RIGHT TO BAIL CASES
RULE 114 - BAIL
Section 1.Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in
the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.
Sec. 2.Conditions of the bail; requirements. All kinds of bail
are subject to the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a) The undertaking shall be
effective upon approval, and unless cancelled, shall remain in
force at all stages of the case until promulgation of the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it;(b) The accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever required by the court of these
Rules;(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification and despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of
his right to be present thereat. In such case, the trial may
proceedin absentia; and(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused
to the court for execution of the final judgment. The original
papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this
section. Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6)
months showing the face, left and right profiles of the accused
must be attached to the bail.chanrobles virtualawlibrary Sec. 3.No
release or transfer except on court order or bail. No person under
detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except
upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail. Sec.
4.Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall
be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial court of an offense not punishable by
death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Sec. 5.Bail, when
discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the
original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court conviction the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court. Should the
court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accuse, of
the following or other similar
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a) That he is a
recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;(c) That he committed the offense
while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;(d) That the
circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the appeal. The appellate
court may,motu proprioor on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse
party in either case.chanrobles virtualawlibrary Sec. 6.Capital
offense defined. A capital offense is an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission and of the application
for admission to bail, may be punished with death. Sec. 7.Capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable byreclusion perpetuaor life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the state of the criminal prosecution.chan
robles virtual law library Sec. 8.Burden of proof in bail
application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense
punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion
of either party, the court may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify. Sec. 9.Amount of bail; guidelines. The
judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited
to, the following factors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a) Financial
liability of the accused to give bail;(b) Nature and circumstance
of the offense;(c) Penalty for the offense charged;(d) Character
and reputation of the accused;(e) Age and health of the accused;(f)
Weight of the evidence against the accused;(g) Probability of the
accused appearing at the trial;(h) Forfeiture of other bail;(i) The
fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested;
and(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
Sec. 10.Corporate surety. Any domestic or foreign corporation,
licensed as a surety in accordance with law and currently
authorized to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed
jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation duly
authorized by its board of directors. Sec. 11.Property bond, how
posted. A property bond is an undertaking constituted as lien on
the real property given as security for the amount of the bail.
Within ten (10) days after the approval of the bond, the accused
shall cause the annotation of the lien on the certificate of title
on file with the Registry of Deeds if the land is registered, or if
unregistered, in the Registration Book on the space provided
therefore, in the Registry of Deeds for the province or city where
the land lies, and on the corresponding tax declaration in the
office of the provincial, city and municipal assessor concerned.
Within the same period, the accused shall submit to the court his
compliance and his failure to do so shall be sufficient cause for
the cancellation of the property bond and his re-arrest and
detention.
Sec. 12.Qualifications of sureties in property bond. The
qualifications of sureties in a property bond shall be as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a) Each must be a resident
owner of real estate within the Philippines;(b) Where there is only
one surety, his real estate must be worth at least the amount of
undertaking;(c) If there are two or more sureties, each may justify
in an amount less than that expressed in the undertaking but the
aggregate of the justified sums must be equivalent to the whole
amount of the bail demanded. In all cases, every surety must be
worth the amount specified in his own undertaking over and above
all just debts, obligations and properties exempt from
execution.chanrobles virtualawlibrary Sec. 13.Justification of
sureties. Every surety shall justify by affidavit taken before the
judge that he possesses the qualification prescribed in the
preceding section. He shall describe the property given as
security, stating the nature of his title, its encumbrances, the
number and amount of other bails entered into by him and still
undischarged, and his other liabilities. The court may examine the
sureties upon oath concerning their sufficiency in such manner as
it may deem proper. No bail shall be approved unless the surety is
qualified. Sec. 14.Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any
person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by
the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission
of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule,
the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited
shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and
costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or
to whoever made the deposit. Sec. 15.Recognizance. Whenever allowed
by law or these Rules, the court may release a person in custody on
his own recognizance or that of a responsible person. Sec. 16.Bail,
when not required; reduced bail or recognizance. No bail shall be
required when the law or these Rules so provide. When a person has
been in custody for a period equal to or more than the possible
maximum imprisonment prescribed for the offense charged, he shall
be released immediately, without prejudice to the continuation of
the trial or the proceedings on appeal. If the maximum penalty to
which the accused may be sentenced isdestierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment. A
person in custody for a period equal to or more than the minimum of
the principal penalty prescribed for the offense charged, without
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or any modifying
circumstance, shall be released on a reduced bail or on his own
recognizance, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 17.Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be
filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial
judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be
filed with any regional trial court of said place, of if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein. (b) Where
the grant of bail is a matter of discretion, or the accused seeks
to be released on recognizance, the application may only be filed
in the court where the case is pending, whether on preliminary
investigation, trial, or appeal.
Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply
for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality
where he is held.
Sec. 18.Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application
for bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give
reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him
to submit his recommendation.
Sec. 19.Release on bail. The accused must be discharged upon
approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in
accordance with section 17 of this Rule. When bail is filed with a
court other than where the case is pending, the judge who accepted
the bail shall forward it, together with the order of release and
other supporting papers, to the court where the case is pending,
which may, for good reason, require a different one to be
filed.
Sec. 20.Increase or reduction of bail. After the accused is
admitted to bail, the court may, upon good cause, either increase
or reduce its amount. When increased, the accused may be committed
to custody if he does not give bail in the increased amount within
a reasonable period. An accused held to answer a criminal charge,
who is released without bail upon filing of the complaint or
information, may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings and
whenever a strong showing of guilt appears to the court, be
required to give bail in the amount fixed, or in lieu thereof,
committed to custody.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 21.Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is
required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be
notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time.
If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail
shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days
within which to produce their principal and to show why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail.
Within the said period, the bondsmen
must:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a) produce the body of their
principal or give the reason for his non-production; and(b) explain
why the accused did not appear before the court when first required
to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be
rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the
amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.chanrobles virtualawlibrary Sec.
22.Cancellation of bail. Upon application of the bondsmen, with due
notice to the prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender
of the accused or proof of his death. The bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of
the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction. In all
instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any
liability on the bail.
Sec. 23.Arrest of accused out on bail. For the purpose of
surrendering the accused, the bondsmen may arrest him or, upon
written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking,
cause him to be arrested by a police officer or any other person of
suitable age and discretion. An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to
depart from the Philippines without permission of the court where
the case is pending.
Sec. 24.No bail after final judgment; exception. No bail shall
be allowed after a judgment of conviction has become final. If
before such finality, the accused applies for probation, he may be
allowed temporary liberty under his bail. When no bail was filed or
the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allow his
release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of
the community. In no case shall bail be allowed after the accused
has commenced to serve sentence.
Sec. 25.Court supervision of detainees. The court shall exercise
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of
eliminating unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the
Regional Trial Courts shall conduct monthly personal inspections of
provincial, city, and municipal jails and the prisoners within
their respective jurisdictions. They shall ascertain the number of
detainees, inquire on their proper accommodation and health and
examine the condition of the jail facilities. They shall order the
segregation of sexes and of minors from adults, ensure the
observance of the right of detainees to confer privately with
counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to the
detainees. In cities and municipalities to be specified by the
Supreme Court, the municipal trial judges or municipal circuit
trial judges shall conduct monthly personal inspections of the
municipal jails in their respective municipalities and submit a
report to the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction therein. A monthly report of such visitation shall be
submitted by the executive judges to the Court Administrator which
shall state the total number of detainees, the names of those held
for more than thirty (30) days, the duration of detention, the
crime charged, the status of the case, the cause for detention, and
other pertinent information.
Sec. 26.Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of
or irregular preliminary investigation. An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefore, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him,
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The court
shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than
the start of the trial of the case.
PEOPLE vs San DiegoFACTS: The accused were charged for murder.
The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of
the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular
trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the
regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses,
the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same
despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it
still had material witnesses to present. Bail was granted on the
ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.ISSUE: Whether the
prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial court
granted bail without allowing the prosecution to present their
other witnesses?HELD: YES. Whether the motion for bail of a
defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial,the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce
before the court should resolve the motion for bail.If, as in the
criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the
prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground. The orders
complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued
in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and
void.The courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must
be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by
the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be
capricious or whimsical. Hence, the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968,
granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and
substance becausethey do not contain a summary of the evidence
presented by the prosecution. They only contain the courts
conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus
defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot,
also on this ground, be allowed to stand.
LAVIDES vs CAFacts: On 3 April 1997, the parents of Lorelie San
Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years
old, had been contacted by Manolet Lavides for an assignation that
night at Lavides' room at the Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon
City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received
reports of Lavides' activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 p.m. of the same date, the
police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the Metropolitan Hotel
where Lavides was staying. When Lavides opened the door, the police
saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an
underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn
statement of Lorelie and the affidavits of the arresting officers,
which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation
of Article III, 5(b) of RA 7610 (An Act Providing for Stronger
Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation, and
other Purposes) was filed on 7 April 1997 against Lavides in the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-97-70550). On 10
April 1997, Lavides filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of
the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest;
and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident,
Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the
Law on Which He is Charged." On 29 April 1997, 9 more informations
for child abuse were filed against Lavides by Lorelie San Miguel,
and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer
Catarman, and Annalyn Talinting (Criminal Case Q-97-70866 to
Q-97-70874). In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various
dates mentioned in the informations, Lavides had sexual intercourse
with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and given
money as payment for the said acts of sexual intercourse." No bail
was recommended. Nonetheless, Lavides filed separate applications
for bail in the 9 cases. On 16 May 1997, the trial court issued an
order resolving Lavides' Omnibus Motion. finding that, in Criminal
Case Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused under
detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the
Rules, and thus he must therefore remain under detention until
further order of the Court; and that the accused is entitled to
bail in all the case, and that he is granted the right to post bail
in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00
for all the cases under certain conditions. On 20 May 1997, Lavides
filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except those
filed in Criminal Case Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution
of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment
scheduled on 23 May 1997. Then on 22 May 1997, he filed a motion in
which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to
P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment. On 23 May 1997, the trial court, in separate orders,
denied Lavides' motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the
informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, Lavides was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against
him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the
total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the 16
May 1997 order and the "hold-departure" order of 10 April 1997. The
pre-trial conference was set on 7 June 1997. On 2 June 1997,
Lavides filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
assailing the trial court's order, dated 16 May 1997, and its two
orders, dated 23 May 1997, denying his motion to quash and
maintaining the conditions set forth in its order of 16 May 1997,
respectively. While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals,
two more informations were filed against Lavides, bringing the
total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated. On 30 June 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, invalidating the first two conditions under 16 May 1997
order -- i.e. that (1) the accused shall not be entitled to a
waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and
must always be present at the hearings of these cases; and (2) In
the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall
be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest
shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in
absentia -- and maintained the orders in all other respects.
Lavides filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.Issue:
Whether the court should impose the condition that the accused
shall ensure his presence during the trial of these cases before
the bail can be granted.Held: In cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is
quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for
the arraignment of the accused. Further, the trial court could
ensure Lavides' presence at the arraignment precisely by granting
bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings,
such as arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the accused shall
appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or
these Rules," while under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required. To condition the grant of
bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion
to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused's constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. The
court's strategy to ensure the Lavides' presence at the arraignment
violates the latter's constitutional rights.
Comendador vs De VillaFacts:This is a consolidated case of
members of the AFP who were charged with violation ofArticlesof War
(AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer anda
Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning
the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion
to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for
provisional liberty and preliminary injunction beforethe courtwhich
was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for
provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have
taken beforethe courtinvoking that military officers are an
exemption from the right to bail guaranteed bythe
Constitution.Decisionwas rendered reiterating the release for
provisional liberty of petitioners withthe courtstating that there
is a mistake in the presumption of respondents thatbaildoes not
apply among military men facing court martial proceeding.
Respondents now appeal beforethe highercourt.Issue:Whether or not
military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the
right to bail.Held:The SC ruled that the bail invoked
bypetitionersis not available inthe militaryas an exception to the
general rule embodied in theBill of Rights. Thusthe right to a
speedy trial is given more emphasis inthe militarywhere the right
to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the
uniquestructureofthe militaryand national security considerations
which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will
be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to
continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the
decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was
reversed.
Baylon v Judge SisonFacts:Respondentjudgeis
accusedformalfeasance in granting bail tothe accusedcharged with
double murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 days
before the scheduledhearingfor bail inviolation ofRule 15, section
4 ofthe Rulesof Court andthe filingof petition for bail has only 2
non-working day interval from thescheduleof thehearing. Moreover
the prosecution also assails that they were not given the chance to
present evidence that strongly prove the guilt ofthe accused.
Respondentjudgejustifies not having committed grave abuse of
discretion since the prosecution did not interpose objection with
his orders and the lack of previous notice was cured withthe
filingof motion for reconsideration.Issue: Whether or not the
respondentjudgeexercised abuse in discretion in the grant of bail
tothe accused.Held:The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in
the discretion of thejudgein granting bail tothe accusedconsidering
that the motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and thehearingwas
immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution
to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule
embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well
established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right
andrequiresahearingwherethe accusedis charged with an offense which
is punishable by death,reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment.
Respondentjudgeshould have carefully scrutinized the validity of
petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.A
guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:. . The
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion
is weighed against in determining whether the guilt ofthe accusedis
strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly,
legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is,
after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound
judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
Cardines vs RoseteRespondent Judge Gregorio L. Rosete of the 4th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Moncada-San Manuel-Anao, Tarlac,
is charged with misconduct and ignorance of the law for allegedly
granting bail to Erlie U. Claro and Emilio B. Claro in conspiracy
with Julieta Villanos who is his Clerk of Court and Reiner Antonio,
Criminal Docket Clerk of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Br.
67, knowing fully well that the charge of illegal recruitment was
punishable with life imprisonment hence non-bailable.The records
show that on 10 November 1993 SPO2 Virgilio B. Pajarillo, PNP Chief
Investigator, filed a criminal complaint before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Moncada-San Manuel-Anao, docketed as Crim.
Case No. 93-1117, charging Erlie U. Claro, Emilio B. Claro and
Albert Reyes with illegal recruitment. The complaining witnesses,
Archimedes Cardines, Noel Visquera, Rolly Acosta and Ronaldo
Macabunga claimed that the accused, who had no license or authority
to conduct recruitment and placement of workers, promised to hire
them for overseas employment upon payment of a fee. The complaint
was filed with respondent Judge for preliminary investigation. On
11 November 1993 a second criminal complaint for illegal
recruitment (not in large scale) was filed by PNP Senior inspector
Julian A. Saygo against the same accused upon the complaint of
Archimedes Cardines and Lea Cardines, docketed as Crim. Case No.
93-1118.Upon filing of the two criminal complaints with the 4th
MCTC of Moncada-San Manuel-Anao, Tarlac, accused Erlie U. Claro and
Emilio B. Claro were placed under preventive detention at the
municipal jail of Moncada, Tarlac, while Albert Reyes remained at
large. On 23 November 1993, upon application of the accused,
respondent Judge granted them provisional liberty on a bond of
P20,000.00 each on the ground that the right to bail was guaranteed
by the Constitution and should not be denied the accused except
those charged with a capital offense and since "the maximum penalty
that could be possibly imposed in any court of justice is life
imprisonment . . . the penalty therefore is still
bailable."1However, after conducting preliminary investigation on
the two complaints, respondent Judge "was convinced that the crime
charged has been committed and that the accused (were) probably
guilty thereof." Whereupon he cancelled the bail bonds and issued
warrants for their arrest. The records of the two cases were then
forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing of two (2)
Informations before the Regional Trial Court one for illegal
recruitment in large scale, and another for estafa.Complainants
contend that one of the offenses charged is illegal recruitment in
large scale constituting economic sabotage under Art. 38, par.
(b),2of the Labor Code as it was committed against three (3) or
more persons (in fact five [5] in this case) individually or as a
group. Since the imposable penalty for illegal recruitment in large
scale amounting to economic sabotage under Art. 39, par. (a),3of
the Labor Code is life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00, the
accused should not have been granted bail.Respondent Judge refutes
the charge. He maintains that under Sec. 3, Rule 114, of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the accused charged with an offense
penalized with life imprisonment should be granted bail as a matter
of right. He also denies that he conspired with Julieta Villanos
and Reiner Antonio in releasing the accused on a bail bond of
P20,000.00 each. This allegation, according to respondent Judge, is
a product of complainants' imagination borne out of their
frustration having been swindled of large sums of money.We agree
with respondent Judge. The complaint is devoid of merit. The law
existing at the time of the alleged illegal recruitment, which was
sometime in May to July 1993, and when the accused applied for bail
was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which took effect 1
October 1988. Particularly, Sec. 3 of Rule 114 thereof provides
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody
shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time
of the application for bail, is punishable byreclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.Clearly, the rule at that time was
that a person under detention shall before conviction be granted
bail as a matter of right. Two exceptions however were recognized:
(a) when the person was charged with a capital offense, or (b) when
the offense charged was punishable withreclusion perpetua, in both
instances when the evidence of guilt was strong. Interestingly,
"life imprisonment" was not among the exceptions, which leads us to
the conclusion that persons accused of crimes punishable with "life
imprisonment" were entitled to bail as a matter of
right.Apparently, complainants find difficulty dissociating the
concept of "life imprisonment" from "reclusion perpetua." As we
have repeatedly held, these terms are not synonymous. While "life
imprisonment" may appear to be the English translation of
"reclusion perpetua," in law it goes deeper than that. First, "life
imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized
by special laws, while "reclusion perpetual" is prescribed under
the Revised Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment," unlike
"reclusion perpetua," does not carry with it any accessory penalty.
Third, "life imprisonment" does not appear to have any definite
extent or duration, while "reclusion perpetua" entails
incarceration for at least thirty (30) years after which the
convict becomes eligible for pardon.4Perhaps, there is no better
proof of the non-inclusion of "life imprisonment" in "reclusion
perpetua" than Adm. Cir. No. 12-94 issued on 16 August 1994, which
took effect 1 October 1994, amending Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Consequently, under Adm. Cir. No. 12-94, a
person now charged with an offense punishable with death,reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment is no longer entitled to bail as a
matter of right when evidence of guilt is strong.5If "life
imprisonment" be considered embraced in "reclusion perpetua," as
implied from complainants' asseverations, there would have been no
need for its separate inclusion in Adm. Cir. No. 12-94. Obviously,
the amendments therein cannot be applied retroactively to the
present case since the application would be unfavorable to the
accused.Thus, under Rule 114 as recently amended, when a person is
charged with an offense which is not capital, or one which is not
punishable withreclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, admission to
bail is a matter of right. However, when the imposable penalty for
the offense charged is death,reclusion perpetuaor life
imprisonment, a person charged therewith is no longer entitled to
bail as a matter of right for then admission to bail is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court depending on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. The prosecution which has the burden
of showing that evidence of guilt is strong6must be accorded an
opportunity to present such evidence which the court shall consider
in determining whether the accused or the person charged therefor
should be granted bail. Judicial discretion must be exercised
regularly, legally, and within the confines of procedural due
process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.7Consequently, when bail is a matter of discretion and
the detainee who is charged in a criminal complaint with the
municipal court investigation files a motion for bail thereat, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity, within a reasonable time,
to present all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before
resolving the motion.In the case of respondent Judge, even
assumingarguendothat he did not give the prosecution an opportunity
to be heard and present evidence on the guilt of the accused, he
cannot be faulted because the crime charged is punishable with life
imprisonment which at the time of its commission and the filing of
the criminal complaint was bailable as a matter of right. Verily,
respondent Judge acted accordingly in initially granting bail to
the accused.The fact that respondent Judge subsequently canceled
the bonds and issued the warrants of arrest upon a finding of
probable cause should not be taken against him, for again, he was
only acting pursuant to Sec. 6, par. (b), Rule 112, of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure mandating that when a Municipal Judge
is satisfied that probable cause exists after conducting
preliminary investigation and finds a necessity for placing
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. All told, we
find no irregularity, much less gross error, on the part of
respondent Judge that should subject him to administrative
sanction.ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Judge
Gregorio L. Rosete, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Moncada-San
Manuel-Anao, Tarlac, for misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED