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ACCESSIO;N3R:18111240384 DOC.DATEi: 81/11/17 NOTARIZED: -4O) FACII:50-259 Oconee quclear Station, Ui~it 1, Duke Poser Co.

50.-2:70 Ocoiee 'uclear Station.,, Unit 2, Duke Po,4er Co. D50DO270 50j-2,,7 Oconee 'uclear St~tioi,p Unit 3p Duke Power Co.. 050.00287

ALJT11I.NME, AUfHjR AFFILIATION PARKERiN.09 Duke lower Co. R E C I P . A E I R E Z1IET AFFILiIATIOJ

DENTON\,pl'.R. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Directori

SUBJECT:; Discusses plainned reviebo of B&N 5S LOCA Methods Prograii1 i-iclIu iJ ng v ar if ic at ion, t e st ir, o ase t o be c omol ated ',i9 810b01.Jtil coimritments stated,,

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DUKE POWER COMPANY POWER BUILDING

422 SOUTH CHuRCH STREET, CHARLOTTE, N. C. 28242

WILLIAM 0. PARKER,JR.

VicE PRESIDENT TELEPHONE: AREA 704

STEAM PRODUCTION November 17, 1981 373-4083

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory-Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 N 0V2 3 1981cz

U'5 NUCtEA EGUArog

Subj.ect: Oconee Nuclear Station COMMISSION

Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, -287

Dear Mr. Denton: Ira

This letter expresses Duke Power Company's understanding of the agreements

reached in the meeting of October 23, 1981 with you and members of your

Staff. In summary, the Staff concluded that it is not clear that further

verification testing of our SB LOCA methods is required and agreed to partic

ipate in an in-depth review of the current B&W SB LOCA Methods Program

including the verification testing base. This review is to begin as soon

as practical and will include the review of results achieved with the improved

models and methods now being developed. This review is to be completed in

conjunction with the completion of the SB LOCA Methods Program or by June 1,

1982, whichever is earlier.

In addition, the Staff stated that a commitment to RCS vents and water level

measurement would support their continued confidence in the Babcock & Wilcox

NSS.

Based on the above understanding, Duke is committed to the following:

1. Duke will participate in a joint effort with the Staff to assure that

the SB LOCA methods and ATOG programs, both of which are currently in

progress, are fully understood. This effort will include the following:

--Code parameters, models, assumptions, etc., which are important in

controlling dynamics of interest will be identified and available

experimental data substantiating their validity will be reviewed.

This will be done using results of the improved evaluation model

in order that the most accurate dynamic response characteristics

are reviewed.

--Additional experimental data, from separate effects or integral e

tests, will be defined which address specific technical gaps, if

any. Duke Power does not oppose additional testing. Instead, Duke

desires to assure that questions which must be answered are answered

in the most appropriate technical and cost-effective manner.

8 1iio~ 811117 112405849117 PDR ADOCK 05000269

- _PDR.

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director November 17, 1981 Page 2

--Identify where and how additional experimental data may be obtained, if any is required.

With a cooperate effort, Duke intends to support the B&W Owners Group in completing this program within one month of completion of the SB LOCA program or June 1, 1982, whichever is earlier. Consistent with this effort, it is expected that the Staff will continue the review of and eventually approve the proposed Abnormal Transient Operating Guidelines program by April 1982.

2. As requested in the meeting, we are providing a summary of Dr. Roy's presentation on the philosophy underlying ATOG. The attached, "Abnormal Transient Operating Procedures for Nuclear Power Plants" by J. J. Kelly and D. H. Williams, includes the total scope of the ATOG approach as well as the philosophy presented by Dr. Roy.

3. Duke Power has previously committed to install RCS high points and on June 30, 1981 provided a detailed description of the proposed system as well as guidance for its use. These vents are currently in the process of being installed on Oconee Unit 1 during the current outage; they will be installed during the forthcoming outages of Oconee Units 2 and 3.

As the Staff is aware, Duke Power has been obtaining information and evaluating various hot leg water level monitoring systems. This concept was discussed with the NRC Staff on May 13, 1981. Duke is in the process of reviewing available system designs as well as evaluating what actions may be taken with an accurate and unambiguous system. We expect to conclude this evaluation in early 1982 and will be providing a report of a proposed level system by May 14, 1982. This report will provide engineering details as well as an anticipated installation schedule following Staff approval of the design.

4. By letter dated November 5, 1981 Duke provided a response to an NRC letter dated May 5, 1981 concerning natural circulation cooldown and the formation of steam voids during cooldown. It is considered that this letter adequately addresses the concern of Dr. Mattson regarding steam formation during transients.

We believe this letter reflects the major conclusions and agreements reached

in the October 23 meeting. If additional information is required, please

advise.

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director November 17, 1981 Page 3

The B&W Owners Group is prepared to begin the review of our SB LOCA Methods Program with the Staff and requests that the assigned Staff reviewer contact Mr. Lou Lanese of GPUNC to establish the details for carrying out this review. It is our intent to implement this review without impacting the current schedule for the completion of the SB LOCA Methods Program.

Very truly yours,

William 0. Parker, Jr.

RLG/php Attachment

cc: Mr. T. M. Novak Assistant Director for Operating Reactors Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Page 11 of 15

July 9, 1979

shall have no marking to indicate that protected and vital

information is contained. The inner package shall be marked

to identify the highest classification of material it contains.

b. A return receipt shall be obtained when transmitting protected

and vital documents outside Duke Power Company.

c. Inter-departmental transmittal of protected and vital documents

shall be accompanied by a return receipt. This receipt shall

identify documents transmitted and documents delivered by docu

ment identification and copy numbers.

d. For each intra-departmental transmittal of a vital or protected

document, the Security Document Controller or the nuclear security

clerk shall record in the register the date, the identity of the

recipient of the document, and the identifying number and copy

number of the document.

e. Documents transmitted between originator and receiver without

intermediate handling need not be sealed.

J. Storage of Documents:

1. Vital documents shall be stored in repository at least equivalent to

commercially available files of substantial construction secured with

a combination or key lock, meeting the requirements of Regulatory

Guide 5.12.

REVISION 5 5/1/80 -80-

Page 12 of 15 July 9, 1979

2. Protected documents shall be stored in a respository at least equi

valent to commercially available locking office furniture. Locking

desks, credenzas, and cabinets provided by Duke Power Company meet

this requirement.

3. All storage repositories and facilities containing protected or vital

documents shall be locked when not attended.

K. Retention of Documents:

1. One copy of each vital and protected document shall be retained for a

minimum of two years after such document becomes an inactive document.

2. Active documents shall be retained for the life of the station.

3. Preliminary drawings, i.e., those drawings under review for acceptance,

may be destroyed upon being superseded.

L. Disposal of Documents:

Disposal of protected documents shall be by any method which will preclude

the further use or copying of that document.

Vital documents may be disposed of by shredding, burning, pulping, or by

any other method that assures complete destruction of the vital information.

The document controller destroying vital documents shall maintain records

of the identification and copy number of each vital document destroyed.

Upon disposal of vital or protected document, the originating document

controller shall be advised.

REVISION 5 5/1/80 -81-

Page 13 of 15 July 9, 1979

M. Missing Documents:

Missing vital or protected documents shall be reported to the originating

or receiving departmental nuclear security document controller.

Upon notification of a missing document, the affected departmental Nuclear

Security Document Controller shall assess the threat of compromise posed

by the missing document, advise his respective Vice President, and initiate

those actions necessary to prevent compromise of the affected system.

N. Document Identification:

Document identification numbers shall be in the following format and provide

the following information.

Station Identification

Document Number

Revision Number

Originating or Receiving Activity

Copy Number

Copying Activity Identification (If Required)

Sub Copy Number (If Required)

AA - NNNN - NN - AA - NN -AA - NN

Station Identification:

GS - All Nuclear Stations

OS - Oconee

MC - McGuire

CN - Catawba

PK - Perkins

CK - Cherokee

REVISION 5 5/1/80 -82-

Page 14 of 15 July 9, 1979

Document Number - 4 digit identification number (may be larger if needed)

Revision Number - 2 digit revision identification number (may be larger if

needed). Original shall be revision number 0; first

revision shall be number 01.

Originating or Receiving Activity:

CD - Construction Department, General Office

DE - Design Engineering Department

SM - Steam Production Department, General Office

QA - Quality Assurance

OS - Oconee, Steam

OC - Oconee, Construction

MS - McGuire, Steam

MC - McGuire, Construction

CS - Catawba, Steam

CC - Catawba, Construction

PS - Perkins, Steam

PC - Perkins, Construction

KS - Cherokee, Steam

KC - Cherokee, Construction

Originating or Receiving Activity Copy Number - 2 digit identification

(may be larger if necessary). The original shall be copy number 0.

Copying Activity Identification - Use same codes as originating or

receiving activity.

REVISION 5 5/1/80 -83-

Page 15 of 15 July 9, 1979

Sub Copy Number - 2 digit copy identification (may be larger if necessary).

Examples:

MC-4021-02-SM-04

Revision #2, Copy 4 of document #4021, originated by Steam Production

Department, General Office, about McGuire Nuclear Station.

MC-4021-02-SM-04-DE-02

Copy #2 made by Design Engineering Department of the above document.

0. All persons allowed access to security related documents per this

procedure will receive a security clearance according to the procedures

prescribed in the Personnel Security Clearance Screening Program Manual.

These individuals will be added to the security portion of the Personnel

Qualifications Data Base according to the procedures in Appendix C of

this manual; to include using the proper data entry forms to insure that

the names are added to the data base correctly.

REVISION 5 5/1/80 -84-

ATTACHMENT B

GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DESIGN FEATURES

MEILINK AND SHAW-WALKER SAFES

Shaw-Walker

Specs: 1) Manipulation-Proof Combination provide absolute security

against manipulation of lock by sound or feel - even

with the aid of electronic listening devices. Bears

Underwriters' Laboratories Group 1 Label.

2) Added Security - Positive Relocking Trigger locks bolt

immovably if forcible entry is attempted by "punching" the spindle...Key-Change permits user to change combin

ation quickly and easily to any of a million combinations.

3) Signal Plunger controls all lower drawers. When the

Signal Plunger projects, you know lower drawers are not

locked.

4) Lock Verifier, a Shaw-Walker exclusive, prevents turning

combination dial to lock top drawer until the Signal

Plunger is depressed, locking all lower drawers.

5) Dead Bolts for All Drawers - The Yanipulation-Proof

Combination Lock operates heavy-duty Dead Bolt in

top drawer; Signal Plunger oprates solid Dead Bolts

in lower drawers.

6) Automatic Dead-Bolt Guards, another Shaw-Walker in

vention, make it absolutely impossible to depress

Signal Plunger unless all lower drawers are closed

and latched. This prevents accidentally leaving any drawer "locked open".

Shaw-Walker

Page 2

7) Spy-Proof Dial - eliminates the possibility of visual or photo

graphic detection of the combination while it is being dialed

by an authorized person. the numerals, shielded from view by

a metal guard, are visible only through opening at top of dial.

8) Fire-Files bear the Shaw-Walker Certified Protection and the

Underwriters' Laboratories labels certifying that they meet

the specifications for one-hour protection. To earn the

one-hour label Fire-Files brought their contents safely through furnace tests of the laboratories under exposure to fire on

all six sides for at least 60 minutes at a temperature reach

ing 17000 Fahrenheit, as required by the Standard Time Temper

ature Curve.

9) (a) Thick, steel-walled steel-reinforced fire-insulation.

(b) Heavily insulated bulkheads between drawers.

(c) Interlocking drawer dronts, all of which combine to

make each drawer an individual safe.

Meilink

Page 3

Spec: 1) All Meilink Four-Hour Safes are built in strict conformity with

United Station Federal Specifications AA-S-81-b for Class "A" insulated safes. Section E-2b of these specifications states, "Class 'S' safes shall be able to withstand a standard fire test for four hours without attainment of temperature within the safe at any thermocuple location higher than 3500 F. (1770C.) either during or after the fire exposure.

2) Safes bearing Class 350-4 hour labels are effective in withstanding:

C, 0 (a) severe fire reaching 2000 F. for at least four hours before the interior temperature reaches 3500 F.

(b) a combined explosion and impact test to determine whether a sudden heating will cause internal explosion; also, if after drop, loss of contents. The safe is placed in the furnace, pre-heated to 2000 0F. for 30 minutes. The safe is removed from furnace and hoisted 30 feet and dropped. After cooling, the safe is again placed into the furnace in an inverted position and heated to 1700 0F. for one hour.

Meilink

Page 4

(3) The Underwriters' Laboratories Relocking Device Label certifies

that a relocking device is built into the safe and if the

lock is forced, the locking mechanism becomes inoperative.

(4) The impact and explosion tests are the same as those of

Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. with the exception that

the safe must be loaded with records of 20 pounds per

cubic foot of capacity. The Federal Specifications in

Adcliticnn V(- rlho n-" --- 4,, t1- i o Pnd n "' cf

of locking bolts, kind and type of combination lock and size and thickness of the drill-resistive guard plates that protect the lock and lock connections..

(5) The new Meilink combination dial has a "cover-up" design which prevents prying eyes from seeing the numbers being dialed. It is larger, too, and easier to operate than the conventional type.

(6) Both inner and outer shell of heavy gauge steel form the foundation of the entire structure and carry the load of the safe.

(7) Additional strength is provided by reinforcing "U" shaped steel channels rigidly welded to the outer surface of the inner wall.

(8) Interlocking door moulding fits tightly against body jamb and effectively retards the penetration of heat during a fire.

(9) Door and frame design give great strength to the safe and provides protection against severe impact and crushir loads in case of building collapse.

(10) Heavy gauge steel door plates give the doors exceptional strength and rigidity and make the safe especially resistive to burglarious attack. Heavy steel hinges are

electrically welded to angle frames and door plates.

(11) Meilink's exclusive and time proven Thermo-Cel insulation is solid cast and encased between the steel inner and

outer shells of body and door and in the front frame

moulding. Thermo-Cel offers great heat resistance and

possesses special properties that preserve the metal.

(12) Bolt operating mechanism and Combination lock are

rigidly assembled and protected by a drill resistive

steel plate. Compound bolt movement assures ease of

operation of locking bolts.