Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding

8/19/2019 Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding

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4 AUGUST 2015

It is not easy to establish peace in a region

that has experienced conict. It has been argued

that a post-conflict region has, within the first

five years, a high risk of recurrence of conflict

(Zürcher 2007; Collier et al. 2008). In fact, 36

per cent of cases studied resumed conict during

a period from 1945 to 1996 (Walter 2004). Thus,

a major issue in a post-conict region is methods

by which it may be transformed from an unstable

to a stable society.

It is essential to generate knowledge of such

risks for peacebuilding in a post-conict region.

It is absolutely critical to understand the mecha-

nisms leading to the resumption of civil war, in

order to prevent recurrence of conflicts, and to

establish peace.

With this view in mind, this essay explains the

risks and mechanisms for the recurrence of civil

war in post-conict regions, and considers con-

ditions for preventing this. We show that cur-

rent peacebuilding efforts by the international

community are significant, and necessary for

preventing the resumption of conict. However,

if the international community is not involved,

we demonstrate that there is an “ironic option”

for post-conict regions in order to build a stable

society.

Thus, a rat ional method for seeking stabi lity

is one based on the knowledge of conicts avail-able to a post-conict region; this comprises the

contradictory policy of a “tyranny for peace.”

A dominant moral value implies that there is a

necessity for involvement in conflict zones by

the international community. However, in real-ity, there are numerous cases where Western

countries intentionally do not intervene, or are

unable to do so. Here we suggest that there is

the paradox of peacebuilding in such cases. To

be specic, available policies for preventing the

resumption of civil war r in such cases do not in-

volve a reconcil iation and coexistence of parties,

but rather oppression and exclusion of one party

against another.

The following sect ions rst explain the mech-

anisms for the transformation of a conict into

peace or into a new war. Second, we examine

the risk of civil war recurrence, which is based

on quantitative research, and focus on the role

of political leaders, and structures in the conict

region. Finally, the essay considers desirable poli-

cies for preventing resumption of conict.

01

Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention:The Paradox of PeacebuildingKosuke Togashi

Introduction



There are signicant questions on how conict

affected regions move towards either peace or re-

turn to war. Ramsbotham et al. (2011) addressed

this question in the field of conflict resolutionstudies, and pointed out the need to understand

“Conict Transformation” as a process.

The concept of “Conict Transformation” that

they introduced was employed to grasp the pro-

cess of armed conict as an occurrence, end, and

resumption (see Table 1). These changes include

major ones including change of the structure of

the conict, as well as minor ones such as chang -

es to various components of the conflict struc-

ture. These mutually inuence each other.

Table 1: Types of Conict Transformation

“Contextual transformation” means changesin social, regional, and international contexts, in

which conf lict is embedded, and provides most

dramatic effects on conict. Ramsbotham et al.,

state that the end of the Cold War was a prime

example of context transformation that unlocked

protracted conflicts in Southern Africa, Central

America, and elsewhere.

“Structural transformation” is what arises

from a change in the conflict structure, which

is a set of parties in conflict, their incompatibleobjectives, and their power relationships. These

changes can take many forms. If the root causes

of the conict lie in the structure of relationships

within which parties operate, then a transforma-

tion of this structure is necessary to resolve the

conict. In asymmetric conicts, structural trans-

formation entails a change in the relationship

between the dominant and weaker parties. It will

then produce a change in the conict party’s at-titude regarding continuation of the conict.

“Actor transformation” comes about through a

change of actors, leadership, constituency of the

leader, or adoption of new goals, values, or be -

liefs. As result of these changes, one of the con-

ict parties decides to seek peace by abandoning

violence or by refusing negotiation, and aggres-

sive military operations by adopting new hardline

objectives or means.

“Issue transformation” may be explained as

follows. Conflicts are defined by the conflicting

positions parties take on issues. The conflict is

transformed when conflict parties change their

positions, or when issues lose salience or new

ones arises. Changes of position are closely re-

lated to changes of interest, and changes of goals,

and hence to actor transformation, and also to

the context and structure of the conict.

“Personal and group transformation” comes

through a change of attitudes toward armed con-

ict by the main leaders. In the best-case scenario,

a former guerrilla leader, committed to victory

through any means, becomes a unifying national

leader offering reconciliation, or the leader of an

02

Conflict Transformation as a Process

"Structural transformation"

Changes in conflict structure, that is, the

parties in confl ict , their incompatible

objectives, and their power relationships.

"Issue transformation"

Changes of attitudes toward armed conict by

the main leaders.

"Contextual transformation"

Changes in social, regional, and international

contexts in which conicts are embedded.

"Actor transformation"

Changes of goals, values or beliefs, anddirections within conict parties or between

their leaders.

"Personal and group transformation"

Changes of attitudes toward armed conict by

the main leaders.



oppressive government decides to include his op-

ponents in the government. However, in the worst

case, the moderate intelligentsia, who were not

committed to violence, become radical national-

ists, mobilizing people by using propaganda.

What k inds of factors cause these changes andtransformations in conflicts? We attempt to un-

derstand this from two viewpoints: the role of a

political leader, and structural factors in a post-

conict region.

The resumption of conf lict is strongly tied to

the decisions of political leaders. Whether a po-

litical leader accepts the post-conict situation or

not is considered vital for establishing peace in a

post-conict region. Their judgment is dependent

on the post-conflict environment. It is thought

that political leaders would pursue peace to a

greater extent than a continuation or resumption

of conflict when the following conditions are

in place; 1) decreased possibility of winning the

conflict; 2) reduced rewards obtainable through

victor y; 3) increased costs for sta rt ing the con-

ict; 4) the length of the previous conict; and 5)

increased rewards for maintaining status quo.

Walter (2004, p.373) states that the cost of a

previous conict determines whether combatants

are likely return to the battlefield again. Fur-

thermore, she states that a post-conflict region

is under high risk for recurring conflicts if the

following conditions prevail: there is the desire

for retribution, combat weariness, and increased

information on combatant capabilities. She points

out that countries with high levels of individual

hardship and restricted outlets for nonviolent

change would be more likely to provide individu-

als with an incentive for joining rebel groups. For

a civil war to occur, intergroup antagonisms and

grievances must exist, and resources and supplies

must be available to support the movement over

time. Furthermore, leaders must emerge to coor-dinate and manage recruitment. Thus, the role of

leaders is also important.

Mason et al. (2011, p.172-173) argued that

there is high possibility for civil war recurrence if

there is “multiple sovereignty” in a post-conict

region, and rebel commanders have an incentive

to resume conict rather than to maintain peace.

“Multiple sovereignty” exists when one or more

organized armed challengers emerge and com-

mand a signicant degree of popular support.

Al l theorists state that the post-conict situa-

tion formed by the last conict has a great inu-

ence on choices of political leaders. In the follow -

ing section, we focus on the question as to what

characteristics of the post-civil war environment

enable a region to be more or less likely to experi-

ence a recurrence of conict.

Structural Factors of Conflict Recurrence, whichrelate to the forms of the end of the previous conflict

First, there are arguments that conflict dura-

tion, casualty, and type are related to a recurrence

of conflict. A society that has experienced pro-

longed conict is unlikely to have an incentive for

restarting conict, because they understand that

this comes at a high cost (Quinn et al. 2007, p.185).

This is why conict parties recognize the possi-

bility of victory in the next war, and the requisite

time to win it (Mason et al. 2011, p.178, 185). Fur-

thermore, for each additional year that the previ-ous war lasted, the probability for the failure of

peace declines by about 10 per cent. Conict du-

ration can be an indicator of the relative strength

03

The Roles of Political Leaders



of the government and rebel groups, as it shows

us how they were able to endure armed conicts.

A higher casualty hardens the hostilit y and

distrust between former protagonists, making

them more likely to resume conict at a later date

(Quinn et al. 2007, p.185; Mason et al. 2011, p.186).It indicates the difculty to coexist with the pre -

vious enemy in a post-conf lict society. Walter

(2004, p.379-380), however, has different view,

that the longer and presumably more costly the

civil wars reduced the likelihood that a country

wou ld face another one. Furthermore, she be-

lieves that costs incurred during the previous war

have no real effect on the likelihood that another

war would occur.

Many researchers see no statistically signicantcausal relationships between civil war recurrence

and types of conflict. Quinn et al. (2007, p.185)

found that secessionist conflicts and ethnically

based revolutions are as likely to occur as ideo-

logical revolutions followed by renewed conict.1

There are arguments that the likelihood of re-

suming conflict depends on whether it will end

in a negotiated settlement or in a military victory.

In general, power sharing and ensuring autonomy

(devolution) 2 are greatly recommended policies

for resolving conict. However, such agreements

form less than 30 per cent of the total (Wal -lensteen et al. 2011, p.151). Thus, there are two

different views on causal relationships between

power sharing and establishment of peace.

Collier et al. (2008, p.471) showed that the

effect of granted autonomy is very large. With-

out autonomy, the decade-risk is 46.2 per cent,

whereas with autonomy, the risk fal ls to 12.2 per

cent. However, they added that there are only a

few cases of autonomy, and that the variables are

not statistically signicant at conventional levels.

Walter (2004) has a different understanding. She

found that governments that agreed to partition

their country (territorial power sharing) as a result

of one war were significantly more likely to face

additional wars. According to this analysis, if the

government readily grants autonomy as a means for

settling a conict, it becomes more vulnerable, and

this could turn into the seeds of a new conict.

However, why does it appear that—in some

cases—power sharing has contributed to main-

tain peace in a post-conflict region? Mukherjee

(2006) tried to answer this question. He argues

that political power sharing must be suggested af -ter either the government army or the rebel group

emerges victorious, rather than a state of military

stalemate. Furthermore, Call (2012, p.184-196)

has stated that a key problem is in the character -istics of power sharing and in the implementation

of agreements. He concluded that political and

military power sharing contributes to the estab -

lishment of peace; however, territorial power

sharing raises the likelihood of resumption of

conict. He added that in more than 80 per cent

of cases where agreements were not withdrawn,

armed conicts did not recur. Yet, there are many

cases of conflicts resuming after violations of

agreements, so it would seem that the problem is

whether part ies have incent ives to implement apower-sharing agreement or not.

Further, many researchers focus on the rela-

tionship between conflict outcome and recur-

rence. For instance, there are many statistical stud-

ies, which indicate that decisive military victory

of either the government or rebel group is more

likely to ensure peace than a negotiated settle-

ment (Walter 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; DeRouen

and Bercovitch 2008; Mason et al. 2011; Obayashi

2013). In a negotiated settlement, both govern-

ment and rebel groups are able to conserve their

energy and maintain military powers. In contrast,

in a decisive mil itary victory, the defeated side will

understand the costs of restarting the conict, and

the winning side will try to control all of the state

power. Therefore, the defeated side loses militarypower and incentives for starting the next war.

Meanwhile, there are studies that the pos -

sibility of the failure of negotiated settlements

(renewed civil war) reduces every year. This is

especially so if international peacekeeping forces

are deployed in a conflict region after a negoti-

ated settlement, therefore reducing the possibility

of recurrence. Thus, many researchers believe

that international peacekeeping forces and peace

agreements contribute to keeping peace.

In addition to this, in the case of a decisive

military victory, the key point is whether the win-

ner is the government or a rebel group. A rebel

victory is less likely to be followed by the recur-rence of a civil war, than either a government vic-

tory or a negotiated settlement (Quinn et al. 2007,

p.174). However, in the rst year following a rebel

04



victory, the risk of fai lure of peace is almost 200

per cent higher than it is for a government vic-

tory (Mason et al. 2011, p.184). According to this

analysis, the probability of the failure of peace

following a rebel victory is substantially higher

than that following government victory within

a period of three to four years after a victory.However, after three years, the risk of failure of

peace is lower than it is for a government victory.

Hence, the conclusive key point is whether the

victorious rebels can surv ive with state power,

gained after war, for about four years or not.

Structural Factors of Conflict Recurrence, whichrelate to the post-conflict environment

Here, we summarize the risks in a post-conict

region from the viewpoint of political, economic,

and social environments.

There are debates su rround ing the sy stem

of governance and the resumption of conflict.

There is a general understanding that democracy

prevents conict and its recurrence, but there is

no obvious causal relation between a democratic

system and the establishment of peace in a post-

conict society. For instance, Quinn et al. (2007,

p.185) found no signicant relationship between

the levels of democracy two years after the con-

ict ended and the likelihood of a civil war recur -

ring. Furthermore, with regards to elections as

one of key elements of democracy, Collier et al.

(2008, p.470) found that the risk of conflict re-

currence declined in the year of the election, but

increased in the following year.

There are st at ist ical resu lts that show that

true democracies are less likely to experience a

renewed civil war than semi-democracies (Wal-

ter 2004, p.384). However, Collier, et al (2008,

p.470) also observed that, unfortunately, severe

autocracy was highly successful in maintaining

post-conflict peace. Mason et al. (2011, p.184)

found that both democratic and autocratic states

are more capable of preserving peace after a con-

flict, but weak authoritarian regimes and partial

democracies are most likely to fail to sustain the

peace in the aftermath of conict.

Many researchers argue about the relationship

between socio-economic development levels and

a failure of peace consolidation. There are ana-

lytical studies that indicate a low probability of

resumption of a conict if socio-economic devel-

opment levels in a post-conict region are high

(Walter 2004, p.380; Quinn et al. 2007, p.186;

Collier et al. 2008, p.469; Mason et al. 2011,

p.186). Collier et al. (2008, p.469) states that the

decade-risk falls to 26.9 per cent if the economygrows at 10 per cent per year, whereas the de-

cade-risk is 42.1 per cent if the economy remains

stagnant throughout the decade. As it is difcultto achieve these results by the post-conflict re-

gions themselves, Quinn and Mason suggest that

international investment is a crucial factor. Simi-larly, it is argued that social indicators, like infant

mortality rates and average life expectancies, in

a post-conict region also have a certain causal

relationship with conict resumption.

Furthermore, there are arguments that if the

government army has a large military capac -

ity, the rebel group will not have an incentive

to resume armed conflict, because the cost of

war is large and the benef its small . In addition,

Obayashi (2013) focuses on the military ability

of rebel groups rather than that of governments,

and demonstrates the following: peace is likely to

be sustained if the rebel army has a great military

strength, but if rebel groups control only partial

territory or hold safe lands outside the conflict

area, the probability of resuming armed conict

will be high.

According to the understanding of conict re-

search discussed above, if the parties in conict

conduct policies as per the table given below,

after conict, there is a high likelihood that they

will reduce the risk of renewed conict and will

be able to secure their interests.

05

Conclusion: Response to Conflict by

the International Community and

the “Ironical Option”



The irony of employing a policy, which is based

on the results of analysis in conflict research, is

as follows. If both government and rebel groups

attempt to secure their own interests and seek

post-conict stability without demanding foreign

intervention, they inevitably arrive at the forma-

tion of an extremely authoritarian system.

In the table, policy options to be taken by the

international community indicate the signicance

and importance of peacebuilding. However, this

does not alter the fact that in conicts where the

international community is not involved, poli-

cies adopted by the warring parties are inevitably

pessimistic ones. If the conflict parties in “ter-

ritorial conict” cannot resolve the possession of

and legal status of a specic territory and conict

region, thus becoming “Unrecognised Quasi-

States”(or “De Facto States”), this problem will

be especial ly serious (Togashi 2011).

Nowadays, when the international commu-

nity intervenes in conflicts, people support the

intervention as a necessity from the perspective

of universal values or norms, and even in some

cases assert that intervention is the duty of the

international community. In reality, however,

there are considerable conflict cases in which

Western countries have not act ively intervened or

have been unable to intervene due to constraints.

In these cases, the author believes that we must

understand that the most rational and effective

policy for stabilization of a post-conict region is

the paradoxical option of a “tyranny for peace.”

Kosuke Togashi

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Japan Society for

the Promotion of Science

The University of Tokyo

References

Call, Charles (2012) Why Peace Fails: The Causes

and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence, Wash-

ington DC, Georgetown University Press.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoefer, Mans Söderbom

(2008) “Post-conict risks,” Journal of Peace Re-

search, 45:4, pp.461-78

DeRouen, Karl and Jocob Bercovitch (2008)

“Ensuring internal rivalries: A new framework

for study of civil war,” Journal of Peace Research,

45:1, pp.55-74

Fearon, James (2004) “Why do some civil war last

so much longer than others,” Journal of Peace

Research, 41:3, pp.275-301

Mason, David and Mehmet Gurses, Patrick

Brandt, Jason Quinn (2011) “When civil warsrecur,” International Studies Perspectives, 12,

pp.171-89

Mukherjee, Bumba (2006) “Why political power-

sharing agreements lead to enduring peaceful

resolution of some civil wars, but not others,” In-

ternational Studies Quarterly, 50, pp.479-504

Obayashi, Kazuhiro (2013) “Rebel Organization

and Postwar Peace Duration,” Kokusai Seiji (In-

ternational Politics), 174, pp.139-152

06

For Actors

Government

Rebel Group

International

Community

Table 2: RATIONAL policy to prevent conict recurrence

Policy

To REMOVE the rebel group completely, to REFUSE political agreements like

power sharing, to STRENGTHEN their own military power, and to BUILD an

authoritarian regime.

1)To BUILD a true democratic system and to DEVELOP a stable economy by

inviting international investment after winning the conict.

2)To BUILD an authoritarian regime that controls all violence and to DEVELOP an

economy by getting support from external actors like the diaspora after winning the

conict.

To involve actively with the conict during stages of negotiation, to support conicting

parties to reach a peace agreement, and to dispatch Peacekeeping Organization

After the conict, to assist in the democratic system and state monopoly on violence,

to ensure a stable economic development by international investment or OfficialDevelopment Assistance



Quinn, Michael, David Mason and Mehmet

Gurses (2007) “Sustaining the Peace: Determi-

nants of Civil War Recurrence,” International

Interactions, 33:2, pp.167-193

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh

Mial l (2011) Contemporary conict resolution 3rd

ed., Cambridge, Polity Togashi, Kosu ke (2 011) “He iwa Ko ch iku ni

Okeru ‘Mi (Hi) Shonin Kokka’ Mondai” (The

Problem of ‘Un(non)recognized States’ in Peace-

building), Kokusai Seiji (International Politics),

165, pp.141-155

Wallensteen , Pete r and Lot ta Ha rbom, St ina

Högbladh (2011) “Armed conflict and peace

agreements,” Peace Research, London, Routledge

Walter, Ba rbara (2004) “Does Conf l ict Beget

Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research, 41:3,

pp.371-388Zürcher, Christoph (2007), The Post-Soviet Wars:Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in

the Caucasus, New York, New York University

Press

Notes:

1 However, the type of conict is likely to affect

conict duration. Fearon (2004) stated that eth-

nic conict is more difcult to end than conict

that has its origin in a coup d’etat and revolution.2 Both power sharing and devolution is the same

where governments permit the opposition group

access to political, economic, and military author-

ity. The difference is that power sharing means

that the government permits the opposition

group access to authority within an existing ter-

ritorial framework, but devolution means that the

government grants a new territorial framework

and authority to the opposition group. However,

there is also an assertion that devolution is one

type of power sharing. See Call (2012, pp.39-

41, 186-195) for definition and classifications of

power-sharing denitions.

07

Risks of Conflict Recurrence and Conditions for Prevention: The Paradox of Peacebuilding

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