REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYAN …sb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2017/B_Crim_SB-16-CRM-0462_Tin… · Mendoza-Ong case werenotappliedhere, the samewouldnot alter the result

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

Quezon City

MINUTES of the proceedings held on February 23,2017

HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANGHON. SARAH JANE T. FERNANDEZHON. BERNELITO R. FERNANDEZ

..... .. ChairpersonAssociate Justice

. Associate Justice

Case No. SB-16-CRM-0462 - PEOPLE vs. DELFIN TELANTING

For resolution is accused Delfin Telan Ting's ((Motion forReconsideration" dated January 20, 2017,1 praying that theCourt's Resolution dated December 14, 2016 be set aside andthe case against him be consequently dismissed.2

In support of his aforesaid motion, the accused-movantinvokes three (3) grounds, namely:

A. The Honorable Court erred in ruling that theperiod of one (1) year and eighty seven (87) daysfrom the filing of the Affidavit-Complaint to thesubmission of the recommendatory Resolution andthe two (2) years and five (5) months that it took forthe Ombudsman to approve the same or a total ofthree (3) years and five (5) months cannot beconsidered as vexatious and oppressive consideringthe hefty volume of cases that are filed with theOffice of the ombudsma~

1pp. 163-191, Record2 p. 180, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople ys. TingSB-16-CRM -0462

B. The Honorable Court erred in ruling that byasking for two (2) extensions of time within which tosubmit his counter-affidavit, Accused contributed tothe delay and should not be allowed to complainabout the violation of his constitutional right tospeedy disposition of cases.

C. The Honorable Court erred in failing toconsider that the: (i) inordinate delay in theresolution of the case vis-a-vis the timing of theapproval of the Resolution by the Ombudsman; (ii)its subsequent dissemination to the voting publicduring the campaign and/ or election period; and (iii)the utilization thereof as black propaganda toconvince the electorate of Tuguegarao City not tovote for the Accused certainly prejudiced hischances of winning the mayoralty race.3

Relative to the first and second grounds, the accused-movant takes exception to the application by this Court of theSupreme Court ruling in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan4 tothe present case. Instead, he insists that the case of Tatad v.Sandiganbayan5 should be applied reiterating the followingcircumstances which allegedly bear the earmarks of inordinatedelay:

15.1. Like in the case of Tatad, the assailedResolution was released more than three (3)years afterthe case was deemed submitted for resolution.

15.2. As in the case of Tatad, there arecircumstances in this case which, with all due respect,indicates that the Officeof the Ombudsman might havebeen manipulated by certain individuals to achieve theirintended political designs.

15.3. While it appears that the case was resolvedon 30 August 2013, it took more than three (3)years forthe Resolution to be approved by the HonorableombUdsmnJf

3 p. 164, Record4440 SCRA423 (2004) ~5159 SCRA70 (1988) IV \l

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. TingSB-16-CRM -0462

15.4. The timing in the release of the Resolutiondated 30 August 2013 should also be considered. Sinceit appears that the same was released barely a fewweeks before the 09 May 2016 elections. In the samevein, the Decision in the administrative aspect of theinstant case was released barely two (2) weeks beforethe 09 May 2016 elections.

15.5. Unsigned copies of the assailed Resolutioncirculated around the City of Tuguegarao a few daysprior to the actual receipt thereof by the Accused.6

Also, the accused-movant invokes anew the case ofCoscolluela v. Sandiganbayan7 and contends that theruling of the Supreme Court in the case of PhilippineCoconut Producers, Inc. v. Republic8 is not applicable to thepresent case.9

The prosecution filed its ((Opposition to the Motion forReconsideration" dated February 7, 2017.10 Therein, theprosecution avers that in order to ascertain whether the rightto speedy disposition of cases had been violated, the followingfactors must be considered: [1] the length of delay; [2] thereasons for the delay; [3] the assertion or failure to assert suchright by the accused; and [4] the prejudice caused by thedelay.ll According to the prosecution, these factors have beenconsidered and it maintains that the right of the accused-movant to speedy disposition of cases was not violated.12

With respect to the accused-movant's reiteration of theapplicability of Tatad, the prosecution maintains that theaccused-movant failed to adduce sufficient basis, except for amere allegation, that the "timing" of the release of the decisionwas politically motivated or was meant to smear the reputationof the accused during the May 2016 elections.13 Likewise, the

6 p. 170, Record7701 SCRA 188 (2013)8663 SCRA514 (2012)9 pp. 165, 179-180, Record10 pp. 224-230, Record11 p. 227, Record12 p. 228, Record13 p. 228, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople YS. TingSB-16-CRM-0462

prosecution points out that the imputation of ill-motiveagainstthe Ombudsman by the accused-movant is unfounded.l4

To be sure, the grounds invoked by the accused-movantin his present motion for reconsideration are mere reiterationsof the arguments previously raised in his motion to quash.These arguments were squarely passed upon by the Court inits Resolution sought to be reconsidered, to wit:

The accused-movant cites the case of Tatad v.Sandiganbayan,15 wherein the Supreme Courtdismissed a case due to the long delay in thetermination of the preliminary investigation by theTanodbayan and held that such delay is in violationof the constitutional right of the accused to dueprocess and speedy disposition of cases.l6 Allegedly,the surrounding circumstances in this caseunmistakably bear the earmarks of inordinatedelay, thus, making the doctrine in Tatadapplicable,17to wit:

9. 1. Like in the case of Tatad, the assailed Resolutionwas released more than three (3)years after the case wasdeemed submitted for resolution. 18

9.2. As in the case of Tatad, there are circumstances inthis case which, with all due respect, indicates that theOfficeof the Ombudsman might have been maniPu/7

14 p. 228, Record15159 SeRA 70 (1988)

16 pp. 84-86, Record

17 p. 86, Record18 id

RESOLUTIONPeople YS. TingSB-16-CRM -0462

by certain individuals to achieve their intended politicaldesigns. 19

9.3. While it appears that the case was resolved on 30August 2013, it took more than three (3) years for theResolution to be approved by the HonorableOmbudsman.2o

9.4. The timing in the release of the Resolution dated 30August 2013 should also be considered. Since it appearsthat the same was released barely a fewweeks before the09 May 2016 elections. In the same vein, the Decision inthe administrative aspect of the instant case wasreleased barely two (2) weeks before the 09 May 2016elections.21

9.5. Unsigned copies of the assailed Resolution circulatedaround the City of Tuguegarao a few days prior to theactual receipt thereof by the Accused.22

Accused Ting likewise invokes the case ofCoscoZluela v. Sandiganbayan,23 wherein theSupreme Court found the delay in the approval bythe Ombudsman of the Resolution and the actualfiling of the Information violative of the right of theaccused therein to speedy disposition of cases anddirected the dismissal of the criminal cases.24 Heintones:

13.1. First, like in Coscolluela, the preliminaryinvestigation proceedings took a protracted amount oftime to complete.25

13.2. Second, the delay in the Ombudsman's resolutionof the case is UnjUstified~

19 id

20 p. 86, Record21 id

22 p. 86, Record

23701 SeRA 188 (2013)

24 p. 87, Record

25 p. 93, Record

26 p. 94, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. TingSB-16-CRM -0462

13.3. Third, as in Coscolluela, the Accused cannot befaulted for failing to assert his right to speedy dispositionof cases because he was unaware that the investigationwas still on-going. Accused was only informed of the 30August 2013 Resolution and Information when hereceived a copy thereof on March 2016 or only after thelapse of three (3)years.27

13.4. Fourth, the Accused is most definitely prejudicedby the lengthy delay in the proceedings against him.28

.......... Moreover, the accused's reliance in Tatad v.Sandiganbayan,29 is misplaced. In Tatad, there werepeculiar circumstances attendant to the three-yeardelay in terminating the preliminary investigation.According to the Supreme Court, ('political motivationsplayed a vital role in activating and propelling theprosecutorial process;"30 and, there was a departurefrom the established procedure in conducting thepreliminary investigation and the issues involved weresimple.

Unlike in Tatad, the present case involves no clearindication of any political motivation in the filing of thepresent Information against the accused-movant. Hisaverment that the timing in the filing of the Informationindicates that the Office of the Ombudsman might havebeen manipulated by certain individuals to achieve theirpolitical designs31 since the resolutions of theOmbudsman were released in close proximity to the2016 elections is sheer speculation. The accused hasnot even identified who these "certain individuals" areand who among the officials in the Office of theOmbudsman "might have been manipulated."

Likewise, the ruling in Coscolluela is inapplicable tothe case at bar. In the said case, the Supreme Courtruled in favor of the dismissal of the Information sincethe circumstances of the case showed that thepetitioners therein were unaware that preliminaryinvestigations against them were on-going; hence, the

~27 id

28 id

29159 SCRA70 (1988)30 p. 81, Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA70 (1988)31 p. 86, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople ys. TingSB-16-CRM-0462

High Court ruled that they could not be faulted for theirfailure to assert their right to speedy disposition ofcases.

Here, accused Ting was aware that there was a casefiled against him before the Office of the Ombudsman.In fact, he filed his counter-affidavit32 on August 31,2012, after filing two (2)motions for extension to file thesame. After receiving an adverse resolution from theOffice of the Ombudsman, he filed a motion forreconsideration thereof. Notably, the accused failed toassert his right to a speedy disposition of his casethroughout the proceedings before the Office· of theOmbudsman. It is only now that he is asserting suchright. 33

Moreover, the Court cited the case of Mendoza-Ong v.Sandiganbayan simply to stress that the heavy workload ofthe Officeof the Ombudsman, which is judicially recognized noless by the Supreme Court, should also be considered inascertaining whether inordinate delay attended the resolutionof cases before the said office. At any rate, even if theMendoza-Ong case were not applied here, the same would notalter the result of the finding of the Court that there was noinordinate delay in the conclusion of the proceedings before theOmbudsman that will properly merit an invocation by theaccused-movant of a violation of his right to speedy dispositionof cases.

The claim of the accused-movant that the ruling inPhilippine Coconut Producers, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic34

is not applicable to this case because COCOFED involvedproceedings before the Court, not with the Ombudsman, alsolacks merit.

Although the proceedings before the Ombudsman isadministrative in nature, the ruling laid down in COCOFEDapplies to it with equal force; that is, the failure of a party toassert his right to speedy disposition of cases at the earliestopportunity results in a forfeiture of that rig~

32 pp. 45-52, Record

33 pp 2-3, 7-8, Resolution dated December 14, 2016; pp. 155-A-156, 158-158-A, Record

34663 SeRA 514 (2012)

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. TingSB-16-CRM-0462

In this case, the record shows that the accused-movantcompletely failed to assert his right to speedy disposition ofcases throughout the proceedings before the Ombudsman.Even at the late stage when he filed on March 8,2016 a motionfor reconsideration of the Ombudsman Resolution datedJanuary 21,2016, which found probable cause against him, hedid not raise this issue of alleged inordinate delay. Indeed, theaccused-movant is raising this issue only now after the caseagainst him was filed with the Court. Surely, the accused-movant cannot be allowed to insulate himself from the adverseoperative effects of his omission as held by the Court in itsResolution:

Under the obtaining facts, the accused must be deemedto have waived said right for his failure to assert it withreasonable promptitude. The Supreme Court held in thecase of Philippine Coconut Producers, Inc. v.Republic35 that the right to speedy disposition of casesis lost unless seasonably invoked, thus:

The more recent case of Tello v. People laid stress tothe restrictive dimension to the right to speedydisposition of cases, i.e., it is lost unless seasonablyinvoked:

In Bernat . . ., the Court denied petitioner's claim ofdenial of his right to a speedy disposition of casesconsidering that [he] ... chose to remain silent for eightyears before complaining of the delay in the dispositionof his case. The Court ruled that petitioner failed toseasonably assert his right and he merely sat andwaited from the time his case was submitted forresolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed toassert his right to a speedy disposition of his case ...He only invoked his right to a· speedy disposition ofcases after [his conviction] .... Petitioner's silence maybe consideredas a waiverofhis righfi

35663 SCRA514 (2012)

36 pp. 588-589, Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. Republic, 663 SCRA514 (2012); pp. 8-9,

Resolution dated December 14, 2016; pp. 158-A-159, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople vs. TingSB-16-CRM-0462

As a final argument, the accused-movant reiterates hisclaim that the promulgation by the Office of the Ombudsman ofits Resolution was politically motivated allegedly because (1) thetiming of the release of the said Resolution was used to((negatively campaign" against the accused-movant since therelease was in such close proximity to the 2016 elections, and (2)that it is of common knowledge that the voters in this country areeasily swayed during the elections. 37

The Court already rejected the aforesaid postulation ofthe accused-movant in its assailed Resolution dated December14, 2016, viz:

Unlike in Tatad, the present case involves no clearindication of any political motivation in the filing of thepresent Information against the accused-movant. Hisaverment that the timing in the filing of the Informationindicates that the Office of the Ombudsman might havebeen manipulated by certain individuals to achieve theirpolitical designs38 since the resolutions of theOmbudsman were released in close proximity to the2016 elections is sheer speculation. The accused hasnot even identified who these "certain individuals" areand who among the officials in the Office of theOmbudsman "might have been manipulated."39

In sum, the accused-movant has failed to raise any newor substantial matter that would warrant a reconsideration ofthe Court's Resolution dated December 14,2016.

WHEREFORE, the accused's "Motion for Reconsideration(of the Resolution dated 14 December 2016)" dated January 20,2017 is DENIED for being pro fonna and/ or lack of m~

37 p. 168, Record38 p. 86, Record

39 P. 8, Resolution dated December 14, 2016; p. 158-A, Record

RESOLUTIONPeople ys. TingSB-16-CRM -0462x--- ----------- ------- ------- ---------- -- --------- x

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J., Chairperson /- ~

FERNANDEZ, S.J., J.