China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era Lai Foon Wong* China–ASEAN relations developed quickly from an absence of diplomatic ti es in the immedi ate post-Col d War peri od to cl ose interaction and cooperation in the late 1990s. Japan–ASEAN political relations, however, lacked the impetus for advancement during the same period. Japan had, as ear ly as 1977, est abl ished dialogue partner rel ati ons wit h ASEAN, and began the proces s of instit uti onali zing its dialogue and cooperati on wit h ASEAN at various levels in the areas of industry, science, technology, culture, trade, and investment. China, on the other hand, did not actively seek to establish official relations with ASEAN until the 1990s, after the Cold War. China first participated in the ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting in 1991 and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996. By the beginning of the 21st century, the nature of China–ASEAN relations had evolved from one based largel y on bilateral relati ons to a multil ateral relati onship built on expanded areas of cooperation incl uding finance, human res ourc es devel opment, health and quarant ine as wel l as judici al matters. In the spheres of security and military relations, China signed the Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and became the fi rst major extra-regional power to accede to the Treaty ofAmity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In 2002, China and ASEAN also released a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s military relations with ASEAN counties had also shifted from one of unofficial to offi ci al nature. The contrast between the rapi d pace of development in China–ASEAN relations and the lack of advancement in Japan–ASEAN relations was most pronounced in the realm of economic relations. Since the year 2000, the trade volume between China and ASEAN has risen at the average rate of 12.4% annually, while the trade volume between Japan and ASEAN has been decreasing at the average rate of 3% annually. 1 * Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]1 These statistics are provided by the ASEAN Secretariat. See http://202.154.12.33/trade/ publicview.asp. Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404 doi:10.1093/cjip/pom003 Reproduced from the Science of International Politics, with kind permission of the authors and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University a tUive rsityo fa dra so De ce m be r23, 2010cjip . o xfo rdjo u rn a ls. o rg Do w lo a de dfro m
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That their relationship represented a convergence of (Asian) values5 also
accelerated development of China–ASEAN relations.
There are, however, shortcomings to these explanations. The first
emphasizes the benefits that the end of the bi-polar world order and of
opposing ideologies brought to China–ASEAN relations. But it does not
explain the rapid advance of China–ASEAN relations in the late 1990s, at a
time when Japan–ASEAN relations made minimal progress. The second
explanation emphasizes the influence of changes in China/ASEAN policy
on the development of China–ASEAN relations, an approach with which
this article concurs, albeit recognizing that it is an explanation that does
not take into account all other possible reasons for accelerated growth in
China–ASEAN relations during the late 1990s.
There are also two general explanations for the slow development of
Japan–ASEAN relations. The first stresses the constraining influence of
Japanese domestic factors on Japan–ASEAN relations, such as its historical
problems, long period of economic stagnation, low public morale, political
upheaval, and a dearth of innovative thinking by the political leadership,
evident in its resolute protection of domestic markets.6 Scholarship in
support of this view argues that despite the need for a restructuring
of Japanese foreign policy, particularly that with regard to East Asia
(including Southeast Asia),7 Japan’s leadership generally gives precedence to
maintaining the domestic political and economic status-quo over its foreignaffairs.
The second view asserts that Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy
underwent changes, but was unable to shed certain of its traditional
principles and psychological constraints. Japan’s focus on relations with the
United States, its clear intent to do what’s best for Japan and lack of a sense
of East Asian (including Southeast Asian) identity all constituted major
obstacles to Japan’s relationship with the region.8 Certain works within this
body of research highlight the role of the Japan–US alliance in constraining
Japan’s foreign policy; others cite Japan’s inability to ‘break away from theUS and enter East Asia as an inhibiting influence on the development of its
relations with East Asian nations. Another argument raised within the
5 Joseph S. Y. Cheng, ‘ASEAN’s Role in the Chinese Foreign Policy Framework,’ in SharonSiddique and Sree Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 2003), pp. 430–4.
6 For instance, see Li Wen, ‘Riben yu Dongmeng guanxi de fazhan quxiang’ (‘Trendsin the Development of Japan-ASEAN Relations’), http://iaps.cass.cn/xueshuwz/showcontent.asp?id¼239; Yoichi Funabashi, ‘New Challenges, New Frontier: Japan andASEAN in the 21st Century’, Asia & Pacific Lecture Series, No. 3 (Singapore: ISEAS,
2003).7 T. J. Pempel, ‘Japanese domestic politics and Asian regionalism’, in S. Javed Maswood,ed., Japan and East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 44–5.
8 See, for example, Liu Jiangyong, ‘Guoji luntan: Riben yanzhong de yazhou’(‘International Forum: East Asia’s Japanese Eye’), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times),April 2, 2004, No. 15.
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relevant research is that Japan does not take its relationship with Southeast
Asian countries as seriously as it does its dealings with the US, or with
China, South Korea, Russia and Europe.9
These two views are also problematic. The first explanation contends that
strongly conservative forces in Japanese domestic politics limited changes to
foreign policy. But it is inconsistent with the facts. Japan’s post-Cold War
foreign policy actually did commence restructure, particularly under
Hashimoto and Koizumi, both of whom took action intended to deepen
relations with ASEAN. The second view, which cites Japan’s preoccupation
with its relations with the United States and its lack of an East Asian identity
as a constraint on Japan–ASEAN relations, has its merits. But it disregards
internal changes that have occurred in ASEAN foreign policies, thereby
falling short of a full explanation.Some research analyzes this phenomenon from an ASEAN perspective, as
regards the impact of changes in ASEAN policy toward China and Japan.10
Yet, the facts reveal that these changes had minimal influence on the
development of bilateral relations. For instance, ASEAN nations were
increasingly wary of China during the mid-1990s owing to intensifying
territorial disputes between China and ASEAN, and also the influence of the
‘China threat’. But this in no way impeded China from becoming a
consultative partner with ASEAN in 1991, or from being upgraded to full
dialogue partner in 1996. Conversely, ASEAN suspicion and wariness of Japan has decreased immensely since the 1980s, yet there has been no
obvious progress in the relationship.
The factors influencing the development of China–ASEAN and Japan–
ASEAN relations are multi-faceted; there is no single factor that explains
developments and changes to bilateral relations. This article, therefore,
adopts a multi-factor methodology that integrates domestic and foreign
criteria.11 The relative progress in ASEAN’s political relationships with
China and Japan appear to the author to have been most apparent since
1997. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought China and ASEANcloser, as regards promoting East Asian cooperation and integration. China
played a stabilizing role during the crisis that gained it the trust and
appreciation of ASEAN. In the wake of the crisis, China worked in concert
with ASEAN toward strengthening East Asian regional cooperation;
it proposed establishing a China–ASEAN free trade area as a means
9 Lam Peng Er, ‘Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia’, in Derek da Cunha, ed.,Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 144–5.
10
Chin Kin Wah, ‘Regional Perceptions of China and Japan’, in Chandran Jeshurun, ed.,China, India and Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993),pp. 3–25; Julius Caesar Parrenas, ‘China and Japan in ASEAN’s Strategic Perceptions’,Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 198–224.
11 Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, Guoji guanxi yanjiu shiyong fangfa (Practical Methods of International Studies), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), pp. 55–60.
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12 Ang Cheng Guan, ‘The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited,’ IDSS Working Paper, No. 4,1999, pp. 9–11.
13 Rosemary Foot, ‘China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisational Processes andDomestic Modes of Thought’, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (1998), p. 426.
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China has also adopted economic measures aimed at countering anxiety
about a ‘China threat’. At the Fourth China–ASEAN Summit in 2000,
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed creating a committee of experts that
would explore the possibility of a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area; it was a
gesture intended to ameliorate worry about China’s entrance into the WTO.
Plans for such an FTA were unveiled at the Fifth China–ASEAN Summit in
November 2001, which raised three recommendations: first, identify key
areas of bilateral cooperation, particularly in agriculture, information and
communications technology, human resource development, bilateral invest-
ment, and the development of the Mekong River Basin; second, create a
China–ASEAN FTA within a 10-year period; third, strengthen political
trust and support, constantly expand bilateral dialogue and cooperation,
and enhance mutual understanding and trust.18 China issued its ‘Country
Report on Participation in Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic
Cooperation’ the same year, announcing that, in support of the ASEAN
integration process, it would grant the least developed countries (Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia) preferential tariff treatment. China’s objective in
creating an FTA with ASEAN and participating in its regional integration
was to convince ASEAN nations that China’s opening, greater competi-
tiveness and growth since WTO membership presented not challenges, but
new opportunities for ASEAN. China also expressed a willingness to open
its markets ahead of ASEAN, provide financial assistance for infrastructureprojects and narrow the development gap between old and new ASEAN
members to help in promoting ASEAN integration. All these measures are
aimed at alleviating any economic worries in the ASEAN region that have
been engendered by China’s rise. The creation of a China–ASEAN FTA ties
the economic fortunes of the two together, heralding a gradual deepening of
economic cooperation. China and ASEAN signed the ‘Joint Declaration on
the China–ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ in
October 2003, thereby formally establishing a strategic partnership. The
following year, China and ASEAN formulated an implementation plan fortheir strategic partnership.
Greater political and economic trust has also had a positive effect on
military relations between China and ASEAN nations. China has signed
memorandums of understanding regarding national defense and coopera-
tion with six ASEAN members since 2003. Military exchanges have also
expanded steadily in recent years. China sent 46 defense delegations to nine
ASEAN nations between 2003 and 2005, during which time 45 defense
delegations from 10 ASEAN nations came to China (Table 1). More
noteworthy still, a mechanism for bilateral defense dialogue, of deputysecretary level, with Vietnam and the Philippines commenced in 2005.
18 ‘Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEANþ1Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001’, http://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm.
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China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional IntegrationPolicies and China–ASEAN andJapan–ASEAN relations
The Process of East Asian Regionalisation
The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a turning point as regards closer East
Asian regional cooperation and regionalisation. The ASEAN ‘10þ 3’
cooperation mechanism evolved as regional countries sought to cope with
the crisis. Owing to certain East Asian nations’ (such as Japan) maintaining
a rather passive attitude toward East Asian cooperation, however, ASEAN
‘10þ 3’ meetings during the initial two years of meetings tended to be low-
key, and did not produce any joint declaration.24 The accent within ASEAN
‘10þ 3’ economic cooperation from 1997 to 1999 was on finance, withparticular focus on strengthening economic appraisal and policy dialogue.
For example, an early warning system and mechanisms to monitor short-
term capital flows were developed to enhance regional financial and
currency stability. The willingness of East Asian nations to strengthen
regional cooperation steadily grew after the Asian financial crisis. The third
informal ASEAN leadership meeting with China, Japan, and South Korea
in November 1999 produced the ‘Joint Statement on East Asian
Cooperation’, which called for wide-ranging expansion of cooperation
among numerous East Asian nations. Cooperation continued to expandunder the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ framework in 2000, each day more diversified
and multi-layered, by virtue of mechanisms for multilateral cooperation,
than the last (Table 4). Under the annual ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ summit
framework, East Asian nations also created a series of ministerial and
senior-level meetings, which multiplied and diversified mechanisms for
consultation and cooperation. For example, these nations began holding
annual ‘10þ 3’ Economic and Finance Ministers’ Meetings and other
‘10þ 3’ senior officials’ meetings in 2000, in addition to the ‘10þ 3’ Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting.East Asian nations gradually began to promote further regionalisation
after the turn of the new century. The Fifth ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Summit in
November 2001 decided that the East Asia Study Group should further
examine the report, ‘Towards an East Asian Community’, prepared by the
East Asia Vision Group (EAVG). It was recommended that governments
make East Asian integration their ultimate objective as regards regional
cooperation. Many forms of integration were proposed, including an East
Asia Free Trade Area.25 The final report of the EAVG was discussed at the
Sixth ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Summit in 2002, when it was agreed to carry outresearch on and delineate specific methods of creation of a regional FTA.
24 Sueo Sudo, Evolution of ASEAN–Japan Relations (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p. 53.25 Report of the East Asian Vision Group, http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/east_asia_vision.pdf.
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26 Men Honghua, ‘Canyu, chuangshe yu zhudao: yi guoji zhidu jianshe wei zhongxin tuidongdongya yitihua’ (‘Participation, Creation and Leadership: International Institutions Buildthe Core of East Asian Integration’) http://www.irchina.org/news/view.asp?id¼841.
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at the center.37 Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2002 reiterated the
importance of Japan’s promotion of multi-level regional cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific.38 At a policy speech in Singapore, Koizumi proposed an
FTA with ASEAN in order to strengthen economic cooperation with
ASEAN countries on multiple levels.39
Japan’s attitude toward FTAs and Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPA) had become increasingly clear by the end of 2002. The Economic
Affairs Bureau at Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued the first Japanese FTA
strategy in October 2002. Soon afterwards, FTA and EPA affairs
departments were added to the Bureau to ensure integrated policy-making
and implementation. After Japan and Singapore signed the JSEPA and
declared it a model in November 2002, Japan actively promoted FTA
negotiations with other ASEAN members and Mexico. (See Table 4 for ahistory of Japan efforts to forge EPAs with ASEAN and ASEAN nations.)
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2004 was the first to add new sections on
the promotion of FTAs and EPAs, citing the rapid development of EPAs
and FTAs around the world and the stalled WTO negotiations as requiring
Japan to seek other avenues such as FTAs and EPAs to promote and
expand economic relations with other countries as well as economic
cooperation outside the scope of WTO.40 In addition, Japan would need
to utilize FTAs and EPAs to consolidate its partnership relations with
countries and regions that it regarded as important.41
At the same time, Japan gradually transitioned away from its stance
against East Asian integration, and began openly to disseminate the concept
of regionalization. But Japan’s attitude toward an ‘East Asian Community’
was nonetheless indecisive and lukewarm. Koizumi first raised the notion of
an East Asian Community during January 2002, with a proposal to create
a ‘Enlarged East Asian Community’ incorporating Australia and New
Zealand into the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ framework.42 Koizumi again proposed,
at a Japan–ASEAN special leadership meeting during December 2003,
that Japan and ASEAN become the central axis of a Japan–ASEAN þ 2
37 Ibid .38 Japan’s 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/
2002.39 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi gave a speech entitled, ‘Japan and ASEAN in East Asia:
a Sincere and Open Partnership’. Koizumi stated that Japan and ASEAN wouldstrengthen future cooperation in five spheres: first, education and human resourcedevelopment; second, strengthen economic cooperation by establishing a comprehensiveeconomic partnership; third, launch an East Asia development initiative and discuss thedevelopment of the cooperation; fourth, make 2003 a year of exchanges between Japan and
ASEAN; fifth, strengthen security cooperation, including on transnational issues. Seehttp://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech-e.html.
Asian Community should be open, transparent and compatible. Third, the
community should focus on functional cooperation rather than institutional
development. The report also suggested that the Japanese government
arrange a ministerial level conference for the specific purpose of considering
East Asia policy.
Japanese official and academic circles recognized that, regardless of
whether or not Japan supported East Asian integration, the region’s
interdependence was increasing day by day and a new type of regional order
was taking shape. To this day, however, the Japanese government speaks
prolifically while acting minimally as regards East Asian integration. The
Japanese Foreign Ministry official for Asian affairs released a document47 in
the autumn of 2005 that raised the notion of East Asian cooperation,
regionalism and integration, but failed to explicate any substantial plan of
action.48 The Japanese government, moreover, is still extremely concerned
about the American view of the East Asian Community as it regards the
United States as an irreplaceable partner in the security and economic affairs
of East Asia. The view from inside Japan is that East Asian cooperation
should be open to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and that
an East Asian Community should not influence the Japan–US alliance.
ASEAN Regional Integration policy
Two events had major influence on ASEAN development during the 1990s.ASEAN membership rose from 6 to 10 members between 1995 and 1999,
making it an organization that spanned the entire region. Although ASEAN
expansion maintained regional peace and improved its international status,
development gaps between original and new members were apparent,
creating a duality that hindered ASEAN unity. The second event was the
Asian financial crisis, which ended the economic growth that ASEAN
nations had experienced since 1990, sending some members into political
and social upheaval. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Vietnam each sustained different degrees of economic
damage between 1997 and 1998. The entire ASEAN economy fell by 8.4% in
1998. Indonesia, the largest member, was hardest hit, and experienced
unprecedented changes to its political system in May 1998, when Suharto
was forced to step down after more than 30 years in power. These two events
accelerated ASEAN integration and played huge roles in spurring East
Asian cooperation.
47 Yamada Takio, ‘Towards a Principled Integration of East Asia: Concept of an East Asian
Community’, 18 November 2005, http://www.ceac.jp/e/commentary/051118.htm.48 Ibid . The article raises four principles: first, East Asian regional cooperation must be an‘open regionalism’; second, East Asian cooperation and integration must be a functionalcooperation but without pursuing institutionalization as in the EU model; third, the EastAsia Community must rely on democracy and freedom, and respect human rights; fourth,the East Asia Community must strengthen trust and cooperation in the security realm.
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As ASEAN faced the tremendous political and economic changes in the
international environment, it began, between 1990 and 1993, exploring ways
of adjusting its political, economic and foreign policies to strengthen its
cohesion and increase its international standing. The Fourth ASEAN
Summit in 1992 proposed a new policy direction, first and foremost toward
expanding the scope of the organization. After the Cambodian issue had
been resolved, ASEAN began exploring channels of membership within its
body for nations of Indochina, thereby enhancing its international status
and influence. Establishing an FTA was another objective. The ASEAN
recognized that globalization was making economic competition increas-
ingly fierce and engendering the rise of economic blocs such as the EU and
NAFTA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional
integration, ASEAN decided to establish a regional FTA within 15 years,
from January 1, 1993 onwards, whose function was to promote internal free
trade, establish a genuinely integrated market and manufacturing base, and
lure foreign investment.49 The ASEAN also wanted to strengthen relations
with China and Russia, both of whom were invited to an ASEAN foreign
ministers’ meeting in 1991. The ASEAN summit in 1992, moreover, decided
to enhance dialogue on regional security issues; this was the first time
political and security problems appeared on the agenda of a foreign
ministers meeting. The ASEAN also launched the ARF—the only regional
multilateral mechanism for political and security dialogue—in 1993.It could be said that ASEAN nations were focused more on ASEAN
economic integration and strengthening the role of ASEAN in regional
political and security problems during this time, rather than being active in
East Asian regional cooperation and integration issues; they had no unified
vision of how to proceed. Mahathir’s call for the establishment of the ‘East
Asia Economic Community’ (EAEC) in 1991 got a lukewarm reaction from
other ASEAN nations.50 Despite Mahathir’s insistence, ASEAN agreed to
the organization only on condition that it changed its name to the ‘East
Asian Economic Caucus’, and integrated into the APEC framework.51
Although ASEAN agreed to EAEC’s exploration of possible expansion of
ASEAN regional cooperation into East Asia, it had no plan to hold regular
meetings, and emphasized that it would not allow the EAEC to become
institutionalized or a trading bloc.52
The ASEAN was devoted to the creation of an AFTA. At the ASEAN
economic ministers’ meeting in September 1994, it was decided to accelerate
realization of the AFTA by shortening scheduled common tariff treatment
from 15 to 10 years hence, and bringing the implementation date forward to
49 ‘Singapore Declaration of 1992’ http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm.50 Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’ Asian Survey,
‘The Fifth ASEAN Summit’, http://www.aseansec.org/9375.htm.55 Ibid .56 ‘Press Statement of The First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Jakarta,
30 November 1996’, http://www.aseansec.org/5206.htm.57 ‘ASEAN Vision 2020,’ http://www.aseansec.org/5228.htm.58 ‘Hanoi Plan of Action,’ http://www.aseansec.org/8754.htm.
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The East Asian financial crisis also made ASEAN realize the importance
of broader East Asian cooperation. After the crisis, the gap in economic
strength between ASEAN and Northeast Asia grew, ASEAN’s gross
domestic output dropping from 9.7% to 7.6% of the East Asia total.59
As China has replaced ASEAN nations as the world’s most low-cost
manufacturing center, certain manufacturing chains relocated directly to
China. Recognizing that economic recovery for some of its members and
achieving economic integration would be impossible unless this trend were
reversed, ASEAN sought integration with Northeast Asia and a closely
cooperative relationship with China, Japan, and South Korea. This was to
prevent the economic marginalization of ASEAN, and possibly allow it to
become the heart of East Asian economic cooperation. The ASEAN
launched the ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ mechanism in 1997 to promote dialogue and
cooperation with the three countries. The second such ASEAN ‘10þ 3’
meeting in 1998 led to the decision to institutionalize the ‘10þ 1’ and ‘10þ 3’
frameworks and hold annual meetings. The ASEAN primarily focused on
promoting financial and currency cooperation with Northeast Asia from
1999 to 2000, in order to formulate risk prevention and resistance
capabilities that would effectively prevent financial crisis. The ASEAN
signed the Chiang Mai Initiative with China, Japan, and South Korea in
May 2000, strengthening the cooperative frameworks at the disposal of
monetary officials. The ASEAN proposed the East Asia Summit and theestablishment of an East Asia FTA and Investment Area at the Fourth
ASEAN ‘10þ 3’ Leadership Summit in November 2000.
As it enters the 21st century, ASEAN began actively to promote the East
Asian cooperation and integration process in addition to advancing the
ASEAN FTA and the institutional development of ASEAN. Plans for
completion of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 were discussed at
the Eighth ASEAN Summit in December 2002. This marked a significant
change in the ASEAN attitude toward integration. During the 1990s
ASEAN had no intention of letting ASEAN integrate as the EU had done;the ultimate goal of the ‘ASEAN 2020 Vision’ of 1997 was indeed not the
establishment of an ASEAN Community. The 9th ASEAN leadership
summit in October 2003, however, issued the ‘Declaration of ASEAN
Concord II’, which provides a framework for establishing a broader
ASEAN Community.60 The ASEAN Community comprises three compo-
nents: the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Security Community
and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community.61 The Tenth ASEAN
59
Pang Zhongying, ‘Dongmeng yu Dongya: weimiao de ‘‘Dongya diqu zhuyi’’ ’ (‘ASEANand East Asia: Subtle ‘‘East Asian Regionalism’’ ’), http://www.neat.org.cn/chinese/xsdt/contentshow.php?content_id=59.
60 ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.
61 Ibid .
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