Rise Of German Nationalism

To what extent was Nationalism A Driving force of German Politics

between 1800 and 1914?

Ken Mortimer , ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’ History Review 2001

Ben Kaufman

1

Bismarck , Kaiser Wilhelm and ‘Martial Nationalism’

Contents page

1 - Title Page

2 - Contents Page

3 - Essay content

2

14 - Bibliography

15 - Source Evaluation

As Nipperdey1 remarked, “In the beginning there was Napoleon”2 and

one may trace German nationalism3 to the social and political

upheavals of the ‘French Revolutionary Wars’4, remaining a potent

force in German politics between the occupations of Berlin in 1806

and 1945. Yet the extent it was a ‘driving force’ varied

throughout the period, becoming more significant as Germany

developed politically and economically. Nationalism was often

exploited by policy makers but never drove politics before the

1 German historian best known for his monumental and exhaustive studies of

Germany from 1800 to 1918

2Edgar Feuchtwanger ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’ History Review

2001 (quoting Nipperdey)

3 Nationalism is a belief system, creed or political ideology that involves a

strong identification of a group of individuals with a nation

4 Were a series of major conflicts fought between the French Revolutionary

government and several European states3

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation

1900‘s, harnessed in turn to liberal5 and conservative6 agendas yet

becoming an overwhelming populist force by 1914.

“Napoleonic rule encouraged the growth of two ideologies;

Nationalism and Liberalism”7. This reflects the effect that the

‘Confederation of the Rhine’ (1806-1813), had upon German

Nationalism.The “French draconian measures”8 acted to strengthen

“national-self-consciousness”,9 and sense of unity, between

previously independent states. Napoleon’s influence was visible in

the creation of the “middle classes ...new freedom”10. Under ‘Code

Napoleon’ the “privileges of the landed aristocracy ...ended”,11

and through governmental reforms the “absolutist state gave way to

5 a kind of nationalism identified by political philosophers who believe in a

non-xenophobic form of nationalism compatible with liberal values of freedom,

tolerance, equality, and individual rights

6 Often right-wing with an outlook accepting or supporting the current social

hierachy or social inequality. Often from the social groups that benefited from

this (for obvious reasons)

7 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11

8 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p14


10 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p29


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Individual_rights

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egalitarianism

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toleration

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_(political)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_values

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xenophobic

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_philosophy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationalism

bureaucratic governance”12 and empowerment of the “growing middle

class”13.An indirect effect was The Prussian reform movement, which

responded to the humiliation by France through seeking to “bridge

the gap between state and society”14, ironically, by imitating

“French reforms”15. A new system of education “to encourage

Prussian patriotic feeling among students”16 and new institutions

(Elimentarschule’, ‘Gynasium’ and the University of Berlin) were

created to foster a renaissance of German spirit. Yet, those

exposed at the universities to such concepts often became

dissatisfied with their lack of political influence, and

gravitated towards ‘ Liberal Nationalism’. Therefore, directly and

through imitation, “Napoleon produced German liberalism”17. Such

developments were viewed as a threat to ‘Germany’ by Conservative

nationalists, for whom French rule was “synonymous with liberal ”18

tendencies. They “from the start [took] an anti-liberal

character”19, opposing the liberal nationalism amongst the educated




15 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p7

16Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p7




middle classes, viewing it as a foreign, subversive threat. It

was, from the start schizophrenic, split between liberal and

conservative groups. Scarcely a driving force then, but rather a

tool to both preserve and question the establishment.

Since its creation at the ‘Congress of Vienna’ in 1815 ‘The German

Confederation’ was outwardly conservative, asserting “the rights

of the states and their legitimacy against the demands of liberals

and nationalists”20 who wanted a Germany that was unified

constitutionally.The ‘Deutscher Bund’ was a reactionary

institution which conflicted with the ambitions of the liberals

through “maintaining the external and internal security and

independence and integrity of the individual states”21. Despite

this, some elements of the Bund were unconsciously ‘Nationalist’

and ‘Liberal’. “The old hotchpotch of states was reorganised,

small states were amalgamated, and the total number was reduced to

39”22 from the 400 states of the ‘Holy Roman Empire’. Simplifying

the boundaries and sovereignty “coerced”23 them into national

consciousness and, thus, the ‘Confederation’ strengthened





Germany’s National identity, by undermining the independence of

these discrete states. A Liberal sentiment pervaded the Federal

Act stipulating “that individual states should establish

constitutions with parliaments”24. The institution of the Bund was

influenced by ‘Liberal Nationalist’ ideas, yet (Württemberg and

Hesse-Darmstadt excepted25) the stipulation that a constitution and

parliament should be formed was “obeyed and ignored at will”26.The

majority of rulers “clung obstinately to their virtually absolute

power”27. Nationalism wasn’t a driving force of politics at this

time, precisely because it was a seen as a threat the rulers of

the subsidiary states who implemented self-serving intentionalist28

agendas.

However, while not an influential force in German politics,

‘Liberal’ and ‘Martial Nationalism’29 grew increasingly significant

24 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p2

25 States of the federation



28 Intentionalist: used in historical debate to argue that an event/ events were

purposefully brought about by individuals (view usage here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_versus_intentionalism#Extreme_intenti

onalist_interpretation)7

in intellectual circles, as evidenced by the ‘Burschenshaften30’

becoming more active in preparing for the “coming radical

Germany”31. In 1817, 450 students, many belonging to the

‘Burschenshaften’, went to the ‘Wartburg festival’, protesting

against the reactionary politics of the Bund and burnt the

conservative writings of Kotzbue. In 1819 Kotzbue, was murdered by

a “romantic student”32 and radical member of the ‘Burschenshaft’.

‘Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke‘33 sees this as evidence for a

“[popular] nationalist movement in Germany”34, but is contested by

A.J.P.Taylor who believes “Nationalism and liberalism remained

largely middle class”35 preoccupations, reserved for the “educated

minority...of the population”36. The actions of the

‘Burschenshaften’ were, to Taylor, those of the intellectual class

29 Nationalism with strong components of patriotism and the popular desire for

military expansion and conflict

30Burschenschaften were founded in the 19th century as associations of

university students inspired by liberal and nationalistic ideas.



33 A German historian, political writer and National Liberal member of the

Reichstag during the time of the German Empire.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Empire

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichstag_(German_Empire)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberal_Party_(Germany)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Writer

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historian

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany

who believed “a unified people of brothers [was] irresistible”.37

It was not yet representative of the majority for whom such

policies were “intense but abstract”38. Not yet a driving force,

Nationalism had begun germinating.

Metternich39 “feared the development of nationalism as part of a

liberal danger”40 due to their close association. The ‘Carlsbad

Decrees’ of 1819 illustrated “how fiercely he opposed both

liberalism and nationalism”41. “Professors were dismissed from

their posts”42 and there was “tighter control on education”43 and

“censorship on publications less than 320 sides long”44. In 1821

“the subjects which [state] assemblies could discuss” were

restricted, and the “Burschenshaften were banned”45. One might

37 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11 (19year old

student 1820)


39 A German politician and statesman, serving as the Foreign Minister of the

Austrian Empire, noted for his conservative reactionary politics.







http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politician

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany

argue that such reactionary measures were responding to popular

Nationalism thereby proving it’s influence as a driving force.

However, “In 8 years of activity...only 107 individuals in the

whole of Germany”46 were convicted by the Metternich’s commissions.

The Decrees testify that Nationalism was excluded from rather than

included in policy formation, and was therefore not a driving

force. Indeed, the sole impact of the ‘Carlsbad Decrees’ were to

give a “halo of martyrdom to a movement which was already

practically extinct”47.

Despite existing in a so-called ‘peaceful dualism’ many

independent states were rivals. Prussia began to outmaneuver

Austria, through it’s establishment of the ‘Zollverein’ in 1818,

and engaged in “economic conquest”48 or ‘Prussification’. By 1836

the “Zollverein included 25 states with a population of 26

million”49, exemplifying ‘economic nationalism’ through promising

“for all member states a common system of customs and tariffs, and

the abolition of all internal customs unions”,50 reducing the






boundaries between states and acting as a unifying agent, giving

the Germans a “stronger sense of unity”51. Growth of transport and

communications had the same effect and by “1838 Prussia...had

built its first railway line from Berlin to Potsdam”52. A

strengthening industry and economy gave Prussia it a

“preponderance of power”53 making it “essential to Germany”54 as a

unifying agent and as the guardian of the German cornucopia.

Consequently, the growing dominance of Prussia, through

‘Prussification’, ran parallel to an “increasing appeal to

nationalism”55. It is therefore unsurprising that the “Zollverein

became a focal point for German nationalism”56 for if “the states

of the Zollverein had prospered - would not the same be true

following political unity?”57.Ironically, despite its “anti-

national origins”58, ‘Prussification’ became an “Instrument of a

demagogic German nationalism”59 as It both encouraged the ‘Liberal










Nationalist’ movement and “made their dreams of a politically

united Germany more likely to be realised”60. ‘Nationalism’ was

inherent in the successes of ‘Prussification’ and both existed in

symbiosis. Whether ‘economic nationalism’ drove Prussian growth or

vice versa, ‘Nationalism’ evolved with Prussia.

Where dynastic structures were crumbling, nationalism supplied the

social cement to hold society together for a “derancinated

people”61.The ‘Zollverein’s’ catalytic effect on the German

Industrial Revolution, while profitable to the minority, was seen

to cause significant social problems. The population of the German

Confederation rose by 60% from 33 million between 1816-1865 62,

putting strains upon the economy. Despite coal and ignite

production increasing by 12 million tons between 1850-1860 and the

length of railway lines increasing by 12,000 km between 1850-1870,

the economy “did not grow sufficiently to absorb the mounting

pressure of those seeking work”63. “From the mid 1840‘s

unemployment in many industries”64 rose. Workers were, “poorly






clothed and inadequately fed”65 and frequently inhabited “dirty,

damp overcrowded accommodation, often [with] 20 to a room”66,

living on “wretched wages in squalid conditions”67. It is

unsurprising therefore, that ”Among workers and peasants, there

was growing unrest”68. However, there was little sympathy for the

working classes (seen as a “rootless immoral rabble”69) from

Germany’s rulers. Yet “Political ideas of liberalism and

nationalism...proved very attractive”70 to the expanding working

classes who were denied reform from above who as a result “gained

a greater political awareness”71 .“It is no surprise, therefore, it

is in these ‘Vormätz years’ between 1815 and 1848 that liberal and

nationalist ideas gained a firm root in Germany”72 as they offered

alternative rallying points for popular opposition to economic

failings. However, Nationalism wasn’t a driving force, as even if

the ‘silent majority’ were ‘Liberal Nationalists’, they were

disenfranchised and, without effective unions, or militias could





69 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p39 (Baron Von Stein)




have no significant influence on politics. ‘Liberal Nationalism’

derived it’s support from popular discontent, rather than popular

appeal.

Treitschke suggests that, ‘Liberal Nationalism’ became a

significant movement due to it’s popular appeal. In 1848 “Violent

protests came from the peasants and workers who demanded

improvements in their daily lives”73. In Berlin, “barricades were

erected...the next day 230 people lay dead,”74 evidencing the mass

support the movement harboured. However, Taylor counters that,

“1848 was not the explosion of new forces [ of ‘Liberal

Nationalism’], but the belated triumph of the Burschenschaft”75. In

fact the towns affected were “dominated by the professional and

intellectual middle classes”76 such as “Andreas Gottschalk [who,

while]cheered on by a crowd of 5,000, called for the establishment

of a revolutionary committee”77. Such men “could hardly claim to

represent the protesters”78, whose motives were wildly different to

theirs. The nature of the protest itself was “far from a socialist







revolution”79, rather an “orgy of Luddism”80 with a “wide divergence

over both aims and methods”81. Consequently, the revolutions were a

product of general discontent exploited by the “professional and

intellectual middle classes”82 for the pursuit ‘Liberal

Nationalist’ ideals. In the Frankfurt Parliament83 “over 80% of the

members held university degrees”. Regardless, we see that

discontent placed the ‘Liberal Nationalists’, previously seen as

irrelevant, in a very influential position while not itself being

a driving force.

The ‘Frankfurt Parliament’ was the first freely elected parliament

for all of Germany. Existing from the 18/5/1848 -31/5/1849 it

advocated a German Empire based on principles of Parliamentary

democracy. This objective satisfied the main demands of the

Liberal and National movements, from which the members were

derived and, therefore, one might perceive ‘Liberal Nationalism’

to have been a driving force in politics. However, the

ineffectiveness of the Parliament belies these initial conceptions

as “Without the discipline imposed by well organised political





83 Formed In 1948 due to the revolts the same year15

parties and without the dominance provided by outstanding leaders,

the Frankfurt Parliament became a talking shop”84. Also, the

Parliament’s liberal outlook was undermined by the fact they were

“themselves afraid of the violence on the streets”85 as well as “of

being overtaken by radicals and socialists”86, actually welcoming

the restitution of state order over the rioters. Consequently,

‘Liberal Nationalism’ was scarcely a driving force when the

ineffective Frankfurt Parliament “Could not impose a new future on

Germany without [relying on] an army or support from the Princes”87

who were the real driving forces at this time and who were

responsible for the eventual unification.

When unification was accomplished, in 1871, it was partly reliant

on Nationalist sentiment. However, in the new ‘Deutsches Reich’

Nationalism was a secondary force to Prussian dominance.The

constitution was a “fig leaf to cover the nakedness of

absolutism”88 and despite the fact that “no parliament in the world






was elected on a broader franchise”89 such liberal ideas were only

permitted, by Bismarck, to secure conservative interests, as

“German peasants and workers had traditional views similar to his

own” 90. Article II of the 1871 unification constitution

symbolically placed the Prussian King as ‘Emperor Of Germany’ and

“Prussian and imperial institutions were so intimately linked that

they could hardly be distinguished”91. Also, the fact that the

Empire was founded through ‘blood and iron’ by Prussia, rather

than a popular development, supports the view that, ‘Liberal

Nationalism’ was secondary to Prussian influence in the new Reich.

Despite this, the ‘National liberal’ influence in the ‘Reichstag’

government was significant, winning 155 out of 399 seats in the

1871 election, they established a stranglehold over the

government’s budget, exerting real power. Bismarck oversaw the

standardisation of law, uniform law of commerce and a single

currency in 1872, to keep the ‘National Liberals’ on side, adding

to the growing “distinct national identity [that] developed [and]

transcended the member states”92. Therefore, the new Reich both





intentionally and unconsciously undermined the independence of

it’s separate member states and Prussian dominance became

indistinguishable from ‘Conservative Nationalism’.

However, despite its influence in the Reichstag, we see that the

Prussian elite still exploited ‘Nationalism’ in order to fortify

their own positions.This is seen in ‘Kulturkampf’93, where “by

attacking Catholicism, Bismarck hoped to secure stronger support

from the [National Liberals94]...in order to push through a new

economic policy”95 which benefited the Junkers (realising the

liberals despised the Catholics for their lack of enthusiasm for

unification). Bismarck was also “suspicious of minorities which

might threaten the Protestant, Prussianised government”96 and

therefore saw Catholics as a “common enemy”97, who could act as

“target for [the] hostility”98 of the Liberals.Therefore, Bismarck

was “playing political games”,99 achieving his objective of the

93 1871 to 1878

94 Political party in the Reichstag whose members often despised the Catholics

for their lack of enthusiasm for unification and liberal policies






“creation and consolidation of Germany”100 with Prussia’s influence

at its heart.Nationalism powered German policies but Prussian

interests directed and drove them, as Bismarck ensured he was the

one ‘in the drivers seat’. Important also is that Nationalism was

seen to begin to express itself violently, with even the

supposedly liberal parties endorsing Bismarck’s actions.This

suggests a tendency for ‘Liberal Nationalism’ and ‘Conservative

(Prussian) Nationalism’s differences to be able to be overcome to

pursue a greater cause often violently, a trend that would be

repeated during ‘Weltpolitik’ under ‘Martial nationalism’.

The ‘Martial Nationalism’ that resisted Napoleon101 and forged with

the ‘blood and iron’ of the 1871 unification became the Emperor

Wilhelm II’s ‘new clothes’. Described by some as a “stereotypical

Prussian”102, he was “rarely seen out of military uniform”103 and was

inherently anti-liberal, remarking, “ There will be no talk of

democracy when my guards appear on the scene”104. Although there is

100 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p34 (Bismarck)

101 Napoleon Bonaparte

102 http://madmonarchist.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/monarch-profile-kaiser-wilhelm-

ii.html ,Thursday, April 29, 2010, posted by ‘site owner’ (anonymous)


104 Wilhelm II19

http://madmonarchist.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/monarch-profile-kaiser-wilhelm-ii.html


debate over whether Wilhelm was in reality a ‘Schattenkaiser’,

rather than a ‘Reichkaiser’, power was definitely believed to be

“centred on the Kaiser and his Chancellorship”105. It ‘appeared’

that, “In present day Germany there [was] no force stronger than

the Kaiser”106. The perception that the Kaiser had “absolute

power”107 gave him influence. He became a focal point for

Conservatives and was supported by the Junkers (landowners), the

army, industrialists and right wing pressure groups who arguably

manipulated him for their own aims. However, it would be facile to

say he was powerless or a ‘Schattenkaiser’ as he naturally sided

with the conservatives anyway, and was at least an asset and at

most an influential ally to them. Consequently, ‘Conservative

Nationalism’ became the driving force of the ‘ruling

establishment’108, but not necessarily of German politics.

‘Liberal Nationalism’, however, remained influential with “a

majority of National Liberals and Populists”109 in the Reichstag

which caused the Kaiser’s ‘Prison Bill’ in 1888 to suffer an


106 Friedrich Nuemann


108 The Kaiser, The Junker Class, The Aristocracy, etc...


“ignominious defeat, leaving the conservatives isolated in their

extreme position”110 proving the significance of the Liberal

Nationalists. Liberals were also unaffected by the policy of

‘Sammlungspolitik’111, which proved to be counter-productive as “in

the elections of 1898...[Liberal parties] gained more seats”112

despite these measures. ‘Liberal Nationalism’ was thus a powerful

force in German politics, able to resist and affect the policies

of the Kaiser and his right wing supporters, who were attempting

to pursue policies of ‘Conservative Nationalism’ to create a sense

of German unity against the perceived threat of Socialism (through

‘Sammlungspolitik’). Just as in the early 19th Century, a tension

between the Nationalism of the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’ evolved, but

power still resided mainly with the latter.

The ‘Martial Nationalism’, that had been present throughout the

era was now


111 Sammlungspolitik is a domestic policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II during his

rule in Germany. It means 'bringing together policy', it aimed to unite

the political parties and groups in favour of Weltpolitik


growing evidenced by the burgeoning strength of the ‘Pan German

League’113 who “wanted to unite all ethnic Germans around the

world”114 and the ‘Navy League’115 whom both had 25,000 and “over a

million members”116, respectively. To some they “reflected rather

than formulated policy decisions”117but their very existence “adds

weight to the view that politics in Germany had become strongly

nationalist”118. ‘Martial Nationalism’ was also prominent in the

German populace as a whole and the “glorification of war and

conquest was also a popular theme in German culture”119. For

example, “On Sedan day120, captured French guns were paraded through

the streets of Berlin to cheering crowds”121 and August Bebel

described the nation as “still drunk with military deeds to be

done”122. This ‘Martial Nationalism’ was visible, also, in the

113 Founded in 1891


115 Founded in 1898





120 The Battle of Sedan was fought during the Franco-Prussian War on 1

September 1870



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Prussian_War

establishment, with the “higher ranks of the army dominated by the

Junker class”123. Consequently, the policy of ‘Weltpolitik’ was

“immensely popular”124 and the Tiripitz Plan, involving the

“expansion of the navy proved more popular”125 as it “Symbolised

German growth”126.The sway of ‘Martial Nationalism’ over the

majority of the populace could be seen to reveal it to be a

driving force of German politics and perhaps the popular appeal of

the policies pushed ‘Weltpolitik’ to achieve more than it was

intended to.

The alternative perspective is to see ‘Weltpolitik’ as an attempt

to harness the popular appeal of ‘Martial Nationalism’ and

patriotism that existed in Germany to secure the positions of

those who held the reins. Bebel remarked “Only a successful

foreign policy can help to reconcile, pacify, rally,

unite”127,suggesting that, far from the innocuous claim that they

were simply trying to attain Germany’s “place in the sun”128,






128 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p166 (Bulow)23

Martial Nationalism was used to “unite peoples of

different ...backgrounds and so overcome [growing] difficulties in

the Reichstag”129.That ‘Martial Nationalism’ was exploited to

placate dissenters is evidenced by the policy of ‘Weltpolitik ’

which was seen to be geared towards subversive working and middle

classes and spearheaded by the Kaiser and his allies. Tiripitz,

for example, contented many of the middle class industrialists and

businessmen with “the promise of new markets for their goods and

new sources of raw materials”130 and provided a “boost to content

heavy industry”131 in the building of a colossal navy. The working

classes, whose growing discontent manifested in the growth of

trade unions from 165,000 to 245,000 (1905-1910) and increasing

support for the SDP, would be assuaged by this policy.

Consequently. “Weltpolitik [was] a red herring of the ruling

classes to distract the middle and working classes from social and

political problems at home”132.‘Martial Nationalism’ was channeled

through the policies attached to ‘WeltPolitik‘ and was

propounded to strengthen and fortify the position of the elite

against the growing political discontent of the working and middle





classes, acting as an ersatz for political change in order to

“satisfy Germany [and its populace] without injuring the Emperor

[and his conservative allies]”133‘’ . Hence, nationalism was not the

driving force of German politics at this point more the driven

force, as it was still firmly under the directorship of the ruling

elite. However, there were signs that this Imperial authority

would soon not be able to “ride above the storm”134 of popular

Nationalism as it had done throughout the century.

AJP Taylor states the effects that the attempted exploitation of

‘Martial Nationalism’ had upon the country in describing, “A

runaway horse or, more truly, an overpowered engine out of

control, such was Germany in the last years of peace”135.Martial

Nationalism overflowed the country, the cries of “the fatherland

in danger”136 were once again heard and that, Industry, just keeping

ahead, “would be ruined by anything less than conquest of all

Europe”137 supports Taylor’s notion of a country driven irrevocably

to war both economically and sentimentally.The “German working

133 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p166 (Eulenberg)





class were willing to become instruments of this”138 as their,

”German pride and German power [, engendered by ‘Martial

Nationalism’,] demanded”139 it, and It was “unconsciously assumed

[, by them, that there would be] a repetition of the successes of

1866 and 1870”140.This thoughtlessness was seen even in the elite,

who were “soaked in the ethos of the barrack square”141 and their

consequent ‘Martial Nationalism’ became a driving force German

politics as they were increasingly involved in “crucial decisions

about the direction of policy”142.Despite what one would expect, the

Reichstag’s liberal intellectuals were similarly overtaken by the

‘spirit of 1914’. Conservatives and liberals and their divergent

strains of Nationalism coalesced under the banner of ‘Martial

Nationalism’ , symbolised by the calling of ‘Burgfrieden’143, and

without this key division in the aims of ‘German Nationalism’, it

proved an irresistible structuralist force, leading to the




141 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p79 (Wolfson)


143 “Castle-peace’, all parties united in support of the war and granted ‘War

Credits’, including the supposedly ‘pacifist’ social democrats.26

outbreak of war in 1914 and “peace ‘exploding’ into cheers and

music”144

Therefore, ‘Martial Nationalism’, with it’s ‘demagogic appeal’

became the structuralist driving force in German politics,

exceeding the intentions of its conservative instigators. The

senseless hubris that accompanied Germany’s engagement in ‘The

First World War’ in 1914 and it’s foreseeable disastrous

consequences, was driven by ‘Martial Nationalism’. Those that had

used nationalism to further their own ends had lost the reins

steering it. Bismarck had said, “Let us put Germany in the saddle,

she will ride”145 now the consequences of the pursuit of

nationalistic policies such as ‘Weltpolitik’ had thrown “the reins

on the horses back”146 which then loosed itself from both the sense

and intentions it had previously been guided by. Nationalism had

become an end in itself, visible in the effects of ‘Martial

Nationalism’, whereas previously it had merely been the means of

achieving ends, visible in pursuit of ‘Prussification’. Few, in

the 1800s, could have imagined that Nationalism would have become

144 The Great War - We Must Hack Our Way Through (Episode Three) Part 1/4

(documentary British Broadcasting Corporation 1964)

145 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p182 (Bismarck)


the driving force of policy that it did, as it had always been

exploited by policy makers to garner popular support for their own

agendas. However, as Germany developed, the centrifugal stresses

caused by industrialism, social and political fragmentation, and

cultural and religious diversity required, more and more, the

centripetal force of nationalism to hold Germany together. As such

all were eventually dragged ineluctably along in its slipstream,

including those who had tried to control it. Ironically what had

started as a reaction to French imperialism evolved throughout a

century, from an ineffectual and often exploited sentiment into

the “driving force” of German imperialism under the unifying guise

of ‘Martial Nationalism’.

Bibliography

•Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986

•Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001

•AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985

•Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012

•Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009

28

•Edgar Feuchtwanger ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’

History Review 2001

•The Great War - We Must Hack Our Way Through (Episode Three)

Part 1/4 (documentary British Broadcasting Corporation 1964)

•http://madmonarchist.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/monarch-profile-

kaiser-wilhelm-ii.html ,Thursday, April 29, 2010

29



Source Evaluation

Nationalism, was a subject that seemed to span the entirety of the

course.It linked in with the syllabus I was studying in my English

Literature course as both ‘Nationalism’ and the ‘Gothic’ had their

roots in ‘Romanticism’.The Initial link between both my History

and Literature studies made me consciously track it’s trajectory

through the period, while it was being outlined to

us.Consequently, when it came to picking a title, ‘Nationalism’

was the one that seemed to be, for me, the most appealing.It was

chosen partly because It would comfortably span the ‘100’ year

requirement of the study and also due to its involvement in

conflicts and ‘the like’ being far more appealing to me than ‘the

role of women’ throughout this period.Following my troubling

fascination with major conflicts, I framed my study between two

violent periods in the following initial question, which was “to

what extent was German Nationalism the Driving Force of German

Politics between 1815 and 1939?”.Also, regarding the dates, It

seemed to me logical to span the question from when this feeling

of unity was instilled, arguably by Napoleon, to when Germany was

once more divided (literally by the Berlin Wall) and this feeling

of euphoric purpose was replaced by desolation.How ever it is

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important to recognise that my initial question did change in both

wording and time frame, for reasons that shall be explained below.

It was recommended, by the examiner, that I use a “wide range of

sources”, this has been achieved.I ensured that all of my

paragraphs, each with a particular point, was referenced

using five or six different sources. Also, I ensured my sources

were not all of one opinion and this is shown by essays ability to

debate on how far Nationalism was or was not a driving force with

references from numerous historians.I also ensured I used at least

one article, documentary and web reference, to add to the

diversity of the sources, often they enabled me to see simplified

frameworks of particular topics, which I could build my study

upon.

In trying to answer the question I focused in on ‘politics’ as my

‘keystone’ word. I made a general list of areas to cover which

were relevant to ‘German Politics’.I interpreted this as relating

to the German government, and therefore often excluded areas which

did not involve Germany as a country or were not related to the

government.Consequently, Napoleon’s effect on German government,

growth of nationalism in the middle classes, the birth and effects

of the Frankfurt parliament, the institution of German Reich at

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unification, kulturkampf, how far politics was influenced by the

Kaiser and ‘Weltpolitic’, were areas which seemed to be most

significant in relation to the wording of the question.Areas of

debate were to be found in; how far ‘Liberal Nationalism’ and

‘Nationalism’ before unification was a driving force and whether

nationalism was a driving force or steered and manipulated

intentionally by the ruling classes.There is also debate over how

much the elite of the Reich were actually able to control

‘Nationalism’ and at what point it became and overwhelming driving

force.

Over the course of the study I realised , nationalism wasn’t as

simple a concept as it looked , and I had to approach it by

dividing it between Liberal and Conservative nationalists147, both

of whom understood and desired different things through and by

Nationalism. Also, I realised that the nationalism of minority

groups, such as the poles was not relevant as these were groups

who did not consider themselves German and therefore cant be seen

to be in the same category as German Nationalists who desired

unification rather than independence.Also, it became apparent that

it would be impossible to construct an argument, in depth, that

would cover until the 1930’s which would fit under the word

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limit.Consequently I shifted my focus back to end in 1914.This was

effective as it allowed me to depict nationalism as a tidal wave,

a destructive force, manifesting itself in the ‘First World

War’.thereby, giving a strong, dramatic resolution to the

essay.Also, the question changed from “the” to “a driving force”,

this was because the latter allowed me to focus on the idea of

‘Nationalism’ in conflict with those in control of politics, while

“the” would suggest to the reader an intent and need to evaluate

ideas such as foreign affairs, other movements, independent

figures and the economy.One who has read the essay will note that

some of the things listed are contained in the essay.However,

their significance is always in relation to ‘nationalism’, rather

than being seen as separate from it and competing with it to

effect German politics.We see therefore that there were two

particular ways to pursue the essay, the way I chose was the one

that would readily read synoptically and chronologically.Also, the

wording limits prevented me from choosing the alternative

approach, which would be far more extensive.

The main skeleton of my essay was built upon synoptic Historical

books.For example, AJP Taylor’s ‘The Course Of German History’ was

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useful as the historian was well known and credible.This was

because Taylor has built up a life long reputation for striking

analysis of history, and is even used by other historians to fill

out their work (the ultimate seal of credibility).He expressed his

viewpoints in a way which was resounding and well expressed.Also,

he addressed nationalism, directly and frequently.However, there

were occasions where AJP Taylor made statements which were

controversial and needed to be balanced out by other sources.For

example “would be ruined by anything less than conquest of all

Europe”, stood out as particularly contentious.Therefore, Martin

Kitchen’s,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012 was useful as it

complemented, and sometimes moderated AJP Taylor’s analysis,

covering the same areas but with revealing differences in

perspectives that added to the richness of the study.For example,

Martin Kitchen revealed much more about the details of

‘Kulturkampf’. However, Kitchen could be brief in key areas, such

as in 1848 and often did not focus as heavily on nationalism

asTaylor.

Alison Kitson’s ‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ was

useful as it contained numerous key quotes and revealed much about

the complexities of Weltpolitik that more narrative driven texts

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missed. It spanned a large range and was precise in detail, making

it a useful tool for filling out particular areas of the study

with evidence.However, nationalism wasn’t always mentioned when it

was relevant to key events and therefore had to be analysed in

combination with other sources, particularly Taylor's. Andrina

Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, was also useful for

providing statistics to support the essay.The concise nature of

the study made it easier to scour the text for relevant

information.Also, the strong focus on alternate perspectives made

it easier to bring debate in to areas such as the effectiveness of

the 1848 revolts.However, the text was of limited use, as it did

not provide information for the latter part of the study.This was

overcome through the use of ‘The development of Germany’ by Sally

Waller, which covered the period from unification until 1914 with

similar usefulness, detail and clarity of the Stiles text.

The online source I used was limited by the fact that the writer

was anonymous, consequently it was with some trepidation that I

used it, out of fear of inaccuracy or bias.However, this was

overcome due to the fact that other sources agreed with this

source.For example he was described as “stereotypically Prussian”,

which complemented Queen Victoria’s opinion of him as “ultra

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Prussian to a degree which is painful to me”.Therefore, websites

often could be used to obtain initial perceptions, but it was

important to see them verified by other sources before they were

used.

The article I used was useful as it provided me with an opening

quote from an established historian.While I didn’t use it in order

to provide statistics or other such quotes, it allowed me to

engage with the reader with this strong statement, “In the

beginning there was Napoleon”, describing how Napoleon was

responsible for the creation of nationalism.This was even more

poignant if you pick up on the fact that it is suggesting

Nationalism to be a deterministic and, therefore, driving force

through the allegory to bible and therefore god.It seemed to

perfectly outline my essay through the inference of ‘determinism

vs free will (or intention)’.It is unfortunate I did not use more

articles, but It is due to the fact that I found ample material in

the other sources and therefore the articles seemed unnecessary.

Consequently, the article was useful to both stylise the essay as

well as effectively outline the argument to the reader from the

start.

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An area of difficulty was to be found in the fact that not all

historians had distinguished between the different types of

nationalism, for example AJP Taylor viewed nationalism as

‘imperial nationalism’ solely and not different.This is likely due

to other historians viewing Germany’s development by splitting it

up in to different areas, such as industry or society, rather than

looking at nationalism predominantly.This was overcome by

comparing different sources and devising appropriate terminology

to obtain a synoptic view of Nationalism over the period.For

example, In the essay it was necessary to distinguish between

liberal, conservative, economic and martial nationalism.Also, it

was difficult to find detailed information about the early 19th

century due to the lack of covering this area in comparison to the

rest of the century, likely due to the genesis of Germany being

far more appealing to historians who are drawn to the

dramatic.This limitation was overcome through the utilisation of

spanning texts such as AJP Taylor’s and Martin Kitchen’s, both of

which dealt with the period in relation to the birth of Ideas such

as nationalism. Both were used in combination to provide the essay

with the information regarding the origins of Nationalism, in it’s

numerous forms.

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Rise Of German Nationalism

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