Responsibility in Engineering

7/28/2019 Responsibility in Engineering

1/32

Responsibility in

Engineering:Impediments to

Responsible Action


2/32

Responsibility for harmful actions by:

Intentional reasons

Recklessness Negligence

Brief Review..

Human Dimension: Attitudes, Frames of Mind


3/32

ENGINEERS PEOPLE


4/32

1. SELF-INTEREST


5/32

1. Self-Interest

Concern for our own interest tempts

us to act contrary to our professional

ideals

EGOISM Extreme means to satisfy

ones interest, even at the EXPENSE

OF OTHERS


6/32

1. Self-Interest: Columbia Accident

NASA Managers advance their careers

by being associated with successful

and on-schedule flights at the expenseof the safety of the crew.


7/32

1. Self-Interest: How to resist?

Contemplation and Rationalization:

Ask ourselves if we would approve of

others treating us in the same way we

are treating them


8/32

2. SELF-DECEPTION


9/32

2. Self Deception

Our rationalizations may seem to

betray a willful lack of self-

understanding Intentional avoidance of truths ,

difficult to confront self-consciously


10/32

2. Self Deception: Columbia Accident

NASA managers convinced

themselves that past successes are anindication that small defects would

not cause problems.


11/32

2. Self Deception: Remedy

Working in teams, Open

communication with colleagueshelp correct biases


12/32

3. FEAR


13/32

3. Fear

Fear of acknowledging mistakes,

punishment, bad consequences

Whistleblowing Cases


14/32

3. Fear: Columbia Accident

Columbia Accident Investigation

board observed that fear of

retribution inhibited the

expression of minority opinions


15/32

3. Fear: Remedy

Group resistance is more likely

to bring about changes in anorganization


16/32

4. IGNORANCE


17/32

4. Ignorance

Ignorance of vital information

Lack of awareness: willful avoidance- aturning away from information to avoid to

deal with challenges it may pose

Lack of imagination, failure to persist,

pressure from deadlines, not looking in

the right places


18/32

4. Ignorance: Columbia Accident

High- level managerial decisions were

based on insufficient knowledge

based on facts; dissenting viewpointare filtered out


19/32

5. EGOCENTRIC TENDENCIES


20/32

5. Egocentric Tendencies

Interpret situations from a limited

perspective

Special form of ignorance

Similar viewpoints and perspectives

with others


21/32

5. Egocentric Tendencies

Test run with typical consumers are

needed in engineering and design


22/32

5. Egocentric Tendencies: Columbia Accident

NASA Managers made decisions

from an exclusively managementperspectives: schedule, politics

and cost.


23/32

6. MICROSCOPIC VISION


24/32

6. Microscopic Vision

Similar to egocentric tendencies

Microscopic vision is highly accurateand precise but our field of vision is

limited

Fail to see things at an ordinary level


25/32

6. Microscopic Vision

Engineers sometimes need to raise

their eyes from the world of science

and technical expertise and look

around to understand the

implications off their actions


26/32

6. Microscopic Vision: Columbia

Accident

NASA organizational structure:

Each has a specialized job, not

responsible for the work of others


27/32

7. UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE

OF AUTHORITY


28/32

7. Uncritical Acceptance of

Authority

Most engineers have bosses, and expected to

defer to authority in their organization

Milgrams Experiments

Decrease the engineers sense of personal

accountability for the consequences

Distances the engineer from the public


29/32

7. Uncritical Acceptance of

Authority: remedy

Group dynamics: Support Critical

Response


30/32

8. GROUPTHINK


31/32

8. Groupthink

Situations in which groups come to agreement atthe expense of critical thinking

Illusion of invulnerability

Shared stereotypes

Illusion of morality

Self-censorship

Illusion of unanimity

Direct pressure on dissenting opinions

Mindguarding against contradictory views


32/32

Responsibility in Engineering

Documents