre of land or sympathize in any way with the agrarian interest but, instead, sought to extend the liberal principles of his 'new course' to the realm of Germany's diplomatic relations. Though hampered by a lack of experience in diplomacy that forced him to rely heavily on the equally inexpert Foreign Secretary, Baron von Marschall, and his nominal subordinate, Friedrich von Holstein, he was still able to have a considerable impact on the direction of policy. For one thing, he forcefully advocated the view that a successful foreign policy was one that promoted the economic strength of the Reich through a combination of stability and trade treaties helpful to industry rather than one that lumbered the state with the expense of administering commercially useless colonial possessions. As he declared on one occasion, 'the less Africa [that Germany has] so much the better for us.' 10 He also agreed to the objective advanced by Holstein that Germany should seek to substitute her understanding with Russia for one with England. Applying these principles to Germany's foreign relations had a number of significant repercussions which, in general terms, could be summarized as being beneficial for her industrial exports and detrimental to her international position in the world of great-power politics. Their effect on Germany's southern African policy was no less marked. Mindful of the desire both to limit Germany's overseas possessions and to encourage good relations with England, Caprivi insisted upon an unobtrusive role in the South African peninsula, with the result that, in the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty of 1890, the German protectorate of Southwest Africa was demarcated in such a way as to remove it as a source of friction in Anglo-German relations. 11 Given Capri vi's belief in stability - as Sir Edward Malet, the British ambassador in Berlin, observed, 'we may feel sure that there will be no politique d'aventure so long as Capri vi is in office' 12 - this was a policy that endured so long as his authority held. Subsequent to this, therefore, interference in South African affairs was only countenanced when it was felt that European interests were at stake.

A good example of this was Germany's intervention in the AngloPortuguese dispute over the future of South-Central Africa. The British South Africa Company had expanded into lands claimed but not actually


occupied by the Portuguese colonial authorities, leading to a confrontation between the two powers. Realizing that the British were on the verge of forcing their claim and fearing that any act of capitulation on the part of the government in Lisbon would spell the end of the Portuguese monarchy, the WilhelmstraBe decided to urge Lord Salisbury to reach a compromise. As Holstein observed of the German intervention:

The course of the Anglo-Portuguese negotiations so far has clearly shown that England is guided exclusively by colonial considerations and occasionally disregards her European interests .... Our task now is to recall England to the consideration of her European interests .... we showed last summer in the East Africa Agreement that we rate our European relations higher than our colonial interests ... .the significance of the colonial question disappears in this case when compared with the progressive jeopardising of the system of monarchical alliances which would be the result of the fall of the Portuguese monarchy .13

This statement epitomizes Caprivian colonial policy. In instances such as this, when European considerations were to the fore, the WilhelmstraBe was prepared to act. However, without such a cause to spur them on, Germany's diplomats remained largely unmoved when it came to colonial concerns. Such was the primacy of Europapolitik in Caprivi's calculations. That this attitude was both dependent upon Caprivi's tenure of office and unlikely to survive his departure was widely recognized. As Lord Rosebery's private secretary observed in October 1894, 'under any new Chancellor the forward Colonial Party will make themselves more disagreeable to us.'~ 4 This prediction was to be borne out by future events.

In contrast with the Caprivian period, foreign and colonial policy during the tenure of Prince Hohenlohe was shaped less by political conviction than by the unwillingness of the new Chancellor to act decisively. Hohenlohe was a seasoned diplomat with a record that included experience in some of the most challenging posts available. He was also closely connected to colonial circles through his cousin, who was the first president of the Kolonialgesellschaft. Nonetheless, in spite of these credentials, he was neither a man of determination nor one driven by the desire to fulfil any particular political idee fixe. Indeed, quite the opposite was true, a situation that almost certainly led to his appointment, as the Kaiser, following his experience of the obstreperous Capri vi, wanted a man who, in Eulenburg' s words, was 'neither conservative nor liberal, neither ultramontane nor progressive, neither clerical nor atheistic.' 15 However, a side effect of Hohenlohe' s undogmatic and uncontroversial nature was that not


only did he rarely give a clear lead to government but, in addition, his hold over external affairs tended to have a detached and airy quality. Nowhere was this more apparent than on the issue of southern Africa. As Sir Edward Malet was to observe in November 1895, after a year in which South Africa had figured prominently in Anglo-German relations, the Chancellor seemed oblivious to the situation. When questioned on the subject, ' ... Prince Hohenlohe replied that what I had told him was very interesting, that he had not gone into the matter himself but that he would enquire about it.' 16 A similar lack of personal involvement can be detected in the Prince's own record of the meeting that led to the Kruger telegram. As his diary records:

At ten o'clock the Kaiser arrived with Hollmann, Knorr and Senden. Marschall was already there. The South African question was discussed. Marschall proposed sending a telegram to Kruger, which was accepted. Then a discussion of the possible support of the Boers. Colonel Schele was sent for and commissioned to go to South Africa and enquire what kind of help could be given to the Boers. Holstein, Kayser and Marschall are against this. We shall deal with the affair in a dilatory way.I7

Hohenlohe's unconcerned and ethereal approach to foreign affairs, while limiting his own role, did not mean that, during his tenure, the conduct of diplomacy was deprived of the stamp of personality. On the contrary, the German political system was constructed in such a way that, if the Chancellor lacked the will to imprint his own views on the Reich's international relations, then this opportunity devolved down to the State Secretary. Consequently, under Hohenlohe, the incumbents of the Auswartiges Amt were to enjoy an unprecedented level of personal influence, that in effect meant that foreign relations were identified closely with their aspirations. 18 In the first instance, this resulted in a diplomatic outlook based upon and shaped by the views of Adolf Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein. Marschall, who had been appointed State Secretary in 1890, cut an unusual figure in the WilhelmstraBe. South German in a largely Prussian domain, he had spent his earlier years first as a successful lawyer and then as Baden's representative in the Bundesrat, a bureaucratic position that, though according its holder diplomatic privilege, provided no insight into either great power politics or the procedural aspects of the Auswartiges Amt. However, though Marschall arrived at the WilhelmstraBe wholly inexperienced in the world of foreign affairs, a career gap that earned him the soubriquet 'Ministre etranger aux affaires',


he was endowed by virtue of his legal training with considerable rhetorical skills. As a result, he was a most effective performer in the Reichstag, where his debating form and contacts with the Centre Party made him much in demand as the government's 'Sprechminister'. Yet, if Marschall liked to devote much of his time to domestic political considerations, the growing experience he developed in foreign affairs as a result of his seven-year tenure of office led, over the course of time, to him playing an increasingly important role in the Reich's external relations. This was particularly true when it came to southern African matters where Marschall, whose personal predilection for the Transvaal was strong, actively promoted the government's interventionist stance. As the British diplomat Martin Gosselin recorded:

.... Baron von Marschall is not as a rule inclined to discuss African matters .... his repeated allusions to this particular question [Delagoa Bay and the Transvaal] are, therefore, the more remarkable, and seem to indicate a determination on the part of the German government to make their influence felt in South East Africa. 19

Marschall's successor, Bernhard von Biilow, was an entirely different character. His appointment to the State Secretaryship followed twentythree years' experience in the diplomatic service during which time he held positions in a number of European capitals including Athens, Paris, St Petersburg, Bucharest and Rome. More important than his travels, however, was his character and connections. An intimate of Philipp Eulenburg, with whom he shared a common vision of Germany as a strongly monarchical state, Biilow aspired to direct government policy towards the goal of popularizing the Kaiser. As he observed in a letter to Eulenburg, 'The leading ideas of our Imperial Master are mostly undoubtedly correct; all that is needed is that they should in future be defended and executed with greater skill and tact.' 20 Biilow, who was sometimes known as 'the eel' for his social skills and deftness at manipulation, felt that he was the man to carry out this task and to this end he devised his foreign policy. Consequently, under Biilow, who sought external success as a means of winning mass support for the monarchy and who therefore wanted to avoid damaging confrontations, the WilhelmstraBe attached more weight to easy gains, such as the valueless Caroline Islands, than to dangerous and unproductive gestures in areas, such as southern Africa, where other powers clearly dominated.

The discernible influence on Germany's external behaviour of the personality and outlook of the Chancellor and State Secretary highlights


another aspect of the German governmental machine that fundamentally affected overseas policy: the role and position of the Kaiser. Illustrative of this is a comparison with the conduct of affairs in Great Britain. During the years from 1886 to 1914, it is a remarkable fact of public life that, while changes in Whitehall and Downing Street brought about significant shifts of policy in almost every field of government competence, the only area to be largely untouched as Liberal and Unionist politicians made way for each other was the country's diplomatic outlook. In Germany, however, where changes in the ranks of office holders were invariably linked to a desire on the part of the Kaiser to redirect the focus of government policy, a new appointment at the top of the Auswlirtiges Amt had great significance for the future shape of the Reich's external affairs. Illustrative of this is the change in foreign policy that followed the replacement of Marschall by Btilow. This was not a coincidental consequence of their differing beliefs but, instead, the planned outcome of a governmental reorganization that saw the promotion of Btilow, along with the advancement of the like-minded Miquel and Tirpitz, in a conscious effort to inaugurate a populist conservative policy based upon a mixture of agrarian tariff concessions, the building of a battle fleet and the spectacle of Weltpolitik. 21 In this context, Marschall's views, including his troublesome South African aspirations, had no place and were promptly jettisoned, the latter for an Anglo-German convention that offered prospective gains in Portuguese overseas territory.

Just as significant as the Kaiser's role in determining the nature of the responsible government was his position in relation to a number of other institutions that, though not part of the executive, were nonetheless able to use their links with the monarchy in order to usurp the role of unofficial political advisors. The existence of this body of alternative opinion was, in part, an unintended anomaly of the independence accorded to the military by the Prusso-German political system. Under Germany's complex constitutional arrangments, the Kaiser, in addition to heading the executive, was also, quite separately, supreme commander of the armed forces and enjoyed a relationship with the services that was outside of civilian control. As a result of this, members of the military had the privilege of direct access to the monarch and, since this right was not dependent upon the wishes of the responsible government, they were able to use it to interfere in the formulation of official policy by advancing, in contradiction to the views of the Chancellor, their own military perspective on the issues of the day. Yet, since they did not have to take formal responsibility for the courses of action thus advocated, they were not constrained by the need to ensure that their suggestions were practicable. In spite of this, the Kaiser


often took such proposals seriously and consequently, the mayhem that could be caused to the governing process by such interventions was considerable. Robert von Zedlitz-Trtitzschler, Marshal of the Imperial Household, was to observe that such contacts with military men had 'far reaching effects ... ' for, as he recorded after one such encounter,

who can later be made answerable .... I am certain ... that not one of those who were present, if they had had to make private and responsible reports ... would have been content to deal with such matters so superficially. But here the vices of our system were thrown into the strongest relief. How much mischief it might do! 22

Colonial affairs were particularly vulnerable to such mischief because African service had produced a body of military men eager to contribute to the determination of policy in an area where experience had given them pretensions to expertise. Most notorious in this regard was Colonel Schele, an individual who, as has already been mentioned, was to be called upon by the Kaiser at the meeting that produced the Kruger telegram to travel to the Transvaal with a view to helping the Boers. That this undertaking fell into his hands is indicative of the way in which an extensive career of intrigue in colonial affairs by someone outside of the formal decisionmaking process could bring that person to the Kaiser's attention. In the case of Schele, he had attracted notoriety when, as governor of East Africa, a post he held between 1893 and 1895, he had so consistently acted against Paul Kayser, the responsible official, that even Hohenlohe was prepared to struggle to secure his dismissal. 23 Yet, though this was achieved, Schele had made such an impression on the Kaiser that two months later he was appointed Fltigeladjutant, a posting that caused consternation in the WilhelmstraBe. Marschall, for instance, predicted 'new difficulties';24 Holstein, who was coming to believe that the work of the Auswartiges Amt was being unofficially duplicated by the Kaiser's aidesde-camp, suspected that Schele was advising on African colonial matters;25 Kayser feared for his position;26 even Eulenburg commented on how 'the old differences with Schele ... have cast their shadow on colonial matters.' 27

The personal link that existed between the Kaiser and the officer corps was mirrored by the relationship that developed, outside the formal constitutional framework, between Wilhelm and the entourage of the imperial court. Consisting of the three Cabinets - Civil, Military and Naval - as well as a number of ceremonial posts and the Kaiser's circle of friends and favourites, this 'camarilla' acted as a powerful influence on the


opinions of the monarch as well as an additional channel for 'irresponsible' advice. That this complicated the business of government cannot be doubted. As Marschall recalled in his diary, 'throughout the day, Holstein and I (and not we alone) write long letters to Philipp [Eulenburg]. What a state of affairs; one has to constantly trouble oneself not only with foreign states, but also with His Majesty and his irresponsible advisors. ' 28 The effect this had on foreign and colonial policy can once again be demonstrated with reference to the audience that produced the Kruger telegram. As both Marschall and Hohenlohe recorded in their diaries, the Kaiser arrived at this meeting accompanied by three admirals, two of whom -Senden, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, and Knorr, Chief of the Naval Executive Command- were not members of the 'responsible' government but had, it seems, nonetheless seen fit to encourage some of Wilhelm's less practical proposals for dealing with the situation. 29 Interference such as this from sources outside of the control of the government had a major and often detrimental impact on the course of German diplomacy.

Another element of the constitutional framework that had the potential to influence the course of foreign affairs was the legislature. In a formal context, its role, particularly that of its senior component, the Bundesrat, was quite considerable for under article eight of the constitution there was established, under the chairmanship of Bavaria, a Bundesrat committee on foreign affairs. Yet, in practice, the powers of this body, which was rarely called to deliberate, were extremely limited and, consequently, its impact on the direction of policy was quite insignificant. By contrast, the Reichstag, which had no formal powers in matters of external relations, managed to exert a more substantial influence through its control over the Reich budget. Illustrative of this are the big colonial debates of the year 1906. These arose when, following press accusations of scandalous, corrupt and incompetent behaviour on the part of the colonial authorities, Matthias Erzberger, a rising star of the Centre Party, began a campaign of criticism in the Reichstag. 30 Such a course of action on colonial matters was by no means new. In 1896, the socialist deputy August Bebel had acted similarly to secure the dismissal of Karl Peters from the post of Reich Commissioner for East Africa.31 Erzberger's criticisms, however, were not levelled at one individual but at the government in general and led to the rejection of the Chancellor's proposal to establish a separate Reich office for colonial affairs. Subsequent to this, the government was also defeated on the issue of appropriations for the repression of the discontented indigenous population, an event of such political significance that it was to lead to the January 1907 elections. In spite of this, the effect that the Reichstag could have on colonial matters should


not be overemphasized. Reichstag debates, though they could lead to criticism and even rejection of government measures, were held subsequent to executive decisions and consequently, the Reichstag could only follow policy, it could not play a part in determining it. Moreover, debates such as those of 1906 were very much the exception rather than the rule.

This circumstance is well illustrated by the Reichstag's treatment of the Transvaal question. At the government's instigation, this issue was debated by the deputies when the White book on the Kruger telegram was released for publication. However, outside of this particular session, the matter was seldom raised. Yet, significantly, those occasions on which it was, do much to underline the Reichstag's negligible role in foreign policy for, insofar as any attempt was made to use events in southern Africa to influence the government's behaviour, it was as likely as not that the desired objective was unrelated to any colonial concern. A good example of this was the attempt by von Kardorff, the leader of the free conservatives, to use the issue to underline his agrarian credentials. As he observed:

... to the satisfaction of the entire German fatherland the Reich government has given a very energetic declaration on the Transvaal relationship. Since it has shown such interest in the Dutch Boers [die ho!Iandischen Buren] there, I hope that it will also once again show a similar interest in the German Boers [die deutschen Buren] here.32

Not surprisingly, such interventions did little to affect the direction of foreign or colonial policy.

The various phenomena described above, namely the limited role of the legislature, the Kaiser's ability to play musical chairs with official positions and his receptiveness to influence from extraneous sources, the ease with which personality was able to dominate the direction of diplomacy and the impetus given by the unusual and ambiguous position of the Kolonial Abteilung towards dogmatic attitudes on imperialism, all had a strong individual influence on the formulation of foreign policy. Taken together, however, their impact both in general terms and also, as in the case of southern Africa, in a narrower geographical context, was that much more significant. Particularly important was the way in which they combined to disrupt the continuity of the German diplomatic process by instigating a series of shifts in the overseas objectives of the German government. In 1890, for instance, when Capri vi came to power, Germany was pursuing, in competition with England, a number of claims in East Africa. Caprivi's liberal-economic and eurocentric outlook quickly ended this rivalry and led to Germany adopting once again the position of


'satiated power' that had been held by Bismarck prior to 1884. With Caprivi's fall, however, the ideological hostility of the German government to colonial ventures came to an end and a more active imperialist policy was unleashed under the auspices of the State Secretary Baron von Marschall that concentrated particularly on southern Africa. In its turn, Marschall's fall from favour, as has already been described, led to the emergence of yet another outlook on foreign affairs that was based on Biilow's concept of finding Germany's 'place in the sun' and not of making that place, of necessity, in southern Africa. All of these shifts, each of which was based in some measure on a combination of a new doctrine of government and a new personality at the helm as a result of new trends in All Highest patronage, illustrate the impact of the structure of the Reich's machinery of government on the policies it produced.

2 The Public Perspective

As has been described in the previous chapter, the dynamic for the development of official attitudes to southern Africa was one based closely upon the structure and internal workings of a number of exclusive institutions and upon the composition of the narrow elite of which they were comprised. It must be stressed, however, that the opinions thus generated and the decisions thereby arrived at, though sanctioned by the authority of the state, were by no means guaranteed to conform to the viewpoints and expectations prevalent among the wider German public. Instead, it was the case that, owing to the growth of widespread interest in the issue, substantial and multifarious consideration of the topic was to become common outside of the confines of the politically empowered elite. Since the stratified political culture of imperial Germany did little to promote conformity between administrative opinion and that of either the non-elite political aspirant or the general public, these views not only had their own separate evolutionary framework but, in addition, often contrasted markedly with their official counterparts.

As is often the case, popular awareness and the subsequent formation of popular attitudes developed in the wake of publicity. At the inception of the Wilhelmine era there existed considerable interest in colonial matters. It was, however, a general interest which remained stubbornly unfocused on any particular area of concern. This was in spite of the long-term endeavours of enthusiasts such as Ernst von Weber, a Saxon landowner with a stake in a South African diamond mine, to get the German public to focus on southern Africa. His efforts, which included agitation, publications and even the establishment of a Society for the Promotion of German Interests in South Africa, 1 set up in 1886, at the time of Germany's first upswing of official colonial activity, all failed to generate the strong response that he expected, with the result that public demand for action in southern Africa remained, at best, muted. Yet over the course of the 1890s a variety of issues arose that concentrated public attention on the situation in southern Africa and led to the gradual development of a number of popular aspirations for the region.

The first indication that southern Africa had the potential to become a special focal point of popular enthusiasm came early on in the Caprivi chancellorship when the future of the colony of South-West Africa came up for general discussion. Caprivi, who was by outlook far more

22

The Public Perspective 23

concerned with industrial trade treaties and the military situation in central Europe than he was with the considerations of overseas empire, 2

announced in the Reichstag that, following an assessment of the protectorate's value, thought would be given to the question of whether it should be retained or abandoned. 3 This pronouncement provoked a storm of indignation in the press, which, as a body, began to devote itself to the publication of editorials and articles justifying the territory's continued possession. As column followed column, there was created a momentum that revolutionized popular perceptions for, with so much effort being applied to the task of providing a convincing basis for the colony's retention, it is hardly surprising that arguments should have evolved that lent its ownership an entirely new and even dogmatic significance. Consequently, almost overnight, the image of South-West Africa was changed from that of an unvalued and far off protectorate with, at the most, pastoral potential to a territory that served as the strategic linchpin of the entire region, a fact well exemplified by a piece in the Kolnische Zeitung which observed that

so long as Germany holds her colonies in Namaqualand and Damaraland, she will not cease to be an important factor in the event of the building of a single South African state and our numerous countrymen here will never give up the patriotic thought that Germany could some day have a mission as the greatest participant in South Africa.4

Caprivi's realization, in the face of such pressure, that the abandonment of the protectorate would be an act of political suicide, led to a swift and total reversal of government policy. As had been hoped, this act had the effect of silencing much of the criticism of the Chancellor's new colonial strategy. More significant, however, than its impact on the government's popularity, was one other unobserved and unplanned side effect. Since the theme of German involvement in South Africa was new to the political arena and had not as yet reached the mainstream of public political consciousness, the ending of the controversy over the future of South-West Africa also led to the abrupt cessation of any further media consideration of the idea that there might be a patriotic or ideological basis for German participation in the affairs of the region. Victory, it seems, brought about disinterest.

Nevertheless, the development of such a concept was not to be long delayed, for over the course of 1893 a second issue was to emerge that, through its associated publicity, not only revived the popular and press


interest in southern Africa but, in addition, permitted the re-emergence and subsequent crystallization of this embryonic interventionist outlook. In this instance the topic of debate was the settlement of the German protectorate, a matter of some delicacy owing to the fact that, in spite of efforts to entice German-speaking colonists, the first sizeable group of white migrants to arrive there with the intention of making it into a permanent home were not of German but of Afrikaner origin.5 The question of what to do with them polarized opinion at all levels of society. Large sections of the press, for instance, were openly hostile to the Boer trekkers, whom they perceived as little more than interlopers. Commenting on their presence, the Vossische Zeitung noted that 'if Southwest Africa is suitable for settlement. .. we would much rather see real Germans there than South African Boers who leave the land when they have exhausted it. ' 6 A similar perspective was taken by the Magdeburgische Zeitung which observed that 'though the defenders of Boer immigration say that the Boers prepare the soil for future German immigration, this is not an argument to be taken seriously.' 7 For those members of the public who had been appreciative of the media's former, more ambitious and ideologically orientated stance, such journalistic conservatism came as something of an anticlimax. This fact had important consequences for the development of attitudes to the region for, whereas during the earlier debate over the future of South-West Africa, the press had been at the leading edge of the emergent radical public outlook, on this occasion they, in effect, abdicated as its promoters, with the result that this role was quickly seized upon by another type of organization, the nationalist pressure group.

So far as their interaction with southern Africa was concerned, pressure groups existed in two forms. By far the most important were the large mainstream organizations whose objectives were diffuse and whose preoccupation with the region was, as a consequence, justified within an ideological framework. Typifying such a body was the Pan-German League. Its interest in southern Africa stemmed from the belief, central to the ethos of the movement, that the German nation was not a geographically delineated entity but rather an ethnic unit composed of all those who were Teutonic by language and culture. Since, as one writer observed, 'the Boers are German in blood, in language, in national character, and in all the rest of their ethnicity', 8 this was a point of view that ensured they became an object of the league's attention. Consequently, in response to the anti-Boer feelings of the press, the Pan-Germans began to publicize their own volkisch interpretation of the matter. The issue in their view was a simple one. In a pamphlet containing an address to the colonial authorities, the question was put as follows:


Does our Reichskommissar in Windhoek recognize the significance of this almost year old movement? Does he perceive even a fraction of the immeasurable advantage that must accrue to the fatherland from a prompt and positive cooperation with the Boers and does he see on the other hand the danger he causes to the fatherland ... should he reject the proffered hand of our South African kinsmen?9

Their answer was no less direct. Mindful of the opinion of mentors such as Treitschke that the Boer Republics were an area where ethnicity favoured German imperialism, they advocated total immersion in the affairs of the Afrikaner people. 10 As another of their leaflets observed, ' ... already we see in spirit that the time will come when here in South Africa the German nationality [Deutschtum] will take the same proud position as the AngloSaxon and lower German element.' 11

The other type of organization to emerge in the aftermath of the publicity surrounding southern Africa was that dedicated specifically to the promotion of German involvement in that part of the globe. The first of these to appear was the African Society, an institution which, in spite of its name, had so strong a South African bias that it even attracted the notice of the police. 12 Its aim, according to a report in the Siidafrikanische Zeitung, the main German-language newspaper in South Africa,D was 'to keep its members continually acquainted with the course of events in Africa, and especially South Africa, through intimate written correspondence with African travellers, African companies, institutions and associations.' 14 Such activities, ensuring as they would a heightened level of knowledge about the region, would make certain that Germany was well placed to take advantage of the fact that 'in today' s circumstances ... Africa no longer plays an unimportant role.' 15

The position taken by the pressure groups with regard to the situation in southern Africa proved to have considerable popular appeal, with the result that it soon began to exert an influence on the stance taken by other opinion-forming bodies. The press, for instance, in response to such clear-cut indications of the nature of public sentiment, quickly abandoned their recent, more conservative perspective in favour of the conflicting interventionist and volkisch interpretation. Effecting such a transformation, however, was by no means the limit of the new viewpoint's potency, which is to be seen not in the ease with which it superseded its rivals but rather in the extremity and vehemency of its subsequent presentation. For, in the expression of these views, the media was now to show all the passion of the converted, a circumstance that led to a massive amplification of the range of activities presented to the public as


legitimate objectives of German policy. Illustrative of this is the reaction that followed the British annexation of Amatongaland. The response of the pressure groups was largely predictable. The Colonial Society, for instance, at its annual convention in Kassel, advocated non-recognition of the British action. 16 As Malet reported:

The Imperial Government is reminded that Germany succeeded in upsetting the Anglo-Portuguese West African Treaty of 1884; that a similar success attended the efforts of this country with regard to the Anglo-Congolese Treaty of last year; and they are now urged to adopt the same line of action with regard to Amatongaland, and so give a helping hand to 'our brothers' in the South African Republic in their praiseworthy efforts to get access to the Sea. 17

In comparison to this and contrasting with previous experience, the attitude taken by the press was to prove considerably more extreme. The Tiigliche Rundschau, for instance, echoing the views of the Colonial Society, was likewise to insist that

the government should let it be known in London that it does not recognize the annexation .... This step can be justified on the grounds that through the annexation Germany is deprived of the direct contact with the Transvaal that ensures that, in the event of disturbances, Germany is well placed to protect important interests with the landing of troops. 18

Significantly, the same article also went on to demand that 'the independence of the Transvaal from every English influence must become the basis of German colonial policy and Germany should take the requisite steps to establish a protectorate over the South African Republic.' 19

This upward escalating spiral of public sentiment reached the apogee of its development with the dispatch of the Kruger telegram, an event which succeeded in bringing out all the patriotic fervour and reckless passions of the German public. Spurred on by this tide of emotions, the media and pressure groups were drawn into making their most explicit declarations of intent. It is in these views that the fully developed non-governmental ideology for southern Africa can be most clearly seen.

The initial reaction of many organizations to the Kaiser's message of congratulation was to treat the Emperor to similar declarations of support. Consequently, following the dispatch of his good wishes, the Kaiser received endless resolutions from branches of the German Colonial


Society and the Pan-German League, thanking him for his resolute stand.20 Amongst such communications, however, was to be found correspondence that, while certainly thankful for this past action, sought primarily to lay down an agenda for the future. Particularly precise in this regard were two letters sent to the government by the Kolonisationsgesellschaft ftir Siid-Afrika. 21 This organization, which had been established as recently as October 1895, was under the direction of the veteran colonial enthusiast Max Schubert. Schubert, an industrialist from Saxony and a leading light in the Chemnitz Colonial Society, had, over the years, been involved in a number of projects designed to promote the establishment of German colonies abroad. At the end of the 1880s, for instance, he had been one of the early supporters of Bernhard Forster's attempt to create Neu-Germanien, now known as Nueva Germania, a German settlement in Paraguay composed exclusively of colonists with a pure Aryan background.22 Disillusioned by the failings of this project, he had, by the end of 1893, severed all connections with this enterprise23 and turned his attention to new endeavours, one of which was the Kolonisationsgesellschaft fiir Siidafrika. Given the background of its leader, it is not surprising that this organization placed considerable emphasis on migration. Accordingly, its declared objective was to bring about 'the acquisition and settlement of lands in South Africa, the opening up of these lands for commerce, and the operation of an export and import business.' 24 Initially restricted to these aims, the Kolonisationsgesellschaft, which included on its supervisory board people from various sections of the community,25 confined its activity to raising funds and membership. However, in the light of the government's response to the Jameson raid, the organization's stated goals were reinforced by requests for direct territorial concessions. Writing to the Auswartiges Amt on the very day of the Kruger telegram, Max Schubert urged the government to use its influence over the Transvaal to secure 'the transfer from available state lands of a particular area for the settlement of German farmers.' 26 Similarly, three days later, he wrote to propose 'that Tongaland and particularly Kosi Bay be removed from English influence which should be superseded by that of the Germans or at the very least the Boers ... .' Yet, even that was not the extent of his ambitions, for as he explained one paragraph later:

... hereby Germany could secure the protectorate over Tongaland or legal ownership of the entire area. Then, as soon as German capital will build a railway from Kosi Bay to Johannesburg, it will hold in its hands the key to the whole of South Africa. 27


Following the public expression of such views, the press once again began to echo the extremism of the pressure groups and to demand, with some impatience, that vOlkisch, pro-Boer policies be put into practice. In an article by the colonial enthusiast Franz Josef von Biilow28 entitled 'South West Africa and Mr Rhodes', the question was raised:

why Germany with her multitude of big talkers and export firms, iron industries and overseas speculators does not strive with all her power and forbearance to develop the project which was in the mind of Liideritz, the founder of our colonial territory, when he acquired Angra Pequefia, to span a bridge from here across the South African continent to the Boer Republics[?]29

The answer was that the Kruger telegram, the very act that had so excited the imagination and so heightened the expectations of non-governmental opinion, was also responsible for creating a diplomatic climate that was to bring about a fundamental rethink of Reich policy. This was to ensure that over the next few years, where southern Africa was concerned, relations between official institutions and non-governmental agents was to be marked by the tension that developed from the ever-increasing divergence of their opinions. Whilst the WilhelmstraBe was to come to favour a complete German disengagement from the Transvaal, the media and pressure groups continued to advocate the interventionist and volkisch standpoint, which became ever more closely a part of the mainstream of popular political culture. Symptomatic of this fact was the permeation of these views from the press into all aspects of publishing, a development well illustrated by the 'Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas', series 9 and 10 of which appeared in the summer of 1896. The former of these was a cartographic representation of South-West Africa that contained, in addition to a projection of the German protectorate, maps on 'the spread of Germanness [Deutschtum] in South Africa', 'German colonies in British Kaffraria, German colonies in Natal. .. [and] German Settlement on the Cape plateau.' 30 The claims made in these maps were firmly rooted in volkisch principles, particularly when it came to the depiction of the ethnic makeup of the region. The Afrikaner population, for instance, were consistently referred to as 'low Germans' and treated as an integral aspect of the overall German presence. As a review in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung explained it, '[the map] contains a complete representation of the spread of German civilization in South Africa and especially of the influence of the Boers.' 31 This, however, should not be taken to imply that the high German element was minimized. On the contrary, as was


observed by Martin Gosselin, the British charge in Berlin, '[map 18] is entitled 'the extension of German influence (Deutschtum) in South Africa' ... [and shows] places where high German colonies are said to be in existence, in the British colonies and in the South African Republic.' 32

With such views in common circulation, it is hardly surprising that rumours of a possible accommodation between Britain and Germany over the future of the Portuguese colonies and, in particular, of Delagoa Bay should have led to the mobilization of the patriotic and volkisch forces in opposition to a policy that went against everything they stood for. This antipathy was made clear to the government. In a letter to Hohenlohe, the German Colonial Society, normally the most dependable and 'Regierungstreu' of the patriotic societies,33 outlined the ideological objections and profound hostility of 'all nationally orientated Germans' to the proposed treaty:

In addition to the material interest there are also principles to consider. The German people cannot agree that a kindred nation, which has received declarations of sympathy from the German government and which has for decades had to fight off English encroachments and domination, should now with German agreement or even participation be economically suffocated and thereby politically destroyed by England.34

However, it was not until the outbreak of the Boer War, when such an outcome was transformed from a hypothetical possibility into a virtual certainty, that the patriotic societies and their affiliates undertook to mount a major challenge to government policy. The basis of their decision was that for them, the conflict between the British and the Boers was a catastrophe of the greatest magnitude. Writing to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the most prominent ideologue of racial politics, Cosima Wagner expressed the view, common to all sections of the patriotic and volkisch element, that 'this extermination of one of the most excellent Germanic races is so horrible that I know nothing I have experienced to compare with it.' 35 The response of the pressure groups to such feelings was to raise a public hue and cry of such intensity as to leave the government in no doubt as to the unpopularity of its stance.36 This campaign manifested itself most dramatically in two ways. First of all, considerable funds were raised in support of the Boer cause; the Pan-German League collecting the astonishing figure of over half a million marks and even the insignificant Deutsche Zeitung managing to accumulate a respectable 15 000.37 Secondly, in response to the government's refusal to grant the exiled Kruger either an audience or official recognition, the Pan-German League organized a gala


reception for him in Cologne that was the subject of considerable publicity, not the least reason for which was that the speech of welcome was made by Reismann-Grone, the owner of the Rheinisch-Westfiilische Zeitung. 38 However, perhaps even more significant an indication of the unpopularity of the government's stance was the fact that amongst those who sought out the exiled Boers there was even to be found German royalty. As the Prussian consulate in Weimar was to report, the ErbgroBherzogin of Mecklenburg-Schwerin 'was very astonished when she accompanied Johann Albrecht of Mecklenburg to the station and saw an "unknown man" in the ducal saloon carriage.' 39 The person in question turned out to be Dr Leyds and though a court official tried, in the manner of a modern-day spin doctor, to suggest that the meeting was due to a concern about mining investments, it is hard to believe that anybody actually interpreted it as such. Certainly, the fact that ten months later Duke Heinrich of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was to ask Pourtales, the minister to the Hague, for his opinion about visiting Kruger in Holland, suggests that sympathy played a greater part than mining assets.40

Not surprisingly, the contrast between the public enthusiasm for the Boer leaders and their vilification of the government was a spectacle that left a strong impression on the authorities,41 so much so in fact that when, in October 1902, there seemed a danger that the appearance of the defeated Boer generals Botha, de Wet and Delarey might lead to a comparable display, the Reich government resorted to subterfuge in an effort to bring about the cancellation of the visit.42

Needless to say, Britain's victory in the Boer War had a considerable impact upon the disposition of both pressure groups and public opinion. Their natural disappointment, however, was somewhat mitigated by the development of a number of other 'patriotic' issues that were able to take its place. Prominent amongst these was the campaign in favour of the building of a German battle fleet, a cause that actively benefited from the South African War as a result of the Bundesrath affair43 and Germany's visible impotence at sea. Consequently, naval ism was able to serve as a useful conduit for much of the public energy that would formerly have been spent on the Transvaal.

Consequently, it can be seen that in the aftermath of the Boer defeat, the energy of those groups that had formerly fought so hard for the adoption of a volkisch outlook on South Africa quickly found alternative directions. If this makes the public attitude to the region seem somewhat fickle, then it should be noted that eight years later the issue still had the capacity to arouse popular emotions, a fact vividly demonstrated by the uproar surrounding the Kaiser's assertion, published in the newspaper the Daily


Telegraph, that he had aided the British campaign effort during the Boer War.44 Consequently, it is the Daily Telegraph affair and not the public's unsettled reaction to disappointed aspirations that serves as the best evidence of the true emotive power of the South African question, the legacy of which was a mainstream non-governmental ideology capable of making an impression years after circumstances had rendered it otherwise inapplicable. 45

Thus, it can be seen that during the 1890s there emerged a public outlook on southern Africa based predominantly upon a sympathetic and often volkisch perception of the Boers. This view, formed largely as a result of publicity and the activities of non-governmental agents, was nonetheless capable of independent development, a fact demonstrated by the failure of the press to create a climate of opinion hostile to Boer immigration in 1893. Its most important feature, however, was its detachment from government. Though influenced by official policy to the extent of responding to governmental actions, and though capable, through the threat of public displeasure, of severely constraining the executive's room for manoeuvre, ultimately this popular outlook was to enjoy a separate development from that of the WilhelmstraBe, with the result that southern African policy was to make a significant contribution to the extremism and disaffection so common to the political culture of Wilhelmine Germany.46

3 The Commercial Perspective

In the aftermath of the Jameson raid and the Kruger telegram, Marschall, capitalizing on the widespread public satisfaction with the government, outlined in a boisterous speech to the Reichstag his interpretation of German policy. The emphasis he provided was preponderantly an economic one:

If anyone were to ask us 'what have you Germans got to do with the South African Republic?', we should calmly answer: we wish to exercise there all the rights granted to us by the Republic with the consent of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. We do not want constitutional or practical changes which might make those rights illusory or render their exercise difficult. Years ago, we established a subsidized line of steamers to Delagoa Bay, principally with German capital. The railway has been built from the Portuguese frontier to Pretoria, German factories have been erected in the Transvaal, German subjects have settled there, German capital is invested in great industrial enterprises, our commerce there is flourishing. The German Reich cannot and will not shirk the duty of protecting these legitimate interests and cultivating as far as it can, these relations in pacific competition with other nations. 1

This public declaration, by far the most explicit that the State Secretary was ever to give, was not the only occasion on which the extent of the German economic penetration of the southern African peninsula was to be cited as the prime motivating factor behind the Reich's prominent political and diplomatic presence in the region. Indeed, on numerous occasions, British officials were to be informed that the German 'attitude was dictated to us by our commercial and economic interests ... ' 2• These interests, it was maintained, obligated Germany to intervene in favour of the status quo and to oppose British efforts to promote a commercial federation among the states of the region, a scheme that Marschall scathingly referred to as the creation of a 'greater Rhodesia.' 3 In the light of these constant assertions, it seems appropriate to examine the actual nature and extent of Germany's business interests in the area in order to ascertain how far financial considerations merited the prominent place that they were accorded in explanations of the Reich's foreign policy.

32

The Commercial Perspective 33

Essentially, the German economic presence in southern Africa manifested itself in two forms. The first of these was through the activities of German immigrants to the region. As the officials of the Auswartiges Amt never tired of reminding their British counterparts, by the mid-1890s there were many thousands of Germans settled in southern Africa, a large number of whom had risen to positions of great importance in the region's commercial life. The extent of the latter group's success should not be underestimated. Looking back in the 1930s, the mining magnate Sir David Harris compiled a necrology of the 'Randlords' he had known. Of the fifteen people on the list, eight of them were of German origin.4 The economic impact of this fact was significant for, naturally enough, in the course of their careers, many of these German-born businessmen maintained close financial links with their native country. Adolf Goerz, for instance, whose firm A. Goerz and Company was registered in Germany, received considerable backing from the Deutsche Bank. In a similar fashion, the General Mining and Finance Corporation, the conglomerate headed by the Berliner George Albu, was supported by the Dresdner Bank.5

However, in spite of such ties, it would be wrong to assume that being of German origin guaranteed comparable national political allegiance. Though some businessmen, such as Edward Lippert, returned to Germany after the South African War in a show of solidarity with their 'teutonic cousins', the Boers, the vast majority had by this time already come to view themselves as British, if not by birth, then by adoption. Indeed, so much was this the case that many of them were to become pillars of the English establishment, receiving knighthoods and becoming a part of the London social scene.6 More revealing than this was the attitude that they were to display during the January 1896 disturbances in Johannesburg. While public opinion in Germany was universally outraged, the position taken by many of the emigres to South Africa was a good deal less clearcut. As the Evening Standard was to note,

it may be observed, in passing, that a good many German, possibly even Dutch, names also occur in the list of those who are charged with complicity in the conspiracy alleged. This seems to dispose effectually of the theory that the plot was a purely British one.7

Significantly, this belief was also shared by Franz von Herff, the German consul to Pretoria, who was to report to Berlin a connection between the 'British party' and the firms of Hermann Eckstein and Wemher, Beit & Company, both of which were headed by German-born businessmen.8

Similarly, it was also the view that was held by the Kaiser, who was to


observe with some irritation that the Jameson raid was instigated by 'German Jews' .9 Consequently, while the Standard's conclusion concerning the origin of the troubles might appear suspect, it nonetheless remains the case that the evidence provided strongly serves to reinforce the point that the question of political allegiance in South Africa was by no means firmly drawn on national lines, a fact that received recognition from many quarters. One of these was the captain of a German warship, the Schwalbe, that put in to Port Elizabeth in April 1900. Commenting on the state of 'Deutschtum' in this English environment, he observed that

among the leading businesses belonging to Germans there exists only the slightest degree of community ... .In the second generation this relationship changes decidedly to the disadvantage of Germanness; the sons of German parents, for example ... frequently acquire English nationality .... 10

The causes of this fluidity of identity were twofold. Firstly and most obviously, there was the integrating effect of living in an environment where English influence was strong and where English served as the lingua franca. As the captain of the Schwalbe observed, 'where business connections and personal relations consist of contact with Englishmen, English sympathies almost always predominate .... ' 11 Secondly and more importantly, however, there were sound business reasons for South African entrepreneurs to favour emphasizing a link with Great Britain over one with Germany. This was particularly true for those connected with the mining industry.

One reason for this was London's predominance as a financial centre. Since the opening of the gold fields in 1886 a large quantity of German capital had flowed into southern Africa. However, due to the fact that the German stock exchange regulations as well as the Reich stamp and equity laws actively hindered the trading of gold shares, a significant proportion of this investment had been routed through Britain's financial district, the City of London, which was then the world's pre-eminent bullion market. 12

These two circumstances, taken together with sterling's role as the region's common currency, were to make the City absolutely indispensable to those companies or individuals who sought to produce or trade South African gold. It was because of this situation that a number of otherwise German concerns made their home in London. Wernher, Beit & Company, for instance, the firm that controlled the most important mining conglomerate on the Rand, was run from the British capital by partners who hailed from Hesse and Hamburg respectively.


London's financial strengths were even more dominant when it came to shipping. In 1890, an anxious John Merriman had written to G. J. Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to inform him that 'the Germans are just about subsidizing a line of steamers to run through the Suez canal to Louren~o Marques for the express purpose of diverting British trade.' 13

The line to which he was referring was the Deutsche Ostafrika Linie, a company that received a government grant of 900 000 marks a year for the purpose of operating a four-weekly service from Hamburg to German East Africa. 14 Owing to the negligible level of trade between these destinations, the service was soon extended to encompass other ports in the region, including Delagoa Bay. 15 In spite of the considerable monetary aid granted to the service by the Reich authorities, the venture, though marking the end of the English shipping monopoly, was not a real success. 16 Part of the reason for this was that, with their various stopovers, the DOAL ships took a month longer in their journey - forty-seven days instead of seventeen -than the steamers of the Castle Mail Packets and Union Steamship lines, which sailed directly from Cape Town to London. This delay was not only inconvenient but also expensive as it led to additional insurance costs and the loss of interest on money tied up in unsold cargo. Given that Lloyds of London already charged higher premiums for German ships than it did for those of the South African shipping line, it becomes clear why, in spite of the administratively convenient German through-rate system whereby the shippers in conjunction with the state railways offered one fixed transport tariff from inland German manufacturer to ultimate East African destination, 17 the majority of gold and other goods were sent via England and the British colonies rather than on the subsidized German route. 18 For the mining industry, as for other commercial concerns, factors such as these provided good reason for favouring a link between Britain and South Africa.

No less important in this regard was the economics of mining. Gold extraction, in spite of its reputation for providing great wealth very quickly, was a difficult process hampered by a number of potentially crippling financial impediments. Not the least of these was that, owing to the gold standard, mining produced a product of fixed price, an ounce of gold being worth exactly £4 4s 111d. There was, however, no such comparable limit to the costs associated with the task of bringing the product to the market. On the contrary, as surface outcrops became exhausted and as the economy of the Rand began to depend more and more upon deep-level mining, so the expenses incurred by production began to increase. They soon became prohibitive. Just opening a deep-level mine was estimated to cost around £650 000 and that was before expenditure on production was taken into


account. 19 While little could be done about the level of initial capital outlay, the extent of the subsequent costs was a source of some anxiety and irritation to the mine owners, for on the Rand, the price of supplies, labour and equipment was kept artificially high. The reason for this was the Kruger government's industrial policy. In their efforts to free their market from the dominance of British suppliers, the Transvaal authorities had sponsored the foundation of a number of monopoly companies in a wide range of essential businesses. These firms, holding state concessions that gave them the exclusive right to provide, sell and market a particular product or service, quickly became a factor of some importance in the operation of the Republic's economy. The effect of their presence on mining costs, while variable in its impact, was almost always adverse. Particularly onerous in this regard were the dynamite and railway monopolies.

Of all the materials required for deep-level mining, explosives were amongst the most important and hence their purchase accounted for a substantial proportion of the overall operating cost of most mines. Unfortunately, little thought was given to this by the Kruger government who, in 1888 and again in 1894, issued a concession permitting the establishment of a company that would act as the Transvaal's sole manufacturer and supplier of explosives. Not surprisingly, the consequence of this decision was that in the Republic dynamite could not be bought at a competitive price.20 In part, this was due to the difficulties inherent to manufacturing such a product in the Transvaal, for as one contemporary expert observed:

The dynamite monopoly simply fosters waste. The raw material is not to be found in the Transvaal and the consumer has to pay the cost of transporting eight tons of raw material in order to make one ton of dynamite. The dynamite factory will probably be compelled for all future times to continue to import sulphur, nitrate of soda, kieselguhr, glycerine and collodion cotton. 21

This situation was further exacerbated by the actions of the monopoly company, whose management ruthlessly exploited the terms of their concession to exclude all their competitors from the market and thus maintain a pricing policy that, being solely determined by the desire to maximize profits, enormously inflated the cost of dynamite. Given that the unprecedented expenses associated with deep-level mining had contributed to a situation in which, up to June 1895, no company engaged in such work had made sufficient profit to declare a dividend,22 these added costs were a cause of considerable concern to the industry.


No less unpopular was the operation of the NZASM or Netherlands South African Railway company. Owing to the fact that the Transvaal was essentially an agricultural economy with only a limited industrial capacity, the vast majority of the supplies and equipment needed by the mining industry had to be imported from outside its borders. Up to the middle of the decade, this meant that a significant proportion of all foreign manufactures that were not delivered to the Republic by ox wagon were transported to the Transvaal on one of the British railways that connected the Republic to the ports of Cape Colony and Natal. The dependence this implied was not to Kruger's liking and so he arranged for the construction of a line between the Rand and the Portuguese harbour of Delagoa Bay.23 Following its opening in July 1895, he then made efforts to ensure that it captured as much of the carrying trade as was possible. The method used to achieve this was the exploitation of the railway concession granted to the NZASM. As a consequence of its monopoly, where foreign track reached the Republic's borders, the Netherlands Railway company had the exclusive right to continue the service. By using this right to manipulate rates on goods coming into the Transvaal from the Cape or Natal, it was possible to make the Delagoa Bay route more attractive in terms of price. Unfortunately, it was nigh impossible to make the route attractive in any other respect. For, though Delagoa Bay was nearer to the Rand than the ports of the British colonies,24 any advantages this conferred in terms of price and speed of delivery were undermined by the fact that the facilities at the harbour there were utterly inadequate for the purpose of handling large quantities of freight. At Lourenr;:o Marques there were no berths capable of dealing with ocean-going vessels, only two piers at which goods could be unloaded and almost no wharf-side storage space.25 As a result, from the very outset the Delagoa Bay railway was only able to haul a meagre 60 tons of freight per day, invariably causing goods delivered to Lourenr;:o Marques for the purpose of transportation to the Rand to be subject to long and costly delays. 26 Yet the alternative of sending goods via the much more reliable ports and railways of the British colonies was, courtesy of the freight rates of the NZASM, artificially expensive. Consequently, the effect this had on the price of imported materials was to earn the railway the hostility of the mining industry, whose leaders were apt to take the British side in disputes relating both to freight rates and the Republic's railway policy.

As a result of these various hindrances, the actions and outlook of the Transvaal authorities evoked the concerted opposition of the entire mining industry, even to the extent that repeated representations were made in


Berlin against the Kruger regime by mining capitalists of German birth. These began as early as December 189327 and were still much in evidence during the winter of 1897, when Adolf Goerz wrote to the WilhelmstraBe, firstly, to appeal for diplomatic support in the struggle to have the Volksraad accept the reformist proposals of the Industrial Commission of Enquiry, and secondly, subsequent to these recommendations being rejected, to make it clear that he would not oppose any British intervention designed to impose a more amenable administration on the Rand.28 Such negative views were to some extent balanced by those of the second manifestation of the German economic presence, namely those German companies that operated state concessions in the republic.

Given that their unique hold upon the market was entirely dependent upon the authority and support of the Transvaal government, it is hardly surprising that the monopoly companies provided an extremely favourable assessment of the Kruger administration and the business climate that it created. Since many of these companies were German owned, their views on the Transvaal were accorded great respect in Germany. Particularly impressive to opinion in the Reich was the argument put forward by the monopoly concerns that, as a result of the Kruger government's policy of countering the regional influence of British firms by the tendering of concessions, German companies found in the Transvaal a unique opportunity to obtain control of a number of high-profile businesses.

Three investments in particular were cited in support of this. Most prominent of these was the aforementioned Netherlands South African Railway Company. Founded, as its name would imply, as a Dutch concern, the NZASM quickly became the subject of considerable German investment, numbering amongst its larger shareholders both the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft and Robert Warschauer and Company. In total, nearly half of the authorized equity capital was to end up in German hands.29

Since the majority of the company's debt was also taken up by Germans, this holding proved more than ample to advance German commercial interests, with the result that the company quite intentionally did most of its business with German firms. Engineering work, for instance, was handled by Lenz & Co., a subsidiary of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, whilst materials were purchased for the most part from the KolnDeutzer Waggonfabrik and the Bochumer Verein fi.ir Bergbau und GuBstahlfabrikation. 30 Indeed, so much work accrued to German companies as a result of the capital invested in the NZASM that the importance of the firm even won the recognition of the Reich authorities. One indication of this is that they chose to emphasize the role of the company in their diplomatic exchanges with Britain. Writing to Lord Salisbury in


January 1896, Sir Frank Lascelles observed that Marschall had specifically sought to make him aware of the value the Imperial government attached to the fact that 'the railway from Pretoria to the Portuguese frontier had been built almost entirely with German capital.' 31 Another, no less revealing, though more public, display of official enthusiasm, occurred when R. W. van den Wall Bake, the Dutchman who headed the NZASM, was awarded the Order of Merit for his services to German industry. 32

Equally impressive to opinion in the Reich was the German influence over the Transvaal's central bank. The Nationale Bank de Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek Beperkt, nominally a German-Dutch collaboration, was founded in 1891 with the aid of the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, which had dispatched one of its employees, Wilhelm Knappe, specifically for this purpose. 33 This effort was amply rewarded by his appointment as one of the Bank's directors, an occurrence that cemented in place their special position and ensured that strong ties between the National Bank and other German finance houses soon followed, a relationship illustrated by the National Bank's use of the Deutsche Bank's London representative as its own agent. 34 The benefits of such links for German financial institutions were immense. To begin with, though the Transvaal based its coinage on the British monetary system, the coins themselves were struck in Germany, to the profit of German mints.35 Similar advantages accrued in respect to bank notes. The National Bank had a fifty-year concession that not only gave it the sole right to issue legal tender, tax free and with a preferential relaxation of the laws governing the amount of specie required as backing, but, in addition, ensured that its notes were the only ones accepted at government offices. These terms gave the National Bank enormous advantages when it came to establishing a branch network, a circumstance that ensured its rapid expansion and hence, given its ownership, the steady proliferation of German capital in the TransvaaP6

No less advantageous were the trading conditions that governed the operation of the third of these examples, namely Edward Lippert's dynamite concession, the South African Explosives Company. This firm, which illegally imported finished dynamite from Europe before selling it at profit margins of up to 200 per cent, produced huge returns for Lippert and his shareholders. Unfortunately for those involved, this concession was terminated in 1892 after it was conclusively proven that the monopoly had reneged upon its obligation to manufacture its product on Transvaal soil. The uncovering of this fraud failed, however, to usher in a period of competitive trading in dynamite, for two years later, in spite of their experience with Lippert, the Kruger government decided to award a new monopoly. On this occasion, the recipient was a company associated with


the Nobel Dynamite Trust, an Anglo-German cartel that had been founded some years before with a view to mitigating against the effects of competition in the explosives industryY As was to be expected of a venture that had such antecedents, the new concern did everything in its power to exclude competition and maximize business for its associates, who, since the new company was a member of the Nobel Trust, included both British and German producers. Nonetheless, in spite of this fact, the new concern was a largely German-dominated firm and was controlled and run accordingly by its chairman, Max A. Philipp, from the offices of the Hamburgbased Dynamit Aktien Gesellschaft. 38 Consequently, though some business did accrue to the Nobel's Explosives Company of Glasgow, who manufactured a share of the dynamite, the majority of the profits from this venture were repatriated to the parent company in Germany. 39

Given the conditions under which they operated, it is more than apparent why the German owners of the monopoly companies gave such determined backing to the Kruger government. Equally, it is no less clear why, in so doing, they encountered the bitter opposition of those whose businesses were adversely effected by the concession system. That this included the mining industry and the British business community is well known. However, it should not be forgotten that there were, amongst those who stood to lose from the introduction of monopoly concessions and who protested against their introduction, numerous German companies. One example of such a firm was the German cyanide manufacturer, the Stassfurter Chemische Fabrik. In August 1895 the Auswartiges Amt received repeated representations from this company concerning the proposed establishment of a cyanide concession in the Transvaal. Such a concession, it was maintained, and the tariffs that would protect it, would lose the firm business worth 1.5 million marks per year.40 Naturally, the management of the company were far from enthusiastic about a concession system that threatened their turnover in this way. Yet, equally naturally, in response to complaints such as this, the concession holders, like the mining magnates, often found themselves calling upon the Reich Government to provide official support for their cause.

It is against this backdrop of a diversity of competing economic undertakings that Marschall's claim that German policy towards southern Africa was dictated entirely by the Reich's commercial interests must be evaluated. It is immediately apparent in this context that the State Secretary's numerous unequivocal assertions that his policy was a straightforward reflection of Germany's clear economic interests stand in marked contrast to a situation in which Germany's economic interests were anything but clear or straightforward. On the contrary, two positions emerged among the various German


economic enterprises active in southern Africa that were entirely contradictory, with one side favouring the Kruger regime for the monopolistic opportunities that it offered and the other campaigning vigorously against a system that shackled it with so many financial impediments.

In spite of the fact that German commercial and business interests were far from united in their view of the Kruger regime and sought different courses of action in relation to it, Marschall's claim that clear economic logic determined his policy has, nonetheless, been readily accepted by many historians. In part, this reflects the prominent role that economic factors have generally been accorded in the construction of South African history. As the mineral-rich region that inspired Hobson's theory of the relationship between surplus capital and imperialism41 and that had in the randlords an easily discemable politically active plutocratic class, it has long been held as the prime example of a location where great power politics was unmistakably driven by economic considerations. Although this view was originally devised to explain British policy in South Africa, it is hardly surprising if it has also been applied to the policy of the region's next most active political player, namely Germany.

While the emphasis on economic factors in the formulation of South African history has played an important part in ensuring the widespread acceptance of Marschall's argument, even more significant has been an influential historiography that explains the external behaviour of the Reich in economic terms. Playing a prominent role in this historiography are works that adhere to the Marxist theory of state-monopoly capitalism.42

According to this interpretation, the economy of each industrial country, especially that of one as advanced as Germany, was made up of a number of industries that coalesced into competing economic blocks or monopoly groups which, to promote their particular interests, vied for control of the state. As a result, government policy, rather than being the product of an autonomous political decision-making process, merely reflected the interests of the then most powerful monopoly group. Naturally, as the balance of influence between the monopoly groups altered, causing new interests to rise to prominence, so government policy was likewise transformed. In the view of the exponents of this methodology, therefore, understanding the government's conduct at any given time is predicated upon identifying which group was dominant at that moment. As an interpretive framework, this theory is most easily applied to circumstances marked by a clear polarization between visibly divergent economic interests. Such a situation was clearly to be found among the German business community in southem Africa, with the result that economic explanations of German policy, based on the theory of state monopoly capitalism, have proliferated.


Owing to the conjunction of these approaches to South African and German history, both of which stress the primacy of economic issues, there exists a significant body of historical literature in which the presence of German economic concerns in the region has been used to explain the Reich's southern African policy.43 In summary, it is suggested that at the outset of the Wilhelmine era, during the period when Marschall was State Secretary, the concessionaires held sway over Germany's diplomats, with the result that the Reich Government, seeking to support the monopoly companies, maintained its firmly anti-English stance in the region. As the decade wore on, however, and the views of mining capital became more important, so the government, now dominated by Billow, withdrew its support from the Transvaal presidency, whose policies acted to damage the profitability of one of the nation's most important investments, and instead, reached an agreement with the British that explicitly allowed them to take whatever action was necessary to create a more pliable polity on the Rand.

In favour of this argument, it must be conceded that among German businesses active in South Africa there was a clear polarization between those advocating Reich intervention on behalf of change and those calling for continued support of the Boer regime. Moreover, during the course of 1896 and 1897, a shift did take place in the outlook of the Reich authorities, who turned from being conspicuous supporters of Kruger to muted critics of his refusal to accept the need for reform. In spite of this, there are a number of reasons for refuting both the German claim that economics dictated these policies and the historical interpretation that accepts this.

First of all, this interpretation assumes that capital investment on the part of a nation's business circles necessitates not only a political interest on the part of its government but also political involvement by its diplomatic representatives. Yet, in reality, there was no reason why German economic participation in southern Africa should have obliged the Reich administration to take a stand of any description with regard to the politics of the region or become involved in any way in the shaping of its political future. This contention is borne out by the Anglo-German Convention of 30 August 1898. This treaty, though involving an explicit and absolute German political withdrawal from the Transvaal and the area around Delagoa Bay, nonetheless in no sense sacrificed the Reich's economic interests in either location. On the contrary, as one historian has observed, this act of political renunciation on the part of the Reich administration actually advanced German commerce as it finally 'opened the door to a competitive commercial development of Delagoa Bay.' 44 This can be seen from the treaty terms that Germany secured. Contained in the agreement


were clauses that committed Britain both to safeguarding the private rights of German subjects in the area and, more particularly, to adopting 'a friendly attitude' towards Germany's most high-profile investment in Delagoa Bay, the Eiffe concession.45 The significance of these clauses is apparent. If German diplomats were willing to accept that the Reich's economic interests could be protected in this way, irrespective of the abnegation of a strong German political presence, then the nature of their previous assertions discounting such an eventuality becomes more clear: they were disingenuous.

Further exemplifying the lack of a necessary connection between capital investment and political involvement is the position taken by the French political establishment on South African matters. During this period, France no less than Germany had a considerable monetary investment in the Transvaal, an investment which the Quai d'Orsay estimated at over 800 million francs. 46 Yet, in spite of this French economic interest in the region, in their case, in contrast to that of Germany, financial involvement never translated into a comparable diplomatic or political engagement. As the Colonial Office in London noted:

The interests of France in the Transvaal are exclusively commercial, and the efforts of Her Majesty's Government to obtain the removal of the abuses which characterise the administration of the country would, if successful, enhance the value of the mining shares so largely held by French investors .... The policy of Germany, on the other hand, has been dictated by political motives and the many advantages given to German citizens by President Kruger are made to serve political ends.47

Clearly, for the officials in Whitehall, the German decision to deviate from the more passive French example was demonstrative not so much of their desire to fulfil a national obligation to their country's investors and businessmen as of the existence of an intentional political agenda on the part of the Reich administration.

Compounding this interpretation is the fact that, even if the German government was motivated to take an interest in the Transvaal for economic reasons, it is still too simplistic to ascribe the direction of its policy to the varying influences of different business sectors, for though there might have been a division in the German business community between the representatives of the mining industry and those of the monopoly concessions, this split was not similarly duplicated amongst the nation's investors. On the contrary, many of the country's finance houses, the ultimate source of capital for nearly all of Germany's business enterprises in


the region, had funds invested in both sectors. The Dresdner Bank, for example, provided financial support both to the General Mining and Finance Corporation, whose chairman George Albu was a staunch critic of the railway and explosives concessions, and also to the Dynamit Aktien Gesellschaft, a firm that benefited greatly from its monopoly position.48 In a similar way, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft was simultaneously the financing house for the Netherlands South African Railway Company and the owner of a large portfolio of mining shares.49 Consequently, for the Dresdner Bank and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, as well as for other financial institutions, reconciling these divergent interests in favour of a single position regarding the situation in the Transvaal would have been in no sense straightforward.

Finally, notwithstanding the theory of state-monopoly capitalism, in the absence of any supporting documentary evidence there is no reason to suppose that it was the WilhelmstraBe that blindly followed the whims of the country's financiers rather than the moneymen who followed in the wake of the officials. 50 Indeed, much research has shown that German diplomats were far from being 'a profession in the service of the high-capitalistic upper strata of society' as some commentators have sought to suggest.51 Instead, quite the contrary has been postulated, with many historians emphasizing the autonomy with which German statesmen could formulate overseas policies without reference to business pressures. In short, they were capable of constructing their own foreign policy agenda and required no guidance in this respect from a dominant capitalist interest. 52

This interpretation is borne out by the nature of German involvement in southern Africa. With respect to Reich policy there, the evidence fails to support the idea that it was determined with close regard to economic considerations. For example, despite Marschall's claims that Germany stood to lose out commercially from the formation of a British-led economic union of South African states and that his policy was framed accordingly, the German records contain little to support this proposition. Indeed, the file on a South African customs union, which might, given Marschall's protestations, be expected to contain information on the impact of such a federation for German trade, is instead largely devoid of any material for the period up to August 1896.53 The factual basis on which Marschall claimed a major German interest in preventing such a union is, therefore, unclear. In a similar way, his general assertion, prominently and publicly highlighted in his Reichstag speech of February 1896 and privately communicated to British diplomats throughout the year prior to that, that German trade and investment provided the foundation for his South


African policy is also suspect. For one thing, German trade and investment statistics were always very imprecise. Such practices as transhipment and throughshipment, for instance, made all data regarding the final destination of German goods bound for South Africa, unlike the figures that Marschall bandied about with such authority to British diplomats, at best approximate.54 However, most revealingly, this fact was only discovered by Marschall, who was not an avid reader of trade reports, when he came to prepare for his Reichstag speech of 13 February 1896. For this purpose, a special memorandum regarding German economic involvement in South Africa was produced for him. 55 It arrived only a few days before the speech and provided the basis for his statements detailing Germany's economic interests. Until then, however, he had seen little to back up his many diplomatic assertions linking policy to economic interests. As Harald Rosenbach has observed, this 'points to the slight (and purely functional) value that the economic component took in the deliberations of the Foreign Office.' 56

Evidence such as this challenges those interpretations that assign a primacy to economic factors in the construction of German South African policy. Far from reflecting a dominant economic group, Germany's diplomats paid only limited attention to German business; they did not base their policy, as the exponents of state-monopoly capitalism would suggest, on choosing between conflicting economic interests. On the contrary, in this respect, they were strictly neutral. This was observed by French diplomats in Germany: commenting on the foundations of German policy, for instance, the Marquis de Noailles, the ambassador in Berlin, observed that 'having national interests in the mines and dynamite and those interests being contradictory, the German government does not intervene.' 57

German diplomats made similar observations in their private correspondence. As Otto von Miihlberg, a senior counsellor in the Foreign Office's trade division, observed:

German capital interests are in question in both the mining industry and also in the monopoly dynamite company. During the intense economic struggle undertaken over the last few years by the different interest groups, it could not fail to happen that the German government would be repeatedly approached by both sides for support. The standpoint of the government is, however, one of absolute neutrality .... 58

Clearly, so far as Miihlberg was concerned, German government policy stood above the economic rivalry of German business groups in South Africa.


If, as the evidence suggests, the Reich authorities were not merely engaged in the process of adapting their policies to fit the requirements of Germany's economic interests, then the possibility clearly exists that the contrary was the case, namely that economic issues and economic rhetoric were explicitly used for political purposes. There are several reasons for stressing such an interpretation.

First of all, it is undeniable that commercial activity could have major political implications. This correlation was well understood by German diplomats in South Africa, who made no effort to hide the fact that the connection between economic involvement and political advancement was frequently the factor that prompted their support for German involvement in local business ventures. A good example of this can be seen in the backing provided by the German consuls for the purchase of the Katembe concession by the Hamburg merchant Franz Ferdinand Eiffe. The Katambe district, a strip of land, lying opposite to Louren9o Marques, had the potential to be developed into the town's main pier and landing site. Were this to take place, the considerable infrastructure problems of Delagoa Bay would be solved, thereby allowing the full freight potential of the port to be realized. Such a concession, therefore, could be expected to turn a healthy profit. 59 As the British were only too well aware, it could also be developed into a significant coaling station or naval base. Were this to be manned by German seaman and placed at the disposal of German and Transvaal interests, then the entire geopolitical balance of the region could easily be altered.60 British diplomats feared that this was the motive behind the German interest in the concession.61 They were right. Eiffe, as Markus Pfeil informed the WilhelmstraBe, was not simply a businessman, but was a funded agent of the Transvaal.62 The purpose of the purchase, as his colleague Herff subsequently wrote to Berlin, was not purely commercial:

This acquisition has been accomplished quite secretly through the hand of the German subject Franz Eiffe from Hamburg with the intention of establishing Transvaal interests in Delagoa Bay and connecting these with German interests in order to be able to take up, if need be, the protection of the concessions by the German Reich.63

As this example makes evident, for diplomats on the ground, such as Herff and Pfeil, the link between economic considerations and political ones was clear: business could be and was used to advance German political and diplomatic interests.


In a similar fashion, diplomats in Berlin were no less cognizant than their colleagues in South Africa of the relationship between economic and political issues: economics should not dictate policy, but policy should, where possible, make use of and be justified by economics. Indicative of this tenet is a letter written by Holstein to Hatzfeldt:

We have learned from confidential information passed on by Parisians to bankers here that while the French and English are quarrelling in public over the Niger, Hanotaux is secretly beginning to support English policy towards the Transvaal Government, ostensibly only out of regard for French financial interests. The actual fact of co-operation, however, is of course designed to promote better feeling. Could we do something similar in South Africa or elsewhere? Could you perhaps use the occasion of similar co-operation, even though it were of little importance, to make Salisbury see the light?64

In the face of such a clear-cut statement from one of Germany's leading policy makers, it is evident that the Reich government did not so much devise its policy stance as a response to business interests, but rather, having decided on its stance, sought out those sectors of the German economy that supported such views and used their beliefs as vindication for its position.

Taken together, these various considerations challenge the muchproclaimed and long-accepted notion that German policy in South Africa was determined by economic factors. In place of this view, a quite contrary perspective emerges. So far as German southern African policy was concerned, economic considerations were but a prop for the chosen direction of imperialism.

II The Course of German South African Policy

4 The Background to Conflict

In the light of clear evidence that German involvement in Southern Africa, though supported by public opinion and, at times, by business interests, was in fact determined by the government to meet requirements of its own, it is now appropriate to examine how German activity in the region was conducted.

For much of the nineteenth century, German interest in southern Africa was promoted entirely by private concerns. As was often the case with remote places, the initial contact was established by missionaries. Setting up stations in Damaraland and the Transvaal as early as the 1840s, their work was for many years the only German activity in the region. However, with the discovery of vast diamond fields in Griqualand in the late 1860s, these spiritual efforts were quickly complemented by others of a more commercial character. The wealth these new enterprises produced led to an immediate and significant expansion of mercantile interest in the region and a small influx of German businessmen. Since many of those involved in the exploitation of South Africa began to put down roots, this financial concern quickly developed into a colonial one. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the first major protagonists for the foundation of a German colony amongst the Boers were Ernst von Weber, the owner of a South African diamond mine, and Adolf Liideritz, a merchant with trading connections there. Between them they undertook the task of propagandizing this idea amongst the German people. In 1879, Weber published an article in the Geographische Nachrichten expounding his views. 'In South-East Africa', he observed,

we Germans have quite a peculiar interest, for here dwell a splendid race of people nearly allied to us by speech and habits .... What must especially interest us is the circumstance that these Transvaal Boers had, and still have, the most earnest longing that the German Empire, which they properly regard as their parent and mother country, should take them under its protection .... [Consequently] Germany should try, by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay, and the subsequent continual influx of German emigrants to the Transvaal, to secure the future dominion over this country, and so to pave the way for the foundation of a German African Empire of the future. 1

51


To give spice to this idea, Weber put considerable emphasis on the fact that, in the Transvaal, 'the mineral treasures are quite immeasurable.' 2

These efforts to publicize the cause of imperialism in southern Africa were considerably aided by a number of fortuitous circumstances. In 1884 both Paul Kruger and Henry Stanley made visits to Germany. The former was received by Kaiser Wilhelm I and the latter by lecture halls throughout the country. Between them, they were able to arouse substantial general interest in Africa and great sympathy for the Transvaal in particular. In this task they were much aided by the work of the German scholars Karl Mauch and Heinrich von Treitschke, both of whom had publicly suggested that the Transvaal had enormous potential as a source of national enrichment. In the case of the explorer and geologist Mauch, southern Africa's value to Germany lay in its mineral wealth, which he believed was extensive. Mauch first visited the region as early as 1858 and continued to travel there to conduct cartographic work and visit archaeological sites until the early 1870s. It was, however, his discovery of gold on the border of the Transvaal in 1864 that directed his attention to the possibility of treasures beneath the surface. In 1867, he made his suspicions public with the prophecy that the Witwatersrand was a huge goldfield.3

Treitschke, by contrast, saw the value of southern Africa quite differently. He advanced the view that there existed unique possibilities for Germans in the region owing to their racial kinship to the Boers. Such ties of blood, he believed, would inevitably draw the two peoples together. By propagating these views, Mauch and Treitschke were able to prepare the ground for the visits of Kruger and Stanley and ensure them a good public reception. Consequently, when Stanley told Germany of the chaos in the region and Kruger informed the country that as a result of this it was the intention of 'the young Transvaal state [to] seek, and hopefully find, protection from its strong and mighty motherland, Germany, and its glorious dynasty', 4

credence was lent to the claim of Ltideritz and Weber that, through colonialism, the riches of the region were Germany's for the taking. As few emotions have a stronger public appeal than avarice, this did much to capture the popular imagination.

It is important to stress that this public interest in southern Africa was not one that was shared by the government. Indeed, when in 1875, Ltideritz and Weber made a formal proposal to the Chancellor asking for official support for the establishment of a colony in the Transvaal, they were politely but firmly rebuffed. 'Prince Bismarck', Weber recorded, 'expressed his approbation of my patriotic sentiments but held out no prospect of these projects being entertained by the Imperial government.' 5

Such was the attitude of the authorities throughout the majority of

The Background to Conflict 53

Bismarck's tenure of office; however, in 1884-85, in a move that startled opinion both at home and abroad, the Chancellor transformed the nature of his attitude to overseas expansion and acquired for Germany, in a series of unexpected actions, a colonial empire five times the size of the Reich. Significantly, the first of these territorial gains was the harbour and hinterland of the South-West African port of Angra Pequefia, a coastal settlement that lay between the British South African possessions of Cape Colony and Walvis Bay and adjacent to the newly retroceded Boer Republic of the Transvaal.

The German action, by introducing a new power factor into the South African peninsula, utterly transformed the geopolitical situation there. Until this point, the British had been pre-eminent in the region, a position that had been secured on the basis of what has been termed a 'Monroe Doctrine for Africa' whereby Britain, as the paramount power, discouraged the incursion of rivals into those areas, such as South Africa, where her influence was strong. First promulgated by Lord Carnarvon in December 1876 with the observation that, 'I should not like anyone to come too near us ... on the south towards the Transvaal, which must be ours,' this outlook was still part of Whitehall's thinking in 1884 when Lord Derby declared that Britain 'claimed a sort of general right to exclude foreign powers from [the coast of South West Africa].' 6 Bismarck's decision to challenge that right and to establish Germany as a player in the imperial politics of the region, thus upset all Britain's assumptions, for the exclusive role she had hitherto enjoyed was now abruptly terminated and, in its place, there emerged a real danger of direct contact being established between the Boer Republic and another European power and of British influence being thereby diluted. On top of this, as Bismarck was only too well aware, in this part of the world, Germany was, from the British perspective, an especially unwelcome neighbour. 'In view of the pro-German tendency of a part of the Dutch farmers,' he wrote, 'England will not be pleased at the prospect of a German establishment four days away from Cape Town.' 7 Bismarck's observation proved, as ever, to be highly accurate and as he predicted, the British reacted strongly to the arrival of the German presence. In December, a military force under Sir Charles Warren marched into and annexed Bechuanaland, thus severing the possibility of conterminous borders between the Transvaal and Angra Pequefia, while simultaneously action was taken to exclude Germany from the south-east coast at Santa Lucia Bay.

While the anxieties that led to this British response are relatively straightforward, the reasons for Bismarck's sudden involvement in the affairs of southern Africa, the stimulus that forced the otherwise reluctant


Cape and Whitehall authorities into action, is, by contrast, anything but clear-cut. Indeed, it is the case that the cause of Bismarck's sudden outburst of imperialism is the subject of considerable historical debate with the result that a number of distinct hypotheses have been brought forward in explanation for his actions. Broadly speaking, these can be divided into three categories.

First of all, there are those interpretations that stress the pre-eminent role of diplomacy and emphasize that, for Bismarck, colonial policy was grounded firmly in European considerations.8 In this instance, the continental factor that guided his strategy was the desire to use colonialism as a means of obtaining a temporary entente with France that had as its goal the objective of demonstrating to the French that 'there could be concrete co-operation with Imperial Germany and that it was worth looking beyond a war of revenge to areas of possible mutual understanding .... ' 9

Alternatively, it has been suggested that, rather than foreign-policy considerations, the explanation for Bismarck's colonial acquisitions is to be found in the realm of domestic politics and, in particular, in the need for a focal point for the 1884 Reichstag election campaign.10 This interpretation, which is strongly supported by Bismarck's record of attempting to procure extraneous issues for parliamentary purposes, draws primarily on the fact that Bismarck's colonial ventures and, in particular the highprofile Berlin Africa Conference, coincided to a remarkable degree with the election campaign - beginning shortly before its commencement and ending shortly thereafter. In addition, it should be noted that colonialism was an issue that divided the 'reichsfeindlich' Progressives from the 'reichsfreundlich' National Liberals and was therefore ideal for use as a means of bolstering the representation of the latter party at the former's expense and of thereby reintegrating them into the alliance of parties that gave parliamentary backing to the Chancellor. Since Bismarck needed the National Liberals for the forthcoming vote on agrarian tariffs and the Army Bill, it made sense for him to find an issue from which he could derive the necessary political capital to ensure the viability of this coalition.

Finally, there are those explanations based upon the proposition that Bismarck embarked upon expansionism as a means of mitigating the adverse effects of industrialization and the resultant socio-economic phenomenon of recession. 11 Previous attempts to obtain economic and social stability had revolved around welfare legislation and protectionism. With the beginning of a new period of depression in 1882, it was clear that these earlier endeavours had failed and that a new form of socio-economic manipulation was required. Under this interpretation, therefore, colonialism 'was one aspect of his [Bismarck's] policy of giving state support to


Germany's foreign trade ... [and] was also part of his experimental anticyclical policy .... ' 12 Given that such a policy, if successfully pursued, would have had the additional benefit of helping to legitimize the status quo and thereby ensure the stabilization of both Germany's existing social hierarchy and her conservative political power structure, this period of expansionism has been described as 'social imperialism' .13

Whatever was Bismarck's actual reason for embarking upon these colonial ventures, one possibility that can definitely be excluded is the idea, suggested by Cornelius Penner, 14 that he was primarily motivated by a desire to establish a German role in the Transvaal. This plan was dear to the hearts of genuine colonial enthusiasts such as Liideritz and his two agents Einwald and Schiel, both of whom ended up as residents of the Republic. It was also advocated by some of the German diplomatic representatives in the region. W. Roghe, for instance, the German consul at Louren<;:o Marques, informed his superiors in Berlin that

a progressive and appropriate emigration from Germany to the Transvaal and the Free State would, after the creation of a railway linking [these areas] to the coast, lead in the course of time to the predominance of the German elements over the Boer population and through the transmission of the German language and customs the idea of German colonization could be put into effect. 15

However, notwithstanding such recommendations, this idea held no attraction for a politician, such as Bismarck, whose expansionism was based upon more disingenuous motives. Hence, though it is true that in 1883 and 1884 the Chancellor flirted momentarily with the idea of using Angra Pequefia's proximity to the Transvaal to put pressure on the British, being the astute diplomat that he was, he saw dangers in such a step and agreed instead to refrain from any territorial acquisitions in the region in return for concessions in the Gulf of Guinea. 16 This decision not to provoke a major crisis through attacks on vital British interests served as the basis for Germany's South African policy for the duration of the Bismarck chancellorship, a fact demonstrated in 1887 when the Reich government turned down the offer of a commercial treaty with the Orange Free State solely in order to avoid the appearance of growing involvement in the region. 17

This cautious and prudent outlook also guided German policy under Bismarck's successor, for the new Chancellor, Leo von Caprivi, having little experience of diplomacy, entered office anxious to demonstrate that Germany's foreign relations were still in safe hands and so did everything that he could to keep his conduct of affairs free of incident. To this


end, advised by the consul in Pretoria that the recent activity of the British South Africa Company rendered it impossible to link the German colonies in South-West Africa and East Africa, 18 he followed a policy of complete disinterest in the region. Thus, by the Treaty of 1890, Caprivi acquired German access to the Zambezi but otherwise, as The Times noted, renounced 'the presence of a strong German administration within reach of the Transvaal.' 19 However, with his first resignation in 1892, this continuity of policy was brought to an end. Though Caprivi was persuaded to stay in office and remain there until October 1894, his influence over affairs never fully recovered and indeed became progressively weaker as he was forced to devote more and more time to political infighting.2° Consequently, he was unable to prevent the gradual transformation of the country's South African policy, which became conspicuously more interventionist as the standing, stability and cohesion of his ministry declined. Thus, when, towards the end of 1892, the issue of Boer emigration rose to prominence owing to the desire of a group of Afrikaner families to leave their homes and settle in the German colony of South-West Africa, the necessary environment for a change of policy already existed.

As a result of this, news of the Boer plan, which did not have the sanction of the Reich authorities, had the effect of polarizing German opinion not only in public but also in official circles. One view, forcefully expressed by the Magdeburgische Zeitung, was that 'the material advantage that [the Boers] would bring, would not outweigh the disadvantage to German interests.' 21 This opinion was also expressed by the colonial authorities in South-West Africa, from where Landeshauptmann von Frans;ois reported that 'the Boer [is] Jess suitable than the German.' 22

Significantly, this outlook was the one adopted by the authorities in Berlin, who feared that

the drive to independence, which had marked the Boers' previous history, ... could cause complications for the Imperial administration and includes the danger for the future that the protectorate would be totally lost to German influence. 23

Consequently, von Frans;ois was instructed to ensure that 'only Germans and such descendants of Germans, who, without holding the German nationality, still keep the German language and customs, may settle.' 24 In effect, the Boers were to be barred.

This was by no means the last word on the matter. In opposition to this view there emerged a faction, led by, amongst others, Joachim Graf von


Pfeil und Klein Ellguth, that, far from feeling threatened by such a migration, saw the Boers as a Teutonic advance party for future German settlement and sought, therefore, to encourage the emigration of their 'South African kinsmen.' 25 In Joachim Pfeil this movement had a leader outstandingly suited to the promotion of its cause. This was partly a result of personal experience for the Graf, as a former South African resident who had travelled widely in the peninsula, had both a great knowledge of the region and a considerable predilection for its character. However, it was also the case that he was a highly experienced colonial enthusiast. His activities, which had allowed him to build up numerous contacts in both official and non-governmental circles, included participation as an associate of Carl Peters and Karl Ludwig Jiihlke in the acquisition of East Africa, 26 experience of colonial administration as a director of the Bismarck Archipelago27 and knowledge of policy formation as a participant during the end of 1891 and the beginning of 1892 in the sittings of the Kolonialrat. 28 In addition to this, he also happened to have the double advantage in his dealings with the government of being a member of the executive committee of the Kolonialgesellschaft and of holding the position of agent of the South-West Africa settlement syndicate. 29

Consequently, partly as a result of his efforts, the standpoint favouring Afrikaner settlement was to make considerable headway, a fact noted by the highly partisan Sudafrikanische Zeitung when it observed that 'in the Imperial capital the pro-Boer party always gains the upper hand over the petty bureaucratic party ... .' 30 In practical terms, this 'upper hand' amounted to the instigation of a policy that allowed Boer settlement to take place in modest numbers, a change that was visibly symbolized by the departure of von Fran~ois and the appointment as the new Landeshauptmann of Major Theodor Leutwein, an officer who had previously expressed the view that there was some advantage to be found in a controlled Boer settlement of the protectorate. 31

The shift in both perception and personnel that had led, by the beginning of 1894, to a change of policy with regard to Boer settlement was soon to be followed by a more considerable transformation. The occasion was provided by the departure from high office of Chancellor Caprivi, who resigned at the end of October 1894. Accompanying this event were other considerable changes to the composition and attitude of the government. As the veteran Social Democratic deputy Wilhelm Liebknecht was to observe to the Reichstag:

Since the end of the last session, a change has taken place, a complete -I may almost say, since the word is so prevalent now- revolution in the


upper regions, a disconcerting change in the personnel of the higher bureaucracy; in short, a change in the government and administration.32

Nowhere was this to be more obvious than in the area of colonial affairs, the new direction of which was immediately evident to British diplomats. As Martin Gosselin, the charge d'affaires at the British embassy, observed:

I gather that we may expect a more 'forward' Colonial policy than was the case under Count v. Capri vi's administration: one of the Emperor's grievances against the Ex-Chancellor is said to be that he never would go 'steam full ahead' enough to please H.M. in colonial matters .... 33

That this assessment of the likely attitude of the new government was accurate was signalled within just two months of the new Chancellor taking office. Among the first acts of Prince Chlodwig zu HohenloheSchillingsftirst was the public announcement of his support for German colonial expansion. As he informed the Reichstag:

The colonial movement is also a national movement. It has grown out of the strengthened national feeling, which after the founding of the Empire sought a field of endeavour for the expansion of national activity; it is a valuable prop for the feeling of unity and no government will be able or will wish to do without this new and strong bond which unites the individual branches of the nation and the various classes of the population. 34

Significantly, it was made abundantly clear that this new doctrine was to apply especially to southern Africa by the simultaneous announcement of a new diplomatic appointment. Graf von Bray, whose imperialist credentials were not in doubt, but who, in his dealings with the Portuguese government over the harbour and railway at the vital South African port of Louren9o Marques, had been notably unsuccessful in putting them into practice, was recalled from the Portuguese capital and replaced by Eduard von Derenthall, a very highly regarded protege of Holstein's.35 The nomination of such a high-profile representative acted as a very strong declaration of intent on the part of the new regime with regard towards their aspirations for Delagoa Bay and hence for southern Africa as a whole. This did not go unnoticed. Responding to Martin Gosselin's warning of a more 'forward colonial' policy on the part of Germany, Lord Kimberley observed:


It is not pleasant to learn that we may expect a more forward colonial policy, still less that it is favoured by the Emperor. ... The rumours of action on the part of Germany in a sense adverse to our interests in the region of Delagoa Bay are especially disquieting .... 36

This disquiet was soon to prove anything but misplaced.

5 The Emergence of Conflict, 1893-96

So far as southern African policy was concerned, the governmental reorganization of October 1894 was a landmark, for, as a consequence of it, the restraining hand of Capri vi's anti-African views was entirely removed. With the presumption of Germany's concentration on central Europe no longer at the heart of policy, other developments became possible. Much was made of this opportunity: as early as August 1893, while Capri vi was occupied with problems in the Prussian ministry of state, Marschall had already begun to flex Germany's muscles in southern Africa. With Caprivi's departure, such activities were able to start in earnest.

From the preceding it seems clear that the nature of Germany's South African policy was dependent upon both the composition of the administrative elite and the balance of power within it. While this clarifies the circumstances that made possible a change of policy towards the end of the Caprivi chancellorship, it does not explain why the Reich government decided to utilize Caprivi's imminent departure in order to take a sudden and active interest in a part of the world that it had always previously considered it prudent to eschew.

One possibility that has been suggested by many historians, most notably Erich Brandenburg, William Langer and Raymond Sontag, is that Germany's interest in the Transvaal was inspired primarily by a desire to effect a shift in the structure of the European balance of power. 1 In this scenario, South Africa was but a pawn in a German diplomatic game that had as its objective the goal of teaching the British government that a policy of 'splendid isolation' was no longer practicable and that rather than facing the enmity of Germany it would be preferable to seek closer relations by joining the Triple Alliance on German terms. The tactics of such a policy were clear. If the WilhelmstraBe were to be successful in its endeavour to persuade the British government both of the precariousness of its position and of the remedial nature of German friendship, then it would be necessary not only to put up barriers to British policy by thwarting her desires and helping her opponents on a global basis, thus demonstrating the potential scope of German opposition, but also to highlight the depth of British difficulties by meddling in an area where the sensibilities of Her Majesty's Government were most acute. Naturally, it was assumed

60

The Emergence of Conflict 61

that the greater were Britain's problems, the more inconvenient would be any German actions and the more willing would be the British to come to terms. 2 For this reason, Britain's relations with the Transvaal were a natural focus for German attention. Not only did the determination of the Boers to resist the advances of their mighty neighbour attract nighuniversal sympathy and admiration but, moreover, the ambiguity of their international position and the strength of German interests in the region allowed ample scope for extensive interference of a kind that, while unlikely to be frowned upon by any other power, would most certainly exacerbate Britain's worries.

If it were the intention of Germany through her South African policy to coerce the United Kingdom into the Triple Alliance by demonstrating that, although Britain would be hard pressed to do without it, the Reich's goodwill could not nonetheless be taken for granted, then it should be noted that there were times when it came close to bringing about the desired result, at least as far as a recognition of the importance of German amity was concerned. Writing on the day of the Kruger telegram, Sir Henry Loch, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, observed that

the question is greatly complicated by the action of Germany, who claims rights of interference in the Transvaal that we cannot for a moment admit.. .. This difficulty coming at the present moment is very unfortunate as it is generally feared that the United States intends to go to war with us and that they will have the support of Russia and France. That is bad enough, but to have Germany likewise against us, would reduce us to having to fight for our very existence .... 3

Had the diplomats of the WilhelmstraBe really directed their efforts in the Transvaal towards the goal of forcing Britain to tum to Germany for a relief to her difficulties, then doubtless they would have found the above opinion most satisfactory. However, Sir Henry's correspondence is no proof of German intentions, the truth of which must be sought from indigenous sources. Unfortunately, the evidence from these is by no means convincing. That Germany wanted to draw Britain into her orbit is undeniable. In reporting a conversation he had with the British military attache, the Kaiser informed Marschall that he had warned Colonel Swaine that 'England could only escape from her present complete isolation ... by a frank and outspoken attitude either for or against the Triple Alliance. The first demanded a formula, such as was customary between continental powers, i.e. a sealed and signed guarantee.' 4 Clearly, in order to achieve so


important an objective, the officials of the WilhelmstraBe would have had no compunction about putting an appropriate degree of pressure on the British authorities. Indeed, such a course of action would have been perceived as no more than complying with normal diplomatic procedures. The question, however, is what sort of pressure would have been appropriate. A precedent in this regard existed in Bismarck's utilization of British difficulties in Egypt in order to achieve European goals and consequently, the case can easily be advanced that, in using the situation in the Transvaal to advantage, the diplomats of 1895 were attempting to imitate this previous success. It is here that the differences between South Africa and Egypt become significant. While both territories were important to the British as routes to India, the former was a great deal more vital than the latter. As the Second World War amply demonstrates, while the British Empire could, if need be, survive without access to the Suez Canal, the same could not be said of the oceanic route to India, without the security of which the Empire was prone to the danger of dislocation and collapse. This strategic reality, apparent even then,5 naturally enough tempered the attitude of the government in London to opinion in the Cape and led, as the Germans were well aware, to an acute sensitivity to events in the region. As Marschall observed, in such matters 'the British government often does not have a free hand but rather has to take into consideration the Cape government. ... ' 6 As a result of this, there was considerable anxiety among many German diplomats as to the likely effect that German interference in South Africa would have upon Anglo-German relations. Commenting on this matter, in the light of an acrimonious clash between the two countries over German activities in the region, Hatzfeldt observed that there were two possible outcomes: 'an immediate binding agreement or nothing. Since the first is not possible here in a formal sense, by our actions we push the English to choose the second and to seek other understandings and leanings. '7

Given the evidence of this assessment and the knowledge of the way in which it was derived, it is difficult to believe that the WilhelmstraBe would have ever considered it either safe or desirable to use the Transvaal as a means of applying pressure to Britain. Even if this could be accepted, it is impossible to concede that this reasoning provides a credible explanation for the two extreme measures that Germany was to take in relation to South Africa in December 1895 and January 1896. During this period, Germany first of all threatened to withdraw their ambassador from London. On 31 December 1895, Hatzfeldt was instructed by Marschall to ask for his passport if he felt that the British government approved of the armed raid launched on the Transvaal from British territory by Dr Jameson.8 This was no light step. Indeed, short of an ultimatum, break-


ing off diplomatic relations in this way was among the strongest diplomatic sanctions available.9 As such, it appears an unlikely method for securing an alliance. Secondly, in January 1896, the Reich government sent and published the Kruger telegram. This, too, seems to be an action that could not, in all plausibility, have been aimed at securing the allegiance of Britain. Certainly, the Kaiser's own post facto explanation to Szogyeny, the Austrian ambassador, that he had sent his message to Kruger because 'his telegram would bring the English to their senses and open their eyes to the need for co-operation with the Triple Alliance' 10

should be treated with the utmost scepticism. For one thing, since it was well known in Berlin that the Austrian Foreign Minister Goluchowski desired British assistance and was therefore of the opinion that 'AngloGerman differences in colonial matters ... [did] not fit in well with his policy', 11 it could not have been expected of the Kaiser that he should, when in conversation with the Austrian ambassador, have given his action any other interpretation. Furthermore, it is clear from the diaries of both Senden and Marschall that the Kruger telegram was the result of an ad hoc decision and that the Kaiser had originally intended to send not a telegram but a military force. 12 This extreme course, had it been undertaken, would almost certainly have led to war. 13 For a strategy designed to tum a non-aligned but friendly state into a committed ally, war would represent an extraordinary and unacceptable downside risk. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Kruger telegram could ever have been meant as a mere diplomatic manoeuvre aimed at securing a British alliance. For such an action, with such risks attached to it, even to have been contemplated, more significant policy objectives must have been at stake.

Another possible explanation, one that has attracted such adherents as Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher and J. A S. Grenville, is the belief that at no stage did Germany ever possess any genuine interest in the Transvaal and that her professions to the contrary were made solely for the purpose of exploiting the situation in order to gain concessions from Britain in other parts of the world. 14 In support of this theory it must be noted that, in 1898, Germany was to become a signatory to a treaty with Britain by which she agreed to the abandonment of the Boers in return for a guarantee that, should Portugal's African colonies ever be partitioned, Germany would receive her share. There are indications that Germany was seeking such an agreement at a much earlier date. As early as November 1894, for instance, the Kaiser had proposed demanding the German acquisition of Zanzibar in part exchange for an agreement to divide Portugal's strategic possessions in southern Africa. 15 Similarly, in 1895, during the course of an acrimonious conversation with Malet over the Transvaal question, Marschall, responding


to the comment that England had the means of overcoming German interference, had noted that this was only the case 'if she is willing to sacrifice Egypt, the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus ... .' Was this, he asked, worthwhile simply to maintain a colonial policy that 'begrudged [Germany] even the smallest territorial advances'? 16

In spite of this evidence, it seems unlikely that Germany's long-term involvement in South African affairs was inspired by the desire for territorial compensation in other parts of the world. Certainly, the fact that this was to be the end result of all their diplomacy is no indication that it was their original intention. Indeed, given that by 1898 Marschall had been superseded as foreign secretary by Billow, with the result that the entire thrust of German diplomacy had altered, it would have been most surprising if the precepts that governed Germany's relations with the Transvaal remained the same. The evidence from 1894 and 1895 is also open to question. With regard to the Kaiser's proposal to demand Zanzibar as part of an Anglo-German agreement, it is less significant that this idea was floated than that nothing ever came of it. Thus, notwithstanding Hohenlohe's memorandum on the Kaiser's demand, Marschall's instructions to Hatzfeldt failed to take this further. 17 Equally, there are a number of reasons for doubting the sincerity of Marschall's hint that an arrangement about the Transvaal question was possible on the basis of 'small territorial advances'. Firstly, more revealing of Marschall's true attitude on the matter was the fact that on almost all other occasions, both previous and subsequent, he was to be implacable in his insistence that nothing short of the maintenance of the status quo was acceptable to Germany. 18

Secondly and more significantly, when, over the course of late 1894 and early 1895, such an accommodation was repeatedly offered to him, Marschall actually turned it down. On 20 November 1894, Hatzfeldt reported a conversation with Lord Kimberley in which the question of the division of the Portuguese colonial empire had been raised and the possible partition of East Africa discussed. 19 In response to this discussion, Marschall agreed that a settlement by which Germany received the northern part of the colony and England the southern section would be acceptable, but only so long as 'Delagoa Bay and its railway remained reserved for the South African Republic or were neutralized.' 20

Despite this rebuff, the offer was made again to the Germans in the new year.21 On 30 January 1895, after Kruger's speech at the Kaiser's birthday celebrations, Hatzfeldt wrote to Berlin to report that

The speech of President Kruger had a very disquieting effect here, and Kimberley has just poured out his heart to me about it. ... People here are


extraordinarily sensitive about South Africa. The government is especially anxious to prevent public opinion from turning against us on account of such speeches, especially now, when Kimberley wants to reach a closer understanding with us about Mozambique and in general wants to make extensive arrangements in colonial matters.22

In response to this information, which would have been received with rapture had the WilhelmstraBe actually been looking for 'small territorial advances', Marschall again telegraphed that Germany could not agree to the English occupation of Delagoa Bay or anything else that prejudiced the interests of the Transvaal.23 Despite the fact that, as late as March 1895, Lord Kimberley expressed a willingness to discuss the idea of neutralization in order to find out exactly what was meant by this, his initiative led nowhere. As Hatzfeldt was subsequently to observe, the negotiations 'failed because Kimberley ... demanded the southern and larger half of the [Portuguese] colony, including Delagoa Bay' .24 Since, however, it was universally acknowledged by all the participants in the affairs of the region that the port of Louren~o Marques was 'the key to South Africa', 25

it cannot have come as a surprise to Marschall to discover that, as part of an agreement designed to compensate Germany for abandoning its support of the Transvaal, the British insisted on pre-emptive rights of control to the one harbour, possession of which would ensure that Germany complied with her treaty obligations. Consequently, one is forced to the conclusion that if Marschall was not prepared to see Delagoa Bay fall into British hands, even as part of an agreement by which Germany renounced her interests in the region, then this can only have been because Germany had no serious desire for such an arrangement and did indeed entertain serious aspirations in the area.

A third possibility, given that the character of Germany's relations with the Transvaal does not seem to have been determined by extraneous diplomatic considerations, is that the Reich's vigorous participation in the affairs of the region stemmed from a genuine desire on the part of the Reich authorities to cultivate the country's South African interests.26

Essentially these were confined to two main fields of activity, both of which were viable areas for governmental concern: economic and colonial interests.

The Reich possessed extensive and ever-increasing economic interests in southern Africa. Since the discovery of the goldfields of the Witwatersrand in 1886, German investment and participation in the business life of the Transvaal had grown from practically nothing to close to one-fifth of all foreign capital in the country.27 So extensive was the


German economic penetration that the Republic became a major outlet for German industry. It is estimated that by 1886, ten to twelve million marks' worth of German goods were exported annually to the Transvaal. Especially successful were imports of iron and steel, munitions, chemicals, particularly potassium cyanide, machines and utensils. Yet, no less impressive were the number of German businesses that established a presence in the country. Krupp, Siemens and Halske, Goertz, Lippert and the Deutsche and Dresdener banks all opened branches there. Moreover, German concerns held the whisky and dynamite monopolies, supplied much of the country's water, were responsible for the production of much of the electrical power used on the Rand28 and controlled the national bank and the railway company. In short, German commercial activity in the Transvaal was both substantial and lucrative, either of which attribute could have served to attract the attention of the Reich authorities.29

There was also the matter of Germany's colonial aspirations. From a German imperialist perspective, the Transvaal had much to recommend it. For one thing, there was the nature of its inhabitants. Though of Dutch rather than German extraction, the Boers were viewed by a substantial section of the Reich's population as being of an impeccable Teutonic pedigree. This belief in the consanguinity of the Boer and German peoples was important because it lent weight to the notion that as 'the civilization which flourishes [in the Cape] is Teutonic and Dutch' 30 it would be a suitable outlet for German emigration. As the astute British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring Rice observed, 'the real and deep rooted object of the German colonial party is to find some part of the world where Germans can emigrate to and live as Germans. They look on South Africa, if ruled by the Dutch element, as such a place.' 31

No less important a factor to the German colonial interest was the Republic's location. A principal motivating force of governmental action throughout human history has been the desire to build territorial possessions into contiguous blocks. Had colonial Africa escaped from this obsession then doubtless its history would have been more free of incident. However, as events such as the Fashoda crisis demonstrate, it, too, was to be afflicted by the dictates of this principle, which was by no means limited in its extent to the Nile Valley. A parallel existed in South Africa where, as the historian David Thomson has observed, 'the relative positions of German and British colonial possessions corresponded to those of French and British north of the Equator; that is British expansion northward from the Cape to Uganda was intersected by the transverse pressure of Germany between South West Africa and German East Africa.' 32 As a consequence, the Transvaal, situated in the middle of southern Africa,


adjacent to the vulnerable Portuguese colony of Mozambique and close to Angra Pequeiia, had the potential of becoming a major linking component in a transcontinental German South Africa. 33

The final factor fuelling the German colonial interest was the topography of the Veldt. Consisting primarily of elevated, open country, it favoured a dispersed agricultural existence of a sort that permitted Germany's agrarians to claim an identity between their lifestyle and that of the Boers. This appealed to one of the fundamental drives behind German 'migrationist colonialism' ,34 namely the desire to preserve for Germany's rapidly modernizing, industrial society an agricultural sector and the deferential attitudes and orderly outlook that were associated with it. As the Grenzboten for July 4, 1895 observed, 'for us the Boer states, with the coasts that are their due, signify a great possibility ... [namely] our last road toward an independent agricultural colony in a temperate clime.' 35

The contemporaneous existence of these colonial incentives, as in the case of German economic involvement, served to make the Transvaal a subject worthy of the interest of the Imperial authorities.

However, identifying possible areas of German concern is by no means the same as demonstrating that these particular interests motivated the conduct of policy. It was, after all, in the nature of the German political system that the Reich administration, while sensitive to the various outside pressures that could be applied by public opinion, business considerations and campaign groups, was nonetheless not under any constitutional obligation to act upon such stimuli, a circumstance which ensured that it very often chose not to do so. Consequently, any connection between these interests and official policy has to be sought in the actions and behaviour of the Reich government. Fortunately, these are highly revealing. It is the case that in the period from 1893 to 1896 a common characteristic is readily discernible in all the German diplomatic moves undertaken with regard to the affairs of southern Africa. Whatever else their interventions might have been designed to accomplish, it can be demonstrated that the immediate, direct and clearly visible short-term objective was always to ensure that the Transvaal and the neighbouring colony of Portuguese East Africa stayed free from any form of British imperial control.

The first German action in the region was undertaken in relation to the future of the port at Delagoa Bay. The harbour there enjoyed the double distinction of being the Transvaal's closest outlet to the sea and of being situated in Portuguese colonial territory. As all the other major ports in the region were in British hands, this made Delagoa Bay of huge strategic significance to the Boers. So long as it was outside of British control, their


Republic would not be dependent on British goodwill for access to the wider world. Unfortunately, the straightened circumstances of Portuguese finances meant that it was by no means certain that this situation would last much longer. Portugal, a country of five million people, had a national debt of £30 million and a fiscal deficit that regularly exceeded £1 million per annum.36 To finance this budgetary disaster, Portugal had been forced to sell off many of its national assets. Numerous colonial concessions had already been floated and it seemed inevitable that, sooner or later, the town of Louren~o Marques and its port and railway facilities would also be on offer. 37 That there would be no shortage of interested bidders should such an eventuality ever come to pass was a certainty that was made more than evident from the numerous unsolicited offers that Portugal had already received. Included amongst these were some financially attractive proposals from Sir Donald Currie, Sir John Pender, Rochfort Maguire MP, John Merriman, Sir James Siveright, Baron Merck and Lord Rothschild. 38 What made this so alarming from the Transvaal's point of view was that most of these potential buyers had connections with Cecil Rhodes, whose interest in the harbour stemmed from his longstanding desire to be the founder of a British South African federation incorporating both the British colonies and the Afrikaner republics. Having failed in the past to achieve this goal by persuasion, he now sought to attain his objective by totally surrounding the Boer states with British territory, thus forcing them to choose between federation or isolation. 39 It was to prevent such an outcome that in September 1893 Dr Leyds, the Transvaal's Foreign Secretary, went to Europe in an attempt to frustrate Rhodes' schemes by securing the vital harbour and railway installations for the Republic.40 In the pursuit of this endeavour he was to receive considerable support from the German government. On 16 March 1894, the German Minister in Lisbon, Graf von Bray, was notified of the Reich's 'complete understanding for the efforts of Beelaerts van Blockland [the Transvaal's representative in Europe] in the question of the purchase of the Louren~o Marques railway and he can rely on our help.' 41 The German diplomats in Lisbon acted on this information enthusiastically. From March through to November, considerable pressure was placed on the Portuguese authorities to accept the proposals of the Transvaal government and their German agents, Hansen und Schrader.42 This was to no avail. More successful, however, were the complementary activities undertaken with a view to frustrating the attempts of the Transvaal's British competitors to secure the port for the Empire. When news was received of renewed efforts to this end on the part of Rhodes' agents, the German response was swift and dramatic. The Minister in Lisbon was sent to the Portuguese court to deliver a note to the


effect that were the contemplated transaction to be undertaken it 'would force Germany to break with Portugal in order to guarantee its national rights and advantages ... by that method which circumstances would dictate.' 43 Being in no position to ignore so explicit a threat from so powerful a nation, the Portuguese had no option but to comply with the demand. Through this diplomatic tour de force, therefore, Germany acted to prevent Britain from acquiring the leverage she needed in order to assert herself over the Transvaal.

This first demarche was quickly succeeded by a whole series of comparable actions. In June 1894, the German ambassador in London protested sharply against attempts by the High Commissioner for South Africa to attain full rights of citizenship for British subjects in the Transvaal.44 This request on the part of Sir Henry Loch was by no means unreasonable given that the Republic's draconian fourteen-year permanent residence requirement meant that many largely British mining communities had no influence over their own affairs. Yet, if implemented, it would have had the effect, undesirable from the Boer perspective, of giving the franchise and therefore considerable political influence to a large body of people with British loyalties and sympathies.45

Consequently, there was a possibility that, through this action, Britain might indirectly acquire a voice in the government of the Transvaal. As Kruger himself observed, 'You see that flag [the Republic's Vierkleur]? If I grant them the franchise, I may as well pull it down.' 46 1t was to stave off the prospect of such an increase in British influence that the German representations were made. 47

Just over three months later, the WilhelmstraBe again took the opportunity to underline its opposition to any extension of the British presence in southern Africa. The circumstance that provided them with this opportunity was the outbreak of hostilities between the Portuguese authorities and the Tsonga chiefs, whose forces quickly advanced from their settlements south of the Limpopo to the very outskirts of Lourenc;o Marques.48 In response to the potential dangers inherent in the situation, the British representative at the port foolishly ordered twenty bluejackets to come ashore in order to protect the consulate. This action, which had not been authorized either by Whitehall or by the Portuguese authorities, was consequently subject to a complaint from the government in Lisbon that led to the consul, Ralph Bernal, receiving a stern rebuke from the Foreign Office. This would normally have been the end of the matter but, in spite of the amicable settlement among the parties involved, this event was nonetheless turned into an incident by the German government who issued a formal protest and sent the cruisers Seeadler and Condor to the port.49 The


presence of these warships, which had been requested by the German consul in Pretoria in order 'to avert a British intervention' ,50 acted, as intended, as a vivid demonstration of the German desire to counteract any British moves in the region. This position was subsequently reinforced when, in December, at a formal meeting between the British Foreign Secretary and the German ambassador, the latter warned that 'Germany would not "permit" us [Britain] to annex the Portuguese East African colonies.' 5 1 The discussion that ensued was by no means amicable. 52

If 1894 thus closed with an unequivocal but private statement of the German position, then the new year began with a declaration that, while no less direct in its message, was anything but restrictive in its audience. The occasion was an official dinner in celebration of the Kaiser's birthday given by the German club of Pretoria. Held on 26 January 1895 at the Transvaal Hotel, the occasion was distinguished by Kruger's presence as guest of honour. 53 In introducing the President, Franz von Herff, the German consul, speaking in accordance with instructions from Berlin, emphasized the theme of Germany's friendship for the TransvaaJ.54 In a rejoinder that had been prepared in advance by Herff and Dr Leyds, Kruger took up this subject with enthusiasm.55 After opening with praise for the German citizens of the Transvaal for both their loyalty and public conduct, he went on to observe that

when the convention with Her Majesty's Government was signed I regarded this Republic as a little child and a little child has to wear small clothing. But as the child grows up, it requires bigger clothes .... I am pleased to see you Germans here ... and I feel certain that when the time comes for the Republic to wear still larger clothes, you will have done much to bring it about. It is my wish to continue these peaceful relations and I wish also to give Germany all the support a little child can give to a grown up man. 56

The metaphors employed in this declaration, obscure to modern ears, would have required only a moment's thought in 1895. The reference to 'bigger clothes', which, as Sir Graham Bower observed, 'could only be provided at the expense of the other colonies or states in South Africa' ,57

implied nothing less than the desire to be free and independent of the conventions with the British, apparently with German help. However, most expressive was the familial metaphor used in the last sentence. In the context of European dynastic relations, the symbolism of the childlike Transvaal helping Germany - in the form of a grown-up man - assert himself, presumably, though it is not stated, against a harsh parental


figure, was suggestive of the relationship between Kaiser Wilhelm and Queen Victoria, and through them of Germany and Britain as a whole. 58

This image of mutual co-operation on the part of Germany and the Transvaal against the British was further reinforced by the no less metaphorically poignant symbolism exhibited by the official printed programme issued to accompany this event. Printed on the front cover of this brochure was, naturally enough, a drawing of the Kaiser and a German imperial eagle; on the back cover, however, beside a drawing of Bismarck, was a photograph of the old fort at Lourenr;o Marques, next to which was the caption: 'The natural harbour for the South African Republic where the S.M.S. Condor now lies at anchor.' 59 With the programme opened and the front and back cover lying next to each other, the image of German statesmen and German naval power asserting the Transvaal's right to Delagoa Bay was unmistakable. The potency of this image so far as the British was concerned was tremendous. As Sir Graham Bower observed: 'Access to the sea would have brought the Transvaal nearer to Europe, in touch with Europe. A German ship in a Transvaal harbour would have created a new International position .... ' 60 The full spread of this programme cover heralded just such a development. In the light of such symbolic claims, the speeches by Herff and Kruger, with their implication of joint resistance to British power and their total lack of regard for Britain's right to supervise the Republic's foreign relations, constituted a considerable and public demonstration of intent.61

This did not go unnoticed in London. In response to these events Lord Kimberley despatched Sir Edward Malet, the British ambassador in Berlin, to inform the German government of his displeasure. Kimberley's letter was delivered, as per his instructions. 'The British Government,' it recorded,

can naturally only rejoice at an ovation for the Sovereign of a friendly state, but is obliged to point out that there are sundry indications that the German Government's attitude towards the South African Republic is producing a feeling there incompatible with the Republic's international position .... The British Government. . .is forced to the realization that the Transvaal is gradually becoming convinced that it can count on Germany's unconditional support .... 62

Following this declaration, Sir Edward, determined to leave no doubt in Marschall's mind, added his own view 'that Germany was "coquetting" with the Transvaal and making them think there that whatever they did would have behind it the support of Germany.' 'For England,' he

72 Rivalry in Southern Africa, 189 3-99

observed, 'the Transvaal was a "point noir" of no less importance than Egypt.' 63 Malet's clear representation on this point was to meet an equally clear rebuff. Shortly after this exchange, Marschall suggested that Herff be awarded the Order of the Red Eagle fourth class, citing the Kaiser Kommers as an example of his good service. The award was duly made.64

It soon became apparent that Germany's disregard for British sensitivity in this matter was unaffected by Malet' s declaration and that the ostentatious German challenge to the British position was to continue. One indication of this was the German decision to undertake a major reorganization of their diplomatic representation at Delagoa Bay. This posting, which had hitherto been considered unimportant by the authorities in Berlin, had accordingly been treated as relevant only for Germany's East African trade. As a result, it had been made subordinate to the consulate in Zanzibar, the most prominent location on the East African trade route and the one through which most German steamers passed, rather than to the more proximate and politically significant position at Cape Town. Moreover, in the previous eight years, it had for the most part been left either unoccupied or had been staffed by local merchants.65 Now, however, it was both to be transferred to the administrative jurisdiction of the consul-general for South Africa,66 and was also to receive a new and more prominent incumbent. Thus, in March, only a month after Malet's protest to Marschall, it was announced in the German newspapers that the Reich government intended to upgrade its representation and appoint a career diplomat, Markus Graf von Pfeil und Klein Ellguth, to replace the local merchant, W. Joost, who, as a trading consul, had hitherto looked after German interests at the port of Louren~o Marques. 67 This harbour, already twice the scene of Anglo-German friction, was by now an important and well known focal point for the struggle in southern Africa.68 As a result, the German decision to appoint a new consul there, especially given that it was to a position now accorded an enhanced standing, involving political rather than merely commercial status, was a clear signal of the German intent to challenge Britain for the right to a say in the region. The selection of Markus Pfeil underlined this fact emphatically.

To begin with, the new consul, as a former member of the German colonial service, was not an unknown quantity so far as British officialdom was concerned. Though seen by Baroness Spitzemberg in the context of Berlin high society as 'a very pleasant, vivacious and handsome man of the best type' ,69 British government officers, from their experience of past dealings with him in Africa, had reason to appraise him somewhat differently. In their view, his record strongly suggested that he was far from friendly to Britain. As acting commissioner in Togoland in 1891, he had


attempted to ban English lessons in certain mission schools under his jurisdiction, a decision that was only rescinded after it had provoked complaints to the Kolonial Abteilung in Berlin.70 Then, subsequent to this, as German representative on the mixed commission delineating the border between the Gold Coast and Togoland, his behaviour had been such as to lead to British diplomatic representations in Berlin, accusations by the British commissioners of intended deception and the observation from the governor of the Gold Coast that 'he is quite capable of making any misrepresentation that will suit his purpose .... '7 1 It was with the knowledge of this record of friction with British officials that, in 1895, the German government selected Markus Pfeil for appointment to one of the most sensitive posts in Africa.

Further augmenting this record was the context provided by his family connections, for Markus Pfeil was the younger brother of the noted explorer and enthusiastic advocate of German imperialism, the aforementioned Joachim Graf von PfeilJ2 The significance of this latter fact was twofold, for not only did it give Markus Pfeil ties with the colonial movement but, more particularly, it meant that he had a known connection with southern Africa. For Joachim Pfeil, as has been observed in a previous chapter, was both keenly interested in the affairs of the region and much involved in the issue of Boer settlement. Naturally enough, with antecedents such as these, the selection of Markus Pfeil did not go unnoticed. As the British diplomat Martin Gosselin was to report:

The appointment of Count Pfeil. . .is strongly approved of in colonial circles in Berlin, and is greeted with undisguised satisfaction by the anti-English organs of the German press.

The conservative 'Kreuz Zeitung' of the 13 instant draws attention to the appointment 'as a further step in the Empire's independent policy in South Africa, inaugurated last Autumn, and as one calculated materially to strengthen the confidence in Germany felt by the Boers and the Portuguese.'

Coming so soon after the visit of German ships to Delagoa Bay, this appointment indicates, says the 'Kreuz Zeitung', that the importance of the harbour and of German communications with the Transvaal is fully recognized in Berlin. 73

Following this appointment, the momentum of German activity continued to build. This was demonstrated some four months later at the festivities surrounding the official opening of the railway from Delagoa Bay to Pretoria. This event was, from the very outset, shrouded in controversy.


To start with, there was the fact that, although President Kruger had pointedly refused to mark the opening of the line from the Cape to Johannesburg with official festivities, he was eager to host an elaborate and costly celebration for the opening of this German-financed and Dutchrun railway.74 The anti-British signal that this sent was reinforced by the manner in which Britain was invited to the event. Every effort was made to minimize British participation,75 a situation which contrasted sharply with the behaviour accorded to the other powers and which did much to provoke a strong determination on the part of the British government to make their presence at the occasion noticeable. As Sir Percy Anderson put it, when writing to the British naval commander in Cape Town, ' ... the principal British man of war should be of superior class, and her commanding officer of superior rank in comparison with the principal German man of war.' 76 German actions only added to this wish, for it was in this environment that rumours reached London that Germany intended to highlight their growing influence in the region by sending a squadron of warships to the ceremony.77 This was to be the cause of a discussion between Sir Edward Malet and Baron von Marschall, during which the latter denied that Germany intended anything so provocative as a naval display. Recording the conversation, Malet reported:

.. .I reverted to the term 'coquetry' and said that what was in my mind was the reported intention of the German government to send their squadron to Delagoa Bay on the completion of the railway in the summer, and to let the officers go to Pretoria. This seemed to me a demonstration that was needless and could not fail to raise hopes in the mind of President Kruger which might do harm. Baron von Marschall replied that there was no thought of a squadron, that perhaps a 4th rate cruiser would go. He could not see what hopes this would raise. It would be a mere act of courtesy. 78

In spite of this denial, anxiety over Germany's intentions was not abated,79 a situation that was exacerbated when, towards the end of June, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a newspaper closely associated with the Reich government, carried an article stating that two German warships would attend the opening. 80 As promised, however, Germany was represented on this occasion by only a single warship, the Condor, which was, indeed, a fourth-rate cruiser.81 Nevertheless, its officers did ultimately go on to be received in Pretoria. Moreover, Kruger and the Kaiser used this occasion once again to exchange messages of goodwill and called for even closer bonds between their two countries. The impact of this exchange,


which Hallgarten refers to as 'the first Kruger telegram', 82 was significant. As Herff, the German consul in Pretoria, recorded:

The success of this telegram was synonymous with the defeat of English policy in Pretoria, whose South African goals have for the first time been frustrated, while the position of Germany has experienced a strengthening so that it is henceforth possible [for us] to play a role as a weighty factor in the politics of South Africa.83

Once again the German position led to a clash between Marschall and Malet. The occasion was provided by Malet' s farewell visit to the Auswartiges Amt, a formalleavetaking that he used to deliver to the State Secretary a strong warning as to the serious complications that could arise from the Reich government's behaviour. This Marschall refused to accept and instead gave the firm reply that Germany would not consent to the British desire to bring about the incorporation of the Transvaal into a British South African economic federation, the so-called 'greater "Rhodesia"' .84

Almost immediately following this meeting came another instance on which Germany found herself in opposition to British policy in southern Africa. On this occasion, the incident arose in relation to the British annexation of Amatongaland, a strip of tribal land adjacent to Natal that had long been coveted by the Transvaal as a possible independent outlet to the sea. As a result, the acquisition of this territory by Britain was a considerable blow to the aspirations of the Kruger government, a fact that Marschall had been quick to draw to Malet' s attention during the confrontation that had arisen on the instance of the ambassador's recall. 85 This was not to prove the end of the matter, for on 25 October Marschall replied to Britain's formal notification of annexation in a manner calculated to ruffle British sensibilities. Rather than providing, as was customary, a simple acknowledgment of the new protectorate, the State Secretary included in his answer the following additional comment: 'While taking note of this act, the undersigned observes that the government of the South African Republic ... has protested against the annexation of the territories ... belonging to Amatongaland.' 86 This response, through its disregard for diplomatic etiquette in a manner clearly indicative of German support for the Transvaal, was a strong signal as to the Reich government's view of its role in southern Africa. Consequently, Martin Gosselin, charge at the British embassy in Berlin, felt obliged to record that Germany's action, 'the latest of a whole series of steps taken by the German government to show their sympathy with the Boers ... ', had to be regarded as the 'symptoms of


an intention on the part of the German government to adopt a forward not to say aggressive line of action with regard to the Transvaal. ... ' 87

This impression was reinforced by further reports of German naval activity in the region. On 16 November 1895, Roger Casement wrote to Lord Salisbury to report that German warships were soon expected to arrive at Louren~o Marques. One of them, he had been informed by his German counterpart, Graf Pfeil, would be remaining in Delagoa Bay for a prolonged period. As the report went on to observe:

As the unhealthy and hot season is now approaching and there is absolute quiet among the natives in the vicinity, the reason for the prolonged visit of the 'Seeadler' cannot be prompted by any regard for the health of her crew or the protection of German lives and property. 88

Given that no British diplomat needed to be educated in the uses of a naval display, the implications of the action were readily apparent in London.

The clearest exposition of the German attitude came in early January 1896. At that time the situation in South Africa had reached a crisis point owing to the actions of Dr Jameson, a close associate of Cecil Rhodes, in leading a band of British South Africa Company Police into the Transvaal in the hope of fomenting an uprising. This undertaking, which was facilitated by the complicity of the British authorities but which did not have official sanction, was immediately repudiated by the government in London. The Jameson raid, nonetheless, provoked a strong German response. Despite several clear British disavowals of Jameson's action and notwithstanding private representations by Lord Salisbury to the German ambassador requesting that he 'say nothing to him in this matter which could be construed as a threat', 89 Marschall, who twice summoned and upbraided the British ambassador,90 also instructed Hatzfeldt to make clear Germany's opposition to British policy and to deliver a stringent note that, in addition to protesting, seemed to accuse Britain of duplicity. 91

Following the surrender of Jameson and his fellow raiders, this note was retrieved unopened and, in place of this action, the Kaiser instead sent a telegram to President Kruger to inform him of his

sincere congratulations that supported by your people, without appealing for the help of friendly powers, you have succeeded by your own energetic action against armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, and have thus been enabled to restore peace and safeguard the independence of your country against attacks from the outside.92


This telegram, with its reference to the Transvaal's 'independence' and with its insinuation that German help could be relied upon to maintain this state, was a forthright and public challenge to the longstanding British claim that the conventions of 1881 and 1884 gave them the right, as paramount power, to consider the region as lying within their sphere of influence. Consequently, the German position, as outlined in the Kruger telegram, was one that sought to circumscribe severely the British interpretation of the Transvaal's dependent status. The fact that the telegram was issued in the context of other, albeit private, German statements added significantly to this effect. As Eyre Crowe observed shortly after the telegram's publication,

... only a week ago they [the Germans] threatened us with a 'combination with other powers' against us in all African questions if we did not recognize the independence of the Transvaal. These are the words of their threatening message, on Dec 31:

'HMG relied too much upon the antagonism between the Triple Alliance on the one hand, and Russia and France on the other. A marked improvement had taken place between these two groups, more especially as regards Germany and France, and your Lordship must be aware that the idea of dealing with unsettled questions (sic!) without regard to English interests would be favourably entertained in certain quarters. ' 93

In the face of such language, the subsequent telegram from the Emperor to President Kruger, which ends with a reference to the possible assistance of 'friendly powers', naturally gained an even more marked character. 94

As if to reinforce this point, in the week following the Kaiser's demarche, both Marschall in Berlin and Hatzfeldt in London consistently let it be known in their verbal communications, in the former case with Sir Frank Lascelles and in the latter case with Lord Salisbury, that in relation to the British contention 'that the Convention of 1884 continued the suzerainty of Great Britain over the Transvaal... the German government did not admit to this interpretation.' 95 As Salisbury noted of a meeting with the German ambassador,

His Excellency repeated the observations he had made the day before with respect to the suzerainty of Her Majesty in the Transvaal. He denied that the documents as they stood, including opinions expressed at various times by Ministers of the Crown, were compatible with the


view that Her Majesty still retained the suzerainty of the South African Republic.96

As this substantial catalogue of incidents amply demonstrates, German diplomats made a significant effort to establish as fact the idea that the Transvaal was, in its own right, a sovereign state. Their efforts in this regard were carried out over a long period of time and in a manner suggestive of a considerable commitment on the part of the WilhelmstraBe. Since altruism has never been a conspicuous motivating force in the development of foreign policy, either in Germany or for that matter anywhere else, it is not unwarranted to assume that if the Reich government strove to establish the freedom of the Transvaal from British influence then it did so, not for the benefit of the Boers, but for reasons that fulfilled requirements of its own devising. As has already been stated, there were two main foci for German activity in southern Africa and consequently, it is to these that one must look for an explanation of German policy.

Of the two, economic interests have always proved the more tangible for the historian. This is predominantly due to the great wealth of German government statements claiming that the protection of their country's commercial and trading links was the sole cause of their South African activities. Marschall, in particular, a statesman who has often been regarded by historians as possessing a preoccupation with economic matters,97 was apt to stress that the precept governing German policy was the goal of

defending against all attacks those material interests which Germany had created with the Transvaal through the building of railways and fostering of trade connections. These interests demanded the maintenance of the Transvaal as a state economically independent and the safety of the status quo regarding the railways and Delagoa Bay.98

It was thus, Marschall asserted, only because British actions ran counter to this position that Germany had been forced to act. In particular, there was the need to ward off the possibility of Britain creating a South African economic federation since that would have 'meant a trade monopoly for Cape Colony and the exclusion of German Trade. ' 99

Were Marschall's assessment of the likely outcome of British policy a valid one then it would have been hard to refute his charge that its attainment 'would seriously injure [German] commercial interests.' 100 However, as is amply demonstrated by the successful continuation of German business following the creation of the Union of South Africa, his accusation


was an entirely false one. Nor, it should be added, had Marschall any reason to suppose that the state of affairs he predicted would actually come to pass. To begin with, this was not a view that was shared by his colleagues, for whom British assurances about future German commerce proved quite acceptable. As Holstein was to note in April 1897, Germany would have no difficulties with a strengthening of the English position in the Transvaal, so long as the Reich's 'unconditional most-favoured-nation position for the whole of South Africa would be guaranteed.' 101

Holstein's insouciance with regard to the prospect of an expansion of British influence in the region can be explained by the fact that Marschall's claims as to the Transvaal's economic importance to Germany were by no means universally accepted. In 1890, for instance, four years after the opening of the goldfields, at a time when German economic interests in the Transvaal were nearly as extensive as they were to be during the mid-1890s, the period of active German engagement in the region, Maximilian von Berchem, the Under State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Director of the Economic Policy Division of the Auswartiges Amt, declined to involve Germany in the on-going dispute between the British and the Boers. As he informed Beelaerts van Blockland, the Transvaal's diplomatic representative in Europe: '[German economic] interests in the Transvaal were not important enough to justify falling out with England.' 102 That they were subsequently to be used to this end was to have little to do with economics, a situation well exemplified when in December 1895, at the height of the German involvement in southern Africa, at a time when it was widely expected that some British action was imminent, the response of Otto von Mtihlberg, a leading figure in the Auswartiges Amt's Economic Policy Division, to a request from Eduard Lippert that Germany provide political support for the Transvaal, was an enquiry as to why Germany should wish to take such a course of action. 103 That Lippert was made to spell out Germany's economic interests in the region to a counsellor in the Economic Policy Division is hardly indicative of a firm conviction on the part of the Reich government of the primacy of commercial considerations in the formation of their policy towards the Transvaal.

Reinforcing this assessment are a number of other no less substantive reasons for doubting Marschall's economic justification for the conduct of German policy. For one thing, it was the case that Britain was the world's leading advocate of free trade and, though there were some commercial apprehensions of German business prowess, these existed outside of the mainstream of British political life. In this context, fear of exclusion from South African trade was little more than paranoia. As the Globe observed, in an article that was sent to Berlin by the ambassador in London:


it is mere foolishness to talk of our administration of South Africa being 'for the benefit of England' when trade is absolutely free to all nations, when all nationalities alike benefit from our administrative system and when there are numbers of German merchants and traders who entirely appreciate the benefits accruing to them from living under British rule. 104

On top of this, it was also the case that Germany had in the past established perfectly satisfactory trading links with many of the constituents of the British Empire and there was no reason to assume that she would be unable to manage this in the future. After all, her right to do so was specifically guaranteed by treaty. In 1865, both Belgium and the Zollverein had been party to an agreement with the United Kingdom that gave the signatories the same commercial rights with the British colonies as the motherland. Germany had been the inheritor of this treaty and thus, had little reason to fear the exclusion of German trade in the event of a British South African federation coming into existence. 105

Adding substance to such treaty rights and reinforcing the Reich's theoretical commercial security in the region were a number of more practical considerations, not the least of which was Germany's position as one of the most important of Cape Colony's trading partners and a major purchaser of its annual wool production. 106 As a result of this, the British colonial administration had much to lose from the placing of barriers to German trade, for, in the unlikely event of the Reich being excluded from the commerce of the region, the German government had, in the form of a disruption of the colony's wool exports, a powerful trading weapon at its disposal. 107 Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that of far greater concern to German commercial circles than the exclusion of German trade was the prospect that the propaganda and diplomatic moves against England would lead to a backlash against German goods. As the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce put it when discussing the South African situation in their 1896 report:

We must vigorously deny the recent suggestions in England that Germany is trying to crowd out British trade all over the world .... Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow are still the first industrial centres of Europe and German overseas markets and trade cannot yet do entirely without their products .... Therefore, we should guard against a chauvinistic underestimate of our competitors .... 108

This does not mean that Germany had nothing to gain economically from insisting upon recognition of the Transvaal's independence. German


business interests in the country, though active in many diverse areas, were most successful in those sections of the economy that were in the gift of the authorities. In the Transvaal this state sector comprised many of the most lucrative industries and consequently, government monopoly concessions were a much-sought-after commodity. However, as Cecil Rhodes observed, 'if anything is to be obtained in the Transvaal you might say it is useless for an Englishman to apply.' 109 The reason for this was the marked preference shown by Kruger and the Raad, the Transvaal legislature, in awarding concessions to German bidders, who, it was hoped, would act as a counterweight to the existing and unwelcome British commercial preponderance. Naturally enough, many Germans benefited from the exclusion of the British from state monopolies and were thus alarmed by the prospect of this practice not surviving the formation of a British-sponsored South African economic federation. Given this, it becomes apparent why the WilhelmstraBe should have wanted to preserve the status quo, partial as it was to German industry, rather than acquiescing to a British scheme that through envisaging, as Rhodes sarcastically informed the Germans, 'no preference at all', harmed their interests. 110

One cannot conclude from this that Germany's South African policy was motivated by economic considerations. To have instituted so vigorous and drawn-out a defence of the Transvaal's international status merely to ensure the preservation of a handful of monopolies, which might have been protected in other ways, would have been to engage in a policy and to take risks out of all proportion to the potential reward. Had German commerce as a whole been threatened by Britain's schemes, as Marschall tried to contend, then such an action would have been more understandable. Yet, given that Marschall's claim was far from the reality and that, owing to British naval supremacy, German overseas trade was more likely to be put at jeopardy by a war with Britain than by the creation of a South African customs union, one must conclude that economic interests can be largely discounted as an explanation for German policy.

If Germany's actions cannot adequately be explained by her economic interests, they do make considerable sense within the framework of an attempt to achieve her colonial aspirations. As has already been demonstrated, the many interventions by the Reich government in the affairs of southern Africa were made with the avowed intention of freeing the Transvaal from dependence upon British power and influence. Yet this aim in no way precluded the acquisition by Germany of these very same attributes. Indeed, it was the case that, since the same territory cannot have two masters, the weakening of British control was a prerequisite of both Boer independence and German dominion. A significant indication as to


which of these objectives was in the German mind comes from the fact that their participation in the political defence of the Transvaal was without a doubt the surest method of securing sway over the region. The reason for this was that it provided a sound basis for acquiring political influence inside the country. For many years, politics in southern Africa had been dominated by the British wish to bring about an economic federation and the Boer desire to free themselves of British influence by abrogating the limitations to their independence contained in the conventions of 1881 and 1884. As these objectives were, in essence, mutually exclusive, antagonism between the two parties was bound to arise. Given that far greater diplomatic resources were at Britain's disposal than were available to the Boers, the outcome of so unequal a conflict could only be that, without support, the Transvaal was unlikely to be successful in her resistance to British plans.

This fact was well understood by both Boers and Germans. In the aftermath of the British annexation of Tongaland, an event considered injurious to Boer interests, a conversation took place between Dr Leyds and von Herff, the German consul in Pretoria. The topic of their discussion was the Transvaal's response to the British move. Asked by von Herff if the Republic regarded this as a casus belli, Dr Leyds replied 'that in his view the Republic was too weak to prosecute a war against England on her own. However, he expected everything from the diplomatic performance of the Transvaal, especially if this received the support of the government in Berlin.' 111 Yet recognition of the need for outside backing was a twoedged sword. While undoubtedly requiring assistance, it was the case that, by accepting aid and allowing another country to speak for her in the conflict with Britain, the Transvaal opened herself up, in much the same way as China and Korea had done before her, to the risk of becoming reliant upon her benefactor and thus, in effect, exchanging one suzerain for another. 112 To be free of Britain solely by the grace of another power was to be dependent upon that other power.

This mechanism for bringing about the transformation of the geopolitical situation in southern Africa was well understood by Germany's diplomats, a fact comprehensively illustrated by a meeting that took place between Markus Pfeil and Dr Leyds during the latter's visit to Louren~o Marques in November 1895. Present in this malaria-infested port ostensibly 'for the benefit of his health', an explanation that satisfied nobody, 113

Dr Leyds took the opportunity to consult with the German consul. Their conversation is most enlightening. After commencing with a discussion of the iron-like grip that England exerted over the Transvaal as a result of her presence in Bechuanaland and her policy of setting up companies, the


issue arose of how this might be countered. The dialogue, as recorded by Graf Pfeil, began with the latter asking Leyds:

'Can you, through persuasion, achieve anything in London?' 'No,' he said. 'Has the Transvaal by itself and on its own the means for serious resistance?' 'No.' 'Do you get adequate support from Holland?' 'No.' 'Do you consider a leaning towards France achievable or desirable given the impulsive character of her colonial policy?' 'No.' 'Do you get support from Portugal?' 'The Portuguese government treats us in all things with the greatest insincerity.' 'Would you consider another power other than Germany?' 'No.' 'Also, by my reckoning, you are really only left with Germany.' 114

From the above interchange, which went on to include the suggestion that German support might be facilitated if the Boers would 'quickly settle the Transvaal with Germans [and] quickly establish a good German newspaper', 115 it seems clear that the struggle between Great Britain and the Transvaal over the Boer Republic's international status represented a unique opportunity for any country seeking to expand her interests in the area. Such a country, it seems, was Germany.

A considerable body of evidence exists to support the view that the German interest in the Transvaal was a colonial one. Certainly, this was the unequivocal British assessment of German behaviour. Writing to his colleague Kimberley in November 1894, Ripon, the British colonial secretary, observed with distaste what he saw as the WilhelmstraBe's 'inclination to take the Transvaal under their protection.' 116 Kimberley's concurrence was absolute. 'Germany', he observed, 'is beyond doubt nibbling at the Transvaal...' .117 Evidence for this was seen both in the expanded German diplomatic, economic and military presence and in the directing role that the Reich had started to assume in the orchestration of the Republic's foreign relations, which had reached such proportions by 1895 that Ripon was to observe that, when it came to international relations, ' ... saying so to Germany is as good as saying so to Kruger.' 118 What made the German activities especially worrying for the British, however,


was their constantly escalating intensity. This had considerable implications for the nature of Britain's own regional policy since it signified an intent on the part of the Germans towards greater involvement in the area that could not but fail to arouse wider British suspicions of their ultimate objective. The development of these fears from calm speculation to apprehensive certainty can be traced in the British ministerial correspondence. On 19 October 1894, at the time of Mahazul' s insurrection in Gazaland, Kimberley wrote to Ripon informing him that 'an insolent article said to be "inspired" in the Cologne Gazette against England declares that Germany will emphatically say hands off to us at Delagoa Bay.' Unperturbed by what was doubtless assumed to be a unique occurrence, he continued with the thought: ' .. .if the Germans attempt to interfere I should (if I can have my way) make them clearly understand that we are determined and able to maintain our supremacy in that part of the world.' 119

A month later, after the realization had dawned that Germany did intend to 'interfere' and that, as a result, British policy was faced with entirely new circumstances, any thought that dealings with the Germans should be based upon personal inclination had departed from the agenda. Symptomatic of this was a series of letters that passed between Ripon and Kimberley as they endeavoured to formulate their standpoint in the aftermath of the German challenge. As the former observed,

Your recent conversation with Hatzfeldt and the tone of the German press about South Africa seems to me to make it necessary that we should at once consider what course we ought to take .... Are we prepared to bind the Transvaal to us by concessions ... or are we prepared to say squarely to Germany that the Transvaal is within our sphere of influence and that they must keep their hands off! Either line may be taken; but one or other ought to be adopted at once. 120

The Foreign Secretary's response was clear cut. 'The German attitude in South East Africa,' he replied, 'makes it indispensable that we should put our house in order. ... As to the Transvaal I am prepared to tell Germany that they must keep their hands off. You will have observed that I used significant language to Hatzfeldt. .. .' 121 Yet, in spite of this resolve, two months later, Ripon could still perceive no improvement in the situation. Instead, commenting on Kruger's speech at the Kaiser's birthday dinner, he felt it necessary to suggest that Britain

take advantage of what he said to make a perfectly friendly statement to Germany of the obligations of the Transvaal to us and of our claims to


consider that state within our sphere of influence. I am afraid if something of this kind is not done we shall drift into an unpleasant position with Germany. 122

This ultimately was to come to pass with the Kruger telegram and consequently, when it did, Kimberley had little doubt about the nature of German policy. As he observed of the Kaiser's action: 'If it was merely a personal outbreak, it might not signify so much, but it is part of a settled policy, as was shown unmistakably in the communications which passed between Hatzfeldt and me, and Malet and the Berlin Foreign Office.' 123

Given the extraordinary sensitivity of British statesmen to events in South Africa, it is, of course, possible to dismiss their suspicions as nothing more than paranoia. However, it should be noted that, when it came to the Transvaal, their interpretation of events often showed remarkable accuracy and penetration. Ripon, for instance, virtually predicted the Kruger telegram. Writing to Rosebery on the second of January 1896, the day before this unprecedented document was sent, he observed that 'people abroad will never believe for a moment that Jameson acted off his own bat, and I am afraid that the German Emperor may give us trouble and render the affair less easy to settle by some sauciness or other.' 124

The British government's suspicion of German intrigue was strengthened by the fact that its fears were known to match those of a number of influential people inside the Transvaal, whose concern over this and other important matters had led them to unite in opposition to the Kruger regime. This group of individuals, though hampered by the fact that organized opposition had never been a feature of the Republic's politics and was hence regarded as an unwelcome innovation by large sections of the population, was nonetheless able to coalesce as an alternative body of opinion based upon a number of policy areas on which they differed markedly from the Kruger government.

Foremost amongst these was the issue of foreign and in particular Hollander and German influence over the national administration, a situation that was deemed to exist as a result of an active policy on the part of President Kruger to staff his government departments with foreign born officials. While there were certainly a considerable number of foreigners in state employ, many of whom had indeed been recruited by the President, it would be wrong to say, as the Progressives did, that it was the result of a premeditated decision. Rather, it was the case that the Republic's independence and aspirations to modem statehood had created a situation in which it was necessary for government employees to have a sound education and a command of the main European languages. As the


average burgher did not fulfil these requirements, the outside recruitment of officials had become necessary. Yet this was not the perception of the opposition who regarded the burgeoning ranks of foreign civil servants as evidence of 'Hollander rule' and demanded to know 'why are our offices filled with foreigners? Hollanders and Germans who draw high salaries, while our sons are treated as outcasts unless they belong to the clique.' 125

In similar fashion, the growing German influence over the Republic was also a matter of concern. Demonstrative of this was an interview that took place on Christmas Eve 1894 between Sir Henry Loch and John Kotze. Kotze, who had held the position of chief justice of the Transvaal since the Republic's retrocession and who was therefore a very influential and well informed member of the Boer polity, perceived 'South Africa as threatened with a very great danger'. Speaking openly, 'in the understanding that what he mentions is regarded as perfectly confidential by Her Majesty's Government', he made a number of revealing claims. According to Loch's account:

The Chief Justice is very anxious of the action of the government of the S.A.R. and the approach made by that government towards Germany and at the very cordial reception with which their advances have been received. He ascribes to Dr Leyds and Mr Esselen the policy that President Kruger has adopted. They have represented to him that the British element in the Transvaal is a danger to the independence of the Republic, and that England can only be kept in check by Germany. Dr Leyds is endeavouring to be sent to Berlin as minister to consolidate the alliance between the two countries which has for its object the practical acquisition of Delagoa Bay by the Republic. 126

This highly partisan interpretation, reflecting Kotze's sympathy for the faction that opposed the influence of the Hollander element, places the onus of responsibility more firmly on Dr Leyds than on the Reich government. Nonetheless, it and expressions like it contributed to the furtherance of the British view of German intentions for, as Loch observed in his discussion of Kotze' s remarks, ' ... whether or not he is right about this, there can be no doubt that German interference may be a real danger. .. .' 127

This belief is substantiated by the evidence from Germany, which suggests that policy for the region was formed with the explicit intention of opposing the British interpretation of South Africa's political status. That the WilhelmstraBe was aware of the London Convention and the restrictions it imposed upon the Transvaal's external relations cannot be doubted. It was, after all, a published document. Nor can it be denied that the


British attitude towards the position of the Transvaal was unknown for, in addition to being mentioned by the Foreign Office and much repeated by Sir Edward Malet, 128 it was also consistently emphasised in reports from the Reich's own London embassy. As Hatzfeldt recorded:

The standpoint of the English government towards article 4 of the London Convention, concerning the regulation of the Transvaal Republic's external relations, will always be that the latter lies in the British sphere of influence and only with the approval of England may make agreements with foreign powers. 129

On the basis of this information, there could have been no doubt in the minds of the diplomats of the WilhelmstraBe that in seeking to advance Germany's position in the region, the Reich was courting confrontation with Britain. That such an outcome was acceptable is a reflection of the attitudes that prevailed towards the peninsula and its Boer population. For, as has already been stated, South Africa had long been perceived by many Germans as an area particularly suitable for the fulfilment of their imperial designs. Significantly, during the early 1890s, this view came to be shared by many of the people with a formative role in the development of the nation's foreign policy. The Kaiser, for one, believed strongly in the desirability of the Empire pursuing political objectives in the region. Indeed, he saw in southern Africa such an opportunity for imperial advancement that as early as November 1894 he was prepared to question the need to defer to Britain's established preeminence there. Indicative of this was his reaction to a report sent in by Hatzfeldt outlining the astonishment felt in London to the notion of German rights at Delagoa Bay. To support his assessment of British feeling, the ambassador enclosed an article from The Times, which observed that

Unless Germany takes an extraordinary paternal interest in the Transvaal, it is difficult to see how she can be affected by proceedings at Delagoa Bay; and, even in that case, we trust that a foreign office remarkable, as we have said, for diplomatic correctness will never forget that the foreign relations of the Transvaal are by treaty to be conducted through this country and not otherwise. 130

In response to this warning, the Kaiser's comment was simply 'so!'~ 31

This interjection, perhaps of little account when considered solely on its own, takes on considerable meaning when placed in the context of some of Wilhelm's other recorded statements concerning the future of the Bay. Two


examples particularly worthy of mention come from October 1894. On the 19th of that month, Hatzfeldt reported from London that the Morning Post had suggested a partition of Mozambique in the event of Britain occupying Delagoa Bay. The Kaiser's response was emphatic: 'If it is taken at all, we will take it.>I 32 Equally revealing is the Kaiser's reaction to an impromptu conversation that occurred when, subsequent to the debacle over Mahazul' s rebellion in Gazaland, Graham Bower, secretary to the Cape Governor, unexpectedly met the German consul in a Cape Town street. A report of their discussion, which focused largely on the ownership of Delagoa Bay, was sent to Berlin and put before the Kaiser who made the observation: 'Very interesting. We must watch over Delagoa Bay with greater vigilance and come to some confidential understanding with the Transvaal en cas que.' 133 Given this attitude, it is hardly surprising that, when, on a subsequent occasion, he was asked by his Chancellor to refrain from precipitate action, he responded emphatically that 'this forfeiture or nonacquisition of Delagoa Bay will have to be heavily paid for in the future and we shall some day deeply regret it.' 134 It is enlightening as regards the Emperor's aims to observe that the All Highest proposal that engendered the call for caution on the part of Hohenlohe had been the statement that 'if Louren~o Marques changes hands, it should come only to Germany or the Boers.'~ 35 That it was equally acceptable for the Transvaal to gain the territory as for the Reich is indicative of the influence the Kaiser must have expected ultimately to wield over the Republic.

In this expectation, however, he would not have been alone, for equally geared to achieving such an outcome was the Foreign Secretary. Of all the leading figures in the government, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, a former member of the colonial society, was the most taken by the possibilities that existed in southern Africa and became the most deeply committed to realizing them. Indeed, such was the extent of his personal predilection in this regard that his behaviour became a matter of comment at the British embassy. As Martin Gosselin observed in a report to Lord Kimberley:

I would venture to recall your Lordship's attention to the numerous allusions made by Baron von Marschall to the Delagoa Bay question at my weekly visits to the ministry for foreign affairs .... Yesterday His Excellency again, of his own accord, reverted to a subject which evidently preoccupies his mind. 136

This assessment of Marschall's interests proved to be accurate, a circumstance made evident by the way in which he committed himself, and


thereby Germany, to opposing Whitehall's goal of improving the British position relative to the Boers. As he recorded in a letter to the German minister in Lisbon, 'every strengthening of English influence in South Africa is in equal measure to the disadvantage of Portuguese and German interests .... ' 137

This attitude did not go unnoticed on the English side. In spite of Marschall's most strenuous efforts to camouflage his actual desires through the rhetoric of economics, his aspirations for South Africa, best characterized by Rhodes' assessment 'I see the cloven foot there and object to it', 138 were very strong indeed. This fact is most clearly illustrated by his behaviour at the time of the Jameson raid. Much of the activity undertaken by the German foreign office at the time of this crisis has subsequently been obscured by the furore created by the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger. Yet, it would be irresponsible to lose sight of the fact that up until the dispatch of this document the initiative and centre stage in Germany's response to the British South Africa Company's filibuster had been taken by Marschall. It was he who warned the British ambassador that 'the Imperial Government could not accept such a solution'; 139 he who threatened Lascelles with the prospect of a continental alliance against Britain which might look at the British Empire for 'objects of compensation'; 140 he who went to see the Kaiser to propose the landing of German marines; he who pressured the reluctant Portuguese government to grant permission for the passage of troops across their territory; he who on 2 January obtained the Kaiser's consent for the sending of a formal protest to the British government, and he who instructed Hatzfeldt, after the retrieval of the note, not to spare Salisbury the knowledge that, but for Jameson's surrender, the protest would have been made. 141 The nature of these actions, which both individually and cumulatively were of a sharpness and stringency well in excess of the requirements of the situation and which thus set aside the German response from those of other governments, leaves no doubt as to the intensity of Marschall's personal involvement in this matter. Moreover, further corroboration of this fact comes from his diary. Writing on the morning of 2 January, he was to record that 'the situation is most uncomfortable. If the Boers are beaten, we will have to intervene actively.' 142 Quite what Marschall thought Germany could do were such an eventuality to come to pass is unclear. However, it is sufficient for an assessment of the strength of his motivation regarding the Transvaal to know that he would have wished to undertake some sort of counteraction.

In addition to considering the course of events up to 2 January 1896, it is also necessary for the proper evaluation of Marschall's attitude to take


into account the matter of the Kruger telegram itself. In respect to this document, certain facts are clear. For one thing, the individual responsible for proposing the sending of a goodwill telegram to Kruger on the morning of 3 January 1896 was MarschalL Furthermore, it was Marschall who, with the help of Paul Kayser, drafted the text and it is in his hand that the corrections were made that led to its content becoming a more direct and clear-cut challenge to Britain. 143 Notwithstanding this, many of the sources for the prehistory and origins of the telegram, as well as many subsequent commentators upon it, have sought to apportion responsibility for the telegram's creation and despatch not to Marschall, the proposer of the document, but to the Kaiser, its inspiration and so-called 'real author.' 144

One such individual is Marschall himself. While acknowledging that it was indeed he who proposed the sending of the telegram, his record of events does, nonetheless, stress that he only acted in this way reluctantly and out of a need to forestall a series of bellicose and damaging schemes that were being advocated vehemently by the Kaiser. As he put it in his diary:

Ten o'clock conference with His Majesty, at which the Chancellor, Hollmann, Knorr and Senden are present. His Majesty expressed somewhat outlandish plans. Protectorate over the Transvaal, which I at once talked him out of. Mobilisation of the naval infantry. Sending troops to the TransvaaL And upon the objection of the Chancellor: 'That would mean war with England', His Majesty says: 'Yes, but only on land.' Then it was decided to send [Colonel] Schele on a reconnaissance mission to the TransvaaL Also an unfortunate idea. Finally His Majesty sends at my suggestion a congratulatory telegram to President Kruger.145

Support for Marschall's assertion that the telegram was adopted purely out of a need to provide an alternative to the Kaiser's dangerous proposals comes from the account left by Friedrich von Holstein. Holstein, who was waiting in an ante-room during this meeting, described the events of that morning in his memoirs:

After a considerable time Marschall came in and, in that laconic way of his, instructed Kayser to draw up a telegram to Kruger, at the same time telling him what to put in it. When I quite naturally expressed my misgivings he said: 'Oh, don't you interfere; you've no idea of the suggestions made in there. Everything else is even worse.' 146


Taken together, these two accounts, coupled with a similar tale by Hohenlohe, have provided the main basis for an interpretation that stresses both the centrality of the Kaiser's role and the spontaneity of the telegram's creation. This version of events, with its suggestion that the telegram was an emergency reaction by Germany's responsible government to the vagaries of All Highest pressure is, however, contradicted in one important detail by another source which implicates the Kaiser more deeply and directly in the genesis of this famous document. According to this material, the sending of a telegram to Kruger was not a plan that emerged out of the 3 January meeting but was one that the Kaiser had already held for several days. The main evidence for this interpretation is an account provided by Lieutenant Mesmer-Seiden, who, as a close friend of Prince Radolin, was invited to the Prince's Berlin residence in early January 1896 to celebrate the new year. His description recalls how the Prince was unexpectedly called away from his guests to attend the Kaiser. The reason, it transpired, was that Wilhelm was searching for a successor to Chancellor Hohenlohe, who had that day refused to countenance, let alone countersign, a message to President Kruger that Wilhelm himself had written for immediate wire to the Transvaal. Indeed, he had threatened to resign if it were despatched. It was to meet this contingency that Radolin had been summoned; he was to fill the breach in the chancellorship. In the end this proved unnecessary; the Kaiser relented, the telegram remained unsent and Hohenlohe stayed in office. 147 The significance of this story, which provides yet more evidence of the turbulence of government in post-Bismarckian Germany, is, of course, the suggestion that a telegram to President Kruger was conceived and put together by the Kaiser in the days prior to the 3 January meeting. Such a draft, if it ever actually existed- and several of the Kaiser's biographers have accepted the validity of this account in spite of the absence of a text to substantiate it148 - would place the onus for the final telegram squarely on Wilhelm's shoulders. Rather than being a spur-of-the-moment decision advocated in desperation by a nervous government, the Kruger telegram would instead be the revival of a royal idea and, as such, the product of All Highest policy and insistence.

Another account that stresses the central role of Wilhelm in the origin of the telegram is provided by Bernhard von Btilow. His version of the events strongly implies that the Kruger telegram was an anti-semitic and anti-English outburst impelled by the Kaiser, who believed that the Jameson raid could be put down to 'his uncle, the Prince of Wales, and to the latter's two capitalist friends, Be it and Sir Ernest Cassel, both of whom, it might be mentioned incidently, were German Israelites.' 149 The telegram, as a response to this Anglo-Jewish filibuster, was, apparently,


Wilhelm's way of expressing his anger against both Jews and England simultaneously. There are reasons for treating this account with caution. Billow was not in Berlin at this time and his narrative is, therefore, not a first-hand recollection but the product of hearsay. Moreover, it cannot be ignored that many of the statements in Billow's memoirs are intentionally malicious or self-serving. This may be one such example. However, there are also grounds for giving it closer attention. For one thing, there is evidence to suggest that Wilhelm did see the Jameson raid as a Jewish plot. The British diplomat Sir Cecil Spring Rice, like Billow, also recorded the Kaiser as blaming the Jameson raid on 'German Jews.' 15° Furthermore, there are German sources that support this assessment of the Kaiser's attitude. In particular, there is the evidence provided by a report from the consul-general at Cape Town regarding the origins of the Jameson raid; at the end of it, the Kaiser wrote down his impressions: 'So [this is] a big stock market manipulation [Borsenjobberei] caused by German Jews.' 151

Documentation like this certainly makes possible Billow's contention that the telegram was the product of the Kaiser's indignation. 152

Given accounts such as those detailed above, it is hardly surprising that many historians and commentators have concluded that Wilhelm was the key figure in the Kruger telegram episode. Yet there are reasons for challenging the thrust of this view, especially insofar as it places responsibility exclusively on the Kaiser. To start with, the charges that he was either favourably disposed to the telegram or, indeed, was the inspiration for it are ones that Wilhelm was thereafter consistently and vigorously to deny. His many refutations in this respect include not only accounts written long after the event, such as his extremely unreliable memoirs,153 but also material that is much more contemporary to the events. On 8 January 1896, for instance, the German minister in Belgium, Friedrich von Alvensleben, sent a column from the newspaper Le Matin to Berlin. The article, entitled 'to Wilhelm II', contained the following message: 'Your Majesty, as always when your heart speaks, you did not consult anyone before sending the telegram ... .' Next to this assertion of his unique responsibility the Kaiser penned a firm denial. 154 Added to this, support for the Kaiser's position comes from a number of independent sources. The Empress Frederick, for instance, who despite being the Kaiser's mother was a staunch critic of his conservative leanings and anti-English outbursts, reported to her British relatives that the telegram was no 'mere hasty and ill-advised action of his own'. On the contrary, she believed that it was 'approved' by the govemment.155 Similarly, the usually well-informed and dependable diarist Baroness von Spitzemberg wrote that 'the Kaiser was induced to send the telegram though not without difficulty .... ' 156 Quite who supplied the per-


suasion is not made clear by the Baroness. However, the English-born Princess of Pless, who also wrote about the telegram, had no doubts on this. As she observed, 'had the Emperor's action not aroused the storm of protest that it did ... there were those close to the Emperor, notably his Foreign Secretary, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who would have been quite ready to claim credit for having inspired its dispatch.' 157 Another notable Berlin commentator who held a comparable view was the longserving Bavarian envoy to the capital, Hugo Graf von und zu Lerchenfeld. Writing to the government in Munich in January 1896, he reported that the telegram had been sent because 'the Foreign Office [of which Marschall was the head] deemed it necessary to teach England a lesson.' 158 He made similar observations in his memoirs. 'For a long time,' he wrote, 'the telegram has been put down to the Kaiser himself, but this is unjust.' 159

Instead, he ascribed the telegram to Marschall, who 'caused or at the very least did not hinder [it].' 160 In a similar fashion, Baron von Eckardstein, then a diplomat in London, also claimed in his memoirs that Marschall was 'the chief culprit' and played a more important role in the origins of this document than was subsequently admitted. 161

The existence of a body of opinion, much of it well informed, that Marschall was more than just an accessory to the telegram cannot be ignored. This is especially true given that Marschall was hostile to Britain at this time and had taken an interest in the Transvaal. Furthermore, when considering the possibility that Marschall might have been crucial to the creation of the telegram, it is worth remembering his central role in the origins of the note of 2 January 1896 that was delivered to and then withdrawn from the Foreign Office in London. This note, no less than the Kruger telegram, had been stringent; so much so, in fact, that as one historian has observed, 'had it been delivered, [it] would have produced no less serious a crisis [than the Kruger telegram].' 162 Clearly, the Kruger telegram was an action of which Marschall was capable.

Reconciling these divergent accounts, with their contrasting perspectives as to the relative prominence of the roles played by Marschall and the Kaiser, is no simple task. Yet, whatever the truth on this matter may be, one thing clearly emerges: it was not only the Kaiser who had firm ideas in relation to the Transvaal, but also Baron von Marschall. Both believed it possible 'to intervene actively'.

This interventionist outlook was not confined solely to Berlin but also received strong support from Germany's representatives in southern Africa, at this juncture the most important of whom were the consuls in Louren~o Marques and Pretoria. 163 As it transpires, the occupants of both of these posts were keen advocates of an active policy in the region.


Transferred from service in the Kolonial Abteilung to become the holder of the former position, for instance, was Markus Graf von Pfeil, the younger brother of Joachim Pfeil, the noted explorer, colonial activist and campaigner in favour of Boer migration. Needless to say, Markus Pfeil, whose belief in imperialism was no less strong than that of his brother, was to become just as interested as his more famous elder sibling in the affairs of southern Africa, something which was to guide his political activities following his assumption of the consulship. As the British representative at Louren\o Marques was to report a few months after the Graf' s arrival: 'From personal observation and the conversation of those who meet him on intimate terms, I gather count Pfeil is increasing in his desires to advance German interests in the Transvaal.' 164 Similarly, on another occasion he was to record 'the keen desire entertained by count Pfeil to strengthen, at all costs, German influence at Delagoa Bay .... ' 165 Naturally, given these attitudes, once firmly established on Portuguese territory Markus Pfeil began to act upon his convictions. This was manifested in a number of ways. To begin with, there were his attempts to alert the WilhelmstraJ3e both to the dangers of Britain's regional pre-eminence and to the advantages that could accrue to the Reich from taking steps to counter it. In particular, he made great efforts to advance the view that the Boers sought a formal attachment to Germany and were only deterred from actively seeking such a connection because of the Reich's past indifference. As one report observed:

He [Dr Leyds] stressed in principle the lively wish of annexation to Germany [Anschlusses an Deutschland] but remarked that in the Transvaal itself, amongst the farmers and the government, there exists a strong mistrust of Germany's readiness to help owing to the fact that a request for aid in 1875 had been rejected by Berlin. 166

In addition to these efforts to create a favourable climate in Berlin for the promotion of German initiatives in the region, Markus Pfeil also drew up plans for more direct forms of action. Arriving in Louren\o Marques on the steamer Reichstag on 19 April 1895, he was within four months convinced that Germany should take possession of the area. In a very lengthy report dated 2 August 1895 that dealt ostensibly with the political situation in the area at a time of conflict between Gungunhua, a local chief, and the Portuguese, Markus Pfeil argued that peace in the port depended upon the chief's fear of the Germans and their warships. Given the existence of this respect for German power, it was, Pfeil argued, desirable that Gungunhuna be brought under German protection. Such a move would bring both peace


to the area and deliver Delagoa Bay into German hands. 167 This impossible proposal was rejected by the Auswartiges Amt. 16g

Complementing his activities in pursuit of this stance were the actions of Franz von Herff, the Dutch-speaking consul to Pretoria, 169 who, like Markus Pfeil, endeavoured to use his office to promote his belief, consistent with his Pan-German sympathies, 170 that Germany should establish herself as 'a weighty factor in the politics of South Africa' .171 Consequently, he too adopted the tactic of bombarding the WilhelmstraBe with submissions designed to further this objective. As in the case of Markus Pfeil, one of the methods that he employed was to claim that German intervention was desired by the Boers. A typical example of this was a letter written in October 1894 to Chancellor Caprivi, in which he reported that extracts from the influential Boer newspaper, the Volkstem, 'showed that the appearance of the German flag in Delagoa Bay would be welcomed by the Dutch press of the Transvaal.' 172 Similarly, like Markus Pfeil, Herff also asserted that action was needed to secure Germany's position against British attempts at undermining it. These were recorded in detail. One report, for instance, was entirely devoted to the 'twisted ways' of Cecil Rhodes who, it was observed, 'had on his last stay in Pretoria attempted to intrigue against Germany and France. He had elaborated to Commandantgeneral Joubert that the Germans and French were a curse for South Africa .... ' 173 Another, more explicit citation quickly followed. In a memorandum supposedly detailing press reports about the festivities surrounding the opening of the Delagoa Bay railway, Herff took the opportunity to explain how the English had acted 'with the goal of spreading mistrust between Germany and the Transvaal.' Their means of achieving this, it was noted, were straightforward and based upon 'falsehood.' According to his report,

Buxton, the former [British] under Secretary of State ... personally went to the general consul of the South African Republic in London and explained to him that in the South African question Germany went hand in hand with England and that the Transvaal could in no way reckon on Germany's support. 174

The extent of Herff's proposals for Germany's regional strategy were commensurate with his assertions of British perfidy. Very early on in his consulship, for example, he sent to Berlin a report in which he advocated the establishment of a trading company, capable of dominating the commercial routes of the entire peninsula, through which German influence could be disseminated. The capital to be invested in this venture was envisaged by the consul as no less than I 00 million marks. 175 As he stated


in a subsequent despatch, the purpose of this company was 'in a peaceful way to conquer South Africa as a German economic area.' 176 The rejection of this proposal did not stop Herff from advocating German action in the region. Rather, with the passage of time, his plans were to become more ambitious. The most comprehensive statement of his aspirations was detailed in a report on the 'political relationship of the German Reich to the South African Republic' that he put together on 25 July 1895. The object of his proposal was to 'secure the stability and independence of the Transvaal and to maintain the status quo with respect to Delagoa Bay.' To this end, he advocated a series of measures. Initially, Germany was to inform the Transvaal, through a formal diplomatic note, of the aims of its policy and of the fact that no change in the balance of power in the region could be tolerated. In return for this note, which was supposed to promote Boer trust in the friendship of Germany, the Transvaal government was formally to undertake never to enter a South African customs union or political federation or any formal association of states through which the influence of Britain could be advanced in the region. Such a commitment, Herff maintained, would be 'to strengthen German influence over the economic and political development of South Africa.' That, however, was not in itself sufficient. Coming on top of these measures, indeed, as a naturally corollary of them, he proposed 'a planned migration of German and Dutch farmers' into the Transvaal in order to give new blood to the population there and strengthen it in its struggle against the ever-growing English mining population. Finally, with these measures in place, he proposed to notify the British government of Germany's political interests in South Africa in such a way as 'to make it impossible for England to violate the South African Republic or Delagoa Bay.' 177 Advocated by Herff as a measure designed to advance Boer self-reliance and independence, this plan would have formally and irrevocably involved the Transvaal in exchanging the then-existing supervision of its foreign policy by Britain for the future overseeing of its external relations by Germany. It would also have entailed accepting, in addition to the uitlanders, a new group of migrants backed by yet another foreign government. With no apparent sense of irony, this scheme for establishing German political supremacy was put forward as a means of preserving the balance of power in the region. Such was the political vision of Germany's diplomatic representative in the Transvaal.

In evaluating Herff's influence it must be acknowledged that neither of these proposals was to be accepted by the authorities in Berlin. 178 Yet, a number of Herff's more feasible reports about the glowing opportunities for German commerce and political influence were noticed and acted


upon. Thus, for instance, having constantly stressed the economic importance of Delagoa Bay, it was at his request that a warship was sent to the opening of the railway there 179 and at his suggestion that an imperial message of friendship and future co-operation was drafted for that occasion.180 Similarly, like Marschall, he was keen to use the Jameson raid as a grounds for bringing German troops to the Transvaal, authority for which action he was as quick to request 181 as Marschall was to provide.

The statements and activities of the Kaiser and Marschall in Berlin, when considered in unison, act to clarify the objectives of their instigators. Such overt behaviour as theirs, compatible only with an interventionist policy in southern Africa, leaves little doubt that their aim was for Germany to supplant Britain as the pre-eminent political influence in the region. The presence of such diplomats as Herff and Pfeil as the representatives of Germany in South Africa makes this certain. After all, why else would the Reich authorities appoint and, more significantly, retain for long periods, such ardent advocates of the expansion of German power in the region if this goal did not correspond with their point of view? Critics of the suggestion that Germany sought to intervene actively in the affairs of southern Africa, historians such as Thimme and Wiid, have attempted to suggest that, in their interventionist activities, Herff and Pfeil were out of step with their superiors. As proof of this, they have made much of the fact that the consuls were at times reprimanded for their excesses. 182 That this occurred is undeniable. Between August and December 1895, a period of only four months, Pfeil was censured no less than four times by the WilhelmstraBe. 183 Herff also received his fair share of reproofs. One should not, however, conclude from this that the two diplomats were at variance with Berlin. Instead, it is worth looking at the nature of the reprimands that they received: on close inspection, it is clear that they were normally mild rebukes for overenthusiastic behaviour. For example, the censure that Markus Pfeil received for his conversation with Dr Leyds in November 1895 took the following form:

Pleased to acknowledge your efforts to acquire influence in the Transvaal. Must however request that you conduct yourself with more care and refrain from expressions of opinion without instruction since you cannot get an overview [iibersehen] as to whether this corresponds to our general political point of view. 184

Described by Wiid as a 'sharp rebuke', this comment seems to suggest a unity of purpose, if not of method, between the central authorities and their agent on the ground. Such a view is compounded by the highly


significant fact that, in spite of such reprimands, both Herff and Pfeil were left in place by the Wilhelmstra13e as the agents of German policy in the region. Had they genuinely been out of step with the government in Berlin or had the authorities in Berlin just wanted a different style of local representation, this could easily have been arranged by recalling Herff and Pfeil and replacing them with more suitable individuals. This did not happen. Indeed, instead of being told to return and give account of their conduct, Herff and Pfeil were both praised on several occasions by the Kaiser. 185

Herff was even decorated. This does much to counter the force of Thimme and Wiid's argument and explains why the two diplomats were left in place. Both were doing exactly what was expected of them. Consequently, the action of keeping Pfeil and Herff in South Africa and of subsequently appointing the like-minded Bruno von Schuckmann to the consul-generalship of the Cape, 186 forces one to the conclusion that these diplomats, their views and their actions were considered appropriate.

If the above-mentioned individuals - the Kaiser, Marschall, Pfeil and Herff - all shared a common enthusiasm for a German role in southern Africa, this should not be taken to imply that this view was ubiquitous throughout the higher echelons of the Reich administration. For though the German government was limited in size and numbers, it was by no means a monolith. On the contrary, its disparate structure harboured a diversity of different opinions, amongst the holders of which, one of the few common feature was a preparedness not to bow to other people's outlook. This had a considerable impact upon policy. As Raymond Sontag has observed in his analysis of the first Moroccan crisis, it created a situation in which Germany's leading statesmen often pursued contrary and divergent goals. 'Even more misleading,' he records,

is the assumption frequently made that the Berlin government was pursuing a consistent foreign policy. A consistent policy predicates unity of purpose and action. During the period under discussion neither of these essential elements was present in German diplomacy. At no time after 1890 does the direction of German foreign relations show the unity of control which marked the Bismarckian period .... and it is only by ... understanding ... the divergent points of view of [Germany's leaders] ... that the events of this period can be correctly interpreted. 187

This analysis is more than borne out by the experience of South Africa. For while there was a considerable body of opinion in the German government actively engaged in promoting the Reich's role in the region, there also existed a number of individuals who had an entirely different percep-


tion of the situation. This group, which had played almost no role in the German activities of 1894 and 1895, found, in the light of the Jameson raid, a sudden and unexpected need to take an interest in South Africa. The contrast between their views and those of their interventionist colleagues is well illustrated by the private correspondence that passed between Hatzfeldt and Holstein. The former, whose belief it was that there existed no prospect of Britain relinquishing her claims to paramountcy in the region and who was, as a consequence, opposed to the State Secretary's high-profile stance, thought that for Germany to back the Transvaal's demand for the abrogation of the London Convention was an exercise in futility. As he observed,

this would greatly complicate the situation since I do not believe that the government here would have the courage to accept a stipulation so explicit that it would be interpreted by the now highly excited public opinion as a political defeat for England. 188

Hence, he believed that the chances of achieving anything from this position were negligible.

Holstein, who had previously expressed to Hatzfeldt his determination to ensure that in South African matters 'our action will not be governed by our feelings and mood, in spite of pressure from the colonial party and elsewhere', 189 concurred completely with this view. Since at least the time of Malet's first confrontation with Marschall in February 1895, he had begun to indicate his misgivings over German policy. The day after that incident, for example, he articulated to Hatzfeldt the view that 'our colonial department has obviously got a chauvinistic feeling against England, perhaps more than necessary.' 190 Such cautious sentiments were soon to became more pronounced. Following the second confrontation between Marschall and Malet in October 1895, Holstein was clearly concerned that matters regarding South Africa were getting out of hand. As he observed,

... the navy obviously regard the Malet incident as a favourable occasion for getting another cruiser. I believe this vessel could cost us dearly because of the dissolution of our alliances, which would be the natural consequence of our attitude towards England.191

Now, following the Kruger telegram, he went one step further. Believing that the seizure of Delagoa Bay by Germany would, in addition to angering Britain, also provoke the antagonism of France whose Madagascan


trade was dependent upon the harbour there, he was determined to avoid any action that put Germany into such an exposed position. 192 Instead, it was his opinion, fully supported by the Chancellor, that Germany should avoid all involvement in southern African matters except in so far as such participation could promote her wider foreign policy objectives. To this end, in response to the Transvaal crisis brought on by the Jameson raid, he drew up plans for a continental league directed against Britain. The purpose of this plan, so far as Holstein was concerned, was to deliver a clear signal to London 'to draw nearer to the Triple Alliance. [England] will not really comprehend this necessity, 'he continued, 'until she has had the experience, catered for by the present proposal, that the Triple Alliance will not follow her lead under every circumstance.' 193 Hohenlohe agreed with him. Writing to Graf Miinster, the ambassador in Paris, he observed that

the Transvaal question, which has suddenly become so acute, will probably give your excellency a quiet opportunity ... to obtain for ourselves the support of other powers in this Transvaal question .... the basic idea of this plan for a continental understanding .. .is that the Triple Alliance has now no prospect of dealing with England, as it used to do, by attracting her to combine in the defence of the interests of the Triple Alliance and England .... Not until England learns by experience that the chasm between the two great continental groups is not unbridgeable, ... will she understand that independence may become isolation, and isolation danger. 194

Problematically, this assessment took no account of the views of the more interventionist elements in the Auswartiges Amt. To them, the Transvaal question was not an issue that had 'suddenly become so acute' but one that had been diplomatically pertinent since, at the very latest, Marschall's first confrontation with Malet in February 1895. Consequently, given that their reaction to the British filibuster was quite different from that of Holstein and Hohenlohe, this meant that the furore over the Jameson raid saw the development of two contrasting lines of German diplomacy: an active regional policy from the interventionists and a more European-focused response from those diplomats less committed to southern Africa.

The dichotomy in the policy-making process that could have been created by this divergence of outlook was not to appear. Owing to the character and position of the individuals of whom it was composed, the influence of the latter group was small. Hohenlohe, for instance, though


Chancellor, lacked the political will either to impose his policy desires or, more importantly, actively to oppose the viewpoint of his more interventionist colleagues. 195 In a similar fashion, Holstein, who had little enthusiasm for South African affairs, nonetheless found it necessary to take account of his colleagues' aspirations for the region when framing his proposals. This can be demonstrated with reference to his memorandum of December 30, 1895. The declared aim of this document, which contained plans for a continental understanding out of which each of the mainland powers would be able to extract colonial concessions from Britain, was to demonstrate to England the need for closer ties to Germany. Yet, the nature of the proposed territorial concessions reveals that, in order to make it acceptable, the proposal was tailored to meet the requirements of the South African enthusiasts. Under his scheme and in line with his perception of Germany's interests, Holstein envisaged Russian expansion in Korea, French advances in the Congo and for Germany gains in China. It was only as an afterthought that he also added the suggestion that 'perhaps an understanding about the Transvaal' 196 should be part of the proceedings. His reluctance, like that of Hohenlohe, had, however, little effect and consequently, in spite of their opinions, the progress and direction of policy remained largely unchanged.

In the light of the views that thus held sway over both the WilhelmstraBe and its overseas representatives, it is clearly impossible to take at face value the German defence of the Transvaal's integrity. A government with such definite territorial ambitions as that of Germany does not battle to obtain a say in the future political structure of a region merely for selfless ends. It would thus have been wholly consistent with the attitude of the Reich authorities if it had been the premeditated intention of German policy for the Reich to establish herself through her actions ipso facto as the protecting power of the Transvaal. It would also have been totally in accordance with their views, and much in line with the forms of western imperialism, if such diplomatic action had been but the prelude to more direct forms of involvement. 197 As the experience of Chinese relations with the West amply testifies, there was an established pattern to European methods of acquiring control over other nations. 198 The process tended to begin with the formation of trade links, the building of railways and the seeking of financial and commercial concessions and then graduate to the offering of diplomatic support against other powers, the better to facilitate which came the sending of troops, the establishment of bases and the acquisition of territory. That many of these actions were in themselves innocuous enough is hard to deny but equally, it is the case that taken as a whole they were a very effective means of advancing imperial objectives,


be those objectives in China or any other part of the world. Consequently, the fact that Germany had established significant financial interests in the Boer Republic and was offering it substantial diplomatic support acquires a new meaning when one takes into account two other considerations.

First of all, there is the extensive emphasis that was placed by the German government upon Delagoa Bay. The significance of this harbour rested upon two factors: its close proximity to the Rand goldfields and its ownership by Portugal. Separately neither of these circumstances would have been important but, taken together, they ensured that the port at Lourenc;o Marques was of the greatest value to the Boers. Solely as a consequence of its existence, access to their Republic was not a British monopoly. Rather, the shortest route to their markets rested with a neutral power. Unfortunately, Portugal, the power in question, was a financially weakened country, whose grave fiscal predicament gave rise to the possibility that it might not be long before she was obliged to part with her colonial possessions, Lourenc;o Marques included. In Pretoria the prospect of such a change of ownership was viewed with some anxiety. For, by an agreement of 1891 pre-emptive rights for this harbour resided with the government in Whitehall. Given the Boers' history of confrontation with Britain, it is easy to understand why this situation made them nervous and why they should attempt to do everything in their power to ensure that Delagoa Bay did not fall into British hands. The German interest in likewise seeking this is, however, less readily comprehensible. According to Marschall, the Reich's attitude was a defensive one derived from the commercial necessity that a united South Africa would be detrimental to German business. This explanation, which was derided by the British, proved no more plausible to a large segment of the Reich's diplomats. As Holstein put it, when assessing the nature of Germany's regional policy, '[if we don't want] Germany to establish herself in Delagoa Bay or its vicinity ... what business have we to be there at all?' 199 This implicit assumption that Germany's presence was based upon acquisitive territorial objectives makes perfect sense in the context of German colonialism. As Woodruff Smith has observed in his study of German imperialism there was, if not a pattern, then at least an ideological basis to the Reich's expansionism, one that was often grounded upon the idea that colonies were

to be points of economic and political entry into larger marketing areas, over which varying degrees of informal control could be exercised. Thus the German naval colony of Kiaochow in China was viewed as the centre of the German dominated, but not directly ruled, Shantung Peninsula, with its major extractive industries.2oo


The parallels between Kiaochow and Delagoa Bay are considerable. The latter, no less than the former, was the port providing the most direct access to an area with 'major extractive industries', in this instance gold mining. Similarly it was the case that international rivalries ensured that both harbours served areas the political status of which was in flux and where, as a consequence, there existed the possibility that the hinterland, in the former instance Shantung, in the latter instance the Transvaal, could be dominated by a colonial power. As a result, Delagoa Bay, like Kiaochow, was potentially a vital segment in a wider imperialist strategy. Though not essential for German trade because a South African Union did not mean, nor was ever likely to mean, the exclusion of German commerce, it was nonetheless vital if Germany wished to dominate the region politically. Though she could land goods elsewhere, short of invading Cape Colony or Natal there were no other ports in the region from which she could establish a political presence. Consequently, a determined interest in the harbour at Louren~o Marques was a signal of intent of the first magnitude and Germany made no secret of her interest. On the contrary, it was most explicit. The Reich's involvement there, which first crystallized in 1893 when the Germans and Boers combined in opposition to the British acquisition attempt, had, by 1894, grown significantly more pronounced. In December of that year, as Marschall noticed approvingly, the matter attracted the Kaiser's attention. 'The Delagoa Bay question,' he observed, 'is of particular interest to His Majesty. From All Highest was it remarked that we cannot permit the entrenchment of England there and that to this end we should come to an understanding with the Transvaal government.' 201 This decision had immediate results. As the German consul in Cape Town observed, 'It is worth remarking that the [Transvaal] President. .. has acted as a spokesman for Germany and France. Asked how the South African Republic would secure its rights ... , if England annexed Delagoa Bay, he explained that France and Germany ... would not allow such an annexation.' 202 The Boers' belief in this fact was strengthened by German prompting. Pfeil, for example, sought to encourage the Transvaal to assert herself in the harbour, even going so far as to tell Dr Leyds 'to be active and have clear objectives in Delagoa Bay.' 203 The desire on the part of the Reich government to see Germany established at the harbour of Louren~o Marques, either in her own right or by proxy of the South African Republic, leaves little doubt as to the nature of the German interest or the motive behind it.

This conclusion is strongly supported by the second consideration, namely that an effort was made to supplement Germany's involvement in the region with a military commitment. The desire on the part of the Reich


authorities to find a pretext for the sending of soldiers to the Transvaal can be demonstrated with reference to their response to the Jameson raid. Much has been written about the origins of the Kruger telegram and its role as a device to forestall some of the Kaiser's more fantastic schemes, such as the fighting of a localized war in the Transvaal. Little, however, has been said about the more mainstream aspects of the Kaiser's behaviour. Indeed, as his ideas were ultimately abandoned because of the opposition of his advisors, it has generally been concluded that the Emperor's proposals were no more than a facet of his eccentric personality and thus, by definition, totally inconsistent with the attitude of the 'responsible government.' This does not seem to have been entirely the case. According to Valentine Chirol, who was summoned to the Auswartiges Amt after the telegram's publication, Marschall was eager to establish the document's official credentials. He records that the Foreign Secretary:

... at once laid stress upon the gravity of the action taken by the Emperor with the complete concurrence of the Chancellor and, he added, with his own. The moment had arrived when it was necessary for Germany to give England plain warning that she was deeply interested in South African affairs, and in the maintenance of the Dutch Republics, and therefore intended to make her voice heard and listened to. The Imperial telegram was no mere impulsive expression of sympathy with a kindred people, but an action of state - eine Staatsaktion - to which His Majesty had lent special weight by putting it in the form of an 'All Highest' message to the President of the South African Republic.204

In addition to this, it should also be emphasized that the objections of the 'responsible' ministers to the Kaiser's alternative proposals stemmed from the precipitate and excessive nature of the suggestions rather than from any disagreement over their content. Thus, while there was considerable resistance to the idea of a German army undertaking the military defence of the Transvaal, there was general and widespread acceptance of the idea that a military force should be introduced into the region in order to protect the German consulate and the lives and property of the German residents there. To this end, the ground was prepared by the sending of a telegram from the Transvaal to the imperial government, which stated that 'the Germans at Pretoria unanimously beseech Your Majesty to intervene at once to prevent endless misery and bloodshed.' 205 Simultaneously, Marschall wrote both to Admiral Knorr informing him that it was his belief that 'for the more effectual protection of our interests ... a second cruiser should be sent to Louren<;o Marques without delay' ,206 and to


Governor Wissmann at Dar-es-Salaam enquiring whether he could spare several hundred colonial troops for service in South Africa.207 On top of this, pressure was put on the Portuguese government to allow the passage of troops through their territory and on the Transvaal to accept their stationing. 208

It is, of course, possible that Marschall's order to Herff that he should obtain permission for troops to come to the Transvaal 'exclusively to protect the consulate and the life and property of our nationals until the troubles are over' 209 was an entirely ingenuous one. The fact that Germany had proven aspirations in the region and had steadily and systematically built up her interests and influence there is not in itself a conclusive indication that a further expansion of German power was desired. The existence of a contingent military interest in the Republic, however, removes any reasonable doubt on this score. As the German people were to discover, much to their indignation, during the Daily Telegraph affair, at the outset of the Boer war, the Kaiser submitted to the British authorities operational information for use against the Transvaal. As he observed in the interview,

I bade one of my officers procure for me as exact an account as he could obtain of the number of combatants in South Africa on both sides and of the actual position of the opposing forces. With these figures before me, I worked out what I considered the best plan of campaign under the circumstances, and submitted it to my General Staff for their criticism. Then I dispatched it to England .... 210

The importance of this revelation has been clouded over the years by the controversial matter of the nature and quality of the imperial proposals, for, though the Emperor in his interview with Colonel Stuart-Wortley was to claim that his submission was based upon work carried out by the General Staff, Bi.ilow maintained otherwise. Writing to Bethmann Hollweg, he recalled that the letter in question contained only 'aphoristic and academic reflections on the art of war and could not have had any practical bearing on the issue of the South African campaign.' 211 While there is a good deal of truth in this assertion, the document, by virtue of its format, is nonetheless revealing.212 The Kaiser, as was well known, took a keen, if inexpert, interest in military matters and was apt to confuse the deference of his generals for their respect for his military skills. The reality of the matter, however, as demonstrated by the Emperor's various naval vessel designs, many of which failed to take into account the need of warships to float, was that his interventions were rarely helpful but


impossible to discourage. Yet the letter he sent to England, while hardly likely to have influenced Lord Roberts, was not of this type. As the Kaiser himself put it, when introducing his suggestions:

Should it interest you to know what is the gist of conversations in military circles over here, I have made a sort of extract for you, in form of reflections, which are only made as 'Orientirung' for you, what the men of the 'services' and 'forces' here think and say.213

In the context of a summary of informal military discussions, the letter is not without interest for, as subsequent publications were to make clear, the German military followed events in South Africa very closely. 214

Indeed, they did so at All Highest prompting, for the Kaiser was apt. even as early as 1896, to submit conceptions of the military situation in South Africa to the War Ministry for comment. 215 Whether the interest thus aroused was ever more than mere observation, as some historians have concluded,216 would be impossible to determine solely on the basis of the Kaiser's letter to the Prince of Wales. However, in conjunction with other available evidence, this hypothesis becomes distinctly plausible.

Also strongly indicative of the theory that Germany sought a means to become militarily involved in the region are the extraordinary measures taken by the diplomats of the Reich legation in Lisbon in their efforts to obtain permission for German troops to disembark at Delagoa Bay and proceed through Portuguese territory to the Transvaal. In the past, consideration of putative German military moves has been glossed over through the mechanism of examining and refuting some of the more speculative contemporary claims in this respect. Thus, for example, both Thimme and Wiid have considered Chirol's belief that Germany had long-laid plans for a military landing at Delagoa Bay and have successfully dismissed this. 217 The fact that Chirol' s journalistic suspicions have proven unfounded should not be allowed to obscure what did actually transpire. A request for the right to land German troops and secure their passage to the Transvaal was made to the governor of Louren~o Marques shortly after Jameson's troops crossed into the South African Republic and repeated in the Portuguese capital on 2 January when it became clear that the colonial authorities would not act without instructions from their government. 218 Yet, before an answer to this second application could be given, news was received of the raid's defeat. Commenting on this, Derenthall, the German head of mission, sent a report to the WilhelmstraBe in which he noted that the Portuguese government 'was aware of the victory and considered our demand no longer relevant.. . .'


'The rug, 'he observed, 'has been pulled from under my feet [Boden entzogen].' 219

This was not the view taken in Berlin, where the objective of landing soldiers was still considered to be an important one. Consequently, instructions were sent to the German Minister calling for him to continue his efforts to secure Portuguese acquiescence to the German demands. As a result, on two further occasions, Derenthall was to force the reluctant Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs to consult with his colleagues about the possibility of their government reconsidering its position.220 The determination of the German diplomatic effort and the brusque treatment afforded to Portugal were so flagrant as to attract universal notice. Characterizing the situation, The Daily News observed:

The semi-official organs here persist in asserting that no note was received from the German Government demanding permission to land forces at Louren~o Marques. However, they cleverly avoid denying the fact that the Portuguese government was subject to the most persistent and energetic verbal demands of the German minister to this court. In fact, so peremptory were these demands that but for the fortunate termination of the international question in the Transvaal the usual Portuguese policy of procrastination in resolving upon difficult decisions would have been of no avail since Germany was determined to brook no delay and, if necessary, to take matters into her own hands by the landing of troops.221

The reason for Germany's insistence upon the need to take military measures five days after all fighting between the protagonists had ceased is inexplicable in the context of the desire solely to protect the lives and property of German citizens. It does, however, make sense if the Wilhelmstral3e's goal were an imperial one. The landing of troops at Delagoa Bay would, in such circumstances, be an essential preparatory step, the blocking of which was guaranteed to upset all subsequent plans. Therefore, any government determined upon such objectives could never accept a precedent that denied them the necessary right of passage. This, of course, explains the continual Portuguese resistance for, as Derenthall observed, the government in Lisbon was aware that 'without urgent need it would be dangerous for Portugal to create a precedent.' 222 Thus, in making the authorities in Lisbon concede that, 'in the event that the danger to the life and property of German subjects should recur, the Portuguese government will not hesitate to permit the disembarkment and passage of a German detachment. .. ' ,223 the Wilhelmstral3e was doing no more than


securing the right to future imperialist intervention. This interpretation was, of course, vigorously denied by Marschall, whose own account of events, as given to the British ambassador, contained no reference to the pressure that had been applied by the German minister in Lisbon to the Portuguese government. On the contrary, as Lascelles reported, the State Secretary's rendering was somewhat different: 'On the news of Jameson's invasion,' Marschall had told him,

the German consul at Pretoria had asked for a guard for the consulate, and His Excellency [Marschall] had telegraphed to Lisbon for permission for 50 men to pass through Portuguese territory for a purely humanitarian purpose. Even before receiving a reply he had telegraphed to withdraw the request, as Jameson's defeat had removed the danger of disturbances and rendered the presence of a German guard unnecessary.224

Sadly for the credibility of this explanation, the facts, as presented in it, did not tally with events as described in the reports of the British minister to the Portuguese court, a circumstance that caused Lascelles to observe of Marschall that

... [there was] a want of straightforwardness in his language to me about his demand for the passage of German marines through Portuguese territory. It may be possible by the exercise of ingenuity to reconcile his language to me with his action at Lisbon but he certainly gave me a false impression and I am afraid he intended to do so. 225

The Foreign Office clerk, Eyre Crowe, was more blunt. Germany, he told his mother, 'expresses astonishment at our not believing that what she did was done out of pure friendliness to England. The understanding with Portugal as to landing marines at Delagoa Bay they deny altogether. We happen to know for certain that it is true all the same.' 226

Other circumstances were also revealing of Germany's imperialist aspirations. Concomitant to the undertaking of these military preparations, the groundwork was being laid for a German diplomatic offensive against the British position in southern Africa. The objective of this was clear-cut: to isolate Britain, make her vulnerable to external pressure and thereby force her to acknowledge the rights of other interested powers to act in matters related to the Transvaal. However, as was well understood in Berlin, given that there were no other interested powers apart from Germany, British agreement to such rights would have been a climb down tantamount to recognizing the region as a German sphere of interest.


Two methods of achieving these aims were formulated. The first of these was Holstein's so-called 'continental coalition', which he envisaged as a league of all the great powers of the European mainland brought together to chasten Britain and divest her of some of her overseas interests, an action which he believed would have the additional advantage of forcing the weakened Britain to throw in her lot with the Triple Alliance. This scheme, which was reinterpreted to suit the views of those who favoured an interventionist policy in South Africa, failed through diplomatic ineptitude; Holstein framed the proposal in such a way as to make it both transparently in Germany's interest and totally unappealing to the other powers. The basic problem was that, while Germany wanted to weaken Britain in southern Africa, European considerations, particularly the need to maintain British power in the Mediterranean as a counter to Franco-Russian pressure on Austria and Turkey, meant that all consideration of Egyptian questions was ruled out by Germany in advance. Yet, as Her bette explained to Marschall, it was on this issue and this issue alone that France sought cooperation from Berlin. Hence, by excluding the eastern Mediterranean as an area of activity for the continental league, Germany was in effect asking France to join a coalition to 'limit the insatiable appetite of England' but to do so only in those areas, such as the Transvaal, where Germany had interests at stake. Naturally enough, the offer of incurring British enmity for protecting the Reich's imperial aspirations was one that Berthelot, the French foreign minister, felt able to turn down.227

Undeterred by the failure of this plan, Germany's diplomats sought alternative means of securing the support of the other powers for the surreptitious advancement of the Reich's position in the Transvaal. Forewarned by the failure of the plans for a continental league that no backing would be forthcoming for any scheme seen to be gerrymandered to the advantage of Germany, the WilhelmstraBe attempted to organize its next endeavour so that it appeared to be the work of the Transvaal government. To this end, the consul in Pretoria was instructed to suggest to President Kruger that he appeal to the powers to call an international conference to discuss the legal position of his country. 'Germany', Marschall wrote, 'would support such a proposal by the Transvaal [but] the Imperial government does not wish to take the initiative because ... we do not wish to be suspected of pursuing selfish aims.' 228 Yet, regardless of Marschall's attempt at camouflage, there can be little doubt that Germany's objective was a self-serving one, proof for which comes from the very nature of Germany's idea for a European congress.

The international conference has a special place in the diplomatic strategy of the Second Reich. Having been deployed by Bismarck in some of


his most inventive and successful endeavours, it was perceived by a body of opinion in the WilhelmstraBe as the ultimate tool for isolating other powers. Such had been its use in 1878 and 1885 and such was to be its rationale at Alge~iras in 1906.229 In 1896 the reasoning was much the same. In the aftermath of the Jameson raid, an international conference on the status of the Transvaal was bound to amount to an assault on the British position. At the very least, the powers were likely to free the Transvaal of its treaty obligations and secure its neutralization on the model of Belgium or Switzerland. Moreover, should Germany take the lead at this conference, there was no reason to suppose that she would be unable to secure the position of the Republic's guarantor state, with all the implications for domination that this implied. This was why Germany was so eager not to be seen as the originator of the conference idea. For, as Marschall explained, 'Germany will support the proposal for a conference, if first mooted by the Transvaal, but she cannot take the initiative all by herself, for this would make us suspected of pursuing a scheme for a protectorate. ' 230

In the light of all the activity, both diplomatic and military, it is difficult to take at face value the claim, long tendered by the German government, that their only interest in the Transvaal was the preservation of the status quo. Indeed, it becomes tempting to dismiss this as a purely spurious assertion. By any objective standard, the German desire to transport troops to the region and to instigate the calling of an international conference to regulate the rights of the powers there represented a major challenge to the existing order as defined by the convention of 1884. However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that the 'status quo' policy was merely a form of camouflage for wider German aspirations when, in reality, it was an integral and vital component of the scheme for the realization of the Reich's objectives. Its value derived from the fact that then, as now, the concept of 'status quo' was an abstraction that had no clear meaning without an accompanying definition of the conditions to be preserved. As no such definition was ever given, the German claim in effect put the Reich forward as arbiter of this state and thus acted to provide the WilhelmstraBe with almost total freedom of manoeuvre while, at the same time, allowing them to maintain that they were circumscribed in their actions by the wish to prevent change. By insisting upon such status quo credentials, and attempting to get Britain to acknowledge them in writing,231 Marschall was thus able to perform the twin feat of advancing Germany's position while simultaneously maintaining the support of the Boers. It strains the bounds of credulity to believe that this was a coincidence and that German diplomats hit upon this position, with all its atten-


dant advantages, purely by accident. This is especially unlikely given that 'status quo diplomacy' was by no means an unknown device for obtaining gradual realignments in the political system. As Kurt Riezler, a future Wilhelmine official of some distinction, was to observe retrospectively at a later date, the promotion of change under the slogan of maintaining the status quo was, at this time, a well-established tactic mastered by all the great powers.232 It is in this context, therefore, and in this context alone that one should understand Germany's constant reference to the policy of 'status quo.' The reality of this tactic did not go unnoticed by the British. As F. Rutherfoord Harris put it when discussing the German position:

... Baron von Marschall lays down a policy in the Transvaal of maintaining the status quo; and what is this status quo? One by which, with the president's aid, a fence is to be set round the Transvaal and the country exploited by a ring of German monopolists? A status quo by which government tenders are open only to German firms? A status quo by which capital floated at Amsterdam and financed at Berlin is to build state railways closed to British trade, since all trade is to be diverted into German steamers disembarking at Delagoa Bay?233

In this light, it becomes clear that, when one considers its implications and the context in which it operated, the status quo policy was no simple deception but rather an integral part of a wider strategy that included important diplomatic and military components. Consequently, it is apparent that, as both the British government and the anti-Leyds faction in the Boer polity had feared, in the period from 1893 to 1896 Germany was engaged in an active and ambitious policy in southern Africa, the direct objective of which was to increase massively her influence over the Transvaal. The method of this policy was intervention. It was hoped that through a gradual escalation of political participation in the region, Germany would be able to assume an ever greater say in its affairs. Included in these calculations was the possible use of military action. This, too, would doubtless have been introduced in incremental stages. First, marines would have been landed in order to protect the consulate. Then if an incident arose, more soldiers, such as those requested of Governor Wissmann at Dar-es-Salaam, would have been stationed to give security to those troops already there. Such an increase in the military presence, reminiscent of the tactics of imperialism used in China,234 could easily have been carried on until such time as Germany was effectively in control. Since all the evidence suggests that such an outcome was much desired both by the leading figures in the government and by the general public, it


does not seem unreasonable to suggest, given that Germany's diplomacy from 1893 onwards had operated with a view to establishing the credentials by which she was the Transvaal's natural protector, that such intervention was planned. Therefore, it seems clear that, through such diplomatic and military methods, the Reich government was aiming to assume a position of power and influence over the Transvaal to a degree that would have amounted to a form of indirect control indistinguishable from a protectorate.

As a result of this German objective and the actions undertaken to achieve it, the situation at the beginning of 1896 had reached a moment of decision for all the parties involved. Analysing German policy, the British Foreign Office clerk, Eyre Crowe, observed that German diplomatic activities had now created a situation with three possible outcomes:

1. We [Britain] may give in. We may renounce our rights in the Transvaal and allow Germany to step into our place. Or at least we may offer and give binding assurances to Germany that never in the future will we extend our influence to anything beyond what it is today, while Germany is free to extend hers ....

2. Germany may give in. That is to say it must be distinctly understood that England alone has the right to deal with the Transvaal. That will mean a well deserved severe diplomatic defeat for Germany.

3. There may be war. Of that no one could foretell the outcome.235

At this stage, with Anglo-German rivalry in the Transvaal at its height, it was by no means clear which of these paths would be followed.

6 From Crisis to Disengagement, 1896-99

If the hegemony described in the previous chapter was the objective pursued up to 1896 it was not to be the one sought thereafter. At first glance, it seems implausible that after many years of build-up Germany's southern African policy should change abruptly at the very moment when the most daring steps were being taken and when the government's conduct was most subject to popular acclaim. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the Kruger telegram represented the high water mark of German interest in the Transvaal and that thereafter activity declined markedly. As in the case of the diplomatic adjustments that followed the departure of Capri vi in 1894, the cause of this transformation was a shift in the balance of power within the Reich's administrative elite. So far as opinions on South African matters were concerned, this body was composed of two competing factions: those with aspirations in the region and those without. Prior to the Kruger telegram, German policy had largely been determined by those members of the government who favoured intervention and the establishment of Germany as a major factor in the politics of the region. Their strategy was carried to its logical extreme, namely a clash with Britain, because, though opposition to their views existed, it was always too weak to have any effective influence over the direction of policy. However, over the course of 1896 and the early part of 1897, this situation was transformed. During this period, a number of events occurred that gave credence to the outlook of those who opposed an active German role in southern Africa and thereby enabled the proponents of this viewpoint to alter the balance of power within the Reich government in their favour.

Of foremost significance in this regard was the nature of the British response to the Kruger telegram. As Hatzfeldt was to report, when assessing the damage it inflicted upon Anglo-German relations, this one act succeeded by itself, in engendering an unprecedented level of anger and hostility towards Germany. 'Here meanwhile,' he observed,

we have to deal with an entirely altered situation ... .It is not a question of annoyance on the part of the government, but of a deep-seated bitterness of feeling among the public, which has shown itself in every way ... .I have no doubt that the general feeling was such that if the

113


government had lost its head or had for any reason wished for war, it would have had the whole of public opinion behind it 1

Naturally, reports such as this had a profound impact upon the credibility of the interventionist policy that was then being pursued, for, until this moment, not even the leading advocates of a German role in southern Africa had foreseen how extreme would be the consequences of undertaking the actions requisite to the fulfilment of their ambitions. It was thus, only when the Kruger telegram seemed to threaten Germany with the prospect of war that it became apparent that the achievement of German imperial aspirations in southern Africa could only be brought about through armed conflict with Britain. The effect of this revelation, the impact of which was commensurate with the worrying circumstances it appeared to foreshadow, was further compounded by two other, no less disturbing discoveries.

First of all, there was the unexpected and highly unfavourable attitude taken by the other powers. Russia, for instance, whose government, in the person of Prince Lobanov, expressed the belief that England already had a protectorate over the Transvaal, claimed sympathy for Germany's stated aims but was aloof and clearly had no intention of providing the Reich with any assistance. 2 The response of the Tsar was even more unfavourable than that of Lobanov. Though the recipient of a personal letter from the Kaiser inviting him to consider the matter of common action, Nicholas II remained uninterested in the proposal, a fact well illustrated by a conversation recorded by the British diplomat, Edward Goschen. As he observed:

When I was presented to the Emperor the other day he suddenly knocked me all of a heap by asking me what the Queen thought of the Transvaal business. I told H.M. that I didn't know but that I expected that there were things connected with it that must have come upon Her Majesty with rather a shock. He shook his head solemnly and said 'Her eldest grandson!' .... 3

This disinterest, however, was as nothing compared to the shock of the French response. Ever since Bismarck had succeeded in sinking the two countries' differences by finding common ground against England on colonial matters, the belief had existed in the WilhelmstraBe that France could easily be enticed to co-operate with Germany for specific short-term objectives; a conviction that had recently been strengthened by the joint action that led to the withdrawal of the Anglo-Belgian treaty of 12 April

From Crisis to Disengagement 115

1894. In this instance, they were quickly to be disabused of any such notion. Although initially concurring with Germany in the matter of their outrage at the Jameson raid, it quickly became clear from the French press that this quarrel between Britain and Germany was seen by the government in Paris principally as an opportunity to improve France's position against the victor of 1871. As Marschall observed,

not only the independent, but also the official French press, in particular the mouthpiece of the French foreign ministry, 'Le Temps', after a few days of observation took up the task of pointing out that the Transvaal was not sufficient to tum away the attention of France from AlsaceLorraine. The headline of 'Le Temps', which was taken up by the rest of the press, was 'no unnatural alliances' .4

These responses from Paris and St Petersburg to the prospect of an 'Anglo-German duel' clearly necessitated that Germany make an immediate and sharp retreat. For, once it became clear in Berlin that, in a struggle over the Transvaal, the Reich would definitely not receive the support it had expected but, on the contrary, would probably see such assistance go to England, then it was obvious that there had been a serious miscalculation. As the diplomats of the WilhelmstraBe had not anticipated armed conflict, let alone one in which they would have to fight alone, this was an outcome they were eager to avoid, a fact that had a considerable impact upon attitudes towards future policy. Indicative of this is a plea sent to the Auswartiges Amt by ambassador Hatzfeldt in London. As he put it, 'for Heaven's sake no new Kruger telegrams, no threats of colonial troops and, above all, nothing whatever which could bring about a conftict. ... ' 5

Strongly supporting this more conciliatory viewpoint was the sudden realization that the naval situation cast considerable doubts upon the ability of the Reich to wage such a war. That this fact should ever have been open to question is one of the more remarkable features of German southern African policy. Yet, extraordinary though it may seem, up to 1896 little thought had been given by the WilhelmstraBe to the possible effect of British maritime supremacy upon the realization of their aspirations in the Transvaal.6 This lapse, which would have been surprising at the best of times, is rendered particularly inexplicable by the fact that, throughout this period, the British government deliberately instigated a number of naval demonstrations in order to impress upon Germany's diplomats the risks they might incur by further involvement in the affairs of the region. Hence, for example, when the rumour reached London that Germany was to be represented at the opening of the Delagoa Bay railway


by a large force of cruisers, Kimberley was insistent that '[Britain] must take care to send a strong naval squadron ... markedly stronger than the Germans ... [as] we must show the Germans.' 7 Yet, in spite of the fulfilment of his instructions, this warning, like all the others, failed to make its mark. Indeed, it had quite the contrary effect; the only note that Marschall took of British sea power at this time was to assert that it invalidated the British claim that their policy was based upon fear of losing control of the Cape, as the government there, possessing no fleet, could not successfully break away from the Empire.8 However, after the Jameson raid and the formation of the Royal Navy's flying squadron, details of which were sent to Germany by both their London ambassador9

and naval attache, IO it soon became clear, even in Berlin, that maritime strength was of overriding importance to the acquisition of influence in southern Africa. I I This realization was one that consul Herff laboured hard to counter. Commenting on the activities of the Royal Navy, he observed that 'the partial mobilization of English warships could only have the goal of deflecting the world's attention away from the defeat of the English policy of annexing the Transvaa!.'I 2 Though receiving the approbation of the Kaiser, IJ such reports were ultimately ineffective as the importance of sea power was made apparent by a continuous succession of demonstrations on the part of the British government, who from 1897 deliberately maintained a naval force at Delagoa Bay stronger than that of any rival power. I4 Particularly significant in this regard were the events of April of that year. On the tenth of that month news reached Berlin, via Wolff's Bureau, of an article in the Cape Argus that stated that the British had secured possession of Inhaca, a small island occupying a strategic position at the mouth of Delagoa Bay, and were sending the Cape squadron there to take control. Is Though this report turned out to be untrue, a fact that Hatzfeldt was able to confirm the very same evening, I6 it nonetheless managed to send shock waves through the WilhelmstraBe, where it had been assumed for the better part of the day that the British government had presented them with a fait accompli that they could not reverse owing to the Royal Navy's maritime superiority. Consequently, when only twelve days after this rumour, Graf Pfeil sent a telegram from Lourew;o Marques announcing the genuine arrival there of six British warships,l7 the news was received in Berlin with some trepidation for it was now clearly understood that since 'nothing ... can take place without the assent of the power which possesses the command of the sea', IS Germany's position in the region rested on the weakest of foundations. This fact provided considerable force to the arguments of those who opposed an active German role in southern Africa and was much utilized by them in order to press the


need for a change of policy. Commenting on the situation, Hatzfeldt, for instance, was to remark that 'without a strong fleet, which unfortunately we still lack, it would not be materially possible for us to give the Transvaal Republic decisive assistance ... .' 19 Therefore, as he observed in a second letter:

If. .. [Britain] decided on aggressive action, no protest on our part and no dispatch of auxiliary troops from our colony could prevent it from being carried out. The sole result of such steps would be a conflict between England and ourselves, in which we could do absolutely nothing against the English; whereas they could take Heligoland away from us again and perhaps bombard Hamburg. 20

It was an appreciation of this predicament that led the British UnderSecretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Selborne, to observe on 29 April 1897 that, so far as southern Africa was concerned, 'Germany is a broken reed.' 21

The growing awareness, which resulted from these diplomatic and military considerations, of the weaknesses inherent to the German position in southern Africa provided a considerable impetus to the arguments of Hatzfeldt, Holstein and Hohenlohe that German aspirations in the Transvaal and the diplomatic activities that resulted therefrom were both misplaced and dangerous. Consequently, whereas they had previously been subdued and ineffectual in their opposition, in the aftermath of the Kruger telegram they were able to undertake a more concerted effort to extricate Germany from what Holstein termed, 'the South African blind alley'. 22 Their prospects for the success of this undertaking, already increased by the revelations of January 1896, were further enhanced by the fact that, concomitant to the Kruger telegram and the resulting re-evaluation of the implications of the Reich's naval weakness, came the emergence of an All Highest interest in naval expansion. This development, which from its inception in the first half of 1895 was to have major repercussions at all levels of national life, was to prove no less crucial to the development of Germany's southern African policy. This was because, for two important, if somewhat contradictory, reasons, the Emperor was to become convinced that the undertaking of a passive policy in the Transvaal would facilitate the realization of his maritime aspirations.

The primary cause of this conviction was the belief that the abandonment of the Boers in the face of British naval supremacy would lead to an upsurge of anglophobia amongst the German public that could be manipulated to secure support for fleet increases. This tactic, which was to be a


source of contention between the responsible government and the court party in the immediate aftermath of the Kruger telegram,23 and which was to be used successfully during the Boer War, was recognized by Holstein as being, after 1896, an important component in the Kaiser's thinking. Writing to Hatzfeldt a year after the Kruger telegram, he reflected that the Emperor regarded the course of events

as an argument for bringing the German navy up to the strength of the English. This is still the Kaiser's guiding political idea which takes precedence over all others, and it is not impossible that he will be afraid that his plans for the fleet will lose in urgency the moment our relations with England are again somewhat better.24

Another consideration was the contention of Tirpitz that the effective realization of his warship building programme necessitated a quiet and undramatic foreign policy of the kind that produced no inopportune diplomatic crises or naval scares. 25 The reasoning behind this was the conviction, ultimately to be proved erroneous, that such tactful diplomacy would ensure that the British did not become alerted to the danger of the nascent German fleet. 26 Given that such an outcome was central to the admiral's Risikoflotte theory, it is hardly surprising that, from the point of view of the Reichsmarineamt, the very last thing that was needed was further British agitation over German activity in southern Africa, a possibility that could be averted if the WilhelmstraBe abandoned its futile and combative stance on this issue.27

As a consequence of the Kaiser's interest in naval matters, the natural corollary of these maritime perspectives was the development of royal pressure for the revision of German objectives in the Transvaal. Impetus for this also came from two further sources.

The first of these was the Kaiser's new passion for Weltpolitik. This doctrine, which was also much in evidence in support of the argument for building a fleet, was aimed at achieving for the German Empire a new international prestige, and thereby domestic authority, through a mixture of territorial aggrandizement and overt participation in the diplomacy of world affairs. Unfortunately for the continuity of existing policy, such principles were not appropriate to the situation in the Transvaal. As Germany's abortive response to the Jameson raid had shown, conspicuous political action, when focused on events in South Africa, though popular with the German public, was apt to have a detrimental effect on the Reich's international position. Ironically, the self-same incident also demonstrated the viability of using foreign policy initiatives as a means to


quell domestic discontent for, as the government had been quick to observe, the German newspapers were almost universally ecstatic about the Emperor's action. In Saxony, for instance, the Prussian consul was able to report that 'seldom has there been such a great degree of unanimity in public opinion and the pronouncements of the bourgeois party press as in this case.' 28

The lesson of this dichotomous situation was clear. The Reich government could use diplomacy as a means of bolstering its position at home but, if it were to do this without incurring the risk of undesirable complications abroad, it would have to focus its efforts on other less sensitive parts of the globe. Such, at any rate, seems to have been the Kaiser's reasoning when, a bare fortnight after the sending of the Kruger telegram, he announced Germany's accession to 'world empire.' 29 That this assertion was more a declaration of future intent than a statement of reality would have been fully understood. That this pronouncement of world goals implied the abandonment of the Transvaal was less obvious. Nonetheless, it is the case that subsequent to this speech German activity in the region began steadily to diminish. In its place, there emerged in earnest a serious interest in other parts of the globe, particularly China, the Middle East and South America. This was to culminate within three years in, amongst other things, the seizure of Kiaochow and the Kaiser's visit to Baghdad in promotion of the German Anatolian Railway Company. 30 It was in this context that Btilow informed the French ambassador that German interests in the Transvaal had been supplanted by interests in China.31 However, perhaps the closest link between the emergence of Weltpolitik and the abandonment of the Transvaal can be seen in South America. Not only was the Kruger telegram followed by an official memorandum outlining German interests in Central and South America32 but, as the historian of German aspirations in the region, Holger Herwig, has observed, 'by the turn of the century, Venezuela and South Africa strangely became intertwined focal points in Anglo-German affairs' 33 such that, as Britain's involvement in the Transvaal increased, so Germany switched her efforts to the other hemisphere, even to the extent that 'Columbia would instead get the latest Mausers, originally intended for sale to the Boers in South Africa.' 34 Thus, as one can see, with the acquisition of a global perspective, the Transvaal ceased to exercise the predominance it had once held over Germany's external ambitions.

In addition to being weakened by the practical issue of global diplomacy, a number of more personal circumstances also contributed to the undermining of the Kaiser's commitment to his former southern African policy. Foremost amongst these was an extremely unwise comment on the


part of President Kruger to the effect that Wilhelm's obsequious letter of explanation to Queen Victoria disgusted him. 'I have', he is reported as saying, 'a contempt for a man who is afraid of his grandmother.' 35 This remark, which unfortunately came to the Kaiser's attention, could not have been better calculated to poison him against the Transvaal. No less detrimental in this regard than Wilhelm's sudden dislike for President Kruger was his equally sudden anger at Heinrich von Treitschke. This arose as a result of an audacious decision on the part of the professor to use one volume of his German History as a vehicle for airing his criticisms of the Emperor. As a consequence of this action, Treitschke was distanced from imperial favour. A practical demonstration of this fact was made a few months after the Kruger telegram at the historian's funeral. Attendance was slight. According to Treitschke's biographer,

fear of All Highest displeasure may have kept much of official Berlin away. For William II was still resentful of Treitschke's criticisms and contented himself with conveying to the family a message of condolence; he sent no wreath and had no representative attend the funeral service.36

More significant than this act of disrespect was the way in which Treitschke's published condemnation alienated Wilhelm from the professor's views. Treitschke had been one of the foremost advocates of the idea that 'it would only be a natural turn of events if their German kindred should hereafter, in some form or other, undertake the protection of the Teutonic population of South Africa.' 37 In renouncing the man it seems that the Emperor also dissociated himself from these beliefs.

These personal considerations, when taken in conjunction with both the unfavourable international response accorded to Germany's diplomatic initiatives and the realism induced by the re-evaluation of the naval situation, led to a considerable reshaping of the Kaiser's attitude towards the situation in southern Africa. Whereas he had previously been much in favour of active participation in the affairs of the region, he was now inclined to treat the entire issue with considerable coolness, particularly when it came to the matter of openly supporting the Boers in their quarrel with Britain. Naturally, this transformation had the potential to be of the utmost importance to the future direction of Reich policy for, if the Kaiser were serious in his change of heart, then those officials who believed in the necessity of Germany distancing herself from the Transvaal could expect to receive royal support, an eventuality that would significantly strengthen them in their struggle to alter the nature of German policy.


Unfortunately, as was often the case with the rather impulsive and mercurial Wilhelm, this shift in his opinions lacked the appearance of permanence but rather had a changeable quality conducive to the creation of uncertainty.38 Illustrative of this is a frantic letter that was sent by Holstein to Bernhard von Biilow, then ambassador to Italy, in which the former outlined to his colleague the anxiety that was created in Berlin by the lack of steadfastness evident in the Kaiser's approach towards this sensitive region. As he observed:

Ad vocem the Kaiser's foreign policy, I must tell you that at yesterday's court ball he said to the representative of the Transvaal who had come here from Amsterdam: 'You may depend on me. I understand how difficult it is for a person who fights with honourable against dishonourable methods.' I would be surprised if this remark of the Kaiser's will pass unnoticed. I asked Miihlberg who has connections with Blokland to tell him emphatically that to use this remark in the press would be tantamount to disloyalty. I did not know what else could be done.39

Holstein's concern was due to the fact that even in the aftermath of the Kruger telegram and Germany's subsequent enforced retreat from her plans for a continental understanding, the issue of intervention in the Transvaal was still a major source of division within the Auswiirtiges Amt. Ranged against those who advocated a more circumspect policy, there was still to be found a faction ' ... hostile to all British action in South Africa ... .' 40 In this uncertain situation, with two opposing and now evenly matched groups in competition for control of policy, the opinions held by the Kaiser assumed a significance even greater than usual. Consequently, the fact that on this matter his views appeared to be malleable and his mind open to suggestion, ensured that the dispute over the direction of Germany's south African diplomacy hinged in part on the influencing of All Highest opinion. The continuing struggle to determine Reich policy was thus directed accordingly. Indicative of this is a letter written by Hatzfeldt to Holstein, in which the former noted:

I have enthusiastically welcomed your idea of making an attempt here [in London] to reach an understanding over the Transvaal question .... But I cannot conceal from you, dear friend, that my hope of success in this regard is at present very small. I fear above all, as you do, that it will be very difficult if not impossible to obtain His Majesty's agreement to it. The same people who at the time agitated for the


Kruger telegram would undoubtedly raise another howl for war and make the Kaiser believe it was another insult to himself if any sort of action were taken here against the Transvaal.41

This assessment, while underestimating the extent of the volte-face that had occurred in the Kaiser's outlook, nevertheless clearly reveals the nature of the struggle that was taking place in the higher echelons of the Reich government over the issue of southern Africa. For, though the events of January 1896 had strongly crystallized the arguments against the methods and objectives of the policy previously pursued by Germany in the region, the direction of the Reich's future diplomatic effort was still an issue that was being contested.

In the ensuing debate, a development of the utmost importance was the realization among the majority of the officials in Berlin that the affinity for all things German that was portrayed by the Reich's consuls42

in South Africa and the nation's colonial enthusiasts at home as being at the heart of Boer aspirations was in fact a considerable misrepresentation of the actuality. This discovery was largely prompted by the general reappraisal that followed the events of January 1896. For, though not piqued, like their master, by the comments of Kruger and Treitschke, the country's diplomats had, nonetheless, been as alarmed as he by the unforeseen consequences of German policy. Particularly important in bringing about this awareness was the poor reception accorded to the German White Book on South African affairs. This collection of official documents, which had been compiled, with considerable care and a great deal of editing,43 in an effort to show that Germany had acted strictly within her rights and, in so doing, had never infringed upon English interests, was, nonetheless, received with some scepticism by the British press. Writing to Berlin on 13 February, Hatzfeldt, at whose request all references to the suzerainty question had been excluded from the publication,44 recorded the mixed reception of the London newspapers and the outright hostility of both The Times and the Globe, the latter of which even went as far as publish its comments under the title 'the plot revealed.' 45 In the face of this unexpected hostility, Germany's diplomats began to reappraise the situation and search for other obstacles that might similarly have been overlooked. It was while undertaking this task that they became aware that any attempt to establish a German protectorate over the Transvaal would face the opposition not only of the British but of the Boers as well. Prior to this moment, it had generally been assumed that the Boers were neither aware of nor hostile to German desires. Writing to Berlin on 6 January 1896, Herff observed that 'there is no


suspicion of Germany amongst the Boers', a statement that elicited from the Emperor the comment 'just what I have thought and said these last few days - so I was right. ' 46 In holding this belief the Kaiser was supported by the example of President Burgers, who in 1875 had been interested in the possibility of concluding a protective alliance with Germany.47

Unfortunately, what had been true then was no longer valid in the 1890s. For one thing, the experience of 1875 had, in itself, been responsible for altering the Boer perception of Germany. As Graf Pfeil reported: 'in the Transvaal... there exists a strong mistrust of Germany's readiness to help owing to the fact that in 1875 a request for aid had been rejected by Berlin. ' 48 Secondly, subsequent circumstances, in particular the war of 1881, had conspired to ensure that the views of the Boer leadership on the issue of dependency had changed significantly. Kruger, for instance, though proud of his German ancestry,49 had but one objective and that was to recover for his Republic the untrammelled independence that it had enjoyed before the British annexation of 1877. In pursuit of this objective there was considerable advantage to be gained from finding a country that could counterpoise the regional power and influence exerted by Great Britain. First choice for Dr Leyds would have been the Netherlands. 5° Not only was it the country of his birth but it was also a state that harboured no political ambitions in southern Africa. Sadly, it was also the case that not even by the wildest stretch of the imagination could it be construed as a power equal to the task of balancing the British. In contrast to this, there was no doubt as to Germany's suitability for the role and consequently, it was to this country that the Kruger government turned for support, offering as the inducement for its advancement an assortment of valuable commercial advantages. Such political backing, however, was all that Kruger sought from Berlin. It was certainly never his intention to neutralize the threat of British imperialism only to be faced instead by that of Germany. Indeed, his antipathy to the idea of German rule was so pronounced that he is reported to have said that, if forced to make a choice, he would prefer a British dominion to a German one.51 Yet, so long as the German government remained content with the economic concessions it had been offered, there was no need for Kruger to allow his preferences to interfere with policy.

Unfortunately, German actions, particularly the military requests made at the time of the Kruger telegram, ensured that it was impossible for the Boers to harbour any illusions concerning the colonial aspirations of the WilhelmstraBe. This forced the government of the Transvaal to act. Permission was refused to the proposal that German marines come ashore


to guard the consulate and instead fifty burghers were assigned to protect the building, thereby underlining the Boer commitment to independence. 52

In addition to this, efforts were made to clarify the Boer position regarding the Kaiser's telegram. Much has been written about Kruger's response to this document, some accounts claiming that it 'raised hopes in the breast of the President' ,53 others that he 'had few illusions about [its] worth.' 54

The sad fact is that, as this disparity indicates, no conclusive evidence exists one way or the other. Certainly, little can be deduced of the President's true feelings from his official reply for, being in no position to snub the Kaiser, Kruger did no more than he had to in sending him a message of gratitude. 55 Under the circumstances, he could do no less.

In spite of this lack of information, it can be stated with absolute confidence that Kruger did read the Kaiser's communication, that he was as capable as the British and German press of understanding the selfinterested character of the Emperor's aspirations and that, if unable for diplomatic reasons of giving an honest response, he could at least get someone else to do this for him. It is interesting, therefore, to observe that on 14 January, eleven days after the publication of the telegram, Jan Hofmeyer, leader of the Afrikaner Bond and a former associate of the President, to whom he had sent a congratulatory message of his own, published in the Cape Times a bitter attack on the Kaiser's actions.56 It has been suggested that in performing this deed Hofmeyer might have been working at Kruger's behestY This seems unlikely. Not only was Hofmeyer a man more than capable of acting on his own initiative but, in addition, his past relationship with Kruger had been rendered somewhat fraught by their taking diametrically opposite positions on the question of racial co-operation.

The debate on this issue was by no means new. Since the days of the Great Trek and the establishment of separate Boer republics, a bitter antagonism had come into being throughout southern Africa between the settlers of English and those of Dutch descent. Fuelled intermittently by events such as the annexation of 1877 and the Battle of Majuba Hill, these sentiments had the capacity to manifest themselves as a force of tremendous political power. However, it was also evident that, with the passage of time, economic and trading pressures were acting to erode their potency. This brought about a division in Afrikaner opinion. On one side were those, like Hofmeyer and the Cape Bondsmen, who, in the interests of both progress and affluence, were prepared to espouse racial cooperation, loyalty to the British crown and economic partnership between the colonies and the republics. On the other side were those, like Kruger and the Transvaal burghers, who were distrustful of the 'imperial factor',


suspicious of ties with the English and who were therefore inclined to use the resources at their disposal, considerable in the case of the Transvaal, to obstruct a customs union and a concerted railway policy.58 The effect of this difference in perception was that Kruger and Hofmeyer found themselves much at odds over economic policy and the disagreements this caused led to genuine friction between the two parties. Indeed, so much was this the case that at one stage Kruger went so far as publicly to call Hofmeyer a traitor. 59 However, in the light of the Jameson raid, these differences simply evaporated, for the Bondsmen, as Afrikaners, were not prepared to countenance a violent attack upon the self-chosen political independence of their brothers in the Transvaal. As a consequence, in reaction to Jameson's filibuster, there arose a new wave of Afrikaner nationalism that saw as its political manifestation a closing of ranks among Afrikaners.60 As John X. Merriman observed, the raid 'united all sections of the Dutch-speaking community in determined opposition to what they consider, with some justice, as a treacherous plot aimed at their nationality and undertaken with the object of stamping out their existence as a separate factor in South Africa.' 61

It was at this moment, in the environment of a situation in which political divisions were once again drawn firmly along racial lines, that Hofmeyer delivered his attack upon the Kaiser. Consequently, whether or not this letter was inspired by Kruger is a matter of little concern. Hofmeyer, as Smuts observed, was the 'undisputed leader of the Dutch Afrikander people' 62 and spoke for a large body of Cape Dutch opinion. Though he may not have had the direct sanction of Kruger for his publication, it is clear that at this time their views would have coincided closely, a circumstance that can be demonstrated by the fact that one month after the release of Hofmeyer' s denunciation of German interference, there appeared an official letter of Kruger's stating categorically that the Transvaal's aim was full independence and that, in return for Britain superseding the London Convention by a treaty of commerce and friendship, he was prepared to safeguard British interests by guaranteeing that the Republic would never seek the protection of a foreign power. Therefore, if, as seems probable, there was no connivance between Hofmeyer and Kruger over the 14 January publication, this may only have been because such concerted action was entirely unnecessary.

In any event, the point was made. From the evidence it seems clear that the Boer message got through to the Wilhe1mstraBe, for following the events of January 1896 a new perspective entered the outlook of the Auswartiges Amt. All ideas about kinship were dispelled from official thinking to be replaced by the realization of Boer hostility to Germany's


imperial aspirations. Naturally enough, spearheading the recognition of this fact were those diplomats who had always been hostile to the government's interventionist policy in South Africa. Writing to the Kaiser, Hohenlohe, for instance, observed of Dr Leyds that

he dislikes a German protectorate no less than a British one ... .It must be assumed, therefore, that Dr Leyds' principal object is to gain out of the present political situation advantages for the Transvaal. .. without considering whether the result may be a war between England and Germany.63

A similar opinion was held by Holstein who made strong expression in his correspondence of the belief that 'we can't burden ourselves with the luxury of England's antipathy simply for the sake of the Boers, who like all Dutchmen are full of mistrustful antagonism towards Germany.' 64

This reassessment of the Boer outlook had important consequences. Not only did it act as a further source of substantiation for the argument that the interventionist policy previously pursued had been based upon mistaken assumptions, but also and more importantly, it served to cast doubt upon the idea that German activity in the region could ever reap the Reich imperial benefits. For against the opposition of both the British and the Boers there was little prospect for the establishment of a German presence. As Holstein summed up, 'I am fed up with the whole of South Africa because we have nothing to gain there under any circumstances. ' 65

This belief was reinforced by news from London, where Hatzfeldt had been busy attempting to assess the outlook for southern Africa as it was perceived by the numerous contacts in his English social circle. The result was a large body of opinion that maintained, with absolute conviction, that some form of Anglo-Boer showdown was inevitable, that it would lead to a military confrontation and that, in such an event, 'England would not under any circumstances tolerate the interference of an outside power. ' 66

This report of English intentions, in conjunction with new awareness of Boer views, led to the final resolution of the internal conflict in the German government over South African policy. On 22 April 1897, Hatzfeldt wrote to Berlin to suggest that

it may not appear unjustified to ask if it might not be worth an effort to ascertain, before the crisis in South Africa becomes acute, whether an understanding with England is not possible, whereby at least we may obtain suitable compensation for what cannot be saved.67


To this opinion the Emperor ascribed the marginal comment 'perfectly correct, I agree.' 68

That the beliefs of the Kaiser and the majority of his officials did not lead to an immediate change in German policy was largely due to the convictions of Baron von Marschall. As has previously been stated, of all the diplomats in the WilhelmstraBe, he was the most strongly committed to realizing German aspirations in the Transvaal. Consequently, the reverses suffered by German policy at the time of the Kruger telegram had only a momentary impact upon him. Initially, of course, he was as disheartened as the rest by the failure of the diplomatic strategy with which he was so closely associated. As Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin observed:

Nothing could have been more amiable than Marschall's language to me this morning, or more diametrically opposite in tone to his conversation of last week. I think he has really been taken aback by the outburst of popular feeling in England, and perhaps he has discovered that the other powers in Europe are not prepared to join him in making war upon England on account of so called German interest in the Transvaal. ... 69

This cautious reserve proved short-lived. Only a week later, Marschall wrote to Radolin that 'in the last few days ... they have come to the conclusion in Paris that they should have sent French squadrons against England.' 70 This unrealistic assessment heralded the revival of his incorrigible views and very soon thereafter Marschall reaffirmed his commitment to an active South African policy by refusing to participate in the realignment of Germany's diplomatic stance as proposed by Hatzfeldt and Holstein. Though claiming to agree in principle with their views/1 the reality proved quite different. This is well illustrated by a conversation that took place between Marschall and George Curzon, the British UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, during the latter's visit to Berlin in April 1897. According to Marschall's record of the meeting, Curzon informed him of Britain's wish 'to deal in a friendly way with all existing questions on colonial matters.' All that was required, he implied, was an accommodation over the Transvaal. None was forthcoming. Marschall's reply, in line with his previous statements, emphasized that the Transvaal was 'fully independent' and that Germany had to protect 'important commercial and material interests'. 72 In the face of this attitude, the discussion was unable to make any progress.


Holstein's reaction to this discussion is informative. In the first instance, he approved. Marschall, he believed, was right to respond negatively at this stage rather than attempt to rush into an accommodation between England and Germany.73 When, it became clear, however, that Marschall's response was not part of a diplomatic strategem but actually reflected his intentions, Holstein changed his views entirely. As he subsequently observed with considerable annoyance:

I cannot get away from a sense of spiteful displeasure arising from Marschall's discussion with Curzon. Curzon had said that England would be willing to discuss all colonial questions with us. What can one reply to that? Different nuances are conceivable but Marschall's reply was only a rewriting of the Kruger Telegram and the instructions that followed. 74

Given that Marschall was the Foreign Secretary, the significance of his intransigence cannot be doubted.75 Consequently, it was only with his dismissal in June 1897, an event mirrored shortly thereafter by comparable changes to the representation at Lisbon, Louren~o Marques and Pretoria, 76

that the opportunity was created for the refocusing of Germany's South African policy. As Marschall's replacement, Bernhard von Biilow, shared few of his predecessor's perceptions on the matter, this was begun immediately. Writing in his memoirs, Billow observed:

it has often been stated in defence of our pro-Boer enthusiasts that the Boers, being Dutchmen, were really Germans. True, the Dutch are an excellent people with a glorious history. But they separated themselves voluntarily from the German Empire centuries ago and have always opposed any economic, political and particularly any military union with Germany, for which, from their own point of view, they cannot be blamed in the least. The Boers in particular were not at all friendly towards us Germans. 77

Guided by this belief and by the ideology of Weltpolitik, Billow could see little purpose in sustaining a futile and possibly dangerous anti-British policy in the Transvaal. Certainly, he had no intention of repeating Marschall's mistake of allowing Germany's South African activities to make possible a rapprochement between Britain and France. As he reminded the Prussian consuls during the Boer War, when the Reich's neutrality was making the government unpopular, in the past, intervention by Germany had merely led to situation in which 'in January 1896 the


French ambassador Baron Courcel told Lord Salisbury "France has only one enemy, that is Germany. England can frame her policy accordingly."'78 Yet, while determined as a consequence to maintain a prudent level of caution, he was still ambitious enough to be loath to give up German claims without extracting some price for so doing. Consequently, he was much drawn to the view, advocated by Hatzfeldt and Holstein and disregarded for so long by Marschall, that 'the only thing that would be left for us to do if we did not wish to get engaged in a senseless conflict would be to broach the question of compensation and to apply the necessary pressure for that' 79 and, therefore, the employment of such coercive techniques to this end became the basis of policy during the Biilow foreign secretaryship. As he himself recorded: 'Seeing that... we were isolated against England in protecting German interests in South Africa, the only course left was to reach an understanding direct with England on the South African question.' 80

An opportunity for putting this policy into practice came in the summer of 1898, when the WilhelmstraBe became aware of new Anglo-Portuguese negotiations on the subject of the latter country receiving a loan, the guarantee for which would be provided by her colonial revenues. Suspicion of British designs for the unilateral acquisition of Portugal's African possessions was a matter of long standing in the Auswiirtiges Amt, whose diplomats kept a close, one might say paranoid, watch on the territories in question. Since the winter of 1897 their attention had been especially assiduous. For, in December of that year, Hatzfeldt had reported the efforts of a British firm, Ochs Brothers and Company, to lease the harbour and railway at Delagoa Bay,81 a prospect thought likely to appeal to the Portuguese government by virtue of the annual rental income that they would receive.82 This idea never came to fruition but in March German fears of a new scheme were raised by an apparent and inexplicable change in the attitude of Britain's representatives in Lisbon. As Wangenheim, a leading diplomat in the German mission, recorded:

... recently the men of the British consulate in conversations about Portugal have shown notable goodwill towards this country. Whereas Sir Hugh [MacDonnell] always used to speak of the sale of colonies as the only means of Portugal's salvation, he now delivers the saying 'Portugal is a venerable colonial empire in whose preservation England has the greatest interest. ' 83

Forewarned of this change of tack, Germany's diplomats were prepared when, on 6 June, Tattenbach telegraphed from Lisbon that loan


negotiatiOns were in progress. Consequently, action was taken immediately. On 21 June, the German minister in Lisbon turned up at the Portuguese court in full uniform to deliver the message that Germany 'could not continue on amicable terms with Portugal if the negotiations now being carried on by the Marquis de Soveral in London were pursued without due regard to the legitimate interests of Germany in her African colonies.' 84 Given that Portugal was in arrears on her German loans, the Reich government was acting within its right in expressing an interest in a financial transaction that was liable to have an effect upon her position as a creditor nation. Equally, however, the nature and language of the German intervention made it abundantly clear that such monetary matters were not at the heart of the WilhelmstraBe's action. Rather, they were looking for an opportunity to press their claim for an agreement with Britain that would allow them to extricate themselves from South Africa with some profit. By becoming party to an accord offering Portugal a loan on the security of her colonies such a possibility existed for, were Portugal to default, these territories would fall to her creditors. 85

Consequently, Portugal's penury had long been the subject of the WilhelmstraBe's attention and as recently as 8 June Holstein had observed that 'when the pawning of Portuguese territory comes about, then His Majesty will become excited and want something.' 86 Therefore, the German Foreign Office was greatly interested in the discussions taking place between Britain and Portugal and sought not only to become involved, but, in addition, to reach an advantageous agreement with Britain concerning the future division of the spoils. German abandonment of the Transvaal, it was hoped, would be sufficient inducement to ensure Britain's co-operation.

The new tenor of German policy was made more than apparent to the British government in the negotiations that followed. As Salisbury drily observed of the German position, 'they are not content to wait for events to give them their share of Portuguese territory but wish to force the pace of destiny.' 87 In this task, he was by no means mindful of helping them, a view that was shared by several Foreign Office officials. Eyre Crowe, for instance, recorded both his outright opposition and the general sentiment of his colleagues when he stated to his mother that

the proposed transaction is the dirtiest and meanest, resembling the partitions of Poland ... and here everyone is deeply ashamed .. .I can hardly speak and certainly cannot think with patience of the whole shabby concern. There must be a day of reckoning some time.88


However, notwithstanding such views, it was much desired by Chamberlain and Milner that the Transvaal be isolated from European aid. Although, as Balfour observed: 'That [Germany] would ever have actively supported the Transvaal is, indeed, more than doubtful' ,89 it was, nonetheless, preferable to be certain in this regard, a fact of which German diplomats took full advantage by stressing the connection between the future of the Portuguese colonies and Germany's attitude to subsequent developments in South Africa. Recording a conversation he had had with the German ambassador, Balfour noted:

I pressed Hatzfeldt as to what advantage he thought we were obtaining as a make-weight to those which Germany acquired by the proposed agreement. His reply, in effect, was that this arrangement would be a public advertisement to the Transvaal government that they had nothing more to hope for from Germany, or indeed, from any other European power, by which our task in South Africa would be greatly lightened.90

As a result of this argument, the negotiations were brought to fruition. Their outcome was the Anglo-German convention of 30 August 1898. By the terms of this agreement, Germany agreed to 'abstain from advancing any claim of whatsoever kind to the possession, occupation, control, or exercise of political influence' 91 in Portuguese East Africa south of the Zambezi, thus satisfying Milner that the agreement 'does formally and forever eliminate Germany as a political influence in the Transvaal and the countries surrounding it' ,92 and in return Britain acknowledged German pre-emptive rights in Portugal's other colonies.

Not content solely with future gains, Germany also sought to use events in South Africa as a lever for extracting concessions in the Pacific. In order to pacify British opinion this was done in secret. As Btilow observed:

... In view of the ever increasing pressure of the Transvaal crisis, we must not let it appear as though we desire to exploit for ourselves the difficulties of the British, whether actual or presumed. As a matter of fact, however, we should be blamed for lack of diplomatic skill, if we did not now obtain a settlement of several of the questions outstanding between ourselves and England- especially that of Samoa!93

The outcome of these efforts was the Samoan agreement of 14 November 1899 and Britain's acquiescence to the German purchase of Spain's


Pacific island territories. In point of fact, however, in contrast to the convention over the Portuguese colonies, neither of these agreements was actually secured as a result of the tension in Anglo-Boer relations. As Paul Kennedy has conclusively demonstrated, Britain's Pacific Ocean policy at this time was determined exclusively by naval considerations and by a new admiralty memorandum that, while dismissing the strategic value of Samoa, emphasized instead the significance of the Tonga group.94

Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that this was not the perception of the German policy makers in Berlin. As Salisbury observed, 'Samoa and the Transvaal are not wholly disconnected, at least in the mind of the German Emperor.' 95 Consequently, German diplomacy on this issue was dictated by the assumption that there existed such a connection, a circumstance that can be demonstrated by their attempts to use Cecil Rhodes as an intermediary96 and by the nigh universal belief amongst the officials at the German foreign office that 'without the Boers [the Samoan agreement] would not have come off.'97

By virtue of the conclusion of these treaties it might be said of Biilow's South African policy that, in contrast to the line pursued by his predecessor, it was brought to a successful resolution. Moreover, there was a certain optimism that this heralded 'the inauguration of a common colonial policy.' 98 After all, concurrence in one matter was surely a good basis for agreement in others. As if to prove this, within six months of the signing of the Anglo-German convention Rhodes came to Berlin. Though, as The Times noted, 'no persona grata to Germans as the author of the Jameson raid' ,99 his visit still led to an audience with the Kaiser and the conclusion of an understanding about the passage of telegraph and railway lines through German East Africa. As Hatzfeldt was happy to be able to report this was seen by the British press as 'the beginning of a new era for the relations between Germany and Great Britain.' 100 However, in spite of such examples, it is hard to label Biilow's policy an unqualified success, especially when consideration is given to the unequal nature of the benefits that these Anglo-German conventions bestowed upon their respective signatories.

For Germany, the material rewards were somewhat scant. As a consequence of the Samoan agreement, the Reich found itself in possession of Savaii and Upolu, two islands that if strategically and economically worthless were nonetheless of symbolic significance to the German public owing to the earlier death there of a number of the nation's marines. This, however, was the total extent of the German gains for the Portuguese pact remained stubbornly inoperative in spite of the fact that, as Bi.ilow put it,


'we aim at total implementation of the treaty.' 101 The reasons for this were twofold. First of all, it was the case that the British, who it had been assumed would trigger a partition by seizing control of Delagoa Bay on the first sign of hostilities with the Transvaal, failed to act as expected. Secondly, and in a similar vein, dealings with the Portuguese proved no more successful. Ten thousand marks had been sent to the Minister in Lisbon to be used as a means of orchestrating a campaign in the Portuguese press promoting the idea of colonial withdrawal as a method of restoring the nation's solvency. 102 However, the effect of this measure was greatly diminished by a sudden and unexpected improvement in the government's finances and as a result, German efforts to force a loan on the country were rebuffed. Taken together, this British inactivity and Portuguese avoidance of bankruptcy ensured that as late as 1914 negotiations were still continuing over a revision of this treaty.

By comparison, the British government, which had never regarded the conventions as 'the inauguration of a common colonial policy' 103 but rather as a form of 'undisguised blackmail' by which Germany extracted concessions as the price of merely refraining from active opposition, found, much to its surprise, that during the Boer war German adherence to the agreements worked much to their advantage. For, as a result of this arrangement and in accordance with Btilow's policy of a 'free hand', it was his view that while Germany had 'no interest in the complete crushing of the Boers and Afrikanders, ... so far as I am able to see the matter, I believe it would be most appropriate if, in the conflict between Britain and the Transvaal, we took an attitude of complete neutrality and calm.' 104

Consequently, on this occasion, in contrast to the period of Marschall's tenure of office, no gestures were made in support of the Boers. Indeed, the opposite was the case. As Dr Leyds was to complain, British orders for munitions and foodstuffs were executed by German companies and sanctioned by the government on the grounds that 'business is business.' 105 In addition, the Kaiser refused to grant an audience to Kruger106 or to act in any way as an intercessor between Britain and the Transvaal. As he informed the Prince of Wales after receipt of a request from the Boers for 'friendly mediation':

I have ordered the Foreign Office to send the following answer: the main point in question of friendly mediation is whether both antagonists are willing to refer to it; this point once fully cleared up, my government would of course be happy to lend a hand in bringing about a peaceful issue. In order to find out whether H. Br. M. government


would at this moment be in the mood to accept mediation my government suggests that the Republics would do well to refer directly to London or to a third power not directly, vitally interested in South Africa. Germany being interested, any action in the above mentioned affair could create suspicion in England and the impression that my government was prompted by other than purely humanitarian motives which instead of serving the cause of peace would only jeopardize it. 107

This utterly disingenuous answer was but one of many examples of the diplomatic support that Germany gave to Britain. Other instances include the blocking of a Russian mediation proposal through the demand that, as a prelude to any joint action, Russia, France and Germany 'should guarantee each other their territorial possessions in Europe for many years ahead'; 108 and the Kaiser's official visit to England in 1899, an action which, it was universally acknowledged, served as a public indication of the fact that, if there were a European coalition in favour of the Boers, Germany would not be party to it.

If the politicians in Whitehall thus did Germany an injustice in their hostile attitude towards the treaties that were to serve them so well, they were no less unfair in regarding German diplomacy as 'blackmail' for, whereas the British government was to avoid all the undesirable aspects of the 30 August convention by ensuring that its provisions regarding the Portuguese colonies never came into effect, the WilhelmstraBe was to discover that its obligations were both inescapable and highly unpalatable to the German people.

The reason for the latter fact was straightforward. After 1894, largely owing to the Reich government's prominent and open involvement in the affairs of southern Africa, the German public's interest in the region developed significantly, growing in magnitude as their country's position hardened and as its expressions of policy and intent increased in boldness. With the despatch of the Kruger telegram, these passions reach a fever pitch. The press carried numerous articles on the matter of a character and stridency typified by the comment in the Vossische Zeitung recording that 'the people of Pretoria reckon on German help against the possibility of an aggressive policy on the part of England, and they are not mistaken.' 109

Similarly, the intense imperialistic feelings engendered by the government found an echo in the outlook of the 'patriotic societies', many of which conveyed resolutions of support to the Kaiser and from thenceforth made the absorption of the Transvaal Boers into the ethnic German Volk a part of their programme. 11 0


The nature of the emotions they had unleashed was a fact well known to the Reich authorities. As Btilow observed, 'the German public looked at the whole situation not with its head but with its heart and the German heart burned for the poor Boers.' 111 With official policy and public opinion running in parallel such a situation was much to the government's advantage. However, given the intensity of these public passions, it was apparent to the Kaiser's ministers that, though they may have engendered these feelings, it was not within their power to extinguish them. 112 This was especially true when it came to the activities of the pressure groups, bodies which long experience had shown were more than prepared to enter into open conflict with the government over the patriotic causes they espoused.

It was against this background that Btilow instigated and brought to fruition Germany's disengagement from the Transvaal. In so doing, there can be no doubt that he was flying in the face of public opinion and that, in thereby incurring the risk of popular displeasure, he was making a genuine concession to Britain. As he himself observed,

in giving England a free hand with regard to Delagoa Bay and its hinterland, we take a step which will stir up in the entire German nation a feeling of painful disappointment, because with the passage of years the Boers have become the object of a sentimental sympathy which, as in all cases of sympathy, cannot be combated on grounds of logic. 1 13

The true extent of this, however, was only to become clear during the Boer War when Biilow and the Kaiser had to endure the humiliating spectacle of seeing Kruger feted by the German people while they were heavily criticised for their refusal to honour him with an official reception. 114

Thus, it can be seen that in the aftermath of the Kruger telegram crisis the attitude of the German government, if not that of the German public, underwent a considerable readjustment in regard to the matter of the objectives to be pursued in southern Africa. In the face of a more realistic and considered approach to the problems inherent in taking a dogmatic and doctrinaire view of a land and people separated from the Reich by considerable obstacles of mentality, geography and naval might, it became clear that former policy objectives were not only unattainable but dangerous. Owing to the upheaval in the administrative elite that saw the dismissal of Marschall in favour of the new ascendancy of Biilow, Tirpitz and Miquel, the only focus of resistance to a change of policy was swept away. Consequently, this altered perception was able to lead to the inauguration of a new diplomatic stance over the issue of the Transvaal. This


was manifested in a number of treaties whereby all claims to influence in the region, claims that it was realized were futile, were bartered away for a different set of rights which, if no less worthless, had the advantage of appearing to have potential.

7 Epilogue

German South African policy in the period up to the Boer War can thus be seen as being comprised of three distinct stages. Initially based upon the principle, inherited from Bismarck, of complete disinterest, it was first transformed by colonial aspirations into a form of active interventionism and then reduced by crisis into a quest for advantageous disengagement. Each of these policy shifts was associated with a particular individual and consequently, it is apparent that, while the course of this development was determined by a variety of factors, foremost amongst these was the composition and internal power structure of the Imperial government. Put simply, successive ministers sought to shape German South African policy according to their own particular perception of the Reich's interests. This was especially important because, as the example of Marschall makes abundantly clear, this individualism, even when it was set in opposition to mainstream opinion in the WilhelmstraBe, could have a most substantial impact on the character of German diplomacy. No less important, however, were the various stimuli that moulded attitudes towards South Africa. These were by no means simple or consistent but it might be suggested by way of a generalization for the period 1893-99 that a central component in their formation was reaction to past experience. That is to say that the active colonial policy of Marschall bore no relation to the mainstream precedents of the Bismarckian and Caprivian periods because it was an intentional abnegation of them. Similarly, the more accommodating attitude of Btilow was drawn from the experience of his predecessor, insofar as the new foreign secretary had no desire to repeat the mistakes that made 1893-96 a time of antagonism and incident. Consequently, it is clear that the disjointed nature of German South African policy was inherent to the way it was developed. In this sense, while German activity in the region was unprecedented in its scope and dynamism, it fits well into the pattern of Wilhelmine government.

German South African policy in the period after the Boer War, however, was moulded by entirely different principles. Most apparent of these was the pressure of public opinion. Throughout the course of the conflict this had been largely ignored as popular aspirations, shaped as they were by sympathy for the Afrikaner cause, were entirely at variance with the disinterested diplomatic posture dictated by the country's treaty obligations. Peace, however, in presenting as it did a fait accompli in the

137


situation in South Africa, transformed the nature of German colonial politics. Just as the outbreak of the Boer war had captured the hearts and minds of the German people, so the anticlimax of the British victory sapped away the basis of popular enthusiasm and led to an alteration in the public's attitude that enabled it to fit in more harmoniously with the official position. As a consequence of this, the focus of colonial politics on the matter of the territories adjoining southern Africa was redirected away from its concentration on events in the Boer Republics and towards the issue of internal development. The impetus for this shift in thinking was further boosted when, in 1906, with the Maji-Maji rising and the Herero revolt, both the East African and South-West African colonies were subject to major internal upheavals. These rebellions, which were a prominent issue in the 1907 Reichstag elections, made it apparent that fundamental flaws existed in Germany's administration of her overseas possessions. This led to the realization that change was necessary and, as a result, reform came to the forefront of the political agenda. This was to crystallize in the elevation of the colonial section of the Foreign Office into an independent department, the establishment of a Colonial Institute and the appointment of new governors. 1 More significant than the fact of change was the process by which it was carried out. As can be seen in the example of Walther Rathenau's information gathering trips, these undertakings were permeated with a new dedication to professionalism.2

Yet, if the political abandonment of the Transvaal appears to have led to an enhanced emphasis on the internal affairs of Germany's existing southern African colonies, it should be noted that, owing to the deterioration of the power political situation in Europe, this shift did not diminish the Army high command's interest in the military potential of the Boers. Indeed, aware that their colonies were vulnerable to conquest in the event of a European war, the country's generals sought to devise an overseas military policy that would tie down as many enemy troops outside the main theatre of operations for as long as possible. To this end, Moltke believed that 'attempts must be made to instigate an uprising in India, if England takes a stand as our opponent. The same thing should be attempted in Egypt; also in the Dominion of South Africa.' 3

The outbreak of war in 1914 saw this policy put into effect. As the German government had predicted, though South Africa was theoretically committed to belligerent status by the actions of the British monarch, in reality there was considerable opposition in the Afrikaner community to the idea of taking Britain's part in the conflict. For a start, there were many who believed that the hostilities were no concern of the Union. For such people, the idea of undertaking offensive action on behalf of their former

Epilogue 139

conquerors against the territory of a hitherto friendly neighbour was an absurdity. At the other extreme, there were those who regarded 'England's adversity as the Afrikaner's opportunity' and who thought that the outbreak of war was the perfect moment to seek to restore the independence of the two former Republics. 4

The existence of such a wide body of dissent, so pervasive that it even included four members of the cabinet, provided an ideal basis for German exploitation. This was facilitated by the fact that over the previous few years, personal contacts had been forged between the Germans and some of the leading hardline Afrikaners. General Beyers, for instance, who was the commander of the Union Defence Force, had been to Europe in 1913 and had taken the opportunity while there to meet with the Kaiser.5 The value of this and other such contacts was to become apparent the moment war broke out. Almost immediately, a meeting was organized between Seitz, the governor of German South-West Africa, and General Christian de Wet, a Boer nationalist who had close ties with Beyers. The outcome of this interview was de Wet's decision, taken with Beyers' blessing, to stir the Free State to rebellion.6

Other hardliners quickly followed suit for de Wet and Beyers were not the only Afrikaners with whom the German authorities had engaged in dealings. Seitz, eager to destabilize the Union in an effort to keep its forces busy within its own borders, had also negotiated a treaty with S. G. Maritz, commander of the Cape military district on the frontier near Upington, by which he committed Germany to guarantee the independence of South Africa after the war. Maritz, in return, went over to the Germans with a detachment of his troops. 7

Other activities were also undertaken to gain the active support of the Afrikaners. First of all, a proclamation was issued announcing Germany's friendly intentions towards 'the Boer people of South Africa' .8 Following this, in an attempt to pit racial solidarity against power politics, von Heydebreck, the German military commander, mobilized the Afrikaner community in South-West Africa into a Vrij Korps and placed it under the command of the prominent burgher, Andries de Wet.9 Not only was it hoped that the idea of an autonomous Boer military force would lure many Afrikaners to fight for the German side but, in addition, there was the possibility that the prospect of a conflict that set Boer against Boer would deter many Afrikaners from carrying arms for the Union. Given that approximately 7 000 Free Staters and 3 000 Transvaalers rebelled against the government's decision to wage war against Germany, it would seem that this was a highly accurate assessment of the situation. 10


Nonetheless, in spite of such impressive numbers, the rebellion itself was short lived. This was in part the fault of the German authorities in South-West Africa. Though adept at intrigue, they were unprepared for war and consequently, were in no position to supply the rebels with more than the most limited assistance. Moreover, such help as they could provide was further restricted by the fact that von Heydebreck did not trust Maritz. As a result, both the rebellion and German control of their colony was to be extinguished within only a few months. Subsequent attempts to use the racial antagonism between the Boers and the British to effect an improvement in the German military position proved no more successful. Though substantial thought was given to the use of political propaganda in South Africa, even to the extent that plans were considered for using Swiss pastors and sympathetic Nationalist Party politicians to act on the Reich's behalf, nothing was actually to be achieved. 11 Yet, if the German involvement with the Boers was thus to bring them little profit, the resolute and lengthy resistance of von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa was to demonstrate the comparatively greater value of internal reform and selfreliance. In many ways, this fact is a fitting epitaph to Germany's final undertaking in South Africa.

Conclusion

Looking back over the course of the Reich's involvement in South Africa, it is clearly possible to make certain observations concerning the nature of German imperialism. To begin with, it is apparent that, regardless of the impetus provided by both public opinion and business interests, the character of German participation in the affairs of the region was determined, not by socio-economic conditions or by fundamental flaws in the nature of the nation's polity, but rather by decisions taken by the executive. In this instance, the answer to Berchtold's question, 'Who rules then in Berlin?', 1

is clear-cut; German policy was decided by the elite. Of course to Berchtold, who framed the question with a view to finding order amid the chaos of the German government2 rather than with a view to questioning its authority, this answer would have caused little surprise. As a statesman in a polity no less hierarchical than that of Germany, it would have been inconceivable for him to have held any other view. In today's history fraternity, this opinion is perhaps more controversial. Nonetheless, it is adequately substantiated by the nature of the shifts that occurred in German attitudes to the region in the period up to the Boer War, each of which was marked by fundamental changes in the composition of the Reich government. Hence, one finds that it was the fall of Capri vi and the appointment of Hohenlohe, Pfeil and Derenthall that heralded the inauguration of Germany's claim to influence in South Africa and that, in a similar fashion, it was the removal of Marschall and Hollmann along with the ubiquitous Pfeil and Derenthall to make way for Tattenbach and the ascendancy of Biilow, Tirpitz and Miquel that led to the disengagement from South Africa in favour of Weltpolitik.

The role of Marschall's South African aspirations as a bridge between Caprivi's continental outlook and Biilow's world policy is also a matter of note. As has been demonstrated, a major consequence of Caprivi's fall, so far as Anglo-German relations were concerned, was the development of rivalry over the Transvaal, a conflict that arose almost exclusively from the German government's sudden and unexpected interest in the Republic. This interest, which would have been anathema to Caprivi, was a prominent component in Marschall's overseas policy and, as such, represented a major departure from Caprivi's attempt to limit the scope of German diplomacy strictly to European considerations. However, though indicative of a broadening of outlook, Marschall's new external policy was

141


nevertheless still bound by self-imposed limitations in that its aspirations were focused strictly on only one region, namely South Africa, and were not, as his colleagues were subsequently and much to their annoyance to discover, transferable from it. Consequently, the development of an official perspective on external relations that was simultaneously both extra-European and devoid of the restrictions imposed by a particular regional focus required the appointment of a foreign secretary who, while accepting the need for expansion that was implied in Marschall's attitude towards South Africa, was not similarly convinced of the necessity of maintaining a focus that was exclusive to this one particular part of the globe. Such a foreign secretary was Biilow and therefore, his appointment, in Marschall's place, ensured the further broadening of the Reich's overseas objectives.

Given this linear progression from European to world outlook, it becomes clear that in the transformation between the eurocentric diplomacy of Caprivi and the Weltmachtpolitik of Biilow, Marschall's South African policy was an important transitional stage. The reason for its significance stems from the radical nature of the change involved. For, in moving from an outlook dominated solely by European considerations to one that held aspirations all over the globe, the entire premise of German diplomacy had to be turned on its head. As a consequence, the link provided by a policy with a single extra-European goal was an invaluable first step in the incremental increase in the scope of German objectives. Since this expansion in the Reich's external perception was ultimately to find form in a considerable proliferation of the country's overseas interests, it is apparent that the abandonment of South Africa and the subsequent development of aspirations in Latin America, China and the Middle East were, in every sense, connected events.

The place of South Africa in the historiography of German imperialism is thus important for two reasons. First of all, it demonstrates conclusively that political decisions concerning the nature of overseas policy, though subject to the influences prevalent in German society, were nevertheless ultimately determined solely by the narrow and exclusive elite that controlled the apparatus of government. Consequently, changes in the elite could, and indeed did, have a profound effect on the direction and objectives of policy, thus creating a situation where governmental change and policy change developed an intertwined dynamic. Secondly, it is also the case that the effort devoted to South African matters was of crucial formative importance to the transformation of the Reich's diplomatic outlook over the course of the 1890s. Having begun the decade firmly committed to securing above all else Germany's position in central Europe, the

Conclusion 143

WilhelmstraBe ended the century preoccupied principally with the task of enhancing the nation's status through worldwide expansion. As the conduit between these two extremes, it can be seen that the localized aspiration of acquiring influence in South Africa was a desire that acted to mould the ultimate shape and geographical focus of future policy by allowing for the linear progression of German aspirations.

Appendix 1 German Diplomatic Representation in Southern Africa 1883-99

Capetown (Consul-General)

1883 W. A. Lippert (Consul) 1886 Dr Ernst Bieber 1888 Ernst von Treskow 1892 Freiherr von Nordenflycht 1896 Bruno von Schuckrnann 1899 Dr Focke

Bloemfontein (Consul) Durban (Consul)

1883 Dr Kellner 1879 Gustav Monhaupt 1886 Dr Max Stollreither

Port Elizabeth (Consul) Pretoria (Consul)

1880 W. H. Dalldorf

Johannesburg (Vice Consul)

1897 Johannes Nels

East London (Vice Consul)

1889 John Dircks 1894 Hermann MalcomeB (Consul)

John Dirks (Vice Consul)

144

1888 Ferdinand Ritschl 1889 Theodor von Schopfer 1890 Franz von Herff 1898 Max Biermann

King William Town and East London (Vice Consul)

1883 Hermann MalcomeB 1889 Position divided

King William Town (Consul)

1889 Hermann MalcomeB 1894 Position abolished

Lourenro Marques (Vice Consul)

1883 Wilhelm Roghe 1886 Unoccupied 1893 W. Joost 1895 Markus Graf von Pfeil 1898 Herr Walter

Kimberley (Vice Consul)

1883 1890 1891 1893 1897

C. L. Diering Unoccupied Werner Rolfes (Consul) Hermann Wehner (Consul) In commission

Appendix 1

Mossel Bay (Vice Consul)

1883 Fr Matare

Simonstown (Vice Consul)

1883 P. D. Martin 1888 Position abolished

Port Alfred (Vice Consul)

145

1883 1886 1887 1888

Robert Louis Bertram Unoccupied Leopold HeB Position abolished

Main Source: Reichsamt des lnnen, Handbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (Berlin, 1883-99)

Appendix 2 Trade Statistics

Origin and value of goods sent to South Africa (in £):

1892 1893 1894 1895

Britain 10118 837 10 880 873 10515730 12 215 907 USA 418 126 602 025 632 618 I 009 318 Germany 231 172 293 840 498 758 828 617 Holland 166 532 125 683 224 512 169 039 Belgium 19 580 40 571 55 001 136 346 France 30 991 32 468 33 676 44 727

1896 1897 1898

Britain 16 429 705 17 Oil 784 15 265 374 USA 2 411 650 2 747 134 2 766 347 Germany I 264 537 I 054 226 966 364 Holland 225 990 281 840 208 389 Belgium 373 861 300 778 312 315 France 146 390 119 388 72 113

Source: British South Africa Export Gazette

German Exports (in millions of Marks) to:

1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898

Tansvaal 1.3 3.2 5.5 9.3 13.7 12.1 9.1 Cape Colony 7.3 10.5 11.8 13.0 15.7 13.5 14.6

Source: Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.32

146

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Baron von Richthofen to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 19 August 1898. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XIV, p.321.

2. A good example of this is a comment made by Chamberlain to Balfour on 19 August 1898: 'we pay Blackmail to Germany to induce her not to interfere where she has no right of interference. Well! it is worth while to pay Blackmail sometimes.' Quoted in Peter T. Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics (New Haven and London, 1994), p.441.

3. The ships of the South and South-West Africa station followed a schedule that ensured a regular German presence in all the Major ports of the region. See BA(Potsdam) RKA#l910.

4. This, of course, refers to the collection Die GrojJe Politik. 5. Friedrich Thimme, 'Die Kriiger-Depesche. Genesis und historische

Bedeutung', in Europiiische Gespriiche: Hamburger Monatshefte fiir auswiirtige Politik, 1924; Johannes Andreas Wiid, Die Rolle der Burenrepubliken in der Auswiirtigen und Kolonialen Politik des Deutschen Reiches in den Jahren 1883-1900 (Niirnberg, 1927).

6. That Thimme viewed this article as a vehicle for creating an effect abroad can be seen in his correspondence. See Friedrich Thimme to Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, 28 May and 27 July 1924. Quoted in Annalise Thimme (ed.), Friedrich Thimme 1868-1938. Ein politischer Historiker, Publizist und Schriftsteller in seinen Briefen (Boppard am Rhein, 1994 ), pp.227 and 230.

7. Thimme's efforts to mask the existence of unwelcome archival evidence and thereby to create a misleading impression about German foreign policy are well documented, especially with regard to German South African policy. See, for example, G. W. F. Hallgarten, Jmperialismus vor 1914. Die soziologischen Grundlagen der AujJenpolitik europiiischer GrojJmiichte vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg (2 vols, Munich, 1963), I, p.vii and II, p.529. Wiid, too, attempted to mislead his readers. His assertion (Wiid, Die Rolle, p.73) that the German files on the Transvaal for the decade up until the beginning of 1895 contain only British government Blue Books is an example of this. This statement is true in that the file 'Akten betreffend Transvaal Band 11' is so constituted. However, it ignores the fact that the papers on German South African policy are mainly located in other files and series.

8. G. W. F. Hallgarten, 'L'essor et l'echec de Ia Politique Boer de l'Allemagne, 1890-1898', Revue Historique, CLXXVII (1936).

9. Hallgarten, Jmperialismus vor 1914. 10. Raymond Walter Bixler, Anglo-German Imperialism in South Africa,

1880-1900 (Baltimore, 1932); Reginald Ivan Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa: A Study in Economic imperialism, 1875-1899 (New York, 1934)this study built on his doctoral dissertation, The Anglo-German Estrangement

147

148 Notes

1894-1896 (Harvard, 1936); and Cornelius D. Penner, England, Germany, and the Transvaal, I 895-1902 (Doctoral dissertation, Chicago, 1935).

11. H. E. Werner Backeberg, 'Die Betrekkinge tussen die Suid Afrikaanse Republiek en Duitsland tot na die Jameson In val ( 1852-1896)', in Archives Yearbook for South African History, I (1949).

12. Werner Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche Wanderung nach Siidafrika im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin, 1955).

13. Werner Schmidt-Pretoria, Der Kulturanteil des Deutschtums am Aujbau des Burenvolkes (Hannover, 1938).

14. Jeffrey Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, 1967).

15. Jeffrey Butler, The Liberal Party and the Jameson Raid (London, 1968). I 6. Holger Nissen, 'Siidafrika im politischen Kalkiil des Kaiserlichen

Deutschlands. Zur Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Beziehungen 1884--1902', Ergebnisse, I (1978).

I 7. Helmut Stoecker and Eberhardt Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und Politische Ziele in Siidafrika 1884-1898', in Helmut Stoecker (ed.), Drang nach Afrika. Die koloniale Expansionspolitik und Herrschaft des deutschen Imperialism in Afrika (Berlin, I 977). An updated version of this essay can be found in Helmut Stoecker (ed.), Drang nach Afrika. Die deutsche koloniale Expansionspolitik und Herrschaft in Afrika von der Anfiingen his zum Verlust der Kolonien (Berlin, 1991).

18. J. J. Van-Helten, 'German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal 1886-1900', Journal of African History, XIX (1978). Modifications to and developments of the views expressed in this article can be found in J. J. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal: With Specific Reference to the Witwatersrand Goldfields and District 1886-1910 (Doctoral dissertation, London, 1981 ).

19. Jochen Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik 1890-1898 im Spannungsfeld zwischen deutsch-englischen Beziehungen. wirtschaftsinteressen und Expansionsforderungen in der biirgerlichen Offentlichkeit (Doctoral dissertation, Berlin, 1987).

20. Hildemarie GrUnewald, 'Auf, auf ihr Bruder ... ' Deutsche in Siidafrika (Vienna, I 992).

21. Harald Rosenbach, Das deutsche Reich, Groj3britannien und der Transvaal ( 1896-1902): Anfiinge deutsch-britischer Entfremdung (Gottingen, 1993).

22. Gerd Fesser in Die Zeit, 5 January 1996. 23. To be precise, out of 3 I 4 pages of text, 33 of these are devoted to the period

before I 896. 24. The name most closely associated with the origins of this theory is Eckart

Kehr. See Eckart Kehr, Der Primat der lnnenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsiitze zur preuj3isch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Berlin, 1965).

25. An historian much associated with this view is Otto Hintze. See Otto Hintze, 'Das Monarchische Prinzip und die konstitutionelle Verfassung', in Staat und Veifassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen (2nd edition, Gottingen, 1962), pp.359-89.

Notes 149

26. See Gordon A. Craig, 'Political and Diplomatic History', in Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard (eds), Historical Studies Today (New York, 1972), pp.356ff. More recently, the notion of 'the primacy of diplomatic history' has been restated, albeit with reference to Britain, by Gordon Martel. See Gordon Martel, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy (London, 1986), pp.252-53.

27. Quoted in Ludwig Dehio, Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1959), p.78.

28. One example would be Ludwig Dehio, who observed: 'We turned our uncertain gaze on the wide world, but instead of keeping our eyes firmly on the acquisition of particular territories, we gambled on general changes in the entire status quo .... ' Ibid, p.l5. Similarly, in relation to the start of the First World War, Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann has suggested that 'war might well not have broken out in 1914 had it not been for the determination of one power [Germany] to exploit the Balkan crisis to change the international status quo ... .' Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, 'Germany and the Coming of war', in R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (eds), The Coming of the First World War (Oxford, 1990), p.91.

29. See, for example, Udo Ratenhof, Die Chinapolitik des deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945: Wirtschaft- Rustung- Militiir (Boppard am Rhein, 1987) or Ute Mehnert, Die 'Gelbe Gefahr' als politisches Mittel der deutschamerikanischen Beziehungen in Ostasien 1905-1909 (Koln, M.A. dissertation, 1988).

30. The most important works on this topic are Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, Lateinamerika als Konjiiktherd der deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen, 1890-1903 (2 vols, Gottingen, 1986) and Holger H. Herwig, Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, 1871-1914 (Princeton, 1986).

31. Fiebig-von Hase, Lateinamerika als Konjiiktherd, pp.l93-248. 32. Ibid, pp.68-87, 120-40; and Herwig, Germany's Vision of Empire in

Venezuela, pp.80-109, 163-67. 33. Fiebig-von Hase, Lateinamerika als Konfliktherd, pp.472-500; Holger H.

Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941 (Boston, 1976), pp.67-92.

34. This view is not without critics. See Reiner Pommerin, Der Kaiser und Amerika. Die U.S.A. in der Politik der Reichsleitung, 1890-1917 (KO!n, 1986); Nancy Mitchell, The Danger of Dreams: Weltpolitik versus Protective Imperialism (Doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1993).

35. After the Boer War, when the two republics were British colonies, a new situation prevailed. Challenging their status then would not have signalled the inception of a new colonial policy but rather the start of a general war.

36. Until recently, this need for further examination was also true of other periods. However, German South African policy during the Nazi era has recently been the subject of two important scholarly investigations that provide an interesting guide to the seven years from 1933 to 1939. See Robert Citino, Germany and the Union of South Africa in the Nazi Period (New York, 1991) and Albrecht Hagemann, Sudafrika und das Dritte Reich: Rassenpolitische Affinitiit und machtpolitische Rivalitiit (Frankfurt, 1989).

150 Notes

THE OFFICIAL PERSPECTIVE

1. As John Rohl has put it, ' ... the German Kaiserreich was not a plebiscitary democracy forced to accede to the demands of an angry crowd!' John C. G. Rohl, The Kaiser and his Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany (Cambridge, 1994), p.8. See also, Bernadotte E. Schmitt, 'The Relation of Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs Before and During the First World War', in A. 0. Sarkissian (ed.), Studies in Diplomatic History and Historiography in Honour of G. P. Gooch, C.H. (London, 1961), p.323.

2. The French Colonial Ministry was established in 1894, before which time colonial affairs were handled by the Ministry of Marine. See Alfred Cobban, A History of Modern France, Vol. III, (London, 1965), p.92. Britain, of course, had a separate India Office.

3. The Kolonial Abteilung was upgraded to the status of a Reich office in 1907.

4. Woodruff D. Smith, European Imperialism in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Chicago, 1982), p.173.

5. J. C. G. Rohl, German Without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900 (London, 1967), p.58.

6. Biilow recalled in his memoirs: 'above all, I read Treitschke, whose German History, together with the speeches of Bismarck, have become the basis of my political thoughts and feeling.' Fiirst von BUlow, Memoirs (4 vols, London, 1932), IV, p.465. For a scholarly account of Treitschke' s influence on Biilow see Peter Winzen, 'Treitschke's Influence on the rise of Imperialist and Anti-British Nationalism in Germany', in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany Before 1914 (London, 1981 ).

7. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London, 1980), p.311.

8. It did not aid Kayser's influence that he was an untitled, bourgeois Jew in an office dominated by Protestant, Prussian aristocrats. Walter Frank, 'Der Geheime Rat Paul Kayser', in Historische Zeitschrift, CLXVIII (1943).

9. Martin Gosselin to Lord Salisbury, 29 October 1895. PRO: FO 64/1539. 10. Lamar Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service (Princeton, 1976), p.259. 11. In spite of this desire, boundary disputes were to continue for may years

thereafter. See Matthew S. Seligmann, 'Maps as the Progenitors of Territorial Disputes: Two Examples from Nineteenth Century Southern Africa', Imago Mundi, 47 (1995), 173-83.

12. Sir Edward Malet to Lord Rosebery, 9 December 1893. Malet Papers, PRO: FO 343/13.

13. Memorandum by Holstein, 24 March 1891. Quoted in Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher (eds), The Holstein Papers (4 vols, Cambridge, 1955-63), III, p.374.

14. Murray to Lord Rosebery, 29 October 1894. Quoted in Martel, Imperial Diplomacy, p.226.

15. Roh1, Germany Without Bismarck, p.120. 16. Sir Edward Malet to Lord Salisbury, 7 November 1895. Malet Papers. PRO:

FO 343/3.

Notes 151

17. Entry from Hohenlohe's diary for 3 January 1896. Quoted inK. A. von Miiller (ed.), Furst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst: Denkwiirdigkeiten der Reichkanzlerzeit (Stuttgart, 1931 ), p.151.

18. The only other State Secretary to manage this feat was Alfred von KiderlenWachter, who benefited from Bethmann Hollweg's lack of experience outside of domestic politics. Certainly none of Bulow's State SecretariesRichthofen, Tschirschky and Schon- ever stood out in this way.

19. Martin Gosselin to Lord Kimberley, 24 November 1894. PRO: FO 64/1334. 20. Bernhard von Biilow to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 6 April 1892. Quoted in

Rohl, Germany without Bismarck, p.l03. 21. Volker Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in I9I4 (New York,

1973). 22. Diary entry for 3 January 1904. Quoted in Robert von Zedlitz-Triitzschler,

Twelve years at the Imperial Court (London, 1924), pp.57-58. 23. Marschall diary, 20 and 25 February 1895 and Friedrich von Holstein to

Philipp zu Eulenburg, 21 February 1895. Quoted in J. C. G. Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs politische Korrespondenz (3 vols, Boppard am Rhein, 1976-83), III, pp.1476, 1479. For the conflict over Schele see Arthur J. Knoll, 'Decision Making for the German Colonies', in Arthur J. Knoll and Lewis H. Gann (eds), Germans in the Tropics: Essays in German Colonial History (New York, 1987), pp.133-34.

24. Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs politische Korrespondenz, III, p.l476. 25. See Friedrich von Holstein to Fiirst von Radolin, 22 March 1896. Quoted in

Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, III, p.60l. 26. See Dr Paul Kayser to Philipp zu Eulenburg, 18 March 1896. Quoted in

Rohl, Philipp Eulenburgs politische Korrespondenz, III, p.1654. 27. Philipp zu Eulenburg to Dr Paul Kayser, 24 September 1895. Ibid, p.l542. 28. Marschall diary, 17 February 1895. Quoted in Ekkehard-Teja P. W. Wilke,

Political Decadence in Imperial Germany: Personnel-Political Aspects of the German Government Crisis I894-97 (Chicago, 1976), p.88.

29. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p.22l. 30. Terry Cole, 'Kaiser versus Chancellor: The Crisis of Biilow' s Chancellorship

1905-6', in R. J. Evans (ed.), Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (London and New York, 1978), pp.45-48.

31. W. 0. Henderson, 'German East Africa, 1884-1918', in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver (eds), The Oxford History of East Africa, Volume II (Oxford, 1965), p.146.

32. Reichstagsverhandlungen, 17 January 1896. Quoted in Stenographische Berichte, IX. Leg. Per., 4 Sess. 1895/97, p.404.

2 THE PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE

l. Details of this society, including promotional literature and lists of the members of the executive committee, can be found in the papers of another of its leading members, Graf Joachim von Pfeil. Pfeil Papers, BA(Potsdam) 90Pf2, vol.87.

152 Notes

2. A good description of Caprivi's eurocentrism comes from Admiral von MUller's memorandum to Prince Heinrich of 1896, in which it is stated that 'General von Capri vi believed that Germany had no chance at all of becoming a world power, and consequently his policy was designed only to maintain [Germany's] position on the European continent.' Quoted in J. C. G. Rohl, From Bismarck to Hitler: The Problem of Continuity in German History (London, 1970), p.59.

3. Reichstagsverhandlungen, 4 February 1891. In Stenographische Berichte, VIII. Leg. Per., 1. Sess. 1890/92, p.l305. Within government circles the idea of surrendering South-West Africa had been a topic of discussion for more than a year prior to this announcement. See Herbert von Bismarck to Grafvon Berchem, 21 June 1889. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, IV, p.415.

4. Kolnische Zeitung, 20 February 1891. BA(Potsdam) RKA#2012, p.21. 5. J. H. Esterhuyse, South West Africa 1880-1894: The Establishment of

German Authority in South West Africa (Cape Town, 1968), pp.172-76; Richard A. Voeltz, German Colonialism and the South West Africa Company, 1894-1914 (Athens, Ohio, 1988), p.22.

6. Vossische Zeitung, 22 May 1894. BA(Potsdam) RKA#1148, p.117. 7. Magdeburgische Zeitung, 14 July 1893./bid, p.38. 8. Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the

Pan-German League, 1886-1914 (Boston and London, 1984), p.64. 9. Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband, Ortgruppe Kapstadt, Centralstelle fiir

SUdafrika, I page pamphlet, April 1894, 'Die Zukunft des Deutschen SUdwestafrikanischen Schutzgebietes'. BA(Potsdam) RKA#l148, p.103.

10. Peter Winzen, 'Treitschke's influence on the Rise of Imperialist and AntiBritish Nationalism in Germany'.

11. ADV, 'Stellungnahme des ADV zu den in Deutsch-SUdwestafrika herrschenden Wirren'. BA(Potsdam) RKA#1148, p.104.

12. Report of the Berlin Polizeiprasident, 21 December 1893. BA(Potsdam) RKA#6726/13, p.l2.

13. The Siidafrikanische Zeitung, a twice-weekly broadsheet, appearing on Wednesdays and Saturdays, commenced publication in 1890 under the joint editorship of Fritz van straaten and Dr Heinrich Geehl. Originally produced in Cape Town, the paper later moved to Johannesburg, where it was published by Hermann Michaelis. In addition to editorials and reports, the paper also printed the official proclamations of the German authorities in SouthWest Africa. See Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche wanderung, p.201.

14. Siidafrikanische Zeitung, II October 1893. BA(Potsdam) RKA#6726/13. 15. Ibid. 16. These views were sent to the German government in a ten-page letter. See

Hertzog Johann Albrecht von Mecklenburg-Schwerin, President of the German Colonial society, to FUrst zu Hohenlohe, 21 June 1895. BA(Potsdam), RKA#8838.

17. Sir Edward Malet to Lord Salisbury, 20 June 1895. PRO: FO 64/1358. 18. Tiigliche Rundschau, 2 August 1895. BA(Potsdam) RKA#1991. 19. /bid,p.116. 20. See, for example, All Deutsche Blatter, !9 January 1896. BA(Potsdam)

ADV#575.

Notes 153

21. This organization was set up as a limited company. However, like the settlement companies run by the colonial societies, it was more nationalist than commercial in orientation.

22. Ben Macintyre, Forgotten Fatherland: The Search for Elizabeth Nietzsche (New York, 1992).

23. Erich Friedrich Podach, Gestalten urn Nietzsche (Weimar, 1932), p.l72. 24. Gesellschaftsvertrag der Kolonisationsgesellschaft fiir Siid-Afrika

(Chemnitz, 1895), Nr. 2. BA(Potsdam) RKA#1770, p.6. 25. The full executive consisted of Max Schubert; two lawyers, Rechtsanwalt

Beutler and Rechtsanwalt Tscharmann; one teacher, Oberlehrer Hermstein; one industrialist, Direktor der Sachsischen Maschinenfabrik Ernst Reith; two businessmen, Geheimer Commerzienrath Vogel and Commerzienrath Mey; one Junker, Gabriel von Schwerdtner, described variously as 'Rittergutsbesitzer' and 'praktischer Landwirth'; and nine additional members of undesignated occupation named as: Rudolph Kretzschmar, Benno Schmidt, Wilhelm Tetzner, Wilhelm Zimmermann, Georg Leuckardt, Hermann Griiner, Theodor Liebau, Ludwig Fischer and Rudolph Schulze. Listed in Max Schubert to Paul Kayser, 3 January 1896. Ibid, p.4.

26. Max Schubert to Dr Paul Kayser, 3 January 1896. Ibid, p.l. 27. Max Schubert to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 6 January 1896. Ibid, p.7. 28. Franz Joseph von Biilow subsequently published a book about Southern

Africa. See Franz Joseph von Biilow, Deutsch Siidwest Afrika: Drei Jahre im Lande Hendrik Witbois (Berlin, 1899).

29. Die Post, 19 June 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#2083. 30. Publicity pamphlet for Paul Langhans, Deutscher Kolonial-Atlas (Gotha,

1896), Inhalts Ubersicht 18. BA(Potsdam) ADV#184. 31. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 July 1896. PRO: FO 64/1387. 32. Martin Gosselin to Lord Salisbury, 30 July 1896. PRO: FO 64/1387. 33. Roger Chickering, 'Patriotic Societies and German Foreign Policy,

1890-1914', The International History Review, I (1979), 471, 475-77. 34. The German Colonial Society to Chancellor Hohenlohe, 30 October 1898.

BA(Potsdam) DKG#500. 35. Cosima Wagner to Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 20 September 1900.

Quoted in Geoffrey G. Field, Evangelist of Race: The Germanic Vision of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (New York, 1981), p.358.

36. Of course, not all Germans supported the Volkisch position. At the same time as the Pan-Germans were campaigning for the Boers, their efforts were being ridiculed by the left. In his last major speech, an attack on the goals of Weltpolitik, given in Dresden on 28 July 1900, Wilhelm Liebknecht observed, 'The Pan-Germans have also often thought of South Africa and the Boer Republics. But I am not going to talk about this childishness ... .' Quoted in William A. Pelz (ed.), Wilhelm Liebknecht and German Social Democracy: A Documentary History (Westport, Connecticut, 1994), p.334.

37. Oron James Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy with Special Reference to England and Germany, 1890-1914 (Princeton, 1964), p.204.

38. Pauline R. Anderson, The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1902 (New York, 1969), p.81.

154 Notes

39. Prussian consulate in Weimar to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 8 February 1900. PRO: GFM8 No. I 04. It should also be noted that Duke Johann Albrecht was president of the Colonial Society.

40. Pourtales to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 20 December 1900. PRO: GFM8 No. 104. 41. See Heinrich ClaB, Wider dem Strom: vom Werden und Wachsen der

nationalen Opposition im alten Reich (Leipzig, 1932), pp.55-57. 42. Ibid, pp.66-68; Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical

Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (New Haven, 1980), pp.243--44.

43. In December 1899, the German mail steamer Bundesrath sailing in the vicinity of South Africa was intercepted by the Royal Navy on suspicion of carrying contraband to the Boers. It was taken to Durban and forced to unload its cargo. The seizure of this vessel and the subsequent seizure of two further vessels, the General and the Herzog, caused uproar in Germany, where it was suspected by a section of the public that the Royal Navy's motive was to ruin the German shipping industry. The event also proved an embarrassment for the British Government. As Sanderson had observed when the commotion first started, 'I sincerely hope that we shall find contraband of war otherwise we shall look very foolish, have to pay heavily, and be a good deal hampered as to the future exercise of the right of search .... ' No contraband was found, with consequences for British dignity that were much as Sanderson had predicted. See Sir Thomas Sanderson to Sir Frank Lascelles, 3 January 1900. Lascelles Papers, PRO: F.O. 800/9. For the best account of the incident and the issues involved see John W. Coogan, The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain and Maritime Rights I899-I9I5 (Ithaca and London, 1981), pp.37--41.

44. Terence F. Cole, 'The Daily Telegraph Affair and its Aftermath: the Kaiser, Bulow and the Reichstag, 1908-1909', in John Rohland Nicolaus Sombart (eds), Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge, 1982), p.254.

45. This fact is also illustrated by the impact in the interwar years of Hans Grimm's novel Volk ohne Raum, part of the enormous popularity of which was a reflection of the South African component of the story-line. That proBoer sympathies still had so strong an appeal in Germany even after the Union of South Africa had demonstrated its loyalty to and integration within the British Empire during the First World War is testament to the emotive power of the issue. See Hans Grimm, Volk ohne Raum (Munich, 1926); and for a commentary on its influence in interwar Germany see F. L. Carsten, 'Yolk ohne Raum: A Note on Hans Grimm', in F. L. Carsten, Essays in German History (London, 1985).

46. For full details of this phenomenon see Eley, Reshaping the German Right, pp.176-77, 183 and 351-52.

3 THE COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE

1. Marschall's Speech to the Reichstag. Reichstagsverhandlungen, 13 February 1896. In Stenographisce Berichte, IX Leg. Per., 4. Sess. 1895/97, p.930.

Notes 155

2. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Grofle Politik, XI, pp.l7-19.

3. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 15 October 1895. Ibid, p.6. 4. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The Randlords: The Men who made South Africa

(London, 1985), pp.41-42. 5. Robert V. Kubicek, 'The Randlords in 1895: A Reassessment', in Journal of

British Studies, XI (1972), 10 I. 6. A list of those whose names were to acquire the prefix 'Sir' would include:

George Albu, Max Michaelis, Sigismund Neumann, Ernest Oppenheimer and Julius Wernher.

7. The Evening Standard, 14 January 1896. Quoted in Graf von Hatzfeldt to FUrst zu Hohenlohe, 16 January 1896. PA(Bonn) Rl4617. In reality, of the sixty-two members of the Reform Committee, the body responsible for the rising in Johannesburg, three held German citizenship. They were Max Langermann, Wilhelm Adler and Fritz Mosenthal. See Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche Wanderung, p.327. There were, of course, others behind the scenes.

8. Franz von Herff to FUrst zu Hohenlohe, 12 January 1896. PA(Bonn) Rl4619.

9. Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.213. 10. Buerner, Kommando S. M. S. Schwalbe, to the Kaiser, 22 April 1900. PRO:

GFM8 No. 16. 11. Ibid. 12. Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and his Times (London, 1964), p.191; Laufer,

Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.36. 13. J. X. Merriman to G. J. Goschen, 20 January 1890. Quoted in Phyllis

Lew sen, Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman ( 4 vols, Cape Town, 1960-69), p.296.

14. Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele in SUdafrika, 1884-98', p.l04; Andrew Porter, Victorian Shipping, Business and Imperial Policy: Donald Currie, the Castle Line and Southern Africa (New York, 1986), pp.211-15.

15. Vivian Edgar Solomon, The South African Shipping Question 1886-1914 (Cape Town, 1982), pp.12-13.

16. Between 1891 and 1898, even with the aid of a government subsidy that totalled 7 I 07 802 marks, the DOAL. was unable consistently to make a profit. Moreover, even in those years when an operating profit was obtained, it never exceeded the subvention that the line received. Figures quoted in Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.44.

17. This was a business practice much disliked by its German competitors. As the British Consul-General in Hamburg noted: 'these arrangements are not regarded with unmixed feelings of satisfaction ... by the German firms in the interior who are interested in the river and canal traffic to Hamburg, which is now of course unable to compete with the largely reduced Railway-Rates on goods destined for South Africa.' William Wand to the British Embassy in Berlin, 12 March 1898. PRO: FO 64/1447.

18. J. J. Van-Helten, 'Empire and High Finance: South Africa and the International Gold Standard, 1890-1914', in Journal of African History, XXIII (1982), 541-42.

156 Notes

19. The estimate was made by the mining engineers F. H. Hatch and J. A. Chambers. Quoted in Wheatcroft, The Randlords, p.l63.

20. It has been estimated that the existence of the monopoly added 20-30 per cent to the price of explosives. See Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal before 1896', 46. The mining industry believed that under the monopoly, dynamite cost them £600 000 per year more than it would have done on the open market. See Smith, Origins of the South African War, p.54.

21. Memorandum by Samuel Adams to Wernher, Beit and Company, I898. Quoted in J. J. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal: With Specific Reference to the Witwatersrand Goldfields and District, 1886-1910 (Doctoral thesis, London, I98I), p.215.

22. Wheatcroft, The Randlords, p.I62. 23. To ensure that it was built, Kruger arranged for the Transvaal government to

guarantee the shareholders a dividend of 6 per cent irrespective of whether or not the company was profitable. See K. Wilburn, The Climax of Railway Competition in South Africa I887 -I899 (Doctoral dissertation, Oxford, I 982), p.33.

24. The following are the distances (in miles) from the main ports of South Africa to Johannesburg:

Lorenr;o Marques 394 Durban 482 East London 665 Port Elizabeth 7 I 2 Cape Town 957

Figures quoted from H. M. Admiralty, A Manual of Portuguese East Africa (London, I 920), p.371.

25. Richard Mendelsohn, Sammy Marks: 'The Uncrowned King of the Transvaal' (Athens, Ohio, 199 I), p.62.

26. Figure quoted in Wilburn, The Climax of Railway Competition, p. I 80. 27. J. J. Van-Helten, 'German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and

the Political Economy of the Transvaal, 1886-1900', in Journal of African History, XIX (1978), 386; AdolfGoerz to Paul Kayser, 13 December 1893. Quoted in Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.57.

28. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal, pp.46-47.

29. The exact figures for the German shareholding are cited differently in different texts. According to Lovell, Germans held 6 836 out of 14 000 shares. Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa, p.346. According to Wilburn, the figure is 8 I 9 out of 2 000. Wilburn, Railway Competition, p.36.

30. Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele', p.104.

31. Sir Frank Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, 2 January 1896. Quoted in VanHelten, 'German Capital in the Transvaal', 385.

32. Ibid, 377. 33. Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele',

p.105. 34. Van-Helten, 'German Capital in the Transvaal', 386.

Notes 157

35. W. H. Chaloner, 'Currency Problems of the British Empire 1814-1914', in Barrie M. Ratcliffe (ed.), Great Britain and Her World 1750-1914: Essays in HonourofW. 0. Henderson (Manchester, 1975), p.l89.

36. Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal before 1896', p.47. 37. For a summary of the diplomacy surrounding the battle for the dynamite

concession, see Laufer, Die Deutsche Sudafrikapolitik, pp.53-57. 38. According to Herff over a quarter of the share capital of the company was in

German hands. Franz von Herff to Leo von Caprivi, 8 June 1894. BA(Potsdam) AA#11840.

39. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal, pp.209-33.

40. The Stassfurter Chemische Fabrik to the Auswartiges Amt, 2, 14 and 21 August 1895. BA(Potsdam) AA#l1841.

41. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London, 1902). 42. State-monopoly capitalism is not the only theory to posit an economic basis

to German policy in Africa. Also important is the idea of social imperialism. Inextricably linked to Hans-Ulrich Wehler, a good summary of this concept can be found in Wehler, The German Empire, pp.171-76.

43. Van-Helten, 'German Capital in the Transvaal', pp.386-88; Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele', pp.ll 0-12.

44. Peter Henshaw, 'The "Key to South Africa": Delagoa Bay and the Origins of the South African War, 1890-1899', Paper presented to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 24 May 1896.

45. Ibid; Porter, The Origins of the South African War, p.177. 46. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal,

p.43. 47. Colonial Office Memorandum, 4 May 1897. PRO: CO 879/56. 48. Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal,

p.237. 49. Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele', p.111. 50. This view is consistent with the findings of recent research into the influence

of capitalist enterprises in the formation of British imperial policy in the region. Ever since the publications of Hobson, there has been a considerable consensus behind the proposition that the actions of the British government were dictated by the interests of the mining industry and its investors. Recent historical research, however, has convincingly challenged the whole notion that the decisions of the British government were significantly influenced by, let alone subordinate to this particular interest group. See lain R. Smith, 'The Origins of the South African War', South African Historical Journal, XXII (1990), 36--37.

51. The phrase comes from Alfred Vagts, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten in der Weltpolitik (2 vols, New York, 1935), I, p.526.

52. Ji.irgen Kocka, 'Organisierter Kapitalismus oder Staatsmonopolistischer Kapitalismus? Begrifflicher Vorbemerkungen', in Heinrich A. Winkler (ed.), Organisierter Kapitalismus. Voraussetzungen und Anfiinge (Gottingen, 1974), pp.26-27.

53. In the file Akten betreffend die si.idafrikanische Zollunion, the contents for the period 1893 to August 1896 consist of only three items: two letters from

158 Notes

Consul Nordenftycht from Cape Town in 1893 and one from Herff from 19 August 1896. BA(Potsdam) AA#ll984.

54. Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, pp.31, 190-91. 55. 'Memorandum on the material interests of Germany in the Transvaal', 8

February 1896. BA(Potsdam) AA#II842. 56. Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, p.54. 57. Marquis de Noailles to Affaires Etrangeres, 12 November 1897. Quoted in

Van-Helten, British and European Economic Investment in the Transvaal, p.237.

58. Memorandum by Otto von Muhlberg, 18 November 1898. Quoted in Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, p.l47.

59. The economic disadvantages of Delagoa Bay's lack of facilities were stressed continually in the reports of consul Pfeil in the period just prior to the granting of the concession. Graf von Pfeil to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 30 August 1895 and 5 September 1895. BA(Potsdam) AA#l1970. It seems unlikely that this was coincidental.

60. Henshaw, 'Key to South Africa'. 61. Porter, Origins of the South African War, p.l26. 62. Graf von Pfeil to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 13 November 1895. Quoted in

Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, II, p.250. 63. Franz von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 17 November 1895. BA(Potsdam)

AA#l1970. 64. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 13 November 1897. Quoted in

Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.51.

4 THE BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT

1. Ernst von Weber, 'Die Erweiterung des deutschen Wirtschaftsgebiets und die Grundlegung zu uberseeischen Staaten.' Quoted in Parliamentary Papers, 1897, IX, pp.437-41.

2. Ibid, p.440. 3. Harald R. Bilger, 111mal Siidafrika (Munich, 1982), p.140; Grunewald,

'Auf, auf, ihr Bruder', p.83. 4. Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.183. 5. Weber, 'Die Erweiterung des deutschen Wirtschaftsgebiets', p.441. 6. Lord Carnarvon to Bartle Frere, 12 December 1876 and Lord Derby to a

delegation of Cape Colony merchants, 16 May 1884. Quoted in G. N. Sanderson, 'British Informal Empire, Imperial Ambitions, Defensive Strategies, and the Anglo-Portuguese Congo Treaty of 1884', in Stig Forster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Ronald Robinson (eds), Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford, 1988), p.l98.

7. Note by Bismarck on Bojanowski's memorandum of August 1883. Quoted in Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.184.

8. See A. J.P. Taylor, Germany's First Bidfor Colonies, 1884-1885 (London, 1938), p.6, and Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'Bismarck, the Concert of Europe,

Notes 159

and the Future of West Africa, 1883-1885', in Forster, Mommsen and Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa, pp.152-53.

9. Ibid, p.169. 10. H. Pogge von Strandmann, 'Domestic Origins of Germany's Colonial

Expansion Under Bismarck', in Past and Present, XLII (1969), 140-59; William Roger Louis, 'Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919', in Gifford and Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa, pp.6-7.

11. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 'Bismarck's Imperialism, 1862-1890', in James J. Sheehan (ed.), Imperial Germany (New York, 1976), pp.180-222.

12. Ibid, p.212. 13. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (Leamington Spa,

1985), pp.l71-76. 14. He observes that 'The Santa Lucia incident was an important revelation of

German policy. It left no uncertainty as to the objective- the Transvaal.' See Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal before 1896', p.34.

15. Quoted in Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche Wanderung, p.332. 16. Ibid, p.34; Jean Van Der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies in South

Africa, 1885-1910, pp.2-3; G. N. Sanderson, 'The European Partition of Africa: Origins and Dynamics', in Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson (eds), The Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 6 (Cambridge, 1985), p.l34.

17. Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.l91. As a result, it was not until 28 April 1897 that a treaty regulating relations between the two countries was signed and it was not until 18 March 1898 that ratifications of the said treaty were exchanged (PRO: FO 64/1447). In a similar fashion, the Reich government under Bismarck also discouraged investment in the country's most visible companies. The Berliner Handelsgesellschaft's participation in the establishment of a National Bank was initially vetoed, as was the Disconto Gesellschaft's involvement in the railway concession. As the manager of the latter observed, 'just one word from Bismarck and the Disconto would help us.' See Van-Helten, 'German Capital, the Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the Transvaal, 1886-1900', pp.372 and 386.

18. Anthony Nutting, Scramble for Africa: The Great Trek to the Boer War (London, 1970), p.256.

19. The Times, 5 June 1890. Quoted in Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa, p.244. It should be noted, however, that the salient of the Capri vi strip was perceived by many, including Rhodes, as mitigating against the desirability of the treaty.

20. Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck, pp.85-117. 21. Magdeburgische Zeitung, 14 July 1893. BA(Potsdam) RKA#ll48, p.38. 22. Kurt von Fran~ois to the Auswi.irtiges Amt, 30 November 1892. Quoted in

Esterhuyse, South West Africa, p.l76. 23. Dr Paul Kayser to General von Caprivi, 13 February 1893. Quoted in

Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.49. 24. Ko1onial Abteilung to Kurt von Fran~ois, 8 December 1892. Quoted in

Esterhuyse, South West Africa, p.176. 25. In his diary, Joachim Pfeil observed, in English, that 'the idea of the Boers

if carried out will lead to the greening of the Kalahari. .. ' He regarded this as

160 Notes

especially important because, as things then stood, Germans were unlikely to settle as ' ... the country is miserable [and] only fit for Boers who do not like to see the smoke of their neighbour's chimney. In fact the country could not support a denser population than one scattered over it like the Boers like to be.' Diary entry for 14 September 1892. BA(Potsdam) 90 Pf 2, Bd.147.

26. Joachim Pfeil, Zur Erwerbung von deutsch Ostafrika (Berlin, 1907). 27. Hermann Degener (ed.), Wer 1st's? (Leipzig, 1912), p.1199. 28. Pogge, Kolonialrat, p.109. 29. Joachim Pfeil's commission as agent and his own account of his activities in

this capacity are contained in his papers. BA(Potsdam) 90 Pf 2. His activities are also described in Esterhuyse, South West Africa, pp.173-76.

30. Siidafrikanische Zeitung, 14 June 1893. BA(Potsdam) RKA#1148, p.47. 31. Voeltz, German Colonialism, p.41; I. Goldblatt, History of South West

Africa from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century (Cape Town, 1971 ), pp.l70-72.

32. Anderson, The Background of Anti-English Feeling, p.58. 33. Martin Gosselin to Lord Kimberley, I November 1894. Kimberley Papers,

Bodleian Library, MS Eng.c.4389. 34. Anderson, Background to Anti-English Feeling, p.228. 35. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p.l30. 36. Lord Kimberley to Martin Gosselin, 7 November 1894. Kimberley Papers,

Bodleian Library, MS Eng.c.4389.

5 THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT

1. See Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy (Oxford, 1927), pp.82-83; William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (2nd edition, New York, 1952), p.232; and Raymond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York, 1933), p.73.

2. This policy has been described as the determination 'to win the other's friendship by making themselves as disagreeable as possible.' Gordon Martel, 'The Limits of Commitment: Rosebery and the Definition of the Anglo-German Understanding', Historical Journal, XXVII (1984), 395.

3. Sir Henry Loch to Sir Henry de Villiers, 3 January 1896. Quoted in Eric A. Walker, Lord De Villiers and his Times: South Africa 1842-1914 (London, 1925), p.265.

4. The Kaiser to Baron von Marschall, 25 October 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.8-11.

5. Kimberley was to observe that Southern Africa was 'perhaps the most vital interest of Great Britain because by the possession of it communication with India was assured ... .' Quoted in Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p.220.

6. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 10 December 1895. PA(Bonn) London 428.

7. Memorandum by Graf von Hatzfeldt, 27 October 1895. PRO: GFM8 No. 119.

Notes 161

8. Baron von Marschall to Grafvon Hatzfeldt, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.19.

9. In the words of Adam Watson, an authority on the theory and conduct of diplomacy: 'In the diplomatic practice of the European system the value of continuous contact with other states was clearly understood, and the rule was therefore to maintain diplomatic representation in other capitals except in the event of war .... To break off diplomatic relations with another state in the system was a grave step, often a prelude to an imminent declaration of war.' Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States (London, Reprint 1991), pp.128-29.

I 0. Szogyeny to Goluchowski, I 8 January I 896. Quoted in J. A. S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London, 1964 ), p.l 04.

I 1. Philipp zu Eulenburg to the Auswartiges Amt, 4 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.31.

12. Bixler, Anglo-German Imperialism in South Africa, p.110. 13. As the British Foreign Office clerk, Eyre Crowe recorded, 'I am quite

certain that if Germany carries out her threat and marches in her troops through the Portuguese territory at Delagoa Bay, it means war with us.' Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 6 January 1896. Crowe Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS.Eng.e.3019.

14. See Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1961), p.438; and Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy, pp.181-82.

15. Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, II, p.246. The original record of this proposal comes from a memorandum by Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 28 November 1894. BA(Potsdam), RKA#9013.

16. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 15 October 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.7.

17. This is evident from Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 13 December 1894. BA(Potsdam) RKA#9013.

18. See, for example, Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 1 February 1895, or Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 28 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.3-5 and 15-16.

19. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 20 November I 894. BA(Potsdam) RKA#9013.

20. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 13 December 1894. Ibid. 21. Between 22 January and 13 March 1895, Laufer has catalogued ten occa

sions in which this matter was discussed between Hatzfeldt and British officials and diplomats. Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.73.

22. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 30 January 1895. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, III, p.493.

23. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 31 January I 895. Ibid, III, p.494.

24. Grafvon Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 23 April1897. Ibid, IV, p.33. A British perspective on the negotiations can be found in Martel, Imperial Diplomacy, pp.235-36.

25. That the British regarded this harbour as being of central significance was regularly reported by Hatzfeldt from London. In a typical example, he wrote

162 Notes

that Kimberley 'saw in Delagoa Bay the core of the whole question.' Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 10 March 1895. BA(Potsdam) RKA#9014.

26. This explanation has so far found favour largely with Marxist historians. See, for example, Eberhard Czaya, Der deutsche Imperialismus in Sud- und Sudwestafrika: Ein Beispiel fur Kontinuitiit und Elastizitiit der deutschen kolonialbestrebungen (Doctoral thesis, Berlin, 1967), pp.23-26. The exception to this rule is G. N. Sanderson, who argues in his unpublished seminar paper, 'The African Factor in Anglo-German Relations, 1892-1895', that 'Germany's aggressive behaviour towards Britain in Africa in the middle 1890s was a genuine imperialist phenomenon .... ' See also G. N. Sanderson, 'The European Partition of Africa: Coincidence or Conjuncture?', the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, III (1974), 40.

27. It is difficult to gauge the exact extent of the German capital investment in the Transvaal as figures for this fluctuate wildly. As Jochen Laufer has pointed out, even the German government was inconsistent on this matter, supplying at the beginning of I 896 estimates that ranged from 100 million to 500 million marks. See Laufer, Die deutsche Sudafrikapolitik, p.34.

28. Penner, 'Germany and The Transvaal before 1896', p.44. 29. See Gordon A. Craig, Germany, I866-I945 (Oxford, 1981), p.245;

Marjorie Juta, The Pace of the Ox: A Life of Paul Kruger (London, 1937), p.l74; Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p.219; Lovell, The Struggle for South Africa, pp.346-47.

30. A. Hausrath (ed.), Heinrich von Treitschke: His Life and Works (London, 1914), p.208.

31. Stephen Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice (Boston, 1929-31), I, p.209. This view was also held by the Cape politician John X. Merriman who, writing to G. J. Goschen on 20 January 1890, observed that 'South Africa is the only temperate country where a considerable German occupation might succeed in establishing a German country ... .' See Lew sen, Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman, I870-I890, p.296.

32. David Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (London, 1962), p.478. 33. A. S. Jerussalinski, Die Auj3enpolitik und die Diplomatie des Deutschen

Imperialismus (Berlin, 1954 ), p.l28. 34. See W. D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York

and Oxford, 1986) for a discussion of this term. 35. Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa (London, 1939), p.l19. 36. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, p.ll4. 37. Ibid, p.l25. 38. Ibid, pp.115-25. 39. See Jean Van Der Poe!, Railway and Customs Policies in South Africa,

1885-1910 (London, 1933); Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South-Central Africa.

40. For the dating of the visit of Dr Leyds to Europe, see Laufer, Die Deutsche Sudafrikapolitik, p.201.

41. Auswartiges Amt to Graf von Bray, 16 March 1894. Quoted in Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, II, p.238.

42. Ibid, pp.238-39; Wilburn, The Climax of Railway Competition, p.146.

Notes 163

43. Note of 10 July 1894. Quoted in Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele in Si.idafrika, 1884-98', p.106.

44. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.417; Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal', pp.53--4.

45. This, of course was the intention- the original1aw of 1858, which gave the vote to anyone holding property or who had resided in the Republic for a year, being progressively amended between 1882 and 1894 to make it impossible for Uitlanders to influence the political system. See Fisher, The Afrikaners (London, 1969), p.141.

46. Ibid, p.140. 47. It is interesting to note that following this demarche, the demand for the

franchise of foreign residents became central to the British negotiating position, particularly as it came to be articulated by Chamberlain and Milner. Yet, prior to this point, though repeatedly demanded by the Cape, it had not received the full backing of the British government. Writing to Salisbury on 14 September 1891, Knutsford observed that '[Loch's] favourite idea of redeeming the Transvaal by extending the suffrage to all white immigrants makes one think he must be a little off his head. Universal suffrage exercised by a floating population of mining adventurers cannot be an ideal form of government.' Quoted in John Benyon, Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa: The High Commission, British Supremacy and the Subcontinent, 1806-1910 (Pietermaritzburg, I 980), p.242.

48. Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London, 1995), p.375. 49. J. A. C. Tilley, 'Memorandum respecting the Relations Between Germany

and Great Britain, 1892-1904', in Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, I898-1914, I, pp.323-24. See also Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, pp. I 06, 127-28; J. S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961), p.47.

50. Franz von Herff to Leo von Capri vi, I 3 October 1894. BA(Potsdam) RKA#9013.

5 I. Lord Kimberley to Sir William Harcourt, 7 December I 894. Quoted in A. G. Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt (2 vols, London, 1923), II, p.325.

52. Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p.217. 53. In the previous year's (less eventful) celebration, the guests of honour had

been the Transvaal Commandant-General, P. J. Joubert, and the Chief Justice, John Kotze. Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche Wanderung, p.289.

54. Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal', p.50. 55. Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p. 193. 56. Quoted in Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p.22 I. 57. Sir Graham Bower, 'Sixteen Years Service in South Africa', p.88. Graham

Bower Papers, MSS Afr. s. 1648, Rhodes House Library. 58. Elizabeth Longford, Jameson's Raid: Prelude to the Boer War (London,

1984), p. I 22. 59. Programme of the I 895 Kaiser Kommers at the Transvaal Hotel. Contained

in the personnel file of Franz von Herff, PA(Bonn) personalia No. 91. 60. Sir Graham Bower, 'Sixteen Years Service in South Africa', p.69. Graham

Bower Papers, MSS Afr. s. 1648, Rhodes House Library. 61. This was reiterated in private. In response to the Kaiser Kommers, Wilhelm

summoned Beelaerts van Blokland, the Transvaal's senior diplomat in

164 Notes

Europe. According to the envoy's report, 'the Kaiser thanked me for the President's toast and assured me of "lasting support".' Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, II, p.248.

62. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, I February 1895. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XI, pp.3-5.

63. Ibid. 64. The process of bestowing this honour is catalogued in Herff s personnel file.

Marschall made the suggestion on I April I 895 and the news was published in the Siidafrikanische Zeitung on 15 May 1895. PA(Bonn) Personalia No. 91.

65. According to the official guide, the consulate at Louren9o Marques had been 'unbesetzt' in 1888, 1889, 1890 and 1892. See Reichsamt des Innern, Handbuch fiir das Deutsche Reich (Berlin, 1888ff).

66. Representations for such a change had come from Germany's two main South African diplomats, the consul-general at Cape Town and the consul at Pretoria. See Freiharr von Nordenftycht to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 20 November 1894 and Franz von Herff to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 16 November 1894. BA(Potsdam) AA#52474.

67. See the Reichsanzeiger of I 2 March 1895. A copy of this is in Markus Pfeil's personnel file. PA(Bonn) Personalia No. 65. Alternatively, see the notice in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 9 March 1895. Quoted in Sir Edward Malet to Lord Kimberley, 12 March 1895. PRO: FO 6411357.

68. The British Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon had identified Delagoa Bay as the 'key position' in the region as early as the mid-1870s. See Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.59. This idea was to become much more widespread in the mid-1890s. See, for example, G. B. Malleson, Delagoa Bay: The Key to South Africa (London, 1896).

69. Diary entry for 5 February 1891. Quoted in Rudolf Vierhaus (ed.), Das Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg (Gottingen, 1960), p.285.

70. Martin Pabst, Mission und Kolonialpolitik. Die Norddeutsche Missionsgesellschaft an der Goldkiiste und in Togo bis zum Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges (Munich, 1988), pp.365-69; Ralph Erbar, Ein 'Platz an der Sonne'? Die Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der deutschen Kolonie Togo 1884-1914 (Stuttgart, 1991), p.290.

71. Sir W. Brandford Griffith to Lord Knutsford, II May 1892. PRO: FO 244/495.

72. Despite the warning of the Hamburger Korrespondent (quoted in Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.210.) that 'the vice-consul Markus Pfeil is not to be confused with his brother, the African explorer Graf Joachim Pfeil', such confusion has been rife and is still prevalent in the historical literature, where the separate identity of these two brothers is often conftated to create one composite individual. This error seems to have originated in Hallgarten, Imperialismus vor 1914 and to have been perpetuated from this source. Genealogical details of the Pfeil family, including the fraternal relationship between Joachim and Markus, can be found in the Pfeil family history. See Otto Graf von Pfeil und Klein-EIIguth, Familienchronik der Grafen von Pfeil und Klein-Ellguth auf dem Hintergrund der Geschichte ihrer schlesischen Heimat (Karlsruhe, 1979).

73. Martin Gosselin to Lord Kimberley, 16 March 1895. PRO: FO 6411357.

Notes 165

74. Wilburn, Railway Competition, p.87. The ceremony cost the Transvaal government £20 000. See John Lang, Bullion Johannesburg: Men, Mines and the Challenge of Conflict (Johannesburg, 1986), p.59.

75. Laufer observes that the government in Pretoria had originally intended to exclude a British naval presence and invite only German and Dutch warships. Laufer, Die Deutsche Sudafrikapolitik, p.82. See, also, SchmidtPretoria, Deutsche Wanderung, p.290; Butler, 'The German Factor', p.198.

76. Sir Percy Anderson to the Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town, 8 June 1895. PRO: ADM 1/7246.

77. Ralph Bernal to Lord Kimberley, 3 April 1895. PRO: FO 63/1297. Jacobus de Wet to Sir Hercules Robinson, 11 May 1895. PRO: CO 417/148.

78. Sir Edward Malet to Lord Kimberley, 20 January 1895. PRO: FO 64/1357. 79. The British government did not believe that Marschall's comment in

January regarding the fourth-class cruiser was a definite promise. Edward Fairfield to Sir Percy Anderson, 7 June 1895. PRO: ADM 117246.

80. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 June 1895. BA(Potsdam) AA#11969. 81. Hans Hallmann, Krugerdepesche und Flottenfrage (Stuttgart, 1927), p.68. 82. Hallgarten, lmperialismus, I, pp.372-73. 83. Franz von Herffto Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 20 July 1895. PA(Bonn) R14616. 84. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 15 October 1895. Quoted in Die

GrojJe Politik, XI, pp.5-7. The impact of Malet's warning was lessened by the fact that it was disavowed by the government in London, who claimed that his comments were not authorized. At first this was not believed in Berlin, where the Kaiser observed: 'This throws a nice light on the relationship of the Prime Minister to the ambassador and ... one must ask whether the ambassador lied or not!' Kaiser's marginal comment on Baron von Marschall to the Kaiser, I November 1895. PA(Bonn) R5768. However, the emphatic disavowal quickly came to be seen as a 'peccavi'. See Baron von Marschall to the Kaiser, 17 November 1895. Quoted in Die Gro.fJe Politik, XI, pp.l4-15.

85. Ibid. 86. Baron von Marschall to Martin Gosselin, 25 October 1895. PRO: FO

6411539. Quoted in part inN. G. Garson, 'The Swaziland Question and a Road to the Sea', Archives Yearbook for South African History, VIII (1957), 392. A copy of the letter is also to be found in the files of the German embassy in London. See PA(Bonn), London 428.

87. Martin Gosselin to Lord Salisbury, 29 October 1895. PRO: FO 64/1539. Quoted in part in Garson, 'The Swaziland Question', 392.

88. Roger Casement to Lord Salisbury, 16 November 1895. PRO: FO 63/1297. On health grounds, the British tried to limit the time spent by their warships at Delagoa Bay. See, for example, the orders given to HMS Magpie. Commander-in-Chief, Cape Town to the Admiralty, 5 January 1895. PRO: ADM 1/7246.

89. Graf von Hatzfeldt to the Auswiirtiges Amt, 1 January 1896. Quoted in Die Gro.fJe Politik, XI, p.24.

90. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 28 December 1895 and Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XI, pp.15-19.

166 Notes

91. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 2 January I 896. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, p.27.

92. The Kaiser to President Kruger, 3 January I 896. Quoted in Dugdale, German Diplomatic Documents, II, p.387.

93. This version of Marschall's conversation with Lascelles accords in all essential respects with the record made by the Germans. See Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, pp.l7-18.

94. Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 9 January 1896. Crowe Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS.Eng.e.3019.

95. Sir Frank Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, 8 January 1896. PRO: FO 179/321. 96. Lord Salisbury to Sir Frank Lascelles, 9 January 1896. PRO: FO 64/1385. 97. See, for example, Ernst Schutte's comment 'the economy was for Marschall a

more important, if not the most important factor of his policy.' Ernst Schutte, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, ein Beitrag zur Charakterisierung seiner Politik (Berlin, 1936), pp.7-9.

98. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, I February 1895. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, p.4. See also Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 15 October 1895 and Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, pp.5-7 and 17-19.

99. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, I February 1895. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, pp.4-5.

I 00. Baron von Marschall to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 28 December 1895. Ibid, p.370. 101. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 12 April 1897. Quoted in Rich

and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.23. 102. Memorandum by Maximilian von Berchem, 30 January 1890. Quoted in

Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.52. 103. Ibid, pp.94-95. 104. The Globe, 4 February 1896. PA(Bonn) R14618, pp.lll-13. 105. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p.231. It might be

added that the abrogation of this treaty, which expired in July 1898, did not signal the end of German trade with the British colonies. As Fieldhouse has observed: 'The abrogation of the treaty with Belgium and the Zollverein had little effect.' See D. K. Fieldhouse, 'The Economic Exploitation of Africa: Some British and French Comparisons', in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds), France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, 1971 ), p.602.

I 06. This fact would continue to be of importance to German-South African relations right up to the Second World War. See Hagemann, Siidafrika und das Dritte Reich.

107. Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.32. 108. Bericht der Handelskammer zu Hamburg, 1896, p.9. Quoted in Anderson,

The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, p.259. 109. Parliamentary Papers, IX, 1897, Reports from Committee, II, 71. Quoted in

Penner, 'Germany and the Transvaal Before 1896', 45. II 0. Ibid, 51. Ill. Franz von Herff to FUrst zu Hohenlohe, 19 May 1895. PA(Bonn) London

428.

Notes 167

112. As China discovered, great power support tended to come at a price. Even a supposedly non-imperialist country such as the United States expected benefits from its aid. As the former diplomat American John Barrett observed in relation to the open-door policy, 'If China maintains her independence through our support, the United States in another decade will have greater material and moral influence than all other nations combined.' Quoted in Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: US Foreign Policy to 1914 (London, 1977), p.l71.

113. As the British consul, Roger Casement, observed: 'I may state that this visit, if undertaken solely with such an object stands without parallel in the annals of the admittedly unhealthiest port in South East Africa .... ' Roger Casement to Lord Salisbury, 8 November 1895. PRO: FO 63/1297.

114. GrafPfeil to Fi.irst zu Hohenlohe, 13 November 1895. PA(Bonn) R14616. 115. Ibid. 116. Quoted in D. M. Schreuder, The Scramble for Southern Africa, 1877-1895

(Cambridge, 1980), p.298. 117. Lord Kimberley to Lord Ripon, 13 January 1895. Quoted in Butler, 'The

German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.199. 118. Lord Ripon to Lord Kimberley, 15 February 1895. Ibid, p.199. 119. Lord Kimberley to Lord Ripon, 19 October 1894. Ripon Papers, British

Library ADD MS 43526. The newspaper in question was the Kolnische Zeitung of 17 October 1894 in which it was stated that the German warships represented 'an unambiguous hands off to English aspirations.' Quoted in Stoecker and Czaya, 'Wirtschaftliche Expansion und politische Ziele in Si.idafrika, 1184-98', p.l 06.

120. Lord Ripon to Lord Kimberley, 25 November 1894. Ripon Papers, British Library ADD MS 43526. This text has been partly quoted in Ronald F. Dreyer, The Mind of Official Imperialism: British and Cape Government Perceptions of German Rule in Namibia from the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty to the Kruger Telegram ( 1890-1896) (Essen, 1982), p.203.

121. Lord Kimberley to Lord Ripon, 25 November 1894. Ripon Papers, British Library ADD MS 43526.

122. Lord Ripon to Lord Kimberley, 30 January 1895. Ripon Papers, British Library ADD MS 43527.

123. Lord Kimberley to Lord Ripon, 8 January 1896. Ripon Papers, British Library ADD MS 43527.

124. Lord Ripon to Lord Rosebery, 2 January 1896. Quoted in Anthony Denholm, Lord Ripon 1827-1909: A Political Biography (London, 1982), p.216.

125. Extract from Schalk Burger's election manifesto of 1898. Quoted in C. T. Gordon, The Growth of Boer Opposition to Kruger 1890-95 (Cape Town, 1970), pp.9-IO.

126. Sir Henry Loch to Lord Ripon, 24 December 1894. Ripon Papers, British Library ADD MS 43562.

127. Ibid. 128. As Eyre Crowe noted, '[Germany] knows that it [the Transvaal] is in our

sphere of action, not in hers. She cannot pretend to be ignorant of this, because we have repeatedly told her so.' Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 7 January 1896. Crowe Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS.Eng.e.3019.

168 Notes

129. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 7 February 1895. PA(Bonn) Rl4616. This view from London was repeated six weeks later when Hatzfeldt, describing a parliamentary appearance by Lord Ripon, observed that it was the British opinion that 'in so far as external relations were concerned the South African Republic lay in the English sphere of influence and would not be allowed without the approval of the English government to make new treaties or new agreements with any foreign state.' Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 30 March 1895. Ibid.

130. The Times, 22 November 1894. From Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 22 November 1894. PA(Bonn) R5670.

131. Ibid. 132. Marginal comment on Hatzfeldt's report of 19 October 1894. Quoted in

Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.67. 133. Freiherr von Nordenftycht to Leo von Caprivi, 22 October 1894.

BA(Potsdam) RKA#9013. See also Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations, pp.l3l-32.

134. Minute by the Kaiser to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe's letter of 7 January 1896. Quoted in Bixler, Anglo-German Imperialism in South Africa, p.lll.

135. The Kaiser to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 6 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.36.

136. Martin Gosselin to Lord Kimberley, 24 November 1894. PRO: FO 64/1334. 137. Baron von Marschall to von Derenthall, 22 January 1895. PA(Bonn)

London 428. 138. Bixler, Anglo-German Imperialism in South Africa, p.75. Similar views

were held in the Colonial Office, where little regard was paid to the German claim that they based their policy on economic considerations. On the contrary, Chamberlain regarded their actions as consistent with a ' ... policy of acquiring such commercial interests in South East Africa as may serve as a pretext for a claim to interference in future arrangements in that quarter .... ' Memorandum by Edward Fairfield, I 0 April 1896. PRO: FO 179/321.

139. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.17.

140. Baron von Marschall in interview with the British Ambassador, Memorandum dated 31 December 1895. Quoted in J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (3 vols, London, 1932-34), III, pp.93-94.

141. Rich, Holstein, II, p.470. 142. Marschall Diary, 2 January 1896. Quoted in Rich, Holstein, II, p.470. 143. The change was from 'the dignity of your government' to 'independence of

the country against attacks from outside.' Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.32.

144. This distinction is made most forcefully in Brandenburg, From Bismarck to the World War, p.85.

145. Marschall Diary, 3 January 1896. Quoted in Thimme, 'Die KriigerDepesche', 212-13.

146. Rich and Fisher, Holstein Papers, I, p.l62. 147. Arnold Oskar Meyer, 'Fiirst Hohenlohe und die Kriigerdepesche', Archiv

fiir Politik und Geschichte, II ( 1924 ), 591-6; Konrad Lehmann, 'Die Vorgeschichte der Kriigerdepesche', Archiv fiir Politik und Geschichte, V (1925), 159-77.

Notes 169

148. One such biographer is Michael Balfour. See, The Kaiser and his Times, p.l94. More recently, this account has been accepted by Lamar Cecil. See, Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900 (Chapel Hill, 1989), p.287.

149. Btilow, Memoirs, I, p.469. 150. Gwynn, Letters and Friendships, I, p.200. 151. Laufer, Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.213. 152. That such a reaction might be explicable in the light of Wilhelm's character

is evident from Rohl, 'Kaiser Wilhelm II and German Anti-semitism', in The Kaiser and His Court.

153. Ex-Kaiser William II, My Memoirs: 1878-1918 (London, 1922), pp.79-81. 154. Le Matin, 6 January 1896. Friedrich von Alvensleben to Fiirst zu

Hohenlohe, 8 January 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8841. 155. The Empress Frederick to Queen Victoria, 4 January 1896. Quoted in

Sir Sidney Lee, King Edward VII: A Biography (2 vols, London, 1925-7), I, p.727.

156. Vierhaus, Das Tagebuch der Baronin Spitzemberg, pp.340-4!. 157. D. Chapman-Huston (ed.), The Private Diaries of Princess Daisy of Pless,

1873-1914 (London, 1950), p.50. 158. Graf von und zu Lerchenfeld to Graf von Crailsheim, 7 January 1896.

Quoted in Wilke, Political Decadence, p.l68. 159. Hugo Graf Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Erinnerungen und Denkwiirdigkeiten

(Berlin, 1935), p.373. 160. Ibid, p.385. 161. Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. James' 1895-1905

(London, 1921 ), pp.84-86. 162. Raymond James Sontag, 'The Cowes Interview and the Kruger Telegram',

Political Science Quarterly, XL (1925), 239. 163. Germany also had representation at the Cape in the form of a consul

general. However, during the crucial period of the mid 1890s, this post was to prove less influential than might have been expected owing to the fact that it saw a succession of different occupants. At the start of 1895, the position was held by Freiherr von Nordenfiycht, a pragmatic and undogmatic individual. However, Nordenfiycht left in March 1895 and his replacement, Bruno von Schuckmann, was not appointed until the end of October. In the interim, Germany was represented by an acting consul-general, Dr Golinelli, who did not take it upon himself to impress his mark upon the post. See Martin Gosselin to Sir Percy Anderson, 16 March 1895 and Martin Gosselin to Lord Salisbury, 25 October 1895. PRO: FO 6411357 and FO 64/1359. A full list of the German diplomatic representation in the region can be found in Appendix I.

164. Roger Casement to Lord Salisbury, 8 November 1895. PRO: FO 6311297. 165. Roger Casement to Sir Walter Hutchinson, 7 January 1896. PRO: FO

6411402. 166. Graf von Pfeil to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 13 November 1895. PA(Bonn)

R14616. 167. Graf von Pfeil to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 2 August 1895. BA(Potsdam)

RKA#9014. 168. Auswartiges Amt to Graf von Pfeil, 22 October 1895. Quoted in Laufer,

Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.89.

170 Notes

169. Herff, who had previously been the consul in Rotterdam, spoke Dutch fluently. Schmidt-Pretoria, Deutsche Wanderung, p.286.

170. Herff' s relationship to the Pan-German League is uncertain. Laufer, however, has found a letter in the league files that suggests Herff was a member. See Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.88.

171. Franz Von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 30 July 1895. PA(Bonn) Rl4616. 172. Franz von Herff to Leo von Caprivi, 25 October 1894. BA(Potsdam)

RKA#9013. 173. Franz von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 2 February 1895. PA(Bonn)

London 428. 174. Franz von Herffto Furst zu Hohenlohe, 20 July 1895. PA(Bonn) Rl4616. A

copy of this report is also to be found in the file on Delagoa Bay. This version was seen by the Kaiser, who added the comment 'Scoundrels' in the margin. See Van winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, II, p.249.

175. Hallgarten, 'L'essor et L'echec', 509-10; Hallgarten, Imperialismus, I, p.367; Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, pp.47-48.

176. Report by Franz von Herff, 7 March 1891. Quoted in Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.48.

177. Promemoria by Franz von Herff, 25 July 1895. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8838. This document is also partially cited in Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.87.

178. The former scheme was formally rejected in February 1891. Herff' s attempts to revive the project were received coldly. Ibid, p.48.

179. See Franz von Herff to Leo von Capri vi, II June 1894. Ibid, pp.512-13. It should also be noted that, owing to the fact the opening ceremonies were delayed for a year, by which time Caprivi was no longer Chancellor, the request was repeated in a subsequent report, in which he wrote: 'For Germany, might I obediently recommend that, if at all possible, we be represented by a squadron or in any case by a warship of the first rank. It would not create a good impression in South Africa if, at festivities of international significance, our warship was of the second rank.' Franz von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 16 February 1895. PA(Bonn) Rl4616.

180. Hallgarten, 'L'essor et L'echec de Ia Politique Boer deL' Allemagne', 515. 181. Franz von Herff to the Auswartiges Amt, 30 December 1895. Quoted in Die

GrojJe Politik, XI, p.l6. 182. Thimme, 'Kruger Depesche', 203-4; Wud, Rolle der Burenrepubliken,

p.IOI. 183. Laufer, Die Deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.212. 184. Ibid, p.94. 185. Herff and Pfeil were both praised by the Kaiser in July 1895 for 'a job well

done [hat seine Sache gut gemacht]' at the opening of the Delagoa Bay railway. BA(Potsdam) AA#ll969. Similarly, on 10 March 1896, Marschall wrote to Herff to say that 'At the order of His Majesty the Kaiser I inform your lordship [Hochwohlgeboren] that the All Highest expresses his most gracious recognition for your stance during the last troubles.' PA(Bonn) Konsulatsakten Pretoria, Personalien des Konsuls.

186. The post of consul-general at Cape Town was the senior German diplomatic office in the region. It was given to Bruno von Schuckmann in October 1895. Schuckmann, who had African experience- he had narrowly missed

Notes 171

an encounter with Markus Pfeil in Togo in 1891- quickly proved himself to be as much a partisan for the Boer cause as his colleagues. As a result, by the start of 1896, when Schuckmann reached the Cape, all the significant diplomatic posts in the region were held by advocates of a pro-Boer interventionist policy. See Bruno von Schuckmann Papers, BA(Potsdam) 90 Schu 2.

187. Raymond James Sontag, 'German Policy, 1904-1906', in American Historical Review, XXXIII (1928), 278-79.

188. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 9 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.46--47.

189. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 4 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.33.

190. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 2 February 1895. Quoted in Ebel, Botschafter Paul Grafvon Hatifeldt, II, p.IOI8.

191. Friedrich von Holstein to Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter, 28 October 1895. Alfred von Kiderlen-Wachter Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

192. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 8 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.41. This theme was repeated some months later. See Friedrich von Holstein to Fiirst von Radolin, 8 April 1896. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, III, pp.603--4.

193. Memorandum by Friedrich von Holstein, 30 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.68-69.

194. Fiirst zu Hohenlohe to Graf zu MUnster, I January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.70-71.

195. See Chapter I. 196. Memorandum by Friedrich von Holstein, 30 December 1895. Quoted in Die

Groj3e Politik, XI, p.68. 197. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, p.70. 198. See Mingchien Joshua Bau, The Foreign Relations of China: A History and

a Survey (New York, 1921), pp.38-39; Harold M. Vinacke, The History of the Far East in Modern Times (London, 1960), pp.151-52.

199. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 12 April 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.22.

200. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism, p.68. 20 I. Baron von Marschall to Franz von Herff, 3 December 1894. Quoted in

Hallgarten, Imperialismus vor 1914, II, p.536. 202. Freiherr von Nordenflycht to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 19 December 1894.

PA(Bonn) London 428. 203. Graf von Pfeil to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 13 November 1895. PA(Bonn)

Rl4616. 204. Sir Valentine Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World (London, 1927),

pp.279-80. The timing of Chirol' s meeting with Marschall is a matter of some dispute as Chirol's account is at variance with that recorded in Marschall's diary. See Thimme, 'Die Kruger-Depesche', 216-17. However, Chirol's comment that the telegram was a government document is widely accepted. See Hammann, World Policy, p.67.

205. The Germans at Pretoria to the Kaiser, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.20.

172 Notes

206. Baron von Marschall to Admiral Knorr, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Parliamentary Papers, 1897, XI, p.551.

207. Baron von Marschall to Governor Wissmann, 31 December 1895. PA(Bonn) R14616. See also Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St James,J895-1905 (London, 1921), pp.84-85. It is interesting to note that in response to this request Wissmann offered four companies of colonial troops, a company of irregulars, two Maxims, two rapid firing guns, two pieces of field artillery and twenty cavalrymen. See Wissmann to Auswartiges Amt, 3 January 1896. PA(Bonn) R14616. For a consulate guard this seems somewhat generous.

208. Lee, King Edward VII, I, p.723; A. McKenzie, C. N. T. DuPlessis and Charles T. Bunce, The Real Kruger and the Transvaal (New York, 1900), p.71; Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of StJames's, p.84.

209. Baron von Marschall to Franz von Herff, 31 December 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, pp.l9-20.

210. The Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1908. Quoted in Louis L. Snyder (ed.), Fifty Major Documents of the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1955), p.1 I.

211. Fiirst von Biilow to Theobold von Bethmann Hollweg, 28 September 1909. Quoted in Spectator, Prince Bulow and the Kaiser (London, 1931 ), p.275.

212. The Kaiser's 'Notes on the War in the Transvaal' of21 December 1899 and his 'Further Notes on the Transvaal War' of 4 February 1900 are quoted in full in Lee, King Edward VII, I, pp.805-l0.

213. Kaiser Wilhelm II to Edward Prince of Wales, 21 December 1899. Ibid, p.755.

214. See Colonel W. H. H. Waters, The War in South Africa: Prepared in the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin (London, 1904).

215. Baron von Marschall to Bronsart von Schellendorf, 12 February 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8839.

216. Stuart Cloete, African Portraits: A Biography of Paul Kruger, Cecil Rhodes and Lobengula (London, 1946), pp.350-51.

217. Thimme, 'Die Kruger-Depesche', 204-5; his views are repeated in Wiid, Die Rolle, pp.l01-2.

218. Graf von Pfeil to the Auswartiges Amt, 2 January 1896 and Eduard von Derenthall to the Auswartiges Amt, 2 January 1896. PA(Bonn) R14616.

219. Eduard von Derenthall to the Auswartiges Amt, 3 January 1896./bid. 220. Eduard von Derenthall to the Auswartiges Amt, 6 January and 7 January

1896./bid. 221. The Daily News, 15 January 1896. PA(Bonn) R14617. 222. Eduard von Derenthall to the Auswartiges Amt, 3 January 1896. PA(Bonn)

R14616. 223. Eduard von Derenthall to the Auswartiges Amt, 8 January 1896. PA(Bonn)

R14616 and R14617. 224. Sir Frank Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, 8 January 1896. PRO: FO 179/321. 225. Sir Frank Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, 11 January 1896. Quoted in the

Lascelles Papers, PRO: FO 800117. 226. Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 9 January 1896. Crowe Papers, Bodleian

Library, MSS.Eng.e.30 19. 227. Rich, Holstein, pp.465-7; G. N. Sanderson, England, Europe and the Upper

Nile, 1882-1899 (Edinburgh, 1965), pp.229-30.

Notes 173

228. Baron von Marschall to Franz von Herff, 3 January 1896. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XI, p.31.

229. Sontag, 'German Foreign Policy, 1904-1906', 278-301. It was only with the failure at Algeciras that this view was abandoned. As Fischer notes, it was the unexpected reverse that Germany suffered there that 'caused her to determine never again to accept a conference as a method of resolving an international dispute.' See Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (2nd edition, London, 1977), p.22.

230. Baron von Marschall to Franz von Herff, 5 January 1896. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XI, p.35.

231. On I February 1895, Marschall had told Malet that if Germany and Britain both sought 'to maintain the status quo, then our views were completely identical, and I did not see why our concurrence should not be recorded in writing.' Malet, who had no desire to legitimize the notion that Germany had the right to a say in the region by putting this idea into a written agreement 'did not pursue this suggestion.' Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, I February 1895. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XI, p.5.

232. Wayne C. Thompson, In the Eye of the Storm: Kurt Riezler and the Crises of Modern Germany (Iowa City, 1980), p.64.

233. 'The Fate of South Africa' by F. Rutherford Harris in New Review. Quoted in Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 26 February 1896. PRO: GFM8 1(d).

234. Interestingly enough, Wilhelm himself made such a comparison in a letter to Queen Victoria in which he informed her that the German forces were there 'to protect the German consulate as they do in China or elsewhere .... ' A year later a similar body of German marines seized Kiaochow. See Kaiser Wilhelm II to Queen Victoria, 8 January 1896. Quoted in von MUller, Fiirst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst, p.155. Equally noteworthy is the difference between the final version of the Kaiser's telegram and the initial draft. In comparison to the above quoted passage with its emphasis upon protecting diplomatic premises, which were after all technically German soil, the draft involved these soldiers more deeply in the normal running of the region. As it observed: 'As to the two small gunboats at Delagoa they were only to protect the Germans en cas que that fights would take place in the towns and the valuable German property endangered. As soon as order is establish [sic] & the Germans no longer in danger they go on their regular duties. Never have I intended anything else ... .' Kaiser Wilhelm II to Queen Victoria (draft), 8 January 1896. PA(Bonn) R5899. In China such actions to 'establish order' were to be a prelude to much deeper involvement.

235. Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 7 January 1896. Crowe Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS.Eng.e.3019.

6 FROM CRISIS TO ENGAGEMENT

1. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 21 January 1896. Quoted in Die Grofle Politik, XI, p.53.

174 Notes

2. Furst von Radolin to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 8 January 1896. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, p.44. W. Goetz (ed.), Briefe Kaiser Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1884-1914 (Berlin, 1920), p.30 1.

3. Edward Goschen to G. J. Goschen, [] 1896. Quoted in Christopher H. D. Howard (ed.), The Diary of Edward Goschen 1900-1914 (London, 1980), p.15.

4. Baron von Marschall to Furst von Radolin, 19 January 1896. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, p.82. See also Graf zu Munster to Friedrich von Holstein, 13 January 1896, where it is noted: 'I take it for granted that they [the French] are agitating against us in London.' Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, III, p.585.

5. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 23 April 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.30.

6. That the diplomatic crisis surrounding the Kruger telegram was responsible for highlighting to the German authorities the deficiencies in their naval situation can be seen in the way that it influenced the thinking of the German Naval planners. Until this point they had considered the likelihood of conflict with Britain to be so minimal as to obviate the need for a predetermined strategy against the Royal Navy. In the light of events in Southern Africa, however, they now decided that it was, after all, necessary to prepare an operations plan for a future war with Great Britain. See Paul M. Kennedy, 'The Development of German Naval Operations Plans against England, 1896-1914', in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers 1880-1914 (London, 1979), p.172.

7. Lord Kimberley to Lord Ripon. Quoted in Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.197. See also Kimberley to Sanderson, 20 October 1894, where he declared it his policy 'to make the Germans clearly understand that we intend to maintain our supremacy in that quarter, and that we are too strong to be meddled with by any other power, especially one whose naval force is so palpably inferior to ours. The Germans must learn that though they have a large army, we are supreme at sea.' Quoted in Dreyer, The Mind of Official Imperialism, pp.202-3.

8. Baron von Marschall to Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1 January 1896. Quoted in Die Grofie Politik, XI, p.22.

9. Initial information about the flying squadron was provided in Graf von Hatzfeldt to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 8 January 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8841. A supplementary report, containing additional material, was sent the next day. See Graf von Hatzfeldt to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 9 January 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8842.

10. Special note was made in this report of the fact that 'the ships assigned to the East Indian and South African stations were prepared for use in Delagoa Bay.' Captain Gulich to the Reichsmarineamt, 13 January 1896. PRO: GFM8 No. l(a).

11. Only 8 days after the formation of the flying squadron, the Kaiser was disturbed by news from Lisbon that suggested that 'an English landing' was to be undertaken in Delagoa Bay. Furst zu Hohenlohe to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 16 January 1896. PA(Bonn) London 1167.

12. Franz von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 19 January 1896. PA(Bonn) R14619.

Notes 175

13. Marginal comment of the Kaiser's. Ibid. 14. Porter, Origins of the South African War, p.l28; Peter Henshaw,

'Simonstown and British Imperial Policy in southern Africa, 1895-1921', Paper presented to the conference 'South Africa 1895-1921: Test of Empire', March 1996.

15. Report of Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau, 10 April 1897. PA(Bonn) Rl4632.

16. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 10 April 1897. P A(Bonn) Rl4632.

17. Graf von Pfeil to the Auswartiges Amt, 22 April 1897. PA(Bonn) Rl4632. These ships had been sent to protest against the Transvaal's new Aliens Expulsion law. See Porter, The Origins of the South African War, p.128.

18. The Times, 23 April 1897. From Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 23 Aprill897. PA(Bonn) Rl4633.

19. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 22 April 1897. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XIII, p.16.

20. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 22 April 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, p.29. This view was also held by Holstein, who, while discussing the same issue, wrote, ' ... at sea we alone could achieve nothing against England.' Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 15 February 1896. Quoted in Ebel, Botschafter Paul Graf von Hatzfeldt Nachgelassene Papiere, p.1073.

21. Lord Selborne to Sir Alfred Milner, 29 April 1897. Quoted in D. George Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power: The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne, I995-I910 (London, 1990), p.50.

22. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 12 April 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.21.

23. Rohl, Germany Without Bismarck, pp.l66-71. 24. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 12 April 1897. Quoted in Rich

and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, pp.23-24. As early as October 1895, following the departure of Sir Edward Malet, the Kaiser had wished to use relations with England to this end. Commenting on a Dispatch of Hatzfeldt' s, he had observed, ' ... we must take care to make full use of this incident, among other things eventually for a demand for an increase of the Navy .... ' See marginal comment to Graf von Hatzfeldt to the Auswartiges Amt, 25 October 1895. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.l2.

25. Diplomatic crises were welcome at the right time- just before the introduction of the next Navy Bill- but it was considered preferable that such crises should not involve Britain. See V. R. Berghahn, Der Tirpitz-Plan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II (Dusseldorf, 1971 ).

26. Paul M. Kennedy, 'Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Arms Race', in Strategy and Diplomacy, I 860-1895: Eight Essays (London, 1983), pp.130-51.

27. Ultimately, the politics of caution were not pursued. See Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War; Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (London, 1966).

28. Graf von Donhoff to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 6 January 1896. PA(Bonn) Rl4616.

176 Notes

29. Quoted in !manuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London, 1976), p.71.

30. Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 19II to I9I4 (London, 1975), pp.49-50.

31. Marquis de Noailles to A.M. Nisard, 19 June 1898. Quoted in Documents Diplomatique Fran{:ais, Series I, vol. XIV, p.342.

32. Fiebig-von Hase, Lateinamerika als Konjliktherd, p.380. 33. Herwig, Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela, p.214. 34. Ibid, p. I 32. 35. Cloete, African Portraits, pp.350-51. 36. Andreas Dorpalen, Heinrich von Treitschke (New Haven, 1957), p.288. 37. Hausrath, Heinrich von Treitschke: His Life and Works, p.208. 38. In reality, the Kaiser kept changing his mind over South African matters. As

Rosenbach has shown, towards the end of I 896 and the beginning of 1897, a period of six months, the Kaiser proposed three different and contradictory proposals for German policy. Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, pp.55-62.

39. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Biilow, 5 February 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.l3.

40. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 22 April 1897. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XIII, p.l6.

41. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 23 April 1897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.31.

42. These included not only Pfeil and Herff but also the newly arrived Bruno von Schuckmann, who quickly developed a strong partisanship for the Boer cause. Writing to Berlin in August 1897, he warned that unless Germany signalled her support for the Transvaal, the country would be 'driven into the arms of England.' Bruno von Schuckmann to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 7 August 1897. PRO: GFM8 no l(u).

43. See BA(Potsdam) RKA#l946. 44. Graf von Hatzfeldt to the Auswartiges Amt, 14 January 1896. PA(Bonn)

R I 4617. See also Graf von Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, I 4 January 1896, in which he also suggested that the Whitebook exclude all reference to the negotiations with Portugal about a landing in Delagoa Bay.

45. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fi.irst zu Hohenlohe, 13 February I 896. PA(Bonn) Rl4619.

46. Franz von Herff to the Auswartiges Amt, 6 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XI, p.36. A similar suggestion was made 13 days later when Herff reported: 'The Transvaal Boers and above all President Kruger recognize with gratitude the support which the German diplomats have given to them and are free of mistrust towards Germany.' Franz von Herff to Fi.irst zu Hohenlohe, 19 January 1896. PA(Bonn) Rl4619. The assertion was repeated again three weeks later. Franz von Herff to Furst zu Hohenlohe, 9 February 1896. BA(Potsdam) RKA#8844.

47. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p.214. 48. Graf von Pfeil to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 13 November 1895. PA(Bonn)

Rl4616. 49. The family originally came from Sadenbeck near Potsdam. 50. J. S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961), pp.14-15.

Notes 177

51. Butler, 'The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations', p.206. A similar comment was made by the Transvaal's minister for mining, Christian Joubert, who observed: 'then by all means let England govern us in preference to any other power.' Quoted in H. E. W. Backeberg, 'Die Betrekkinge tussen die Suid Afrikaanse Republiek en Duitsland tot na die Jameson Inval 1852-1896', Archives Yearbook for South African History, I ( 1949), 286.

52. Johannes Meintjes, President Paul Kruger: a Biography (London, 1974), p.190; Cloete, African Portraits, p.314.

53. Manfred Nathan, Paul Kruger: His Life and Times (5th edition, Durban, 1946), p.350.

54. T.V. Bulpin, Storm Over the Transvaal (Cape Town, 1955), pp.238-39. 55. Full text of Kruger's telegram quoted in Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek

Correspondentie, p.121. 56. Quoted in full in J. H. Hofmeyer and F. W. Reitz, The Life of Jan Hendrik

Hofmeyer (Cape Town, 1913), p.496. 57. Mckenzie, DuPlessis and Bunce, The Real Kruger and the Transvaal (New

York, 1900), p.71. 58. VanDer Poe!, Railway and Customs Policies in South Africa, pp.32-33. 59. T. R. H. Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African

Political Party, 1880-1911 (Oxford, 1966), p.l30. 60. Ibid, pp.163-67. 61. Nutting, Scramble for Africa, p.339. 62. W. K. Hancock and Jean VanDer Poe!, Selections from the Smuts Papers

(Cambridge, 1966), I, p.127. 63. Fiirst zu Hohenlohe to the Kaiser, 7 January 1896. Quoted in Die Groj3e

Politik, XI, p.36. 64. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 12 April 1897. Quoted in Rich

and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.22. 65. Friedrich von Holstein to Fiirst von Radolin, 8 April 1896. ibid, III,

p.603. 66. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 18 March 1897. P A(Bonn)

R14631. 67. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 22 April 1897. Quoted in Die

Groj3e Politik, XIII, p.16. 68. Ibid. 69. Sir Frank Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, 11 January 1896. Quoted in Ebel,

Botschafter Paul Grafvon Hatifeldt, II, p.1066. 70. Baron von Marschall to Fiirst von Radolin, 19 January 1896. Quoted in Die

Groj3e Politik, XI, p.82. 71. As a postscript to his letter of 12 April 1897, in which he suggested that 'after

an agreement. .. the South African question would be left as a trial of strength between England and the Boers', Holstein wrote: 'Shortly before the post was to go off, Marschall came in. I asked that the above be read to him. He agrees in principle.' See Friedrich von Holstein to Grafvon Hatzfeldt, 12 Apri11897. Quoted in Rich and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.25.

72. Memorandum by Baron von Marschall, 17 April 1897. Quoted in Die Groj3e Politik, XIII, pp.13-14.

178 Notes

73. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 22 April 1897. Quoted in Ebel, Botschafter Paul Graf von Hatifeldt, II, p.1136.

74. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 5 July 1897. Quoted in Ebel, Botschafter Paul Graf von Hatifeldt, II, p.1139. Curzon, in his account of the conversation, also noted that Marschall made a special point of justifying the Emperor's telegram. See Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon (New York, 1928), I, p.248.

75. Harald Rosenbach interprets the conversation between Marschall and Curzon somewhat differently. He believes that Marschall, like Hatzfeldt, stressed Germany's interests as a negotiating ploy. Both Holstein's angry commentary on the conversation and Marschall's past record makes this unlikely. Rosenbach, Das Deutsche Reich, p.85.

76. Some months after leaving the consulate at Louren~o Marques, Graf Pfeil was appointed to represent Germany in Bombay. At the same time the former German consul there, Max Biermann, was sent to South Africa to take up the position previously held in Pretoria by Herff, who was moved to Milan. Also changed was the representation in Lisbon where Christian Graf von Tattenbach replaced von Derenthall. These transfers saw the effective removal of those diplomats associated with the old German policy in South Africa. Laufer, Die deutsche Siidafrikapolitik, p.127.

77. Billow, Memoirs, I, p.468. 78. Bernhard von Biilow to the Prussian consuls in Germany, 13 March 1900.

PRO: GFM8 No. 86. 79. Grafvon Hatzfeldt to Friedrich von Holstein, 22 April1897. Quoted in Rich

and Fisher, The Holstein Papers, IV, p.29. 80. Bernhard von Biilow to Fiirst von Radolin, 2 September 1898. Quoted in

Die GrojJe Politik, XIV, p.360. 81. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 30 December 1897. PRO: GFM8

No. l(v). 82. Wangenheim to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 10 February 1898. PRO: GFM8

No. l(w). 83. Wangenheim to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 4 March 1898. PRO: GFM8 No. l(w). 84. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South-Central Africa, p.\42. 85. This was a possibility that had long worried the government in Lisbon. As

Bertie reported, ' [the Portuguese were] more in dread than they were of the designs of other foreign powers, especially Germany, who, since her intervention on behalf of German holders of the Greek debt and her seizure of Kiao-Chow Bay, has given the Portuguese Government cause to think that a German protest in regard to the grievances of the German holders of the Portuguese debt might be followed by a seizure of Portuguese territory.' Memorandum by Mr Bertie, I May 1898. Quoted in Gooch and Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War, I, p.46.

86. Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 8 June 1898. Quoted in Ebel, Paul Grafvon Hatifeldt Nachgelassene Papiere, II, p.\166.

87. W. R. Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1967), p.26.

88. Eyre Crowe to Lady Crowe, 24 August 1898. Crowe Papers, Bodleian Library, MSS.Eng.d.2899.

Notes 179

89. A. J. Balfour, Memorandum, 5 September 1898. Quoted in Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p.448.

90. A. J. Balfour to Joseph Chamberlain, 8 August 1898. Quoted in Ebel, Botschafter Paul Grafvon Hatzfeldt, Nachgelassene Papiere, II, p.l169.

91. Article II of the Convention of 30 August 1898. Quoted in Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, p.174.

92. Milner to G. V. Fiddes, 23 November 1898. Quoted in G. H. L. LeMay, British Supremacy in South Africa, 1899-1902 (Oxford, 1965), pp.15-16.

93. Bernhard von Biilow to the Auswartiges Amt, 21 September 1899. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XV, p.395.

94. Paul M. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-GermanAmerican Relations, 1878-1900 (New York, 1974), pp.248-82.

95. Lord Salisbury to Joseph Chamberlain, 18 September 1899. Ibid, p.202. A similar view was held by large sections of the German press, one provincial editor going so far as to say: 'All hail and victory, brave Boers! You have fought for us and have won us Samoa!' Quoted in Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, p.l93.

96. The idea of using Cecil Rhodes in this capacity was first muted by Holstein. As he observed to Hatzfeldt: 'It is known that Cecil Rhodes wishes to come to Berlin .... Could his influence make itself felt in dealing with the Samoa question?' See Friedrich von Holstein to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 24 February 1899. Quoted in Die GrojJe Politik, XIV, p.580.

97. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, p.248. 98. Baron von Richthofen to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 19 August 1898. Quoted in

Die GrojJe Politik, XIV, p.32l. 99. The Times, 11 March 1899. PRO: GFM8 No. 22.

100. Graf von Hatzfeldt to Fiirst zu Hohenlohe, 13 March 1899. PRO: GFM8 No. 22.

101. Bernhard von Btilow to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 30 June 1900. Quoted in Die grojJe Politik, XVII, pp.323-24.

102. Kennedy, The Samoan Tangle, p.l90. 103. Commenting on this point, Balfour noted: ' ... Count Hatzfeldt earnestly, but

somewhat vaguely, assures me that this is to be the beginning of a new era of Anglo-German cooperation in other parts of the world. I offer no estimate on the value of this prophecy.' Memorandum by A. J. Balfour, 5 September 1898. Quoted in Peter Winzen, Die Englandpolitik Friedrich von Holsteins 1895-1901 (Koln, 1975), p.234.

104. Bernhard von Biilow to the Kaiser, 6 August 1899. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Merseberg, Briefe des Reichskanzlers Fiirsten Biilow an Kaiser Wilhelm II, Rep. 53 J Lit. B Nr.16a. I am grateful to Dr Rodderick Mclean for drawing my attention to this document and for making available to me material from his doctoral dissertation, Monarchy and Diplomacy in Europe 1900-1910 (University of Sussex, 1996).

105. K. Van Hoek, Kruger Days: Reminiscences of Dr W. J. Leyds (London, 1939), pp.29-3l. This attitude would come to haunt Germany. During the First World War, the American government cited German behaviour during the Boer War as a justification for their policy of allowing munitions sales to the Allies. See James Watson Gerard, My Four Years in Germany (London and New York, 1917), p.l58.

180 Notes

106. An attempt was made to discourage his visit. See Memorandum by Linenau, 5 November 1900. Quoted in Die Grofle Politik, XV, p.549.

107. Kaiser Wilhelm II to Edward Prince of Wales, II March 1900. PRO: GFM8 No. 86.

108. Geiss, German Foreign Policy, p.92. Holstein was subsequently to label this act as 'a decisive service for the English'. Friedrich von Holstein to Ida von Stiilpnagel, November 1902. Quoted in Helmuth Rogge (ed.), Friedrich von Holstein. Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau (Berlin, 1932), p.214.

109. C. E. Vulliamy, Outlanders: A Study of Imperial Expansion in South Africa, 1877-1902 (London, 1938), p.190.

110. Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German, p.64. 111. Btilow, Memoirs, I, p.289. 112. Efforts were undertaken in this regard. Biilow even made a personal

approach to the Pan-German leader Heinrich Class but was quite unable to get him to tone down his anti-British rhetoric. See Wolgang J. Mommsen, 'Public opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmine Germany, 1897-1914', Central European History, XXIV (1991), 190.

113. Bernhard von Btilow to Graf von Hatzfeldt, 22 June 1898. Quoted in Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, p.l74. Hatzfeldt was subsequently to give expression to this view when he told Balfour that ' .. .it was the surrender of all German claims to interfere directly or indirectly in the affairs of the Transvaal that would most excite German opposition to the proposed agreement.' A. J. Balfour to Sir Frank Lascelles, 22 August 1898. PRO: FO 64/1447.

114. ClaB, Wider den Strom, pp.55-7.

7 EPILOGUE

l. W. 0. Henderson, Studies in German Colonial History (London, 1962), p.9. 2. See Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (ed.), Walter Rathenau, Notes and

Diaries, 1907-22 (Oxford, 1985), pp.27-92. 3. Moltke to Jagow, 2 August 1914. Quoted in !manuel Geiss (ed.), July 1914:

The Outbreak of the First world War: Selected Documents (London, 1967), p.350.

4. T. R. H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, p.271; N. G. Garson, 'The Boer Rebellion of 1914', in History Today, XII (1962), 134; Kenneth Ingham, Jan Christian Smuts: The Conscience of a South African (London, 1986), pp.77-78.

5. Eric Rosenthal, Southern African Dictionary of National Biography (London and New York, 1966), p.27.

6. T. R. H. Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion of 1914', in English Historical Review, LXXVII (1963), 84.

7. Garson, 'The Boer Rebellion of 1914', 135. 8. Ibid, 139. 9. Davenport, 'The South African Rebellion of 1914', 84.

Notes 181

10. Figures taken from Wilson and Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South Africa (Oxford, 1971), p.370.

11. See BA(Potsdan) RKA#l902, RKA#l907 and RKA#l908.

CONCLUSION

1. Berchtold, 31 July 1914. Quoted in A. J.P. Taylor, 'The Ruler in Berlin', in Europe: Grandeur and Decline (Harmondsworth, 1967), p.159.

2. Berchtold was not alone in this assessment of the German governmental system. Sir Edward Goschen, shortly after his arrival in Germany, noted: 'I must say that on coming to Berlin I expected to find order in affairs developed to the highest point. What I do find is more muddle - more confusion -than I have found in any country during my 35 years experience. Chaos is the only word for it .... ' Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Charles Hardinge, 26 February, 1909. Quoted in Howard, The Diary of Edward Goschen 1900-1914, p.28.

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Index

Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, 91, !06, !33

Albu, George, 33 Alvensleben, Friedrich Johann Graf von, 92 Alge~iras Conference ( 1906 ), II 0 Amatongaland, 26, 75-6 Anderson, Sir Percy, 74 Anglo-German Convention (1898), 17, 42,

63, 131, 134 Anglo-German Treaty (1890), !3, 56 Angra Pequefia, 28, 53, 55, 67

Backeberg, Werner, 2 Baghdad, 119 Balfour, Arthur James, 131, 147 Barrett, John, 167 Bebel, August, 19 Bechuanaland, 53 Beelaerts van Blokland, G. J., 68, 79, 121,

163 Beit, Alfred, 91 Belgium, 80, 110 Berchem, Maximillian Graf von, 79 Berchtold, Leopold Graf von, 141 Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, 39, 44, !59 Bernal, Ralph, 69 Berthelot, Marcelin, !09 Bertie, Sir Francis, 178 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von, !05 Beyers, General Christian Frederick, 139 Bismarck, Otto Fiirst von, 12, 21,52-5,62,

71, !09, 114, !59 Bixler, Raymond, 2 Boer Rebellion (1914), 138-40 Boer War, 105, 118, 128, 133, !35, 137,

138 Botha, General Louis, 30 Bower, Sir Graham, 70, 71, 88 Brandenburg, Erich, 60 Brasil, 5 Bray, Graf von, 58, 68 Biilow, Bernhard Graf von

background and character, 16 'free hand' policy, 133 German interests in China, 119 influenced by Treitschke, 12, !50 lack of interest in South Africa, 21,

128-9

negotiations over Samoa, !3!-2 'place in the sun', 6, 21 promotes Weltpolitik, 6, 17, 128 subject to public pressure to help Boers,

135 succeeds Marschall as State Secretary,

!6, 64, 128 view of Boers, 128 view on Kaiser's Boer War campaign

plan, !05 view on Kruger telegram, 91-2

Biilow, Franz Joseph von, 28 Bundesrat Affair, !54 Burgers, Thomas Fran~ois, 123 Butler, Jeffrey, 2 Buxton, Sydney Charles, 95

Cape Argus, 1!6 Cape Times, !24 Capri vi, Leo Graf von

advocates abandonment of South-West Africa, 23

correspondence with Herff, 95 hostility to colonies, 12, 13-14, 20-l,

22-3,55-6,58,142, !52 influenced by Karl Goering, 12 resignation as chancellor, 57, 60, 113,

141 Carnarvon, Henry Herbert, 4th Earl of, 53,

164 Caroline Islands, 16 Casement, Roger, 76, 167 Cassel, Sir Ernest, 91 Chamberlain, Houston Stewart, 29 Chamberlain, Joseph, 131, 147, 163 China, 101-2, Ill, I 19, 142, 167, 173 Chirol, Valentine, 104, 106 Colonial Society, see Kolonialgesellschaft Columbia, 119 Condor,SMS,69, 71,74 Courcel, Baron de, 129 Crowe, Eyre, 77, !08, 112, !30, 161, 167 Currie, Sir Donald, 68 Curzon, George Nathaniel, 127-8 Czaya, Eberhard, 3

Daily News, 107 Daily Telegraph Affair, 30-!, 105-6

195

196 Index

Daisy, Princess of Pless, 93 Damaraland, 51 Delagoa Bay (Louren~o Marques)

Anglo-German negotiations over, 64-5 British naval demonstration at, 115-17 calls for German acquisition of, 5 I Eiffe's concession at, 43, 46 German attempts to land troops at, I 06-8 German diplomatic representation at, 55,

72-3, 128 German government's interest in, 32,

58-9,68-9,87-9 German naval presence at, 69-70,71,74,

76, 97, 104 German shipping to, 32, 35 Herff' s interest in, 96-7 Holstein's attitude to, 99-100, 102 inadequacies of facilities at, 37, 46 Kaiser's interest in, 87-8, 103 Marschall's interest in, 65, 88-9 parallels with Kiaochow, 102-3 strategic importance of, 65, 67-8, 102

Delagoa Bay Railway, opening of, 73-5, 95, 97, I 15-16

Delarey, General Jacobus Hercules, 30 Derby, Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of,

53 Derenthall, Eduard von, 58, 106-7, 141 Deutsche Bank, 33, 66 Deutsche Zeitung, 29 De Wet, Andries, 139 De Wet, General Christian Rudolf, 30, 139 Disconto Gesellschaft, I 59 DOAL (Deutsche Ostafrika Linie), 35 Dresdener Bank, 33, 44,66 Dynamite, 36, 39-40

Eckardstein, Hermann Freiherr Von, 93 Eiffe, Franz Ferdinand, 46 Eiffe concession, see Katambe concession Einwald, August, 55 Erzberger, Matthius, I 9 Esselen, Ewald, 86 Eulenburg, Philipp zu, 14, 16, 18, 19 Evening Standard, 33

Fesser, Gerd, 3 Fiebig-von Hase, Ragnhild, 6 Forster, Bernhard, 27 France, 43, 54, 95, 99, 109, I 14-15, 128,

174 Fran~ois, Kurt von, 56, 57 Frederick, Empress (Mother of Wilhelm II),

92

Gallagher, John, 63 Gazaland, 84, 88 Geographische Nachrichten, 51 Globe, 79-80, 122 Goering, Karl, 12 Goerz, Adolf, 33, 38, 66 Gold Standard, 35 Golinelli, Dr, 169 Goluchowski, Agenor von, 63 Goschen, Edward, I 14, 181 Goschen, George Joachim, 35, 162 Gosselin, Martin, 12, 16, 29, 58, 75, 89 Grenville, J. A. S., 63 Grenzboten, 67 Grimm, Hans, !54 Grunewald, Hildemarie, 3 Gungunhua, Chief, 94

Hallgarten, G. W., 2, 75, 164 Hamburger Korrespondent, 164 Hanotaux, Gabriel, 47 Hansen und Schrader, 68 Harris, Sir David, 33 Harris, Frederick Rutherfoord, I I I Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg, Paul Graf von

actions during Jameson raid, 76, 89 advocates an agreement with Britain,

121-2, 126, 127 assesses British naval supremacy, I I 6- I 7 conversation with Balfour, 131 conversations with Lord Kimberley,

64-5,84 conversations with Lord Salisbury, 76,

77-8,89 correspondence with Holstein, 47, 99,

I 18, 121-2 reports British views on South Africa, 62,

87 reports on Kruger telegram, I 13-14, I 15

Heinrich, Prinz (Brother of Wilhelm II), !52

Herbette, Jules, I 09 Herero Revolt, 138 Herff, Franz von

advocate for German role in South Africa, 95-7, 185

argues against importance of Royal Navy, 116

conversation with Dr Leyds, 82 interest in Delagoa Bay, 96-7 praised by Kaiser, 98, I I 6, I 70 receives Order of the Red Eagle, 72, 98 relations with authorities in Berlin, 97-8 replaced as consul at Pretoria, I 28, I 78

Index 197

reports on Boer trust of Germany, 122-3 reports on 'British party' among German

businessmen, 33 reports on Eiffe concession, 46 reports on opening of Delagoa Bay

railway, 75 role at Kaiser Kommers, 70-1

Herwig, Holger, 119 Heydebreck, Lt-Col Joachim von, 139, 140 Hobson, John A., 41, 157 Hofmeyer, Jan, 124-5 Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, Furst Chlodwig

zu appointment as chancellor, 14--15 attitude to colonial movement, 58 character and apathy of, 14-15, 101 correspondence with Colonial Society, 29 opinion of Dr Leyds, 126 opposes Kaiser's plan to acquire Del a goa

Bay, 88 role in Kruger telegram, 15, 19, 91 secures dismissal of Schele, 18 seeks to bring Britain into the Triple

Alliance, 100 Hollmann, Admiral Friedrich von, 15, 90,

141 Holstein, Friedrich von

attitude to Delagoa Bay, 99-100, 102 Caprivi's reliance on, 13 concentration on European affairs, 14 concern over German South African

policy, 99-100, 117 conceives continental1eague, 100-1, 109 correspondence with Hatzfeldt, 47, 99,

118, 121-2 evaluates naval questions, 99, 118 opinion of Kaiser, 121 opinion of Marschall, 128 opposes Kruger telegram, 15, 90 regards economic interests as diplomatic

tools, 47 unconcerned by British pre-eminence in

Transvaal, 79 seeks to bring Britain into the Triple

Alliance, I 00 view of Boers, 126

Inhaca Island, 116

Jameson, Dr Leander Starr, 62, 76, 106, 108, 125

Jameson Raid, 2, 28, 32, 62, 76, 89, 97, 100, 104, 115, 116, 118, 125

Johann Albrecht, Herzog von Mecklenburg, 30

Joost, W., 72 Joubert, Christian, 177 Joubert, General Petrus Jacobus, 95, 163 Juhlke, Karl Ludwig, 57

Kaiser Kommers ( 1895), 70, 84 Kardorff, Wilhelm von, 20 Katambe (Eiffe) Concession, 43, 46 Kayser, Dr Paul, 12, 15, 18, 90, 150 Kennedy, Paul, 132 Kiaochow,l02-3, 119, 178 Kimberley, John Wodehouse, 1st Earl of

anxiety over German policy in South Africa, 58-9, 83-5

conversations with Hatzfeldt, 64--5, 84 correspondence with Lord Ripon, 83-5 policy towards Delagoa Bay, 64--5, 116,

161-2 response to Kaiser Kommers, 71, 84--5 view of Kruger telegram, 85

Knappe, Wilhelm, 39 Knorr, Admiral Wilhelm von, 15, 19, 90,

104 Knutsford, Sir Henry Thurston Holland, 1st

Viscount, 163 Kolnische Zeitung, 23, 167 Kolonialgesellschaft (Colonial Society), 26,

29,57 Kolonialrat, 57 Kolonisationsgesellschaft fiir Sud-Afrika,

27 Kosi Bay, 27 Kotze, John, 86, 163 Kreuz Zeitung, 73 Kruger, Paul, 30, 43, 52, 69, 70, 71, 74, 81,

83,85-6,120,123-5,133 Kruger telegram

Boer reactions to, 124-5 Crowe's view of, 77 Hohenlohe's role in, 15, 19,91 Holstein's opposition to, 15, 90 influence of naval personnel in, 19 Kaiser's role in, 63, 76,90-3, 104 Marschall's role in, 89-93, 104 reported on by Hatzfeldt, 113--4, 115 Ripon's prediction of, 85 Schele's mission arising from, 15, 18,90 support of patriotic pressure groups for,

26-7 text of, 76 views of historians on, I, 3 White book on, 20

Langer, William, 60 Lascelles, Sir Frank, 39, 77, 89, 108, 127

198 Index

Laufer,Jochen, 3,4 Le Matin, 92 Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Hugo Graf von und

zu,93 Le Temps, 115 Lettow-Vorbeck, General Paul von, 140 Leutwein, Major Theodor von, 57 Leyds, Dr Willem Johannes

background and sympathies, 86, I 23 complaints during Boer War, 133 conversation with Herff, 82 German perception of, I 26 journey to Europe (1893), 68 meeting with Duke of Mecklenburg, 30 meeting with Markus Pfeil, 82-3,97, 103 role at Kaiser Kommers, 70

Liebknecht, Wilhelm, 57, !53 Lippert, Eduard, 33, 39, 66, 79 Lloyds of London, 35 Lobanov-Rostovski, Prince Alexi, I 14 Loch, Sir Henry, 61, 69, 86 London Convention (1884), 77, 82, 86-7,

99, I 10, 125 Louren9o Marques, see Delagoa Bay Lovell, Reginald, 2 Liideritz, Adolf, 28, 5 I, 52, 55

MacDonnell, Sir Hugh, 129 Magdeburgische Zeitung, 24, 56 Maguire, James Rochfort, 68 Mahazul (Tsonga chief), 69, 84, 88 Maji-Maji Rising, 138 Majuba Hill, Battle of, I 24 Malet, Sir Edward

conversations with Marschall, 63-4, 71-2,74,75, 87, 99, 100, 165, 173

opinion of Capri vi, I 3 opinion of Hohenlohe, 15 report on Colonial Society convention, 26

Maritz, General Solomon Gerhardus, 139, 140

Marschall von Bieberstein, Adolf Freiherr attitude to Jameson raid, 62, 97, I 08 Background and character, 15-16 Caprivi's reliance upon, 13 claims economic basis to his foreign

policy,32,39,44, 78-9,102 conversations with Curzon, 127-8 conversations with Lascelles, 77, I 08,

127 conversations with Malet, 63-4, 7 I -2,

74,75,87,99 correspondence with the Kaiser, 61 interest in Delagoa Bay, 65, 88-9 interest in the Transvaal, I 6, 2 I, 88-93

negotiations with Britain over Delagoa Bay,64-5

policy of the status quo, II 0-11, I 73 problems with the Kaiser's unofficial

advisers, I 8, 19 proposes award to Herff, 72 proposes international conference on the

Transvaal, 109-10 Reichstag speech (13 February 1896), 32,

44-5 replaced by Biilow, 128, 142 role in Kruger telegram, 89-93, 104

Mauch, Karl, 52 Merck, Baron, 68 Merriman, John X., 35, 68, 125, 162 Mesmer-Seiden, Lieutenant Joh. von, 91 Milner, Sir Alfred, 131, 163 Miquel, Dr Johannes von, 17, 135 Moltke, General Helmuth von, 138 Morning Post, 88 Moroccan Crisis, First, 98 Miihlberg, Otto von, 45, 79, 121 Miiller, Admiral Georg Alexander von, !52 MUnster, Georg Herbert Graf zu, 100

Netherlands, 123 Netherlands Railway Company (NZASM),

37,38-9 Neu-Germanien (Nueva Germania), 27 Nicholas II, Tsar, I 14 Nissen, Holger, 3 Noaiiies, Marquis de, 45 Nobel Trust, 40 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 28, 74 Nordenflycht, Freiherr von, 169

Ochs Brothers and Co., 129 Orange Free State, 55

Pan German League, 24-5, 27, 29-30 Paraguay, 27 Pender, Sir John, 68 Penner, Cornelius, 2, 55 Peters, Karl, I 9, 57 Pfeil und Klein Ellguth, Joachim Graf von

colonial enthusiast, 56-7, 73 relationship to Markus, 73, 94, 164 view of Boers, 57, 159-60

Pfeil und Klein Ellguth, Markus von advocate for German role in South

Africa, 94-5 appointment as consul at Louren9o

Marques, 72-3, 141 British perceptions of, 72-3, 76, 94 meeting with Dr Leyds, 82-3, 103

Index 199

praised by Kaiser, 98, 170 relations with authorities in Berlin, 97-8 relationship to Joachim, 73, 94, 164 replaced as consul at Louren~o Marques,

128, 178 report on Franz Ferdinand Eiffe, 46

Philipp, Max A., 40 Portugal, Finances of, 68, I 02, 130, 133 Pourtales, Friedrich Graf von, 30 Pretoria Convention (1881 ), 77, 82

Radolin, Hugo fiirst von, 91, 127 Rathenau, Walther, 138 Reichstag, Steamship, 94 Reismann-Grone, Theodor, 30 Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung, 30 Rhodes, Cecil John, 68, 76, 81, 89, 95, 133 Richthofen, Oswald Baron von, I Riezler, Kurt, Ill Ripon, Frederick Samuel Robinson, I st

Marquis of, 83-5, 168 Risikoflotte theory, 118 Roberts, Field-Marshall Earl, 106 Robinson, Ronald, 63 Roghe, w., 55 Rosebery, Archibald Primrose, 5th Earl of,

85 Rosenbach, Harald, 3, 4, 45, 178 Rothschild, Nathan Meyer, Lord, 68 Royal Navy, 116, 154, 174

Salisbury, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquis of

conversations with Hatzfeldt, 76, 77-8, 89

negotiations with Germany (1898), 130, 132

reports from Lascelles, 38-9 response to Jameson raid, 76 urged by Germany to come to terms with

Portugal (1891), 14 Samoan Islands, 131-2, 179 Sanderson, Sir Thomas Henry, 154 Santa Lucia Bay, 53, !59 Schele, Friedrich Rabod, Baron von, 15, 18,

90 Schiel, Colonel Adolf, 55 Schmidt-Pretoria, Werner, 2 Schubert, Max, 27 Schuckmann, Bruno von, 98, 169, 170-1,

176 Schwalbe, SMS, 34 Seeadler, SMS, 69, 76

Seitz, Dr Theodor, 139 Selborne, William Waldergrave Palmer,

2nd Earl of, 117 Senden und Bibran, Admiral Gustav, 15,

19,63,90 Shantung, see Kiaochow Siveright, Sir James, 68 Smith, Woodruff, 102 Smuts, Jan Christian, 125 Sontag, Raymond James, 60, 98 South-West Africa, 13, 22-3, 53, 56-7 Soveral, Luis Maris Pinto, Marquis de,

130 Spitzemberg, Hildegard Baronin von, 72,

92-3 Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, 66, 92 Stanley, Henry, 52 status quo, the, 64, 110 Stoecker, Helmut, 3 Stuart-Wortley, Colonel Edward, 105 Sildafrikanische Zeitung, 25, 57, !52 Swaine, Colonel Leopold, 61 Szogyeny-Marich, Ladislaus Graf von, 63

Tag lise he Rundschau, 26 Tattenbach, Christian Graf von, 129, 141 Thimme, Friedrich, 2, 97-8, 106, 147 Thomson, David, 66 The Times, 56, 87, 122, 132 Tirpitz, Admiral Alfred von, 17, 118, 135 Tonga, 132 Transvaal, British annexation of (1877),

123, 124 Treitschke, Heinrich von, 12, 25, 52, 120,

122, 150 Triple Alliance, 60-3, 77, 100

Van den Wall Bake, R. W., 39 Van-Helten, Jean Jacques, 3 Venezuela, 5, 119 Victoria, Queen, 71,114,120,173 Volkstem, 95 Vossische Zeitung, 24, 134

Wagner, Cosima, 29 Walvis Bay, 53 Wangenheim, Hans Baron von, 129 Warren, Sir Charles, 53 Weber, Ernst von, 22, 51,52 Weltpolitik, 6-7, 12, 17, 118-19, 128, 141,

142 Wernher, Beit and Company, 33, 34 Wilhelm I, Kaiser, 52

200 Index

Wilhelm II, Kaiser advocates active colonial policy, 58-9 blames Jameson raid on German Jews,

33-4,91-2 control over appointments by, 17-19 conversations with Beelaerts van

Blokland, 121, 163-4 correspondence with Prince of Wales,

133-4 correspondence with Queen Victoria,

173 interest in Delagoa Bay, 87-8, 103 interest in Zanzibar, 64 meeting with General Beyers, 139 naval interest of, 117-18 praises Herff and Markus Pfeil, 98, 116,

170 proclaims German 'world empire', 6, 119

role in German abandonment of Transvaal, 120--2, 126-7

role in Kruger telegram, 63, 76, 90--3, 104

sends British a Boer War campaign plan, 105-6

view of Boers, 123 view of Kruger, 119-20 view of Malet, 165 view ofTreitschke, 120 visit to Britain (1899), 134

Wissmann, Hermann von, 105, 111, 172 Wtid, Johannes Andreas, 2, 97-8, 106, 147

Zambezi River, 56, 131 Zanzibar, 63, 64, 72 Zedlitz-Trtitzschler, Robert Graf von, !8 Zollverein, 80