Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization · 2015-04-08 · young Muhajir students led by Altaf Hussain formed MQM, claiming that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs constitute

RISE OF THE MQM IN PAKISTAN Politics of Ethnic Mobilization

Farhat Haq

The sudden and dramatic rise of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan's Sindh Province in the mid-1980s is an important case study in cultural pluralism and example of very successful ethnic mobilization. The MQM's claim that Urdu-speaking muhajirs (refugees), Muslims who left India after partition in 1947, constitute a fifth nationality in Pakistan was also a redefinition of political identity (Muhajir) for a community that had previously shunned particularistic ethnicity in favor of a broader Muslim Pakistani identity. The rise of MQM has occurred in the midst of ethnic unrest in urban Sindh, especially Karachi. The level of violence has not abated despite an Operation Cleanup launched by the military in 1992. A greater understanding of the factors responsible for the emergence of MQM can contribute to the larger literature on cultural pluralism and also shed light on recent political developments in Pakistan.

In April 1985 the death of a college student hit by a minibus led to rioting by students against transporters in Karachi. Within two days, widespread clashes erupted between ethnic Pathans, who are the owners and operators of minibuses, and Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, predominantly the passengers on minibuses. I This conflict intensified over the next two years, and a group of young Muhajir students led by Altaf Hussain formed MQM, claiming that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs constitute the fifth nationality (along with Punjabi, Pathan, Baluchi and Sindhi) in Pakistan and ought to be granted constitu- tional recognition as such.

In 1988 the MQM won a landslide electoral victory in municipal elections in Hyderabad and Karachi, and it repeated these victories in the national elec-

Farhat Haq is Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Illinois. The author is grateful to the American Institute of Pakistan Studies for support for field research on this subject.

( 1995 by The Regents of the University of California

1. A mid- I 980s report cited traffic congestion and reckless driving as one of the main reasons for growing ethnic tension in Karachi.

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tions in 1988 and 1990. By 1991, the MQM had established a virtual monopoly over representation of the Urdu-speaking community in urban Sindh. Its massive popularity fundamentally transformed the political identity of the Urdu-speaking community and led to a generational change in the leadership of the Muhajirs. This article looks at factors that contributed to the rise and popularity of the MQM, then focuses on the organization's various coalition strategies and the reasons for continued ethnic violence in urban Sindh.

Relative Deprivation Between partition in August 1947 and April 1951 when the borders between India and Pakistan were open, six million non-Muslims moved from Pakistan to India and eight million Muslims moved from India to Pakistan. The majority of the Muslim refugees came from East Punjab and settled in West Punjab, but about 20% of the migrants went to Sindh. The vast majority of the latter came from the Urdu-speaking Muslim communities in the other northern, central, and western provinces, and settled almost exclusively in urban areas. By the 1951 census, close to 55% of the population of Karachi was Muhajir. During the first decade after partition, the Urdu-speaking new- comers, along with the Punjabis, were dominant in Pakistan's political and bureaucratic arena. One account of important political offices between 1947-58 shows both Punjabi-speaking refugees and Urdu-speaking refugees holding 18 out of a total of 27 offices of governor general/president, prime minister, provincial governors, and chief ministers.2 For these centrist political elites, Urdu as the national language and an emphasis on Islamic identity became the foundation for engineering a common national outlook within this multinational state.

By the end of the 1950s, however, the rising power of the military, an institution dominated by Punjabis and Pathans, pushed the Urdu-speaking elites to the status of junior partners in the political arena. The MQM claims that Ayub Khan's government (1958-69) was guilty of systematic discrimination against the Muhajirs in urban Sindh, and perceives Ayub's decision to move the capital from Karachi to Islamabad as a deliberate attempt to marginalize the Muhajirs. But the shift in power under Ayub Khan also brought technocratic elites into prominent policy-making positions, many of whom were Urdu-speaking Muhajirs. In Sindh the Muhajirs continued to dominate the bureaucracy but Punjabis and, later, Sindhis claimed a greater share of such positions in the 1970s.3

2. Theodore P. Wright, Jr., "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, July 1974, p. 196.

3. The Punjabis had come increasingly to share the higher level provincial offices with the Muhajirs. See Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Separatism," South Asia Bulletin, vol. 8 (1988), pp. 33-57.

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During the 1960-80 period, the Muhajirs experienced a slow relative decline in their political and economic status. MQM supporters, mostly young men and women in their 20s and 30s, blame the quota system for what they perceive to have been a dramatic decline in Muhajir socioeconomic status. "Since 1949 Pakistan has instituted complex regional and special interest quotas for recruitment to federal, provincial, and semi-governmental posts. Similar quotas with myriad variations have also been applied to the admission policies of educational institutions."4 The quota system has made the bureaucracy more representative but urban Sindh and the Punjab continue to be over-represented in the federal bureaucracy.

Many Muhajirs were aggrieved by Z. A. Bhutto's policies in the 1970s, which were perceived as anti-Muhajir and pro-Sindhi. Under Bhutto's government, Sindh was given a 19% share in the federal bureaucracy. For recruitment into federal and provincial bureaucracies and admission into educational institutions, further allocation was made based on rural (60%) and urban (40%) "domiciles" in Sindh. The Domicile, a document that deter- mines an individual's place of residence, became a dreaded piece of paper for many Muhajir youth. The rural/urban quota, in practice, meant an ethnic quota for Sindhis (rural) and Urdu-speaking Muhajirs (urban). The Muhajirs continued to dominate the federal bureaucracy and management positions in the private sector, but the quota system limited their opportunities at the provincial level and created competition at the federal level.

Though there has not been an absolute decline in the Muhajir share of jobs and admissions, their share has dropped relative to that of the Punjabis, Pathans, and Sindhis. Moreover, though the Muhajir upper and upper-middle classes have continued to do well, it is the middle and lower-middle class Muhajir youth who have felt the constraints of the quota system. "Because the criterion for favored status (domicile) is largely ascribed and not based on need or achievement, it follows et ceteris paribus that the quota favors the relatively well-off candidate from both backward and developed regions."5 It is not surprising, therefore, that the MQM's leadership and support comes from the lower-middle and working class segments of the Muhajir population.

The language controversy in the early 1970s further alienated the Muhajirs from Bhutto's government. To redress a long-standing grievance, the Sindh Assembly passed a bill in 1972 elevating the status of the Sindhi language in the province. The new law required that Sindhi be taught as a second lan-

4. Charles H. Kennedy, "Policies of Redistributional Preferences in Pakistan," in Nevitte and Kennedy, eds., Ethnic Preferences and Public Policy in Developing States (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986), p. 64.

5. Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on the Situation in Sindh, Government of Pakistan, December 1989, p. 81.

FARHAT HAQ 993 guage for those students not receiving their instruction in Sindhi, and made it mandatory for provincial government officials to learn Sindhi within a speci- fied period. This produced a strong reaction by most Muhajirs. "Serious linguistic riots broke out over the issue in 1972 and some refugees proposed cutting a 'Mahajaristan' out of Sindh, reinforced by Biharis brought from Bangladesh."6 The alienation from Bhutto's government landed most Muhajirs on the anti-Bhutto platform of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) for the 1977 elections.

Initially, most Muhajirs supported Zia ul-Haq's military rule. Altaf Hus- sain and many other MQM leaders first became active in politics by joining the PNA-led agitation against the Bhutto government in 1977. But the changing demographic and political situation continued the relative decline in the Muhajir share of jobs, admissions to educational institutions, and political influence. General Zia's decade-long rule solidified Punjabi dominance: "In ethnic terms the Pushtoons clearly emerged as the junior partners of the Punjabis in the military and bureaucracy. The share of the Muhajirs in the civil bureaucracy was further reduced under Zia."7

Critics of the MQM argue that Muhajirs do not have any basis for claiming discrimination or oppression since they continue to be "over-represented" in key sectors of Pakistani society-the bureaucracy, management positions in the private sector, print and electronic media, the medical and legal profes- sions, and educational institutions. But groups become disaffected from a system when the gap between society's resources and opportunities to which they feel entitled and their share in those resources increases to an intolerable level, a situation Ted Gurr calls "relative deprivation."8 A majority of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs see a wide gap between what they get and what they feel they are entitled to because of their parents' generation's contributions to the Pakistan movement, their deeply ingrained sense of cultural superiority, and their educational achievements. MQM addressed this sense of "relative deprivation" effectively, and thus became an extremely successful example of collective mobilization of ethnic loyalties.

Politics of Demography Internal and external migration has increasingly become an important varia- ble in cultural politics, especially affecting the more backward groups in many Third World societies. "Backward-indigenous groups 'feel under siege

6. Wright, "Indian Muslim Refugees," p. 199. 7. Feroz Ahmed, "Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Separatism," South Asian Bul-

letin, vol. 8 (1988), p. 50. 8. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

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in their own home'."9 Thus, one of the most important claims to legitimacy in ethnic conflict is based on claims of indigenousness. As their name sug- gests, the refugee experience has been crucial in the rise of the MQM. Com- ing from the Muslim minority provinces of the Subcontinent, the Urdu- speaking Muhajirs were urbanized and generally literate, and became the "achieving minority" in Sindh. But in the last two decades, they have felt overwhelmed by the increased migration of Punjabis and Pathans to Karachi, a changing demographic trend that has deepened their anxieties.

From 1947 to 1981, the overall population of Pakistan increased 250% but urban population growth was nearly 400%. Karachi-the largest city, the biggest industrial and commercial center, and the only trade port-became a magnet for migrants from other areas of Pakistan as well as elsewhere in South Asia. Karachi's population growth is estimated to be around 5% annually, half of it due to inward migration. According to one estimate, around 250,000 people, mostly from Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), move to Karachi annually. The majority of these new migrants are in their 20s and are competing in the labor market.10 The Punjabi and Pathan migration has added to the Muhajir perception of becoming marginalized, and out of 26 demands put forward by the MQM in its 1988 Charter of Reso- lution, more than half concerned the population issue. For example, MQM demanded that only those persons living in Sindh for the last 20 years be granted "domicile," that the non-domiciled not have the right to vote or be granted business permits and licenses, and that outsiders (for MQM that would mean anyone who has come to Karachi in the last two decades) not be allowed to buy property in Sindh.' 1

The arrival of Afghan refugees in the 1980s added to the volatile demographic situation in Karachi whose citizens associated the "drug and arms mafia" with these new refugees, most of whom were Pathans. Undoubtedly, the easy availability of arms made the ethnic clashes more deadly, and since the first clashes (between 1985-87) were between Pathans and Bihari muhajirs from Bangladesh, MQM targeted the Afghans as the main cause of instability in Karachi. MQM demanded easier access to arms licenses for Muhajirs to counter the armed Pathans and urged that all Afghan refugees be moved to camps near the border. There is no clear evidence that the Afghan refugees were the ones who dominated the drug trade but the trade did ex- pand greatly in the 1980s, leading to the expansion of an underground econ-

9. David L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 214.

10. Methab S. Karim, "Karachi's Demographic Dilemma," Dawn, Friday Magazine, Febru- ary 27, 1987, p. 1.

11. Charter of Resolution, Department of Information and Publication, Muhajir Quami Move- ment, Karachi, 1988.

FARHAT HAQ 995 omy in which "black" money was laundered through financing land development and transportation. "New patterns of illegal land development emerged, new systems of informal banking came into being, the transporters' mafia expanded to control the city roads, and the older squatter settlements came under attack."'2

Thus, during the 1980s and 1990s, Karachi and to lesser extent other urban areas in Sindh experienced a great upsurge in population and a growing demand for housing, transportation, electricity, water, education, and employment that a deteriorating infrastructure could not provide. The Muhajirs felt particularly squeezed since employment opportunities in the West Asian oil economies were also declining. The relative drop in the socioeconomic status of the Muhajirs and the demographic factors outlined above provided fer- tile ground for ethnic mobilization of the Urdu-.speaking community in urban Sindh.

Ethnic Fragmentation But perhaps the single most important factor in the emergence of MQM and Muhajir ethnicity was the rising nationalist sentiments of the Punjabis, Baluchis, Pathans, and Sindhis. Until the mid-1980s, the dominant Muhajir response to nationalist assertions by other groups was to oppose ethnic partic- ularism, support centrist forces, and lean toward "Islamic" parties. In the 1970 election, for example, the Jamaat-i-Islami performed best in urban Sindh with Muhajir support, and it continued to dominate the municipal elections until the mid 1980s. The successful separatist movement in East Paki- stan (Bangladesh) was a defining moment for the Muhajirs in two specific ways. Bangladesh became a living reminder of the imperfection of the two- nation theory the idea that Hindus and Muslims constituted two nations in the Subcontinent the cornerstone of Muhajir Pakistani identity. The second important outcome for Muhajir identity was the Bihari refugee question.

Though the majority of the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs settled in West Paki- stan after partition, about a million of them, almost all from Bihar, migrated to East Pakistan where they identified with the center, spoke Urdu, and did not mingle socially with the Bengalis. During the 1971 war, they actively assisted the Pakistani army. Given that history, after the formation of Ban- gladesh they wanted to be repatriated to Pakistan. Close to 100,000 Biharis were repatriated but funds and sympathies ran out by the late 1970s, leaving more than 300,000 Biharis stranded in 60 refugee camps in Bangladesh. De- spite intense pressure by the MQM on both the first Benazir Bhutto and the Nawaz Sharif governments, not much progress has been made on this issue.

12. Arif Hasan, "Karachi's Godfathers," Herald, December 1986, p. 77.

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The Sindhi nationalists oppose the repatriation on the grounds that their province is already swamped with migrants.

Some of the top leaders of the MQM are Biharis, and repatriation of all Biharis is one of the organization's central demands. The Biharis in Bangla- desh camps also have an important symbolic meaning for the Muhajirs, who fear that the same fate may be awaiting them if Sindhudesh (an independent state for Sindhis) becomes a reality. MQM is a product of middle and lower- middle class urban Muhajirs who view themselves as dispossessed. Unlike their grandparents' generation, they can no longer assume open borders in the ummah (the worldwide Islamic community), and the Bihari case is a constant reminder of the importance of a claim to a particular piece of territory. To them, the political identity of "Muhajir as a nationality" is the way to estab- lish a territorial claim. Imran Farooq, secretary-general of MQM, says that many object to the use of the term muhajir as a political identity because it conveys an absence of connection with a particular territory. But the problem is that these critics take the word muhajir literally and do not understand it as an identity for a group. Others object that without land there could be no nationality.

To those folks, I ask, does a nation need an allotment order, if so, then other na- tionalities must also show their allotment permit.... Sindh is our land, our watan, it is our duty to love this land and work for its prosperity. We are not going to leave it and migrate some place else.'3

To stake a claim on Sindh as the land for Muhajirs and Sindhis serves another important goal: it delegitimizes the more recent migration from the Punjab and NWFP, and allows the MQM to demand that only those who live, work, and spend their money in Sindh are entitled to full residence status. Tapping into the growing discontent and worry of young Muhajirs, the MQM became a major political player in Pakistan by the late 1980s.

Altaf Hussain: The MQM Quaid The factors discussed thus far explain why "ethnicity" became the basis for collective action by the Urdu-speaking community of urban Sindh, but to appreciate the particular shape such collective action has taken and the tremendous emotions it has invoked, we must look at the political career of Altaf Hussain. One of the founders of the MQM, Altaf Hussain's oratorical skills and his ability to make his life experiences a metaphor for the "trials and tribulations" of the Urdu-speaking community in Pakistan enabled him to

13. Imran Farooq, Muhajir Quamiat Aur Zamin, pamphlet, MQM publicity department, Janu- ary 1989, pp. 7-11.

FARHAT HAQ 997 exercise complete control of the MQM until he went into voluntary exile in London in 1992.

MQM-sponsored biographies depict the emergence of Altaf Hussain's Muhajir consciousness. The loyalty of his parents to the Muslim League and the centrist forces are contrasted with his early encounters with the anti- Muhajir sentiments of other communities such as the Pathans in 1965. Altaf Hussain's zeal to serve his country in the 1971 war with India is contrasted with his treatment by the army during his training in the National Service cadet organization. He recounts how a corporal told him: "You Hindustorva (ethnic slur), what sort of war will you city-dwellers fight? Who took you into the army in the first place?" Altaf Hussain points to the 1972 Sindhi- Muhajir language riots as the turning point for him: "Every government which came to power after Liaquat Ali Khan discriminated against the Muhajirs." He became convinced that "the Muhajirs will not gain their fair share unless we organize as Muhajirs."'4

In 1978 Altaf Hussain and other students founded the All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO), eventually broadening their cause until formation of the MQM in 1986. Altaf Hussain takes much pride in his modest, lower-middle class background, and invokes the language of disenfranchise- ment to claim that he speaks for the majority of the Muhajirs who have been betrayed by the traditional upper and upper-middle class leadership. From 1987 to 1992, he gained complete control of the MQM. His modest home in the middle-class neighborhood of Azizbad in Karachi became the center of political activity. Huge portraits of him adorned most neighborhoods of Ka- rachi and Hyderabad, and his birthday became an occasion for enormous public celebrations in urban Sindh. His formal title within the MQM became the quad (the leader), and his earlier informal sobriquet of Altaf Bahi (brother Altaf) was soon elevated to Pir Sahib (spiritual guide).

But such veneration created a dilemma for the MQM as Altaf Hussain's wish for total control precluded any possibility of a democratic structure emerging within the organization. Born in the midst of ethnic violence, MQM gained national status after a series of electoral victories. Almost all of its members who won local, provincial, and national elections were new to the political scene, and because they had no constituency independent of the MQM, they were not in a position to assert strong leadership. Even some of the founders of the APMSO and the MQM such as Aim Ahmed Tariq, Imran Farooq, and Salim Shehzad never gained a status like that of Altaf Hussain. It is significant that Altaf Hussain never contested elections or sought a cabinet position. Instead, through strict party discipline he aimed for total control

14. Khalid Ather, Saffar-i-Zindaghi: MQM ki Khani, Altaf Hussain ki Zabani [The life jour- ney: MQM's story by Altaf Hussain] (Lahore: Jung Publications, 1988), pp. 16, 23.


of the MQM, and that dominance became a major liability for the party after the army launched Operation Cleanup and focused on dislodging Altaf Hus- sain's leadership, which forced the MQM out of the parliamentary arena.

Coalitions of Convenience Since 1986 when it first burst on the scene, the MQM and urban Sindh have experienced monumental changes and tremendous instability. At the height of its power, the MQM claimed a monopoly over leadership of the Muhajirs in urban Sindh; it formed alliances, first with the PPP government and then with the IJI, and shared in cabinet positions both at the provincial and federal level. But also during this time, ethnic clashes, violence, and rioting became a permanent feature of life in urban Sindh. In June 1992, Operation Cleanup drove many MQM leaders and workers underground or abroad and allowed a splinter group, the MQM (Haqiqi), to claim to be the real MQM.15 Let us examine the various coalition strategies pursued by the MQM with other ethnic groups and political parties as well as some of the factors contributing to instability and violence in Sindh.

The rise of the MQM with its claim that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs should be regarded as an indigenous group in Sindh had led to an attempt to forge an alliance with the Sindhis during the first three years of MQM's existence. Many left-leaning Muhajir intellectuals pushed for such an alliance as an antidote to the Punjabi-dominated center, and many Sindhi nationalists welcomed such a move as an indication that the Muhajirs were prepared to become "new Sindhi" rather than insisting on their "superior" Muhajir culture.

In December 1988 the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the MQM became coalition partners after signing a 59-point agreement, the Karachi Ac- cord. The first 14 provisions of this agreement were devoted to general statements supporting a democratic system, protecting political rights, up- holding the rights of all oppressed people, and so on. Other provisions were devoted to specific promises of better housing for the urban poor, better mass transportation, and more hospital beds for all of Sindh. Nine points were devoted to education, including creating "objective" criteria for admissions to colleges and universities. Other important and somewhat controversial points included: repatriation of Afghan refugees; the provision that only citizens could buy property in Pakistan, while Pakistanis living abroad would have all the privileges of citizenship; restrictions on arms licenses; review of the status of political prisoners held since July 1977; and compensation to be con-

15. Altaf Hussain was in London at the time, ostensibly for medical reasons. Within 10 days, the MQM(H) took charge of the organization's offices.

FARHAT HAQ 999

sidered for next of kin of persons massacred in September and October 1988 in Hyderabad and Karachi.

Within months of signing the accord, disagreements surfaced between the two parties. In May 1989 MQM ministers in the Sindh cabinet resigned in protest against what they termed nonimplementation of the agreement. The resignations were not accepted, and another round of negotiations started resulting in another agreement, termed a memorandum of understanding. But continuing clashes between PPP and MQM workers in Karachi and between the MQM and the Jeay Sindh (a Sindhi nationalist party) in Hyderabad ended any possibility of a renewed PPP-MQM alliance. In October 1989 the MQM formally ended the relationship and announced its support for a no-confi- dence move against Prime Minister Bhutto in the National Assembly.

The formal end of the alliance ignited new tensions in Karachi and Hyder- abad. In April 1990 a former president of the Pakistan Student Federation (a PPP student wing) was shot and died six days later. The same week Altaf Hussain started a "fast unto death" to protest the government's "anti-Muhajir policies." Amid mounting tensions, the Sindh governor intervened and convinced Hussain to end his fast but tensions between the MQM and the provincial government continued unabated. MQM supporters viewed the PPP's provincial government as no longer representing the interests of urban Sindh, and supporters of the government viewed the alliance made between the MQM and Nawaz Sharif's Islami Jamhouri Ittehad (IJI) as anti-Sindhi. Some of the worst ethnic violence in the history of Hyderabad occurred in May 1990. The city was under curfew, and on May 27 the police opened fire on a women's rally resulting in an estimated 60 dead and about 250 injured, including many women and children. The violence then spread to Karachi where over 130 people were killed in a five-day period. Troops were called in to restore order in the province.

The alliance between the MQM and the PPP was strained from the very beginning and worsened as rifts began to appear in the MQM organization, especially between the Karachi and Hyderabad leaderships. The very brittle relationship between the parties in 1988-90 also strained the attempted alliance between the Muhajirs and the Sindhis. Given the very narrow margins of the PPP's electoral victory in 1988, the party depended on MQM's 13 seats in the National Assembly to maintain a parliamentary majority, and it had to balance a variety of interests to maintain the alliance. The PPP, as a national party that very much needed support in the Punjab, did not want to appear too "partisan." It also faced pressure from its Sindhi constituency. For instance, one of the MQM's central demands was repatriation of the Biharis from Bangladesh but the government could not act on this in the face of intense opposition from Sindhi politicians. The IJI, desperately trying to unseat Benazir Bhutto's government, actively wooed the MQM, and the


growing violence between Muhajirs and Sindhis in urban areas and the PPP's inability to deliver on the Karachi Accord gave MQM the excuse to break the alliance and join the IJI's Combined Opposition Parties (COP). The alliance with the Punjabi-dominated opposition dealt a serious blow to any hope for a Muhajir-Sindhi rapprochement. But the MQM's relationship with the IJI was also fraught with contradictions. Within COP (until 1992) was the Jamaat-i- Islami, the party that had lost much of its constituency in urban Sindh to the MQM, and much of the violence in the mid- 1980s was due to armed clashes between the MQM and the student wing of the Jamaat. The continuing tension between MQM and the Punjabis and Pathans living in Karachi further strained the alliance with IJI.

Operation Cleanup and Politics of Violence

Though the MQM leadership had increasingly strained relations with Nawaz Sharif 's government, the provincial administration of Jam Sadiq Ali gave the MQM control of urban Sindh. Jam Sadiq and Altaf Hussain cooperated with each other in subduing their respective political opponents, but centrist forces, particularly the intelligence agencies, became increasingly alarmed at the MQM's activities under Jam Sadiq's administration. For example Mili- tary Intelligence prepared a report about the politicized manner in which arms licenses were granted. Another report outlined concerns with the tremendous influence wielded by the senior vice-chairman of MQM, Salim Shahzad, over appointments in law enforcement agencies.16

The MQM was caught unprepared when the army launched Operation Cleanup in June 1992. Altaf Hussain pointed out that "the prime minister and other federal leaders had categorically and repeatedly stated that the operation was to be against dacoits, kidnappers and other criminals."17 But soon after the operation was launched it became clear that the MQM no longer had the immunity it had enjoyed since 1990. The army had promised an "even-handed policy" in restoring law and order in Sindh, but by June 19, when the dissident Haqiqi faction of the MQM took over the party's offices, it became clear that the MQM was one of the main targets of the army's operation.

The Haqiqi faction was led by Afaq Ahmad and Amir Khan, who had once been close allies of Altaf Hussain; also, four MQM members of the provincial assembly joined the ranks of the dissidents once they were expelled from the MQM. Altaf Hussain is alleged to have asked Jam Sadiq in 1991 to arrest these dissidents on criminal charges but most of them managed to slip out of

16. Herald, October 1992, pp. 41-44. 17. Ibid., July 1992, p. 38.

FARHAT HAQ 1 001

the country. The army now saw a possibility of getting rid of Altaf Hussain by patronizing the Haqiqi faction, and this enabled MQM (H) to start a turf battle against MQM (Altaf), forcing most top leaders and activists into hid- ing. Altaf Hussain turned his medical trip to London into self-exile, and from June 1992 to the end of 1993, the MQM (H) attempted to convince most of the activists and Hussain's supporters that the MQM (A) had become a terrorist organization. It received much help from the army, which conducted well-publicized tours of torture cells allegedly run by the MQM (A).

The almy's strategy was imprudent because it profoundly delegitimized the Haqiqi among the majority of MQM supporters, who regarded the dissidents as traitors, and ended any possibility of a more "moderate" leadership emerging anywhere within MQM ranks. Instead, Karachi continued to experience violence and instability, much of it now a result of vendetta killings by the two MQM factions. By the end of 1994, the Haqiqi faction had become discredited as a puppet of the army. Though Operation Cleanup is credited with getting rid of dacoits and ransom seekers in rural Sindh, its policies in the urban areas failed to restore law and order. In November the army formally concluded its operation, and within days Karachi became the site of renewed violence.

The MQM's break with the IJI also came in June 1992, and the military operation effectively ended the "parliamentary phase" of MQM's coalition strategies. The party boycotted the 1993 National Assembly elections although it did participate in the Sindh Assembly elections. Continuous armed clashes with the Haqiqi group, criminal charges brought by the government against Altaf Hussain and other members of the MQM, and greater critical coverage by the press has forced the party to fight for its very sur- vival.

The MQM is now pursuing two contradictory strategies in response to the variety and intensity of challenges it faces. On the one hand, it has made some attempts to moderate its emphasis on Muhajir ethnicity by announcing that MQM would now stand for Mutahida Quami Movement (United Na- tional Movement), and has introduced branches in cities of Punjab Province such as Multan and Muzaffargarh. Thus far, its efforts have borne little political fruit. On the other hand, the MQM's rhetoric and actions have become more militant since the beginning of 1994; Altaf Hussain has accused the military of Muhajir genocide and compared the situation in urban Sindh to those in Bosnia and Indian-occupied Kashmir."8

The provincial PPP government has taken over the Karachi Municipal Au- thority, and made controversial decisions such as carving a new Malir Dis- trict out of Karachi East, which was vehemently protested by both factions of

18. See Altaf Hussain's interview in Herald, May, 1994, p. 39.

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MQM and by non-MQM Muhajirs who see this as an extreme case of gerry- mandering to create a Sindhi-dominated district and shrink MQM's electoral base.19 After the withdrawal of the army from Sindh, the PPP government launched another round of negotiations with the MQM (A) but pronounce- ments by both sides do not augur well for a settlement. Sindh Chief Minister Abdullah Shah declared in December 1994 that his government was not prepared to negotiate with a terrorist like Altaf Hussain, while Hussain accused Benazir Bhutto of being "a fundamentalist at heart."20 Such public pro- nouncements aside, the current deadlock between the MQM and the PPP government is one of the most crucial political challenges facing Pakistan. Deep pessimism and alienation prevails among a majority of the Muhajirs in urban Sindh, and extremist solutions such as a demand for a separate Muhajir province carved out of urban Sindh have gained increasing currency.

The MQM insists on being the sole representative of the Muhajirs in urban Sindh, and has created a highly centralized structure that relies on modem technologies such as faxes, mobile phones, and computers for command and control. Altaf Hussain continues to address public meetings via telephone from London. Though the MQM has talked much about the drug and transportation mafia being responsible for ethnic conflict in Karachi, its own organization has mimicked a mafia-like structure. Its pamphlet on training workers lists four essential elements of a strong movement: (1) "blind faith" (literal translation from Urdu) in the leadership; (2) elimination of individual- ity; (3) strong sense of common purpose; and (4) complete knowledge of, and agreement with the ideological basis of the organization.21 Altaf Hussain has been determined to maintain complete control of the organization, and many blame his "remote control" politics from London for the MQM's nonpartici- pation in the 1993 National Assembly elections.22

One of MQM's principal aims was to become the key patronage source for the Muhajirs in urban Sindh. It collected chanda (contributions) from busi- nesses and citizens, and the Karachi press is full of credible reports of extor- tion and threats against those who hesitated. MQM-organized charities helped Muhajirs in their quest for jobs, admission to educational institutions, and with a variety of other problems faced by the ordinary person. The or-

19. Karachi East was the largest district in the city, and although there had been much discussion of creating more districts, the lack of any public discussion before the decision was made, the irregular shape of the new district, and establishment of a separate development authority for Malir and Lyari have led to Muhajir perception that the decision was a move to break Muhajir strength in Karachi. Herald, March 1995, pp. 63-68.

20. Newsline, March 1995, p. 56. 21. Imran Farooq, Nazunr-O-Zabad Ki Takazay, MQM pamphlet, 1989. 22. Altaf Hussain had argued that MNAS and MPAS would have been intimidated or bought

by the government and thus the decision to boycott.

FARHAT HAQ 1003

ganization also intimidated journalists and "boycotted" newspapers it viewed as anti-MQM in an effort to silence criticism by the Karachi and Hyderabad press. The core of the MQM consists of members who have taken loyalty oaths-200 such members for each of Karachi's 20 sectors.23 The next level of membership consists of hundreds of thousands of "party workers," mostly young men in their twenties and thirties who are extremely loyal to the MQM and have come to view street clashes and armed confrontations as a necessary part of their struggle.24 MQM supporters view the police (which in Karachi are predominantly Punjabis) and the military as ethnically partisan institutions rather than neutral arbiters of ethnic conflict in urban Sindh.

Karachi in the 1980s became a stage for many regional exile groups such as small underground groups from Iran and other parts of West Asia, and most importantly, some Afghan refugees who have used Karachi as a base for their activities.25 The hostile relationship between India and Pakistan and covert activities by both countries to support separatist movements has further added to the volatility of urban Sindh. The so-called "Kalashnikov culture"-greater availability of guns, increase in drug trafficking, kidnapping, robberies, extortions-were all reflective of a weakening governmental structure that could no longer maintain public order.

Violence in urban Sindh has taken a more ominous turn since April 1994, with 62 policemen and 500 civilians killed, most of them targeted and not the result of ethnic rioting. In December Mohammed Salahuddin, editor of Takbeer, an Urdu weekly magazine affiliated with the Jamaat-i-Islami and highly critical of the MQM, was killed as he left his office. The assassination created a fresh cycle of revenge killing, and within a week an editor of a pro- MQM newspaper was among those killed. In the first few months of 1995, Shia-Sunni sectarian violence caused several hundred more deaths, and some former MQM (A) and MQM (H) activists have become associated with this terrorist activity in Karachi.

Conclusion National integration has been an intractable problem for Pakistan since the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, and the rise of the MQM has been viewed by centrist forces as especially troublesome since the Muhajirs had been the

23. Interview with MQM Chairman Azeem Ahmad Tariq, August 1989. Tariq was killed in 1993.

24. Interviews with around a hundred MQM workers and supporters in 1989 and 1990 in Karachi.

25. Due to the covert nature of such groups, it is difficult to find out much about their activities. But the possible connection between the killing of three American consulate employees in March 1995 in Karachi with the extradition of Ramzi Ahmed Yusuf point to the possible existence of such groups in Karachi.


core support group for the concept of a Pakistani nationality. The extreme violence of the last decade has added to the insecurity of centrist forces. The deepening sense of "relative deprivation," the rapidly changing demographics of urban Sindh, and the failure of national integration all contributed to the rise of MQM.

An almost exclusively urban-based movement, the MQM has injected elements into the national politics of Pakistan that were absent in earlier in- stances of ethnic mobilization. Unlike the Bengali, Sindhi, or Baluchi nationalist movements, the MQM represents an exclusively urban group with no historical claim to the land they occupy, and unlike the others, MQM represents a pronounced generational shift. The much younger, urban, edu- cated leaders and members of the movement have thus far successfully re- sisted attempts by the central government to dismantle their organization. What is most important, in spite of all the violence, they have maintained a high level of legitimacy among their constituency and thus thwarted any internal challenge to their claim to be the exclusive representatives of Urdu- speaking Muhajirs. Ironically, a group that had traditionally supported centrist forces such as the federal government and the army has become the most forceful opponent of the state.

But the level of violence since the appearance of MQM on the political scene is creating a growing sense of pessimism among the people of urban Sindh. After the MQM's first victory in municipal elections, many journalists and political commentators hailed its arrival as a positive force that would provide a sense of direction to the Muhajir youth. But as David Horowitz reminds us: "Ethnicity is one of those forces that is community- building in moderation, community-destroying in excess."26 The ethnic politics of MQM has crossed that threshold. But the "manufactured ethnicity" of MQM is also a reminder that ethnic conflict ought not to be viewed as "pri- mordial" and thus resistant to accommodation. MQM and the Pakistani government must heed the lessons of ethnic conflict and accommodation, and resolve the current impasse through a negotiated settlement. Pakistan must learn to live with ethnic tension in order to prevent ethnic fragmentation, the nation's central challenge.

26. David L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, p. 13.

Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization · 2015-04-08 · young Muhajir students led by Altaf Hussain formed MQM, claiming that the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs constitute

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