-
mile Durkheim: Exemplar for an Integrated Sociological
Paradigm?Author(s): George Ritzer and Richard BellSource: Social
Forces, Vol. 59, No. 4, Special Issue (Jun., 1981), pp.
966-995Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL:
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Emile Durkheim: Exemplar for an Integrated Sociological
Paradigm?*
GEORGE RITZER, University of Maryland RICHARD BELL, University
of Maryland
ABSTRACT Stipulating that an adequate integrated paradigm for
sociology must
embrace two basic social dimensions, macro- to micro-social and
the objective- subjective aspects of social life, we ask whether
Durkheim's work meets these requirements. We find that although his
work can contribute to this end (with its recognition of multiple
levels of reality, the relations among these levels and their
change through history, and with its marked contributions at the
macro- subjective level) it is nonetheless an inadequate exemplar
for an integrated paradigm. His work is marred by one-way causal
attributions, by an overem- phasis on the macro-subjective level,
by an undeveloped conception of human nature, and a restricted view
of science.
The objective in this paper is to assess the degree to which
tmile Durk- heim would be an adequate exemplar for an integrated
sociological para- digm.I Before we can get to the body of this
paper, an assessment of Durkheim's work from this perspective, we
need to outline the need for, and parameters of, an integrated
paradigm.
In his earlier work the senior author of this paper (Ritzer, a,
b) argued that sociology was dominated by three paradigms which he
labeled the social facts, social definition, and social behavior
paradigms. Briefly, those sociologists who work within the social
facts paradigm focus on macrostructures, look to the work of Emile
Durkheim as their exemplar, use structural-functional and conflict
theory, and tend more often to em- ploy the interview/questionnaire
and historical/comparative methods. Those who accept the social
definition paradigm focus on the action and interaction that result
from the minding (i.e., creative mental) process, accept Max
Weber's work on social action as the exemplar, employ various
theories including symbolic interactionism, and
phenomenology-ethno- methodology, and are more prone in their
research to use the observational
*We would like to thank Jere Cohen and Whitney Pope for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
01981 The University of North Carolina Press.
0037-7732/81/040966-95$03.00 966
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? 1967
method. Finally, those who accept the social behavior paradigm
focus on behavior and contingencies of reinforcement, view B. F.
Skinner's work as their exemplar, operate from behavioral or
exchange theory, and tend to more often employ the experimental
method.
One of the problems with each of the dominant paradigms is their
tendency to focus on one, or a few, level(s) of social reality and
to argue that it is the most important aspect of social reality.
Ritzer concluded his 1975 work with a plea for a more integrated
paradigm and in a recent paper (c) and book (d) he outlined the
structure of that paradigm. It is the schema for that paradigm that
will provide us with the basis for deciding whether Durkheim offers
a sufficiently integrative approach to qualify as an exem- plar for
such a paradigm.
The key to an integrated paradigm is the notion of "levels" of
social reality. We do not mean to imply that social reality is
really divided into levels. In fact, social reality is best viewed
as an enormous variety of so- cial phenomena that are involved in
continuing interaction and ongoing change. In order to deal with
this, given its enormous complexity, sociolo- gists have abstracted
out various levels for sociological analysis. Thus the levels are
sociological constructs rather than really existing in the social
world.
For our purposes the major levels of social reality can be
derived from the interrelation of two basic social continua-the
macroscopic- microscopic and objective-subjective. The
macroscopic-microscopic di- mension (Blalock and Wilken; Edel;
Wagner) relates to the magnitude of social phenomena ranging from
whole societies to social acts, whereas the objective-subjective
continuum (Blau; Jackman and Jackman) refers to whether the
phenomenon has a real, material existence (e.g., bureaucracy,
patterns of interaction) or exists only in the realm of ideas and
knowledge (e.g., norms and values). Figure 1 is a schematic
representation of the intersection of these two continua and the
four major levels of social reality that are derived from it.
It is our contention that a new sociological paradigm must deal
in an integrated fashion with the four basic levels of social
reality identified in the figure.2 An integrated sociological
paradigm must deal with macro- scopic objective entities like
bureaucracy, macro-subjective structures like culture,
micro-objective phenomena like patterns of interaction, and
micro-subjective facts like the process of reality construction.
Remember that in the real world all of these gradually blend into
the others as part of the larger social continuum, but we have made
some artificial and rather arbitrary differentiations in order to
be able to deal with social reality. These four levels of social
reality are posited for heuristic purposes and are not meant to be
an accurate depiction of the social world.
An obvious question is how these four levels relate to the three
paradigms outlined in Ritzer's earlier work as well as to the
integrated
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968 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
MACROSCOPIC
I. Macro-objective II. Macro-subjective Examples include
Examples include society, law, bureaucracy, culture, norms
architecture, technology, and values. and language.
OBJECTIVE SUBJECTIVE
III. Micro-objective IV. Micro-subjective Examples include
Examples include patterns of behavior, the various facets of
action, and interaction. the social construction
of reality.
MICROSCOPIC
Figure 1. MAJOR LEVELS OF SOCIAL REALITY
paradigm being discussed here. Figure 2 relates the four levels
to the four paradigms.
The social facts paradigm focuses primarily on the
macro-objective and macro-subjective levels, the social definition
paradigm is largely con- cerned with the micro-subjective as well
as that part of the micro-objective world that depends on mental
processes (action), and the social behavior paradigm deals with
that part of the micro-objective world that does not involve the
minding process (behavior). Whereas the three extant para- digms
cut across the levels of social reality horizontally, the new
integrative paradigm cuts across vertically. This depiction makes
it clear why the pro- posed paradigm does not supercede the others.
Although each of the three existing paradigms deals with a given
level or levels in great detail, the proposed integrated paradigm
deals with all levels, but does not examine any given level in
anything like the degree of intensity of the existing paradigms.
Thus the choice of a paradigm depends on the kind of question being
asked. Not all sociological issues require an integrative approach,
but it is certain that at least some do.
To some, tmile Durkheim might seem like an unlikely choice as a
possible exemplar for an integrated sociological paradigm. After
all, Durk- heim is already an exemplar for the social facts
paradigm, and that would seem to eliminate him as a possible
exemplar for an integrated paradigm. It was Durkheim (b) who argued
that sociology should focus on social facts, or what we have termed
the macro-objective and macro-subjective levels of social reality.
This implies, and Durkheim at times rather baldly took the
position, that the micro-objective and micro-subjective levels are
not part of sociological explanations. As Durkheim said: "The
determining cause of
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 969
Level of Social Reality SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS
Macro-subjective Social Facts
Macro-objective
0 0 0
Micro-subjective O 0 Social Definition a
Micro-objective >
Social Behavior
Figure 2. LEVELS OF SOCIAL REALITY AND THE MAJOR SOCIOLOGICAL
PARADIGMS
a social fact should be sought among the social facts preceding
it" (b, 110). It is this kind of orientation, as well as Durkheim's
effort to carry it through by using social facts to study such
individual acts as suicide,3 that led Tiryakian to see Durkheim as
the prototype of sociologism, "the viewpoint of those sociologists
who, making sociology a science completely irreduc- ible to
psychology, consider it as necessary and sufficient for the total
explanation of social reality" (11). If Durkheim in fact
consistently took such an extreme position, then there would be
little possibility of finding the outlines of an integrated
paradigm in his work. But Durkheim does take a softer position on
this issue with the result that he does have some- thing to offer
on paradigmatic integration. We will see that what he has to say is
severely limited, but his work can nevertheless be useful to the
development of an integrated paradigm.
Despite this enunciation of a general integrative interest,
there remains the issue of whether Durkheim tells us enough about
the micro- scopic levels to warrant further investigation. Although
one would have to begin such an enterprise with grave doubts, the
fact is that there is suf- ficient evidence of his interest in the
microscopic level to at least begin such an exploration. Nisbet,
for example, argues that there is little difference between the
approaches of Durkheim and George Herbert Mead. If this were only
partially true, it would lend considerable weight to the idea that
Durkheim has something to offer on the microscopic levels since
these
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970 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
were Mead's primary foci. Alpert, in one of the earliest serious
analyses of Durkheim's work in this country, argued forcefully that
Durkheim not only understood the micro-levels of social reality,
but gave them a significant role in his system. He says that
Durkheim was keenly aware of the recalcitrant nature of human
beings, of the give and take element in the process of
acculturation, and of the fundamental tendency of indi- viduals to
be refractory to social discipline. It is erroneous to attribute to
Durkheim, as Malinowski does, the theory of unswerving, automatic,
'slavish, fascinated, passive' obedience to social codes. (208).
This theme is repeated in a much more recent analysis of Durkheim's
work by Wallwork: "Durkheim was quite willing to accept Kant's
claim that the self is free, in some sense to choose. To see man as
a being-in-society, he states, 'it is not necessary to believe that
the human personality is totally absorbed in the bosom of the
collective being"' (36). Finally, Pope also stresses the
microscopic level in Durkheim's work, but in a slightly differ- ent
way by focusing on the conflict between the unsocialized individual
and society: "The force opposing society is the nonsocial
(unsocialized) individual .. ., an opposition that constitutes the
central dynamic of his theory" (a, 363). Thus there seem to be
enough claims (although there are certainly many counter-claims) to
lead us to believe that Durkheim has some insights into the
microscopic levels and these, in concert with his elaborate
analyses or the macroscopic levels, might well make him a candi-
date for an exemplar for an integrated paradigm.
Levels of Social Reality
Also leading us to look to Durkheim as a potential exemplar is
the fact that he had a sense of "levels" of social reality,
although he did not spell them out in precise detail. However,
Lukes (1972:9-10) made Durkheim's interest in levels of social
reality very explicit: Durkheim saw social facts as lying along a
continuum. At one end are structural, 'anatomical or morphological'
social phenomena, making up the 'substratum (sub- strat) of
collective life': these consist in-
The number and nature of the elementary parts of which society
is com- posed, the way they are arranged, the degree of coalesence
they have attained. The distribution of population over the surface
of the territory, the number and nature of channels of
communication, the form of dwell- ings, etc.
Then there are what one might call institutionalized norms,
which may be more, or less, formal-'legal and moral rules,
religious dogmas, financial systems, etc.'- 'established beliefs
and practices' which have their origin or 'substratum' either in
'the political society as a whole, or in one of the partial groups
which comprise it!
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? 1 971
Finally, occupying the rest of the continuum are social facts
which are not institu- tionalized but 'without presenting these
crystallized forms, have both the same objectivity and the same
ascendancy over the individual.' These are 'social cur- rents'; and
these may be relatively stable 'currents of opinion,' or, at the
extreme, 'transitory outbreaks' such as occur when 'in an assembly
of people, great move- ments of enthusiasm, of indignation or of
pity are generated.' Durkheim argued that 'a whole series of
degrees without a break in continuity links facts of the most
clearly structural character with those free currents of social
life that are not yet caught within any definite mould.'
Translating Durkheim's terms into ours, we can see that Durkheim
was aware of a continuum of social reality encompassing the
macro-objective (anatomical or morphological social facts),
macro-subjective (norms, be- liefs and practices, and stable social
currents) and micro-subjective and micro-objective (the transitory
outbreaks in an assembly of people). We are perhaps stretching
Lukes meaning here by interpreting the latter phe- nomena as part
of the microscopic realms, but Lukes has not gone far enough in his
analysis of Durkheim's levels. Durkheim had a far clearer
conception of the microscopic levels, particularly the
micro-subjective, than Lukes implies here and we will deal with
them later in this chapter along with an analysis of the weaknesses
of Durkheim's work in this realm.
Social Reality as a Continuum
Before we get to Durkheim's specific insights into the
macro-subjective level (the primary focus of his work), it is worth
returning to the theme just discussed-the fact that Durkheim views
social reality as a continuum rather than a discrete set of levels
of social reality. This is an essential insight, and one that we
accept wholeheartedly, even though it is neces- sary for heuristic
purposes to divide social reality into levels. Durkheim's
conception of a continuum leads him (and us) to be unclear on
precisely where one level ends and another begins. They all meld
imperceptibly into each other.4
For example, Durkheim is not clear precisely where the
macro-sub- jective phenomena like norms end and the macro-objective
phenomena like morphological factors begin. Norms and social
currents are certainly macro-subjective, but we begin to move to
the micro-subjective level in talking about currents of opinion and
transitory outbreaks. The lack of a clear dividing line between the
macro-subjective and micro-subjective is highlighted by Durkheim's
use of the French word conscience in his early and crucial concept
of the collective conscience. Says Lukes, "The French word
'conscience' is ambiguous, embracing the meaning of the two English
words 'conscience' and 'consciousness.' Thus the beliefs and
sentiments comprising the conscience collective are, on the one
hand, moral and reli-
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972 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
gious, and, on the other, cognitive" (4). The collective
conscience encom- passes both macro-subjective ("moral and
religious") and micro-subjective ("cognitive") phenomena, although
Durkheim almost always used the term to refer to macroscopic
phenomena. Wallwork, in his analysis of Durkheim's moral theories,
confirms Lukes' conclusion: "Durkheim claims that the collective
conscience refers not only to shared moral norms, but to the
individual's 'awareness of' cultural norms or the 're-presentation'
in consciousness, or conscience of shared moral meanings" (37).
The fact that Durkheim did not in general clearly separate the
macro-subjective from the micro-subjective is also found in a
number of his specific arguments. We can take one example from his
work on primi- tive classification where Durkheim (and Mauss) try
to show the roots of the classification system used in the mind in
the social world. Needham, in his introduction to Primitive
Classification, points out how it is impossible to clearly separate
the two levels in their work: They aptly call their essay a
'contribution to the study of collective representations,' but
their real concern throughout is to study a faculty of the human
mind. They make no explicit distinction between the two topics, and
indeed they argue as though there were none to be made, so that
conclusions derived from a study of collective representations are
taken to apply directly to cognitive operations (xxvi). Thus we
begin this discussion of Durkheim's work at the macro-subjective
level with the clear sense that Durkheim systematically refused to
clearly differentiate this level from at least some of the others,
indeed his commit- ment to the idea of levels of social reality as
part of a social continuum made such a rigid differentiation
impossible.
Morality
As we have already pointed out, 'Durkheim's richest insights lie
at the macro-subjective level. In fact, when Durkheim talked of
social facts, he most often had in mind moral facts, or
macro-subjective phenomena. Among the aspects of macro-subjectivity
that interested Durkheim were, most generally, morality as well as
more specifically the collective con- science, collective
representations, social currents, and most questionably from a
modern sociological perspective, group mind.
At the most general level, Durkheim was a sociologist of
morality, indeed Wallwork argues that his sociology was a mere
"by-product of his concern with moral issues" (183). That is,
Durkheim's concern with mo- rality led him as a sociologist to
devote most of his attention to the moral elements of social life.
The problem with saying that Durkheim focused on morality at the
macro-subjective level is that morality is so abstract and general
a concept that we learn very little. The same is true if we equate
mo-
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 973
rality with culture as Tiryakian did. We learn an ifnportant
lesson from this and that is that we need to go beyond talking
about the macro-subjective level (morality, culture) in general and
focus on the various components, or sub-levels, within the
macro-subjective level. We need to explicate the various sub-levels
within each of the four main levels of social reality rather than
being satisfied solely with generalizations about these broad
levels.
Collective Conscience
In his early efforts to deal with morality Durkheim developed
the idea of the collective conscience. Durkheim defined this basic
concept in the Divi- sion of Labor in Society: The totality of
beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the society
forms a determinate system which has its own life; one may call it
the collective or common conscience.... It is, thus, an entirely
different thing from particular con- sciences, although it can only
be realized through them (a, 79- 80). Several points are worth
underscoring about this definition in terms of our interest in
macro-subjectivity. First, it is clear that Durkheim conceives of
the collective conscience as occurring globally, or societal-wide,
when he speaks of the "totality" of people's beliefs and
sentiments. Second, Durk- heim clearly views the collective
conscience as being an independent, deter- minate, macro-subjective
system. But, third, although he holds such a view, he is also aware
of its ties to the micro-subjective level when he speaks of it
being "realized" through individual consciousness.
That the collective conscience is also related to the
macro-objective form of society is made clear by the fact that
Durkheim relates the collective conscience to the type of society
in which it is found. Societies are di- chotomized into those
characterized by mechanical and organic solidarity. Giddens
performs a useful service by pointing out that the collective con-
science in these two types of societies can be differentiated on
four dimen- sions-volume, intensity, rigidity, and content. In
societies characterized by mechanical solidarity the collective
conscience covers virtually the entire society and its members, is
believed in with great intensity (as reflected, for one thing, by
the use of repressive sanctions when it is violated), is ex-
tremely rigid and its content is highly religious in character. In
societies with organic solidarity the collective conscience is much
more limited in its domain and in the number of people enveloped by
it, is adhered to with much less intensity (as reflected by
the.substitution of restitutive for re- pressive laws), is not very
rigid, and its content is "moral individualism," or the elevation
of the importance of the individual, the human being, to a moral
precept.
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9741 Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
Collective Representations
As we have seen the collective conscience is very general and
Durkheim's dissatisfaction with its amorphous character led him to
progressively aban- don it in favor of the much more specific, but
still macro-subjective, notion of collective representation.
Collective representations may be viewed as spe- cific states, or
substrata, of the collective conscience (Lukes). In contem- porary
terms, we may most often think of them as the norms and values of
specific groups such as family, occupation, state, educational and
reli- gious institutions. Although they are more specific than the
collective con- science, collective representations are not
reducible to the micro-subjective realm: "representations
collectives result from the substratum of associated individuals .
. . but they cannot be reduced to and wholly explained by features
of individuals: they have sui generis characteristics" (Lukes, 7).
It is the sui generis character of collective representations (as
well as the collec- tive conscience) that places them generally
within the macro-subjective realm. They transcend the individual
because they do not depend on any particular individual for their
reality. In addition, they have independent existence because their
temporal span is greater than the lifetime of any individual. They
are, in other words, macro-subjective.5
Social Currents
Durkheim became even more specific (and more dynamic) in his
analysis of macro-subjectivity in his discussion of the even less
crystallized "social currents": But there are other facts without
such crystallized form which have the same objectivity and the same
ascendancy over the individual. These are called 'social currents.'
Thus the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and pity in a
crowd do not originate in any of the particular individual
consciousness. They come to us from without and can carry us away
in spite of ourselves (b, 8). While Durkheim explicated the idea of
social currents in The Rules of Socio- logical Method, he used it
as a major explanatory variable in Suicide. In brief his argument
there was that suicide rates change as a result of changes in
social currents. At the most basic level this means that more or
less people commit suicide as a result of what happens at the
macro-subjective level of social currents. Here is the way Durkheim
describes his thinking on the relationship between social currents
and suicide: Every social group has a collective inclination for
the act, quite its own, and the source of all individual
inclination, rather than their result. It is made up of currents of
egoism, altruism or anomy running through the society under
consideration with the tendencies to languorous melancholy, active
renunciation or exasperated
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 975
weariness derivative from these currents. These tendencies of
the whole social body, by affecting individuals, cause them to
commit suicide (c, 299-300). It is difficult to think of a clearer
or more explicit statement of Durkheim's conception of social
currents and their impact on the thoughts (e.g., "lan- guorous
melancholy") and actions (suicide) of individuals.
Group Mind
Although given the emphasis on norms, values, and culture in
contempo- rary sociology, we have little trouble accepting
Durkheim's focus on macro- subjectivity, we do have problems with
the idea of "social currents." One source of difficulty is
Durkheim's use here of an electrical analogy. But even more
troublesome is the sense that there are a get of independent
currents coursing throughout the social world as if they are
somehow sus- pended in a social void. It is this imagery, as well
as other aspects of Durk- heim's work at the macro-subjective
level, that have led many to accuse him of a "group mind"
perspective. Pope says: "Durkheim clearly held the concept of a
group mind' (b, 171). Simpson (1964:xxii-xxiii) offers a similar
conception of Durkheim's "prejudice in favor of regarding social
facts as the manifestation of the will or purpose of some occult
collective mind." If these and other critics are correct and
Durkheim does have a group mind orientation, then Durkheim's
insights into the macro-subjective realm would be less useful to
us. But we do not think they are right; Durkheim's position is
defensible in several ways.
On a specific level, Durkheim's conception of social currents
can be defended as an unfortunately named, but otherwise widely
accepted, part of the macro-subjective world. Social currents can
be viewed as a set of meanings that are shared (although not fixed)
intersubjectively by mem- bers of a population. As these meanings
change and the changed meanings are communicated from one actor to
another, a change in the suicide rate (as well as various other
rates) will occur. Thus social currents can be seen as a major
causal factor in Durkheim's work on suicide (Douglas, 42). But it
could be argued that one needs to defend Durkheim's entire
conception of macro-subjectivity, not just his notion of social
currents, from the charge of being a group mind orientation.
In defense of Durkheim at this most general level, it seems to
us that Durkheim had a very modern conception of macro-subjectivity
that is easily defended on the group mind charge. However, the task
is compli- cated by the fact that in order to lay out a separate
domain for sociology Durkheim often made some highly exaggerated
statements about macro- subjectivity, and social facts in general.
At times Durkheim talked as if social facts were clearly separated
from psychological facts and it is this
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976 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
separation that is supportive of a group mind point of view.
However, in other places Durkheim did not adhere to this
dichotomous view; in other words the macro-subjective world was
rooted in the micro-subjective, and vice versa. While some moral
facts are separated from individuals (e.g., cultural artifacts),
most can only exist in and through the minds of indi- viduals. In
modern terms we would say that these phenomena are shared
intersubjectively. In contradiction to the group mind idea,
Durkheim makes his more reasoned position on macro-subjectivity in
a number of places and in a number of different ways. It is stated
most explicitly in the Division of Labor in Society: Of course, it
is a self-evident truth that there is nothing in social life which
is not in individual conscience. Everything that is found in the
latter, however, comes from society. They come, then, not from the
psychological nature of man in general, but from the manner in
which men once associated mutually affect one another, ac- cording
as they are more or less numerous, more or less close (a, 350). At
the same time that Durkheim was making outrageous claims for soci-
ology and for the independent status of macro-subjective social
facts, he also was willing to link social facts to the
micro-subjective base: We see no objection to calling sociology a
variety of psychology, if we carefully add that social psychology
has its own laws which are not those of individual psy- chology (c,
312). Individuals, forming groups by mingling and fusing, give
birth to a being, psycho- logical if you zvill, but constituting a
psychic individuality of a new sort (b, 103; emphasis added). Lukes
neatly summarizes Durkheim's integration of the macro-subjective
with the micro-subjective: "In the course of his career he became
increas- ingly insistent that the realities studied by sociology
and psychology were equally mental, though of a different nature
and governed by different laws" (16; emphasis added). Durkheim does
an even better job of making essen- tially the same point and
putting to rest the group mind mythology: Either the conscience
collective floats like a void, a kind of indescribable absolute, or
else it is connected to the rest of the world by a substratum upon
which, conse- quently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this
substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of society as
they are combined socially? (Durkheim, cited in Giddens, 159).
Thus, outside of some outrageous argumentation, Durkheim's views
on macro-subjectivity are in line with modern thinking on this
level which focuses on such phenomena as culture, norms, values,
and inter- subjectivity. Durkheim began with a focal interest in
this level, retained it throughout his career, and if anything grew
even more interested in it in his later years (Wallwork).
This increasing concern is best seen in The Elementary Forms of
Reli-
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 977
gious Life which can be viewed as focusing almost exclusively on
the macro- subjective level. Religion, itself, may be seen as a
macro-subjective phe- nomenon and Durkheim defines this aspect of
macro-subjectivity very broadly as "systems of ideas which tend to
embrace the universality of things and to give us a complete
representation of the world" (165).
One of Durkheim's concerns in The Elementary Forms Of Religious
Life was the source of religion in earlier forms of
macro-subjectivity. Durkheim argued that the roots of modern
religion lay in primitive totemism and he makes it clear that
totemism, too, was part of the macro-subjective domain: Totemism is
the religion, not of such and such animals or men or images, but of
an anonymous and impersonal force, found in each of these beings
but not to be confounded with any of them. No one possesses it
entirely and all participate in it. It is so completely independent
of the particular subjects in whom it incarnated itself, that it
precedes them and survives them. Individuals die, generations pass
and are replaced by others; but this force always remains actual,
living and the same. It animates the generations of today as it
animated those of yesterday and as it will animate those of
tomorrow (217). Not only does Durkheim make clear the
macro-subjective character of totemism, and the roots of religion
in totemism, but he also underscores an essential focus of an
integrated paradigm-the historical analysis of social forms. On the
issue of history, Durkheim is not only making clear the historic
roots of religion, but also the fact the people in the past,
present, and future are faced with macro-subjective forms that
shape their lives.
But there is even more to Durkheim's analysis of religion that
is of significance for understanding macro-subjectivity. For one
thing, Durk- heim also demonstrates the degree to which primitive
religion is at the root of other forms of macro-subjectivity
including morality and systems of sci- entific thought. Beyond
linking religion to other macro-subjective forms, Durkheim also
links it to the micro-subjective level: "we have established the
fact that the fundamental categories of thought . . . are of
religious origin" (d, 466).
We will have much more to say about this kind of relationship
be- tween levels of social reality in ensuing sections.
By way of summarizing this discussion we can say that Durkheim
made the macro-subjective level the focus of his analysis and
offered us a number of insights including his unwillingness to
completely and arbi- trarily separate this level from the others,
his sense of the multidimension- ality of macro-subjectivity as a
level of social reality composed of a number of sub-levels, and his
sense of the historicity of the macro-subjective as well as of its
historical impact on the other levels of social reality. Further-
more, and perhaps most importantly, we have encountered in great
detail the ways in which the various levels of social reality
interpenetrate in Durkheim's work. Although our focus in this
section was on macro-subjec-
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tivity, we have been exposed to much discussion of the other
levels as they relate to macro-subjectivity. We will encounter more
of Durkheim's in- sights into macro-subjectivity as we proceed for
Durkheim was ever aware of the way it affects, and is affected by,
the other levels.
Material Social Facts
The macro-objective level in conjunction with the
macro-subjective are what Durkheim means when he talks about social
facts. "A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable
of exercising on the individual an external constraint" (b, 13).
All of the elements of macro-subjectivity dis- cussed above fit
this definition as do the macro-objective phenomena we are about to
discuss. Macro-objective phenomena occupy a curious role in
Durkheim's thinking. They often occupy a position of causal
priority, but they also seemed to interest Durkheim far less than
macro-subjectivity de- spite their causal priority. At other times
they are treated as dependent variables determined by
macro-subjective forces. In either case, they never receive the
attention from Durkheim that macro-subjective phenomena do.
At the most general level, Durkheim discusses society as a
macro- objective phenomenon, but he is not always consistent in the
way he deals with society. As Lukes points out, society was
sometimes "real, concrete society," e.g., France or the State (21).
At other times Durkheim tended to talk about more microscopic
phenomena as society such as the family or an occupation. This
tendency to identify disparate phenomena as society is underscored
by Pope: "Durkheim's conception exhibits great 'displace- ment of
scope' . . . He treated France as a society; he also referred to a
married couple as a society" (b, 192).6 Although this is a problem,
the situation is made even worse by the fact that Durkheim
sometimes wrote about society as if it was the same as common
morality. In this case, his refusal to differentiate the
macro-objective and macro-subjective levels be- comes a problem for
US.7 In our view, a society is a structural reality that
encompasses a common morality, but for heuristic purposes it is
best to think of society as a macro-objective (structural)
phenomenon. More gen- erally, we can say that while it is desirable
to view the real world as a series of interpenetrating levels, it
is best to keep them conceptually distinct for analytic
purposes.
Durkheim's overwhelming interest in the macro-subjective often
led him to think of macro-objective phenomena as of secondary
signifi- cance. For example, Durkheim clearly identifies the church
as a macro- objective phenomenon.8 A church is seen as a structure
whose major func- tion is to translate the common ideas of a
religion into common practices (d, 59). But Durkheim is not
interested in the church per se, but more in its
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 979
functions for the macro-subjective religion. Thus, Durkheim
defined the church as the structure which serves to differentiate
one form of macro- subjectivity (religion) from another (magic). In
politics Durkheim saw the state performing a variety of
macro-subjective functions including the maintenance of the common
morality and more specifically in modern society, the cult of the
individual (Giddens, 18; Lukes, 272).
A similar argument can be made about another macro-objective
structure, occupational associations, which receives even more
attention from Durkheim. Durkheim conceived of these associations
as a means of coping with the pathological moral (macro-subjective)
problems that he saw as part of the transition from mechanical to
organic solidarity. Anomie is seen as the most important of these
moral pathologies and the occupa- tional association was to be
designed to help resolve it: For anomy to end, there must then
exist, or be formed a group which can constitute the system of
rules actually needed . .. Neither political society, in its
entirety, nor the State can take over this function . .. The only
one that could answer all these conditions is the one formed by all
the agents of the same industry united and organized into a single
body. This is what is called the corporation or occupational group
(a, 5). Durkheim is espousing a structural resolution that starnds
in stark contrast to the one offered by Karl Marx to the ills of
capitalist society. While Marx saw class antagonisms as the key
structural problem, Durkheim saw no in- herent differences between
classes. Indeed he felt that the different classes could be unified
within these occupational associations and create a com- mon
morality that would serve as an antidote to the ills of
capitalism.9
In addition to structural factors like society and occupational
asso- ciations, Durkheim also makes much of what he calls
morphological fac- tors. Durkheim sometimes uses these
morphological factors as the causes of important social changes and
on other occasions he treats them as out- comes of these changes,
or as indexes to these outcomes. Perhaps the best known of the
former type of morphological factor in Durkheim's work is "dynamic
density." It is the main causal factor in the Division of Labor in
Society: If we agree to call this coming together, and the active
commerce resulting from it, 'dynamic' or 'formal' density, we can
say that the progress of the division of labor is in direct ratio
to the moral or dynamic density of society (Durkheim, cited in
Giddens, 151). Key factors in dynamic density are detailed by
Durkheim: If condensation of society produces this result, it is
because it multiplies intra-social relations. But these will be
still more numerous, if, in addition, the total number of members
of society becomes more considerable. If it comprises more
individuals at the same time as they are more intimately in
contact, the effect will necessarily be re-enforced (a, 260).
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It is the increasing number of people, and their increasing
interaction, that leads to the transition from mechanical to
organic solidarity, or more gen- erally from a society
characterized by one form of macro-subjectivity to another. Thus,
somewhat ironically given Durkheim's focus on macro- subjectivity,
the central causal factor in his theory of social change is a
macro-objective force. He is not focally interested in these
morphological factors per se, but rather in their impact on
macro-subjectivity.
Tiryakian underscores Durkheim's tendency to accord causal pri-
ority to morphological forces: For Durkheim, morphological facts
are the ultimate source of change in collective representations.
Morphological phenomena ... give rise to collective representa-
tions ... Collective representations, or collective beliefs may
then interact to give rise to further social facts which are not
traceable to a morphological origin" (17). 10
Consciousness
Given his well-known orientation toward the study of social
facts, and the clear preference for the macro-subjective level
discussed above, it is often assumed that Durkheim had little or
nothing to say about consciousness (micro-subjectivity). As we will
see (and have already seen to some degree) this is far from the
truth.
It was Durkheim's overly zealous position for sociology and
against psychology that led many of his critics to assume that
Durkheim was weak on the micro-subjective level. As Lukes put it:
"Very many of his critics ... have regarded this exclusion of
psychology as his major theoretical failing" (228). One exponent of
this point of view is Pope. Durkheim has ruled out appeal to
individual intentionality as too subjective (a, 368). Human
intentions were hidden, subjective and changeable through mere acts
of will and as such eluded, and therefore did not constitute proper
subject matter for, scientific analysis (a, 374). Another exponent
of this point of view is Nisbet who argues that one of Durkheim's
objectives in the Rules of Sociological Method was to "make
unnecessary exploration of individual consciousness, feeling, and
other internal states falling within the realm of psychology as
then understood" (32).
As Pope points out above, a major reason that Durkheim is sup-
posed to have ruled out concern for the micro-subjective is his
concern for science. Nisbet, too, makes this clear: We cannot go to
internal states of mind . . . consciousness, though real enough,
will not serve the austere tests of scientific method. If we are to
study moral phenomena in an objective fashion, we must substitute
for the internal fact of
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 981
consciousness an external index which symbolizes it and study
the former in the light of the latter (52). Pope makes essentially
the same point in discussing why Durkheim did not deal with intent
in his study of suicide: "Insofar as intent is employed, though, it
will, in Durkheim's estimation, lack the objectivity that is the
sine qua non for scientific definitions" (b, 10-11).
Although there is some truth to these claims, they grossly
exagger- ate the reality to be found in Durkheim's work. While
Durkheim may have made politically motivated statements against the
study of micro-subjec- tivity, the fact remains that he did deal
with this level in a variety of places and in a variety of ways.
However, it is also true that he treats micro- subjectivity as a
secondary, or residual, factor, or more commonly as a dependent
variable to be explained by the more independent and focal social
facts.
Although one can cite many places where Durkheim was critical of
dealing with the micro-subjective level, there are a number of
places in which he demonstrated his awareness of the significance
of micro-subjec- tivity and he even integrated it directly into his
work. Although he makes a similar point in several places (e.g.,
Suicide, 315), the following is Durk- heim's clearest statement on
his ultimate interest in micro-subjectivity: In general, we hold
that sociology has not completely achieved its task so long as it
has not penetrated into the mind . . . of the individual in order
to relate the institutions it seeks to explain to their
psychological conditions . . . man is for us less a point of
departure than a point of arrival (Durkheim, cited in Lukes,
488-9). It appears that Durkheim focused on "external" facts, e.g.,
suicide rates, laws, etc., because they were amenable to scientific
analysis, but he did not deem such a macroscopic focus sufficient
in itself. The ultimate goal was to integrate an understanding of
micro-subjectivity into his theoretical sys- tem. Even though he
never quite achieved an adequate integration, he did address the
issue of micro-subjectivity in several different ways.
Assumptions About Human Nature
One of the most important places to gain insight into Durkheim's
work on micro-subjectivity is his assumptions about human nature.
At an obvious level are a variety of biological drives, but of
greater significance to soci- ology are a set of social penchants
including "love, affection, sympathetic concern, and associated
phenomena" (Wallwork, 28). People were viewed by Durkheim as
naturally social: "If men were not naturally inclined to- ward
their fellows, the whole fabric of society, its customs and
institutions, would never arise" (Wallwork, 28). However, these
sentiments did not play an active role in his sociology and were
therefore relegated to psy-
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chology. Another basic assumption that receives only scant
attention from Durkheim is the idea that people are able to think.
His position here is close to Mead's, but it is largely an
unexplored assumption: "Men differ from animals, Durkheim contends,
precisely because images and ideas intervene between innate
inclinations and behavior" (Wallwork, 30).
While the preceding are of marginal significance to his work,
an- other of his assumptions about human nature may be viewed as
the basis of his entire sociology. That assumption is that people
are endowed with a variety of egoistic drives11 that if unbridled
constitute a threat to them- selves as well as the larger society.
To Durkheim, people were character- ized by an array of passions.
If these passions were unconstrained, they would grow and multiply
to the point where the individual would be en- slaved by his own
passions. This leads Durkheim to his curious (on the surface)
definition of freedom as external control over passions. People are
free when their passions are constrained by external forces and the
most general and most important of these forces is the common
morality. It can be argued that Durkheim's entire theoretical
edifice, especially his empha- sis on macro-subjectivity, is
erected on this basic assumption about peo- ple's passions. As
Durkheim puts it, "Passion individualizes, yet it also enslaves.
Our sensations are essentially individual; yet we are more per-
sonal the more we are freed from our senses and able to think and
act with concepts" (d, 307-8). This same issue is manifest in the
differentiation Durkheim makes between body and soul and the
eternal conflict between them. The body represents the passions
while the soul stands for common morality. Clearly, Durkheim wishes
this conflict to be resolved in the direc- tion of the soul rather
than the body.
To return to an issue raised above, freedom for Durkheim comes
from without rather than from within. As was pointed out, this
requires a morality to constrain the passions. But freedom, or
autonomy, has an- other sense in Durkheim's work. That is, that
freedom does not come from within, but rather is a characteristic
of the common morality that is in- ternalized in the actor.
Individual autonomy is derived from the inter- nalization of a
common morality that emphasizes the significance and independence
of the individual (Lukes, 115, 131). Thus freedom is a char-
acteristic of society, not individuals. Here, as elsewhere, we see
the degree to which Durkheim emphasizes the macro-subjective (in
this case "moral individualism") over the micro-subjective.
We can also include "individual representations" within Durk-
heim's assumptions about human nature. While collective
representations are created by the interaction of people,
individual representations are formed by the interaction of brain
cells. As such they are, as many other parts of Durkheim's thoughts
on micro-subjectivity, relegated to psy- chology. This is the
portion of the minding process that Durkheim is un- willing to
explore. It is here that Durkheim is most vulnerable to attack.
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 983
Homans, for example, argues that Durkheim had a very limited
conception of psychology. He limited psychology to the study of
instincts, but the psy- chology of today goes much beyond the study
of instincts and encom- passes a number of social phenomena that
Durkheim would have seen as part of sociology. Homans concludes
that "Sociology is surely not a corol- lary of the kind of
psychology Durkheim had in mind" (18). However, it is much harder,
if not impossible, to clearly separate sociology from the
psychology of today.
Socialization
Given his views on innate human passions and the need to
constrain them by common morality, it should come as no surprise
that Durkheim was very much interested in the internalization of
social morals through educa- tion and more generally through
socialization. Social morality is simul- taneously both inside and
outside of us; common morality "penetrates us" and "forms parts of
us" (Durkheim, cited in Lukes, 131). Although he based much of his
work on it, Durkheim, in Pope's view of his work in Suicide, had "a
primitive notion of internalization," one that lacked an adequate
"social psychology of internalization" (b, 195). Thus, despite the
fact that it is basic to his sociology, Durkheim did not, because
of his pull to the macro-subjective level, explore the process of
internalization in any detail.
Durkheim is not focally interested in the issue of
internalization, but rather in how it bears on his interest in the
macroscopic problems of his day. The essence of the problem for
Durkheim is the decline in the degree to which macro-subjectivity
exercises constraint over consciousness. As Nisbet put it:
"Durkheim would never really abandon the idea that the Western
society he knew was undergoing a major crisis and that that crisis
consisted at bottom in a pathological loosening of moral authority
upon the lives of individuals" (192). Durkheim's concern with
anomie in both Suicide and The Division of Labor in Society can be
seen as manifestations of this concern.
Not only was Durkheim interested in this problem, but also in
sug- gesting reforms aimed at coping with the problem of inadequate
socializa- tion. Much of Durkheim's work on education, and
socialization in general, can be seen in this context. Education,
and socialization, were defined by Durkheim as the process by which
the individual learns the ways of a given group or society. Learned
in the process are the necessary physical, intellectual, and, most
importantly to Durkheim, moral tools to function in society (e,
71). Moral education has three important aspects (Wallwork). First,
its goal is to provide the individual with the discipline s/he
needs to restrain the passions that threaten to engulf him/her.
Second, the indi-
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vidual is instilled with a sense of autonomy, but it is a
characteristically atypical kind of autonomy in which "the child
understands the reasons why the rules prescribing certain forms of
behavior should be 'freely de- sired,' that is to say, 'willingly
accepted' by virtue of 'enlightened assent"' (Wallwork, 127).
Finally, the process of socialization is aimed at developing a
sense of devotion to society as well as to its moral system. All of
these aspects of moral education can be seen as efforts to combat
the pathological loosening of the grip of macro-subjectivity on
micro-subjectivity in modern society.
At the most general level, Durkheim is concerned with the way in
which collective morality constrains micro-subjectivity both
externally and internally. In one sense, macro-subjectivity stands
outside people and shapes their thoughts (and actions). Of course,
macro-subjectivity cannot act on its own, but only through agents.
Of greater importance, however, is the degree to which the
individual constrains himself by internalizing social morality. For
the collective force is not entirely outside of us; it does not act
upon us wholly from without; but rather, since society cannot exist
except in and through indi- vidual consciousness, this force must
also penetrate us and organize itself within us (d, 240). In
addition to making clear the process of internalization, the
preceding quotation also shows once again that Durkheim rejects the
idea of a group mind since he states that collective forces can
only exist in individual con- sciousness. Wallwork does an
excellent job of clarifying the importance of the internalization
of morality in Durkheim's system: A normal mind, Durkheim observes,
cannot consider moral maxims without con- sidering them as
obligatory. Moral rules have an 'imperative character'; they exer-
cise a sort of ascendancy over the will which feels constrained to
conform to them. This constraint is not to be confused with
physical force or compulsion; the will is not forced to conform to
the norms it entertains even if these norms are enforced by public
opinion. Moral 'constraint does not consist in an exterior and
mechanical pressure; it has a more intimate and psychological
character.' But this intimate, psychological sense of obligation
is, nevertheless, none other than the authority of public opinion
which penetrates, like the air we breathe, into the deepest
recesses of our being (38). Durkheim offers a specific example of
this process of internal constraint in his study on religion: if he
acts in a certain way towards the totemic beings, it is not only
because the forces resident in them are physically redoubtable, but
because he feels himself morally obligated to act thus; he has the
feeling that he is obeying an imperative, that he is fulfilling a
duty (d, 218).
These concerns with internalization, socialization, and
education
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 985
can all be seen in the context of the constraining effect of
macro-subjec- tivity on micro-subjectivity. Whether the constraint
is external, or internal- ized, it still comes down to external
morality controlling the thoughts and actions of people.
Durkheim's limited thoughts on the micro-subjective level led
many to assume that his ideal actor was one who was almost wholly
controlled from without. His ideal actor would seem to be a total
conformist. Al- though there is much to recommend this view, and
some modern sociolo- gists in following Durkheim seem to have
adopted this position, Durkheim himself did not subscribe to a view
of the actor as a total conformist: "conformity must not be pushed
to the point where it completely subju- gates the intellect. Thus,
it does not follow from a belief in the need for discipline that it
must be blind and slavish" (Durkheim, cited in Giddens, 113).
Although Durkheim left open the possibility of individual freedom,
the thrust of his work was in the direction of outlining external
constraints on actors and furthermore the desirability of such
constraint.12
Dependent Variables
Micro-subjectivity most often occupies the position of dependent
vari- able in Durkheim's works determined by various
macro-objective and especially macro-subjective phenomena.
"Durkheim viewed sociologically relevant subjective states as the
product of social causes. They 'are like prolongations . . . inside
individuals' . . . of the social causes on which they depend. They
may enter sociological explanations as effects, but never as
causes. Appeal to subjective states as causal agents, according to
Durkheim, threatened the legitimacy of sociology's claim to
scientific status by reducing it to psychology" (Pope, et al.,
419). Although we will discuss several examples of micro-subjective
dependent variables, it should be made clear that although Durkheim
deals with them, it is often only in a vague and cursory sense. In
Suicide, for example, Durkheim is quite uncer- tain how social
currents affect individual consciousness and how changed
consciousness in turn leads to a heightened likelihood of suicide
(Pope, b). The same could be said about every other treatment by
Durkheim of micro- subjectivity.
In The Division of Labor micro-subjectivity is dealt with in a
most indirect sense, but it is clear that it is a dependent
variable. That is, the sense of the argument there is that changes
at the macroscopic level lead to changes in micro-subjective
processes. In mechanical solidarity, individual consciousness is
limited and highly constrained by a powerful collective conscience.
In organic solidarity, individual potentialities expand as does
individual freedom. But again, although this sense of
micro-subjectivity as a dependent variable is there, it is largely
unexplored by Durkheim and is
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left largely implicit. In Suicide, however, the status of
micro-subjectivity as a dependent variable is much clearer.
Schematically, the main independent variables are collective
morality and the ultimate dependent variable is suicide rates, but
intervening is another set of dependent variables which can only be
micro-subjective states. Lukes' point in the following quotation
about "weak points" in the individual implies the micro-subjective
level: "The currents impinge from the outside on suicide prone
individuals at their 'weak points"' (214).
Lukes (216-17) goes further on this issue and argues that there
is a social psychological theory hidden beneath the aggressively
sociologistic language found in Suicide. One part of that theory is
the belief that indi- viduals need to be attached to social goals.
Another aspect is that individu- als cannot become so committed to
such goals that they lose all personal autonomy. Finally, as we've
discussed before, there is Durkheim's belief that individuals
possess passions and they can only be contented and free if these
passions are constrained from without.
One can find in Suicide specific micro-subjective states
associated with each of the three main types of suicide. These
subjective states, themselves effects of given social conditions,
impel the individual to suicide . . . 'the egoistic suicide is
characterized by a general depres- sion in the form either of
melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference' . . . Ano- mic
suicide is accompanied by anger, disappointment, irritation, and
exasperated weariness... , while the altruistic suicide may
experience a calm feeling of duty, the mystic's enthusiasm, or
peaceful courage . . . (Durkheim c, 277-94; Pope, b, 197). Thus
Durkheim saw well-defined micro-subjective states accompanying each
form of suicide. Just as clear is the fact that these are
peripheral interests to Durkheim who maintained a steady focus on
the macroscopic level. Even Nisbet wishes that Durkheim had given
more attention to this level: Admittedly, one might wish that
Durkheim had given more attention to the specific mechanisms by
which collective representations in society are translated, in dis-
tinctly human, often creative ways, into the individual
representations that reflect man's relationship to society (115).
Lukes makes the same point: his (Durkheim's) exclusive
concentration on the society end of the schema, on the impact of
social conditions on individuals rather than the way individuals
perceive, interpret and respond to social conditions, led him to
leave inexplicit and unex- amined the social-psychological
assumptions on which his theories rested (35).
We can find a specific example of this in Durkheim and Mauss'
work in the impact of the structure of society on the form of
individual thought. Basically, Durkheim (and Mauss) argued that the
form that society took
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 987
affected the form that thought patterns took. They were
contesting those who believed that mental categories shape the
social world. Their view is that it was the social world that
shapes mental categories. They first make it clear how their
position differs from those of their predecessors: "Far from it
being the case ... that the social relations of men are based on
logical relations between things, in reality it is the former which
have provided the prototype for the latter" (82). While specific
components of macro-objectivity (e.g., family structure, economic
or political systems) played a role in shaping logical categories,
Durkheim and Mauss devoted most of their attention to the effect of
society as a whole:
Society was not simply a model which classificatory thought
followed; it was its own divisions which served as divisions for
the system of classification. The first logical categories were
social categories; the first classes of things were classes of men
... It was because men were grouped, and thought of themselves in
the form of groups, that in their ideas they grouped other things,
and in the beginning the two modes of grouping were merged to the
point of being indistinct (82-3).
Durkheim's emphasis on the macroscopic level is well illustrated
by this discussion of the impact of society on logical categories.
An essential prob- lem is that Durkheim does not analyze the
corresponding process-the way in which the operation of mental
categories in turn shapes the struc- ture of society.
It is our view that to do a more adequate sociology, Durkheim
had to do more with the micro-subjective level than to treat it as
an unexplored dependent variable. An almost total focus on the
macroscopic level leaves out important elements of an adequate
sociological model. Lukes makes some telling points here in his
discussion of Suicide. He argues, quite rightly, that an adequate
explanation of suicide cannot stop with an exami- nation of social
currents. In his view, "explaining suicide-and explaining suicide
rates-must involve explaining why people commit it" (221; em-
phasis added). Second, Durkheim was wrong in assuming that micro-
subjectivity was not amenable to scientific inquiry and
explanation. It can be done and furthermore must be done if we are
to go beyond partial theo- ries of social life. Nothing is solved
by simply acknowledging the existence of the micro-subjective, but
refusing to examine it. Durkheim's commit- ment to a narrow view of
science led him awry as did his tendency of making radically
sociologistic statements that ruled out recourse to the
micro-subjective: He need only have claimed that 'social' facts
cannot be wholly explained in terms of 'individual' facts; instead
he claimed that they can only be explained in terms of social facts
... it would have been enough to have claimed that no social phe-
nomenon, indeed few human activities, can either be identified or
satisfactorily explained without reference, explicit or implicit,
to social factors (Lukes, 20).
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988 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
In addition to not dealing with micro-subjectivity in any
detail, Durkheim also failed to give it an active role in the
social process. Despite his disclaimer mentioned above, people are
in general controlled by social forces in his system, they do not
actively control those systems. This leads Wallwork to contend that
"the principal weakness ... is Durkheim's fail- ure to consider
active moral judgment" (65; emphasis added). Durkheim (Pope and
Cohen, 1364) gave too little independence to actors. They can
reject some, most, or perhaps even all of the moral principles they
are exposed to. When Durkheim did talk of autonomy it was in terms
of the acceptance of moral norms of autonomy. The individual only
seemed capa- ble of accepting these norms and of controlling
himself through the inter- nalization of those norms. But as
Wallwork points out, autonomy has a much more active component,
"Autonomy also involves willful explora- tion, spontaneous
initiative, competent mastery, and creative self-actuali- zation .
. . The child must also be encouraged to exercise his own will,
initiative and creativity" (148). Indeed research into cognitive
processes, in part done by Piaget who was working in the
Durkheimian tradition, indi- cates that this micro-subjective
creativity is an important component of social life. Wallwork in
summarizing the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, and others says the
following: In addition to culture conditioning, the cognitive
activity of the subjective is neces- sary to constitute the
experience. Piaget and Kohlberg conclude from their studies that
the distinctive phenomenological character of moral experience is
always as much a product of the cognitive construction of the
subject as it is an accommoda- tion to cultural conditioning by the
subject (67). In other words, a more complete sociology requires a
more creative actor and insight into the creative processes. 13
In summary we have seen that contrary to the view of many, Durk-
heim does have a variety of things to say about micro-subjectivity.
How- ever, its residual character in his theoretical system makes
his insights vague and amorphous. More damning is the fact that the
thrust of his work leads to a passive image of the actor while an
active actor is, in our view, an essential component of an
integrated sociological paradigm.
Action and Interaction
Given his primary orientations to macroscopic and subjective
factors in general, Durkheim is weakest on the micro-objective
level. He has little or nothing to say directly on individual
action and interaction. Implied in his system are various changes
at this level as a result of changes at the macro- scopic level,
but they are not detailed. For example, it seems clear that the
nature of action and interaction is quite different in mechanical
and organic
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 989
solidarity. The individual in mechanical solidarity is likely to
be enraged at a violation of the collective conscience and act
quickly and aggressively toward the violator. In contrast, an
individual in organic solidarity is likely to take a more measured
approach such as calling a policeman or suing in the courts.
Similarly, in Suicide the assumption behind changes in suicide
rates is that the nature of individual action and interaction has
changed as a result of changes in social currents. People may be
more or less likely to interact with peers; they would be more or
less likely to kill themselves. Suicide rates are used as
cumulative measures of changes at the individual level, but the
nature of these changes is not explored, at least in any detail.
Similar points could be made about Durkheim's other works, but the
criti- cal point is that micro-objectivity is left unanalyzed in
Durkheim's work. We need to look to other theorists (e.g., Blau;
Blumer; Homans) for insight into this level.
DURKHEIM S INTEGRATIVE MODEL
We have seen that Durkheim addressed all of the levels of social
reality, although his treatment of some are weaker than others.
Unevenness is a basic problem in Durkheim's work from the point of
view of an integrated paradigm. Another weakness is a lack of a
dialectic; or a systems model; there is great concern for the
impact of macro-structures on micro-level phenomena, but the
feedback effects are largely ignored. But while these are
weaknesses from the point of view of the integrated model we are
interested in developing, they form the basis of Durkheim's own
integra- tive model which obviously therefore has basic weaknesses
as far as we are concerned.
Although we cannot present one theory that summarizes Durk-
heim's overall integrative model, it is our view that his theory of
suicide is representative of the kind of causal model he used in
all of his work. The following, Figure 3, is Pope's (b, 59)
schematic model of Durkheim's theory of suicide which catches the
heart of Durkheim's causal model as well as its weaknesses:
We need to translate this model back into our four-fold schema.
It begins at the macro-objective level with the morphological
structure of society; number of people, and rate of interaction.
Changes at these macro- objective levels lead to changes at the
macro-subjective level-strength of collective sentiments. This, in
turn, affects macro-objective structures of integration and
regulation, i.e., the structures and mechanisms of social control.
In Part B and C we see the link between the macroscopic level and
the micro-subjective level in terms of meaning of life for the
individual and the degree to which means are proportional to
individual needs. Changes at the macroscopic level affect
micro-subjectivity in these ways. Then changes in
micro-subjectivity lead to changes in action
(micro-objectivity),
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990 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
4-E X 4 e
0S m) b ' ( =9~~~~~~~~~F L X co
._ o - z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C oc , .
00 0
sCfi 8 ? o~~~~~t c a ffi =v h t a "~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4
0
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? 1991
in this case suicide, as summarized by changes in the suicide
rates. In this model, we see that Durkheim touches on all four
levels of social reality. Although this is to his credit, Pope's
schematic representation also under- scores the two key problems in
Durkheim's thinking-his focus on the macroscopic levels and, most
importantly, his use of a one-way causal model that does not allow
for microscopic levels to impact on macro-levels.
Conclusions
Does Durkheim offer us an integrated theory of social reality?
The answer, given the preceding discussion, must be yes, but it is
an integrated theory with a number of serious liabilities. These
liabilities would tend to indi- cate that Durkheim would not be an
adequate exemplar for an integrated paradigm, but he does offer
insights that would be useful in the develop- ment of that
paradigm. We can close this discussion with an enumeration of the
strengths of Durkheim's work and then turn to the problems which
prevent him from being an adequate exemplar.
On the positive side, Durkheim has a number of things to offer
to an integrated paradigm:
1. A sense of the multiple levels of social reality. 2. Some
insight into the interrelationships among these levels; in-
deed of the fact that in the real world they meld imperceptibly
into each other.
3. A schema that makes it clear that not only are there major
levels of social reality, but also a number of sub-levels within
each. For example, his identification of collective conscience,
collective representations, and social currents within the
macro-subjective level.
4. A powerful theory of the macro-subjective level and its
signifi- cance in the social world.
5. A sense of the importance of historicity and the need to
study the multiple levels of social reality historically.
However, a number of problems point to the fact that Durkheim
would not be an adequate exemplar for an integrated paradigm:
1. His overemphasis on the macro-subjective level. 2. The
corresponding tendency to downgrade the significance of the
other levels. a. Macro-objective forces tend to be comparatively
unexplored causes or results in his theoretical system.14 b.
Micro-subjectivity, although there, tends to be underdevel- oped.
More importantly, it is viewed as a passive force, a depen- dent
variable, that cannot play a dynamic role in his system.
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992 / Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
c. Micro-objectivity is almost entirely unexplored. 3. Although
his lack of clear dividing lines is laudable, it sometimes
led him to confuse phenomena that need to be kept distinct, at
least heuris- tically (e.g., using collective conscience to refer
to both macro- and micro- subjective phenomena simultaneously).
4. Although he has clear assumptions about human nature, they
are comparatively unexplored in his work.
5. Durkheim's narrow sense of the nature of science and the
scien- tific method led him to downplay the significance of
factors, especially the micro-subjective, which need to be examined
more fully if we are to de- velop a more integrated paradigm.
6. His conservative politics led him to focus too much attention
on the macroscopic level and on reforms that needed to be made at
that level. 15
7. Finally, and most importantly, there is Durkheim's tendency
to think in one-way causal terms. Although he often addressed
feedbacks between various levels, he did not have an overall model
that allowed the microscopic levels a dynamic role in shaping the
macroscopic levels.
In sum, Durkheim is not a suitable exemplar for an integrated
para- digm, but he is not without fruitful insights for those who
are interested in developing such a paradigm.
Notes 1. In this paper, as well as Ritzer's earlier work, the
exemplar concept is used differently from Kuhn from whom we are
borrowing it as well as the more important concept of a paradigm.
Kuhn sees an exemplar as a concrete piece of research that serves
as a model for groups of scientists. In our view, and here we are
in disagreement with Eckberg and Hill, there are no such exemplars
in sociology. Instead, our exemplars tend to be bodies of work done
by a particular sociologist that serves as a model for groups of
sociologists. Relatedly, while Kuhn in his later work tends to
equate exemplars with paradigms, we are inclined to see paradigms
in sociology as closer to what Kuhn calls disciplinary matrices, or
groups of sociologists who share an exemplar, an image of the
subject matter of sociology, theories and methods. 2. We are using
the concept of levels here despite the fact that it causes some
difficulties. Although it is clear that macro-levels stand "above"
the micro-levels, there is no clear hier- archy among the two
macro-levels or the two micro-levels. Dimensions of social reality
might be a better way of conceptualizing this issue, but it loses
the hierarchical sense associated with macroscopic and microscopic.
Although it is not ideal, we are using the levels notion rather
than dimensions or similar conceptualizations which have even
greater problems associated with them. 3. Although Durkheim is
careful to point out that he is dealing with suicide rates, and not
individual suicides, it seems clear that the basis of suicide rates
is the individual suicide. Furthermore, a suicide rate is no more
than the sum of individual suicides. 4. Although we see this as a
strength in his work, and a necessary part of an adequate
integrated paradigm, it also sometimes becomes a weakness in
Durkheim's work. As we will see, Durkheim sometimes fails to keep
the different levels conceptually distinct. Even though they form a
continuum in the real world, there is a need in doing sociology to
keep them distinct conceptually. 5. Although collective
representations exist outside actors, it is also true that they may
extend
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Durkheim: Exemplar for a Paradigm? / 993
into the individual and be manifest in cognitive and affective
states. This is similar to our con- temporary view on norms and
values and the degree to which ty they become internalized. 6. It
is this tendency that led Marks into an unfortunate analysis of
Durkheim's work on anomie. Marks argues that the early Durkheim had
a microscopic conception of anomie, but later took a more
macroscopic approach. However, what Marks identifies as microscopic
are simply specific components of the macroscopic level.
Microscopic phenomena are defined by Marks as "specific groups" and
he concludes that "The would-be corporations were the perfect
embodiment of Durkheim's microsociological commitment" (335). It is
clear that these phenomena do not quality as microscopic, at least
as we are using the term here. We have little difficulty with
Marks' argument that Durkheim identifies the macroscopic level with
"whole societies" or "the march of civilization." 7. Tiryakian
makes this point, but in a more general way. That is, Tiryakian
argues that Durkheim developed two orders of social facts,
macro-objective and macro-subjective, "but he did not explicitly
differentiate them" (17). Wallwork makes a similar point: "neither
mo- rality nor society exists without the other, for morality only
begins with social life and group life depends upon moral
consensus" (75). Wallwork also sees Durkheim's definition of
society encompassing both macro-objective and subjective
components:
Durkheim views society in two different ways, which generally
complement each other. On the one hand, he sees society as an
interdependent set of beliefs and ideas ... linguistic symbols,
religious beliefs, moral norms and legal formulas . . . On the
other hand, Durkheim looks upon society as a structural system
composed of individuals or subgroups. Seen from this morphological
angle, the structure or pattern of the group, the order or
arrangement of its elements, gives to the group its characteristic
physiognomy (19).
Gouldner contends that Durkheim fails to distinguish "patterns
of social interaction, or social structures, and cultural patterns
of moral beliefs or sentiments" (xxi). 8. Of course, a church also
has a macro-subjective component. 9. This is but one of the many
political differences between Durkheim and Marx. 10. One possible
exception to his tendency to accord causal priority to
morphological factors is Durkheim's macro-subjective notion of
collective effervescence. The idea appears in several places in
Durkheim's work, but is never spelled out in great detail. These
are the great moments in history when a collectivity is able to
achieve a new level of collective mental exaltation which in turn
can lead to great changes in the structure of society such as
happened during the Reformation and Renaissance. Although
potentially very important, Durkheim never spells out collective
effervescence with the effect that it plays a negligible role in
his sociology. 11. Which were no doubt stimulated by society. 12.
In an interesting paper, Mulligan and Lederman argue that Durkheim
could have con- ceived of a more creative actor had he adequately
differentiated between rules that regulate social life (his focus)
and rules "which bring into being novel forms of behavior" (539).
They argue, in effect, that had Durkheim analyzed these "rules of
practice" he would have been able to account for creativity
macroscopically. While this may be true, it does not negate the
fact that Durkheim also needed a more creative conception of the
actor. 13. Nisbet (119) disagrees, in part, with the position taken
here and argues that Durkheim "promises" an active, acting person.
Of course, a "promise" of an active actor, and the carrying through
of such a promise are two different things. In fact, Nisbet (vi)
praises Durkheim for not engaging in the kind of subjective
analysis that would be required if one is to develop the notion of
a creative actor; Durkheim is seen as being useful in the
"liberation of American sociology from its recent and short-lived
plunge into subjectivism-call it what we will, ethnomethodology,
consciousness-, reflexive-, or egocentric-sociology." Furthermore,
although Nisbet is inclined to see similarities between Mead and
Durkheim on a number of counts including seeing society as
sovereign over the individual and rejecting the dualism of the
individual and society, Nisbet is quite aware that Durkheim does
not offer the insights into micro-subjectivity found in Mead: "We
find little in Durkheim anywhere to suggest the kind of thinking in
Mead that bore fruit in his treatment of the "I" and "Me," the
concrete process of interaction among individuals, the roots of the
self in perception of the 'generalized
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9941 Social Forces Volume 59:4, June 1981
other,' and so on. None of this can be taken from Mead or
asserted in any degree of specificity to Durkheim" (113). 14. His
work in The Division of Labor is something of an exception to this.
15. While he is conservative in terms of our political views,
Durkheim was in the French politics of his day more of a liberal
and he thought of himself as such.
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Issue Table of ContentsSocial Forces, Vol. 59, No. 4, Special
Issue (Jun., 1981), pp. 897-1358Volume Information [pp. 1353 -
1358]Front Matter [pp. 897 - 1073]Durkheim Lives!In Appreciation of
Everett K. Wilson's Contribution to Sociology [pp. 898 -
899]Introduction: From Wilson to Durkheim [pp. 900 - 901]A Marxist
Consideration of Durkheim [pp. 902 - 917]Moral Integration and
Po