www.advisian.com Michael Quinnell – Senior Associate, Advisian November 2016 Risk-based cost estimating for water infrastructure projects – does it stack up?
www.advisian.com
Michael Quinnell – Senior Associate, Advisian
November 2016
Risk-based cost estimating for water
infrastructure projects – does it stack up?
Inaccurate cost estimates can lead to suboptimal project selection, inefficient budget management and disruption to the delivery of other essential projects.
To overcome these issues and improve the management of their investment programs, a number of NSW water authorities have adopted a stochastic approach to estimating: Risk-based cost estimating (RBCE).
Risk-based Cost Estimating
What is it?A stochastic process utilising Monte-Carlo Simulation modelling to reflect the degree of uncertainty (risk and opportunity) associated with a cost estimate.
Base estimateInherent risk:Uncertainty within base estimate, defined assumptions and known scope
Contingent risk:Uncertainty from unplanned events
Risk workshop
Monte Carlo Simulation
Sample output of RBCE process
BASE COST ESTIMATE
COST
BASE RISK
CONTINGENCY RANGE
CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY
FORECAST EXPECTED COST
(MEAN OR MEDIAN [P50])
MAKE FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR WORSE COST
OUTCOME
RESIDUAL RISK EXPOSURE
RANGE20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
PROB
ABIL
ITY
(CUM
ULAT
IVE)
Why use the RBCE process?
1.Identify, quantify and incorporate risks and opportunities into the project budget
2.Incorporate project knowledge and experience from a wide stakeholder group through the risk workshop process
3.Provides organisations the information required for decision makers to set project budgets that match the risk tolerance
4.A more sophisticated approach to allocating appropriate project contingency
Understanding the performance of the RBCE
process
water infrastructure projects studied
2002 – 2012range in total actual cost values
23 $4.2m to $191.7m
Projects delivered by several water authorities in NSW over the period
Study objectives:Obtain a better understanding of the performance of the RBCE process
Identify areas where the process can be further improved in the future
1.2.
Data collected
Final actual project cost
Actual cost incurred by the water authority at
completion of the project; includes initial contract
price, any variations paid and client costs
Data collected from each project included:
Project timing data
Date when the estimate was prepared, contract
award date and the date of practical completion
Original cost estimate
Prepared at project appraisal stage at the time
where the decision was made to go ahead with the
project
Data AdjustmentsAdjustments were made to ensure a ‘like-for-like’ comparison between budget and actual project cost. These included:
Escalation adjustment to account for the difference between base period of
estimate and actual project delivery timeframe
Increased or decreased scope change
So… does it stack up?
Findings 1: How accurateare RBCE budgets?• The water projects in the studies
sample performed well compared to other studies
• Cost underruns were found to occur more frequently than overruns
• Weighted average of projects under budget was 8.5%
• Out of the 23 projects:
• 17% of projects experienced cost overruns
• 83% of projects were on or under budget
Difference (%) =
Actual Project Cost (adjusted to ensure consistent comparison)
Project Budget (raw)X 100
% overrun/underrun vs. Estimate date
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
-40%
-50%A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W%
ove
rrun/
unde
rrun
vs. E
stim
ate
date
Projects sorted by estimate preparation date
Older Newer
Findings 2: RBCE success in forecasting outcomesThe main output from the RBCE process is not a single estimate; it is a range of potential outcomes.
• The range of outcomes were between the P1 to P99 value
• Only 57% of the sample fell within the expected range
Possible causes:
• Project Managers ‘anchor’ on the base estimate (i.e. they’re not willing to adjust or expand the range to capture the best and worst case scenario)
• Results in the forecasted range are too narrow to capture the true level of uncertainty
50%57% of actual project costs were within the
expected range
CostPr
obab
ility
(cum
ulat
ive)
100%
“It was expected that 98% of projects would fall within the defined
range”
Findings 3: Reliability of confidence from RBCEA key feature of the RBCE process is that it provides a level of confidence for each value in the range of potential project outcomes.
• Between P50 and P90, confidence levels in the process were reliable
However…
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%P01 P99P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Well calibrated
results (i.e. accurate representation of p-value)
P Value
% o
f pro
ject
at o
r bel
ow b
udge
t (un
derru
n)
Expected % Underrun
Actual % Underrun
Findings 3: Reliability of confidence from RBCEBelow the P50 and above the P90 level there was a wide difference between the expected and the actual result.
This suggests:
• The process isn’t placing enough focus on identifying opportunities
• The process isn’t capturing the ‘extreme risks’ (low likelihood and/or very high consequence)
A possible explanation could be that it
may not be worth the effort of accurately estimating figures outside of the P50 and P90 range (which are used the most often).
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%P01 P99P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Extreme risks not adequately considered
P Value
% o
f pro
ject
at o
r bel
ow b
udge
t (un
derru
n)
Expected % Underrun
Actual % Underrun
Results indicate value <P50 too conservative
Findings 4: The Portfolio PerspectivePublic agencies delivering projects face the dual challenge of neither exceeding their allocated funding nor significantly underspending the allocated funding.
• Results highlighted an opportunity for more efficient contingency allocation
• Agencies could set a less conservative P-value as the budget and reduce the portfolio cost underrun
• Means accepting that a greater number of projects will overrun vs individual project budgets, but the overall portfolio is sufficient to deliver all projects
• Provides ability to invest this released contingency on other valuable projects or agency priorities
% deviation from budgetTotal portfolio actual costTotal portfolio budget
P01 P99P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
1,400
1,200
1000
800
600
400
200
-
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00%
-10.00%
-15.00
Milli
ons
% d
evia
tion
from
bud
get
Had the program budget been set at P50, the percentage
underrun would have reduced from 8.5% under the budget to
4%
Areas for improvement
Issues relating to cognitive bias or delusions - such as anchoring and adjustment - affected the results of the process.
This was particularly highlighted by the limitations to fully capture the range of expected outcomes and in producing reliable confidence levels below the P50 and above the P90 levels.
This can be mitigated by placing more emphasis on identifying key opportunities rather than only focusing on risks, as well as calibration techniques and training.
1. 2. 3.
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