RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Citation: 20 Sw. J. Int'l L. 347 2013-2014

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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ALATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Ricardo Arredondo*

1. INTRODUCTION... .......................... ............ 347II. FOREIGN INTERVENTIONISM OR PROTECTION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 349III. LATIN AMERICA, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERVENTIONISM....................................... 353IV. Is THERE A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 358V. LATIN AMERICA AT THE UN DEBATES................. 363

A. The Advocates of the Responsibility to Protect ...... 363B. The Opponents ..................................... 365C . The Eclectic......................................... 367

VI. CONCLUSIONS .............................. ............. 376

I. INTRODUCTION

The question of humanitarian intervention was a central theme ofthe international agenda between the end of the Cold War, and upuntil the events of September 11, 2001. After the NATO interventionin Kosovo in 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations("UNSG") at the time posed an interrogation to the UN: How shouldthe international community react when human rights violations occurwithin a State, bearing in mind the traditional principles of sover-eignty and non-intervention in internal affairs?'

Events such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina,Haiti, and Kosovo, among others, exemplify the lack of response fromthe international community to these mass atrocities. The rejection ofhumanitarian intervention by a large number of States evidenced the

* LLB (UNT), LLM (LSE), JD (UBA). Professor of Public International Law (UBA).The author would like to express his deepest gratitude to Alisa Azizyan, Editor-in-Chief andChristine Ataian, Lead Article Editor, at the Southwestern Journal of International Law for theediting of this paper.

1. See G.A. Res. 54/2000, 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).

347

348 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

need to start looking for a different answer to these types ofsituations.

More than a decade after the emergence of the Responsibility toProtect ("R2P") principle 2 and eight years after its endorsement' bythe international community, recent events have once again empha-sized both the importance and challenges of ensuring timely and deci-sive responses to the four core crimes covered by the principle.'These events have stressed the need to further operationalize the prin-ciple in order to implement it effectively and prevent mass atrocities.5

Recent events related to specific crises such as those in Sri Lankaand C6te d'Ivoire, the recent intervention in Libya, the ongoing con-flicts in Syria and the Central African Republic ("CAR"), amongothers, demonstrate the persistent challenges involved in reaching acommon understanding on how to ensure the timely and effective im-plementation of the R2P principle. At the same time, it is difficult togenerate a common political will and an effective capacity to preventor stop genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against hu-manity, whether committed by national and local authorities or non-state actors.

On the contrary, these discussions are not absent in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean. As a matter of fact, this region has takenlead on the R2P debate by bringing about its own experiences andperspectives that shape a unique reading of the international commu-nity and its responsibilities when dealing with the State's inability toprotect its own people and prevent mass atrocities.

In light of such difficult questions, this Article analyzes LatinAmerica's past and present stance on the R2P principle. However,any discussion on this matter should start by briefly considering whatwe are talking about when we say "responsibility to protect," 6 whatthis principle encompasses, and finally the current situation regarding

2. See INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (ICISS), THE RESPON-

SIBILITY 1o PRorCr 11-15 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS REvoRT], http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

3. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N.Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).4. See id. 9 138.5. See Ricardo Arredondo, La responsabilidad de proteger: De la nocian a la accidn [The

Responsibility to Protect: From Concept to Action], PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, Jan.-June 2009, at185, 194-95 (Arg.).

6. See generally RICARDO ARREDONDO, INTERVENCION HUMANITARIA v RisroN

SABILIDAD DE PROTHGER. ,UN NuE~vo PARADIGMA EN LA PROTECCION DE DEiRCiHos HUMA-

NOS? [Is nlE RESPONSIBILIY TO PROTECT TIIE NEw PARADIGM IN HUMAN RIGHTSPROTECHON?] (2012) (Arg.) [hereinafter INTERVENCI(N HUMANITARIA Y RESPONSABILIDADDE1 PROTEGER] (providing a more detailed analysis of responsiblity to protect).

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R2P: A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

the historical and political context which has determined the stancetaken by many Latin American countries when implementing theirforeign policy decisions.

II. FOREIGN INTERVENTIONISM OR PROTECTION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS?

The dilemma was-and remains-between the sovereign right ofa nation to be free from outside interference and the right of otherstates to defend and protect human dignity on a universal basis.' Thistension has been greatly exacerbated by the globalization process.8

This is a time when the globalization of markets and finance, not tomention other challenges such as climate change, piracy, and terror-ism, test the strength and authority of the State. This notion of sover-eignty, which is the traditional base of international politics,' is goingthrough a prolonged crisis of identity and purpose."o Furthermore, thegrowing global media coverage of mass atrocities and the increasinginvolvement of civil society (a phenomenon that some authors call"empathy without borders")n are also playing an important role. Allof these factors have led to discussions about foreign intervention thatare even more acute and controversial than in the past.

Faced with this dilemma, following a Canadian-Australian initia-tive, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-eignty ("ICISS") was established, and by the end of 2001 it issued areport titled The Responsibility to Protect.12 The ICISS report soughtto find a way out of the paradox posed by the Secretary-General,which proposed to introduce a fundamental change in perspective byconsidering the issue in terms of responsibility to protect rather thanhumanitarian intervention." The report concludes that sovereignty notonly gives the state the right to "control" their affairs, but also confers

7. See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Presents his Annual Re-port to General Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136-GA/9596 (Sep. 20, 1999) [hereinaf-ter Annual Report]; see also ICISS RiEiowr, supra note 2, at 1-2.

8. See generally MICIIAEL HAROT & ANTONIo NEGI, EMPIRE (2000) (discussing the newpolitical order of globalization).

9. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. I ("The Organization is based on the principle of thesovereign equality of all its Members.").

10. Antonio Remiro Brot6ns, Desvertebracidn del Derecho Internacional en la SociedadGlobalizada [Dislocation of International Law in the Global Society], in Cuiisos EUROMIDITER-RANEOs BANCAJA D DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 137-38 (2001).

11. See Daniel Fiott, INTRooucrioN 'ro OPERATIONALIZING THE1 RESPONSIBILfY' TO PRO-

TEcr. A CONTRIBuTION To THE TmIRD PILLAR APPROACH 8 (Daniel Fiott et al. eds., 2012).

12. See ICISS REPORr, supra note 2, at 1-2.

13. See id. at 9, 17.

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upon it the primary "responsibility" to protect the population withinits borders.14 Likewise, the report states that when a State fails to pro-tect its people, due to lack of ability or willingness, the internationalcommunity should take on that responsibility.' The R2P principle hasbeen further defined to encompass three different dimensions: (1) theresponsibility to prevent; (2) the responsibility to react; and (3) theresponsibility to rebuild."

The R2P concept was subsequently incorporated in a series ofUN documents (although non-binding from a legal standpoint). In itsreport, A More Secure World: A Shared Responsibility: Report of theHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, the UN echoedthe ICISS Report and stressed that more than a right to intervene, theStates have an obligation erga omnes to take all measures in theirpower to prevent or put an end to serious and massive human rightsviolations as soon as possible." The report argues that it is a collectiveinternational responsibility, "exercisable by the Security Council au-thorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocideand other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations ofinternational humanitarian law which sovereign governments hadproved powerless or unwilling to prevent."" The Panel stated that inorder to legitimize the use of force by the Security Council of the UN,certain basic criteria should be considered, such as the seriousness ofthe threat, proper purpose, last resort, and proportionality of the re-sponse.19 As Focarelli noted, it is almost commonplace to observe thatthe conditions or precautionary principles developed by the ICISS andcollected in the UN Report2 0 faithfully reflect those made by theChristian theological tradition of just war, although he acknowledgesthat the problem is not the guidelines themselves but how they areinterpreted in each particular case.21

In its 2005 report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Se-curity and Human Rights for All, the Secretary-General of the UNaffirmed that the international community "must also move towards

14. See id. at 13.15. See id. at 17.16. Id. at 17.17. See G.A. Res. 59/565, 1 203, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).18. Id.19. Id. 1 207.20. U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the

High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004)21. Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention:

Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine, 13 J. CONFLICr AND S-c. L. 191, 191-93, 196(2008).

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embracing and acting on the 'responsibility to protect' potential oractual victims of massive atrocities." 2 2 In this regard, he proposed thatin order to authorize the use of force, a set of criteria must be fulfilledsuch as "the seriousness of the threat, the proper purpose of the pro-posed military action, whether means short of the use of force mightreasonably succeed in stopping the threat, whether the military optionis proportional to the threat at hand and whether there is a reasonablechance of success." 2 3

The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome provides, for the first time,a common definition of the principle of R2P.24 The principle of R2P,embedded in paragraphs 138 and 139, represents an important stepforward by establishing the obligation of states to protect their popu-lations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimesagainst humanity. Similarly, it embodies the obligation of the interna-tional community to help States assume this responsibility and to reactshould they fail to protect their citizens against these four specifiedcrimes and violations.2 5

Since its first report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect in2009, the UNSG issued reports on an annual basis to try to clarifydifferent aspects of the R2P principle and foster the debate amongMember States. In 2010, the Secretary-General addressed an informalinteractive General Assembly dialogue on Early Warning, Assessmentand the Responsibility to Protect,2 7 and the following year on The Roleof Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Re-sponsibility to Protect.28 On September 5, 2012, the Secretary-Generalpresented his report on The Responsibility to Protect: Timely and De-cisive Response,29 and in 2013 he published his fifth report, State Re-sponsibility and Prevention.3 0

22. See G.A. Res. 59/2005, $ 132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).23. See id. $ 6(h).24. See G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N.Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).25. See id. 1 138.26. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Sec-

retary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibilityto Protect].

27. U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect,U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010).

28. U.N. Secretary-General, The Role and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing theResponsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 28, 2011).

29. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, U.N.Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012).

30. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention,U.N. Doc. A/67/929-S/2013/399 (July 9, 2013).

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As the Secretary-General explained, the principle of R2P is basedon three pillars, namely: (1) the State bears the primary responsibilityto protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes againsthumanity, and ethnic cleansing; (2) the international community mustassist States in fulfilling their protection obligations; and (3) when aState manifestly fails to protect its population or is in fact a perpetra-tor of these crimes, the international community has a responsibilityto take collective action.

The R2P principle has undergone criticism that it is humanitarianintervention under a different name.3 2 In particular, it has been saidthat it gives powerful countries a window of opportunity to use forceunder their own discretion, emphasizing mainly the "responsibility toreact" dimension." In this regard, it must be recalled that R2P en-compasses three different dimensions which involve using all availabletools under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the Charter, ranging fromnon-coercive responses to collective action.34 This is a fundamentalreflection towards the further development and the legitimacy of theprinciple.

The development of the R2P principle is welcome since it clarifiesand strengthens the existing obligations of states to ensure the protec-tion of civilians." In this regard, it represents an important step to-wards anticipating, preventing, and responding to genocide, warcrimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Furthermore, itupholds fundamental principles of international law, in particular in-ternational humanitarian, refugee, and human rights law. The princi-ples should be applied as consistently and uniformly as possible, towhich effect it is crucially important that early warning and assess-ment should be conducted fairly, prudently, and professionally andthat the use of force should remain the measure of last resort. As the

31. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26, [ 1.32. Stephen P. Marks & Nicholas Cooper, The Responsibility to Protect: Watershed or Old

Wine in a New Bottle, 2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 91, 93 (2010).

33. See Noam Chomsky, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly Thematic Dia-logue on the Responsibility to Protect (July 23, 2009), http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/protect/noam.pdf; ERIC HOBSBAWM, GUERRA Y PAZ EN Et SiGtLo XXI xiv-xv (2007)(Spain).

34. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 26, at 4, 9, 23.

35. See THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY T1o PROTECT, THE RESPONSI-

BIIY TO PROTECT AND) THE PROTECl-ON OF CIVILIANS: AsIA-PACIFIC IN THE UN SECURITYCOUNCIL UPDATE No. 1 2 (2009), http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Reports/Protection%20of%20Civilians update 1%2OFeb%202009.pdf.

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R2P. A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

European Union put it, the principle has been considered to be "criti-cal for the survival of the community of nations."36

The development of the R2P principle, particularly its preventioncomponent, can advance global efforts towards a more peacefulworld." This is bearing in mind that many mass atrocity crimes occurduring periods of violent conflict, and these situations evidence thenecessity to create effective capacities for structural and operationalconflict prevention.3 8 Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to mini-mize the need to recourse to the use of force, leaving it as the lastresort.

III. LATIN AMERICA, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERVENTIONISM

Before considering the present stance of Latin American coun-tries regarding the R2P principle, it is important to bear in mind LatinAmerica's history and its strong support of non-intervention.4 0 In ad-dition, it is also relevant to analyze the well-built Latin American tra-dition regarding human rights.4 ' In my view, the combination of theseelements is essential to understanding the current foreign policy posi-tions of the States of the region vis-A-vis the R2P principle.

Additionally, it is also important to note that while many observ-ers are accustomed to think of Latin America as a monolithic subject,the region shows a healthy political and ideological diversity that isreflected in the foreign policy positions taken by their governmentswhich do not necessarily agree with positions held by these countriesin the past.42

The new political and ideological diversity "affects certain re-gional alliances to the extent that hemispheric geopolitical tensionstranslate into 'ideological frontiers"' when addressing issues that take

36. Rep. of Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Plenary Sitting, Mar. 21, 2013, Eur. Parl. Doc. A7-0130/2013 (Mar. 27, 2013) (adopting proposal on the UN Principle of the "Responsibility toProtect").

37. See id.38. Id. at 6.39. Id.40. See ANTONIO RE7MIRO BRONTONs, DE7RECHO INTERNACIONAL [INTERNATIONAL

RIGHTs] 138 (2007) (Spain); J.M. YEPES, LES PROBI-FMES FONDAMENI-Aux Du DROIT DES

GE'Ns EN AMIERIOUE [FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AMERICA] 55(1935) (Fr.).

41. See generally MONICA PINTO, L'AMIRRIOUE LAIINE ET LF TRAITFMENT DES VIOLA-

TIONS MASSIVES DES DROITS DE' L'IIOMME [LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROCESSING OF MASSIVE

VIOLATIONS o HUMAN RIGHTS] (2007) (Fr.) (discussing human rights in Latin America).

42. See generally ANDREA OE1lSNER, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA:

PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE SOUTIHE'RN CONE (David Mares ed., 2005) (analyzing relationsbetween Latin American countries).

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up the foreign policy agenda of our countries. 43 At the same time,there seems to be two muscular elements of continuity in the LatinAmerican agenda: human rights and the principle of non-interventionin internal affairs.44

Latin American foreign policy was built gradually during theNineteenth and early Twentieth Century based on six principles: (1)sovereign equality of all States; (2) no intervention; (3) territorial in-tegrity; (4) self-determination; (5) peaceful settlement of disputes; and(6) respect for international law. 45 Successive Inter-American Confer-ences from 1899 strengthened these principles, rejected intervention-ism, and set up exemplary humanitarian practices such as asylum andconvinced the United States to inaugurate the policy of the "goodneighbor," which led to greater cooperation and understanding withinthe hemisphere.46

After World War II, the adoption of the Charter of the Organiza-tion of American States ("OAS"),4 7 along with the American Treatyon Pacific Settlement, also known as the "Pact Of Bogoti," 48 and theAmerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,4 9 contributedto reinforcing these principles within the region. Indeed, it must bereminded that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties ofMan preceded the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights andmany of the principles of the Inter-American system were incorpo-rated into the Charter of the UN.o From these historic moments, therole of the OAS, with its lights and shadows, has served to demon-strate that countries are associated mainly for two reasons: strategicneeds arising from sharing a massive geographical area, and the cul-

43. Ricardo Arredondo et al., Responsabilidad de proteger y prevencidn en Amdrica Latinay el Caribe: El rol de la sociedad civil [Responsibility to Protect and Prevention in Latin Americaand the Caribbean: The Role of Civil Society], COORDINADORA RiEGIONAL DE INVESTIGACIONES

ECONOMICAS Y SOCIALEuS (CRIES), Feb. 2011, at 11 (Arg.) [hereinafter CRIES].44. Id. at 5-6.45. Fernando Petrella, John Kerry, la OEA y la Argentina [John Kerry, the OAS and Argen-

tina], INFO1AE (Dec. 18, 2013), http://opinion.infobae.com/fernando-petrella/2013/12/18/john-kerry-la-oea-y-la-argentina/#more-68.

46. Id.

47. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter OAS Charter].

48. American Treaty of the Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 [hereinafterBogoti American Treaty].

49. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, O.A.S. Res XXX, re-printed in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4, doc. 1 rev. 13 (2010), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm.

50. G.A. Res. 48/141, 1 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Jan. 7,1994).

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tural and institutional affinities reflected in common values such asdemocracy, human rights, and republican principles.5 1

The Latin American and the Caribbean region is one with a longhistory of human rights violations, foreign interventionism, and politi-cal instability.5 2 The past decade brought about a change with the im-plementation of democracy, the development of institutions, and thebuilding of a unique Inter-American human rights protection sys-tem.53 This system fosters a regional-level mechanism that contributesto preventing mass atrocities and reinforcing the responsibility ofStates in protecting its own people.5 4 It represents an effort to over-come past failures and sets an example for the international commu-nity because it establishes preventive mechanisms to protect citizensand civilian populations. 5

However, when the odds of protecting human rights in otherStates arises, Latin America shows strong support for the principle ofnon-intervention in internal affairs and a clear reluctance to supportany kind of foreign intervention.5 6 This is mainly due to historical rea-sons evidencing that interventionism has been used as an instrumentof foreign policy in Latin America, mainly by the United States. Butthere are also many other examples of foreign interventions by thehegemonic powers of each historical period." In this regard, it isworth recalling the words of Argentine jurist PodestA Costa:

Facts show that interventionism has been due to several reasons: ithas been founded on the desire to maintain political balance butalso to cover it up several arguments were alleged from humanita-

51. See generally Ricardo E. Lagorio, Institutionalization, Cooperative Security, andPeacekeeping Operations: The Argentine Experience, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AN) DEMOC-RACY: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 121 (Jorge I. Do-minguez ed. 1998) (discussing strategic relationships between countries).

52. See generally Tuiio HALPERIN DONGIII, THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY oF LATIN

AMERICA (John Charles Chasteen ed. & trans.) (1993) (Spain) (discussing the history of LatinAmerica and the struggles it has faced in regard to human rights).

53. Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: The Inter-American Human Rights System andthe Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUMAN RIaris QUARTERLY

856, 856-57 (2009).54. See Victor Abramovich, Das Violagdes em Massa aos Padrdes Estruturais: Novos Enfo-

ques e CIdssicas Tensdes no Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos [From Massive Viola-tions to Structural Patterns: New Approaches and Classic Tensions in the Inter-American HumanRights System], 6 SUR REvISTA INTERNACIONAL DE DIREITOs HUMANOs 7, 11-12 (2009)(Braz.).

55. Id. at 10.56. See SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE LATIN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATEs 237

(Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1943).

57. See Hugo Caminos, The Role of the Organization of American States in the Promotionand Protection of Democratic Governance, 273 RECUEI. DES COURS 103, 196-97 (1998).

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rian reasons to racial or religious persecution ... in any case, what isessential is that interventionism has been left to the unilateral andultimate government action, that decided whether or not to use it,as it considered appropriate in each case regarding its particular in-terest and the political circumstances of place and time. Interven-tion is not a tool to be used by weaker States against the strong. It isa weapon that can only wield the powerful in certain cases whenaccidental circumstances so warrant .... Therefore, there is no rightof intervention.58

Perhaps it is unnecessary to underline that Podesti Costa's wordsare as relevant today as when they were written more than fifty yearsago. They also serve to explain why the principle of non-interventionhas become a cornerstone of the American system. As Caminos re-minds us, the rules on non-intervention in the OAS Charter arestricter than those of the UN Charter, for they not only prohibit theuse of armed force, but also all other forms of interference or at-tempted threat against the personality of the State in its political, eco-nomic, and cultural elements.5 9

Similar to the UN Charter, the OAS Charter contains numerousrules on the promotion and protection of human rights. These includethe principle laid down in Article 3(e) that reads:

Every State has the right to choose, without external interference,its political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in theway best suited to it, and has the duty to abstain from intervening inthe affairs of another State. Subject to the foregoing, the AmericanStates shall cooperate fully among themselves, independently of thenature of their political, economic, and social systems.60

In 1965, the Inter-American Juridical Committee issued an opin-ion about the difference between non-intervention and collective ac-tion.6 ' Overall, their findings reinforce the concept of non-intervention as "a fundamental principle of international law" incor-porated in both the Charters of the OAS and the UN. 62 Among otherreasons, the Committee concluded that interventionism is an illegal

58. INTERVENCION HUMANITARIA Y REsPONSABILIDAD DE PROTEGER, supra note 6, at 252n. 548.

59. See Hugo Caminos, Humanitarian Intervention and the Inter-American System, in IN-TERNATiONM LEGAL Issui-s ARISING UNDER THE UNITED NATIONs DECAIDE OF INTERNA-rIONAL LAw 963, 976 (Najeed Al-Nauimi & Richard Meese eds., 1995) (Neth.).

60. OAS. Charter art. 3, para. e.61. See 9 Comit6 Juridico Interamericano, Diferencias Entre Intervenci6n Y Acci6n Colec-

tiva [Differences between Intervention and Collective Action] (Sept. 23, 1965), in Recomenda-ciones e Informes 111 (1970).

62. See id. at 125.

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act because no State or group of States has the right to intervene,directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other forany reason.6 3 Collective action consists of the fulfillment of agree-ments freely entered into and accepted by the State concerned withsafeguarding their interests, and those of the international communityto which it belongs.64 A foreign intervention means a violation ofState sovereignty.65 Conversely, the aim of collective action is to re-pair the inflicted injury to any international organization.6 6

Despite these strict rules on non-intervention in the Americansystem, the region has seen quite a few instances of alleged "humani-tarian intervention." 67 In some domestic situations where there havebeen massive violations of human rights in countries under non-demo-cratic regimes, the OAS, through its political bodies, has authorizedsome measures to overcome these crises. 68 Among the most signifi-cant cases are the occupation of the Dominican Republic by armedforces of the United States in 1965, the OAS action during the Somozadictatorship in Nicaragua (1978-1979), and the activities of the UnitedStates in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989).61

However, in light of the provisions of the OAS Charter, theAmerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the AmericanConvention on Human Rights, the Inter-American Democratic Char-ter, and the practice of the Organization, it can be argued that humanrights are no longer subject to the exclusive domestic jurisdiction ofMember States of the OAS. However, the ability of the OAS andother organizations in Latin America to adopt measures for the pro-tection of human rights and international humanitarian law dependson the applicability of the instruments referred to in a particular caseand on the political will of Member States to adopt concrete measuresto this aim.o Still, it is worth noting that in Latin America, a unilateralhumanitarian intervention carried out by any Member State would beconsidered a violation of the principle of non-intervention.7 1 Today

63. See id. at 126.64. See id.65. See id.66. See id.67. See Caminos, supra note 59, at 978. However, according to John Kerry, "the era of the

Monroe Doctrine is over." John Kerry, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks on U.S. Policy in the West-ern Hemisphere (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/217680.htm.

68. See Caminos, supra note 59, at 978.69. See id. at 978, 980, 983, 987.70. See id. at 977.71. See id.

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the Latin American and Caribbean States continue to consider theprinciple of non-intervention as the cornerstone on which the frame-work of international relations is based and therefore sustain that "thedoctrine of humanitarian intervention is inconsistent with the Char-ters of the United Nations and OAS." 72

IV. Is THERE A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT?

As mentioned before, Latin American countries today show a di-vergent stance toward many issues affecting both the regional and theinternational agenda. In the case of R2P, it is generally possible todraw three types of ideological boundaries that I call the Bolivarian,the Inter-American, and eclectic positions. The Bolivarian and Inter-American have clearly defined attitudes, while the eclectic borrows el-ements from the first two.

The Bolivarian frontier or ALBA, which includes Cuba, Vene-zuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador, depart from what can becalled an "anti-imperialist" stance that situates Latin America in anopposite position to the United States. 74 Therefore, it seeks tostrengthen the non-intervention principle, rejecting all forms of for-eign interference." From this perspective, the United States is per-ceived as "the enemy" of national sovereignty, a core value of thisposition. 76 Therefore, the responsibility to protect is perceived as acovert instrument of the hegemon that intends to intervene to protector enforce its own interests in the region."

The Inter-American frontier is one that brings together most ofthe States of the region, both leftist governments (Uruguay, El Salva-dor) and right or centre governments (Mexico, Chile, Colombia,Peru). These countries, while holding dear the principle of non-inter-vention, consider the R2P principle is a positive tool for the protection

72. See id. at 983-84.73. See Roberto Russell, Foreign Policy, in THE 'NEw LEFV AND DEMOCRATIc GOVERN-

ANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 44, 44 (Cynthia J. Arnson & Jos6 Raiil Perales eds., 2007).74. See Fernando Bossi, Organizational Sec'y, Bolivarian Peoples' Cong., 10 Points to Un-

derstand the ALBA (Nov. 3, 2005), http://alianzabolivariana.org/que es-el-alba.php.

75. See id. ("The peoples of the ALBA ... will refuse to accept the new colonialistimposition . . . .").

76. See id. ("The United States government hopes to take advantage of the slightest weak-ness shown by Latin Americans and Caribbeans. If they sense dissension, they will try to put usagainst each other to later defeat us.").

77. See id.

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of human rights in humanitarian crises and therefore support the con-solidation of the principle.78

Finally, the eclectic frontier gathers countries like Brazil and Ar-gentina which maintain a clear assertion for the promotion and pro-tection of human rights, however do not seem to fully support the R2Pprinciple.7 9 Rhetorically they seem to support the R2P principle, butthey have also expressed some doubts on this issue. Brazil and Argen-tina maintain that R2P needs further elaboration, particularly regard-ing the responsibility to react and the eventual use of force.o In thecase of Argentina, its support for the principles of national sover-eignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States is persis-tent in its discourse, yet Argentina is also considered an "R2PChampion."" On the other hand, Brazil cautiously took an extra stepwhen it brought the concept of Responsibility While Protecting("RWP") into the 2011 UN debate, both criticizing and validating theR2P principle.82

This map of plural Latin American politics creates difficultieswhen addressing the issue in regional organizations or groups, sincegeopolitical alliances based on ideological agendas often obstruct thepossibility of reaching a consensus on any matter. In this sense, theideological frontiers, especially those promoted by ALBA, have be-come a serious obstacle to the extent that other governments in theregion do not know how to defend the Inter-American perspectivethat most share.83 For instance, the events in Venezuela at the begin-ning of 2014 do not allow room for hope since the Maduro Adminis-tration, similar to the Chavez regime, claims to respect and abide by

78. See generally Alfredo Toro Carnevali, El concepto de Responsabilidad de Proteger: Laperspectiva de la Repdblica Bolivariana de Venezuela y otros paises en desarrollo [Venezuela andOther Developing Countries' Perspective on the Responsibility to Protect], PENSAMIHNTO PROPIO,Jan.-June 2012, at 135, 151-53 (Arg.) (discussing how Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Cubaoppose the concept of the Responsibility to Protect and believe the concept facilitates imperial-ism and interventionism, which disrespects the sovereignty of the States).

79. See GLOBAL CTR. FOR TiiE; RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEC7, IMPLEMENTING THE RESPON-

sIBILrrY TO PROTECT Tu- 2009 GENERAi ASSEMBL..Y DE:BATE: AN ASSESSMENT 10 (2009),available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gcr2p_-general-assembly-debate-assessment.pdf [hereinafter RiSPONSIBIL'Y TO PROTECT].

80. See Juan Carlos Sainz-Borgo, La Responsabilidad de Proteger: La Perspectiva de Brasil[Brazil's Perspective on the Responsibility to Protect], PINSAMIFNTo Pizoio, Jan.-June 2012, at193 (Arg.) (explaining how the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine needs to shift towards theconcept of "Responsibility while Protecting").

81. See RusroNsIBIITY To PROTECr, supra note 79, at 11.82. See id at 10.83. U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from the Permanent Representative of

Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701(Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Brazil Letter].

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democratic principles and human rights while the situation in thecountry shows the opposite.

The first reaction by Latin American countries to the Implement-ing the Responsibility to Protect report was cautious. Many countriesshared the premise that the inclusion of the R2P concept in the 2005UN World Summit Outcome was an achievement, but at the sametime they believed that the wording contained certain vulnerabilitiesthat made it necessary to move slowly in implementing the concept.8 4

Some States were certain that the issue could be addressed at the UNGeneral Assembly ("UNGA") and agreed that it was desirable thatthe debate lead to the issuance of a resolution. However, five reportsand years later, the UNGA has not formally included the issue in itsagenda. This situation made the Representative of Guatemala, thecountry that submitted the draft for the first UNGA resolution onR2P,8 6 urge the body to include this issue as "a formal agenda item toclarify the way forward."8 7

With respect to the three pillars established in this first Report ofthe UNSG, Latin American countries generally share the view thatthe first pillar, which provides that each State has the responsibility toprotect its own population, is not a problem." The same is true inregard to the second pillar regarding capacity building and assistance,although some countries argue that it would be desirable to furtherdebate and elaborate more on the subject." The third pillar, whichupholds the necessity of a "timely and decisive response," is clearlythe most controversial one as it opens the possibility of the use offorce within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.90 Inthis regard, it should be noted that there remained some sensitivity tothe potential risks of abuse arising from the application of the conceptin practice, which proved truthful after NATO's actions in Libya in2011.

84. Press Release, Org. of American States, OAS Sec'y Gen. Appeals to the Responsibilityof Political Actors in Venez. to Avoid Further Violence (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.oas.org/en/media center/press-release.asp?sCodigo=E-050/14.

85. See RESPONSII3LITY TO PROTECF, supra note 79, at 2, 6.

86. Id. at 8.87. Outcome of July Debate: Adoption of First UN Resolution on the Responsibility to Pro-

tect, INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEcr, http://www.responsibili

tytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/2626-un-resolution-on-the-responsibility-to-protect (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).

88. Statement Delivered on Behalf of the Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the UnitedNations (Sept. 11, 2013).

89. See RESPONSIBILITy To PROTEcr, supra note 79, at 5.

90. Id.

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In February 2009, a regional forum took place in Mexico City,organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government ofMexico and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect in or-der to continue the discussion of all the issues involved around R2P.9'During the forum, a clear watershed was evident between those coun-tries that wanted to build up the principle as outlined by the UNSG inhis first Report, a position led by the host country and Chile, andthose countries with a radically different view of the principle, whichemphasized the risks of developing a rule on the R2P principle.92

There was agreement on the first two pillars and the idea that one ofthe main roles of the State is the responsibility to protect its own pop-ulation.93 Similarly, it was considered necessary to emphasize preven-tion efforts, recalling the central role of UN agencies, regional bodies,other forms of inter-State cooperation, and the role of civil society, allof which make it unnecessary to create new structures.

While there were some countries and NGOs that intended to re-late the R2P principle to the development agenda (arguing that thecases in which R2P would eventually apply are likely to take place inthe less developed world, therefore making it necessary to attack thecauses of poverty and development),94 the majority opposed such alinkage.95 Although it is undeniable that there is a link between devel-opment, human rights, and security issues, as repeatedly stated by theformer UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan,96 it was deemed that dis-cussing R2P in the causes of conflict context would produce a disper-sal debate when the aim sought was just the opposite.97 In effect, thegoal of the debate was to find tools to implement what the Heads ofState and Government agreed in 2005-to change the legal nature ofR2P from a principle to a standard, thus from mere guidance to acompulsory rule. In order to do so, it was essential to narrow the de-bate to arrive to concrete outcomes in the shortest possible time.

91. See GLOAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILrrY ro PROrFcr, "TIMELY AND DECISIVE RE-SPONSE": SUMMARY OF TH1E INFORMAL INTERACfIVE DIALOGUE OF TIlE UN GENERAL ASSEM-

BLY ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT HELD ON 5 SFI'IE.MBER 2012 (2012), available at http://www.globalr2p.org/medialfiles/r2p-unga-dialogue_2012.pdf [hereinafter TIMELY AND DECISIVERESPONSE].

92. See GLOAL CrR. FOR TE RiEsiONSIBILIfY To PRoTer, MEETING SUMMARY: Ri-

GIONAi FORUM ON RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2009), available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/mtgsummmexicocity2009.pdf [hereinafter MEFTING SUMMARY].

93. Id. at 1.94. Id.95. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEco, supra note 79, at 8.

96. See MEETING SUMMARY, Supra note 92, at 2.

97. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, andHuman Rights for All, 116-17, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).

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The third pillar remained the most controversial one for the rea-sons stated above. It must be noted that if the debate on R2P were tofocus only on this aspect, there would be a grave risk that an extensiveand comprehensive discussion of the other two pillars could not becarried out, with the consequent danger of paralyzing the dialogueand negotiations. In this regard, some countries have argued that it isnot possible to advance the operationalization of the principle withouta proper reform of the Security Council, including the limitation orpossibly the elimination of the veto power of the five permanentmembers on this matter.9 8 However, other countries noticed that thediscussion on Security Council reform is much broader, as it has beenon the UN agenda for more than twenty years with no substantialprogress.99 Therefore, to subordinate the debate on R2P to this sub-ject would indefinitely postpone the implementation of the principle.Moreover, in situations where there are massive violations of humanrights and/or international humanitarian law, it would be ludicrous toargue that the UN Security Council ("UNSC") action is subject to apossible and future reform of the Council's working methods. SomeStates that believe there is a pragmatic way forward to implementR2P within the current UN legal framework maintain this view.'00

Another issue discussed was the contention made by the Secre-tary-General that in case of paralysis of the Security Council, the Gen-eral Assembly could adopt coercive measures under the provisions ofUniting for Peace Resolution 377(V).10' This created controversy tothe extent that, while it would be an exceptional situation, it clearlydeparts from the provisions contained in paragraphs 138 and 139 ofthe Outcome Document and the rules of the Charter itself.102 Al-though this possibility is not expressly provided for in these instru-ments, it would not hurt to use it since the law enforcement effortsultimately adopted would enjoy greater consensus and therefore,might have greater legitimacy. There was consensus that if authoriza-tion for the use of force is granted, enforcement action should be thelast resort and its application should be taken on a case-by-case basis,avoiding all kinds of automaticity.o 3

98. See MEETING SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 1.99. See RESPONSIBILfY T10 PROTEIcr, supra note 79, at 6.

100. Id.101. Id.102. G.A. Res 377(V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/RES/377, at 10

(Nov. 3, 1950).103. Heraldo Muitoz, Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations, Statement

on Occasion of the Debate of the General Assembly on Responsibility to Protect (July 23, 2009).

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Some Latin American NGOs were in favor of extending thescope of the principle, as they feel that circumscribing its use to the"four crimes" might leave a large number of human rights violationswithout adequate protection.'o4 However, most forum participants ex-pressed support for maintaining and developing the principle asadopted in 2005, and considered that if this stance was taken, it wouldreopen a deep and very difficult debate. 1o5 Moreover, participantsnoted that maintaining a numerus clausus of cases (the four crimes)decreases the chances of trying to use R2P for cases other than thosefor which it was originally intended.1 06

V. LATIN AMERICA AT THE UN DEBATES

The overall positions mentioned above were reiterated by variousLatin American countries at the five Thematic Dialogues on the Re-sponsibility to Protect, which took place between 2009 and 2013 at theGeneral Assembly. Each of these Thematic Dialogues were precededby a report of the UNSG that helped focus the debate on a certainaspect of the principle, as was recalled in the first part of this paper. 07

A close look at the statements made by the representatives of LatinAmerican countries shows that there was little to no modifications onthe different positions previously adopted by the States of the re-gion.1os From these reports, press releases, documents, and positionstaken in different fora, it is possible to draw three diverse stances onR2P.

A. The Advocates of the Responsibility to Protect

As previously mentioned, Chile,109 Uruguay,"o Mexico,"' andGuatemala'1 2 have emerged as "champions" in promoting the R2Pprinciple."' Some of them even point out that R2P has acquired thestatus of a legal rule." 4 In this regard, Chile, referring to the legal

104. Id.105. See MEEING SUMMARY, supra note 92, at 1.106. Id.107. Id.108. See Annual Report, supra note 7.109. See International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Government Statements,

http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govern-ment?view=fjrelated&id=2409 (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).

110. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 98th plen. mtg. at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98 (July 24, 2009).111. Id. at 17-19.112. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 99th plen. mtg. at 18-19, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99 (July 24, 2009).113. U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 97th plen. mtg. at 14-15, U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97 (July 23, 2009).114. See U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98, supra note 110, at 10.

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nature of R2P, argued that the principle adopted at the 2005 UN Sum-mit had acquired the nature of norm' 1 5 and expressed its "firm com-mitment to R2P, whose solid foundations were established by theHeads of State and Government in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the2005 Outcome Document and which cannot be selectively addressedor revised."" 6 On the use of force, Chile stated that the collectiveimperative is not to intervene, but to adopt any "timely and decisive"action in accordance with the UN Charter, and that "there is no auto-maticity, triggers, or implicit green lights for coercive action in whatthe world leaders agreed."" 7

Mexico, using similar concepts to those of Chile, emphasized thetype of practice the Organization should develop in order to invokeR2P to the extent that such practice will guarantee the legitimacy andprestige of the Organization."" In this regard, Mexico stated that agradual practice should be developed to strengthen multilateral actionand reinforce the role of the UN to respond to situations that havebeen observed in the past from the sideline or have been validated expost facto." 9

Other countries of the region, such as Uruguay,120 Costa Rica,' 2 'Guatemala,'122 Colombia,'123 and Panama,' 2 4 among others, have alsoexpressed their continued support for the commitment made in 2005,stressing that attempts to extend the principle to other cases or associ-ate it with other notions is outside the agreement reached in the Out-come Document.125 Uruguay reiterated its support for the 2005consensus and recalled that "the prohibition to commit genocide, eth-nic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes are not only

115. Id. ("I prefer to . . . cite the distinguished jurist Sir Ian Brownlie . . . . In the fourthedition of his book Principles of Public International Law" he indicates that "'[t]he final act orother statement of conclusions of a conference of States can be a form of multilateral treaty' . . .it can be considered to be a source of international law. Moreover the practices of politicalbodies, such as this General Assembly, whose resolutions are not binding have . . . 'considerablelegal meaning."').

116. Id.117. Id.118. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99, supra note 112, at 19.119. Id.120. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98, supra note 110, at 18.121. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 22-23.122. Id. at 14.123. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98, supra note 110, at 13-14.124. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 16.125. See GLOBAL CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PuoTEcr, "EARLY WARNING, AssEss-

MENT, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY To PROTECr": INFORMAL INTERAClVE DIALOGUE OF THEGENERAL ASSEMBLY HELD ON 9 AUGUST 2010 6 (2010), available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/gcr2p-report-_informal-interactive-dailogue-2010.pdf.

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R2P. A LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

obligations within the framework of the Human Rights InternationalLaw, but are real jus cogens norms of absolute respect and inviolabil-

ity.""6 Furthermore, bearing in mind the lesson from the Libyan in-tervention, Uruguay underlined the necessity to detach R2P "fromimprecise associations with notions that have nothing to do with the2005 consensus, such as the pretext of the external use of force in or-der to comply with other aims that are not to prevent or stop massatrocities including regime change."I 2 7

B. The Opponents

On the other side of the table are countries like Venezuela,128Nicaragua, 1 29 Bolivia,130 and Ecuador. 3 1 Former Foreign Minister,Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, in his capacity as President of the 63rdUNGA, opened the thematic dialogue by expressing a strong rejec-tion of the R2P principle, calling it "debatable."1 3 2 He vindicated theprinciples of sovereignty and non-intervention and recalled that:

Recent and painful memories related to the legacy of colonialism,give developing countries strong reasons to fear that laudable mo-tives can end up being misused, once more, to justify arbitrary andselective interventions against the weakest states. We must take intoaccount the prevailing lack of trust from most of the developingcountries when it comes to the use of force for humanitarianreasons.13 3

Brockmann sought to shift the focus of the debate, stating thatthe way to solve a crisis is by attacking "the root causes" which are"underdevelopment and social exclusion." 3 4 He argued, "To the ex-tent that the principle is applied selectively, in cases where publicopinion in P5 Member States supports intervention, as in Darfur, and

126. Ambassador Jos6 Luis Cancela, Permanent Representative of Uru., Interactive Debateon the Responsibility to Protect at the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 5, 2012),http://www.globalr2p.org/medialfiles/uruguay-statement-2012.pdf.

127. Ambassador Jos6 Luis Cancela, Permanent Representative of Uru., Interactive Debateon the Responsibility to Protect at the General Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 11, 2013),http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Uruguay%2013.pdf.

128. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99, supra note 112, at 3-6.129. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 12-13.130. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99, supra note 112, at 8-9.131. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98, supra note 110, at 8-10.132. U.N. President of the G.A., At the Opening of the Thematic Dialogue of the General

Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect (July 23, 2009), http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/statements/openingr2p230709.shtml.

133. Id.134. Id.

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not where it is opposed, as in Gaza, it will undermine law."1 3 He saidthat the doctrine of R2P is not necessary and does not guarantee thatStates will intervene to prevent another Rwanda.13 6 Thus, D'Escotodid not advocate for a capable system of collective security." 7

Similarly, Venezuela argued that in this debate "there are nobinding rules" and warned against "the dominance" they have in theworld today.'13 "It is controversial, first of all, because of the domi-nance-which we are sure will change in the future-enjoyed in to-day's world by the prevailing imperial powers, whose interests oftendetermine the course of the dynamics of international relations."' 3 9 Ina curious interpretation of the current security scheme in the Charterof the UN, Venezuela considered that an effective implementation ofthe elements of R2P will require a substantive reform of the UNCharter.14 0 Furthermore, Venezuela maintains that R2P and the rec-ommendations made by the UN Secretary General:

[Hiave not been accepted or adopted as valid by the MemberStates, nor have they been discussed in any intergovernmentalframework. Therefore, the call for States to fulfill these recommen-dations goes beyond the mandate of the Secretary General, andcannot be accepted . ... There are still mixed feelings and thoughtsconcerning the Responsibility to Protect.141

However, "Venezuela supports the establishment of an intergov-ernmental process within the General Assembly for this issue to beformally discussed."' 4 2 Ecuador associated its position with that of theNon-Aligned Movement and advocated that the R2P principle shouldbe "implemented pursuant to premises that do not undermine theguarantees and the sovereignty of States." 14 3 Using soccer as a meta-phor, it could be said that Ecuador, in a clear attempt to "smear" thefield, affirmed that the proposals in the first report of the UNSG werepart of negotiations in other areas such as disarmament, sanctions, Se-curity Council reform, humanitarian assistance, international coopera-

135. Id.136. Id.137. See id.138. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.99, supra note 112, at 3.139. Id.140. Id. at 4.141. Ambassador Samuel Moncada, Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic

of Venez., Interactive Debate on the "Responsibility to Protect" at the 67th Session of the Gen-eral Assembly of the United Nations (Sept. 11, 2013) available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Venezuela%202013.pdf.

142. Id.143. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.98, supra note 110, at 9.

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tion, among others. Therefore, Ecuador deemed it relevant toconsider the results that have been achieved in these deliberations aspart of a negotiations package.14 For that reason, Ecuador concludedthat while there is no clarity on the conceptual scope, policy parame-ters, and the actors, any decision that would force States to implementthis concept could not be taken.145 As in the past, Ecuador, reaffirmedthat the legitimacy of the R2P concept can only be based on the fol-lowing elements: (1) establishing clear grounds which may be consid-ered sufficient to justify international intervention; (2) identifying on acase-by-case basis, the limits of the eventual intervention, excludingcase-by-case exhaustively the regime change, the occupation of theterritory, or the natural resources of the state; (3) determining that theuse of force should be the ultimate recourse that would exhaust thepeaceful solutions to the controversy and exclusively lower the au-thority of the UN Security Council, and how that will dispose of Chap-ter VII of the Charter; (4) establishing monitoring mechanisms inorder to avoid resolutions authorizing the use of force beyond the lim-its set by the Security Council; and (5) ensuring compliance with theprovisions of the UN Charter about the manner in which military con-tingents act on behalf of the international community, preventing theoccurrence of privatized military operations.14 6

C. The Eclectic

As previously discussed, the eclectic frontier gathers countrieslike Brazil and Argentina that maintain a clear assertion for the pro-motion and protection of human rights, however do not seem to fullysupport the principle of R2P.14 7 Rhetorically they support R2P, butthey have also expressed some doubts about it.""

Brazil, bearing in mind that all members of the UN support thepromotion and protection of human rights, urged UN Member Statesto avoid a Manichean division between those who are human rights

144. Id.145. Id.146. Permanent Representante de Ecuador, Republica del Ecuador, Intervencion de la

Delegacion del Ecuador Durante el Dialogo Interactivo Informal de la Asamblea General Sobrela Responsabilidad de Proteger [Statement by the Delegation of Ecuador During the InformalInteractive Dialogue of the General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect] (Sept. 9, 2013)(Ecuador), http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/ecuador-2009-r2p-debate.pdf.

147. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 13; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 101st plen. mtg.at 9; U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.101 (July 28, 2009).

148. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 12-13; U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.101, supra note147, at 9-10.

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defenders and those who allegedly do not protect human rights. 149

Brazil was against the reopening of the debate on the R2P principleand noted that it should not apply to situations that are outside thescope of the four enumerated crimes, such as AIDS, natural disasters,and climate change.s 0 Brazil was clear on the legal nature of the prin-ciple, noting that it never argued that R2P is properly a principle,much less a new legal standard, but just a strong policy encouraging allcountries to comply with international law.'5 1

Nevertheless, Brazil, reaffirming the principle of "non-indiffer-ence," noted that there is a legal framework to act in humanitariancrises, and the lack of implementation of the R2P principle cannot beinvoked as an excuse to let these crimes take place. 15 2 Referring to the"structure of pillars" posed by the UNSG, Brazil supported the devel-opment of pillars I and II.' However, contrary to what is affirmed bythe Secretary-General in his report, Brazil stated that the third pillaris a subsidiary of the first and that it is a course of action of an excep-tional nature.154 This point of view, as it will be seen below, was main-tained by Brazil two years later when it submitted its concept paperon Responsibility While Protecting.'55 The case of Brazil is particularlystriking because during previous discussions it had expressed concernabout whether the enforcement action is necessary or appropriate.156

However, during the thematic dialogue, Brazil took a more positivetone and accepted the third pillar though stressing that such use offorce should be considered an exceptional procedure and a lastresort. 57

At UNSC, Brazil voted in favor of Resolutions 1970 (Peace andSecurity in Africa) and 1973 (Libya) which allowed the use of force inthe Libya case, and later elaborated on a new doctrine called Respon-sibility While Protecting, which mainly argues that the internationalcommunity must show a great deal of care while exercising R2P.'5

149. U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.97, supra note 113, at 12.150. Id.151. Id. at 13.152. Id.153. Id.154. Id.155. 2011 Brazil Letter, supra note 83.156. See, e.g., Celso L. N. Amorim, 0 Brasil e os Novos Conceitos Globais e Hemisfericos de

Segurancai [Brazil and the New Global Concepts and Hemispheric Safety], I REPFLEXOES SOBRIDEFESA E SEGURANCA: UMA ESTRATEGIA PARA o BRASIL 135, 139-40 (2004) (Braz.).

157. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 9th plen. mtg. at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.9 (Sept. 17, 2005).158. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. For the Resp. to Protect, Keynote Address at

GCR2P/FGV/Stanley Found. Workshop, Resp. While Protecting, What's Next?: R2P and RWP

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Brazil supports a restrictive view with regard to the use of force, af-firming that it can only be used as a last resort and it must always beauthorized by the Security Council in accordance with Chapter VII ofthe Charter, or in exceptional circumstances by the General Assemblyin line with its resolution 377 (V).' Particularly, Brazil wishes that:

(d) The authorization for the use of force must be limited in its le-gal, operational and temporal elements and the scope of militaryaction must abide by the letter and the spirit of the mandate con-ferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and becarried out in strict conformity with international law, in particularinternational humanitarian law and the international law of armedconflict;(f) In the event that the use of force is contemplated, action must bejudicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives established bythe Security Council.160

From a legal point of view, Brazil's RWP evidenced the need toestablish clear rules to define how an intervention should be approvedand implemented. As Rodrigues stated, "The Security Council cannotbe only a channel to allow interventions, but it's a guardian and super-visor during the whole process. The powers involved in the implemen-tation of the mandate (NATO or others) should be accountable to theSC during the whole process, not only at its end."' Although thisinitiative was presented by Brazil's President, Dilma Roussef, Brazilhas lacked further initiative and has been thoroughly criticized for itsalmost unilateral action when presenting RWP.16 2

Historically, Argentina has expressed its willingness to contributeto the search for answers to humanitarian crises, as the internationalcommunity has witnessed in the last two decades.16 3 In this regard,Argentina expressed a clear preference for the utilization of collectivesecurity mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter, and its reluc-

After Libya and Syria (Aug. 21, 2012), available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech485.html; see also 2011 Brazil Letter, supra note 83.

159. 2011 Brazil Letter, supra note 83.160. Id.161. Andres Serbin, Civil Society Perspectives on Responsibility While Protecting, INT'L COA-

LIION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTEcr at 11 (Sept. 2012), http://responsibilitytoprotectblog.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/responses-final.pdf.

162. Cf Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting," FOR-

EIGN POLICY (Aug. 29, 2012), http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil-backs responsibility-while-protecting (arguing that Brazil's proposition will undermine the Responsibil-ity to Protect).

163. Press Release, General Assembly, Recognizing Evolving Nature of Humanitarian Cri-ses, General Assembly Encourages Dialogue Among Member States, UN Agencies to BolsterEmergency Response System, U.N. Press Release GA/11327 (Dec. 13, 2012).

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tance to accept that R2P is exercised unilaterally by a State, a coali-tion of States, or regional organization without the authorization ofthe Security Council.'64 Also, Argentina has affirmed that the UNSChas the legal framework and tools to implement the responsibility toreact to cases where grave, massive, and systematic violations tohuman rights and humanitarian law occur.16 5 This requires the will ofthe Member States, and in particular, the permanent members of theUN Security Council (P5) to exercise this subsidiary responsibility ef-fectively and legitimately.16 6

This position was foreshadowed in 2000, after a presentation bythe UNSG on the "dilemma of intervention."167 At that time, Argen-tina stated that the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairsof a State should balance itself with the principle of non-indifferenceto the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 168

Following this logic, Argentina shared the opinion that the weightof R2P falls on the Security Council, and warned about the negativeconsequences that would result if an intervention was carried out by acoalition or organization of States or without authorization. 169 Not-withstanding that, Argentina believed that, if possible and when nec-essary, Member States should be able to initiate proceedings beforeregional agencies, according to the conditions of Article 53 of the UNCharter, maintaining that they keep the UNSC fully informed.1 70

Moreover, Argentina holds that the Security Council, throughseveral of its resolutions, has created a legal framework that has sub-stantially improved the international regime for the protection of peo-ples.17' At the same time, Argentina considers that the Council has

164. See Ricardo Arredondo, La Repablica Argentina ante la Responsabilidad de Proteger:Un Atisbo de Cambio? [Argentina Before the Responsibility to Protect: A Hint of Change?], P1N-

SAMIE1NTO PROPIO, Jan.-June 2012, at 109, 129-30 (Arg.) [hereinafter La Reptiblica Argentina].165. U.N. SCOR, 61st Year, 5577th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5577 (Dec. 4, 2006).166. See La Repdblica Argentina, supra note 164, at 130.167. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the U.N. in the Twenty-First Cen-

tury: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 215-19, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000).168. See U.N. SCOR, 55th Year, 4194th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4194 (Sept. 7, 2000); U.N.

SCOR, 56th Year, 4288th mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4288 (Mar. 7, 2001); see also Press Release,Security Council, Security Council Meets to Review Commitments of September 2000 Summit:Secretary-General Cites Council's 'Crisis of Credibility,' UN Agencies to Bolster EmergencyResponse System, U.N. Press Release SC/7024 (Sept. 3, 2001).

169. See U.N. SCOR, 55th Year, 4194th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4194 (Sept. 7, 2000).170. See INTERVENCION HUMANrfARIA Y RESPONSABILIDAD DE PROTEGER, supra note 6, at

281.171. Delegation of Argentina, Statement delivered at the 2010 United Nations General As-

sembly Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Aug. 9, 2010) [hereinafter State-ment of Argentina].

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received a mandate from the UNGA which urges measures of "collec-tive action in a timely and decisive manner to protect populationsfrom genocide, war crimes, the ethnic cleansing and crimes againsthumanity. 172

Following the Report of the Secretary-General from July 23,2009, the Argentine government decided to join the group of like-minded countries to work together in promoting and strengtheningthe principle, bearing in mind the close relationship between humanrights, peace and international security. 7 3 This decision is part of apolicy to promote, protect, and respect human rights and internationalhumanitarian law, a policy that Argentina has sustained since its re-turn to democracy in 1983.174 During the past thirty-years, Argentinahas shown its concern and commitment to this area, which has earnedit a prominent place in the defense of international humanitariancauses, along with active participation in causes related to prevention,cessation, and mediation in situations where gross and systematichuman rights violations and international humanitarian law takeplace. 7

On this occasion, Argentina reiterated its support for the R2Pprinciple17 6 on the grounds that a State has the primary responsibilityto protect its population and that the international community has asubsidiary responsibility, which should be carried out through the UNin a timely and decisive manner. 7 7 In this regard, Argentina ex-pressed that experience has shown that the UNSC has determined, invarious occasions, that massive and systematic violations of humanrights and international humanitarian law are a threat to peace andinternational security. 7 From this, Argentina concluded that the cur-rent UN legal framework provides for an opportunity to react and todecisively end these types of situations if the UNSC has the politicalwill to do so."'7 Nevertheless, Argentina was reluctant to define crite-

172. General Assembly, Draft Resolution Referred to the High-Level Plenary Meeting ofthe General Assembly by the General Assembly at its Fifty-Ninth Session at 31, A/60/L.1 (Sept.15, 2005).

173. See INTERVENCION HUMANITARIA Y RESPONSAlIlLIDAD DE PROTEGER, supra note 6, at

281-286.174. See id.175. See id.176. See Statement Delivered by the Government of Argentina During the July 2009 United

Nations General Assembly Debate on the Responsibility to Protect (July 27, 2009) (transcriptavailable at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/argentina-2009-r2p-debate.pdf).

177. See La Reptiblica Argentina, supra note 164, at 122.

178. See id.179. See id.

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ria in order to guide the process of decision-making by the SecurityCouncil.'s On the one hand, Argentina felt that adopting criteriacould lead to a procedural debate that could affect the decision-mak-ing process. However, in case of an eventual paralysis of the Council,some countries might be tempted to act unilaterally by using thosecriteria of legitimacy to act outside the system.18

Considering that many States have expressed deep reservationsabout R2P, linking the principle to humanitarian intervention, Argen-tina believed it would be useful to make efforts aimed at promotingthe principle in developing countries, 18 2 in particular, those that couldpotentially take place in areas with risky human rights situations.'8 3

This position is based on the understanding that implementing R2P isnecessary to advance a common strategy model that will have the con-sensus of the wider UN membership.' 84

When the UNSG report titled Early Warning, Assessment and theResponsibility to Protect was debated at the UN General Assembly in2010,185 again Argentina showed a favorable attitude towards R2P.186

On that occasion, the representative of Argentina said that R2P is anessential obligation of States since it combines all international obliga-tions to protect the human person.' However, when States fail tosatisfy their obligations, the UN cannot remain inactive and must takeaction to prevent the commission of grave crimes. The implementa-tion of R2P requires careful and detailed discussion, and the GeneralAssembly is the appropriate forum for this debate. Argentina is con-vinced that, as stated in paragraph 139 of the Outcome Document, theUNGA should continue to examine the issue, in order to implementR2P.' Argentina considered that "the 'duty to protect' . . . is nothingbut the synthesis of other international obligations and reiterated theimportance of prevention efforts and assistance, particularly in thecase of those States that lack the infrastructure required to apply thesetypes of international cooperation programs." 8 9 With respect to thethird pillar, referring to the timely and decisive response, Argentinaconsidered the adoption of measures by the UN system in implement-

180. See id.181. See id.182. See id.183. See id.184. See id.185. See Statement of Argentina, supra note 171.186. See id.187. See id.188. See id.189. See id.

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ing R2P to be very useful in protecting populations from genocide,war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.' 90 How-ever, Argentina felt hesitant to accept assumptions that unilateral ac-tions could constitute a collective armed action, and argued that thecollective security system must be activated using the mechanismsprovided for in the UN Charter.19' At that time, Argentina's positionemphasized three essential aspects: (1) the need to respect humanrights; (2) the importance of early warning and assessment; and (3) thecontinued international commitment, through the General Assembly,on the subject.' 9 2 Argentina noted that political dialogue betweenMembers should continue specifically on how to implement the strat-egy and stated that the UN action must be complemented by regionalor subregional efforts.1 93

When the situation in Libya arose in early 2011, Argentina ex-pressed "its deep concern over the grave situation" while regretting"the loss of life and violence occurring in the fighting."1 94 It urged for"a quick and peaceful settlement, within a constructive democratic di-alogue that grants full respect for human rights and the will of theLibyan people."1 95 Further, Argentina was deeply concerned aboutthe serious human rights violations in Libya, and co-sponsored a spe-cial session of the Human Rights Council, called for by the UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay. Mr. Pillay requested animmediate end to the grave human rights violations committed by theLibyan authorities, and the launch of an international investigationinto the violent repression of demonstrations in that country. 1 9 6 How-ever, Argentina expressly rejected the inclusion of the proposed mea-sures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which it conditioned to a

190. See William Pace, Civil Society, Latin America and the Development of the Responsibil-ity to Protect, PENSAMIENTO PROPIO, Jan.-June 2012, at 13, 14 (Arg.).

191. See Statement of Argentina, supra note 171.

192. See id.

193. See id.

194. Press Release, Direcci6n de Prensa de Cancillerfa, Situaci6n en Libia: Profunda Pre-ocupaci6n del Gobierno Argentino [Argentina Foreign Ministry Press Office, Situation in Libya:Deep Concern of the Argentine Government] (Feb. 22, 2011).

195. Id.

196. See Press Release, Direcci6n de Prensa de Cancillerfa, Situaci6n en Libia: ArgentinaCopatrocina la Convocatoria a una Sesi6n Especial del Consejo de Derechos Humanos [Argen-tina Foreign Ministry Press Office, Situation in Libya: Argentina Co-Sponsors the Call for aSpecial Session of the Human Rights Council] (Feb. 23, 2011) (Arg.).

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corroboration of the situation by objective, serious, and concludingdata. 197

These conditions were intended to prevent the kind of action thatwas later triggered by the authorization granted by UNSC Resolutions1970 and 1973, for which there is heavy criticism. These Resolutionsrepresented the first instance in which a case of R2P led to a militaryintervention. The adoption of Resolution 1973 had the support of theArab League and the African Union, which conferred upon them un-questioned legitimacy from the beginning,198 although two permanentMembers (China and Russia) and three other Members (Brazil, Ger-many and India) abstained.'99 The resolution established a no-fly zoneand a naval embargo on Libya and 'authorized Member States to take"all necessary measures . .. to protect civilians, excluding a foreignoccupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory."20 0

In July 2011, a meeting organized by the Government of Mexicofor the previous Special Advisor on R2P, Edward Luck, and the LatinAmerican "friends of R2P," was held to discuss the third report by theSecretary-General on the matter.20' During this meeting, the Argen-tine delegate supported Luck's view that in implementing R2P, thecultural and institutional differences of each region must be taken intoaccount and respected.202 In this regard, she recalled the developmentof R2P in Latin America, where situations of massive and systematichuman rights violations took place before the emergence of R2P. 203

Similarly, she highlighted the fact that Latin America has assigned sig-nificant value to the principle of non-intervention.204

Many delegations, including Argentina, agreed that the R2P prin-ciple does not imply the emergence of a new rule, but rather summa-rizes existing obligations regarding the obligation of the State toprotect its population in light of universal standards and regional pro-tection of human rights and international humanitarian law mecha-

197. Pablo Tettamanti, Resoluciones adoptadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las NacionesUnidas en el caso de Libia y su implementacidn, VIsION DIuSDE EL. Sun (June 19, 2012), http://www.visiondesdeelsur.com.ar/index.php/internacionales/287-pablo-tettamanti.

198. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' Over Libya,Authorizing 'All Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Ab-stentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).

199. Id.

200. Id.201. U.N. Doc A/65/877-S/2011/393, supra note 28.202. See La Repablica Argentina, supra note 164, at 125.

203. See id.

204. See id.

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nisms.2 05 Therefore, it confirmed the importance of second and thirdpillar, and reaffirmed the notion that the third pillar must be consid-ered a last resort in cases of grave and massive violations of humanrights which can be categorized as one of the four crimes. There wasalso widespread agreement and concern to avoid selectivity and "re-gime change" as veiled objectives of powerful countries. 206 Likewise,the important role of regional agencies in implementing R2P obliga-tions was addressed, considering the specific mechanisms adopted inthe OAS framework as well as other sub-regional organizations.2 0 7 inthis regard, the "democratic clause" adopted at OAS, Southern Com-mon Market (Mercosur), Union of South American Nations(Unasur), etc., was recalled.20 8 Similarly, the precursor role of the In-ter-American system for the promotion and protection of humanrights and the fight against impunity was also mentioned.20 9 While re-gional initiatives may not have developed solutions for the fightagainst impunity in cases of massive and systematic violations ofhuman rights, the lessons learned from these experiences could be thebasis for regional capacity building.

On February 21, 2012, an informal meeting organized by the Per-manent Mission of Brazil, Brazil's Minister of Foreign Affairs, and theUN Special Adviser for R2P, was held on the concept of RWP to ad-dress the components of the concept paper submitted by Brazil.210

The meeting was followed by a lively debate and was marked withhigh participation by Member States.2 11 Argentina expressed its sup-port for the Brazilian initiative, stressing that it represents a "substan-tive" contribution and "overcomes" the R2P principle.2 12 Argentinastated that this proposal "rightly captures our own vision" and "repre-sents an opportunity to progressively develop a substantive aspect ofR2P." 2 13 It further added that it is imperative to strengthen protectionstrategies on the ground with clear and predictable rules, since it isunacceptable that the very protection the international community in-tends to provide could result in further damage to the same innocentcivilians they seek to protect.2 1 4 Taking into consideration that the Se-

205. See id. at 126.206. See id.207. See id.208. See id.209. See id.210. See 2011 Brazil Letter, supra note 83.211. See id.212. La Repdtblica Argentina, supra note 164, at 127.213. See id.214. See id.

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curity Council's actions are based on a case-by-case basis, Argentinahighlighted the need to establish clear rules that respond to the essen-tial objective of protection, and consequently prevent the conceptfrom being manipulated and misrepresented in order to implementregime change.21 5

One of the corollaries of the armed intervention in Libya was thereluctance of many Latin American countries, including Argentina, tosupport any kind of use of force in Syria. 2 16 As the Argentine repre-sentative put it:

The concerns risen (sic) by the coercive action in Libya includeresorting to the use of force without trying other measures first, re-gime change, the adequacy of air strikes to protect civilians, theneed for the Security Council to do a follow up of the authorizedmeasures and accountability of those authorized use of armed force.Those reservations must be addressed in order to ensure that actionby the United Nations does not cause more victims than civiliansprotected, that it does not incur in legitimizing political objectivesbeyond those of the Organization and, in the end, to ensure thelegitimacy of collective action by the United Nations.217

VI. CONcLusioNs

There is no consensus in Latin America and the Caribbean on theprinciple of R2P, but instead, there are three main trends amongst thecountries in the region and their approach to this principle. On onehand there is a group of countries that promote a strong oppositionagainst the concept. This group is represented by Venezuela, Cuba,and other ALBA member countries, whose criticism of the principle isbased on the prevalence of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 2 18 The second group of countries is characterized by asteady support for R2P, and represented by Mexico, Panama, Chile,Costa Rica, and Guatemala amongst others.2 19 A third group, includ-ing Argentina and Brazil, two countries with a very strong human

215. See id.216. See Tettamanti, supra note 197.217. Minister Mateo Estr6m6, Charg6 d'Affaires a.i. of the Argentine Republic to the

United Nations, Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and De-cisive Response (Sept. 5, 2012).

218. See GLOBAL CTR. FOR TI1E RElsrONsnI31LITY -T0 PROTECr, "STATE REsPONSIIII ITY AND

PREVENTION": SUMMARY OF THE INFORMAL INTERACTIVE DIALOGUE OFTHE UN GENERAL

AsSEMB YON TIE RESrONSIBILrrY To PROTECr HELD ON 11 SEPTEMBER 2013 (2013), availableat http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/summary-of-the-2013-r2p-dialogue.pdf. [hereinafterSTArE RESPONSIIITIY AND PREVENTION].

219. See id.

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rights discourse, have a long history of support for UN lead missionsand an active role in the development of R2P, although from differentperspectives.2 2 0 In the case of Argentina, its support for the respect ofstate sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention is persistent inits discourse, yet it is also considered an "R2P Champion," bearing inmind that it has taken an active role in promoting the principle sinceits inception.2 2' On the other hand, Brazil has taken a more cautiousapproach by taking the concept of RWP into the UN debate, bothcriticizing and validating the R2P principle.2 2 2 Yet Brazil has lackedfurther initiative and has been thoroughly criticized for its almost uni-lateral action when presenting RWP.22 3

Within this framework, two contending juridical traditions strug-gle to impose their own principles to foreign policies of Latin Ameri-can Governments: (1) the tradition of unrestricted respect for statesovereignty and the defence of the principle of non-intervention; 2 24

and (2) a strong tradition of promotion and protection of humanrights, particularly relevant after the demise of military dictatorshipsin the eighties.22 5

An analysis of the Latin American States' positions shows thatwhile a large number of governments have accepted the principle ofR2P, many of them are still reluctant to legalize the unilateral use ofarmed force on humanitarian excuses, especially in light of the abusesthat have taken place in the past. In that sense, most States do not feelinclined to open the norm under Article 2.4 of the UN Charter inorder to include an exception for humanitarian intervention.2 2 6 AsGoodman clearly explains, "The overriding concern about pretextwars turns on assumptions about state opportunism and the power ofboth law and perceived legitimacy in regulating state behavior." 2 2 7

220. See id.221. Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval, Permanent Representative of the Mission of Ar-

gentina, Official Statement at the UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on theResponsibility to Protect, State Responsibility and Prevention (Sept. 11, 2013), available at http://www.globalr2p.org/medialfiles/perceval-transcription.pdf) [hereinafter Perceval].

222. See 2011 Brazil Letter, supra note 83, at 3.223. See Chris Kreutzner, Responsibility While Protecting: Help or Hindrance to R2P, INT'l

L. STuDENrs Ass'N-UNIV. OF OrfAWA (Nov. 16, 2012), http://ilsauottawa.wordpress.com/2012/111/16/responsibility-while-protecting-help-or-hindrance-to-r2p/.

224. See Perceval, supra note 221.225. See id.

226. See Oscar Schacter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. RLv. 1620,1624 (1984).

227. Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Intervention and Pretext for War, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.107, 109 (2006).

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The regional roundtables convened by the ICISS, as well as thesubsequent consultations on the Report with NGOs and Governmentscoordinated by Canada and other civil society organizations, served toevidence that in most cases there was a widespread hostility towardsthe notion of humanitarian intervention, and a broad consensusagainst the idea of an alleged "right of intervention," particularlywhen that alleged right was associated with unilateralism.228

But this deep skepticism towards intervention did not necessarilytranslate into a rejection of the underlying purpose of R2P-the pre-vention of genocide and mass atrocities and the protection of vulnera-ble populations. 229 The adoption of a text, which focused on the rightsof endangered populations rather than the alleged right of interven-tion, contributed to a wide range of State and civil society actors whoexpressed a disposition to recognize that sovereignty entails responsi-bilities and that an international intervention can be legitimate in cer-tain circumstances. However, the Commission's approach to unilateralintervention and apparent openness to actions authorized by the Se-curity Council revealed that it was unlikely that the R2P principlewould be accepted without a careful examination.230

The military intervention of 2011 in Libya shows the need to clar-ify the role of regional and sub-regional organizations when applyingR2P. Although such organizations can be both legitimizers and opera-tional agents for the implementation of R2P, they often lack capacitiesand resources to carry out operations in a meaningful way.

The three mentioned trends and established traditions raise a se-ries of questions on the validity of the R2P principle in this region.First, the usefulness of R2P in Latin America and the Caribbean, tak-ing into account the existence of a preventive system such as the Inter-American Human Rights System, even if it is applicable ex post facto.Second, the different positions that it entails for the foreign policies ofthe LAC countries, particularly within a very dynamic process ofregionalism and regional transformation, and the prevalence of theprinciples of national sovereignty and non-intervention. Third, the in-volvement of several Latin American countries in peace operations

228. See generally WORLD FEi)ERALIST MOVEMENT-INSTITUE IOR GLOBAL PoIcy, CiviL

SOCIETY PERSPECIVES ON TiE RESPONSIBIIT- Y TO PROTFcr (2003) (summarizing the outcomesand perspectives of several countries after roundtables convened by the ICISS), available athttp://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/WFM-Civil%20Society%20Perspectives%

200n%20R2P_30Apr2003.pdf; see also Noel M. Morada, R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges andProspects, 11 UNISCI J. 59, 59-60 (2006).

229. See Perceval, supra note 221.

230. INTERVFNCION HUMANITARIA Y RE'sPONSABILIDAD DE PROTEGER, supra note 6, at 41.

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and both the impact and influence of the LAC experience and debateon the issue of humanitarian intervention for the global agenda. Fi-nally, the role of civil society organizations and networks in preven-tion in a region where democratic systems prevail.

As the representative of Argentina before the UNSC recentlystated, "It is crucial that we put into practice regional and universalearly-warning mechanisms to prevent atrocities, an aspect in which re-gional and national scope becomes essential to cooperation and dia-logue in order for the rule of law to be strengthened."2 3 1

Most Latin American States have expressed their willingness tocontribute to the search for answers to the humanitarian crises, andexpressed a clear preference for the use of collective security mecha-nisms provided in the Charter of the United Nations. 2 3 2 They havealso expressed a reluctance to accept the R2P principle to be exercisedunilaterally either by a State, a coalition of States, or a regional bodywithout express authorization of the UNSC. 23 3 Moreover, most LatinAmerican countries have advised that the UNSC already has the legalframework and tools to implement that responsibility to react to seri-ous, massive and systematic violations of human rights and humanita-rian law violations.23 4 The will of its Member States, and in particular,the P5, is a required condition to effectively and legitimately exercisethat vicarious liability imposed on the international community as awhole.

As the Permanent Representative of the United States ofAmerica to the UN eloquently stated, "The international consensusaround R2P remains a signal achievement of multilateral cooperationand a testament to our common humanity." 3 5 Latin America willcontinue to support and foster R2P. However, this drive will heavilyrely upon how the international community, and particularly its mostpowerful members, use this principle in the future.

231. Statement by Argentina at the Open Debate of the United Nations Security Council(Jan. 29, 2014), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Argentina(2).pdf.

232. See STATE' RESPONSIBILITY AND PREVENTION, supra note 218, at 3.233. See id.234. See id.235. Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Statement at

an Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Sept. 11, 2013).

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