Resilience can counter Dezinformatsiya - CHORUS · Resilience can counter Dezinformatsiya How the military considers its contribution to enhancing Dutch resilience. ... 'We want to

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Resilience can counter Dezinformatsiya How the military considers its contribution to enhancing Dutch resilience.

Author: Ir. Caspar Versteegden Supervisor: Dr. Floribert Baudet Co-examiner: Dr. Jörg Noll August 2018. Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Military Science of the Netherlands Defence Academy, as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA in Military Strategic Studies.

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This thesis is dedicated to my wife’s patience.

This thesis is the sole work of the author, and has not been accepted in any previous application for a degree; all quotations and source information have been acknowledged. Signature Date: August 2, 201

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Abstract: Although disinformation is certainly not a new phenomenon, it nowadays poses a near insoluble problem for the western world. Russian disinformation, Dezinformatsiya, in particular is perceived as an aggressive method to influence western societies and politics. One of the countermeasures proposed by scholars, think tanks and international organizations is the enhancement of (societal) resilience. This thesis researches how resilience can be built or enhanced according to theory and proves that resilience can indeed counter the effects of disinformation. The current involvement of resilience in policies for countering disinformation is investigated. Resilience is found to be omnipresent, which might indicate a form of symbiosis with countering disinformation. The opinion of military experts in the field is that the implementation of these policies in the Netherlands is not yet adequate, indicating a mismatch between policy and practice. This thesis provides recommendations how to solve this mismatch, e.g. implementing media literacy programs in Dutch scholar systems, re-emphasizing our own values and norms or installing a central board coordinating all issues regarding disinformation. Military assets can certainly play a role in supporting this enhancement of resilience, although the acceptance of the use of these assets is not aphoristic.

Samenvatting: Hoewel desinformatie zeker geen nieuw fenomeen is, is het vandaag de dag een schier onoplosbaar probleem voor de westerse wereld. Russische desinformatie, Dezinformatsiya, in het bijzonder wordt gezien als een agressieve methode om de westerse maatschappijen en politiek te beïnvloeden. Een van de maatregelen die voorgesteld worden door deskundigen, denktanks en internationale organisaties is het versterken van de (maatschappelijke) weerbaarheid. Deze thesis onderzoekt hoe weerbaarheid, volgens de theorie, kan worden gebouwd of versterkt en bewijst dat weerbaarheid inderdaad de effecten van desinformatie kan bestrijden. De huidige aanwezigheid van weerbaarheid in beleid om desinformatie te bestrijden wordt onderzocht. Weerbaarheid blijkt alom tegenwoordig te zijn, wat een indicatie kan zijn van een vorm van symbiose met bestrijden van desinformatie. Militaire experts die op dit gebied werkzaam zijn vinden de implementatie van dit beleid in Nederland echter inadequaat, en wijzen op een discrepantie tussen beleid en praktijk. Deze thesis doet aanbevelingen om die discrepantie op te lossen door bijvoorbeeld media-literacy programma’s in te voeren in het Nederlandse schoolsysteem, meer nadruk te leggen op onze eigen normen en waarden of een centraal orgaan in te stellen dat zich bezighoudt met alle facetten van desinformatie. Militaire middelen kunnen zeker een rol spelen in de versterking van weerbaarheid, alhoewel het gebruik van deze middelen niet vanzelfsprekend is.

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Table of Contents: Abstracts. 3 Table of Contents. 4 Figures and Tables. 5 Abbreviations. 6 Introduction. 7 Chapter 1. Dezinformatsiya. 10 Chapter 2. Resilience Theory. 21 Chapter 3. Do current policies against disinformation involve or even enhance resilience? 30 Chapter 4. Implementation of policies against disinformation and the role of military assets in helping enhance resilience in the Netherlands. 38 Chapter 5. Conclusions. 45 Chapter 6. Discussion and Recommendations. 47 Bibliography 51 Appendix A: Interview protocol. 64

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Figures Figure 1. Anti-hegemonic warfare. 13 Figure 2. State-Funded Russian Media for Foreign Audiences. 15 Figure 3. Building Blocks of a Resilient Society. 26

Tables Table 1. Dominant Concepts and Practices employed by Russia. 10 Table 2. Russia’s Hybrid tools. 12 Table 3: Selected definitions of resilience. 22 Table 4. MMR Typology of resilience. 24 Table 5. Crosscheck effectiveness of Resilience Building Blocks. 29 Table 6. EU actions against hybrid threats. 31 Table 7. Presence of Building Blocks of Resilience in various strategies. 37 Table 8. How interviewees refer to resilience building blocks 45

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Abbreviations. A2AD Anti-Access and Area Denial AD Anno Domini C&E Communication and Engagement CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMICo Civil Military Interaction Command COE Centre of Excellence DCC Defence Cyber Command DCO Defence Communication Organization DOPS Directorate of Operations EEAS European External Action Service eFP enhanced Forward Presence EU European Union HDB Directorate of Policy (Hoofddirectie Beleid) HLEG High Level Expert Group JIT Joint Investigation Team KCT Dutch Special Forces (Korps Commando Troepen) MIVD Military Intelligence Agency (Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst) MoD Ministry of Defence NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe PA Public Affairs RT Russia Today SACT Supreme Allied Command Transformation SME Subject Matter Expert Stasi Ministry for State Security (Staatssicherheitsdienst) STRATCOM Strategic Communication TEU Treaty of the European Union UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States VAT Value Added Tax WRR Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het

Regeringsbeleid)

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Introduction. On the 17th of July 2014 Air Malaysia flight MH17 crashed over Eastern Ukraine, with 298 people on board. There were no survivors. On the 18th of July Prime-Minister Rutte of the Netherlands already disclosed that the plane was shot down and assured the Dutch the shooting would be thoroughly investigated and the guilty would be brought to trial.1 In the weeks after the disaster in which 193 Dutch people were killed, the Netherlands, in a state of shock, watched dozens of coffins with human remains flying into Eindhoven airport and being transported to Hilversum for identification purposes. Although the people of the Netherlands seemed to stand united in grief in the first days and weeks after the disaster, there never was consonance about who was responsible for the shooting down of flight MH17. In spite of a conclusive report by the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) there remains doubt in Dutch society about what to believe.2 Many theories about the cause of the incident and consequent loss of MH-17 circulated in the weeks, months and even years after the event. Most of these theories can be traced back to be of Russian origin. Russian MoD and Russian state-sponsored news agencies launched different stories about what happened to flight MH-17 varying from the shifting of MH-17’s flight path, to the downing being done by a Ukrainian BUK-launcher, to the theory that the MH-17 was shot down by a Ukrainian Sukhoi-25 fighter plane. The most peculiar fictions involved the allegedly mistaking MH-17 for President Putin’s plane and a CIA conspiracy-theory in which MH-17 was supposedly loaded with corpses to be downed over Eastern-Ukraine.3 Many of these theories were self-contradictory or were completely abandoned after some time.4 Their spin-off however, is enormous and can still be found littering the Internet. The wilful spreading of diverging theories through a “fire hose of falsehood” is one of many new challenges the Western World is facing, against which there is no fitting answer.5 Many scholars have concluded that particular authoritarian regimes such as Russia are successful in creating influence through non-kinetic means.6 The purposeful spreading of diverging and confusing theories through various channels in order to create an information overload at the receiver’s end, is part of Russian

1 “Rutte: 'We want to get to the bottom of this tragedy',” Rijksoverheid, accessed February 27, 2018, https://www.government.nl/topics/mh17-incident/news/2014/07/18/rutte-we-want-to-get-to-the-bottom-of-this-tragedy. 2 Openbaar Ministerie, Presentation preliminary results criminal investigation MH17 28-09-2016, accessed February 28, 2018, https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/presentaties/presentation-joint/; See also Peter Kanne and Milan Driessen, Desinformatie leidt tot verwarring bij Nieuwsconsument. Onderzoek voor de Volkskrant (Amsterdam: I&O research, 2017). 3 Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for confronting the West. Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power (London: Chatham House, 2016); See also: David Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters (New York: Basic Books, 2017); Hans de Vreij, De kronkels in de Russische versies over de MH17, 2016. https://www.raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/oekraine/283-de-kronkels-in-de-russische-versies-over-de-mh17; Arik Toler, “The Kremlin’s Shifting, Self-Contradicting Narratives on MH17, 2018”, accessed February 27, 2018, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/01/05/kremlins-shifting-self-contradicting-narratives-mh17/. 4 Peter Groenendijk, “Waarom de Russen niet meer over MH17 praten,” Algemeen Dagblad, July 16, 2018, https://www.ad.nl/buitenland/waarom-de-russen-niet-br-meer-over-mh17-praten~a87093a2/. 5 Christopher Paul et al, Lessons from Others for Future U.S. Army Operations in and Through the Information Environment. Case Studies, (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2018), 185. 6 Frans Osinga, “The Promise, Practice and Challenges of Non-Kinetic Instruments of Power” in Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. Winning without Killing: The strategic and operational Utility of non-kinetic capabilities in Crises, eds. P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga. (The Hague: Asser Press) 1-18; See also: Roy Godson, “Written Testimony of ROY GODSON to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing, March 30, 2017,” Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Homeland Security Digital Library; Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden, Fake News: a Roadmap (Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018).

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doctrine.7 It is called Dezinformatsiya, which we translate as disinformation. Disinformation assaults the social cohesion of our societies, undermines trust in our information system and is hence perceived as a risk to our democracies.8 In the last few years the western world has become aware of this threat and is diligently looking for ways and means to counter disinformation, or rather the effects of disinformation. One of the solutions to counter disinformation and its effects that has been propagated by organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), by numerous think tanks and by many scholars, is the enhancement of resilience of western societies. Resilience is a concept that has been used in ecology and environmental science and has found its way into security policy recently. Resilience can be described as the ability of something or someone to cope in the face of adversity, i.e. to recover or rebound and return to the normal situation.9 The purpose of this research is to find solutions that can counter the threats posed by disinformation campaigns by the Russian Federation, by helping emerge a resilient collective mind-set. Although this research is specifically aimed at the Netherlands, it is obvious that the issues we are researching can never be solved by Dutch efforts alone. Therefore, we will involve doctrine and policy that is developed and used by the treaty organizations the Netherlands adheres to: The EU and NATO. Most research regarding the enhancement of resilience focuses on the role of civil society. This research will use a military perspective and will look at the role Dutch military assets can play in helping enhance societal resilience. The core question of this research will be:

How can resilience in the Netherlands be enhanced by the military to counter the effects of disinformation?

With the following sub questions:

1. What is disinformation and why is it used? 2. What is resilience? 3. Can resilience counter disinformation? 4. How can resilience be enhanced according to theory? 5. Do Dutch, EU and NATO policies enhance resilience? 6. Are Dutch civilian and military assets suited for enhancing resilience? 7. Would there be sufficient acceptance in the Netherlands for the use of military assets to enhance

resilience? To answer these questions, we relied on a broad set of research approaches that include mostly qualitative and sometimes quantitative methods. Specific research methods, if applicable, are detailed in each chapter, but we provide a brief overview here.

7 Neil Verrall and David Mason, ”The Taming of the Shrewd”, The RUSI Journal, March 19, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2018.1445169; See also: Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, (Rome, NATO Defense College, Fellowship Monograph, 2016), 46-60; Valery Gerasimov, “According to the Syrian experience, hybrid war demands high-technology weapons and scientific rationale”, Military-Industrial Courier, issue No.9 (2016, 624), 1; De Jong et al., Inside the Kremlin house of Mirrors. How liberal democracies can counter Russian Disinformation and Societal Interference (The Hague, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2017); Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters; Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017 (Den Haag: Crossmedia, 2018). 8 Theo Brinkel, “The Resilient Mind-Set and Deterrence”. In Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, Winning without Killing: The strategic and operational Utility of non-kinetic capabilities in Crises, eds. P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga (The Hague: Asser Press, 2017), 23; See also: European Commission High Directorate for Communication Networks, Content and Technology, A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation. Report of the High level group on fake news and disinformation (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), 10. 9 A. McAslan, The Concept of Resilience. Understanding its Origins, Meaning and Utility, (Adelaide: Torrens Resilience Institute, 2010); See also: Carl Folke, “Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analysis,” Global Environmental Change 16: 253-67 (2006), 259; J. Rodin, The Resilience Dividend; Managing Disruption, Avoiding Disaster, and Growing Stronger in an Unpredictable World (London: Profile Books, 2015), 3.

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Chapter One examines the problem Russian disinformation is posing for the entire western world. Drawing from published and unpublished reports, doctrinal papers, policy papers and various Internet data such as digital journals, websites and blogs, and interviews; we will investigate what disinformation is. We will examine how it is embedded in Russian doctrine and if it is perceived as a threat by the western world. Chapter Two draws on classic and more modern resilience theory documents to examine the concept of resilience. We will draft a working definition regarding resilience and disinformation and we will define building blocks that are expected to build or enhance resilience. In Chapter Two we will also try to prove that the concept of resilience is indeed suitable to counter disinformation. In Chapter Three we will benchmark building blocks of resilience against policies used to counter disinformation. The policies against disinformation developed by EU, NATO and the Netherlands will be examined to find out if they do adjoin the aforementioned building blocks and hence involve resilience. This will be done by a qualitative search of the policy documents. Chapter Four will discuss the perceived implementation of the policies researched in Chapter Three to find out if the policies really work. We will present findings from military documents on current and future operational development and, equally important, from experts in the field. In order to get the most current opinions, we have interviewed about 30 military and civilian personnel working in positions where they are able to implement or influence policy. This concerns personnel from the Dutch Ministry of Defence working at the Directorate of operations (DOPS), at the Policy Directorate (HDB), at the knowledge centre of the Dutch Civil-Military Interaction unit (1 CMICo), at Army brigade-level, at the German/Dutch Corps level, at several Centres of Excellence (CoE), and at Dutch Special Forces (KCT). We also conducted interviews with personnel working at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and people working in the social capital sphere. Chapter Five will draw conclusions from findings presented in Chapters Two through Four, and answer the main research question. Finally, in Chapter Six we will discuss recommendations for enhancing resilience and countering disinformation.

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Chapter 1. Dezinformatsiya. In this chapter the concept of disinformation will be discussed. Disinformation is not new; one could even state that Arminius already used it against Varus, which led to the loss of three Roman legions in AD 9.10 Disinformation is not reserved for Russia, as many claim the information campaign shaping the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to be a textbook example of disinformation by the US.11 But the manifestations of Russian disinformation in the last couple of years are certainly seen as a new threat.12 In this chapter the place and the goal of disinformation in Russian doctrine will be discussed as well as the concept of Dezinformatsiya itself. After giving some examples of its use, we will look at how the western world perceives disinformation. Finally, we will look at a concept that seems promising in countering disinformation. Doctrinal origin of disinformation The purposeful spreading of diverging and confusing theories is commonly ascribed to Russian strategies and doctrine in which the use of these disinformation campaigns is ubiquitous. The use of “informational provocation” is nothing new and has been part of the Russian/Soviet lexicon of conflict for generations.13 It is the inheritance of a culture of influence deriving from the Soviet and even Tsarist past.14 Many scholars point out that disinformation campaigns are inherent to Russian Reflexive Control Theory. Reflexive Control is the Russian equivalent of information warfare and makes use of active measures such as maskirovska (deception) and dezinformatsija (disinformation) in order to control the enemy’s decision-making processes. These different concepts are explained in table 1. Table 1. Dominant Concepts and Practices employed by Russia. 15

10 Tacitus, Annals I (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1998). 11 Interview with Officer at Public Affairs, April 2018. 12 Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 4. 13 Oscar Jonsson and Robert Seely, ‘Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2015, pp. 3–4. 14 James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad, (London: Chatham House, 2013). 15 Verrall and Mason, Taming the Shrewd.

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Reflexive Control wants to impact a state from its military and government systems down to its population’s opinions.16 By targeting the information flow and the information systems, Russia is able to influence its target to form a decision based on disinformation in the direction desired by Russia.17 The question why Russia uses Reflexive Control on our western societies is difficult to answer and leads to a lot of discussion. A widely supported point of view is that Reflexive Control is mirrored in the Gerasimov doctrine, which is believed to postulate that every effort Russia makes today is in support of a future military conflict that will evolve x years from now.18 Examples are the Russian interventions in Georgia and the Ukraine, where years of influencing preceded a conclusive military invasion. Gerasimov himself states in 2016 ” the most effective asymmetric methods of warfare are falsification of events, [and] limiting the activities of the media”.19 Information resources have become one of the most effective weapons that can upturn a country within days. All that is needed besides that is military measures of hidden nature, including assistance to extremist and terrorist organizations.20 This has led to the wide-spread belief that the Gerasimov doctrine is the basis for an overarching strategy in which the Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) in Kaliningrad,21 the use of tactical nuclear missiles as means of escalation,22 Russian “snap exercises” and the aggressive incursions of Russian airplanes and vessels all have their role.23 Gerasimov doctrine, Reflexive Control or “hybrid warfare” are seen by many as the way for Russia to maintain or enlarge its influence in what it calls its “near-abroad”, being the ancient Soviet satellite states, and to influence countries further away from its borders. An overview of the tools Russia uses in “hybrid warfare” is provided in Table 2. In contrast to this stands the opinion that Gerasimov wrote an article that was only meant to be read by Russia’s senior leadership and that may have been intended to reassure this leadership that the MoD can meet Russia’s current and future threats.24 It was meant as a wake-up call about catching up with and defeating, what Gerasimov regards as a Western innovation.25 This would mean that Gerasimov doctrine is not set on reconquering the near abroad and Gerasimov only urges the Russians to adopt the New Western way of war, that was used to intervene in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the ‘Arab

16 Timothy L. Thomas, Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17 (2004): 237–256. 17 Natalie Minton, Cognitive Biases and Reflexive Control (thesis, The Mississippi University, 2017). 18 In 2013 chief of the Russian General staff, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, published “The Value of Science is in the Foresight: New Challenges demand rethinking the Forms and Methods of carrying out Combat Operations” in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier. (Military-Industrial Courier). In this article Gerasimov lays out his perspective of the past, present and future of warfare. Although the article was published before the Maidan protests and Gerasimov could not have foreseen the events that followed leading up to the Crimean invasion, this article is often cited in the West as “Gerasimov doctrine” for the way Russian forces conduct their operations. See: Charles K. Bartles, Getting Gerasimov right, Military Review January-February 2016, 30-39. 19 Gerasimov, “According Syrian experience”, 1. 20 Ibid. 21 Kathleen Weinberger, Russian Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) Range: August 2016, accessed February 27, 2018, http://iswresearch.blogspot.nl/2016/08/russian-anti-access-and-area-denial.html; See also: Tomasz Smura, Russian Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities - implications for NATO, accessed February 28, 2018, https://pulaski.pl/en/russian-anti-access-area-denial-a2ad-capabilities-implications-for-nato/. 22 E. Colby, Russia's Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, accessed February 28, 2018, https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/russia-s-evolving-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-implications-2016-01; See also Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 23; Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017, 19; 23 Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 21,22; See Also Frans Osinga, Net geen oorlog? Hybrid Warfare en de uitdaging van de nieuwe geopolitieke realiteit, Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing 2016, 14(5–6): 16-21; See also: Ulrik Franke, War by non-military means. Understanding Russian information warfare. Ministry of Defence, 2015, ISSN 1650-1942, 49. 24 Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov right”, 31; See also: Eugenio Cusumano and M. Corbe, A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 305; Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the’Gerasimov Doctrine’,” Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/(accessed March 28, 2018); Ulrik Franke, War by non-military means, 41; Molly McKew, The Gerasimov Doctrine. It’s Russia’s new chaos theory of political warfare. And it’s probably being used on you, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538 (accessed February 27, 2018). 25 M. Galeotti, “The Gerasimov Doctrine and Russian Non-Linear War", In Moscow’s Shadows, accessed March 2, 2018. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/; See also Robinson et al. Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2018).

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Spring’, in order to protect itself.26 In all these interventions and uprisings Russia decidedly perceives a threat, especially in the emphasis of the West in transforming countries and societies Russia deems within its sphere of influence: the ancient Soviet Republics. Russia looks upon the so-called “colour revolutions” in these countries as coups d’état supported and funded by the West rather than originating from domestic movements.27 Table 2. Russia’s Hybrid tools.28

Galeotti, who is the self-proclaimed founding father of the term “Gerasimov doctrine”, makes a 180-degree turn in 2018. He states he is sorry for launching the term “Gerasimov doctrine”, while he was describing Russian “active measures”, not only as a prelude to armed operations, but rather as an alternative for them.29 This would fundamentally change the understanding of the threat and therefore our best responses, meaning armed deterrence remains a necessity, but counterintelligence, media literacy and fighting corruption are equally important as countermeasures to this form of “active measures”.30 Offensive or defensive doctrine? The above poses the question if Reflexive Control, and “Gerasimov doctrine” -if you will- are based on an offensive, or on a defensive mind-set. According to Covington - a renowned strategist, who was advisor to 10 Supreme Allied Commanders Europe on international affairs over a 27 year period - it is actually both: He states Russia assumes it is strategically unique and Russia’s strategic culture centers on a “perceived geo-strategic and technological vulnerability that feeds an uncertainty about Russia being truly defendable”.31 Russia has extremely long and porous borders, which make it difficult to defend

26 Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov right”, 30-39. 27 Colby, Russia’s Evolving Doctrine; See also Gerasimov, “According Syrian experience”; Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 10; Galeotti, Sorry for Doctrine. 28 James Rogers, ‘Reinforcing Deterrence Through Societal Resilience: Countering Hybrid Threats in the Baltic Region’ in A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats, eds. Eugenio Cusumano and Corbe Eugenio (Palgrave Macmillan US. 2017), 263. 29 Galeotti, Sorry for Doctrine. 30 Ibid. 31 Stephen R. Covington, The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare (Cambridge: Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, 2016), 13.

1. Threat of nuclear strikes to escalate rapidly in order to—paradoxically—de-escalate, by deterring a Western military response to any Russian action.

2. Military probing activities involving conventional weaponry to maintain pressure on Western countries and create an image of unstoppable Russian power.

3. Threat from regular forces to deter a foreign response to Russia’s more illicit tools, Russian conventional forces are held in abeyance but maintained ready to strike.

4. Snap exercises on foreign borders to generate fear and sow confusion as to Russian intentions among its neighbours.

5. Deployment of so-called little green men: irregular, illicit forces, essentially Russian soldiers without national emblems, making recognition and attribution difficult during an initial Russian attack.

6. Suspension of energy to disrupt energy supply to encourage political instability in subjected countries or draw attention to their vulnerability.

7. Spread of disinformation and fake news to sow confusion and prevent an opponent from establishing an understanding of Russia’s policy or intentions.

8. Interference in foreign elections and stoking corruption to undermine opponents from within and prevent them from responding and to degrade the Western imaginary.

9. Bankrolling foreign pro-Russian sympathisers or minorities to generate societal fissures and disorder. 10. Creating and fanning the flow of refugees within subjected countries, as well as from them, to distract and

overwhelm European governments. 11. Attacking cyber infrastructure using both state-based and non-state-based architecture to undermine opponents

from within.

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reactively. So throughout history deception and misinformation have evolved as tools to influence or even control the political and military systems on the other side of these borders.32 Russia’s strategic uniqueness thus makes it seek opportunistic employment of its armed forces with an overly strong sense of decisive purpose. This means that the average Russian military strategist “holds a view that Russia is strategically vulnerable, susceptible to surprise, and not completely defendable […]”.33 On top of this the Russian military mind-set is in all facets much more pre-emptive than any westerner would believe, “focusing on the moves and next moves of an opponent and decisively disrupting those moves with pre-emptive action”.34 From this combination of factors Covington deduces that, for the Russians, “there is no contradiction between this pre-emptive interpretation of ‘countering anticipated surprise with surprise’ and being defensive”.35 The Russians themselves call it homeland hybrid strategic offensive.36 The simple conclusion here would be that the Russians subscribe to the old adagio that the best defence is offense, and the homeland hybrid strategic offensive can be perceived as such: Offensive! This would make perfect sense, as the Soviet doctrine also was offensive, and we have seen that Russian doctrine is the obvious heir of Soviet doctrine.37 Rogers, expert on European Geopolitics and Baltic Security, supports the view that Russia is conducting a strategic offensive, which he describes as ‘anti-hegemonic warfare’ (See Figure 1), “deliberately designed to ‘scramble’ the Western narrative—even at the centres of Western power—and to spread chaos and discord in its wake”.38 Figure 1. Anti-hegemonic warfare.39

32 Verrall and Mason, Taming the Shrewd. 33 Covington, Culture Strategic thought, 13; See also: Hanna Grininger and Christoph Bilban, “Die Security Studies in Russland im disziplinären Kontext der Internationale Beziehungen” in Neue Ansätze der Sicherheitsstudien, eds. Teresa Ulrich and Thomas Pankratsz, (5) 2018, 67; Robinson et al., Political Warfare, 65. 34 Covington, Culture Strategic thought, 14. 35 Covington, Culture Strategic thought, 14. 36 Ibid., 11. 37 Kenneth M Currie, Soviet Military Doctrine: An Overview (Headquarters USAF Intelligence Assessment, 1983), 8; See also: David M. Glantz, The Bases of Future Soviet Military Strategy, Soviet Army Studies Office, U.S. Army Combined Arms Command (Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 1990), 3: N.V. Ogarkov, Strategiya voyennaya, vol. 7, Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976-1980) 563. 38 Rogers, Reinforcing Deterrence, 265. 39 James Rogers and Andriy Tyushka, ”Russia’s ‘Anti-hegemonic’ Offensive: A New Strategy in Action”, Diplomaatia 160 (December 2016), https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russias-anti-hegemonic-offensive-a-new-strategy-in-action/, accessed March 8, 2018. Russian Myth is the construction of a perceived “great power-in-waiting”, by enabling the pursuit of a future-oriented ideational (re)construction, to generate meanings and legitimize or delegitimize the agency and action in question. Controlling the present to be able to control the past, by changing it, and hence to influence and control the future. This is e.g. done by high-lighting or even changing historical events to frame enemies or enhance Russia’s historical greatness; See Ulrik Franke, War by non-military means, 43.

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Rogers states “Moscow’s new approach is to generate a certain degree of ‘chaos’, which can be ‘managed’ to destabilize those countries that either seek ‘admission’ into the West or are courted by Western countries”.40 According to him the Kremlin knows NATO will not accept semi-stable or unstable states, or states without the required territorial cohesion, into their ranks as members. So Russia hopes to stop further NATO-expansion or ‘Europeanization’ in its sphere of influence, by generating ‘manageable’ chaos in key areas. For this thesis it is important to deduce from the above that the use of Reflexive Control, Gerasimov doctrine or Hybrid warfare, by Russia against the countries in Western Europe is perceived by the West as offensive. We will hence follow the assessment that Russia uses Hybrid warfare and disinformation in an offensive way to reach strategic goals. Dezinformatsiya, the Russian concept of disinformation explained. We have read in the above that disinformation campaigns are used by Russia in offensive doctrine. The Russians call these disinformation campaigns Dezinformatsiya. Dezinformatsiya literally means disinformation, but in Russian doctrine it includes more. The definition we will use is a combination of the definition for Dezinformatsiya and the one for Reflexive control, of which we deem Dezinformatsiya to be an unalienable part.

Disinformation is the purposeful spreading of different theories through multiple channels to create an information overload at the receiver’s end, so that the receiving public can no longer discern truth from false and does not know anymore what to believe, and is inclined to perform whatever the sender desires.41

Apart from the use of Kremlin spokespersons Russia uses a whole array of means to spread this disinformation.42 One asset Russia uses is its state-sponsored News Channels, Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik (see Figure 2).43 These news channels portray themselves as independent, alternative voices telling the untold truth and “providing a perspective otherwise missing from the mainstream media echo chamber”.44 Both RT and Sputnik try to position themselves as independent news agencies, claiming to adhere to Western media culture norms and practices that celebrate and encourage diversity of opinion and freedom of speech. In spite of their efforts, many in the West perceive them as agents of the Kremlin, assisting in undermining trust in media, democracy and authority figures in Western democracies.45 Another asset available to Russia to penetrate Western public consciousness is the use of ‘trolls’ (fraudulent online accounts operated by humans) and ‘bots’ (accounts operated by automated processes). These directly engage with readerships of various media outlets globally.46 In interviews ex-Russian trolls revealed how ‘thousands of fake accounts on Twitter, Facebook, LiveJournal, and vKontakte’ were created to sustain and promote Moscow’s position on several issues as well as to create the impression of a plurality of opinions in the information space.47 A declassified US intelligence report on the alleged Russian

40 Rogers, Reinforcing Deterrence, 265-266. 41 Verrall and Mason, Taming the Shrewd. 42 Helmus et al., Russian Social media. 43 Patikarakos, War in 140 Characters; See also: Molly McKew, The Scourge of Russian Propaganda: Evaluating Russian Information Warfare and Shaping the American Response, Testimony submitted to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Helsinki Commission. September 14, 2017; Sylvia Sasse, ” In the depths of disinformation: this is how RT propaganda works”, Geschichte der Gegenwart, January 28, 2017, https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/in-the-depths-of-disinformation-self-experimentation-with-rt/. 44 McFarquhar, Powerful Russian Weapon. 45 Althuis and Haiden, Fake News. 46 Lawrence Alexander, ‘Social Network Analysis Reveals Full Scale of Kremlin’s Twitter Bot Campaign’, GlobalVoices, April 2, 2015, https://globalvoices.org/2015/04/02/analyzing-kremlin-twitter-bots/ (accessed March 10, 2018); See Also: Helmus et al., Russian Social media; Patrikarakos, War in 140 Characters; Caroline O., Russia’s Troll Factory Just Launched A New Website Targeting Americans. Might be a new direction in information warfare, https://arcdigital.media/russias-troll-factory-just-launched-a-new-website-targeting-americans-cbacdcf3e842. 47 Dmitry Volchek and Daisy Sindelar, ‘One Professional Russian Troll Tells All’, RadioFreeEurope, 2015, https://www.rferl.org/a/how-to-guide-russian-trolling-trolls/26919999.html; See Also Shaun Walker, “ The Russian troll factory at the

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meddling in the 2016 elections, confirms the use of paid social media users or “trolls”.48 According to NATO’s STRATCOM CoE “wider activities of troll factories include the use of blogs, false stories, and opinion pieces posted on pseudo-news websites”.49 Figure 2. State-Funded Russian Media for Foreign Audiences 50

Russian disinformation campaigns use all of these assets and “seek 5 complementary objectives to strengthen Russia’s position over Western democracies”:51

- Undermine citizen confidence in democratic governance; - Foment and exacerbate divisive political fractures; - Erode trust between citizens and elected officials and democratic institutions; - Popularize Russian policy agendas within foreign populations; - Create general distrust or confusion over information sources by blurring the lines between

facts and fiction.52

The tried and tested way of making disinformation work is using the adversary’s weakness against him, which in this case is the western emphasis on balance in media reporting. This emphasis ensures that Russian narratives, no matter how patently fraudulent they are, will be repeated to European and American audiences by their own media and thus validated and reinforced.53

heart of the meddling allegations”, Guardian, international edition, April 2, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/02/putin-kremlin-inside-russian-troll-house. 48 National Intelligence Council, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington: Declassified report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2017). https://www.dni.gov/files/ documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 49 Althuis and Haiden, Fake News, 64. 50 Robinson et al., Political Warfare, 62. 51 Weisburd, Andrew, Clint Watts and J.M. Berger, “Trolling for Trump: How Russia is Trying to Destroy our Democracy”, War on the Rocks, November 6, 2016. https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-democracy/. 52 Ibid: See also: Clint Watts, “Statement prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing, March 30, 2017,” Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaign, Homeland Security Digital Library, 5. 53 Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 34; See also: Han Bouwmeester, “Lo and Behold: Let the truth be told-Russian Deception Warfare in Crimea and Ukraine and the Return of ‘Maskirovska and ‘Reflexive Control Theory’” in Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017. Winning without Killing: The strategic and operational Utility of non-kinetic capabilities in Crises eds. P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga ,125-152 (The Hague, Asser Press, 2017).

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Disinformation as part of Russian Active Measures uses this weakness to drive wedges in pre-existing cracks.54 According to Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth, who headed the East German Stasi’s Active measures department X for over two decades, ” [a] powerful adversary can only be defeated through […] a sophisticated, methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even the smallest ‘cracks’ between our enemies […] and within their elites”.55 Cracks are the scars of polarization, which means the more polarized a society is, the more vulnerable it is. The US in 2016 is a very good example of a highly polarized society.56 But such a polarization is not unique for the US. According to Putters, director of the Dutch “Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau” (Institute for Social Research), a comparable polarization is also visible in the Netherlands where fissures and cracks are appearing on social and cultural boundaries, threatening the fabric of our societies.57 It will be no surprise that the aforementioned polarization is occurring all over Europe, with issues as mass-migration, economic malaise and emerging anti-EU sentiments fueling it. This obviously means that nearly all our western societies will be susceptible to Russian Active measures and Dezinformatsiya. Dutch society is especially vulnerable for this disinformation because Dutch society is one of the most digitalized, open and free societies worldwide. The Netherlands has been a free haven for freedom of speech for centuries and has become a global digital information node in the last decades. Traditionally there is no role for the government in controlling information flows, only in facilitating them.58 Manifestations of disinformation Although the use of disinformation is nothing new, since around the last decade, it seems to be growing, or at least getting more attention. The MH-17 example given is just one of many that shows how Russia is trying to influence other countries, there are numerous known cases where “Russia’s disinformation campaigns have targeted liberal democracies in Europe and North America with the goal to undermine societal coherence and distort the democratic process”.59 Some other examples are the disinformation campaign accompanying the Crimean invasion and the “little green men”;60 the disinformation campaign that was conducted in Sweden to influence the Swedish decision making regarding NATO membership;61 and of course the alleged meddling in the US elections in 2016, that is still under investigation.62 The latest examples are the Russian disinformation campaigns following the chemical weapons attack on Douma (April 7, 2018) and the nerve agent attack on former Russian spy Skripal in the UK.63 There are reliable reports of Russian interference in the

54 Thomas Rid, “Select Committee on Intelligence United Sates Senate, March 30, 2017,” Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Homeland Security Digital Library. 55 Günther Bohnsack and Herbert Brehmer, Auftrag Irreführung (Carlsen, 1992), 16. 56 Rid, Select Committee Intelligence, 2. 57 Kim Putters, Land tussen hoop en vrees: over het maatschappelijk vertrouwen van Nederlanders, Drees-lezing, 17 november 2016. See also Helmus et al., Russian Social media, 10. 58 Michel Rademaker et al., Hoe beschermen wij ons tegen russische desinformatie? (The Hague, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), 2017). 59 De Jong et al., Inside Kremlin house,1. 60 Peter Felstead and Georg Mader,’OCSE evidence lifts lid on “little green men” in Crimea’, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 March 2014; See also: Barber, Nicholas, “A warning from the Crimea: hybrid warfare and the challenge for the ADF”, Australian Defence Forces Journal, Issue No. 201, 2017; Reuters staff, Russia's Putin denies Russian troops took Crimea. Reuters, March 4, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-crimea/russias-putin-denies-russian-troops-took-crimea idUSL6N0M122M20140304. 61 Radio Sweden, Report: Russia spread fake news and disinformation in Sweden, January 9, 2017, http://sverigesradio.se/sida/ artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=6604516; See also Neil MacFarquhar, “A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories”, New York Times, 28 August 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/29/world/europe/russia-sweden-disinformation.html?mcubz=0; Rob de Wijk, “Hybride dreigingen” in Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing 14(5–6), 2016: 14–15. 62 National Intelligence Council, Assessing Russian Activities, ii, 3; See also: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, The Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections. Summary of Initial Findings, July 3, 2018, https://www.burr.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SSCI%20ICA%20ASSESSMENT_FINALJULY3.pdf; Hosenball, Mark. Senate panel backs intelligence agencies on Russia-Trump conclusions. Reuters. July 4, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-cyber/senate-panel-backs-intelligence-agencies-on-russia-trump-conclusions-idUSKBN1JT2YB. 63 David Omand, From Nudge to Novichok: The response to the Skripal nerve agent attack holds lessons for countering hybrid threats (Helsinki: European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2018)

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information domain in the Baltic States, Sweden and Finland, France, Ukraine, the United States as well as the Netherlands.64 Obviously we have chosen the MH 17 example because it had the most impact on the Netherlands and because it also was a “wake-up call” for many countries that the Russians were not only interfering with kinetic means in Crimea and Donbass but also with non-kinetic means in the form of disinformation in a much wider arena. 65 Disinformation perceived as threat It is commonly accepted that policies can be heavily influenced by public opinion and public opinion in its turn is heavily influenced by information that is processed through the media.66 The different theories that were allegedly spread by disinformation on the MH-17 crash were able to impact Dutch and international media on their reporting on the disaster, they were able to influence public opinion and by that it is highly likely that they had impact on Dutch and international policies. This threat posed by Russian disinformation campaigns is widely recognised nowadays. Resonance of this recognition is found in policy documents of governments and organisations and in papers by think tanks and scholars, some examples are given below. NATO NATO’s 2015 framework for future alliance operations warns against “hybrid warfare methods […] striving to shape the information sphere, influencing public perception, slowing and disrupting political decision making and undermining the credibility of the Alliance”.67 NATO’s CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) states in a 2017 book that Russia’s disinformation campaigns are to be seen as part of broader strategic campaigns that are aimed at weakening NATO and EU unity.68 And in its 2018 Summit Declaration NATO acknowledges the threat of hybrid warfare and disinformation by stating that “[i]n cases of hybrid warfare, the Council could decide to invoke article 5[…]”.69 EU The 2015 European External Action Service (EEAS) food for thought paper mentions the threats posed by Russia’s hybrid warfare: “Massive disinformation campaigns designed to control the narrative are an important element of a hybrid campaign”.70 These campaigns are raised by Russia to gain political influence, or even dominance over a country, in support of a strategic aim. According to the 2018 EU High Level Expert Group (HLEG) report, disinformation represents “risks for our democratic processes, national security, social fabric, and [it] can undermine trust in the information society and confidence in the digital single market”.71

64 Adam Withnall, ‘Finland: Russian Propaganda Questioning Our Validity Risks Destabilising Country,’ Independent, October 20, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-finland-putin-propaganda-destabilising- effect-a7371126.html; See also: De Jong et al., Inside Kremlin: See also Dana Priest and Michael Birnbaum, “Europe Has Been Working to Expose Russian Meddling for Years,” Washington Post, June 25, 2017, sec. Europe, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europe-has-been-working-to-expose- russian-meddling-for-years/2017/06/25/e42dcece-4a09-11e7-9669-250d0b15f83b_story.html; Jakub Janda et al., “How Do European Democracies React to Russian Aggression?,” Kremlin Watch Report (European Values, April 22, 2017); National Intelligence Council, Background to “Assessing”; Reinier Kist and Rik Wassens, “ Russisch trollenleger ook actief in Nederland”, NRC, July 15, 2018, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/07/15/de-russische-trollen-zijn-anti-islam-en-voor-wilders-a1610155. 65 Paul Lewis, “Obama says destruction of MH17 is a 'wake-up call' for Europe”, Guardian, July 18, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/obama-mh17-wake-up-call-europe-ukraine-russia; See also : “The MH-17 crisis. A wake-up call”, Economist, July 25, 2014. https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/07/mh17-crisis. 66 Helmus et al., Russian Social media Influence. Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2018); See also: Christopher Kremidas Courtney, It’s All About Governance. Addressing hybrid and transnational threats, Friends of Europe, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/its-all-about-governance. 67 NATO, Framework for Future Alliance Operations (SACT, SACEUR, 2015). 68 Eugenio Cusumano and M. Corbe, A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats, (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017). 69 NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, July 11, 2018, Public Diplomacy Division Press Release PR/CP (2018)074, 8; See also NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, 1. 70 EEAS, Food-for-thought paper “Countering Hybrid Threats”. Working Document of the European External Action Service. Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, EEAS 731, 13 May 2015, 2, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/may/eeas-csdp-hybrid-threats-8887-15.pdf 71 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 10.

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Kremlin Watch, a strategic program of the European Values Think-Tank, states in its 2017 report that the Russian disinformation campaigns are perceived as a threat by all 28 EU member states.72 Kremlin watch is also the instigator of an open letter sent to Federica Mogherini urging her to start taking the Russian disinformation threat seriously.73 The Netherlands In the Netherlands the threat of disinformation was already mentioned in a 2014 policy document by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.74 In 2017 another policy document “Houvast in een onzekere wereld”, by the Dutch Ministry of Defence on the future of Dutch Armed Forces, states Russia is increasingly antagonizing the West and uses the influencing of media, cyber-attacks and propaganda as part of its arsenal.75 It also specifically mentions hybrid threats in which the spread of disinformation plays an important role.76 The Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), or Scientific Council for Government Policy mentions disinformation as a threat to Dutch national security in the first paragraph of its 2017 report.77 The former secretary of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders warns against disinformation in an article in a national newspaper and this same newspaper “ De Volkskrant” conducted a nation-wide investigation regarding the influence of disinformation.78 One of the conclusions of this 2017 research was that due to disinformation 25% of the Dutch public did not know for sure who shot down MH-17 and 20% thought the Dutch government wanted to cover-up the whole MH-17 affair.79 It is doubtful if the latest JIT report,80 that provides legal proof of Russian involvement in bringing down MH-17 will ameliorate these percentages, as the stream of disinformation continues,81 and dualism in the Netherlands persists.82 The secretary of Internal Affairs Kajsa Ollongren warns against disinformation in a letter to parliament, in which she calls disinformation a potential threat to Dutch democracy.83 And in a 2018 publication meant for Army personnel the commander of the Army mentions the MH-17 and the disturbing and hostile activities in the information domain, e.g. cyber-attacks and fake news.84 According to him, these activities have the potential of destabilising our (Dutch) society.85

72 Janda et al., European Democracies React. 73 Jakub Janda, Open Letter of European Security Experts to Federica Mogherini: Please start taking the Russian Disinformation threat seriously, 2017, Accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.europeanvalues.net/mogherini/medias-mentioned-open-letter-european-security-experts-federica-mogherini/. 74 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid. Turbulente tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, Kamerstuk: Kamerbrief/14-11-2014. 75 Ministerie van Defensie, Houvast in een onzekere wereld: lijnen van ontwikkeling in het meerjarig perspectief voor een duurzame gerede en snel inzetbare krijgsmacht, Kamerstuk kst-33763-126, 2017, 7; Literal text: “Rusland [is] zich in toenemende mate gaan afzetten tegen het Westen” and “Beïnvloeding van de media, cyberaanvallen en propaganda maken tevens deel uit van het door Rusland gehanteerde instrumentarium.” 76 Ibid., 8; Literal text: “De hybride dreiging omvat […] psychologische oorlogvoering en het verspreiden van desinformatie.” 77 WRR, Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen. Een strategische visie op het defensiebeleid (Den Haag: Textcetera, 2017). 78 Bert Koenders, “Wie desinformatie herkent, is ertegen bestand”, Volkskrant 13th February 2017, https://www.volkskrant.nl/opinie/wie-desinformatie-herkent-is-ertegen-bestand~a4461493/ 79 Kanne and Driessen, Desinformatie leidt tot verwarring. 80 Openbaar Ministerie, Update in criminal investigation MH17 disaster, accessed May 30 2018, https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-vliegramp/@103183/update-criminal/; See also: ANP, “JIT:’ BUK-installatie was van Russisch leger”, Parool, May 24, 2018, https://www.parool.nl/amsterdam/jit-buk-installatie-was-van-russisch-leger~a4598780/. 81 One example: Kyrill Vishinsky, “Journalist, Activist on JIT report: Poor Evidence, Bias and Convenient Timing”, Sputnik May 27, 2018, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201805271064858681-jit-report-evidence-bias-timing/. 82 Parlementaire Redactie. PVV en FVD sparen Rusland in zaak-MH17. Telegraaf, June 5, 2018. https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/2129730/pvv-en-fvd-sparen-rusland-in-zaak-mh17. 83 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Informatie en Communicatietechnologie, December 18, 2017, Kamerstuk 26 643, nr. 508. 84 Koninklijke Landmacht, Samen bouwen aan de toekomst (Utrecht, Commandant Landstrijdkrachten, 2018). 85 Ibid., 3; Literal text:” Bovendien zien we verstorende en vijandige activiteiten in het informatiedomein, zoals cyberaanvallen en inzet van fake news. Dit alles heeft de potentie om onze samenleving te ontwrichten.”

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Although the Dutch public is the most appeased regarding fake news of 37 countries investigated worldwide, still 47% of the population is worried about disinformation, defined as the manipulation of facts to reach a certain goal. 86 Responses to Dezinformatsiya. So, Dezinformatsiya is an integral part of Russian hybrid warfare, that is being applied in an offensive way, and that is explicitly perceived as a threat by a susceptible western world. Hence it is important that ways and means are found to counter Dezinformatsiya or at least diminish its effects on our societies. Many scholars, organisations and think tanks around the world and especially in Europe are studying how best to counter the effects of Russian Dezinformatsiya. There has been been a “significant surge in initiatives aimed at countering misinformation since the start of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and the 2016 US presidential election. Many of these initiatives have been sustained and expanded during the 2017 elections in European countries”.87 Organisations like the EU and NATO as well as many individual countries are developing strategies based on the best countermeasures against Russia’s disinformation campaigns. These strategies and countermeasures will be treated in chapter 3. When looking at these strategies from organizations and papers from the various think-tanks there is one concept that is frequently encountered and is seen as promising; it is not based on law-fare that will inevitably lead to repression; and it is preventive and not curative which is all the more important because one cannot stop disinformation. This concept mentioned as one of the solutions how to counter Dezinformatsiya is called: Resilience. Some examples: societal resilience is mentioned as a means to counter disinformation and reinforce deterrence in the Baltic States;88 there is an abundance of papers written on resilience in relation to hybrid operations;89 and apart from that there is plenty of reference to resilience by NATO, the EU and the Netherlands. 90 Conclusion We can conclude from this chapter that the Western world has developed a concern about Russian disinformation over the last couple of years, although the Russian use of this tool in its Reflexive Control doctrine is certainly not new.91 The Western world perceives this doctrine as an aggressive threat and has developed countermeasures and counterstrategies against disinformation. Many of these strategies

86 Fake news is defined as different forms of false information, including: bad journalism, stories made up for political or commercial gain, news turning out to be an advertisement, satirical news, news made up to discredit others and news that manipulates facts to reach a certain goal (disinformation), from: Commisariaat voor de media, Mediamonitor 2018, Reuters Institute Digital News Report Nederland 2018 (Hilversum: Reijnen Media, 2018), 59; See also: Commisariaat voor de media, Nederlanders hebben weinig zorgen over nepnieuws, June 14, 2018, https://www.cvdm.nl/nieuws/nederlanders-hebben-weinig-zorgen-over-nepnieuws/. 87 Jente Althuis and Siri Strand, “Countering Fake News” in Fake News: a Roadmap, eds. Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden, (Riga, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence), 68. 88 Brinkel, “Resilient Mind-Set”; See also: Rogers, Reinforcing Deterrence. 89 Anna Wieslander, “How NATO and the EU can Cooperate to Increase Partner Resilience”, Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World Working Paper Series, (Johns Hopkins, 2016); See also: René Nyberg, Hybrid Operations and the Importance of Resilience: Lessons from Recent Finnish History, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (Carnegie Russia Program, February 8, 2016); C. Bilban, “Resilience: Silver Bullet in Challenging Hybrid Warfare?” 210098 SE M4 a: Resilienz in den Internationalen Beziehungen (WS) L V-Leitung: Mag. Dr. Jan Pospisil (2015). 90 Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT), Building Resilience-Collaborative proposal to help nations and partners, (Norfolk, 2017); See also: NATO, Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw, NATO press release July, 8, 2016; Althuis and Strand, “Countering Fake News”; EEAS, Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (Brussels: EEAS, June 2016), 10; EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 3; Teri Schultz, “EU-NATO hybrid threat center launched in Finland”, Deutsche Welle, October 3, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/eu-nato-hybrid-threat-center-launched-in-finland/a-40784773; NATO, Secretary General participates in Hybrid Centre of Excellence inauguration with Finnish leaders and EU High Representative, October 2, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/news_147497.htm; Willem Oosterveld et al., SI VIS PACEM, PARA UTIQUE PACEM. Individual Empowerment, Societal Resilience and the Armed Forces. HCSS StratMon 2016 (The Hague, The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies); Koenders. “Wie desinformatie herkent.” 91 Giles, Russia’s New Tools.

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are based on the concept of resilience, that seems to be the silver bullet to stop disinformation. The next chapter will look further into the theory of resilience and discuss how the concept of resilience is perceived and used.

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Chapter 2. Resilience Theory. This chapter will treat the development of resilience and discuss different scholars, definitions and theories. The aim of this chapter is to discern a working definition for resilience -more specifically- for resilience against disinformation, as well as to examine what lies beneath resilience, what are the underlying principles that can be used as building blocks to build or enhance resilience? Finally, this chapter wants to prove that resilience can indeed counter disinformation. Resilience development and definitions “In less than a decade the term resilience has evolved from the disciplines of materials science and environmental studies to become a concept used liberally and enthusiastically by policy makers, practitioners and academics”.92 The Latin root of resilience is found in salire meaning to jump or to spring and its derivative resilire meaning to jump back or recoil.93 Resilience as a term originates in the 17th century when it was used in describing the properties of timber and materials in British Royal Navy’s fighting ships.94 In the 20st century resilience was introduced in ecology and since the 1990’s resilience is used in psychology as a means of assessing how well individuals cope in traumatic situations.95 From psychology resilience also found its way into the assessment of communities, organizations and national security.96 Since 2010 resilience is employed by political science and International Relations scholarship, and it seems that in the last few years resilience has become fashion.97 The UK Government rewrote its civil contingencies law, doctrine and plans based on the concept of resilience.98 Resilience centres, institutes and research programs have been established by universities that offer resilience degrees. Even business schools have embraced resilience as a concept,99 and in January 2013 Resilience was declared “buzzword” of the year by Time magazine.100 In the field of security studies the discussion on resilience has emerged in relation to the newly evolving hybrid character of warfare.101 The term resilience is attractive as it suggests the ability of something or someone to cope in the face of adversity, i.e. to recover or rebound and return to the normal situation after being confronted with an abnormal, alarming or disturbing and mostly unexpected threat.102 It has however proven elusive to give a clear definition of resilience, which can be seen from the different definitions given in the different fields of study where resilience was employed. An overview of definitions used in the different fields of resilience study is given in Table 3.

92 McAslan, Concept of Resilience, 1. 93 Philippe Bourbeau, “Resilience, Security, and World Politics” in Routledge Handbook of International Resilience: Policies, Theories, and Practices, eds. Davis Chandler and Jon Coaffee (London: Routledge, 2017), 2. 94 McAslan, Concept of Resilience. 95 G. A. Bonanno, ‘Loss, trauma and human resilience: Have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events?’ American Psychologist, 59 (2004), 20. 96 McAslan, Concept of Resilience. 97 Philippe Bourbeau, ‘Resilience and International Politics: Premises, debates, agendas’ International Studies Review, Vol. 17 (3) Issue 3, (2015), 348 https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12225. 98 Danny MacKinnon and Kate Driscoll Derickson, From Resilience to Resourcefulness: A Critique of Resilience Policy and Activism, Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography # 12.12 (Utrecht University, 2012), 8: “UK resilience amounts to more than simply preparedness; implying a systematic programme of measures and structures to enable organisations and communities to better anticipate and tolerate disruption and turbulence. This requires what has been termed a ‘multi-scale governance fix’, involving the establishment of `local` resilience forums and regional resilience teams within each of the government offices for the regions in England”. 99 McAslan, Concept of Resilience. 100 K. Brown, ‘Global environmental change I: a social turn for resilience?’, Progress in Human Geography, 2013, 00(0) 1–11. 101 NATO also started mentioning resilience in its documents e.g. in 2016 in Warsaw: NATO, Commitment to enhance resilience, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016 (8 July 2016). http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm. 102 McAslan, Concept of Resilience.

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Table 3: Selected definitions of resilience.103

I will elaborate on some definitions used by international organizations and scholars in the field of security studies that will be used as a basis to discuss resilience theory: The United Nations defines resilience as “the capacity of a system, community or society to resist or change in order that it may obtain an acceptable level of functioning and structure”.104 The United Nations uses the resilience concept mostly in the context of improving reactions to natural disasters. NATO defines resilience as “a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. In sum, resilience is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity”.105 Similarly NATO’s CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) describes state resilience as: the ”state’s ability to withstand or recover from strategic shocks that stress and possibly distort state institutions and political settlements”.106 State resilience comprises the rule of law, governance, infrastructure and societal security systems. NATO looks upon resilience mainly in the sense of civil preparedness that has to be enhanced in order to tackle two challenges: To make sure that troops and material can deploy

rapidly to any relevant crisis-area within alliance territory; and to assure the ability to anticipate,

103 MacKinnon and Driscoll Derickson, “Resilience to Resourcefulness”, 37. 104 United Nations, Living with risk: a global review of disaster reduction initiatives, (New York, UN Publications, 2004). Ch.1, S.1,17. 105 NATO, Resilience and Article 3, June 22, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_132722.htm. 106 CCOE, Resilience, a CCOE fact sheet (The Hague, 2017), 3.

Author,

date

Discipline Level of

analysis

Definition

Gordon,

1978

Physics Physical

system

The ability to store energy and deflect

elasticity under a load without breaking or

being deformed

Holling,

1973

Ecology Ecological

system

The persistence of relationships within a

system; the ability of systems to absorb

change and still persist

Resilience

Alliance,

undated

Ecology Ecological

system

The capacity to tolerate disturbance without

collapsing into a qualitatively different state.

http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/resilienc

e. Accessed 25 October 2011

Egeland,

1993

Psychology Individual The capacity for successful adaptation and

functioning despite high risk, stress or trauma

Agder,

2000

Geography Community The ability of communities to withstand

external shocks to their social infrastructure

Katz, 2004 Geography Community Ways in which people adapt to changing

circumstances to get by and ‘make do’

through the exercising of autonomous

initiative.

Hill et al.,

2008

Urban and

regional

development

Region The ability of a region to recover successfully

from shocks to its economy

Source: Adapted and extended from Norris et al., 2008: 129.

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identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks so that the social, political and military cohesion of the alliance is least affected.107

The EU defines resilience as “the capacity to withstand stress and recover, strengthened from challenges”.108 This is a very concise definition but, in my opinion, it lacks the background that is so specific for the EU. This specific background is articulated in the EU Global Strategy document, which tackles the moral dimension of resilience. It reasons that resilience makes up an important element of the EU strategy and it sees values as central to that. The same values that were at the basis of the EU’s foundation, i.e. respect for and defense of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. Living up to these values internally and externally is seen as the most crucial of all measures, and as “the strongest antidote we have […]”.109

Looking at definitions of resilience given by different scholars we find a very elaborate definition by Folke, who is the co-founder of the Stockholm Resilience Centre: “Resilience is currently defined […] as the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and re-organize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks...But resilience is not only about being persistent or robust to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories. In this sense, resilience provides adaptive capacity [...]”.110 This definition encompasses all aspects this research will study, but this is due to its vastness, which also makes it awkward to use.

One of the more abstract definitions for resilience is given by Professor Philippe Bourbeau, a Canadian political scientist. He conceptualizes resilience as “the process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society or an individual in the face of endogenous or exogenous shocks”.111 By using this definition Bourbeau wants to clarify that resilience will differ from culture to culture and from context to context, he also wants to rule out the assumption present in other definitions that a return to equilibrium is always necessary.112 And lastly he wants to stress that disturbances do not objectively exist and are always the result of social construction.113 Bourbeau identifies three different types of resilience and describes them: “resilience as maintenance, resilience as marginality and resilience as renewal - in short, the ‘MMR’-typology”. 114 (Shown in Table 4) We find a division of resilience in different parts with more scholars.115 For this research, it is important to understand there are different types of resilience that are not mutually exclusive and can be found in “the same society diachronically and synchronically. Furthermore, a society can adopt one type of resilience in one domain and another type of resilience in another domain”.116

107 NATO, Resilience: a core element of collective defence, accessed March 3, 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm. 108 European Commission, Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats - a European Union response (Brussels: EC, 2016), 5. 109 Brinkel, “Resilient Mind-Set”, 27; See also: EEAS, Shared Vision. 110 Carl Folke, “Resilience: Emergence”, 259. 111 Bourbeau, “Resilience, Security, Politics”, 4. 112 This is congruent with Holling’s opinion who also does not envisage the necessity for systems to return to an (old) equilibrium after shock. C.S. Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems”, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol. 4 (1973): 1-23. 113 Bourbeau, “Resilience, Security, Politics”, 4. 114 Philippe Bourbeau, “Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitization research”, Resilience 1(1), 3–17 (2013), 11, doi:10.1080/21693293.2013.765738. 115 M. Keck and P. Sakdapolrak, “What is Social Resilience? Lessons Learned and Ways Forward”, Erdkunde 67(1) (2013), 5-8; See also: Holling, “Resilience and Stability”; Patrick Martin-Breen and J. Anderies Marty, Background Paper Resilience: A Literature Review, Ed. The Bellagio Initiative; The Future of Philanthropy and Development in the Pursuit of Human Wellbeing, Draft November 2011, 7 116 Bilban, “Resilience: Silver Bullet“, 16.

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Table 4. MMR Typology of resilience 117

There are some definitions given by military scholars that seem more adequate for this specific topic. Giegerich, a German political scientist, says resilience is a matter of reducing one’s own vulnerabilities; it thus also contributes to deterrence in a hybrid context by reducing the potential gains an attacker might hope to reap.118 Applying resilience to modern military theory, Osinga, an F-16 pilot and professor at the Dutch military academy, defines resilience in complex adaptive systems as “the ability to withstand, recover from, and reorganize in response to crises”.119 Bilban, an Austrian political scholar and reserve-officer gives a very useful definition, which focuses on the issue at stake here: “The concept of resilience thus means to strengthen social cohesion by constantly pointing out the advantages of Western values and liberalism, while applying self- criticism at the same time. External shocks, for instance propaganda campaigns […], then should become the initial point for societal debates on values in order to build confidence in the nation state and the European Union”.120 Within this definition we see the importance of the values, so significant for the EU, clearly articulated. Working definition We will build on all different aspects of resilience theory stated in the above, and we combine several definitions of resilience to draft a working definition on resilience against disinformation to be used in this research:121

Resilience against disinformation means the strengthening of social cohesion by constantly pointing out the advantages of existing norms and values, using endogenous or exogenous shocks, e.g. disinformation campaigns, as an initial point for adjusted societal debates on norms and values, in order to continue building trust in the nation state and the treaty organizations it adheres to.

117 Ibid., 12. 118 Bastian Giegerich, “Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict”, Connections QJ (15: 2016, No. 2) 69. 119 F. Osinga, “Organizing for Insecurity and Chaos: Resilience and Modern Military Theory”, in Organizing for Safety and Security in Military Organizations- Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2016, eds. R. Beeres et al. (The Hague, TMC Asser Press), 46. 120 Bilban, “Resilience: Silver Bullet“, 11. 121 Definitions e.g. from: Bilban, “Resilience: Silver Bullet“, 11; Bourbeau, “Resilience, Security, Politics”, 4.

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How to build resilience We have seen in the above what resilience is, and we have defined it, but we do not know how it emerges, how we can build it, or how it can be used to help counter the effects of Reflexive Control and specifically of disinformation. When looking into this specific question and searching for the applicability of resilience to palpable implementations one finds the concept is rather ethereal. There is plenty of theory but little elaboration. Or as Linkov et al. and Bilban state: resilience often is more of a buzzword than an operational paradigm.122 This paragraph will research what theory tells about building or strengthening resilience. Scholars have discerned a number of elements that are important for building resilience. These are: Social capital. Scholars do agree on the fact that resilience can be strengthened by social capital. According to Rodin, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, “communities react in ways that provide more than just the sum of individual connections. Members of communities feel committed to the groups they are part of, such as neighborhoods or voluntary organizations. What results, is social capital, “the glue that holds people together” and that leads to commitment, common values and opinions, a common purpose and a feeling of identity”.123 Keck and Sakdapolrak also see social capital as a central factor in building and maintaining social resilience.124 Without explicitly quoting resilience, Putnam, an American political scientist, implicitly gives social capital a big role in strengthening democracy: ”Communities with strong social networks and grassroots associations are better at confronting unexpected crises than communities that lack such civic resources. [...] Social capital, the evidence increasingly suggests, strengthens our better, more expansive selves. The performance of our democratic institutions depends in measurable ways upon social capital”.125 Trust. Trust can be described as a willingness to be vulnerable combined with a positive expectancy for the future.126 Political trust has been defined as the willingness of citizens to be vulnerable to the actions of their government in the face of uncertainty, whereby citizens believe the government will abide by ordinary ethical rules, e.g. telling the truth.127 Low levels of trust in news media, society and government are assessed to create a fertile environment for disinformation.128 Brinkel, a Dutch scholar and politician, states that the resilience debate is often “about technical solutions and infrastructure. But public debate about common values and objectives is seen by many authors as a contribution to social capital and therefore, trust”.129 Other sources also mention trust being needed for a society to “mobilize and self-organize” to become resilient.130 Trust can therefore be discerned as a factor in building resilience.

122 I. Linkov et al., “Changing the resilience paradigm”, Nat. Clim. Change 4, 407– 409 (2014), accessed March 12, 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263808670_Changing_the_resilience_paradigm; See also : Bilban, “Resilience: Silver Bullet.“ 123 Brinkel, “Resilient Mind-Set”, 33; See also: Rodin, Resilience Dividend, 193-194. 124 Keck and Sakdapolrak, “Social Resilience”, 11. 125 P. Putnam, Bowling Alone; The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster paperbacks, 2000), 349. 126 Rousseau, Denise et al., “Introduction to Special Topic Forum: Not so Different after All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust”, The Academy of Management Review 23, No3(1998): 394. 127 Tom van der Meer, “Political Trust and the ‘Crisis of Democracy”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, January 2017. Doi: 10.1093/acre- fore/9780190228637.013.77, 1; See also: Messick and Kramer (2001) quoted in “Moral Bases of Public Distrust”, Ronnie Janoff-Bulman in Restoring Trust in Organizations and Leaders: Enduring Challenges and Emerging Answers, ed. Roderick M. Kramer and Todd L. Pittinski (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 8. 128 Leonie Haiden, “Whatever happened to Trust?” in Fake News: a Roadmap, edited by Jente Althuis and Leonie Haiden, 41-47 (Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence), 2018. 129 Brinkel, “Resilient Mind-Set”, 33 130 Martin-Breen and Marty, Background Paper Resilience, 18; See also Haiden, “Whatever Trust?”, 45.

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Norms, values and narratives. Rodin points out some of the characteristics of resilience, e.g. policy, values, norms, behavior, and identity.131 Real resilience builds on a common set of values and norms. In the words of Durodié, that is what orients society to a sense of purpose and what is needed to win the hearts and minds of our own population.132 “People are prepared to bring sacrifices if the purpose is important enough to live for”.133 This means the set of values and norms has to be well developed, accepted and well propagated, preferably in the form of an elaborate and perceptive narrative. A new “Grand Story” about the values in our western societies that is more credible than the disinformation being spread.134 The value of narratives is underscored by scholars who say that in a world perceived as chaotic, unpredictable and fast changing, “narratives become important devices for identifying order and structure”.135 Although norms, values and narratives are definitely intertwined, we will treat them as different building blocks. Narratives being the expression of values and norms are easier to encounter, but it is important to also research the values and norms within a society that remain unspoken. Interconnectedness A factor, closely linked to social capital that can enhance resilience is “connectedness”. According to Cho et al. resilience relies “heavily on the widespread capacity to connect for deep and authentic collaboration”.136 They present what they call their building blocks of a resilient society in which connectedness forms the basis (Figure 3). According to Cho et al. “putting these pieces of the puzzle together in a new narrative of “connecting for resilience” is critical to governing well amidst unprecedented risk, change and opportunity”.137 Figure 3. Building Blocks of a Resilient Society.138

131 Rodin, Resilience Dividend, 63. 132 B. Durodié, “The Limitations of Risk Management: Dealing with Disasters and Building Social Resilience”, Politik 8(1) (2005) :17-19. 133 Brinkel, “Resilient Mind-Set”, 32. 134 H. Beunders, “ Het beste wapen? Schrijf het betere verhaal” in Magazine Nationale Veiligheid en Crisisbeheersing 14(5–6)(2016): 11–13. 135 Hellmann and Wagnsson, ” How can European states respond to Russian information warfare? An analytical framework, European Security, 26:2, (2017), 155; See also: A. Miskimmon et al., Strategic narratives communication power and the new world order (New York: Routledge, 2013), 74. 136 Albert Cho et al., The Resilient Society. Innovation, Productivity, and the Art and Practice of Connectedness (Cisco Internet Business Solutions Group, 2011), 9. 137 Ibid., 2. 138 Ibid., 5.

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Interconnectedness is also brought up by Thiele, who states we have to acknowledge that the interconnectedness between the civil, private and military sectors is conditionally for resilience to emerge.139 SACT phrases it thus: “building resilience demands persistent interconnectedness between the civil, private and military sectors”.140 The EU follows the same line; it wants to enhance the resilience of society by deepening relations with civil society, by seeking better contact with cultural organizations, religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders.141 Innovation and education. Scholars also claim innovation as a factor that is important to help emerge or strengthen resilience. Cho et al. have dedicated a building block to innovation in their puzzle (figure 4). According to them “innovation doesn’t necessarily lead to greater resilience, [but] resilience is impossible without innovation. Innovation is the inescapable imperative of “doing better things”.142 Martin-Breen says, “innovation and novelty is critical for resilience and governance structures are critical in promoting innovation”.143 SACT acknowledges innovation as a requirement for building resilience as a capacity.144 Closely connected to innovation is education, which is also cited by many organizations and scholars as being important for strengthening resilience.145 Major stresses the need for an education policy, and SACT describes education and shared awareness as the best weapon against manipulation in a contested environment.146 Early warning or awareness Several scholars articulate one last factor, which is to be reckoned with; there is no possibility to develop resilience, if we do not know the problem coming. This is all the more important as Russian military scholars specifically state they aim for unexpectedness. “Informational and psychological operations in future wars will have to comply with the basic principles of new type (hybrid) warfare - they must be timely, unexpected, and clandestine”.147 Godson, an American scholar in the field of National Security, states at a Senate Committee hearing that the US needs enhanced early warning regarding Russian active measures, and actually advices anticipation and not only prediction of Russian active measures operations.148 Major underlines that prevention, including better early warning, becomes essential in empowering societies.149 Apart from scholars also organizations support the importance of awareness; SACT says, “identifying […] risks is an important factor in achieving resilience”.150 The EU states we have to “maintain a sufficient level of situational awareness” to create early warning.151

139 Ralph, D. Thiele, “Building Resilience Readiness against Hybrid Threats- A Cooperative European Union/NATO Perspective”, ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, 449 (September 2016) 1-8. 140 Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative, 1. 141 EEAS, Shared Vision. 142 Cho et al., Resilient Society, 6. 143 Martin-Breen and Marty, Background Paper Resilience. 17. 144 Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative, 4. 145 McAslan, Concept of Resilience, 10; See also: European Commission. CORDIS. Building Resilience through Education. Accessed June 3, 2018. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/213014_en.html. 146 Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “A Hybrid Security Policy for Europe; Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense as Leitmotiv”, SWP Comments, eds. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (22, April 2015), accessed March 12, 2018, https://www.swpberlin.org/fileadmin/ contents/products/comments/2015C22_mjr_mlg.pdf; See also: Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative, 6. 147 S. G. Chekinov and S. A. Bogdanov, “Прогнозирование характера и содержания воин будущего: проблемы и суждения” (Forecasting the nature and content of wars of the future: problems and assessments), Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), No. 10, 2015, pp. 44-45. 148 Godson, “Written Testimony”; See also Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 52. 149 Major and Mölling, “Hybrid Security Policy”, 3. 150 Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative, 7. 151 EEAS, Food-for-thought.

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Building Blocks Summarizing the above we can construe the recommendations from theory on how to build or strengthen resilience, which we will designate: building blocks of resilience:

1. Social capital; 2. Trust; 3. Values-Norms; 4. Narratives; 5. Interconnectedness; 6. Innovation and education; 7. Early warning and awareness.

Is resilience able to counter the effects of disinformation? These building blocks provide a perfect tool for testing if all scholars, think tanks and organizations are right and resilience can indeed counter Russian disinformation. For this assumption to be correct the goals of disinformation we have seen in Chapter 1 have to be affected by the building blocks, see Table 5.

- Undermining confidence in democracy can be countered by a high level of trust in democratic values and norms.

- The fomenting of divisive political fractures can be mitigated by a strong interconnectedness and a strong social capital within a society.

- Degrading trust between citizens and democratic institutions and officials is less easy if there is a high level of trust in those institutions and the interconnectedness between citizens and these institutions and officials is strong.

- An effort to popularize Russian policy agendas has less chance when own values and norms have been strongly propagated using the right narratives.

- Creating distrust over information sources is severely hindered if the level of trust in the media is high and a population is well educated and aware of the disinformation attempt.

- All goals of disinformation are affected by awareness or early warning, because when a target is forewarned, it becomes less susceptible.152

This shows that indeed all goals of disinformation can be affected by one or more of the resilience building blocks, which means resilience can counter disinformation.

152 Jeffrey M Quinn and Wendy Wood, “Forewarnings of Influence Appeals: Inducing Resistance and Acceptance” in Resistance and Persuasion, ed. Eric S. Knowles and Jay A. Linn (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2004), 193-214.

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Table 5: Crosscheck effectiveness of Resilience Building Blocks.

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Chapter 3. Do current policies against disinformation involve or even enhance resilience? Many scholars perceive the continuous Russian interference by disinformation in western countries not as a crisis, but as the “new normal”.153 This awareness has materialized in western institutions in the last years and hence we see many developments that are conceived to counter disinformation. In this chapter we will research the developments in civilian and military organizations. In view of the fact that we are focusing on the Netherlands, we will also have a look at the organizations that the Netherlands adheres to: the EU and NATO. We will benchmark the policies and strategies that are being implemented to counter disinformation, against the resilience building blocks to theoretically assess the involvement of resilience in countering disinformation. EU The EU presented a joint framework on countering hybrid threats in 2016. It states that the primary responsibility for countering hybrid threats lies with the member States,” as most national vulnerabilities are country-specific”.154 The framework proposed some 22 “actions” that vary significantly in immediate usefulness, depicted in Table 6. Most of the actions urge the High Representative or the Commission to “examine”, “promote and facilitate” or “explore ways”. The actions are directed at safeguarding critical infrastructure, energy networks, transport and supply chain security, public health and food security, strengthening Defense capabilities, cyber-security and maintain sound financial systems.155 In its conclusions the framework does underscore the seriousness of hybrid threats by referring to the application of Art. 42(7) in case of “a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack”.156 Article 42(7) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) is known as the mutual assistance clause. Although less compulsory, it is regarded as the equivalent of NATO article V.157 Implementing the recommendations from the joint framework the EU set up the East StratCom Task Force and Centre in 2015 to help counter the threat of Dezinformatsiya.158 The East StratCom Centre produces two weekly newsletters, Disinformation Review and Disinformation Digest, which can be read on the Internet via https://euvsdisinfo.eu.159 The newsletters offer a systematic overview of cases of disinformation and highlight broader media trends. The Task Force itself does not engage in counter-propaganda, but uses a more pro-active approach, it “projects a positive EU narrative by focusing on the Union’s activities in key policy areas in the Eastern partnership region, thereby identifying and correcting disinformation, and, as such, increasing awareness of disruptive and hostile discourses in public communication”.160 The identifying and correcting of disinformation is not always a success, in March 2018 several Dutch media were incorrectly accused of spreading fake news.161 This caused a court case and severe upheaval forcing the Dutch secretary of Interior Affairs to react, because obviously this

153 Giles, Russia’s New Tools; See also: Eugene B. Rumer, “Russian Active Measures and Influence campaigns” Testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Open Hearing, March 30, 2017,” Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns, Homeland Security Digital Library, 6. 154 European Commission, Joint Communication, 2. 155 Ibid. 156 European Commission, Joint Communication, 18. 157 European Union, Treaty Of Lisbon. Amending The Treaty On European Union And The Treaty Establishing The European Community (2007/C 306/01), Lisbon, 2007. 158 General Secretariat of the EU Council, European Council meeting (19 and 20 March 2015) – Conclusions (Brussels, European Council, EUCO 11/15, 2015). 159 De Jong et al., Inside Kremlin, 13. 160 General Secretariat of the EU Council. European Council meeting, 13. 161 Isabel Baneke, “EU-instantie tegen nepnieuws voor de rechter vanwege eigen nepnieuws”, Trouw, February 20, 2018, https://www.trouw.nl/home/eu-instantie-tegen-nepnieuws-voor-de-rechter-vanwege-eigen-nepnieuws~ad0c6598/.

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incrimination was in stark contrast with the freedom of speech.162 In spite of this incident many countries see the Task Force as a major milestone in the fight against Russian Dezinformatsiya and interference in (east) European societies.163 It is an example of a joint effort between institutions and civil society, but unfortunately it is severely hampered in efficacy by its lack in funding and the insufficient number of staff (10 full-time communications experts).164 Table 6. EU actions against hybrid threats. 165

162 Ministerie van Binnenlandse zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Schriftelijke reactie op de moties van het VSO voor de OJSC-raad van 21 februari jl. March 6, 2018, https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/.../kamerbrief-over-waarborgen-van-d. 163 Interview with employee working at ministry of Interior Affairs, May 2018; See also: Caroline O., Russia’s Troll Factory. 164 General Secretariat of the EU Council. European Council meeting, 13; See also: Francesco Giumelli et al., ‘From Strategic Communication to Sanctions: The European Union’s Approach to Hybrid Threats’ in A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats, eds. Eugenio Cusumano and Corbe Eugenio (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017), 153; Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 59; Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “La lutte contre la désinformation russe: contrer la propaganda sans faire de contre-propagande?” Revue Défense Nationale, no 801, Juin 2017, 97. Vilmer states the Task Force employs 11 persons. 165 Table from Giumelli et al., “Strategic Communication”, 149-150.

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The EU is an organization which is regularly blamed for its torpidity, it is sometimes called the apogee of bureaucracy and in the above we have hinted at the gutlessness of the 22 steps presented in its joint framework on countering hybrid threats.166 However, in the first months of 2018, the EU has really shown vigour. On the 12th of January 2018 High Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, Mariya Gabriel, set up the so-called High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG).167 On the 12th of March the group’s first report was launched, it is called “A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation”.168 The report lists a number of measures already taken by various stakeholders, outlines the key principles the EU should adhere to and presents a number of responses and actions that have to be taken to successfully counter disinformation. The key principles the EU adheres to are Freedom of expression and law standards regarding disinformation. Where the former key principle is an age-old adagio well known throughout our world, the latter is new. In a joint declaration in 2017 a number of organisations, such as UN, OSCE have stated that disinformation and propaganda interfere with ” the public’s right to know as well as the right of individuals to seek and receive, as well as to impart, information and ideas of all kinds”.169 Hereby these organizations declare there is a lawful right for every citizen to be able to access independent and truthful information and they sketch a “positive obligation” of States to provide an “enabling environment for the freedom of expression “ involving policy rules and frameworks.170 These two key principles lead to the general objectives that should be met by implementing the new framework for facing disinformation. The first objective to be met is the increase of the “long-term resilience of EU citizens, communities, news organizations, Member States and the EU as a whole to empower Europeans and help them proactively recognize various forms of disinformation”.171 The second objective is that responses to disinformation always have to be up-to-date, meaning they constantly have to evolve and innovate to be adaptive to the problems at hand. The HLEG wants to meet these objectives by providing an advice based on five pillars:172

1. Enhance transparency of the digital information ecosystem. This has to be achieved by “source transparency indicators”; improve recognition of sponsored content, increase of the visibility for quality media content; provide information on the use of human influencers (trolls) and robots (bots) that was used to promote certain content; improve coordination by creating European centres for interdisciplinary and independent evidence-based research.173

2. Media and information literacy is seen as strategically very important because it can empower individual users, whereas mass empowerment of users will lead to greater societal resilience against disinformation and other yet unknown disorders of the information age. This will have to be primarily achieved by education, programs in schools, but also life-long learning because of the speed of change in the information age. Although not easy to achieve this is one of the most powerful tools against disinformation because it is preventive, and not re-active as most other measures are.174

166 European Commission, Joint Communication. 167 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 2-3 See also: Clara Jimenez Cruz et al., Six Key Points from the EU Commission’s New Report on Disinformation, Medium 2018, https://medium.com/@hlegresponse/six-key-points-from-the-eu-commissions-new-report-on-disinformation-1a4ccc98cb1c. 168 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 2-3 169 The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., Joint Declaration on “Fake News,” Disinformation and Propaganda, March 3, 2017, http://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true. 170 Ibid., § 3. 171 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 19. 172 Ibid., 35. 173 Ibid., 22-25. 174 Ibid., 25-27.

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3. Empowerment of users of platform’s services, both citizens and media professionals is a key element to increase societal resilience to disinformation. This can be achieved by developing tools that aggregate quality signals, e.g. the aforementioned source transparency indicators, but also identity labels and verified content labels. Media outlets should equip newsrooms with automatic content verification tools, journalists should receive media and information literacy training and media outlets should invest more in innovation.175

4. Diversity and sustainability of the news media ecosystem. Real and quality news is declining in the face of commercialization of the media landscape, it is a responsibility, also financially, of the EU and member states to support independent quality news media and train journalists, to invest in research and innovation to improve technologies for online media services. Obviously in the meantime, authorities will also have to assure editorial independence and to protect fundamental rights, e.g. freedom of speech in case of censorship programs against disinformation.176

5. A structured implementation framework. All stakeholders have to be assessed and engaged, a code of practices for platforms has to be set up and implemented and a road map with a strict timetable has to be drafted. And this has to be permanently reviewed and evaluated.177

The composition of the HLEG combined with its modus operandi has born fruit immediately. On the day the HLEG report was launched it was confirmed that Twitter, Facebook and Google, as members of HLEG, were signatories to the Code of Practices that is meant to battle disinformation.178 These platforms have promised to adhere to 10 Key Principles that “should be used to pursue the on-going discussions with all stakeholders committed to ensuring quality news and information online”.179 The report also amplifies what is already being done in these five pillars:

- Many initiatives are being implemented on source transparency indicators and interconnectedness.

- The business model behind disinformation is attacked by assuring that advertising networks stop advertising on disinformation-spreading websites and stop accepting advertisements from these websites.180

- Regarding media and information literacy there were 547 media literacy skills projects listed in March 2017.181

Looking at what is being done by the EU to counter disinformation, one can conclude that a major effort is underway momentarily. The reports and plans drafted by various EU commissions do not only mention resilience, but also emphasize nearly all building blocks for resilience, meaning these plans involve and can really enhance resilience. The only building block not mentioned explicitly is “social capital”. NATO NATO has also developed some programs to counter disinformation and bolster resilience. In 2008 NATO sincerely started emphasizing STRATCOM to “ both assist in operations and manage public perceptions, and [to be] at the heart of leading and managing our response to the challenges of the information era”.182

175 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 27, 28. 176 Ibid., 29,30. 177 Ibid., 31-34 178 ANP, Techbedrijven gaan code tegen nepnieuws opstellen, March 12, 2018, https://www.nu.nl/tech/5173076/techbedrijven-gaan-code-nepnieuws-opstellen.html. 179 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 32. 180 EU High Directorate, Multi-dimensional approach, 15-17. 181 Susanne Nikoltchev, Mapping of media literacy practices and actions in EU-28 (Strasbourg, European Audiovisual Observatory, 2016), 6. 182 NATO, ACO Directive number 95-02 ACO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (Brussels, SHAPE, 2008), 1-1.

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The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE) became functional in January 2014. Seven member states – Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the United Kingdom – signed memorandums of understanding on the establishment of the StratCom COE.183 On the 2nd of October 2017 NATO together with EU opened a NATO/EU Centre of Excellence for countering Hybrid Threats in Finland. This first joint NATO/EU Centre of Excellence will fight hybrid threats from "tweets to tanks".184 NATO’s official website holds a myth-busting portal named ‘NATO-Russia: Setting the Record Straight’, which identifies, debunks and corrects false claims about NATO and its attitude towards Russia on a wide variety of topics.185 NATO’s approach “has been pragmatic and pro-active and the focus has been on disseminating timely and culturally-attuned messages based on a positive, coherent, consistent and a forward-looking narrative”.186 To put this in the right perspective, it is important to understand that in the past two decades NATO has faced grave challenges in trying to formulate a coherent strategic narrative applicable to and acceptable for 29 member countries.187 Comparable to the EU East StratCom Centre, StratCom CoE is not mandated to confront Russian activities or engage in counter-propaganda by itself. Instead, the studies general patterns, how networks work, what the strong points and weaknesses in Russia’s communication strategy are, and then feeds this information through its network and to the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The Centre operates in an open and visible way, and all its work is accessible online.188 Its activities center on strengthening the Alliance’s own communication environment and hence target mostly NATO itself. Some of the limitations that hamper the overall effectiveness of NATO’s StratCom efforts can be found in the lack of an overarching doctrine and the fact that StratCom is not yet integrated into any NATO Capstone Doctrine. Another setback is that most NATO commanders are unaware of the importance and the usefulness of StratCom since the emphasis in their training has always been on kinetic effects.189 A recent example of the work done by NATO’s Centre of Excellence in Strategic Communication is a book that was written on “Fake News” and how best to counter it.190 The book provides some options how to counter fake news for the media, for civil society and for the government; the latter should focus on two activities. First, “the implementation of regulations or legal provisions aimed at limiting the dissemination of fake news”.191 Sometimes media literacy is not sufficient and authorities have deemed it necessary to close down media outlets that were engaged in outright propaganda.192 The use of legislation to combat fake news however is not uncontroversial; a government always has to be aware of the “dividing lines between legitimate expressions of freedom of speech and malign interference with potentially subversive effects”.193 Second, “establish support for institutions or entities responsible for coordinating national efforts aimed at raising awareness and increasing public knowledge regarding the impact of fake news”.194 Neither

183 StratCom COE website https://www.stratcomcoe.org/history. 184 Schultz, “EU-NATO hybrid threat”; See also: NATO, Secretary General participates. 185 NATO, NATO-Russia relations: the facts, Last updated February 28, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm? 186 De Jong et al., Inside Kremlin, 20. 187 Paul et al, Lessons from Others, 23, 33; See also: G. R. Dimitriu, “Winning the Story War: Strategic Communication and the Conflict in Afghanistan,” Public Relations Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, June 2012, p. 204. 188 De Jong et al., 21 189 Ibid.; See also: Patrick Dekkers and Pieter Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen, middel en doel (Den Haag, Ministerie van Defensie, 2016), 29; Giles, Russia’s New Tools, 59. 190 Althuis and Haiden, Fake News. 191 Althuis and Strand, “Countering Fake News”, 68. 192 De Jong et al., Inside Kremlin. 193 Ibid., 2. 194 Althuis and Strand, “Countering Fake News”, 70.

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NATO, nor the EU, ”nor its member states alone would be capable of countering the hydra-like dangers posed […] by the spread of false news. It is therefore crucial to build public-private and private-private partnerships which can help counter misinformation while at the same time safeguarding freedom of information”.195 In 2017, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation hosted a conference on “ Interdependency in Resilience”, the conference was attended by 34 NATO and EU Nations and over 30 private sector partners.196 This conference focused on interdependency and connectivity between private and military sectors. Its recommendations can be summarized as a call for the need to collaborate and cooperate: NATO and EU have to jointly map their resilience efforts; governments have to adopt a more integrated approach including civil, private and military sectors; strengthen the engagement in resilience between NATO, EU and academic institutions to discuss interdependencies; collective progress and a coordinated and combined training strategy.197 The latter recommendation had already been implemented in 2016. A tabletop exercise was conducted to identify gaps in strategy, statecraft and capabilities when dealing with Russian unconventional tools to influence the Baltics. It became clear during the exercise called “Assured Resolve” that the West experienced severe difficulties when having to deal with aggressive disinformation campaigns. The strategic communications response and accessory narrative could not be formulated in due time because it remained unclear who would be responsible for drafting it, how it would be delivered and by whom.198 The coordination of coherent messaging and the building of widely supported narratives has already been tackled as a problem, and although this may be inherent to an alliance, it is definitely an issue that has to be solved in order to make StratCom function properly. Overall we see that the programs and plans of NATO involve all of the building blocks of resilience in their methods of how to tackle disinformation. The Netherlands Looking specifically at the Netherlands and how it is acting on countering disinformation campaigns it is rather difficult to find explicit measures in policy documents. When investigating governmental policy papers we find the 2017 coalition agreement does mention resilience only once, and does not mention disinformation at all.199 One might say this is to be expected; on the other hand one might call this negligence or naivety, considering what we have already discussed in this paper. Brinkel opinions in his inaugural lecture that the coalition agreement implicitly mentions resilience in the passages on a recognizable Holland, where a set of norms and values is sketched.200 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its 2017 Security Strategy, mentions resilience as a measure to confront external interference in the Netherlands, which is defined as intentional, mostly covert activities of state actors aimed at undermining Dutch society. The document also states that disinformation, trying to influence the Netherlands, is countered by targeted strategic communication and by raising awareness on disinformation within governmental organizations and vital sectors by publicity, education and training.201

195 Giumelli et al., “Strategic Communication”, 155. 196 Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative. 197 Ibid., See also: CCOE (Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence), Minutes of Community of Interest Conference (Riga, 2017), 17. 198 Julianne Smith and Jerry Hendrix, Assured Resolve. Testing Possible Challenges to Baltic Security (Centre for a New American security, 2016), 10. 199 VVD, CDA, D66 en ChristenUnie, Vertrouwen in de Toekomst, Regeerakkoord (Den Haag, 2017), 3. 200 Theo Brinkel, Moraliteit, beleid en weerbaarheid. Een verkenningsmissie, Oratie ter gelegenheid van de benoeming tot bijzonder hoogleraar met als leeropdracht Militair-maatschappelijke studies. Gehouden op 15 januari 2017 te Leiden. 201 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Wereldwijd voor een veilig Nederland’-Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022 (Den Haag, 2017), 35.

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The Dutch secretary of Interior Affairs gives plenty attention to disinformation and resilience, as disinformation is seen as her domain of responsibility. In a letter to parliament on information and communication-technology, she elaborates on measures that have to be taken to counter disinformation. She proposes e.g. integrity training to enhance the resilience of public administration, as part of a greater scheme called resilient democracy. The letter provides measures that will be taken to counter disinformation which are very much in line with those proffered by the HLEG report: attach some sort of source-transparency indicators to news, empower online news consumers, innovation, cooperation and enhancement of quality press. The letter also mentions the importance of media-literacy and the value of regional news stations.202 The 2018 Defense Policy Document “ Investeren in onze mensen, slagkracht en zichtbaarheid”, written by the Ministry of Defense mentions resilience once: in its measures that it aims at enlarging the resilience of society and protecting the vital infrastructure and digital safety in the Netherlands.203 There is no further explanation on the role of the military in helping enhance societal resilience. In spite of the fact that disinformation is a rare topic in Dutch policy papers we do find that all building blocks except “social capital” are mentioned in the papers that were researched. Since we have seen that social capital as a building block was also missing in EU policy papers, we will look somewhat deeper into the subject of social capital. Social Capital Social capital is only explicitly mentioned once in a NATO document, and is explicitly missing in EU and Dutch policy papers.204 One could reason that this is because within the EU and the Netherlands social capital is historically implicitly expected to be omnipresent and to play a major role. Looking somewhat closer at theory on social capital the assumption that social capital is implicitly present seems correct. Putnam introduced what has become the most frequently used definition of social capital: ”features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”.205 Pelling and High also reason that trust plays an important role in social capital.206 If we add up all these aspects that are important for social capital we do find they are similar to some of the building blocks that we have discerned for resilience; interconnectedness (networks), trust, and norms and values. This would mean that in strategies social capital can be expected to be enhanced if the building blocks trust, norms and values, and interconnectedness are present, even if social capital is not specifically addressed as such. However, Pelling and High also reason that the interpersonal relationships that give form to social capital can be categorized as: bonding, within ethnic or religious groups; bridging between contrasting social backgrounds; and linking between social classes.207 As we have already seen in Chapter 1, a number of reasons e.g. mass-migration, the rise of nationalist parties and of Islamist parties, economic malaise and emerging anti-EU sentiments are creating polarization across Europe. In the Netherlands fissures and cracks are appearing on social and cultural boundaries.208 This polarization breaks up the links, bridges and bonds and hence undermines social

202 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Informatie en Communicatietechnologie, 4. 203 Ministerie van Defensie, Investeren in onze mensen, slagkracht en zichtbaarheid. Defensienota (Den Haag, 2018), 15. 204 Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Building Resilience-Collaborative, 3. 205 R. Putnam, “Turning in, turning out: the strange disappearance of social capital in America”, Political Science and Politics 1995, 28:664-665. 206 M. Pelling and C. High. “Understanding adaptation: what can social capital offer assessments of adaptive capacity?” Global Environmental Change, 15 (4) (2005): 310, 311. 207 Ibid., 311,312. 208 Putters, Land tussen hoop; See also: Luijendijk, Joris. “Dat politici wegkomen met fake news, bewijst dat we onze machtspositie kwijt zijn”. Knack. Accessed June 19, 2018. http://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/joris-luyendijk-dat-politici-wegkomen-met-fake-news-bewijst-dat-we-onze-machtspositie-kwijt-zijn/articlelongread1161563.html? utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium= social_ knack&utm_ source=Facebook#Echobox=1529082948.

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capital and diminishes the potential for resilience building. Therefore, we assess it as wise not to let the building block of social capital depend on others, but to keep a focus on it. Crosschecking and conclusion When comparing the strategies implemented by EU, NATO and the Netherlands we see consonance but also differences. We will use the building blocks of resilience as reference points and benchmark each separate set of strategies/policies against them to see if they will really enhance resilience. Although it is dangerous trying to catch qualitative parameters in a quantitative format, we deem this the best way to visualize how the different strategies discussed above have the ability to enhance resilience. Obviously we cannot look at the effects of the possible implementations of these strategies, at this point we can and will only assess if the content includes the building blocks of resilience. Table 7 shows that nearly all building blocks of resilience are knowingly, or unknowingly, incorporated in the various strategies. These strategies aimed at better countering of disinformation are interwoven with resilience themes, which once again proves the role resilience plays in countering disinformation. But, since all building blocks of resilience are present in these strategies, this would also mean that the strategies themselves would enhance resilience. Apparently there is a large overlap or maybe even some sort of symbiosis between resilience and the countering of disinformation, as they partly seem to rely on the same themes. Resilience helps in countering disinformation, and the strategies to counter disinformation build resilience. Table 7: Presence of Building Blocks of resilience in various strategies.

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Chapter 4. Implementation of policies against disinformation and the role of military assets in helping enhance resilience in the Netherlands. In the former chapter we have seen what policies in countering disinformation aspire and how they involve resilience. In this chapter we want to find out if the content of these policies is really working its way down to the level where it should be implemented. To do this, as well as to gain insights for our recommendations chapter, we conducted interviews with more than 30 Dutch experts. They were questioned on the threat of disinformation, on current efforts to counter this threat, and on recommendations for enhancing resilience. The findings are crosschecked against the building blocks for resilience. This way we can discern if the positive impression the crosschecking of policies shows, is also perceived as such by experts working in the field. We will research if the interviewees subscribe the importance of the building blocks, and if they deem these properly implemented or if they see shortfalls. Taking into account the proposals made by interviewees, we will also try to answer the question how resilience in the Netherlands can be enhanced and which military assets can play a role in this. Approach We conducted interviews with, predominantly military, subject matter experts working in specialisms deemed useful in countering disinformation and enhancing resilience. Overall, we conducted more than 30 interviews, on the basis of non-attribution. Interviews were recorded and completely typed afterwards. The interviews were informally coded to enable subsequent analysis. Appendix A shows the interview protocol and all interviewees. The interviews are considered semi-structured and were conducted as such, sometimes leading to intense discussions.209 However, most interviews focused on 3 main issues:

• Disinformation, awareness of the threat and possible countermeasures.

• Resilience, its role and possible enhancement.

• Role of military assets in countering disinformation and enhancing resilience. As this shows, interviewees were not specifically asked after building blocks in order not to contaminate the results by influencing or leading. For the analysis we supplemented interview content with input derived from other appropriate sources, such as studies and reports on Defense operational developments. We specifically used documents from the “ASCALON” and “DELPHI” studies as these describe the operational developments of maneuver in the information layer.210 For this chapter the different resilience building blocks, the role of the State, and the role of the military will serve as framework. Early warning and awareness The ASCALON study warns against the dogma that active measures are a prelude to war, stating that many conflicts do not reach the threshold of armed conflict, and calls “shaping, the new decisive”,

209 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4thed, 2012), 471. 210 Dekkers and Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen; See also: Land Warfare Centre, Operationeel Concept voor het Landoptreden, Editie Ascalon, Ratification Draft (Amersfoort, Land Warfare Centre, 2016); Pieter Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen: The way ahead, Memo STAF CLAS (Utrecht, 2017); Pieter Grijpstra, Informatie als key enabler, Memo STAF CLAS (Utrecht, 2017).

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underscoring the importance of the early recognition of hybrid war and disinformation campaigns.211 Active measures could be the new kind of war, urging for a completely different defensive stance, including resilience, from the one we have held so far.212 Many interviewees share this opinion that early warning and awareness are key in countering disinformation and enhancing resilience: “forewarned is forearmed”.213 A good example how awareness can be raised is the elucidation program on disinformation given to Dutch troops and their home front before being deployed to Lithuania in eFP, in which e.g. local SME are used to explain how disinformation works in Lithuania.214 The larger part of the public is not aware of the threat that is facing the Netherlands, as hybrid warfare and the spreading of disinformation mostly stay below the threshold of armed conflict. In that way disinformation gets less attention and the military does not get involved (apart from classified operations).215 Psychological experiments show that warning participants of an impending persuasive communication enhances their resistance to this communication and makes them less susceptible to persuasion.216 In order to achieve awareness by early warning, interviewees suggest lowering the detection threshold for disinformation campaigns; this can be done by assuring a better understanding of these campaigns.217 Parallel to this, interviewees suggest lowering the threshold of using military means to counter disinformation.218 Intelligence services or military assets abroad, such as the eFP, are the obvious assets in providing early warning.219 Education and Innovation Adaptability is seen by ASCALON as the most important ability for future forces to be able to deal with fundamental insecurity.220 Learning capacity and innovation are requirements to make adaptability work. Most interviewees mention learning, education and adaptability as being conditional for countering disinformation and building resilience.221 In the Netherlands media literacy is not treated centrally as an educational object, it has been the government’s policy to facilitate entrepreneurship and stimulate decentralized media efforts.222 Interviewees plea for the governmentally prescribed integration of specific subjects regarding the use of internet and information and media-literacy in the curricula of educational institutions from primary schools up, as is common in Finland and Sweden nowadays.223 Also the critical thinking of the Anglo-Saxon world is recommended as a proper augmentation for our school curricula.224 Independent

211 Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept. 212 Galeotti, “Sorry for Doctrine”. 213 Interviews with Officer working at National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, Stratcom CoE, Directorate of operations, Special Forces, CIMIC etc, April/May 2018; See also Dekkers and Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen. 214 Interview with Officers working in Public Affairs, officers with experience in eFP, May 2018. 215 Interview with Officer working in Public Affairs, April 2018; See also Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst. MIVD Jaarverslag 2017; Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept. 216 Quinn and Wood, “Forewarnings of Influence Appeals”, 193-214. 217 Interviews with Officers working in Public Affairs, CIMIC, 1 GNC, April 2018; See also: Paul et al, Lessons from Others, iv, 45, 181; Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 16. 218 Interviews with Officers working in Public Affairs, CIMIC, 1 GNC, April 2018. 219 Interviews with Officer working in Public Affairs, CIMIC Officer, PSYOPS Officer, Officer working at Directorate of Operations, April 2018. 220 Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 29. 221 Interviews with Officers working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, Officers working in Public Affairs, Officer working at 1 GNC, CIMIC Officers, April 2018; See also Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 29. 222 Nikoltchev, Mapping of media, 294. 223 Interview with Officer working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, April 2018. 224 Anglo Saxon critical thinking is defined as the “ability to develop a capacity to reason logically and cohesively or as the ability to question and challenge existing knowledge and the social order”, according to Joelle Vandermensbrugghe, “The Unbearable Vagueness of Critical Thinking in the Context of the Anglo-Saxonisation of Education “, International Education Journal, Vol 5, No 3, 2004, 419.

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journalism is considered a cornerstone of democracy and an important educational asset in building resilience.225 Regarding innovation, examples were given in fact-checking such as the latest developments where apps will warn and explain about disinformation when using e.g. Facebook,226 or the building of an online platform for the next generation where children can experiment with information.227 Another innovation is the reversed use of echo chambers; nowadays social media users highly value the reference of peers. This obviously offers the opportunity to use peers to influence echo chambers.228 The pioneering role Defense has played in cyber defense by taking the responsibility and building an organization to defend the Dutch cyber infrastructure, is also seen as innovative. Interconnectedness Partnering, working together with others at all different levels is a conditio sine qua non in countering disinformation.229 Most interviewees deem cooperation as indispensable and they strive for an interdepartmental or comprehensive approach in which all relevant ministries cooperate: Defense, Foreign Affairs, Safety and Justice, and Interior Affairs.230 This rejuvenation of the comprehensive approach was also recommended by Giegerich: he says that if hybrid warfare is indeed the “evil twin” of NATO’s comprehensive approach, NATO’s answer towards hybrid warfare and disinformation should lay in redoubling its efforts in making the comprehensive approach more successful and in particular strengthen the links with other organizations.231 A problem is recognized here; looking at the comprehensive approach there is the DIME acronym referring to the instruments of national Power: Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy.232 For D, M and E there are ministries responsible, but not for the I.233 This is, however, inherent to democracies, as institutes for Information or propaganda are more likely to be found in totalitarian states. In the Netherlands such a ministry would even be counter-constitutional, because it would implicitly trespass on the terrain of other ministries, which is constitutionally not allowed and was already tried and precluded just after World War II.234 Anyway, on the one hand not having a primarily responsible institution causes problems, because there is no overall plan or guidance regarding Information. On the other hand, Information is something that cannot and should not be allocated to one responsible institution, because it is all encompassing, and influencing all DIME elements at once.235 The best solution many interviewees came up with was a sort of inter- or supra-departmental platform or board that will coordinate everything regarding Information. The Dutch ministry of Interior Affairs sees itself as coordinating –not as responsible- for countering disinformation and is setting steps towards such a “board”: a project-group has been formed in which the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry of Education, Culture and Science, and the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security participate.236 Lithuania has given a good example how such a board could work at the time of Russian exercise ZAPAD 17. During the entire exercise an interdepartmental forum was active that launched a joint narrative to counter or frame prevailing incidents.237

225 Interviews with Officers working in Public Affairs, employee working at ministry of Interior Affairs, Officers working at 1 GNC, May 2018 226 Interview with Officer working at Stratcom CoE, June 2018. 227 Interview with founder of a foundation aimed at countering social engineering, May 2018. 228 Interviews with Officer working at 1GNC, founder of a foundation aimed at countering social engineering, May 2018. 229 Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 30. 230 Ibid., 30; See also: Dekkers and Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen. 231 Giegerich, “Hybrid Warfare”, 69. 232 John Mills, “All Elements of National Power: Re-Organizing the Interagency Structure and Process for Victory in the Long War”. Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 6 (July 2006). 233 Interviews with Officer working at Policy Directorate, Officer working at 1 GNC, Officer working at Stratcom CoE, April 2018. 234 Floribert Baudet, Het Vierde Wapen. Voorlichting, Propaganda en Volksweerbaarheid 1944-1953 (Amsterdam: Boom, 2013). 235 Interviews with Officer working at Special Forces, Officer working at Defence Cyber Command, May 2018. 236 Interview with employee working at ministry of Interior Affairs, May 2018. 237 Interviews with Officers working in CIMIC, April 2018.

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Norms and Values Success in future conflicts, that will be fought more and more in the information domain,238 will largely depend on pursuing and living up to shared universal values.239 Values such as human rights, democracy, rule of law, freedom of speech, women’s emancipation are both typical and binding for western societies. These values also have an appeal for many other nations. There is very little explicit reference to values and norms by the interviewees apart from referring to our democracy, to freedom and freedom of press. This could either be because of the fact that these values and norms are intrinsic and are therefore not specifically mentioned. It is also possible the research is contaminated because of the fact that most interviewees are military that are expected, and mostly live up to that expectation, of having a high set standard of norms and values. According to some interviewees it could also be that the worth we assign to these values and norms is eroding, because we see them as aphoristic, and that we are getting cynical.240 I deem the fact that ALL interviewees refer to our country as “The Netherlands Inc.” as evidence to this.241 Unknowingly, this detached, company like-business model description robs our country of its history and diminishes its intrinsic values and norms, so readily recognizable in the official name “Kingdom of the Netherlands”.242 Narratives The countering of disinformation and the building of resilience requires an active communication policy based on direct and indirect messaging, according to an overarching narrative.243 Although the importance of such an overarching narrative is undeniable and undisputed, the Netherlands is not up to speed regarding these overarching narratives.244 First of all, as mentioned above, there is no institution primarily responsible for these narratives. Each ministry is responsible for its own communication, causing a lack of integrality. Second, looking at the ministry of Defense, its narratives and communication are deemed not transparent and are sometimes even perceived as propaganda.245 Also the work of the Defense Communication Organization (DCO), which is the overarching entity regarding all communication of the Armed Forces is perceived as reactive instead of the preferred pro-active.246 Most interviewees suggest or even require a more vigorous and pro-active stance. An interesting and effective example of such a vigorous stance is the Novichok attack case. British Prime Minister Theresa May made a statement 10 days after the attempted murder on Sergei Skripal and his daughter that “ there is no alternative conclusion other than that the Russian State was culpable”.247 This had the exact opposite effect of what Russia probably aimed at. Instead of driving a new wedge in the EU and in NATO, the alliances gathered behind Theresa May and stood firm. The result was the biggest collective diplomatic expulsion of Russians in history and a show of dedicated collectivity towards Russian interference.248

238 Patikarakos, War in 140 Characters. 239 Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 32. 240 Interviews with Officers working at CIMIC, at Directorate of Operations, April/May 2018. 241 In Dutch the term B.V. Nederland is used since a couple of years. 242 Mark van Ostaijen, “De BV Nederland Is Een Misplaatste Metafoor”, Binnenlands Bestuur, February 22, 2017, https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/opinie/columns/de-bv-nederland-is-een-misplaatste-metafoor.9558534.lynkx. 243 Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 32. 244 Interviews with Officers working at Policy Directorate, Officer working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, PSYOPS Officer, April 2018; See also: Land Warfare Centre. Operationeel Concept, 32. 245 Interview with Officer working in Public Affairs, April 2018. 246 Interviews with Officer working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, Officer working at Stratcom CoE, Officer working at Special Forces, April/May 2018. 247 Omand, David. From Nudge to Novichok: The response to the Skripal nerve agent attack holds lessons for countering hybrid threats. Helsinki, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, 2018, 3. 248 Omand, Nudge to Novichok.

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Pro-activity is very important because the first message sticks! In psychology this is called “front of mind”. All messages that are released later will have to counter the first one, which is seen as more truthful by the recipient, just because it was the first!249 Interviewees adhere to this point and stress the need for decentralized and opportune pro-activity in exploiting possibilities based on a strategic narrative.250 Trust Trust as well as credibility regarding the government, state institutions, the press and the military are important conditions for resilience. Unfortunately, nearly all interviewees bring up the opposite and talk about distrust and lack of credibility. One of the main reasons given for the wavering trust is the aforementioned lack in overarching narratives and pro-activeness, but also the lack in transparency by the government and its institutions.251 There is a large perceived say-do gap between government narratives and government actions.252 Distrust regarding the press is originating from the economic model of journalism nowadays where numbers of subscriptions or views/hits, and not content, determine programming. The combination of this economic model with the late economic crisis, in which many reporters have been let off, has resulted in a demise of quality investigative journalism.253 Several interviewees say that the wavering trust in the military could possibly be improved by making the military resilient and presenting them as such.254 According to them the military should assure that in all scenarios it is “the last man standing”. If all energy-supply fails, the military should still have energy, if all IT fails, the military should still have IT etc. If the military can send this signal, it will enhance trust.255 Social Capital Social capital has earlier been defined as the links, bonds and bridges between different societal groups.256 As such it is not mentioned explicitly by any interviewees, apart from some reference to the military and investigative journalism as part of social capital.257 However, the snowball effect of the interviews has led the research towards social capital. One of the interviewees is the founder of a foundation with the goal to battle social engineering. This foundation is a good example what social capital could be made of, it builds cross-links within society, it is a civic initiative interconnecting between different layers of society that battles disinformation or parts of it. The foundation raises awareness by putting themes in the spotlight. Its goal is to “create strong voices in the mass of people, the sound of multiple strong voices reaches further and has a better tone, sort of like a choir”.258 A good indication of the value of social capital is that “almost a third (305) of the main 939 media literacy stakeholders identified in the 28 EU countries is categorized as Civil Society”.259 In the Netherlands 9 out of 23 media literacy stakeholders are civil society, other stakeholders are online platforms, media regulatory authorities, public authorities and academia.260

249 Interview with PSYOPS Officer, Officer working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, Officer working in Public Affairs, April 2018; See also: Paul et al, Lessons from Others, 187; Richard Shirreff, War with Russia (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2016). 250 Interviews with Officers working at National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, April/May 2016; See also: Dekkers and Grijpstra, Informatie als wapen. 251 Described by Haiden as “distrust in traditional voices of authority”. Haiden, “Whatever Trust?”, 46. 252 Interviews with Officers working at at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, in PSYOPS, CIMIC, Directorate of Operations, Public Affairs. 253 Interviews with Officers working in Public Affairs; See also Jiri Haanen, “In de vuurlinie voor een grijpstuiver”, NRC, April 30, 2018, digital edition. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/04/30/in-de-vuurlinie-voor-een-grijpstuiver-a1601337. 254 This is in line with NATO papers on resilience e.g.: NATO, Resilience a core. 255 Interviews with Officer working at Directorate of Operations, at 1 GNC. 256 Pelling and High, “Understanding adaptation.” 257 Interview with Officer working in Public Affairs, April 2018. 258 Interview with founder of a foundation aimed at countering social engineering, May 2018. 259 Nikoltchev, Mapping of media, 27. 260 Ibid., 298.

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Role of the State According to most interviewees the State certainly has a role in countering disinformation, what role exactly differs between opinions. Some interviewees think the State should take more responsibility in raising awareness or create more laws restricting the income-model of Internet platforms.261 Others suggest the setting up of a Political Strategic Element that should safeguard that Dutch Strategy is implemented in all policy documents.262 This however poses the question: “What Dutch strategy?” There is much resonance about the lack of strategic awareness and the lack of long term vision in the Netherlands, while both are seen as being imperative for countering disinformation.263 Some interviewees went as far as to plea for a “Ministry of Information”.264 As mentioned earlier this idea would certainly not sit well in the national character of the Dutch, proven by the fact that it was already tried and precluded just after World War II.265 For most interviewees it goes without any doubt that the State should take its responsibility in stimulating the role of society and in enabling or stimulating high quality or “deep search” journalism, e.g. News Deeply by Lara Estrakian.266 Another possibility of stimulating investigative and quality media, could be the lowering of taxes on hard copy and on-line newspapers.267 In Belgium e.g. the VAT on newspapers is 0%, and in Europe a discussion is still running on lowering the tax-rate for on-line newspapers, so these could have more leeway for innovation;268 the rate is fixed at 21% at the moment.269 Although one interviewee said the State should play a larger role in influencing content of public broadcasting channels, most interviewees do agree that the State has to be careful not to cross the thin line between stimulating a process and being perceived as an influencer itself.270 Role for military assets All interviewees were asked what role military assets could play in enhancing resilience and also if this would be acceptable to Dutch society. In the above we have seen some recommendations that were made. Many interviewees agree that the military assets in the field, such as eFP, and the MIVD can play an important role in early warning.271 Also, they expect a more prominent role to be played by Public Affairs in spreading narratives, and foresee an important role for DCC in enhancing innovative efforts on

261 Vilmer, “lutte contre désinformation”, 105. 262 Interview with Officer working at Stratcom CoE, May 2018. 263 Interviews with Officers working in Public Affairs, officer working at Defence Cyber Command, May 2018. 264 Interview with Officers working in Public Affairs, officer working at Defence Cyber Command, May 2018. 265 Baudet, Vierde Wapen. 266 News Deeply, https://www.newsdeeply.com; See also: Interview with founder of a foundation aimed at countering social engineering, May 2018. 267 Interview with Officer working in Public Affairs, June 2018. 268 “Geen lager btw-tarief voor elektronische boeken, kranten en tijdschriften”, Money Talk, accessed May 30, 2018, http://moneytalk.knack.be/geld-en-beurs/belastingen/geen-lager-btw-tarief-voor-elektronische-boeken-kranten-en-tijdschriften/article-normal-866791.html; See also: Herman Wolswinkel, Hoge btw-tarief voor digitale journalistiek is niet uit te leggen, NDP Nieuwsmedia, accessed May 30, 2018. http://www.ndpnieuwsmedia.nl/6-procent-btw/; P.A. Stadhouders, Action Plan on VAT op agenda van informele ECOFIN 22/23 april, Brief van Nederlandse Uitgeversbond aan vaste commissie Financiën Tweede Kamer, http://www. dpnieuwsmedia.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/20160414-Brief-NUV-aan-Tweede-Kamer-over-Action-Plan-on-VAT.pdf; 269 What is actually happening at the moment is the very opposite; due to foreseen budget cuts Dutch public service broadcasting corporations are planning to make TV watchers pay for watching public TV! This would mean that e.g. news or documentaries based on investigative journalism, could only be viewed after paying extra, while research shows that the willingness of Dutch people to pay for online news is very low. Showredactie. “Kijker gaat dubbel betalen voor publieke omroep”. Algemeen Dagblad. Accessed June 1, 2018. https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/kijker-gaat-dubbel-betalen-voor-tv~a1fb30ff/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=sendafriend&utm_campaign=socialsharing_app; See also: Commissariaat voor de media, Mediamonitor 2018, 64-65. 270 Interviews with Officers working in CIMIC, eFP, Public Affairs, Directorate of Operations, April, May 2018. 271 Interviews with Officer working in Public Affairs, CIMIC Officer, PSYOPS Officer, Officer working at Directorate of Operations, April 2018.

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cyber-terrain.272 The specialism of Communication & Engagement (C&E), being developed at the moment as a specialism in the Information domain, is expected to play a role in innovation regarding the countering of disinformation.273 Also the more “default” roles for the military were quoted, e.g. being part of society and as such playing its role in the social capital, and enhancing trust by showing itself as capable and resilient. The distinct role the military has to play in a central “board” that counters disinformation is mentioned as being ineluctable. However, apart from some exceptions, most interviewees state that the use of military assets in “peace-time” is not (yet) acceptable for Dutch society. Awareness regarding the threat we are facing has to be raised, trust in government has to be restored, and the role and necessity of the assets to be used has to be properly explained, before acceptance can be achieved.274

272 Interviews with Officer working at Policy Directorate, Officer working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security, PSYOPS Officer, April 2018. 273 Interview with Officers working at 1 GNC, CIMIC Officers, May 2018. 274 Interviews with Officers working at Special Forces, PSYOPS, CIMIC, 1 GNC, Public Affairs, April/May 2018.

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Chapter 5. Conclusions. Although it has become clear that this subject demands and merits much more research in order to develop an appropriate solution, we deem it valid to draw some conclusions from the research discussed in the previous chapters. Dezinformatsiya or disinformation is a tool used by Russia in an offensive way to reach strategic goals. Russia aims to reach these goals by (ab)using the western emphasis on balance in media reporting, focusing on enlarging cracks in the fabric of societies and hence enlarging polarization within and between societies. Resilience indeed proves to be the silver bullet capable of countering disinformation, as the building blocks of resilience we have discerned, can strongly affect the goals of disinformation. The foundations of resilience, these building blocks, are omnipresent in EU, NATO and Dutch policies used in countering disinformation. This means that these policies, if properly implemented, will counter disinformation and enhance resilience. However, experts working in the field of disinformation perceive a large say-do gap between these policies and their application. In Table 8 we see they evaluate almost all building blocks as being necessary in building resilience and countering disinformation, but we also see that they discern shortfalls in the practical application of most building blocks. Table 8: How interviewees refer to resilience Building Blocks.

Hence the conclusion must be there is a discrepancy between policy and application. This discrepancy can only be solved by a whole-of-society approach, in which the state has to play a leading role. The balance between state-involvement and state-interference however is a very fine one. It falters between a free and open society with little state-interference, susceptible to disinformation, and a stricter role of state institutions battling disinformation with all risks attached; if a democracy tries too hard to protect its norms and values by law-fare, it becomes a dictatorship. Regarding the main question of this thesis, how the military can help enhance resilience and counter disinformation in the Netherlands, we conclude that military assets certainly have a role to play in the aforementioned whole-of-society approach. The military has a default role -as all government institutions- in enhancing social capital and interconnectedness, it can raise trust by showing it is up to its task and is seen as the apogee and the protector of society’s values and norms; it can provide early warning and enhance awareness regarding disinformation through its intelligence services and its fielded

Table 8: How interviewees refer to resilience building blocks.

Res

ilie

nce

bu

ild

ing b

lock

s

Soci

al C

apita

l

Tru

st

Nor

ms

Val

ues

Nar

rati

ves

Inte

rcon

nect

edne

ss

Inno

vatio

n &

Educ

atio

n

Earl

y W

arni

ng

Interviewees

Stressing necessity (+) + + 0 + + + +

Describing shortfalls (- ) 0 - 0 - - +/- +/-

Role for military assets yes Default

yes Default

yes Default

yes DCO/PA

yes Default

yes DCC/C&E

yes MIVD/eFP

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units; it can support overarching narratives through the use of its Public Affairs offices; and it can use specialisms such as Cyber and Communication & Engagement to support the development of innovative ways to counter disinformation. While doing all this, the military also enhances resilience. The acceptance of the use of military assets, however, is not self-evident as most citizens consider the use of the military as limited to war, or crisis situations. Success or failure in enhancing resilience and countering the effects of disinformation will depend on strategic choices by the government that will have to lead to a whole-of-society approach. We all have to realize we are in the middle of an information war, that we cannot afford to lose.

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Chapter 6. Discussion and Recommendations. Having recognized the discrepancies between policy and practice we will use all input generated so far to discuss some recommendations on how to better the enhancement of resilience against disinformation. The recommendations will be structured along the same lines we have used so far: the building blocks of resilience. Early warning, Awareness Awareness is of the utmost importance. An effort should be made to launch awareness campaigns so that the population knows about disinformation and is hence better prepared to deal with it. The problem we are seeing is that military assets cannot be brought to bear because the effects of disinformation will seldom to never reach the threshold of article V. And if they reach the article V threshold it will be too late, because what the Western world has perceived as shaping by the Russians was intended by them as decisive! Hence the Russian’s goal has already been achieved. One could obviously argue that this is precisely what should have invoked article V, but I must refrain from that discussion and recommend it merits a separate research. Anyway, in order to prevent the Russians from achieving their goals unopposed, the detection threshold for disinformation campaigns and if possible the threshold of countering disinformation with military means should be lowered. Lowering the detection threshold can also raise the level of awareness. The most suitable military assets for providing early warning are military assets in the field such as eFP and the Military Intelligence Service (Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdient, MIVD). Because of the inherent restrictions on the operations of these assets I cannot ascertain it, but I deem it safe to assume these assets are already employed for early warning. Trust Trust in State institutions by society has severely diminished over the last decades. Obviously one could argue that disinformation is partly to blame. However, most scholars and interviewees agree that trust can only be brought back by transparency and clarity. The narratives that are sent out by State institutions should give full disclosure and be clear and the say-do gap should be closed. Trust can also be enhanced by showing the population what is being done to counter disinformation. The military can enhance trust by showing that it is up to its task and that it is resilient itself. Having had to cope with over two decades of budget cuts makes this not an easy task for the Dutch Armed Forces in the upcoming years, but even small feats or accomplishments can contribute, under the condition that they are supportive to and supported by a strong overarching narrative. Narratives The Netherlands is blamed for lacking vigor in this terrain, and some call out for a more coordinated approach for the spreading of Information, referring to a governmental body taking responsibility, which would probably not be acceptable to Dutch public. However, a more pro-active, more vigorous and less ambivalent stance in the spreading of narratives is recommended. It is advised narratives should be transparent, build upon own strength, e.g. own values and norms, and be consistent. Looking at the military, the same recommendation for a more vigorous and pro-active stance regarding narratives is also valid. If this would be combined with the delegation of authority to lower levels to exploit possibilities, this could seriously improve the effectiveness of one of the most powerful assets the military has in countering disinformation: Public Affairs.

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Innovation and Education Following the example of the European Union, education programs should be established to raise awareness against disinformation and enhance media literacy. These programs do already exist in e.g. Finland and Sweden and are implemented in the curricula of schools. It is highly questionable if the military should play an active role in these programs, as it will mostly not be perceived as neutral by the population. However, the military is certainly apt to deliver the examples from its missions that can be used in these programs. Another measure that should be taken is the reconstruction of powerful high quality independent investigative journalism or deep search journalism. The State should take its responsibility in this matter and stimulate quality investigative journalism through a system of subsidies, lowering (VAT) taxes or by granting exposure through public broadcasting possibilities, and keeping the access to public channels free of charge. In the perspective of enhancing resilience paying for news, on TV or online, is an undesired development. The military has to assure it is resilient against disinformation itself. This can be achieved by implementing education and awareness training in military training curricula, as is already being done for troops being deployed to Lithuania in the eFP program and has proven effective. Regarding innovation and developing new means of countering disinformation, military assets, such as DCC and Communication and Engagement (C&E), can play an increasingly important role. Interconnectedness Although the Ministry of Interior Affairs is currently responsible for coordination in the disinformation domain, there is a perceived need for central inter- or supra-departmental control regarding disinformation. The Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs and Security and Justice as well as other stakeholders, e.g. big Internet platforms and representatives from societal organizations and foundations, should be represented in a central “board” that gives guidance to the battle against disinformation. It is highly recommended that an “independent” institution should run this “board”. If State institutions would run it, it would be perceived as partial and much of its output could be tarnished as disinformation or propaganda. The Ministry of Defense could take a role in helping establish this “board” in the same way as it has done with Cyber. Norms and values These are key in distinguishing our country from nearly all other countries worldwide. Our democracy, our historically embedded freedom of speech, our tolerance, our accommodating “polder” culture, our overstated correctness regarding international rules, our 4th and 5th of May, our King, our national anthem, our ever continuing discussions, these are all typical for our country and should be underlined, valued and propagated. This will obviously take a major effort to be instigated by the “board” and supported by our social capital. One small thing we can all do to start with; our country is not a company that is profit driven, so if we stop calling it the “The Netherlands Inc.”, and start calling it our Kingdom again, this will certainly connect people instead of separating them. The military has a major role in protecting Dutch norms and values and should portray itself further in this way. The current campaign “Defensie beschermt wat ons dierbaar is” is seen as a good starting point.

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Social Capital There are many initiatives in society on the terrain of countering disinformation and enhancing resilience. These should be supported and facilitated by the Dutch government, preferably through the aforementioned “board”. Special attention should be given to those initiatives that are able to build bridges, bonds and links while working on the terrain of disinformation. Foundations, hacker-collectives, educational institutions are already cooperating and if state institutions can be thrown in the mix, this will help weave a stronger societal fabric and enhance resilience. Obviously the military is also part of social capital and should take its role, meaning that the military should pro-actively get in touch with organizations that are active in society and striving after the same goals e.g. countering disinformation.

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Appendix A Interview protocol. This appendix reproduces a translated version of the interview protocol. All correspondence, as well as the interviews, were conducted in Dutch, as all interviewees were Dutch: Dear Sir, The subject of my thesis is Russian disinformation and how to deal with it. The main question will be if military (non-lethal) assets can help enhance resilience in Dutch society in order to counter disinformation. The thesis will be based on literature research, data research based on Internet data and data research based on interviews. The interviews will not be quantitative but qualitative, and I will try to interview personnel in a position that makes them knowledgeable about non-lethal assets and/or the operational use of these assets. That is why I am contacting you! The interview comprises 10 questions and takes about 30 minutes, obviously depending on the thoroughness of the interviewee. Most interviews can be done by phone. According to NLDA and academic world guidelines, the thesis will be public. This obviously means it cannot contain classified information, we do have to keep that in account. This does not have to be a problem, seeing that the questions are not too specific. Also you can of course indicate if you do not which the interview to continue in a certain direction, or generalize the examples you want to give. The interviews will not be attributed, meaning I will not quote from the interviews, using your name. They are meant to give an idea how specialists in this field think about the specific issues. I will use the generic picture that will hopefully emerge from the interviews. My intent is to do all the interviews in April up until half May. I sincerely do hope you are willing to cooperate in my investigation. Questions will be:

1. Are you familiar with the concept of disinformation? a. How would you describe it?

2. What are your personal experiences with disinformation? a. Privately? b. Professionally?

3. According to you, does disinformation pose a threat to Dutch society? a. Why, explain?

4. How could Dutch society counter this threat? 5. Can military assets help counter this threat?

a. Are they doing so already? b. Which assets could play a role in this?

6. Are these military asserts being effective? a. How can their effectiveness be improved?

7. Are you familiar with the concept of resilience? a. According to you, what does it mean?

8. How could resilience against disinformation be improved in Dutch society? 9. Can military assets help improving resilience?

a. Are they doing so already? b. Which assets could play a role in this?

10. Would the use of military assets be acceptable to Dutch society?

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a. Why (not)? 11. What other questions should we have asked?

a. Is there something we have not touched upon, regarding this subject that you would like to add?

12. Is there anybody with specific expertise you think we should speak to regarding this research? Interviewees Interviewees within Dutch Armed Forces were primarily identified based on their apparent relevance for the research on disinformation, sometimes because of their recent experience in e.g. missions and sometimes because of their position. Secondary interviewees were identified via the snowball method such that initial contacts recommended others within the Armed Forces or in the government that had specific expertise or experiences. The anonymous interviewees participated in a round table discussion at CHORUS, Amsterdam, where a presentation was given regarding the subject. Interviewees: Maj Asma, working at CIMIC knowledge Centre, specific expertise in STRATCOM eFP Col de Boer, working at Directorate of Policy, specific expertise disinformation LtCol van Boxmeer, working at 1 GNC, specific expertise in STRATCOM and MH17 LtCol Dekkers, working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security Maj Dijkstra, working at CIMIC knowledge Centre LtCol van den Eijnden, Commander 1 CMICo Maj Flink, working at STRATCOM CoE LtCol Franssen, working at 1GNC, specific expertise in PSYOPS Maj Groothedde, working at CIMIC, specific expertise in Mali Capt Heijl, working at CIMIC knowledge Centre Capt van Meir, working in PA, specific expertise in PSYOPS Afghanistan Maj Nielen, working in CIMIC, specific expertise in Information Operations Afghanistan Maj Paulissen, working at Defence Cyber Command, specific expertise disinformation LtCol Poetiray, working at Directorate of Operations Maj van Poll, working at Directorate of Operations Maj Pothuizen, working with 42nd Battalion, specific expertise eFP Mr Rutkens, founder of a foundation aimed at countering social engineering CHORUS Ms Scharphof, working at Ministry of Interior Affairs, specific expertise disinformation LtCol Schouwenaars, working at the National Centre for Countering Terrorism and Security Maj Theunissen, working in PA, specific expertise in JFCB Mr Tiggelman, head of CIMIC knowledge Centre Capt van de Velden, working in PA, specific expertise PA in eFP Ms Visser, working at Public Affairs, specific expertise in MH-17 Maj van de Watering van Oosten, working at PSYOPS Maj Wolf, working at Special Forces, specific expertise in BDM and resilience Anonymous, working in hacker’s collective Anonymous, working in hacker’s collective Anonymous, working in hacker’s collective Anonymous, student at Haagsche Hogeschool in Information protection Anonymous, student at Haagsche Hogeschool in Information protection Anonymous, working at Global Knowledge, IT training company

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