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Canadian PubliC PoliCy – analyse de Politiques, vol. xxxvi, suPPlement/numéro sPéCial 2010 Research, Policy Development, and Progress: Antisocial Behaviour and the Automobile riCk linden Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg robert e. mann Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto reGinald G. smart Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto evelyn vinGilis Schulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Western Ontario, London robert solomon and erika Chamberlain Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, London mark asbridGe Department of Community Health and Epidemiology, Dalhousie University, and Centre for Clinical Research, Halifax JürGen rehm Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto benedikt fisCher Centre for Applied Research in Mental Health and Addictions, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, and Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto Gina stoduto Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto Piotr wilk School of Nursing, University of Western Ontario, London miChael roereCke and Cindy traylinG Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto david l. wiesenthal Psychology Department, York University, Toronto
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Research, Policy Development, and Progress: Antisocial Behaviour and the Automobile

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Page 1: Research, Policy Development, and Progress: Antisocial Behaviour and the Automobile

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Research, Policy Development, and Progress: Antisocial Behaviour and the AutomobileriCk lindenDepartment of Sociology, University of Manitoba, Winnipegrobert e. mannCentre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of TorontoreGinald G. smartCentre for Addiction and Mental Health, Torontoevelyn vinGilisSchulich School of Medicine and Dentistry, University of Western Ontario, Londonrobert solomon and erika ChamberlainFaculty of Law, University of Western Ontario, Londonmark asbridGeDepartment of Community Health and Epidemiology, Dalhousie University, and Centre for Clinical Research, HalifaxJürGen rehmCentre for Addiction and Mental Health, Toronto, and Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Torontobenedikt fisCherCentre for Applied Research in Mental Health and Addictions, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, and Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, TorontoGina stodutoCentre for Addiction and Mental Health, TorontoPiotr wilkSchool of Nursing, University of Western Ontario, LondonmiChael roereCke and Cindy traylinGCentre for Addiction and Mental Health, Torontodavid l. wiesenthalPsychology Department, York University, Toronto

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En matière de justice, l’adoption de réglementations et de diverses mesures est très généralement basée sur des considérations politiques plutôt que sur les données fournies par la recherche scientifique. L’une des façons d’abolir les barrières entre chercheurs et décideurs politiques est d’encourager les partenariats. AUTO21, qui fait partie du programme des Réseaux de centres d’excellence, a justement été créé pour faciliter la mise en place de ce type de collaborations. L’un de ses projets, Comportement antisocial et automobile, a porté sur le vol de voitures, la conduite sous l’influence de l’alcool et du cannabis, et sur la rage au volant et les agressions envers des automobilistes. Les champs de recherche parmi lesquels des travaux ont eu le plus d’impact sur les politiques publiques sont ceux où de solides partenariats ont pu être établis avec des organismes ayant la visibilité, l’autorité et les ressources nécessaires pour mettre en place d’importants changements dans le financement de programmes et les politiques sociales ; de nombreuses recherches ont d’ailleurs ainsi pu être réalisées, par le passé, dans ces domaines.

Mots clés : vol de voitures, conduite avec facultés affaiblies, alcool et conduite, cannabis et conduite, rage au volant, conduite agressive

Justice policy is typically based more on political considerations than on research results. One way to break down barriers between researchers and policy-makers is to encourage partnerships. AUTO21, a member of the Networks of Centres of Excellence program, is designed to facilitate partnerships. The Antisocial Behaviour and the Automobile project focuses on auto theft, driving under the influence of alcohol and cannabis, and road rage/driver aggression. The research areas that have had the greatest policy impact benefited from strong partnerships with organizations that have the visibility, authority, and resources to implement significant changes in program funding and social policy. These areas also have an extensive body of prior research.

Keywords: auto theft, impaired driving, drinking and driving, cannabis and driving, road rage, aggressive driving

Quality of life in Canada is closely related to the automobile in many ways. Antisocial

behaviour (defined here as intimidating, destruc-tive, or aggressive behaviour that adversely affects other people) linked to the automobile has a major impact on Canadian society. Behaviours such as vehicle theft, impaired driving, and road rage have enormous social and economic costs (e.g., Linden and Munn-Venn 2008; Rehm, Gnam, et al. 2007). A principal way that society has attempted to control these problems has been to pass laws or regula-tions designed to deter or otherwise prevent these behaviours.

However, it is relatively rare that specific laws are passed or justice policies implemented on the basis of research showing that these laws and

policies are likely to reduce crime and other threats to public safety. Justice policy is often based on political considerations rather than on the results of research (Leicester 1999), as many politicians use justice policy as a “hot button” issue to attract voters, not as a means of ensuring a safer society.

Of course, the relationship between research and policy is no better in many other fields. Lomas (2000, 236) has observed that in health care policy, “discussions on the use of research in decision making quickly descend into finger-pointing. Decision-makers accuse researchers of irrelevant, poorly communicated ‘products’; researchers accuse decision-makers of political expediency that results in irrational outcomes.” Lomas and others have sug-gested that one way of breaking down the barriers

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between researchers and policy-makers is to encour-age partnerships that will enhance understanding and give both parties an interest in the other’s work.

One Canadian initiative designed to facilitate partnerships between researchers and users of re-search, including industry and policy-makers, is the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) program. Two goals of the NCE program are to “stimulate leading-edge research in areas critical to economic and social development” and to “accelerate the exchange of research results within the networks and the use of these results by organizations who can harness them for economic and social develop-ment” (Networks of Centres of Excellence 2007, 1). The mission of the AUTO21 network is to “build a stronger automotive sector in Canada through excellence in public/private sector collaborative research and the development of human and social capital” (AUTO21 2008). The network has encour-aged collaboration, synergy, and partnerships since its inception in 2000. AUTO21 projects are required to involve at least three institutions from at least two provinces, and also to have specific financial or in-kind support from private sector or public sector partners. AUTO21’s goal of creating partnerships between researchers and stakeholders in private industry, government bodies, and community-based groups could create important pathways for the influence of research on the policy process.

While much of the work of the AUTO21 NCE has been in technical fields that involve commercial partnerships, government policy development has also been an important component of AUTO21 ac-tivities. This paper will describe the policy-relevant activities and policy impacts of an AUTO21 project studying antisocial behaviour and the automobile. Work in the project has focused on three areas: vehicle theft, impaired driving (driving under the influence of alcohol or cannabis), and road rage/driver aggression. It is important to note that, be-cause of the complexity of the policy process and the descriptive nature of this work, we cannot claim any

causal link between AUTO21 research on antisocial behaviour and the automobile and subsequent policy change. Nevertheless, policy change has occurred in several of the areas addressed by project investiga-tors. Other project activities have attracted attention from policy-makers and the general public, and it is possible that policy change in these areas will occur in the future.

auto theft

Research on auto theft funded by AUTO21 and by external partners including Manitoba Justice and Manitoba Public Insurance was an important part of one of Canada’s most successful crime prevention programs (Linden and Munn-Venn 2008). The link between research and policy was facilitated by the fact that the AUTO21 researcher was the chair of the Manitoba Auto Theft Task Force, which meant that research results could be very quickly com-municated to policy-makers including the province’s Minister of Justice and the CEO of Manitoba Public Insurance.

Winnipeg has had high rates of auto theft since the mid-1990s, and had the highest rates in North America from 2003 to 2007. The cost of stolen vehicles was about $40 million a year, and several deaths and serious injuries had been caused by young people driving stolen vehicles. Some of the young offenders had become so aggressive that they were launching stolen vehicles into buildings by putting a cement block on the accelerator, trying to run down joggers on the street, and regularly driving stolen trucks and SUVs at police officers who were trying to stop them.

In response to this problem, the Province of Manitoba established an Auto Theft Task Force. One of the first steps taken by the Task Force was to use research to define the problem and develop solutions tailored to Winnipeg’s local situation. The Task Force knew that, in Winnipeg, auto theft was

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primarily a crime committed by young offenders and involved joyriding1 rather than stealing cars for profit. Led by the National Committee to Reduce Auto Theft, a national study of young offenders was planned. AUTO21 support was combined with funding from several provincial governments and from the automobile insurance industry to conduct a national study in which young auto theft offenders would be interviewed. The pilot site for this study was Winnipeg, where the results (Anderson and Linden 2002) provided guidance for subsequent programming.

The research found that auto theft had become an important part of youth culture in some parts of Winnipeg. The primary motivation for stealing cars was excitement and showing off for friends rather than to get money. Moreover, the young offenders were highly committed to stealing cars, and knew which cars were most vulnerable to theft. For almost a decade, the most commonly stolen vehicles were minivans manufactured in the early 1990s, which were particularly easy for young people to steal. The research suggested that the youth were so commit-ted to stealing cars that the simple measures that had been implemented by the province, such as not allowing convicted car thieves to obtain drivers’ licences and suing offenders to recover the costs of vehicle thefts, would not be effective.

To determine what might help to reduce the incidence of this crime, a second component of the AUTO21-funded research was an international re-view of auto theft prevention programs (Linden and Chaturvedi 2005). This review provided information about prevention strategies that had been successful elsewhere and was used as the basis for the Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy (WATSS). WATSS has three main components.

The first component is intensive supervision of chronic auto theft offenders. Many chronic offenders are in the community under conditions of release that typically involve curfews. The Regina Police Service had established a very successful program

in which high-risk offenders were monitored on a regular basis. That practice became a key part of WATSS, though the program was significantly modified in Winnipeg. Curfew checks are done as often as every three hours by Manitoba Corrections officials and the Winnipeg Police Service, and youth who violate release conditions are apprehended.

The second component of the program involved the installation of electronic immobilizers in high-risk vehicles. Immobilizers are devices that disable a vehicle’s starter, ignition, and fuel systems un-less the car is started using a coded transponder. Research in several countries, including Australia, showed that immobilizers were very effective in reducing auto theft (National Motor Vehicle Theft Reduction Council 2001, 2002). Manitoba Public In-surance provided subsidies to encourage Manitobans to install immobilizers in their vehicles. Owners of the 100 models of vehicles most at risk of being stolen were offered free immobilizers and a $40 per year reduction in their insurance policies. This voluntary program resulted in immobilizers being installed in 70,000 vehicles. When the participation rate in this voluntary program began to decline, the program was made compulsory for the most at-risk vehicles, which can no longer be registered unless they have immobilizers.

The third component of the WATSS program addressed the root causes of auto theft by working with young people and their families to reduce the number of youth who find auto theft an appealing form of recreation. This component is important in helping young offenders to stop stealing cars and ending the flow of new recruits into this dangerous and costly pastime. Programming is delivered to four levels of offenders, ranging from young people who are only at risk of involvement to those who are heavily involved and have a very high risk of reoffending.

Ongoing evaluation research has shown that the program has been very effective. Auto theft rates increased by nearly 500 percent between 1992 and

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2004 but have dropped significantly since the incep-tion of WATSS in late 2005. WATSS was phased in over a three-year period and while thefts increased by 5 percent in 2006, rates dropped by 27 percent in 2007, by 42 percent in 2008, and by an additional 34 percent in the first ten months of 2009. The aver-age of 6.2 cars stolen per day in 2009 represents a reduction of 74 percent from the average of 24 cars per day in 2004.2 This reduction is far larger than the reductions nationally3 and for the rest of Manitoba, and far greater than can be explained by changes in risk factors such as the proportion of young males in the population and the age of vehicles in the city.

drivinG under the influenCe of alCohol

Driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) is a major cause of collisions, injuries, and preventable deaths in Canada (Vingilis and Wilk 2007, 2008). DUI is widely recognized as a major public concern and has been the subject of preventive efforts for many years. In Canada, there have been previous indications that certain legal and policy initiatives may influence DUI rates, but these indications have not always been strong (Sen 2003, 2005; Vingilis et al. 1988). However, AUTO21 research has shown that numerous legal and policy initia-tives have played an important role in controlling the drinking-driving problem in Canada. Initia-tives such as a Criminal Code 0.08 blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for driving, provincial 90-day administrative licence suspension programs, ignition interlock programs, and comprehensive remedial programs for convicted drivers have been shown to reduce rates of DUI and alcohol-related collisions and resulting fatalities (Asbridge et al. 2004; Ialomiteanu, Mann, and Adlaf n.d.; Mann et al. 2001, 2002).

AUTO21 researchers have considered initia-tives that could further reduce drinking driving and related fatalities in Canada, and have done this in partnership with Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) Canada. The partnership with MADD

involved (a) MADD Canada’s support for the project’s research plan, (b) the opportunity for the organization to shape the research plan by identify-ing areas of particular interest, and (c) an agreement to participate in the production of reports for the public and policy-makers. Robert Solomon and Erika Chamberlain studied federal and provincial legislation relating to impaired driving, and have recommended comprehensive packages of reforms based on reviews of evidence from AUTO21 investi-gations (e.g., Asbridge et al. 2004) and international sources (e.g., Wagenaar, O’Malley, and LaFond 2001). Two of their initiatives, in particular, have garnered sustained attention from policy-makers and have contributed to legislative reform: the call for a provincial 0.00 percent BAC limit for all drivers under the age of 21, and the recommendation for a 0.05 percent BAC Criminal Code offence.

In each case, Solomon and Chamberlain identi-fied problems with the current law, surveyed the international literature to determine best practices, and recommended solutions that were consistent with Canada’s unique social and legal framework, including the requirements of the Canadian Char-ter of Rights and Freedoms. In partnership with MADD Canada, they presented their proposals to the responsible government authorities and, in some cases, helped to draft and promote new legislation.

Zero Percent BAC Laws for Drivers under 21Many graduated licensing programs (GLPs) include a requirement that affected drivers maintain a low or zero blood alcohol concentration at all times while driving, on the theory that beginning drivers are already disadvantaged by their lack of driving ex-perience, and should not have their judgment further impaired by alcohol. These BAC restrictions have consistently been shown to reduce self-reported driving after drinking and alcohol-related crashes (Wagenaar, O’Malley, and LaFond 2001).

A major drawback of the current system, at least in Canada, is that the zero BAC restrictions

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are usually lifted on completion of the GLP, which typically occurs around the age of 18 or 19 (Cham-berlain and Solomon 2008a). This corresponds to the legal drinking age in all of the provinces and ter-ritories, a period during which alcohol consumption and rates of binge drinking increase (Adlaf, Begin, and Sawka 2005). Moreover, this is precisely the age at which teenage drivers are most vulnerable to alcohol-related crash deaths and injuries (May-hew and Simpson 1999). It is dangerous to expose 18- to 20-year-olds to their first experiences of unrestricted driving at the same time as their first legal use of alcohol (Mann et al. n.d.; Mayhew and Simpson 1999).

One way to address this problem is to raise the minimum legal drinking age. There is very strong evidence, from the United States and Canada, that lower minimum drinking ages significantly increase alcohol-related collisions and deaths among the affected age groups (Schmidt and Kornaczewski 1975), and that higher minimum drinking ages sig-nificantly reduce alcohol consumption and related crashes (Wagenaar and Toomey 2002). However, proposals to raise the drinking age in Canada are likely to be met with considerable opposition by young people, and by politicians concerned about angering young voters.

Fortunately, many of the traffic safety benefits of a higher minimum drinking age can be achieved through zero BAC restrictions in graduated licensing programs, and particularly by extending the zero BAC restriction until drivers reach the age of 21. Zero and low BAC restrictions have been shown to have very positive results (Hingson, Heeren, and Winter 1994) whether applied to young beginning drivers (16- and 17-year-olds) or older teenagers (Lacey, Jones, and Wiliszkowski 2000).

Solomon and Chamberlain have advocated extended BAC limits for almost ten years (Cham-berlain and Solomon 2001), and have made them a priority recommendation as part of MADD Can-ada’s “Rating the Provinces” project (Solomon and

Chamberlain 2000) and youth campaign (Cham-berlain and Solomon 2006, 2008b). Provincial authorities have been very responsive to these pro-posals. In 2006, Manitoba became the first province to enact a zero BAC limit for the first five years of licensure, and in the last three years Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Ontario have also taken steps to introduce extended zero BAC limits. Finally, the National Alcohol Strategy Working Group recommended the implementation of such BAC limits (National Alcohol Strategy 2007). These initiatives will help to keep extended zero BAC limits at the forefront of the national traffic safety agenda for years to come. If these initiatives have the same effect in Canada as they have had in the United States (Shults et al. 2001; Wagenaar, O’Malley, and LaFond 2001), we can anticipate reductions in DUI-related fatalities in the affected groups.

A 0.05 Percent BAC Criminal Code OffenceCanada’s current Criminal Code BAC limit is 0.08 percent. Given the margin of error accepted by Canadian courts, most police will not lay criminal charges unless a driver’s evidentiary BAC readings are above 0.10 percent. This de facto limit allows individuals to drive after consuming large quanti-ties of alcohol. For example, a 200-pound man can drink over six bottles of regular-strength beer in two hours, on an empty stomach, and then drive largely immune from criminal sanction (Solomon and Chamberlain 2003).

Since Canada’s 0.08 percent BAC limit was first introduced in 1970, numerous laboratory, driving simulator, and closed-access roadway studies have established that even small amounts of alcohol adversely affect driving skills and performance (Moskowitz and Fiorentino 2000). In addition, re-search has established that the relative risk of crash death rises sharply starting at BACs of 0.05 percent, particularly for young males (Zador, Krawchuk, and Voas 2000). In response to this research, the vast majority of countries have made it an offence to drive with a BAC of 0.05 percent or higher.

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Every jurisdiction that has lowered its permissible BAC limits for driving has experienced significant reductions in impaired driving deaths and injuries (Chamberlain and Solomon 2002; Mann et al. 2001; Shults et al. 2001).

Solomon and Chamberlain have advocated a 0.05 percent Criminal Code BAC offence as a supple-ment to the existing 0.08 percent offence, thereby creating a tiered approach based on a driver’s BAC record (Solomon, Chamberlain, and Usprich 2006). They have called for a 0.05 percent BAC offence with more streamlined procedures, such as ticketing provisions, and lower penalties. Further, offenders without a subsequent Criminal Code impaired driv-ing conviction within two years could be deemed not to have a criminal record for the 0.05 percent offence, and the related information could be automatically destroyed. Bills incorporating these features have already been drafted and introduced in both the House of Commons and the Senate,4 though neither was enacted. Solomon and Chamberlain also submitted their proposals to the Standing Commit-tee on Justice and Human Rights in February 2008 (Solomon and Chamberlain 2008). The creation of the proposed 0.05 percent BAC offence would help to maximize deterrence, minimize the administrative burden on the criminal justice system, and appro-priately sanction offenders.

drivinG under the influenCe of Cannabis

Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug among Canadian adults, and use rates have increased in recent years (Fischer, Rehm, and Hall forthcom-ing). For example, in Ontario usage among those 18 and over increased from 8.7 percent in 1996 to 12.5 percent in 2007 (Ialomiteanu et al. 2009). Cannabis slows reaction time, the processing of information, psychomotor coordination, attention, and memory (Ramaekers et al. 2004; Solowij 1998). Until re-cently there was little information available on the prevalence of driving under the influence of canna-bis (DUIC), and available research on the effects of

cannabis on collision risk was mixed. Nevertheless, there have been indications that cannabis may play an important role in collisions, including the obser-vation that cannabis is the illicit drug most often found in dead or injured drivers (e.g., Drummer et al. 2004; Kelly, Darke, and Ross 2004; Stoduto et al. 1993). Thus, in recent years there has been increased general interest in the topic of cannabis and driving by policy-makers and community groups such as MADD Canada. AUTO21 researchers have sought to provide Canadian data relevant to this issue, and have done this in partnership with MADD Canada.

One central question is the prevalence of DUIC. If DUIC is an extremely rare event, it may not war-rant the attention of policy-makers. This issue had seldom been dealt with in the past, and available information did seem to suggest that DUIC was uncommon in the general population (Jonah 1990; Walsh and Mann 1999). A complicating factor is that DUI and DUIC are often observed in the same individuals (Walsh and Mann 1999). On the other hand, both collision involvement and cannabis use are most common among the young, and so AUTO21 investigators have examined the incidence of DUIC among this group. This research provided new and surprising information. DUIC appears to be more common among high school students than driving after drinking (Adlaf, Mann, and Paglia 2003; Asbridge, Poulin, and Donato 2005). Among university students, there appears to be an important subgroup who report DUIC, sometimes very fre-quently, and who believe that this behaviour poses little risk (Fischer et al. 2005). A follow-up study with a larger, multi-campus sample confirmed these findings (Fischer et al. n.d.), and discriminant func-tion analysis suggested that frequent cannabis use, frequent driving, perception of one’s own ability to drive after cannabis use, and expectation of can-nabis use in the next 12 months were determinants of high-frequency cannabis use and driving (i.e., over 12 occasions in the past year).

If driving after cannabis use is a common enough behaviour to be a potential traffic safety concern, a

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central question concerns the extent to which DUIC affects collision risk. Determining the influence of DUIC on collision risk has proven to be a difficult task for research. The case-control design that has proven so valuable in assessing the impact of alcohol on collision risk has been very difficult to imple-ment in the study of cannabis effects on collision, because of problems in collecting and interpreting data (Mann et al. 2007.) Thus, available evidence on the impact of cannabis on collision risk has been described as mixed (Bates and Blakely 1999; Vingilis and Macdonald 2002).

AUTO21 researchers have explored innovative methods to obtain information on the relationship between cannabis use and collision risk. Asbridge, Poulin, and Donato (2005) assessed the link between self-reported cannabis use, including self-reported DUIC, and self-reported collision risk. These investigators found that, among high school stu-dents, DUIC was associated with an increase in self-reported collision risk similar to that seen with alcohol. Similar results have also been found in the adult population (Mann et al. 2007). Asbridge and colleagues were also able to control for the effects of driving after drinking in their analyses, indicating that the link between DUIC and collisions remained even after controlling for alcohol consumption and drinking driving.

More recently, AUTO21 investigators have undertaken pilot work to assess the feasibility of examining the impact of DUIC on collision risk with a variant of the case-control design called the case-crossover design. This design allows researchers to assess the impact of DUIC on actual collisions, using collision victims as their own controls (in contrast to the case-control design, where a separate group of controls not involved in collisions is required). The pilot study was conducted in a major Toronto hospital emergency department. The procedures for data collection worked well within this hospital set-ting (Rehm, Adlaf, et al. 2007). The response rate was 89 percent, similar to the response rate found in

similar studies, suggesting good acceptance of the study content and procedures by MVC participants receiving hospital care. Interviews were success-fully conducted in the emergency department or at the bedside without any major issues. Finally, items in the questionnaire seemed acceptable and posed no major difficulties for the respondents. The success of this pilot study has enabled these investigators to obtain funding recently from the Canadian Insti-tutes of Health Research for a full-scale trial in the emergency departments of participating hospitals in Halifax and Toronto. The results of this work should provide clear Canadian information on the role of DUIC in collision causation.

In a process parallel to AUTO21 research on the prevalence of DUIC and its contributions to colli-sion risk, the federal government introduced and eventually enacted Bill C-2, which, among other things, broadened police powers to investigate drug-impaired driving and to gather the evidence needed to prosecute offenders. The legislation also created a new offence of failing, without a lawful excuse, to participate in physical coordination or drug recognition evaluation testing. These provi-sions parallel the roadside screening and evidentiary breath and blood-testing provisions that apply to alcohol-impaired driving suspects. Project inves-tigators have advocated for this type of legislation since 2001 (Solomon and Chamberlain 2001), and have provided information and research in sup-port of this legislative process both informally and formally. The latter activities have included filing submissions and appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Hu-man Rights (Mann 2005; Solomon 2005; Solomon, Carlson, and Nikolic 2007).

driver aGGression and road raGe

The late 1990s were marked by increasing interest among the public and policy-makers in driver ag-gression and road rage. Driver aggression and road

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rage refers to attempts by drivers to direct aggres-sion toward other road users, including attempts to injure or damage. Driver aggression and road rage does not include speeding and other road user be-haviours sometimes classed as “aggressive driving” (Smart and Mann 2002a). However, in this area, as in cannabis use and driving, there was a paucity of scientific information. Some commentators sug-gested that reports of driver aggression and road rage were an “urban myth” propagated by such factors as media interest in stories involving violence and aggression (Fumento 1998).

AUTO21 investigators sought to provide infor-mation on this topic to inform public opinion and policy considerations. Their research has shown that serious injuries and deaths from road rage are re-ported relatively frequently in Canadian newspapers (Smart and Mann 2002b). As well, driver aggression and road rage appears to be a common experi-ence among drivers. Almost half (46.6 percent) of drivers reported being a victim of road rage in its milder forms in the past year while 7.2 percent had experienced road rage serious enough to warrant, in principle, a criminal charge. A large proportion (31.7 percent) also reported being perpetrators of road rage in its milder forms, while 2.1 percent re-ported conduct serious enough to potentially warrant criminal charges (Smart, Mann, and Stoduto 2003).

Other research has identified the factors that can act to increase or decrease driver aggression and road rage. Drivers who report more frequent experience of driver aggression and road rage are more likely to report alcohol and other drug use and psychiatric distress (Butters, Mann, and Smart 2006; Mann et al. 2004; Smart et al. 2003). Driver stress may be heightened by the addition of oc-cupational stress and daily hassles (Wickens and Wiesenthal 2004). Aggression is one of the most common reactions of motorists to stress (Hennessy and Wiesenthal 1997; Hennessy et al. 2004; Wiesen-thal, Hennessy, and Totten 2003). Drivers frequently engage in aggressive behaviours in retaliation to the

perceived harmful or inconsiderate actions of other drivers (Wickens and Wiesenthal 2005; Wiesenthal, Hennessy, and Totten 2000). These factors may point to causative mechanisms and potential preventive actions.

AUTO21 research has been of interest to policy-makers in Canada and elsewhere (e.g., Australia. Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee 2005). Currently, no specific policy reforms on the topic of driver aggression and road rage have been intro-duced, but campaigns designed to encourage safe and courteous driving are common. Our AUTO21 research has provided extensive information on a topic of interest to government and to the public. The work has attracted substantial interest from the media, including newspapers, radio, and television. A recent Transport Canada survey found that the public rated road rage as the seventh most important road safety issue, ahead of such concerns as fatigued drivers, driving while impaired by prescription drugs, speeding, aging drivers, and young drivers (EKOS Research 2007).

ConClusion

AUTO21’s project on antisocial behaviour and the automobile has played an important role in Canadian public policy. The two activities that have had the most impact had the strongest partnerships. The work on alcohol and driving has a strong partnership with Mothers Against Drunk Driving Canada, one of Canada’s most effective advocacy organizations for impaired driving and road safety initiatives. The auto theft activities involved partnerships with Manitoba Justice and Manitoba Public Insurance, both of which had the authority and the resour-ces to implement some very significant changes in program funding and social policy. These two activities also had the advantage of dealing with well-documented and extensively studied problems. Drinking and driving has been on the public agenda for decades and there has been a great deal of

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research on the most effective means of preventing impaired driving. There is also a strong body of research on auto theft, and the problem in Winnipeg was so far out of control that it was obvious that it had to be addressed.

Other project activities (e.g., driver aggression and road rage, cannabis and driving) have had less specific effects, though the recent passage of drug-impaired driving legislation shows that policy initiatives are beginning to take place. It has been more difficult to develop the strong partnerships that are necessary to make policy changes in these areas. This may be because public concern about these issues is not yet great enough to encourage govern-ments and other decision-makers to act. Moreover, in the case of road rage and aggressive driving, no effective interest group, such as MADD Canada, has emerged to push for public and political support for change. Nevertheless, AUTO21 research in these areas has provided some of the basic information that will be necessary to guide policy in the future.

These “case studies” demonstrate the role that research can play in developing policy on justice and health issues. Researchers investigate topics for various reasons, and often the interests of policy-makers do not figure highly in these reasons. However, the Networks of Centres of Excellence program and AUTO21 specifically seek research that will be of value to business, policy-makers, and others. AUTO21 research projects also require researchers to link up with end users. The experi-ence of the antisocial behaviour and driving project points to the success of these requirements. The link-ing of researchers and policy-makers has resulted in research that has been of value and interest to Canadian policy-makers and the public.

Notes

This research was supported by a grant from AUTO21, a member of the Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) program that is administered and funded by the Natural

Sciences and Engineering Research Council, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council in partnership with Industry Canada. We are very grateful to Dr. Peter Frise, Scientific Director of AUTO21, for his comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

1 The term joyriding is misleading, as it connotes a minor activity rather than a dangerous crime that has taken hundreds of lives across Canada. However, the term is commonly used to describe auto thefts that do not involve stealing for resale.

2 These figures are actual thefts in Winnipeg, while Statistics Canada’s crime figures also include attempted thefts. If we also include attempts in Winnipeg, the decline from 2004 to 2009 was 71 percent.

3 Between 2004 and 2008, Statistics Canada (2005, 2009) reported a decline of 29 percent compared with 51 percent in Winnipeg. National figures for 2009 are not yet available, but it is highly unlikely that they will approach the 2009 Winnipeg reductions.

4 Solomon and Usprich (1990) worked with Senate staff to draft this legislation.

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