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TEAM CODE:____TC-28________
5TH EDITION OF NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION “CHECK MATE”
UNDER ARTICLE 136 AND 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
In the Matter of
MANU SHARMA AND VAIBHAV SHARMA …..…………………………………………
(APPLICANT)
V.
UNION OF INDIA, U.T OF CHANDIGARH AND STATE OF PUNJAB……………….……..
(RESPONDENT)
MEMORIALfor RESPONDENTS
UNION OF INDIA, U.T OF CHANDIGARH AND STATE OF PUNJAB
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
MANU SHARMA V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH
The applicant has invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the present criminal dispute. The Respondent
challenges the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court. Thereby, the RESPONDENT submits this
memorial which sets forth the facts & the laws on which the responses are based.
VAIBHAV SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB
The applicant has invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the present criminal dispute. The Respondent
challenges the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court. Thereby, the RESPONDENT submits this
memorial which sets forth the facts & the laws on which the responses are based.
MANU SHARMA V. UNION OF INDIA
The applicant has invoked the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the dispute regarding the constitutionality of
the ordinance. The Respondent challenges the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble Court. Thereby, the
RESPONDENT submits this memorial which sets forth the facts & the laws on which the
responses are based.
QUESTIONS OF LAW
MANU SHARMA V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH
ISSUE I: Whether the Special Leave Petition is maintainable in the Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE II: Whether the First Information Report should be quashed.
VAIBHAV SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB
ISSUE I: Whether the Special Leave Petition is maintainable in the Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE II: Whether the First Information Report should be quashed.
MANU SHARMA V. UNION OF INDIA
ISSUE I: Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable in the Hon’ble Court.
ISSUE II: Whether the ordinance is constitutional.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
MANU SHARMA V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE HON’BLE
COURT.
The Special Leave Petition is not maintainable in the Hon’ble Court as the conditions under
which the Supreme Court of India would hear a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India are not satisfied.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT SHOULD BE QUASHED.
The First Information Report should not be quashed as the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble court as well as the conditions mentioned in the provision with regard to quashing an
FIR are not satisfied.
VAIBHAV SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE HON’BLE
COURT.
The Special Leave Petition is not maintainable in the Hon’ble Court as the conditions under
which the Supreme Court of India would hear a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India are not satisfied.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT SHOULD BE QUASHED.
The First Information Report should not be quashed as the principles laid down by the
Hon’ble court as well as the conditions mentioned in the provision with regard to quashing an
FIR are not satisfied.
MANU SHARMA V. UNION OF INDIA
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE HON’BLE COURT.
The Writ petition is not maintainable in the Hon’ble Court as no fundamental right of the
petitioner has been violated in the present case.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
The ordinance is constitutional as it is in consonance with the fundamental rights enshrined in
the Constitution of India, including Article 14, Article 19 and Article 21.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
MANU SHARMA V. UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH
ISSUE I: THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS
NOT MAINTAINABLE.
In the present case, the appellants have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article
1361 which refers to Special leave petition.
The Supreme Court has laid down the grounds on which a Special Leave Petition can be
entertained. It is humbly submitted that firstly, exceptional and special Circumstances2 are not
present [A]; secondly, there is no substantial question of law of General public Importance3 or
any Uncertainty of law4[B]; thirdly,the judgement of the lower court is not erroneous5and
nograve injustice6 has been done [C].
[A] EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT PRESENT.
If exceptional and special circumstances are present, then in such cases, the Special Leave
Petition should be entertained.7 Article 1368 does not confer a right of appeal upon the party9.
It gives the Supreme Court discretionary power10 to interfere in cases which are exceptional
in nature.11
The appellant has merely used an Artificial Intelligence entity as an innocent agency to fulfil
his mala fide intentions. There is a clear case of Section 3412 r/w 30213 and 120 B14 which is
made out against the accused. The concepts of innocent agency, common intention and
criminal conspiracy are not extraordinary under criminal law. Therefore in the present case
there is no extraordinary circumstance on the basis of which SLP can be maintainable.1 Article 136, The Constitution of India (1950).2Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd v. CIT, A.I.R.1955 S.C. 65.3CCE v. Standard Motor Products, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1298; Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1767.4 Central Exercise and Customs v. M/s Venus Castings (p) Ltd., (2000) 4 S.C.C. 206.5BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal, A.I.R.1955 S.C. 610.6Pritamsingh v. State, A.I.R. 195 S.C. 169.7 ZahiraHabubullahSekh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 S.C.C. 353.8 Article 136, The Constitution of India (1950).9Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 633.10Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authotity, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 2036.11Municipal B.D. Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1493.12Section 34, Indian Penal code (1860).13 Section 302, Indian Penal Code(1860).14Section 120-B, Indian Penal code (1860).
[B] THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW OR UNCERTAINITY OF LAW.
In kunhayammed v. State of Kerala15, it was held, that it is the duty of the court to entertain
petitions under Article 136 where a substantial question of law of general public importance
has been raised.
It has also been held that if the law has not been predetermined and there is some uncertainity
regarding the same, the Special Leave Petition can be entertained.16
In the present case, there is no substantial question of law involved. The appellant has prayed
for the quashing of the FIR under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19f73. The
laws relating to quashing of FIR are well settled and there is no ambiguity in this area.
Moreover, the appellants are charged under section 302, 34, 120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860
and the laws relating to these offences have been made certain through various judgements of
this Hon’ble court.
[C] JUDGEMENT OF LOWER COURT IS NOT ERRONEOUSAND NO GRAVE INJUSTICEHAS
BEEN DONE.
In the case of BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal17, The Supreme Court has stated that if the
judgement given by the lower Court is completely baseless and the principle of justice, equity
and good conscience has been ignored, then, in such situations, a person can approach the
Hon’ble court under Article 136.
In the present case, there is no injustice which has been done by the lower court and its
judgement is based on sound principles. The High Court has based its judgement on the
principle that the FIR cannot be quashed at such a preliminary stage and that the police
should be allowed to file the charge sheet. In many cases18, the Supreme Court has laid down
that there is no hard and fast in determining the case in which the High Court can exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the FIR. Moreover, it has been categorically stated that
the High Court can use this power at any stage.19 Therefore, the High Court has rightly used
its discretion to quash the FIR under section 48220 and thereby, no injustice has been caused
to the accused.
15Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2587.16Central exercise and Customs v. M/s Venus Castings(Pvt.), A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1568.17BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 610.18Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 305.19Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1;MinuKumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 S.C.C. 359.20 Section 482,The Code of Criminal Procedure (1973).
Therefore, since important conditions regarding the maintainability of the SLP have not been
fulfilled in the present instance, the Hon’ble court should outrightly reject the matter without
going on the merits of the case.
ISSUE II: THE FIR REGISTERED AGAINST MANU SHARMA SHOULD NOT BE
QUASHED.
The power of the High Court to quash a First Information Report is inherent in nature and can
be exercised under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.21 This section does
not provide the High Court with any new power and only saves the powers inherent with the
High Court even before the enactment of the code.22 The provision itself provides three
circumstances under which the High Court can exercise the inherent powers, namely, to give
effect to an order under the Code, or, to prevent abuse of the process of court, or to otherwise
secure the ends of justice.23
The Supreme Court has laid down seven alternative conditions under which the High Court
should quash an FIR under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.24
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, there is no absurdity in the allegations mentioned in the
FIR [A]; secondly, the allegations made in the FIR against Manu Sharma, prima facie,
constitute an offence [B]; and thirdly, the quashing of FIR would cause injustice [C].
[A] THE ALLEGATIONS MENTIONED IN THE FIR ARE NOT ABSURD.
The allegations mentioned in the First Information Report against Manu Sharma are neither
absurd nor inherently improbable. Therefore, on the basis of the allegations mentioned in the
FIR, there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is humbly submitted that
it is Manu Sharma who is responsible and that the Artificial Intelligence system was
manipulated by him [a].
[a] Manu Sharma is responsible and not artificial intelligence.
According to Gabriel Hallevy’s first model, an Artificial Intelligence entity does not possess
any human attributes and should be considered as an innocent agency.25 According to him, a
21State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy and Others, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1489.22State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and Others, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4135.23PriyaVrat Singh and Others v. ShyamJiSahai, (2008) 8 S.C.C. 232.24State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 604.25 amamama
machine should be treated as a machine and can never be a human being.26 In such peculiar
situations, the perpetrator of the crime will be either the user or the programmer. Usually, a
person who uses an innocent agency for the commission of the crime is liable for the crime
committed by the innocent agency.
If the programmer uses the innocent agency as a means to commit an offence, then the
commission of the offence by the AI entity is attributed to the programmer. The intention of
committing an offence is already fed in the AI entity by the programmer or the user.
Therefore, the action committed by the innocent agency should be taken as the action done of
the programmer.
In the present case, there is a chain of events which establish the guilt of Manu Sharma.
Firstly, Manu Sharma and Riha were fond of each other in their college days but they never
really pursued the matter because of Ish’s presence.27 Moreover, Manu Sharma never looked
at individual clients; however, in this case he took the matter solely in his own hands and did
not allow anyone else from the company to interfere in the case.28 Subsequent to the
commission of the offence, even the M.D. of stargazer stated that the particular action of
Manu Sharma seemed suspicious.29 He also mentions that the AI entity is not completely
anonymous and it was, to a limited extent, influenced by the inputs given by the handlers and
specialists30 and in the present case, the only handler was Manu Sharma.31 Therefore, the
above sequence of events clearly shows the liability of Manu Sharma in the commission of
the offence.
[B] THE ALLEGATIONS MADE IN THE FIR, PRIMA FACIE, CONSTITUTE AN OFFENCE.
The FIR has been registered against Manu Sharma under section 302, 120-B, 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860. In this light, it is put forth that, firstly, Manu Sharma had common
intention to commit murder [a]; and secondly, the offence of Criminal Conspiracy is made
out against the accused [b].
[a] Manu Sharma had requisite common intention to commit murder.
26 id27Moot Proposition, Para 8.28 Moot proposition Para 929 Moot Proposition, Para15.30 Moot Proposition, Para15.31 Moot proposition Para 9
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 recognizes the principle of vicarious liability in
criminal jurisprudence.32 This particular provision makes a person liable for the offence
committed by another with whom he shared a common intention.33
Before showing that Manu Sharma is liable under section 3434, it is humbly submitted before
the Hon’ble court that the act of Riha Kaushal comes under section 300 (Thirdly) and
therefore, amounts to murder. For the application of the provision, there must be an intention
to cause bodily injury and that injury must be sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course
of nature.35A reference to Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence36 will show how easily life may be
destroyed by a blow on the head producing extravasation of blood. Therefore, even a single
blow on the head is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.37
It is clear from the facts of the case that the attack was pre-meditated38 and the blow was
caused on the head with a vase which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.
Subsequently, it is put forth that, firstly, conduct of the parties show common intention [i];
secondly, participation of the accused is not an essential element to attract section 34 [ii]; and
thirdly, the use of the words in furtherance of in section 34 suggests that common intention
was there in this particular case [iii].
[i] Conduct of the parties show common intention.
Common intention can be inferred from the conduct of the parties39 and the totality of the
circumstances.40 Meetings of minds, which is an essential ground for section 32, may be
express or implied.41
It can be seen that there was a meeting of minds between Manu Sharma and Riha. It is this
meeting of minds which is an essential element under section 34.42 This meeting of minds,
32Suresh and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 1344.33Rotash v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 1765.34 Section 34, The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).35Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 465.36Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence, 4thedn, pg 294.37GudarDusadh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 952.38Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 126.39State of Uttar Pradesh v. Iftikhar Khan and Others, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 863.40RishideoPande v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 331.41 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Iftikhar Khan and Others, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 863.42Rajesh GovindJagesha and Others v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 160.
which forms the common intention between the parties, has to be inferred from the conduct
of the parties.43
It is clear from the facts of the case that Manu Sharma classified the files of Riha so that no
person in the company had access to it.44 Moreover, the system of Stargazer was influenced
by the inputs that were provided by the handlers45 and subsequently, Manu Sharma invited
Riha to a purely experimental section of Stargazer.46
Therefore, it is clear from the conduct of Manu Sharma that he had common intention along
with Riha to commit the murder of Ish.
[ii] Participation is not an essential element under section 34.
The participation of the accused in the commission of the offence is not an essential
requirement in every case to attract section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.47 Therefore,
participation of the accused need not be shown in each and every case.48
The essentials of section 3449 are common intention and a criminal act done in furtherance of
it by any one of the persons. Presence of the accused is not an essential requirement under
section 34.50 Therefore, the applicability of section 34 cannot be excluded merely on the basis
that the accused was not physically present at the scene of the offence.51
[iii] The use of the words in furtherance of suggests common intention was present.
It is not necessary that the common intention must be to commit the particular crime which
was actually committed.52 The use of the words ‘in furtherance’ in section 34 suggests that it
is also applicable also where the act actually done is not exactly the act jointly intended by
the accused.53Section 34 makes it quite clear that the liability of all the conspirators is for the
criminal act actually done.54Where several persons bear a common unlawful object and
43Masalti v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 202.44 Moot Proposition para 9.45 Moot Proposition para 1546 Moot Proposition para 947Surendra Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1436.48RamaswamiAyyangar and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2027.49 Section 34, India Penal code, 1860.50Anup Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1941.51JaikrishnadasManohardas Desai and Anr.vs. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 889.52BharwadMepa Dana and Another v. The State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 289.53Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2519.54Bashir v. State, A.I.R. 1953 All. 668.
anyone of the persons commit a criminal act within the scope of a common purpose, all are
responsible for that act, whether it was originally contemplated or not.55
It is clear that the crime was committed in furtherance of the common intention of both Manu
Sharma and Riha.56 Thereby, it is put forth that, Manu Sharma had the requisite common
intention along with Riha to commit the murder of Ish.
[b] The offence of criminal conspiracy is made out against the accused.
The gist of the offence of criminal conspiracy, mentioned under section 120-A of the Indian
Penal Code, is an agreement to commit an offence.57The offence of criminal conspiracy is
complete as soon as there is meeting of minds and unity of purpose between the conspirators
to do the illegal act.58 Therefore, the essential element is the agreement to commit an offence.
The unlawful agreement need not be formal or express but may be inherent in and inferred
from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators.59
Therefore, the agreement may also be implied in nature. Moreover, the presence of the
conspirator at the scene of crime is not an essential element to establish criminal conspiracy.60
It is clearly inferred from the acts and conduct of Riha that there was an implied agreement
between herself and Manu Sharma to commit an offence against Ish. Moreover, there was
unity of purpose between the two of them to eliminate Ish from Riha’s life. Therefore, an
offence of criminal conspiracy is clearly made out against Manu Sharma.
[C] QUASHING OF FIR WOULD CAUSE INJUSTICE.
A First Information Report should be quashed if such exercise of power secures the ends of
justice.61 However, it is humbly submitted that the quashing of FIR in the present case would
cause injustice rather than serving the ends of justice. Thereby, it is put forth that, firstly, a
prima facie case has been made out [a]; and secondly, significant legal issues are involved
[b].
[a] Prima Facie case has been made out.
55Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1988 (36) BLJR 279.56 57State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Others, (1999) 5 S.C.C. 253.58Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1637.59State through Superintendent of Police, CBI/SIT v. Nalini and Others, (1999) 5 S.C.C. 253.60FirozuddinBasheeruddin and Others v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 3488.61Talab Haji Hussain v. MadhukarPurshottamMondkar and Another, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 376.
The power given to the High Court under Section 48262 is very wide in its amplitude and
requires great caution in its exercise.63 It has already been shown that the offence of criminal
conspiracy as well as the common intention to commit murder is made out against the
accused, Manu Sharma. Therefore, the court should not quash an FIR when a prima facie
case has been made out against the accused.
[b] Significant legal issues are involved.
Moreover, the High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie order under section 482
when the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when evidence has not been collected, and
the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of significant magnitude.64
It is clear that the legal issues involving artificial intelligence are of significant importance in
the modern world.65 Moreover, the fact that the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the court66 clearly shows that this is not a fit case in which the FIR should be quashed.
Therefore, the quashing of FIR in this particular case would lead to injustice and therefore in
the present case it should not be quashed.
62 Section 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).63Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1.64MinuKumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4 S.C.C. 359.65 Cite 66 Moot Proposition Para 20
VAIBHAV SHARMA V. STATE OF PUNJAB
ISSUE I: THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 IS
NOT MAINTAINABLE.
In the present case, the appellants have approached The Supreme Court under Article 136 of
the constitution of India which refers to Special leave petition.
The Supreme Court, in various judgments, has laid down the grounds on which an SLP can
be entertained. It is humbly submitted that firstly, exceptional and special Circumstances67 are
not present [A]; secondly, there is no substantial question of law of General public
Importance68 or any Uncertainty of law69[B]; thirdly, the judgement of the lower court is not
erroneous70and no grave injustice71 has been done [C].
[A] EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT PRESENT.
In the case of ZahiraHabibullahshekh v. state of Gujarat,72the Supreme Court has
categorically stated that if exceptional and special circumstances are present, then in such
cases, the Special Leave Petition should be entertained. Article 136 does not confer a right of
appeal upon the party73. It gives the Supreme Court discretionary power74 to interfere in cases
which are exceptional in nature.75
In the present case,the presence of extraordinary circumstance is not there.The appellant has
clearly purchased coke from a decoy website and therefore, it is a clear case in which Section
22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act should be invoked. The cases
relating to purchase of contraband are fairly common in India and a number of cases come up
regularly regarding the same.
[B]THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW OR UNCERTAINITY OF LAW.
67Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd v. CIT, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65.68CCE v. Standard Motor Products, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1298; Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1767.69 Central Exercise and Customs v. M/s Venus Castings (p) Ltd., (2000) 4 S.C.C. 206.70BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal, A.I.R.1955 S.C. 610.71Pritamsingh v. State, A.I.R. 195 S.C. 169.(check year)72ZahiraHabubullahSekh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 5 S.C.C. 353.73Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 633.74Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authotity, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 2036.75Municipal B.D. Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla, A.I.R.1982 S.C. 1493.
In kunhayammed v. State of Kerala76, it was held that it is the duty of the court to entertain
petitions under Article 136 where a substantial question of law of general public importance
has been raised.
It is also been held that if the law has not been predetermined and there is some uncertainity
regarding the same, the Special Leave Petition can be entertained.77
In the present case, there is no substantial question of law involved. The appellant has prayed
for the quashing of FIR under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The laws
relating to quashing of FIR are well settled and there is no ambiguity in this area. Moreover,
the appellants have been charged under section 22 of the NDPS act78 and the laws relating to
this offence are no more in controversy. The statute is clear about the interpretation of these
provisions. Therefore, there is no substantial question of law involved nor is there any
uncertainity of law in the present case.
[C] JUDGEMENT OF LOWER COURT IS NOT ERRONEOUS AND NO GRAVE INJUSTICE HAS
BEEN DONE.
In the case of BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal79, The Supreme Court has stated that if the
judgement given by the lower Court is completely baseless and the principle of justice, equity
and good conscience has been ignored, then, in such situations, a person can approach this
court under Article 136.
In the present case, there is no injustice which has been done by the lower court and its
judgement is based on sound principles. The High Court has based its judgement on the
principle that the FIR cannot be quashed at such a preliminary stage and that the police
should be allowed to file the charge sheet. In many cases80, the Supreme Court has laid down
that there is no hard and fast in determining the case in which the High Court can exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the FIR. Moreover, it has been categorically stated that
the High Court can use this power at any stage.81 Therefore, the High Court has rightly used
its discretion to quash the FIR under section 48282 and thereby, no injustice has been caused
to the accused.
76Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2587.77Central exercise and Customs v. M/s Venus Castings(Pvt.), A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 1568.78Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.79BikajiKeshav v. BrijLalNandlal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 610.80Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 305.81Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1;MinuKumari v. State of Bihar (2006) 4 S.C.C. 359. 82 Section 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure (1973).
Therefore, since important conditions regarding the maintainability of the SLP have not been
fulfilled in the present instance, the Hon’ble court should outrightly reject the matter without
going on the merits of the case.
ISSUE II: THE FIR REGISTERED UNDER SECTION 482 SHOULD NOT BE
QUASHED.
The power of the High Court to quash a First Information Report is inherent in nature and can
be exercised under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.83 This section does
not provide the High Court with any new power and only saves the powers inherent with the
High Court even before the enactment of the code.84 The provision itself provides three
circumstances under which the High Court can exercise the inherent powers, namely, to give
effect to an order under the Code, or, to prevent abuse of the process of court, or to otherwise
secure the ends of justice.85
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, the appellant is liable under section 22 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act [A]; andsecondly,the conditions for quashing an FIR
under Section 48286are not fulfilled [B].
[A] THE APPELLANT IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 22 OF THE NDPS ACT.
Section 1687 states that one of the conditions for making a person liable is the purchase of
Cocoa plant and for the same; the punishment may extend to ten years or a fine, which may
extend to one lakh rupees. The term ‘purchase’ has not been defined anywhere in the NDPS
Act.
The definition of purchase has to be construed in a wider sense.88 The term ‘purchase’ should
be interpreted in a comprehensive sense and should include voluntary as well as involuntary
transfer.89 The main ingredients of purchase are 1) There must be acquisition of goods90 2)
The acquisition shall be for cash deferred payment or other valuable consideration91and 3) the
83State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy and Others, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1489.84State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal and Others, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 4135.85PriyaVrat Singh and Others v. ShyamJiSahai, (2008) 8 S.C.C. 232.86 Section 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure (1973).87Section 15, Narcotics Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act(1985).88State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Mills Ltd. A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 687.89Devi Das Gopal krishnan and others v. State of Punjab and others,A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1895.90 State of Himachal Pradesh and Others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and others, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3936.91Madhya Pradesh and others v. Orient Mills Ltd.,A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 687.
valuable consideration referred above should be free from any charge, mortgage,
hypothecation or pledge.92
In the present case, all the three conditions have been fulfilled as the appellant had tried to
acquire the goods as soon as his robot had ordered the coke.93 The payment details and
address mentioned are of the appellant and therefore, he will be considered as the buyer for
any third person.94 Moreover, as the robot has provided the payment details, the second and
third conditions are also fulfilled. Even though all the conditions of purchase are fulfilled, an
involuntary transfer also comes under the category of purchase.
[B] CONDITIONS FOR QUASHING FIR UNDER SECTION 482 ARE NOT FULFILLED.
The Supreme Court has laid down various guidelines for the quashing of an FIR. These
conditions are as follows:
1) No prima facie case against the accused is established, even if the allegations
mentioned in the FIR are taken on their face value.95
2) The allegations mentioned in the FIR do not, in any way, disclose a cognizable
offence for which investigation under section 156(1) is required.96
3) Whether the probability of the conviction of the accused is very bleak and if the case
is continued, there would be great hardship and oppression caused to the accused.97
4) If the proceedings would not serve the ends of justice and will result in the abuse of
the process of the Court.98
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, a prima facie case is established [a]; secondly, allegations
mentioned in the FIR disclose a cognizable offence [b]; thirdly, probability of conviction is
high [c]; and fourthly, the proceedings would clearly serve the ends of justice [d].
[a] Prime facie case is established.
Even If the allegations mentioned are taken at their face value, if there is no prima facie case
which is established against the accused, then the FIR can be quashed by the High Court. In
92Devi Das Gopal krishnan and others v. State of Punjab and others,A.I.R., 1967 S.C. 1895.93 Moot Proposition Para 18.94 Moot Proposition Para 18.95R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1960 S.C. 866.96 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,(1992) Supp.(1) S.C.C. 335.97Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 S.C.C. 466.98Prashant Bharti v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2013) 9 S.C.C. 293.
the present case, there is a clear case under section 2299 which is made out against the
accused.
[b] Allegations mentioned in the FIR disclose a cognizable offence.
The accused is charged under S.22100, which is a cognizable offence as can be seen from S.37
(a)101 of the NDPS Act, which states that every offence punishable under NDPS Act shall be
cognizable in nature.
[c] Probability of conviction of the accused is high.
If, after seeing the allegations mentioned in the FIR, the court is of the view that the chances
of the accused getting convicted is bleak and moreover, if the proceedings are continued, then
it would cause great hardship to the accused, the court, under Section 482102, can quash the
FIR. However, in the present case, it is put forth that there is a clear chance of the accused
getting convicted. The delivery address and the payment details acquired by the police
officers are of the accused103 and this surely creates a suspicion against the accused.
Therefore, the FIR should not be quashed in the present case.
[d] Proceedings will serve the ends of justice.
In the present case, the FIR is filed against a person who has tried to purchase the Narcotic
substances from a decoy website, which was setup by the police to catch drug peddlers and in
the process, he has been caught red handed.104 Therefore, merely initiating proceedings in
such a case, which involves the purchase of contraband, would never cause injustice and can
never result in the abuse of the process of law. Moreover, there is a clear chance of the
accused getting convicted.
Therefore, since none of the conditions required for the quashing of FIR are fulfilled, the FIR
should not be quashed and proceedings should be allowed to continue.
MANU SHARMA V. UNION OF INDIA
99Section 55, Narcotics Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act(1985).100Section 22, Narcotics Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act(1985).101Section 37(a), Narcotics Drugs and psychotropic Substances Act(1985).102 Section 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure (1973).103 Moot Proposition, Para18.104 Moot Proposition, Para18.
ISSUE I: THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
A person or citizen can only file a writ in the Supreme Court of India if his Fundamental right
is violated105. No question other than fundamental Right is determined by Article 32106,
including interlocutory relief.107Judiciary is the ultimate protector of fundamental rights108 and
a writ under Article 32 will not lie for the enforcement of government policy or directive
principle.109In other words, violation of Fundamental Rights is a sine qua non for the exercise
of right conferred by the Article 32110.
In the light, it is submitted that, firstly, the petitioner does not have Locus Standi to file the
writ petition [A]; secondly, Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not violated [B]; thirdly,
Article 19 of the Constitution of India is not violated [C]; and fourthly, Article 21 of the
Constitution of India is not violated [D].
[A] THE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE WRIT PETITION.
It is evident from various judgements of the Hon’ble Court that only a person, whose
fundamental right is violated, has the locus Standi to file a writ petition in the Supreme
Court.111 The legal right which is enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the legal right
of the petitioner and of nobody else.112 The rights which can be enforced must ordinarily be
the rights of petitioner himself.113Petition cannot be filed by any other person.114
In the present case, there has been no violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner. The
ordinance was passed with the sole motive to protect public interest. The ordinance was
passed to discourage citizens from committing crimes and then blaming on machines115 that
couldn’t be prosecuted or punished under the law prevailing in the country.
105 Andhra Industrial works v. Chief Controller of Imports, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1539.106 Star Sugar mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 37.107 Express News Paper v. Union of India, (1986) 1 S.C.C. 133.108Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2006 S.C.109 B. Krishna V. Union of India, (1990) 3 S.C.C. 65.110Hindi HarshakSamiti v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 851.111S.sinha v. S.Lal& Co., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2720.112 G.C College V. GuahatiUniverity, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 761.113State of A.P V. Mc dowell& Co., (1996) 3 S.C.C. 709.114State of A.P V. Mc dowell& Co., (1996) 3 S.C.C. 709.
115 Moot Proposition para 19.
[B] THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India ensures equal protection of laws which means the right
to equal treatment in similar circumstances.116
The ordinance does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India as the Doctrine of
Reasonable Classification117 protects the ordinance and moreover, the ordinance is not
arbitrary in nature.118
[C] THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Article 19(1) (g) guarantees right to profession to its citizen.119 It provides that all citizens
have the right to practice any profession.120 Although, Article 19(6) provides for restrictions,
the same has to be reasonable and in the interest of the general public.121 Therefore, the
conclusion is irresistible that the rights protected by article 19(1), in so far as theyrelate to
rights attached to the person, that is, the rights referred to in sub-clauses (a) to (e) and (g), are
rights which only a free citizen, who has the freedom of his person unimpaired, can
exercise.122 The state can make any law imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest of
general public.123
In the present case, the ordinance passed by the central government was in public interest so
as to protect law and order in the country. The step was taken as a measure to restrict the
individuals to commit the crimes and blame the entities which are not covered under any law
prevailing in the country, that is, Artificial Intelligence entities.124 The ordinance was passed
to restrict the individuals from committing the crime and absolving themselves from the
liability arising from illegal act of theirs. Therefore, the ordinance is very well covered under
article 19(6) of the constitution and hence, does not violate any fundamental right of the
petitioner.
116Shrikishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 795.117R.K.Garg and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 675.118E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555.119 120 121 122K. Rajendran&Ors. Etc. Etc vs State Of Tamil Nadu, 1982 AIR 1107.123 Article 19(6), The Constitution of India(1950).124 Moot proposition Para 19
[D] THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 relates only to the acts of State or acts
under the authority of the State which are not according to procedure established by law. The
main object of Article 21 is that before a person is deprived of his life or personal liberty by
the State, the procedure established by law must be strictly followed. Right to Life means the
right to lead meaningful, complete and dignified life. It does not have restricted meaning. It is
something more than surviving or animal existence. The meaning of the word life cannot be
narrowed down and it will be available to every citizen of the country. The Apex Court gave
a new dimension bystating that the procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable.125
It is clear from the facts that the government has the authority to pass the ordinance and
although, right to livelihood of few citizens is being affected but that was done merely to
serve the larger interest of the community. The basic intent to pass the ordinance was to serve
the interest of the public at large.
ISSUE II: THE ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
The ordinance making power is given to the president of India under Article 123 of the
Constitution of India. An ordinance is a law126 and therefore, can impose a restriction on the
fundamental rights given under Article 19 (1).127
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, the ordinance does not violate the fundamental right given
under Article 19 (1) (g) [A]; secondly, the ordinance does not violate the Right to Life given
under Article 21 [B]; and thirdly, the ordinance is not arbitrary and hence, does not violate
Article 14 of the constitution of India [C].
[A] THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE 19 (1) (G).
The fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g)128 gives the right to a citizen to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 19 (1) guarantees those
great and basic rights which are recognized and guaranteed as the natural rights inherent in
the status of a citizen of a free country.129
125Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597.126Article 13 (2), Constitution of India (1950).127Article 19 (1), Constitution of India (1950).128Article 19 (1) (g), Constitution of India (1950).129State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 92.
The right under Article 19 (1) (g) can only be taken away in the interest of the general
public.130Of the two tests as to the validity of the legislation under Article 19, the first is the
test of reasonableness, and the second test is whether the restriction sought to be imposed on
the fundamental right falls within clauses (2) to (6).131
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, the restriction imposed through the ordinance is
reasonable [a]; and secondly, the restriction is in the interest of the general public [b].
[a] The restriction imposed is reasonable.
The reasonability of the restriction imposed must be determined from the standpoint of the
interests of the general public and not from the point of view of the persons upon whom the
restrictions are imposed.132 A strong nexus between the restriction and the object of the
ordinance would go a long way in establishing constitutionality of the ordinance.133 It has
been held that the term ‘restriction’ includes prohibition as well.134
The citizens have no right to carry on a business which is dangerous135 to the society or
injurious to health, safety and welfare of general public.136 Therefore, total prohibition in such
cases is reasonable.137
The object of the ordinance is to prohibit the people from using Artificial Intelligence entities
to commit crimes138 and therefore, the prohibition imposed is clearly connected with the
object of the ordinance.139 Moreover, the prohibition has been imposed after two such
instances in quick succession. It is clear that such entities can be used as innocent agencies to
commit crimes and therefore, is dangerous to the public welfare. Using these entities to
commit crimes would lead to disorder in the society. Therefore, no matter how important the
right of a citizen may be, it has to yield to the larger interests of the community.140
[b] Ordinance is in the interest of general public.
130 Article 19 (6), Constitution Of India (1950).131DharamDutt v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 1295.132Hanif Qureshi Mohd. V. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 731.133M.R.F. Ltd. v. Inspector Kerala Govt., (1998) 8 S.C.C. 227.134Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Others v. Union of India and Others, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 3240.135Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 220.136State of Bombay v. F.N.Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318.137Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise Commissioner of Taxation, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1121.138 Moot Proposition para 19139 Moot Proposition para 19140KesavanandaBharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461.
The fundamental right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or
business can only be restricted if the restriction is in the interest of the general public.141
The ordinance might be ‘in the interests of the general public’ even though it affects the
interests of particular individuals, or causes hardship to particular individuals.142 The phrase
‘in the interest of general public’ has wide amplitude and includes public order, public
security and public morals.143Any financial loss caused to any person through the ordinance is
insignificant as the ordinance serves the larger public interest.144It is in the interest of
everyone that the crimes should be effectively investigated and the guilty prosecuted.145
Therefore, the ordinance is clearly in the general public interest since it would prevent crimes
by, or through, Artificial Intelligence entities and prevent public disorder and secure public
welfare. Moreover, it would prevent people from blaming Artificial Intelligence entities for
the crimes committed by them and would ensure effective investigation and punishment to
the guilty. Therefore, the ordinance protects the public order and is in the interest of the
general public.
[B] THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21.
Article 21 is not attracted in case of trade or business. The right to carry on any trade or
business and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 are too remote to be
connected together.146Moreover, the right to livelihood is included within Article 21 but when
the business or trade is injurious to public health or has insidious effect on public morale or
public order, it can be restrained.147
It is clear that Artificial Intelligence Agencies have been used, and can be used, to commit
crimes which would cause disorder in the society. Therefore, Article 21 would not be
attracted in this particular case.
141Article 19 (6), Constitution of India (1950).142Narendra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 430.143Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Others v. Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai and Another, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1205.144The State of Maharashtra v. HimmatbhaiNarbheram Rao and Others, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1157.145SmtSelvi and Others v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 2010 S.C. 1974.146Sodan Singh and Others v.New Delhi Municipal Committee and Others, (1989) 4 S.C.C. 155.147M.J.Sivani and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1770.
Also, according to the surveys conducted in India, it is clear that the rate of depression among
the Indian youth due to parental deprivation is very high148 (i.e. about 39.28%149) which
makes India a niche market for companies like stargazer.
[C] THE ORDINANCE DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14.
Article 14 of the Constitution of India ensures equal protection of laws which means the right
to equal treatment in similar circumstances.150 But such equal protection of law need not be
adhered to when there is reasonable classification and the impugned law is arbitrary.151
It is humbly submitted that, firstly, the classification made by the ordinance is reasonable [a];
and secondly, the ordinance is not arbitrary in nature [b].
[a] The classification is reasonable.
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution does not prohibit reasonable classification.152 The test
for reasonable classification is that, firstly, the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and
secondly, that differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by
the Act.153 It is thereby put forth that firstly, there exists an intelligible differentia [i]; and
secondly, there is a rational nexus between the differentia and the object of the ordinance [ii].
[i] Intelligible differentia.
The business relating to Artificial Intelligence is prima facie¸ and quiet significantly different
from any other business due to the advanced technology that is required for such a business
and the disorder that it could cause to the society.
Therefore, it has been rightly differentiated from any other form of business.
[b] Rational nexus.
The fact that the ordinance has differentiated the business of Artificial Intelligence and
subsequently, prohibited it is clearly linked with the object that the ordinance seeks to
achieve.148Poongothai S, Pradeepa R, Ganesan A, Mohan V. Prevalence of depression in a large urban South Indian population - The Chennai Urban Rural Epidemiology Study (CURES-70) PloS One. 2009;4:E7185.149 Badrinarayana A. Study of suicidal risk factors in depressive illness. Indian J Psychiatry. 1980;22:81–3150Shrikishan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 795.151 152BudhanChowdhry v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 191.153R.K.Garg and Others v. Union of India and Others, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 675.
It has already been stated that the object of the ordinance is to prohibit the people from using
Artificial Intelligence entities to commit crimes and therefore, the prohibition imposed is
clearly connected with the object of the ordinance.
[b] The ordinance is not arbitrary.
An arbitrary state action violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.154 The ordinance or
the government policy cannot be held to violate Article 14 unless it is wholly unreasonable.155
For deciding whether a particular decision was arbitrary or reasonable, the existing
circumstances at the time of taking the decision had to be examined.156 The court should not
interfere where the state seeks to promote the common good of the people.157
It is clear that the two successive incidents relating to Artificial Intelligence agencies clearly
warranted a stringent action and moreover, it has already been stated that the ordinance
promotes the public welfare at large and therefore, is not unreasonable.
Moreover, an ordinance cannot be struck down only on the ground that it is arbitrary.158
154E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555.155Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 911.156Patna Regional Development Authority v. RashtriyaPariyojnaNirman Nigam, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2074.157Mohinder Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.C. 85.158State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1511.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed and implored before the Supreme Court of India, that it may be graciously
pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1) The SLP’s in the present case are not maintainable.
2) The FIR against Manu Sharma should not be quashed.
3) The FIR against Vaibhav Sharma should not be quashed.
4) The writ petition filed under Art. 32 should not be held maintainable
5) The ordinance is constitutionally valid.
Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the RESPONDENT to meet the
ends of equity, justice and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the Respondent shall duty bound forever pray.