RISK ANALYSIS OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD AT BALASORE …environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/FormB/EC/Ris… · · 2016-07-29RISK ANALYSIS OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION

RISK ANALYSIS

OF

BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD

AT

BALASORE POL DEPOT

SOMNATHPUR , ODISHA

Risk Analysis Report of Balasore POL Depot

INDEX

SL NO

CHAPTER

SUBJECT

PAGE No

1 Chapter – 1

Introduction 1-1 to 1-2

2 Chapter -2

Executive summary 2-1 to 2-6

3 Chapter -3

Depot Details 3-1 to 3-14

4 Chapter -4

Process Description 4-1 to 4-1

5 Chapter -5

Risk Analysis 5-1 to 5-6

6 Chapter -6

Hazard Identification

6-1 to 6-2

7 Chapter -7

Maximum Credible Accident Analysis 7-1 to 7-12

8 Chapter -8

Risk Assessment 8-1 to 8-5

9 Chapter -9

Consequence Analysis 9-1 to 9-44

10 Chapter -10

Risk And Failure Probability 10-1 to 10-2

11 Chapter -11

Recommendation & Conclusion 11-1 TO 11-3

Annexure

1 MS Attachment - 1 2 HSD Attachment - 2 3 SKO Attachment – 3 4 ETHANOL Attachment – 4


Page 1

CHAPTER – I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Bharat petroleum corporation limited (BPCL) is a fortune 500 oil refining,

exploration and marketing PSU with navratna status. BPCL has multiple refinery

units in Mumbai, Kochi, Numaligarh and Bina. BPCL has also many POL Depots

spread across the country. In order to meet market demands, BPCL now

proposes to expand the storage capacity of the existing POL Depot at Balasore,

Odisha by installing additional Tanks.

The proposed project is for increase in storage capacity and change in Product

mix. The expansion project is for increasing the storage capacity by 5000 KL in

addition to the existing storage capacity of 17321 KL. After expansion, combined

storage capacity of different petroleum products at Balasore POL depot will be

22321 KL. Product mix change comprises of Tank no. 03 used presently for

storage of FO to be converted for storage of HSD, Tank no. 06 presently used for

storage of MS to be converted for storage of SKO and underground tank no T12

presently used for storage of SKO to be converted for storage of MS (Speed)

The depot mainly has facilities for storage & handling of different petroleum

products.

Total land (including the land required for proposed expansion) is under

possession of BPCL. Water requirement is met through bore wells. No additional

water requirement is envisaged for the proposed expansion. Power supply is

taken from the grid,of Odisha State Electricity Board. Power requirement will

remain same after the proposed expansion..


Page 2

All the mitigation measures will be in line with the existing practice to meet the

environmental standards and environmental operating conditions for the

expansion project. Fire fighting facilities will be as per the recommendations of

OISD 117.NoR &R issue is involved with this proposed expansion.

Since the proposed expansion is not a major one, it is envisaged to complete the

whole expansion within eight (8) months from the date of obtaining environmental

clearance (EC) for the proposed project. Project cost for the proposed storage

expansion of MS tank is around Rs. 894.77 lakh. and project cost of conversion of

products is 180.58 lakh. Total project cost is 1075.35 lakh.


Page 1

CHAPTER – II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various

statutory bodies:

Identification of potential hazard areas:

Identification of representative failure cases:

Identification of possible initiating events:

Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and

the impact zones from the accidental scenarios:

Consequence analysis for all the possible events:

Hazard effect of POL Depot.

2.2 DEPOT LOCATION

Balasore depot is about 12 km away from Balasore Railway Station. The depot is

located at Somnathpur Industrial Estate, P.S Industrial PS, Balasore, Odisha –

756019. The depot is well connected by road through NH 5 and by rail. Balasore

is located within 21029’46” N longitude and 86050’57” E latitude.


Page 2

2.3 CLIMATE & METEOROLOGY

(a) Rainfall & Temperature

The climate of the place is extreme. The place is having annual average

rainfall of 1613.6 mm and average temperature in summer is between

43.8° - 33° C and in winter 10.5° - 5.3° C.

However, in summer the maximum temperature goes as high as 45.4°C

during day and in winter minimum temperature may fall down to 3.1°C.

(b) Wind Direction and Wind Velocity

During winter wind flows mainly from East to West. In summer wind flows

mainly from North-East. Speed of the wind varies during day & night and

also there is seasonal variation of wind speed. On the average wind speed

varies from 8KM/Hr. to 20KM/Hr.

Climate data for Balasore

Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year

Record high °C (°F)

33.5

(92.3)

38.1

(100.6)

40.3

(104.5)

42.5

(108.5)

45.4

(113.7)

43.8

(110.8)

40.1

(104.2)

39.5

(103.1)

39.2

(102.6)

38.3

(100.

9)

38.0

(100.

4)

36.2

(97.2)

45.4

(113.7)

Average high °C (°F)

27.0

(80.6)

29.5

(85.1)

33.7

(92.7)

36.0

(96.8)

36.1

(97)

34.2

(93.6)

31.8

(89.2)

31.4

(88.5)

31.7

(89.1)

31.3

(88.3)

29.2

(84.6)

26.9

(80.4)

31.57

(88.83)

Average low °C (°F)

13.9

(57)

16.7

(62.1)

21.0

(69.8)

24.4

(75.9)

26.0

(78.8)

26.2

(79.2)

25.8

(78.4)

25.8

(78.4)

25.5

(77.9)

23.0

(73.4)

17.8

(64)

13.7

(56.7)

21.65

(70.97)

Record low °C (°F)

3.1

(37.6)

8.5

(47.3)

13.4

(56.1)

17.2

(63)

20.0

(68)

22.1

(71.8)

21.8

(71.2)

21.8

(71.2)

21.7

(71.1)

18.4

(65.1)

10.5

(50.9)

5.3

(41.5)

3.1

(37.6)

Average mm (inches)

17.0

(0.669)

36.3

(1.429)

39.4

(1.551)

54.8

(2.157)

108.6

(4.276)

233.4

(9.189)

297.9

(11.72

8)

318.3

(12.53

1)

275.8

(10.85

8)

184.0

(7.24

4)

41.6

(1.63

8)

6.5

(0.256)

1,613.6

(63.526)

Source: India Meteorological Department (1901-2000)


Page 3

2.4 DEPOT PROFILE

Gross storage capacity of the Depot is 17321 KL and proposed to be increased to

22321KL. The main Depot facilities comprise of product input through Tank

Wagons and tank lorries.

The main facilities are summarized as under:

Storage Existing 12 No’s tank (Above Ground - 08 & Under

Ground - 04)

Proposed 1 above ground tanks of 5000 KL

TLF Gantry 2x 6 bay gantry with 12 loading points

Wagon unloading facility

– TW gantry.

Available

DG Sets.

3 no’s rating of which are 250 KVA -1

200 KVA -1

125 KVA -1

FIREFIGHTING

FACILITIES

As per OISD 116 & 117

Fire Water Storage. 2 X1527 KL

1 X 858 KL

Fire Water pumps. 2 x 410 m3/hr

Fire Water ump.(Standby

1 x 410 m3/hr


Page 4

Jockey Pump 2 x 30 m3/hr

Control panel As per Standard

Storage Tank with active

water protection.

I. Fixed Roof tanks are fitted with sprinkler System

and foam system

II. Floating Roof tanks are provided with Rim seal

protection.

III. Hydrants Monitors are provided at all strategic

point including TLF area, Tank farms, Pump House,

Tank Truck parking area, etc.

Fire extinguishers. As per OISD-117

Hydrants & Monitors. As per OISD-116


Page 5

2.5 UTILITIES

WATER REQUIREMENT:-

Required quantity of water for domestic consumption, tank farm washing, fire

fighting etc is met through bore well water.

LAND:-

Land measuring 16.4 acres.are in possession Unused portion of Balasore POL

depot is used for installation of of 1 Nos. additional Tanks.

POWER REQUIREMENT:-

In absence of supply from the power grid, requirement is met through DG sets of

575 KVA capacities.

DG Set : The following generators have been installed for maintaining operation

during power cut.

Capacity (KVA) NOS

250 1

200 1

125 1

The emergency DG have tall stack as specified by CPCB. All the DG sets are

provided with acoustic enclosures.


Page 6

2.6 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:-

There are very rare chances of spillage of hazardous materials in ground water,

because this Depot is constructed as per various OISD norms and international

standards. All precautions right from designing stage (various controls) are taken

so as to eliminate the chance of spillage of product. The chances of human error

and accident thereof are rare probability.

2.7 MAN POWER:-

At present total 21 permanent staffs are available for total operation of Balasore

Depot. In addition to that contract workers are also engaged for regular

maintenance and operation of the Depot. Operation of the Depot will be

managed with the exiting staffs after enhancement of capacity..

However, the proposed project has the potential of indirect employment

generation.


Page 1

CHAPTER – III

DEPOT DETAILS 3.0 INTRODUCTION

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) is a fortune 500 oil refining,

exploration and marketing PSU with Navratna status. BPCL has multiple refinery

units in Mumbai, Kochi, Numaligarh and Bina.

Bharat Petroleum’s Mumbai Refinery is one of the most versatile Refineries in

India. With successful implementation of various projects and de-bottlenecking,

our Refineries currently process about 12 Million Metric Tons of crude oil per

annum.

Kochi Refinery, a unit of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, commissioned in

1966 with a capacity of 50,000 barrels per day. Formerly known as Cochin

Refineries Limited and renamed as Kochi Refineries Limited, the refinery was

originally established in collaboration with Phillips Petroleum Corporation, USA.

Today it is a frontline entity as the unit of the Fortune 500 Company.

Numaligarh Refinery Limited is a public sector oil company set up in the year

1993, with its 3 MMT refinery situated in Numaligarh, Assam. The Refinery is one

of the most technologically advanced and environment friendly refineries in the

country. BPCL is the major share holder with 61.65% of the Company’s paid up

equity capital.

Moreover, Bharat Oman Refineries Limited (BORL), a company promoted by

Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) and Oman Oil Company Limited

(OOCL), has set up a 6 MMTPA grass root refinery at Bina, Madhya Pradesh

along with crude supply system consisting of a Single Point Mooring system


Page 2

(SPM), Crude Oil Storage Depot (COT) at Vadinar, District – Jamnagar, Gujrat

and 935 Km long cross country crude pipeline from Vadinar to Bina.

BPCL has also many POL Depots spread across the country. BPCL now

proposes to expand the capacity of the existing POL Depot at Balasore, by adding

one additional tanks.

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF DEPOT FACILITY

Product pipe line system

Tank Wagon Loading / Unloading facility,

Tank Farm

Truck Loading facilities/TW loading facility.

Fire- fighting system including 2 nos. fire water tanks each of 2500m3

capacity

Electrical Depot

Instrumentation

Drinking water and Rain Water Harvesting System.

Building

Utility

3.2 LAND, LOCATION AND LAYOUT

Balasore depot is about 12 km away from Balasore Railway Station. The depot

is located at Somnathpur Industrial Estate, P.S Industrial PS, Balasore, Odisha

– 756019. The depot is well connected by road through NH 5 and by rail.

Balasore is located within 21029’46” N longitude and 86050’57” E latitude.

The layout has been prepared strictly as per prescribed OISD standards and

guidelines. The safety distances are maintained as per the standard


Page 3

guidelines. The road network is designed in such a way that the movement of

vehicle carrying bulk petroleum products is smooth.

3.3 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND OPERATING PROCEDURES Following facilities are existing in the Depot.

i) Product are received through BTPN railway wagons

ii) Unloading of different products in their designated tanks through TWD

Pumps

iii) Storage in Tanks

iv) Loading in Tank Trucks through TLF Pumps

The detail process descriptions are discussed below : 3.4 PRODUCT PIPELINE SYSTEMS

3 dedicated pipe lines have been laid between the pumps and the storage

tanks.

Pipelines within the Depot consists of the followings :

1. Pipelines from Unloading pump house to the Tank Farm : There are

dedicated pipelines for individual products.

2. Pipelines from Tanks to Loading pump house : There are dedicated

pipelines for individual products.

Pipelines from Loading pump house to the TLF Gantry. There are dedicated

pipelines for individual products. Tank wise dedicated pipelines have been

provided. The lines connecting the loading arms are of 3”NB Size. The loading

arms and the metering assembly are of 3”NB Size.


Page 4

3.5 Receipt

Petroleum products are received through: 1) Tank wagons received is mainly from Numaligarh Refinery

3.6 Petroleum Product Unloading Petroleum products received by BTPN wagons at TW unloading gantry

located outside the Depot premises. Materials are unloaded through pumps

earmarked for each product. 3 dedicated pipe lines for MS, HSD, & SKO have

been laid to receive product from rakes.

TWD PUMP HOUSE MOTOR PUMP

Sl. No. Make KW HP Volts Amps RPM Head Flow Rate Product

MS 1 Crompton Greaves 15 20 415 22 1475 35 100 kl/hr MS



SKO 1 Crompton Greaves 30 40 415 51 1450 35 235 kl/hr SKO

SKO 2 Crompton Greaves 30 40 415 51 1450 35 235 kl/hr SKO

HSD 1 Crompton Greaves 37 50 415 63 1450 35 275 kl/hr HSD



FO 1 Crompton Greaves 55 75 415 93 1450 50 125 kl/hr. FO

FO 2 Crompton Greaves 55 75 415 93 1450 50 125 kl/hr FO


Page 5

3.7 `TANK FARM:

The POL Depot is provided with storage tanks for Class A, B & C petroleum

products.

Product MS HSD SKO FO ETHANOL

Class A B B B A

The tanks for Class A are floating roof tanks and fixed roof tanks are provided for

Class B & class C products. The design and construction of storage tanks are

according to Indian regulations IS 803 and/or API 650. All tanks are provided with

sprinKLers and foam feeding devices as per the OISD regulations. All the

storage tanks are equipped with automatic level indicators with high / high high

level alarms.

The design of the Depot is according to Indian standards OISD 117,116 and as

per recommendation of Chief Controller of Explosives, Nagpur (CCOE)

Balasore current Storage Product Storage Capacity MS : 1 x 3000 KL, 1X100 KL, 1 x 45 KL = 8145 KL 1 x 5000 KL(Proposed) HSD : 1 x 858 KL, 2 x 3406 KL, 1 x 4700 KL, 1 x 45 KL = 12415 KL SKO : 1 X 858 KL, 1 X 858 KL = 1716 KL Ethanol : 1 x 45 KL = 45 KL ________________________

Total 22321 KL


Page 6

TANK CHART DETAILS

Storage of products: The following storage capacities are envisaged:

Sl. No.

Produce Tank No.

Position Total Tankage (KL)

Dimension of tanks (mtr)

Type of tank

1 HSD T2 A/G 3406 17.03 X 15 Cone roof 2 HSD T3 A/G 3406 (Convert

From FO) 17.03 X 15 Cone roof

3 HSD T4 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 4 SKO T5 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 5 SKO T6 A/G 858 (Convert

from MS) 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof

6 HSD T7 A/G 4700 20.0 X 15.0 Cone roof 7 MS T8 A/G 3000 20.0 X 11.5 Floating roof 8 MS T9 A/G 5000

(proposed) 24.0 X 12.0 Floating roof

9 MS T10 U/G 100 3.2 X 12.6 Underground 10 HSD T11 U/G 45 2.36 X 10 Underground 11 MS

(speed) T12 U/G 45 (Convert

from SKO) 2.36 X 10 Underground

12 Ethanol T13 U/G 45 2.7 X 8.4 Underground Total 22321 KL


Page 7

Truck /Wagon loading facilities

A. TLF Gantry:-

TLF PUMP HOUSE MOTOR PUMP

Sl. No. Make KW HP Volts Amps RPM Head Flow Rate

(m3/hr) Product

MS 1 Crompton Greaves 7.5 10 415 14 2865 35 60 kl/hr

MS

MS 2 Crompton Greaves 7.5 10 415 14 2865 35 60 kl/hr MS

SKO 1 Crompton Greaves 7.5 10 415 14 2865 35 60 kl/hr SKO

SKO 2 Crompton Greaves 7.5 10 415 14 2865 35 60 kl/hr SKO

HSD 1 Crompton Greaves 18.5 25 415 32 1470 36 120 kl/hr

HSD


HSD


HSD


Page 8

3.8 Fire detection and protection system

The fire protection and detection system are in accordance with OISD 117.

Portable fire extinguishers of 10-75 kg are installed on pump stations, tank farms

and buildings, the size depending on the object concerned. Electrical rooms are

protected by Carbon dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers. Mobile fire fighting vehicles

with foam monitors, hoses, etc.have been provided. Fixed fire fighting monitors

are located at the pump station and truck loading gantries, each with a capacity

of 144 m3/hr. sufficient hydrants are installed in the POL installation, with the

hydrants spaced at a maximum distance of 30m.

The tanks are equipped with fixed cooling water and foam installations and

mobile vehicles and equipment (monitors, hoses, branch pipes, etc.) are

provided to handle field fires.

Table below will show fire water storage tank, fire water pumps,

Fire Water Storage Tank

Sr.No No’s Capacity (KL) 1 2 2X1527

2 1 858

TOTAL 3912


Page 9

Fire Water Pump

The salient features of the existing fire fighting system are furnished below:

The existing fire fighting facility will be upgraded during the proposed

expansion of the Balasore Depot. There will be provision of following fire

fighting equipments for the proposed expansion:

o Dry Chemical Powder Extinguisher

o CO2 type Extinguisher

o Mechanical foam type Extinguisher

o Water CO2 type Extinguisher

o Water and sand buckets

o Hose Reel

o PA system

o Hydrant system

o Foam Monitor

o Water monitor

o Fire alarm system

o Foam drum

Sr.No Category No’s Capacity 1

Main Pump ( Engine Driven)

3 410 M3/Hr

1 Stand By 410 M3/Hr

2 Jockey Pump 2 30 M3/Hr


Page 10

3.9 Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus

Following types of fire extinguishers and other fire fighting equipments

specified for installation in vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative

block, control room, fire water pump house. MCC etc as per OISD

guidelines.

Following are the available firefighting equipment available in the

installation: Inventory of Fire Fighting Equipments

ITEM DESCRIPTION. Nos. Remarks Fire Water Tanks 2x1527 KL +

1 X 858 KL

Fire Engines 3 x 410 kL/hr Fire Extinguisher -DCP Type-75 kg 7 -DCP Type-50 kg NIL -DCP Type-10 kg 55 -CO2 Type-4.5 kg 11 -CO2 Type-2 kg NIL Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) 180kg spare Foam (AFFF) 14 Foam compound Trolly-250 ltrs NA Foam compound stalls (at vulnerable points) NA Water Sprinkler for MS Tank 1 LPM/3LPM Sand Buckets 22 Double Headed Water Hydrants Single Headed Water Hydrants 26 Water Monitors 14 Fire Hose Reels including spares 72 Fire Hose Boxes 26 Jet Nozzles including Spares 26 Foam cum water Nozzles(FB 10X) NA FB 5X Nozzle NA


Page 11

3.10 FIRE ALARM SYSTEM

Conventional type Fire alarm systems are provided in following areas;

a) Truck Loading

b) Tank Farm

c) Office / Admn. Building

d) Sub-Stations

Fog Nozzle 4 Triple Purpose Nozzles (Diffuser) 3 Safety Shoes 27 Safety Helmets 30 Safety Belts 9 Flame Proof Torch 2 Breathing Apparatus 2 Fire Proximity suit, Boot , Helmet, Gloves 2 Water Jel Blanket 2 Electric Siren (3 Km) 2 Electric Siren (1 Km) 2 Electric Siren (2 Km) Hand Operated Siren 4 Public Addressing System 1 First Aid Boxes 4 Stretcher 2 Wind Socks 3 Electrical Gloves 2


Page 12

3.11 Source of Signaling The source of signaling is considered as ESD These are considered for the

areas where manual warning is to be initiated on notice of fire. They are mostly

provided for open areas or near to access doors, truck loading, pump house,

tank farm, administrative building, etc.

3.12 Plant Automation System

VHF communication system containing a base station with antenna (1 set) and

number of portable VHF Tran receivers (8 sets) with charger units are provided

for providing communication within the plant premises. The base station is

located in the administrative office. The communication system does not cause

interference to the I & C system and existing communication system in the

vicinity of operational areas. Public address system is at the security room .The

fire water pumps are activated manually. When the fire-water header pressure is

low, the jockey pump maintains the pressure automatically. The foam is sucked

through Venturi system.

3.13 Water Treatment

Waste water is generated due to area cleaning /housekeeping and occasional

tank cleaning operations (Once in five years) at the POL Depot.

Oil contaminated waste water is generated mainly from pump areas, manifolds,

truck loading, etc. only when spillage is washed with water as well as occasional

tank washing. The direct discharge areas i.e. those areas within the POL Depot

where leakage is likely to occur during normal operations is to be provided with

leak-proof curbing. These curbed areas are connected to the Oil-Water

Separator (OWS) system for treatment of oily wastewater generated. Indirect


Page 13

discharge areas such as dykes, etc. are connected to the OWS. The capacity is

adequate to take care of, the oily waste water to be handled from the facility

during the monsoon season.

The separated oil consisting of a comparatively dry floating layer is removed and

is drained into a common draw –off pipe discharge to the oil pit. This collected oil

is sold to third party for off-site recovery or recycling. Separate storm water

drainage system is provided at the facility. The non-contaminated rain water is

discharged directly to a drain However, particularly during the monsoon; any oil-

contaminated rain water is led to the OWS for treatment prior to discharge.

3.14 SITE ANALYSIS

Connectivity The nearest railway station is Balasore which is about 12 km from the

Project Site. Nearest domestic and international airport is at Bhubaneswar

which is at a distance of about 202 km from Project Site.

Existing Land Use

The project is for installation of four one additional tanks within the existing

premises. hence additional space is not required. Thus, no change in land

use is envisaged.

There is no Reserve Forest, Protected Forest, National Parks and

Sanctuary within the 10km of Project Site.


Page 14

Land Ownership The total land is and is under possession of BPCL.

Existing Infrastructure

All infrastructural facilities of the existing Depot will be used for the project.


Page 1

CHAPTER – IV

PROCESS DESCRIPTION

RECEIVE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS

BY TANK WAGON/

STORE IN ABOVE GROUND

(FIXED & FLOATING ROOF

TANK) UNDER GROUND

LOAD TANK TRUCK FOR DELIVERY,


Page 1

CHAPTER – V

RISK ANALYSIS 5.1 PREAMBLE

With growth of population, industrialization, urbanization and modernization,

demand of petroleum products, such as MS, HSD, and SKO are increasing at a

very rapid pace. In view of this, the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas has

been encouraging Oil Companies to augment their existing facilities and/or

construct new facilities to bridge the gap between demand and supply.

As the Depot handle various petroleum products which have got potential of fire /

explosion hazard for itself, hence it is necessary to evaluate the Risk due to the

Depot. Accordingly, M/s. Sonar Bharat Environment & Ecology (P) Ltd. (SBEE)

has been retained by M/s. BPCL as consultant to carryout Risk Analysis Study

for the Depot.

5.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The risk assessment has been carried out in line with the requirements of various

statutory bodies:

Identification of potential hazard areas;

Identification of representative failure cases;

Identification of possible initiating events;

Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events

and the impact zones from the accidental scenarios;

Consequence analysis for all the possible events;


Page 2

5.3 Existing Facility The existing capacity of the POL Depot is furnished below.

Product

Storage Capacity Description (KL) Total (KL)

MS 1 x 858 + 1 x 100 + 1 x 3000 3958 HSD 1 x 858 + 1 x 3406 + 1 x 4700 + 1x45 9009 SKO 1 x 858 903 FO 1 x 3406 3406 Ethanol 1 x 45 45

TOTAL 17321

Storages facilities after Expansion .

Sl. No.

Produce Tank No.



Type of tank

1 HSD T2 A/G 3406 17.03 X 15 Cone roof 2 HSD T3 A/G 3406 17.03 X 15 Cone roof 3 HSD T4 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 4 SKO T5 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 5 SKO T6 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 6 HSD T7 A/G 4700 20.0 X 15.0 Cone roof 7 MS T8 A/G 3000 20.0 X 11.5 Floating roof 8 MS T9 A/G 5000



(speed) T12 U/G 45 2.36 X 10 Underground



Page 3

The product wise capacity of the POL Depot after Expansion is furnished below:

Product

Storage Capacity Description (KL) Total (KL)

MS 1 x 100 + 1 x 3000 + 1 x 5000 + 1 x 45 8145 HSD 1 x 858 + 2 x 3406 + 1 x 4700 + 1x45 12415 SKO 1 x 858 + 1 x 858 1716 Ethanol 1 x 45 45

TOTAL 22321

5.4 Hazard Identification

Identify potentially hazardous materials that can cause loss of human

life/injury, loss of properties and deterioration of the environment due to

loss of containment.

Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and

consequent hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity.

5.5 Consequence Analysis

Analysis of magnitude of consequences of different potential hazard

scenarios and their effect zones.

Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important

for taking precautionary measures for risk reduction as well as mitigation

of effect in case of such accidents happening.

This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of risk

assessment and the information provided by BPCL Balasore Depot


Page 4

5.6 Glossary of Terms Used In Risk Assessment

The common terms used in Risk Assessment and Disaster Management are

elaborated below:

“Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death)

occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be

either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances.

“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury,

damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria.

“Hazardous Substance” means any substance or preparation, which by reason

of its chemical or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm

to human beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the

environment.

“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an

industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or

connected therewith or which may result in pollution of general environment.

“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic

disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on

a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected

area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire explosions and

release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc.


Page 5

“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal

injury or property damage or both.

“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the

resources. This highlights the tropical nature of emergency “It is seen after

experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this

nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always.” “Emergency

Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall management.

Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response capacity of the

persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others in the

organization before, during and after an emergency.


Page 6

FLOW CHART FOR RISK ANALYSIS STUDY

YES

START

PLANT VISIT

DATA COLLECTION PROCESS DESCRIPTION PROCESS CONTROL LOOPS PRI/PFD OPERATING MANUAL START UP/SHUT DOWN PLOT PLAN METEOROLOGICAL DATA PAST ACCIDENTS DATA ALL RELEVANT PHYSICAL CHEMICAL DATA OF CHEMICALS INV0LVED

SELECT THE

CLASSIFY VESSEL/EQUIPMENT

INVENTORY ANALYSIS

CALCULATE EFFECT

IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD

IS FE/FET IN SEVERITY ADOPT CHECK LIST

APPROACH

CONSEQUENCE

PLOT DAMAGE DISTANCE


Page 1

Chapter – VI

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 6.1 INTRODUCTION

Identification of hazards in the Depot is of primary significance in the analysis,

quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals and

process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the

characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an accident.

Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly

examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned

event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.

Typical schemes of predictive hazard evaluation and quantitative risk analysis

suggest that hazard identification step plays a key role.

Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequence form the

basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or

personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a

toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its

damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures

required to be taken. The following two methods for hazard identification have

been employed in the study.

Identification of hazardous storage units based on relative ranking

technique, viz, Fire-Explosion and Toxicity index (FE & TI); and

Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)


Page 2

6.2 CLASSIFICATION OF MAJOR HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE

Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely

flammable substances, unstable substances and toxic substances.

Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized;

under certain circumstances vapours arising from flammable substances when

mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if

present in sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also.

Unstable substances are liquids or solids, which may decompose with such

violence so as to give rise to blast waves.

Finally, toxic substances are dangerous and cause substantial damage to life

when released into the atmosphere. The ratings for a large number of chemicals

based on flammability, reactivity and toxicity are given NFPA Codes 49 and

345M.


Page 1

CHAPTER – VII

MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (MCAA) APPROACH 7.1 INTRODUCTION

A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with

a maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.

MCA analysis does not include quantification of probability of occurrence of an

accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of

probability that is still believed to be credible, selection of MCA is somewhat

arbitrary. In practice, selection of accident scenarios representative for a MCA-

Analysis is done on the basis of engineering judgment and expertise in the field

of risk analysis studies, especially accident analysis.

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

MCA analysis. This encompasses certain techniques to identify the hazards and

calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of heat radiation,

toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or potential

accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage and

handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their credibility.

Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event,

the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage

caused can be assessed. Flow chart in Page no.24 depicts the flow chart for

MCA analysis.

As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and

storage units and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level of

risk for the surroundings in terms of damage distances. For this selection,

following factors have been taken into account:


Page 2

Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic

Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity and

Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing

and presence of incompatible material.

In addition to the above factors, location of a unit or activity with respect to

adjacent activities is taken into consideration to account for the potential

escalation of an accident. This phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The

units and activities, which have been selected on the basis of the above factors,

are summarized, accident scenarios are established in hazard identification

studies, whose effect and damage calculations are carried out in Maximum

Credible Accident Analysis Studies.

7.2 METHODOLOGY

Following steps are employed for visualization of MCA scenarios:

Chemical inventory analysis

Identification of chemical release and accident scenarios

Analysis of past accidents of similar nature to establish credibility to

identified scenarios; and

Short-listing of MCA scenarios

7.3 COMMON CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS

Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents

are identified as:

Poor house keeping

Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities

Unsafe or defective equipment facilities

Lack of proper procedures

Improvising unsafe procedures


Page 3

Failure to follow prescribed procedures

Jobs not understood

Lack of awareness of hazards involved

Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities

Lack of guides and safety devices, and

Lack of protective equipment and clothing

7.4 FAILURES OF HUMAN SYSTEMS

An assessment of past accidents reveal human factor to be the cause for over

60% of the accidents while the rest are due to other component failures. This

percentage will increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis.

Major causes of human failures reported are due to:

Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavorable environmental

conditions, fatigue, etc.

Lack of training in safety and loss prevention

Indecision in critical situation; and

Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situation

Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident

reports only provide information about equipment and/or component failures.

Hence, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human

systems and consequent damages.


Page 4

7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (MCAA)

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes,

causing possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the

question of how the consequences of release of such substances and the

damage to surrounding area can be determined by means of models.

It is intended to give an insight into how the physical effects resulting from

release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of models and

how vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of

injuries and damage to exposed population and environment. A disastrous

situation in general is due to outcome of fire, Vapour Cloud explosion or toxic

hazards in addition to other natural causes, which eventually lead to loss of life,

property and ecological imbalance.

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identity the

hazards and calculate the consequent effect in terms of damage distances of

heat radiation, toxic release, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or

potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage

and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their

credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on

the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the

respective damage caused can be assessed. The MCA analysis involves

ordering and ranking various sections in terms of potential vulnerability.


Page 5

7.6.1 ANALYSIS OF PAST ACCIDENTS

Numerous accidents involving different hydrocarbons in process plants have

been reported. Table 9 provides a worldwide list of all such accidents reported

since 1917. More than 1000 people have received injuries of various intensity

and many people died due to these accidents. The major causes of accident

involving fraction are given below.

i) Fire, over pressure, explosions 19 Nos

ii) Overfilling, loading/unloading and pipeline ruptures 5 Nos

iii) Collision and impact of rail/road tankers during transportation 21 Nos

---

45 Nos

It can be seen that the storage areas and transportation vehicles of C fractions

are most vulnerable to accidents. More than 10 accidents out of the 45 incidents

examined have ended in BLEVE situation. Rest of them has caused fires and

explosions.

The consequences of BLEVE have been found to be most severe in the vicinity

of the accident site. The worst disaster of C fraction had occurred in November

1984 at the C fractions storage and distribution center in San Juan Ixhautepec in

Mexico City. An extensive fire and a series of violent explosions resulted in

chaos.


Page 6

MAJOR ACCIDENT IN PROCESS INDUSTRIES

Accident Date (dd/mm/yyyy)

Location Material name

Source Event (Note-1)

No. of Fatalities

No. of Injuries

Country

24/01/1970 Semarang, Java

Kerosene Storage Pipework

Fire;Tank Fire 50 Indonesia

26/06/1971 Czechowice Oil Storage Atmospheric

Explosion;Fire 33 Poland

30/03/1972 Duque De Caxias, Rio De Janeiro

LPG Storage Pressurised

BLEVE;Fire 39 51 Brazil

??//1972 Weirton, West Virginia

Propane Process Confined Explosion

21 20 USA

10/2/1973 Staten Island, New York

Natural Gas Storage Atmospheric

Confined Explosion;Fire

40 2 USA

13/07/1973 Potchefstroom, Natal

Ammonia Transfer Pressurised Storage

Instantaneous Release; Dense Gas Cloud

18 65 South Africa

5/7/1973 Kingman, Arizona

Butane Transfer: Rail Tanker

Continuous Release; BLEVE

13 95 USA

1/6/1974 Fixborough, Lincoinshire

Cyclohexane

Process: Pipework

Continuous Release; Unconfined Explosion

28 89 UK

13/10/1974 Crude Oil Transrfer: Ship

Explosion;Fire 15 4 Sumatra

??/6/1974 Zaluzi Ethylened Process Explosion 14 79 Czechoslovakia 7/4/1974 Fort Miffin,

Pennsylvania Crude Oil Transfer:

Ship Fire;Explosion 13 8 USA

7/11/1975 Beek Propylene Process: Pipework

Dense Gas Cloud; Unconfined Explosion

14 107 Netherlands

??//1976 Chalmette, Louisiana

Ethyl Benzene

Process: Process Vesseld

Explosion;Fire 13 USA

9/12/1977 Cartagena Ammonia Process: Reactor

Explosion; Release

21 30 Colombia

25/08/1977 Cairo Butane Process Release 14 6 Egypt 8/1/1979 Bantry Bay,

Cork Crude Oil Transfer:Shi

p Explosion; Fireball

50 Eire

23/03/1979 Beira, Sofala Oil Storage: Atmospheric

Tank Fire; Fire

19 Mozambique

13/07/1979 Taipei Resin Storage Dense Phase Explosion; Fire

18 59 Taiwan

2/6/1979 Sajobabony Chemicals (unspecified)

Process Explosion; Fire 13 6 Hungary


Page 7

??/2/1979 Risa Petrol Process Confined Explosion; Fire

10 Germany

22/06/1981 Rocklin, California

Gasoline Storage: Atmospheric

Release 10 USA

19/12/1982 Tacoa Fuel Oil Transfer: Atmospheric Srorage

Explosion:Instantaneous Release

>153 500 Venezuela

3/12/1984 Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh

Methy Isocyanate

Process: Pressurised

Continuous Release: Firebll

>2000 >170,000

India

2/11/1984 Dronka Aircraft Fuel Storage: Atmospheric

Continuous Release;Fire

>580 Egypt

19/11/1984 San Juan Lxhuatepec, Mexico City

LPG Storage:Pressur4ised Storage

BLEVE >500 2500 Mexico

??/7/1984 Chicago, LLinois

Propane, Monoethanolamine

Process: Process Vessels

Instantaneous Release; Explosion

17 17 USA

23/05/1984 Abbeystead, Lancashire

Methane Process Explosion 16 28 UK

23/07/1984 Romeoville, LLLinois

Propane Process: Reactor

Unconfined Explosion;BLEVE

15 USA

??/3/1984 Lagos Kerosene Process Explosion 10 Nigeria 1/11/1986 Devnya Vinyl

Chloride Process:Pipework

Explosion;Fire 17 19 Bulgaria

9/11/1988 Bombay Toluene, Benzene, Naptha

Storage: Atmospheric

Fire;Explosion 35 16 India

22/10/1988 Shanghai LPG Process Unconfined Explosion;Fire

25 17 China

23/10/1989 Pasadena, Texas

Isobutane Process: Reactor

Unconfined Explosion;

23 125 USA

13/08/1989 Qingdao Oil Storage Explosion; Tank Fire

16 86 China

4/10/1989 Yochon, Cholla Namdo

Chemicals Process Explosion; Fire 13 19 South Korea

30/01/1989 Secunda, Transvaal

Oil Process: Pipework

Explosion;Fire 12 8 South Africa

6/11/1990 Maharastra, Bombay

LPG Process:Pipework

Continuous Release;Unconfined Explosion

<31 >30 India

5/7/1990 Channelview, Texas

Hydrocarbons

Waste: Atmospheric Storage

Explosion;Fireball

17 5 USA

18/03/1990 Tehran Gas Storage Explosion; Fire 13 >1 Iran 24/03/1992 Dakar Ammonia Process Explosion;Fire 41 403 Senegal 1/9/1992 Eleusis Crude Oil Process:

Pipework Explosion; Fire 14 >30 Greece

26/05/1992 Haryana Ammonia Process: Release 11 9 India


Page 8

Pipework 7/9/1992 Haryana Ammonia Process:Pipe

work Explosion >11 9 India

5/8/1993 Qingshuihe, Guangdong

Sulphus, Organophosphorus, Ammonium Nitrate, LPG

Warehouse Explosion;Fire >15 >160 China

25/03/1993 Maracaibo Natural Gas Process Explosion; Fire

11 >1 Venezuela

20/10/1995 Colombo Diesel, Kerosene,Crude Oil


Explosion;Fire <25 Sri Lanka

26/06/1996 Nr Tiranjin Chemicals (unspecified)

Process Explosion 19 20 China

14/09/1997 Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh

LPG;Kerosent, Petroleum Products, Crude Oil

Transfer: Pipework

Explosion;Fire 56 20 India

6/1/1998 Xingping, Shaanxi

Nitrogen Process:Pipework

Explosion 50 100 China

17/08/1999 Korfez, Gulf of Izmit

Crude Oil, Naphtha

Process Fire;Continuous Release

37 Turkey

21/09/2001 Toulouse Ammonium Nitrate, Ammonia, Chlorine


Explosion 30 2500 France

8/7/2002 Shenxian, Shandong Province

Ammonia Process: Pipework

Continuous Release

13 11 China

23/12/2003 Gao Qiao, Chongqing

Natural Gas, Hydrogen Sulphide (Sour Gas)

Gas Well Blowout;Continuous Release

243 4000-9000

China

19/01/2004 Skikda LNG Process:Heat Exchangers

Fire 23 74 Algeria

23/03/2005 Texas City, Texas

Octanes Process: Process Vessels

Explosion;Fire 15 >100 USA

29/10/2009 Jaipur Petroleum Product

Pipeline Transfer

Leakage in pipe line

12 200 India


Page 9

RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE

POOL CONTINUOUS

VAPOUR

FLASH

HEAT RADIATION

EFFECTS

IGNITION

DISPERSION

PRESSURE WAVE

VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION

FIRE

IGNITION


Page 10

7.7 FIRE FIGHTING FACILITY: Details of Fire fighting arrangements within the factory and similar additional services that can be obtained at a short notice are as under:

ITEM DESCRIPTION. Nos. Remarks Fire Water Tanks 2x1527 KL + 1 X 858 KL Fire Engines 3 x 410 kL/hr Fire Extinguisher -DCP Type-75 kg 7 -DCP Type-50 kg NIL -DCP Type-10 kg 55 -CO2 Type-4.5 kg 11 -CO2 Type-2 kg NIL Dry Chemical Powder (DCP) 180kg spare Foam (AFFF) 14 Foam compound Trolly-250 ltrs NA Foam compound stalls (at vulnerable points) NA Water Sprinkler for MS Tank 1 LPM/3LPM Sand Buckets 22 Single Headed Water Hydrants 26 Water Monitors 14 Fire Hose Reels including spares 72 Fire Hose Boxes 26 Jet Nozzles including Spares 26 Foam cum water Nozzles(FB 10X) NA FB 5X Nozzle NA Fog Nozzle 4 Triple Purpose Nozzles (Diffuser) 3 Safety Shoes 27 Safety Helmets 30 Safety Belts 9 Flame Proof Torch 2 Breathing Apparatus 2 Fire Proximity suit, Boot , Helmet, Gloves 2 Water Jel Blanket 2 Electric Siren (3 Km) 2 Electric Siren (1 Km) 2 Hand Operated Siren 4 Public Addressing System 1 First Aid Boxes 4 Stretcher 2 Wind Socks 3 Electrical Gloves 2


Page 11

7.8 CALCULATION OF FIRE WATER REQUIREMENT: TANK FIRM NO – 1: Requirement of cooling water for the largest tank T7 = 3.14 x 20 x 15 x 3 lpm/m2

= 2826 lpm/m2

= 169.56 m3/hr

Cooling water requirement for T8 (since T8 is within R+30 from T7)

=3.14 x 20 x 11.5 x 3 lpm/m2

=2166.6 lpm/m2

= 130 m3/hr

Cooling water requirement falling tank beyond (R+30) of T2, T3, T4, T5 & T6

= (802.11+802.11+381.51+381.51+381.51) x 1 lpm/m2

= 2748.75 lpm/m2

= 164.92 m3/hr

FORM WATER FLOW RATE :

Foam water requirement Largest tank on fire =(3.14 x 20 x 20 x 5)/4 lpm

= 1570 lpm

= 94.2 x 0.97m3/hr

= 91.37 m3/hr

WATER REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPLYMENTARY HOSE:

4 Single Hydrant Streams – 4 X 36 = 144 m3/hr

2 HVL - 2 X 228= 456 m3/hr

Total = ( 144 + 456 ) = 600 m3/hr

Total water requirement for tanktrotection of tank firm I

= (169.56 + 130 + 164.92 + 91.37 + 600) m3/hr = 1155.85 m3/hr


Page 12

WATER REQUIREMENT FOR TANK FIRM II:

Water requirement for the largest tank (T9) = 3.14 x 24 x 12 x 3 lpm/m2

= 2712.96 lpm/m2

Foam water requirement = 3.14 x (242 – 22.42) /4 m2

= 58.29 m2

Foam solution rate 12 lpm/m2 = 699.48 lpm

Foam water required = (0.97 x 699.48) lpm

= 678.5 lpm = 40.71 m3/hr

Water requirement for supplementary hose

Water for 4 Single Hydrant Streams – 4 X 36 = 144 m3/hr

Water fir 2 HVLR - 2 X 228= 456 m3/hr

Total = ( 144 + 456 ) = 600 m3/hr

Total water requirement = (162.78 + 40.71 + 600) m3/hr

= 803.49 m3/hr

Highest of 2 requirements = 1155.85 kl, 803.49 kl,

Fire water requirement on single fire contingency – 1155.85 x 4 = 4623.4kl

Item Calculated capacity As

per OISD 117

Existing Capacity

Fire Water

Storage

(Considering

air space)

4623.4 kl

2 x 1527 KL + 1 x 858 KL = 3912 kl


Page 1

CHAPTER – VIII

RISK ASSESSMENT 8.1 Introduction

Balasore POL Depot of B.P.C.L which includes the facilities for receipt, storage

and dispatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard due to unwanted

and accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due safeguard has been

taken in design and operation of the system to prevent any unwanted release of

hydrocarbons from their containment. However, in the event of release of

hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire but chances of

explosion are less. This section deals with various failure cases leading to

various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and consequence analysis.

Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various

failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to

determine the distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason

and purpose for consequence analysis are manifolds like.

Computation of risk

Aid better plant layout

Evaluate damage and protective measures necessary for saving

properties & human lives

Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures

Formulate safe design criteria and protection system

Formulate effective Disaster Management plan

The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all

known and unknown effects that are of importance when failure scenarios occur

and to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also

gives the plant authorities, workers district authorities and the public living in the


Page 2

area an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be

taken.

8.2 Modes of Failure There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any Depot. The

leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of small

dia pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms,

leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to

overpressure, pump mechanical seal failure and many other sources of leakage.

8.2.1 Damage Criteria

The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to

thermal radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released

since the petroleum products are highly inflammable specially Naphtha and

Motor sprit oil whose flash points are low.

The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally

spread on the ground as a pool or released in the form or jet in case of release

from a pressurized pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present

in the petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet

as well as liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage

tanks due to ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may

also be regarded as pool fire.

Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of

burns on human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment,

piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects

due to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in the Table


Page 3

TABLE

DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY

Incident Thermal

Radiation Intensity KW/M2

Type of damage

37.5 Can cause heavy damage to process equipment, piping building etc. (100% lethality)

32.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks. 12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of work(50%lethality) 8.0 Maximum heat flux for un insulated tanks 4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover

within 20 sec. (% of 1st Degree Burn) 1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure. 0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation

TABLE

PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD THERMAL DOSES

Dose Threshold

Kw/M2

Effect

37.5 3rd Degree Burn

21.50 2nd Degree Burn

12.5 1st Degree Burn

4.5 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin caused.

1st Degree Burn > Involve only epidermis, blister may occur example-

sun Burn.

2nd Degree Burn > Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn

plus some Portion of dermis.


Page 4

3rd Degree Bun > Involve whole of epidermis and dermis;

subcutaneous Tissues may also be damaged.

In case of Motor Spirit having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a

possibility of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over

pressure is given in Table

TABLE

DAMAGE EFFECTS DUE TO BLAST OVER PRESSURE

Blast Over Pressure (Bar)

Damage Type

0.30 Major Damage to Structures 0.10 Repairable Damage 0.03 Damage of Glass 0.01 Crack of Windows

8.2.2 Dispersion and Stability Class

In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons dispersion of vapour

plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors which affects dispersion

is mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface

roughness. One of the characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an

important role in dispersion of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to

which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is

generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The

stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse

pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems

relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Turbulence induced by

buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature

profile.


Page 5

Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height.

The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It

varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature

with height under adiabatic or neutral condition is approximately 1 °C per 100

metres. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the

lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 1°C per

100 metres.

Pasquill has defined six stability ranging from A to F A = Extremely unstable

B = Moderately unstable

C = Slightly unstable

D = Neutral

E = Stable

F = Highly Stable


Page 1

CHAPTER – IX

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done to evaluate

and identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable measures

in operational phase to prevent such failure events.

9.2 STORAGE TANKS IN DEPOT

Sl. No.

Produce Tank No.



Type of tank

1 HSD T2 A/G 3406 17.03 X 15 Cone roof 2 HSD T3 A/G 3406 17.03 X 15 Cone roof 3 HSD T4 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 4 SKO T5 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 5 SKO T6 A/G 858 9.0 X 13.5 Cone roof 6 HSD T7 A/G 4700 20.0 X 15.0 Cone roof 7 MS T8 A/G 3000 20.0 X 11.5 Floating roof 8 MS T9 A/G 5000



(speed) T12 U/G 45 2.36 X 10 Underground



Page 2

9.3 CONSIDERATION FOR MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT SCENARIO: HAZARD ASSESSMENT (QUANTIFICATION) 9.3.1 Hazard Distances In The Event Of Storage Tanks on Fire Scenario-1 Calculation of hazard distance due to storage Tank on FireT8 (MS)

Tank Farm

Tank No.

Dimension Dia & Height(m)

Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

1 T8 20.0 X 11.5 3000 MS Floating Roof

Storage tank of MS on Fire (Largest Diameter of the Existing tank in tank firm 1).

Entire roof

Surface will burn.

METEOROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED

Temperature(Max) 43.8o C/ 316.8oK Humidity(Min) 41%

Maximum temperature of 43.8o C and minimum relative humidity of 41 % have

been considered for the calculation of hazard distance.

Result

Event No Scenario

Tank diameter

Radiation Intensity inside tank

Hazard Distance from the centre of the tank (m)

(m) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1.

MS

20 32.51 Within

tank 11.3 14.6 21.3


Page 3

Consequence:

It will be seen from the above diagram that Thermal Radiation level of

37.5 kw/m2 will not be generated.

21.5 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone will spread to an area having

radius of 11.3 mts. This zone will cover tank no T7 (HSD).

Mitigative Measure :

Tank is to be cooled by water spray through monitor.

Consequence:


radius of 14.6 mts. This zone will cover tank no T7(HSD),in the

adjacent dyke.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone will spread to an area having radius

of 21.3 mts. This zone will cover the following facilities.

i. TWD Pump House

ii. T9 in the Adjacent dyke

iii. Manifold


Pumping to the tank is to be stopped .Unloading is to be stopped.

Pump house is to be kept under cooling. Tank no T3, T6 and tank no

T9 (MS) are to be cooled by water spray.


Page 4

Scenario-2

Calculation of hazard distance in the event of storage Tank on Fire (HSD)

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product

Tank Type

1 T7 20.0 x 15.0 4700 HSD Cone roof

Storage tank of HSD on Fire (Largest Diameter tank in tank firm 1). Vapour will

burn at the rim (0.8M)


Temperature(Max ) 43.8o C/ 316.8oK

Humidity(Min) 41%


been considered for the calculation of hazard distance

Result

Event No Scenario

Tank diameter



(m) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1.

HSD

20 30.90

Within tank

Within tank 12.2 22.4


Page 5

Consequence:

In case of tank no T7 (HSD) 37.5 kw/m2 and 21.5 kw/m2 Thermal

Radiation level will not be generated.


radius of 12.2 mts. This zone shal cover tank no T8 (MS).



Consequence:


of 22.4 mts. This zone shall cover the adjacent tank no T8(HSD) this

shall also cover tank no T3 and T6

.This zone further spread beyond the boundary on the northern side

and western side


Tank no T8 (MS), tank no T3 and T6 are to be cooled by water spray

through water monitor.

Habitation if any on the northern side and the western side are to be

alerted. In case of prolonged fire evacuation may be necessary.


Page 6

Scenario-3 Calculation of hazard distance due to storage Tank on Fire (SKO)

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

1 T9 9.0 x 13.5 858 SKO Cone Roof

Storage tank of SKO on Fire (Largest Diameter tank in tank firm 1). Entire roof

Surface will burn.





Result

Event No Scenario

Tank diameter



(m) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1.

SKO

9.0 44.51

Within tank

Within tank 7 14.8


Page 7

Consequence:

In case of tank no T6 (SKO) 37.5 kw/m2 and 21.5 kw/m2 Thermal

Radiation level will not be generated.


radius of 7 mts. This zone shal cover tank no T5 .



Consequence:


of 14.8 mts. This zone shall cover all the tanks no T2, T3, T4 and T5.


All the tanks in the dyke are to be cooled by water spray.


Page 8

Scenario-4 Calculation of hazard distance due to storage Tank on Fire (MS)

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

2 T9 24.0 X 12.0 5000 MS Floating Roof

Storage tank of MS on Fire (Largest Diameter Existing tank in tank firm 2). Entire

roof Surface will burn.





Result

Event No Scenario

Tank diameter



(m) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1.

MS

24 31.33 Within

tank 13.1 16.2 25.2


Page 9

Consequence:

In case of tank no T3 (MS) on fire. 37.5 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation will

not be generated.


radius of 13.1 mts. This zone remain confined within the dyke.


radius of 16.2 mts. This zone remain confined within the dyke.


of 25.2 mts. This zone will cover the tank no T4, T5 and T6 in the

adjacent dyke.

This zone will also cover the sample room, HVLR control panel and

little part beyond the boundary on the eastern side. Pumping to the

tank is to be stopped. Pump house is to be kept under cooling. Tank

no T3, T6 and tank no T9 (MS) are to be cooled by water spray.


Pumping to the tank is to be stopped.

Tank no T4, T5 & T6 are to be cooled. The sample room, HVLR

control panel are to be kept under cooling.

Habitation, if any, beyond the boundary wall are to be alerted. In case

of prolonged fire, evacuation may be necessary.


Page 10

9.3.2 HAZARD DISTANCES IN CASE OF POOL FIRE Scenario -1 Calculation of hazard distance in case of pool Fire – (MS)

Largest diameter of the MS tank in tank firm – 1

Tank Farm

Tank No.

Dimension Dia & Height (m)

Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

Pool Area M2

1 T8 20.0 X 11.5

3000 MS Cone roof 6852

Spillage within dyke area, complete containment failure



Humidity(Min) 41%

Maximum temperature of 43.8o C and minimum humidity of 41 % have been

considered for the calculation of damage distance in the case of pool fire radiation

heat intensity in KW/M2

Result Sl no Scenario

Pool Radius

Radiation Intensity inside pool

Distance from the edge of the pool (m)

(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1 MS 46.71 20.05 Within pool

Within pool 1.9 32.0


Page 11

Consequence:

In case of spillage within the dyke and getting a source of ignition, 37.5

kw/m2 and 21.5 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation will not be attained.

Thermal Radiation level of 12.5 kw/m2 shall extend upto 1.4 mts

beyond the dyke wall. All the tanks within the dyke will be covered in

the zone.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread to 32mts around the

dyke wall. This zone will cover the following facilities.

i. Tank no T9

ii. TLF Gantry

iii. TLF Pumps

iv. Underground tanks

v. Administrative block.

This zone shall spread beyond the boundary wall on the southern side.


Tank no T9 is to be cooled by water spray.

Tank truck filling is to be stopped

Trucks parked at the TLF gantry are to be removed to safer places.

The gantry and the pump house are to be cooled by water spray.

]Persons working at the Administrative Block should move to safer

places beyond this zone.

Water to be sprayed on the building for cooling.


Page 12

Scenario -2 Calculation of hazard distance due to pool Fire – (HSD)

Largest diameter of the HSD tank in tank firm – 1

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

Pool Area M2

1

T7 20 x 15 4700 HSD Cone Roof

6852




Humidity(Min) 41%



heat intensity in KW/M2.


Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1 HSD 46.71 20.00 Within pool



Page 13

Consequence:





the zone.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread to 19.7 mts around the


i. Tank no T9

ii. TLF Gantry

iii. TLF Pumps













Page 14

Scenario -3

Calculation of hazard distance due to pool Fire – (SKO)

Largest diameter of the SKO tank in tank firm – 1

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

Pool Area M2

1

T6 9.0 x 13.5 858 SKO Cone Roof

6852




Humidity(Min) 41%





Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2

1 SKO 46.71 20.00 Within pool



Page 15

Consequence:





the zone.



i. Tank no T9

ii. TLF Gantry

iii. TLF Pumps









Persons working at the Administrative Block should move to safer




Page 16

Scenario - 4

Calculation of hazard distance due to pool Fire – (MS)

Largest diameter of the existing MS tank in tank firm – 2

Tank Farm

Tank No.


Capacity (KL)

Product Tank Type

Pool Area M2

1

T9 24 x 12 5000 MS Floating Roof

4643




Humidity(Min) 41%

Maximum temperature of 43.8 C and minimum humidity of 41 % have been




Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 17

Consequence:





the zone.



i. Tank no T4, T5, T6 and T8

ii. TLF Gantry

iii. TLF Pumps













Page 18

9.3.3 CALCULATION OF HAZARD DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE PIPELINE RUPTURE AT TLF GANTRY

Scenario -1 Pipeline rupture (open area) Specification considered 1. Product MS 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 60KL/H 4. Duration 300 Second(There will always be people

around the area. Spillage is likely to be identified

within the short period and hence 5 min duration is

considered )

5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2

METEROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED Temperature(Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5 K

Humidity(Min) 41%




Quantification of hazard

Sl no Scenario

Pool Radius


Distance from the centre of the pool (m)

(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 19

Consequence:

It is seen from the diagram that Thermal Radiation level of 37.5 kw/m2

and 21.5 kw/m2 will not be attained.

12.5 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread to an area having

radius of 16.39 mts. This zone shall cover the TLF gantry and master

meter.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread to an area having radius

of 33.39 mts. This zone shall cover the following facilities

i. Administrative building

ii. TLF Pump house

iii. Tank no T2, T3, T4 and T9


Fire is to be covered with foam to avoid spreading.

Filling tank trucks is to be immediately stopped.

Trucks Parked at the bay are to be removed to safer places.

TLF Gantry, TLF pump House, tank no T2, T3, T4 and T9 are to be

cooled by water spray.


Page 20

scenario - 2 Pipeline rupture (open area) Specification considered 1. Product HSD 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 120 KL/H 4. Duration 300 Second 5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2

METEROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED

Temperature (Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5oK

Humidity(Min) 41%




Quantification of hazard Sl no Scenario

Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 21

Consequence:




radius of 20.50 mts. This zone shall cover the TLF gantry and master

meter.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread an area having radius

32.91 mts. This zone shall cover the following facilities

iv. Administrative building

v. TLF Pump house

vi. Tank no T2, T3, T4 and T9



Filling of tank trucks is to be immediately stopped.





Page 22

Scenario – 3 Pipeline rupture (open area)

Specification considered 1. Product SKO 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 60KL/H 4. Duration 300 Second 5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2


Temperature(Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5oK

Humidity(Min) 41%





Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2



.


Page 23

Consequence:




radius 20.50 mts. This zone shall cover the TLF gantry and master

meter.

4 kw/m2 Thermal Radiation zone shall spread an area having radius

32.91 mts. This zone shall cover the following facilities

vii. Administrative building

viii. TLF Pump house

ix. Tank no T2, T3, T4 and T9



Filling tank trucks is to be immediately stopped.





Page 24

9.3.4 CALCULATION OF HAZARD DISTANCE DUE TO POOL FIRE PIPELINE RUPTURE AT GASKET FAILURE WITH RESPECT TO TLF

Scenario -1 Pipeline rupture (open area) Specification considered 1. Product MS 2. Pipeline dia 150 mm 3. Pump discharge 60 KL/H 4. Duration 1800 Second(There will always be people

around the area. Spillage is likely to be identified

within the short period and hence 5 min duration is

considered )

5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2

METEROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED Temperature(Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5 K

Humidity(Min) 41%




Quantification of hazard

Sl no Scenario

Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 25

Consequence:

in case of fire on the spill, Thermal Radiation level of 37.5 kw/m2 and



radius of 12.41 mts. This zone will cover the pump house and

underground tanks.


30.47 mts. This zone will cover the following facilities

i. TLF Gantry

ii. Tank no 3 & 4

iii. This zone shall further spread beyond the boundary on the

northern side.


Fire is to be covered with foam to prevent spreading of fire.

Filling of tank truck is to be stopped.

Tank trucks parked at the bay are to be removed to safer places

Gantry is to be cooled by water spray.

Tank no 3 & are to be cooled by water spray.


Page 26

Scenario - 2 Pipeline rupture (open area) Specification considered 1. Product HSD 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 120 KL/H 4. Duration 1800 Second 5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2


Temperature (Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5oK

Humidity(Min) 41%





Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 27

Consequence:




radius 15.42 mts. This zone will cover the pump house and

underground tanks.



iv. TLF Gantry

v. Tank no 3 & 4

vi. This zone shall further spread beyond the boundary on the

northern side.








Page 28

Scenario – 3 Pipeline rupture (open area)

Specification considered 1. Product SKO 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 60KL/H 4. Duration 1800 Second 5. Pump discharge pressure 2Kg/M2


Temperature(Max) 43.8o C/ 316.5oK

Humidity(Min) 41%





Pool Radius



(m2) (kW/ m2) 37.5 kW/m2

21.5 kW/m2

12.5 kW/m2

4 kW/m2




Page 29

Consequence:




radius 14.7 mts. This zone will cover the pump house and underground

tanks.



vii. TLF Gantry

viii. Tank no 3 & 4

ix. This zone shall further spread beyond the boundary on the

northern side.







Habitation if any beyond the boundary are to be alerted.and In case of

prolonged fire evacuation may be necessary


Page 30

9.4 VAPOUR CLOUD MODELING SCENARIO - 1 (VAPOUR CLOUD MODELING) Vapour cloud modeling on complete containment failure:

Specification considered 1. Product MS 2. Duration 300 Second


Temperature( Min ) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Max) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Min) 1 KMPH

Wind Direction ( larger vapour cloud) N/NW>S/SE Surface Roughness( Open country side) 0.11

Pasquill Category F ( Very stable)

Dispersion outputs for spill of MS at Complete Containment Failure Event No

Material Spilled

Release mode Duration

Spill Area

Evaporation/ Dispersion Rate

Distance up to LFL

Distance up to UFL

14000 ppm 76000 ppm

S

M2 (kg/s) DW CW DW CW

1 Motor spirit

Continuous 300 8324.3 25.3 35 24.3 9.3 11.2


Page 31

Consequence:

Tank no T9, HVLR control panel, administrative block shall be covered

within the LEL zone.


The facilities are mentioned above are to be cooled by water spray.


Page 32

Consequence output for Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) : Complete Containment Failure: Pipe line rupture while loading Tank Lorries @ 150 KL/hr for 15 mins.


Temperature( Min) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Maxm) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Minm) 3 KMPH

Wind Direction ( larger vapour cloud) N/NW>S/SE

Surface Roughness( Open country side) 0.11


Damage distances from VCE at Gantry from spill of MS

Event No & Material Spilled

Meteorological Conditions ( max) Wind Speed 2 km/hr Stability F Amount in Explosive Limits (kg)

Damage Distance in meters Different Overpressure 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 0.01 bar

1. Motor spirit 586 96.1 152.4 321.2 789.6


Page 33

Consequence & Mitigative Measure:

0.3 bar explosion zone shall cover HVLR, control room, sample room.

The panel and the sample will be subjected to major damage.

0.1 bar explosion zone shall cover the tank no T9 and part of the

administrative building, Fittings of the tank like valve and flanges will be

subjected to the minor damage.

0.03 bar explosion zone shall cover the the administrative building. Tank

no T4 and T5 and shall spread further beyond the boundary wall on the

northern side. Glass panes of the administrative building may break.

Glass panes of the building on the northern side beyond the boundary

wall will break.

0.01 bar explosive zone shall spread to an area having radius of 789.6

mts. Glasses of the buildings around the boundary wall are likely to

develop crack.


Page 34

SCENARIO - 2 VAPOUR CLOUD MODELING

Vapour cloud modeling on TLF Pump Discharge Pipeline Rupture: TLF Gantry

Specification considered 1. Product MS 2. Pipeline dia 150mm 3. Pump discharge 60 KL/H 4. Duration 300 Second

METEROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED Temperature( Min ) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Max) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Min) 1 KMPH

Wind Direction ( larger vapour cloud) N/NW>S/SE Surface Roughness( Open country side) 0.11


Dispersion outputs for spill of MS at TLF Gantry

Event No

Material Spilled

Release mode Duration

Evaporation/ Dispersion Rate

Distance up to LFL

Distance up to UFL

14000 ppm 76000 ppm S

(kg/s) DW CW DW CW

1 Motor spirit

Continuous 300 3.2 12.8 8.4 1.9 2.5


Page 35

Consequence:

In case of ignition LEL which extends to 8.4 mts covers the entire gantry.


Pumping to TLF and filling trucks is to be immediately stopped. Trucks

parked at the bay are to be removed to safer places.


Page 36

Consequence output for Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) : TLF Gantry: Pipe line rupture while loading Tank Lorries @ 60 KL/hr for 30 mins.


Temperature( Min) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Maxm) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Minm) 3 KMPH







Damage Distance in meters Different Overpressure 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 0.01 bar

1. Motor spirit Quantity lor, Explosion unlikely

Consequence:

If leakage can be controlled within 30 minutes, VCE can be avoided

and consequent damage .


Page 37

SCENARIO: 3 (VAPOUR CLOUD MODELING)

1) Gasket failure in pump discharge line.

2) Failure area 25 % of the perimeter of gasket (equivalent to 1% area of pipe)

3) Duration of release 600 sec (10 mins ) Specification considered 1. Product MS 2. Pipeline dia 150 mm 3. Pump discharge 60 KL/H 4. Duration 600 Second 5. Pump discharge pressure 4Kg/cm2

METEROLOGICAL DATA CONSIDERED Temperature( Minm ) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Maxm) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Minm) 1 KMPH

Wind Direction ( larger vapour cloud) N/NW>S/SE > SW/S



Dispersion distances leak from failure of gasket on pump discharge line

Event No

Material Spilled

Release mode

Spill Rate Evaporation/ Dispersion Rate

Distance up to LFL

Distance up to UFL

(kg/s) 14000 ppm 76000ppm

(kg/s) DW CW DW CW

1 Motor spirit Continuous 10.2 3.8 10 6 1.5 2.4


Page 38

Consequence:

In case of ignition LEL which extends to 10 mts covers the entire TLF

gantry.


Pumping of TLF and filling oil immediately stopped. Tank trucks are

moved to safer places.


Page 39

Consequence output for Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE) : Tanker Pipeline Open Area: Pipe line rupture – Release time - 10 min @ 150 KL/hr ; failure area – 25%


Temperature( Minm ) 10° C/ 283° K Humidity( Maxm) 63% Atmospheric Stability Very stable- F Wind Velocity( Minm) 1 KMPH







Damage Distance in meters ETHANOLr Different Overpressure 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar 0.01 bar

1. Motor spirit Quantity low Explotion unlikely

Consequence:

If leakage can be controlled within 10 minutes, VCE can be avoided

and consequent damage .


Page 40

9.5 REFERENCE / MODELS USED The calculations were conducted using OUTFLOW/ SOURCE STRENGTH

ESTIMATION and CONSEQUENCE models as per the Indian Standards IS

15656: 2006 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION & RISK ANALYSIS- CODE OF

PRACTICE and internationally accepted models and equations

9.5.1 POOL FIRE MODEL Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions, Flash

fire and BLEVEs, (1994) by centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American

Institute of Chemical Engineers1, NY

9.5.2 Spill Model

Spreading and Evaporation

Shell SPILLS model (Fleischer-1980)

Guidelines for use of VAPOUR CLOUD DISPERSION MODELS by Hanna

and Drivas (1996) by Centre for Chemical Process safety of the American

Institute of Chemical Engineers1,NY

9.5.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion

Shock wave model

a) TNO, Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (Green Book)

CPR 16E, 1st ed. (1992).

b) Hanna, S.R., Drivas, P.J.

Guidelines for use of Vapour Cloud Dispersion Models by S R Hanna and PJ

Drivas (1996) by Centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of

Chemical Engineers1,NY


Page 41

9.5.4 Dense Gas Modeling

Heavy gas dispersions based on Thorney Island Observations (1985)

Guidelines for use of Vapour Cloud Dispersion Models by S R Hanna and PJ

Drivas (1996) by Centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of

Chemical Engineers1,NY

9.5.5 Effects of Thermal Radiation

World Bank ( 1985) Manual of Industrial Hazard Assessment techniques Office of

Environmental and Scientific Affairs, World Bank, Washington, D.C.

9.5.6 Explosion Damages

Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapour Cloud Explosions, Flash

fire and BLEVEs, (1994) by centre for Chemical Process Safety of the American

Institute of Chemical Engineers1, NY


Page 42

9.6 ACTION DURING FIRE 9.6.1 Storage Tank in Fire

a) A fire burning at the vent will not normally flash back into tank and

explode, if the tank contains product since flame arresters are provided

b) Start cooling of tanks by using water sprinklers provided on tanks as

well as by wet jets.

c) Close all valves since any removal of product will result in air being

sucked inside, with the resultant flash back and explosion.

d) Close manhole covers of other tanks if they are open. Also stop loading /

Receipt of tank wagons, into / out of the tank since it will result in eviction

of vapour due to displacement and subsequent intensification of fire.

e) Use foam to extinguish fire. Small fire can be handled with portable fire

extinguishers.

f) Fire in tank will normally burn quietly till the oxygen is consumed unless

temperature of the product is allowed to increase uncontrolled. Hence

care must be taken to ensure that product temperature does not go high

by cooling with water sprinklers & jets. This also avoids possibility of tank

rupture due to hydrostatic pressure

g) When sufficient air vapour mixture is available inside the tank as in the

case during removal of products from tank on fire there is a distant

possibility of tank roof collapse or blow out. In such cases, immediate

action should be taken to ensure that the fire does not spread to other


Page 43

areas. If there is product spill to outside, foam should be used to cover

the same.

H) In such cases, foam should be pumped to inside the tank for blanketing

the fire and simultaneously taking action to cool the tank shell with water

and also removing the product by pumping it cut to some other tank.

i) Uncontrolled use of water on the burning product will result in product

spill over and spread of fire. In the case of heavy ends this will result in

boil over and frothing at the surface.

j) When heavy ends like HSD or FO burn, a layer of hot oil is formed below

the surface, which extends towards the bottom. Temperature of this layer

is of the order of 250° C to 300° C much above the boiling point of water.

When water turns into steam, it expands appx. 1600 times and this result

in boil over. The boil over may overflow the tank resulting in spreading of

fire. Hence, in such fire, cool down the tank by continuous water jet on

the tank shell, transfer the product to other tanks and judiciously use

foam to smoothen fire.


Page 44

9.6.2 Pool Fire at TLF Gantry.

A) Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading.

B) Shut down the pumps by cutting of power supply.

C) Remove any person who is working in the effected area.

D) Close the valves of either side to starve the fire close all tank wagon

valves and manifold valves.

E) Put foam on burning oil spills

F) Put foam on oil spills. Do not splash burning oil.

G) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on electrical fire.

H) Wet down the structure close to the fire with water

9.6.5 General

a) In case of F/R tanks, fires normally occur at F/R seats. Efforts should be

made to put foam in the correct place simultaneously cooling the tank

shell from outside

b) Incase of Oil spill the same should be blanketed with foam in order to

avoid contact with source of ignition.

c) Use DCP or CO2 fire extinguisher on Electrical fire.

d) Wet down structure close to the fire with water.

e) Discharge DCP to prevent fire from spreading.

f) In case flammable liquid pool due to containment failure, pipeline rupture

within the dyke area it is suggested to cover the flame with foam blanket.


Page 1

CHAPTER – X

RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY

The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any

undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm of damage being caused to

life,property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to

sudden/accidental release of any hazardous material from the containment. This

sudden/accidental release of hazardous material can occur due to failure of

component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any system

because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure occurs,

the probability of fire and the extent of damage will depend on many factors like,

A) Quantity and physical properties of material released.

B) Source of ignition

C) Wind velocity and direction

D) Presence of population, properties etc nearly.

Failure frequency of different components like pipes, valves, instruments,

pressure vessels and other equipment manufactured in India are not available.

The statutory authority has tried to collect the information and form an

acceptable data bank to be used under Indian condition.

Failure frequency data for some components accepted in U.S.A and European

Countries are given Table


Page 2

TABLE FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA

Sl.No Item Failure Frequency / 106 years

1 Shell Failure a) Process/pressure vessel b) Pressurized Storage Vessel

3 1

2 Full Bore Vessel Connection Failure (Diameter MM) <25 40 50 80 100 >150

30 10 7.5 5 4 3

3 Full Bore Process Pipeline Failure D< 50mm 50<d<150mm D>150mm

0.3* 0.09* 0.03*

4 Articulated Loading / Unloading arm Failure

30 x 108 **

* Failure frequency expressed in (n/106 years) ** Failure frequency expressed in (hr of operation)


Page 1

CHAPTER – XI

RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS The recommendations & conclusions as revealed from Risk Analysis study

are as follows:

i) The individual Risk value of 1.0 E-6/ year as evident from the ISO

Risk contour is not always confined within the plant premises.

Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis also

reveals that in most of the cases hazard is not always confined

within the plant premises.

ii) Health check and maintenance of the equipment including

storage tanks and pipelines should be done at regular intervals

to avoid any major failure. History sheet of all major equipment

giving the details of fabrication data / design data to be

maintained.

iii) Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated

at regular intervals to prevent any wrong signaling and

consequent failures.

iv) Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances

should be always kept in good working condition. Safety

appliances should be also checked and kept in good working

condition.

v) Mock Drills should be conducted at regular intervals.


Page 2

vi) To reduce the failure frequency due care has been taken in

design, construction, inspection and operation. Well-established

codes of practices have been followed for design, inspection and

construction of the facility.

vii) The Depot should be operated by experienced personnel trained

for operation of such facility and also in fire fighting. Safe operating

practice ( SOP) to be drawn and critical SOP to be displayed near

the TLF,TWG, Tankfarm, Pump house and manifold

viii) Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the Depot.

ix) Non -sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any

spark.

x) The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in Tank Lorry Filling Shed

should be properly earthed to avoid accumulation of static

electricity. Bounding to be ensured for TLF, TWG, operation.

Tripping arrangement recommended in case of failure in earthing /

bounding system.

xi) Entry of personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.

xii) A elaborate Disaster Control Management Plan containing a mutual

aid agreement should be drawn to meet major exigencies.

xiii) Two High Velocity Long Range (HVLR) monitors are to be

positioned for each tank farm area specially for MS, HSD & SKO

tank farm.2nos HVLRs are available,4 more should be provided.


Page 3

xiv) 2 No. Trolley Mounted Foam Monitors should be maintained in

order,

xv) Rim Seal protection system is to be maintained properly.

xvi) Failure data must be recorded.

xvii) Maintenance schedule is to be drawn and the same should be

strictly adhered to.

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET MOTOR SPRIT

1. Chemical Identification

Chemical Name : Petrol Chemical classification : Flammable Liquid Synonyms : Gasoline., Motor Sprit Trade name : Petrol Formula : Mixture of hydrocarbons C.A.S No. : 86290-81.5 U.N.No. : 1203. Shipping name : Gasoline , Petrol Regulated identification : Petrol Hazardous west ID No. : NA Hazchem No. : Class 3

Hazardous Ingredients C.A.S.No. : Gasoline 8006-61-9 Benzene 71-43-2 n-Hexan Trace 110-54-3.

2. Physical & Chemical data

Boiling Range / points : 30OC to 215Oc Physical state : Liquid Appearance : Colourless Melting / freezing points: 90OC to 75Oc Vapour Pressure : 300 to 600mm Hg @35OC Vapour Density (Air-1) : 3-4 Solubility in water : 1-100 PPm Specific Gravity water : 0.75-0.85 PH : NA

3. Fire and Explosion Hazards Data Flammability : Yes LEL : 1.4% Flash Point : < 23OC Auto ignition : 446OC TDG Flammability : Class 3 UEL : 7.6% Explosion Sensitivity to impact : Non sensitive to Mechanical Impact Explosion Sensitivity to Static Electricity : For vapors sensitivity exist Hazardous Combustion Products : Carbon monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic Hazardous Ploymerisation : N.A Combustible Liquid : Yes Explosive material : Yes Corrosive material : No Flammable material : Yes Oxidiser : NA Other : NA Pyrophoric material : NA Organic peroxide : NA

4. Reactivity Data

Chemical stability : Stable Incompatibility with other material : Oxidizers such peroxides, Nitric acid and Perchorates Hazardous Reaction Product : On fire it will be liberate some amount carbon monoxide, Nitrogen oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons

5. Health Hazards Data

Routes of Entry : Inhalation , Skin absorption, ingestion Effects of Exposure Symptoms : Excessive inhalation vapors cause rapid breathing, excitability,

staggering ,headache, fatigue, nausea and vomiting, dizziness, drowsiness, narcosis convulsions, coma

Emergency Treatment : in case of contract with Skin flush with fresh with fresh water , remove containment clothing, in case of excessive inhalation move the victim to fresh air, obtain medical assistance.

TLV (ACGIH) : 300 PPm STEL : 500 PPm Permissible Exposure Limit : L.D50 ( Oral –Rat) : 13.6 g/Kg L.C50( Rat for 4 hrs) 43g/M3

NFPA Hazards Health Flammability Stability Special Signals 0 3 0 -

6. Preventive measures Personal Protective equipment : Gloves, Eye protection preferred

Handling and storage Precautions : Eliminate all sources of ignition at storage, ensure good ventilation, ground and bond the containners

7. Emergency and First aid measures

Fire Fire Extinguishing media : Foam. CO2, Dry Chemical Powder. Water may be used to cool fire exposed containers

Fire Special procedures : Shut off leak, if safe to do so,. Keep non –involved people away from spill site. Issue warning “ FLAMMABLE” . Eliminate all sources all sources of ignition.

Unusual Hazards : Vapor heavier than Air it will spread along the the ground and collect in sewer. ExposureFirst Aid measures : Skin contact ; in case of contact with Skin flush with fresh water, remove containment clothing

Inhalation: in case of excessive inhalation move the victim to fresh air, If problem in breathing give artificial respiration; give oxygen obtain medical assistance

Ingestion : Give water to conscious victim to drink; do not induce vomiting.

Antidotes/Dosages : NA

Spills Steps to be taken : Shut off leak , if safe to do so, Keep non – Involved people away from spillage site.

Eliminate all sources of ignition. Prevent spill entering in to sewers, for Major spillage contact emergency services.

Waste disposal Method : NA

MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET HIGH SPEED DIESEL


Chemical Name : Diesel Oil Chemical classification : Flammable Liquid Synonyms : Automotive Diesel Oil Trade name : HSD Formula : Mixture of hydrocarbons C.A.S No. : 8052-41-3 U.N.No. : 1202. Shipping name : HSD Regulated identification : HSD Hazardous west ID No. : NA Hazchem No. : Class 3

Hazardous Ingredients C.A.S.No. : Benzene Trace 71-43-2 Naphthalene Trace 91-20-3 Sulphur Trace 7704-34-9


Boiling Range / points : 215OC to 376Oc Physical state : Liquid Appearance : Light brown Melting / freezing points: 18OC to 46Oc Vapour Pressure : 2.12 to 26mm Hg @38OC Vapour Density (Air-1) : 3-5 Solubility in water : 30 PPm Specific Gravity water : 0.81-0.91 PH : NA

3. Fire and Explosion Hazards Data Flammability : Yes LEL : 0.6% Flash Point : 32OC Auto ignition : 225OC TDG Flammability : Class 3 UEL : 6% Flash Point : Explosion Sensitivity to impact : Non sensitive to Mechanical Impact Explosion Sensitivity to Static Electricity : For vapors sensitivity exist Hazardous Combustion Products : Carbon monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons Hazardous Ploymerisation : N.A Combustible Liquid : Yes Explosive material : Yes Corrosive material : No Flammable material : Yes Oxidiser : NA Other : NA Pyrophoric material : NA Organic peroxide : NA

4. Reactivity Data

Chemical stability : Stable Incompatibility with other material : Oxidizers such peroxides, Nitric acid and Perchorates Hazardous Reaction Products : On fire it will be liberate some amount carbon monoxide,

Sulphur dioxide Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons




Emergency Treatment : in case of eye or Skin contract fresh with plenty of fresh water , remove containment clothing, in case of excessive inhalation move the victim to fresh air, obtain medical assistance.

TLV (ACGIH) : 800 PPm STEL : 500 PPm Permissible Exposure Limit : L.D50 ( Oral –Rat) : 5 g/Kg L.C50( Rat for 4 hrs) 5g/M3


6. Preventive measures Personal Protective equipment : Canister type gas mask. PVC or Rubber. Goggles giving

complete protection to eyes. Eye wash fountain with safety. Handling and storage Precautions : Do not expose to heat and naked lights, keep containers and

valves closed when not in use. 7. Emergency and First aid measures


Fire Special procedures : Shut off leak, if safe to do so,. Keep non –involved people away from spill site. Eliminate all sources all sources of ignition.

Unusual Hazards : It will spread along the ground and collect in sewers Exposure First Aid measures : Skin contact ; in case of contact with Skin flush with fresh water, remove containment clothing Inhalation: in case of excessive inhalation move

the victim to fresh air, If problem in breathing give artificial respiration; give oxygen obtain medical assistance Ingestion : Give water to conscious victim to drink; do not induce vomiting.





MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET SUPERIOR KEROSENE OIL


Chemical Name : Kerosene Chemical classification : Flammable Liquid Synonyms : Superior Kerosene Oil Trade name : SKO Formula : Mixture of hydrocarbons C.A.S No. : 8008-20-6 U.N.No. : 1223 Shipping name : SKO Regulated identification : SKO Hazardous west ID No. : 17 Hazchem No. : Class 3

Hazardous Ingredients C.A.S.No. : Benzene 100-41-4 Naphthalene Trace 91-20-3


Boiling Range / points : 300OC to 570Oc Physical state : Liquid Appearance : Colourless Melting / freezing points: 18OC to 46Oc Vapour Pressure : 0.50mm Hg Vapour Density (Air-1) : >1 Solubility in water : <0.1% Specific Gravity water : 0.78-0.84 PH : NA

3. Fire and Explosion Hazards Data Flammability : Yes LEL : 0.7% Flash Point : 32OC Auto ignition : 225OC TDG Flammability : Class 3 UEL : 5% Flash Point : Explosion Sensitivity to impact : Non sensitive to Mechanical Impact Explosion Sensitivity to Static Electricity : For vapors sensitivity exist Hazardous Combustion Products : Carbon monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons Hazardous Ploymerisation : N.A Combustible Liquid : Yes Explosive material : Yes Corrosive material : No Flammable material : Yes Oxidiser : NA Other : NA Pyrophoric material : NA Organic peroxide : NA

4. Reactivity Data

Chemical stability : Stable Incompatibility with other material : Oxidizers such peroxides, Nitric acid and Perchorates Hazardous Reaction Products : On fire it will be liberate some amount carbon monoxide,

Sulphur dioxide Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons




Emergency Treatment : in case of eye or Skin contract fresh with plenty of fresh water , remove containment clothing, in case of excessive inhalation move the victim to fresh air, obtain medical assistance.

TLV (ACGIH) : 800 PPm STEL : 500 PPm Permissible Exposure Limit : L.D50 ( Oral –Rat) : 5 g/Kg L.C50 : >340 mg/m3/1H NFPA Hazards Health Flammability Stability Special Signals 0 2 0 -

6. Preventive measures Personal Protective equipment : Canister type gas mask. PVC or Rubber. Goggles giving

complete protection to eyes. Eye wash fountain with safety. Handling and storage Precautions : Do not expose to heat and naked lights, keep containers and

valves closed when not in use. 7. Emergency and First aid measures


Fire Special procedures : Shut off leak, if safe to do so,. Keep non –involved people away from spill site. Eliminate all sources all sources of ignition.

Unusual Hazards : It will spread along the ground and collect in sewers Exposure First Aid measures : Skin contact ; in case of contact with Skin flush with fresh water, remove containment clothing Inhalation: in case of excessive inhalation move

the victim to fresh air, If problem in breathing give artificial respiration; give oxygen obtain medical assistance Ingestion : Give water to conscious victim to drink; do not induce vomiting.





MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET ETHANOL


Chemical Name : Ethyl Alcohol Chemical classification : Flammable Liquid Synonyms : Ethanol Trade name : Formula : Mixture C.A.S No. : U.N.No. : 1170. Regulated identification : Petrol Hazardous west ID No. : NA Hazchem No. : Class 3

Hazardous Ingredients C.A.S.No. : Water 7732-18-5

Ethyl Alcohol 64-17-5


Boiling Range / points : 78.5OC Physical state : Liquid Appearance : Colourless Melting / freezing points: -114.1OC Vapour Pressure : 5.7 kPa Vapour Density (Air-1) : 1.59 Solubility in water : 1-100 PPm Specific Gravity water : 0.8 PH : NA

3. Fire and Explosion Hazards Data Flammability : Yes LEL : 3.3% Flash Point : 18.5OC Auto ignition : 363OC TDG Flammability : Class 3 UEL : 19% Explosion Sensitivity to impact : Non sensitive to Mechanical Impact Explosion Sensitivity to Static Electricity : For vapors sensitivity exist Hazardous Combustion Products : Carbon monoxide, Nitrogen Oxide and other aromatic Hazardous Ploymerisation : N.A Combustible Liquid : Yes Explosive material : Yes Corrosive material : No Flammable material : Yes Oxidiser : NA Other : NA Pyrophoric material : NA Organic peroxide : NA

4. Reactivity Data

Chemical stability : Stable Incompatibility with other material : Oxidizers such peroxides, Nitric acid and Perchorates Hazardous Reaction Product : On fire it will be liberate some amount carbon monoxide, Nitrogen oxide and other aromatic hydrocarbons




Emergency Treatment : in case of contract with Skin flush with fresh with fresh water , remove containment clothing, in case of excessive inhalation move the victim to fresh air, obtain medical assistance.


6. Preventive measures Personal Protective equipment : Gloves, Eye protection preferred

Handling and storage Precautions : Eliminate all sources of ignition at storage, ensure good ventilation, ground and bond the containers

7. Emergency and First aid measures


Fire Special procedures : Shut off leak, if safe to do so,. Keep non –involved people away from spill site. Issue warning “ FLAMMABLE” . Eliminate all sources all sources of ignition.

Unusual Hazards : Vapor heavier than Air it will spread along the the ground and collect in sewer. Exposure First Aid measures : Skin contact ; in case of contact with Skin flush with fresh water, remove containment clothing Inhalation: in case of excessive inhalation move

the victim to fresh air, If problem in breathing give artificial respiration; give oxygen obtain medical assistance Ingestion : Do NOT induce vomiting unless directed to do so by medical personnel. Never give anything by mouth to an unconscious person. Loosen tight clothing such as a collar, tie, belt or waistband. Get medical attention if symptoms appear Eyes : Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15 minutes, occasionally lifting the upper and lower eyelids.Get medical aid. Gently lift eyelids and flush continuously with water


SpillsSteps to be taken : Flammable liquid. Keep away from heat. Keep away from sources of ignition. Stop leak if without risk. Absorb with DRY earth,sand or other non-combustible material. Do not touch spilled material. Prevent entry into sewers, basements or confined areas; dike if needed. Be careful that the product is not present at a concentration level above TLV. Check TLV on the MSDSand with local authorities


RISK ANALYSIS OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD AT BALASORE …environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/FormB/EC/Ris… · · 2016-07-29RISK ANALYSIS OF BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION

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