REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYANsb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2019/C_Crim_SB-18-CRM... · 2019-03-04 · REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYAN QUEZONCITY SPECIAL THIRD

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSANDIGANBAYAN

QUEZON CITY

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Criminal Case No. SB-18-CRM-0458For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of

Republic Act No. 3019

- versus- Present:

SOLEDAD C. MONTILLA, etal.,

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.,Chairperson,FERNANDEZ, B., J. andFERNANDEZ, S.J., J.1

Accused. Promulgated:

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RESOLUTION

CABOTAJE-TANG, P.J.:

For resolution is accused Renato P. Manilla, Fernando R.Balbin, Porferio E. Calderon, Jr., Elizer R. Balbin and Alfredo G.Lim's "Motion for Reconsideration" dated January 7, 2019.2

Accused-movants Manilla, et al., pray that the Courtreconsider its Resolution promulgated on November 29, 2018,3and, consequently, order the dismissal of the present c~

1 Associate Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez was a signatory to the assailed Resolution. She sat as a specialmember of the Third Division per Administrative Order No. 262-2018 dated April 30, 2018. )0} pp. 331-342, Record3 pp. 311-322, Id

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against them on the ground of a violation of their constitutionalright to speedy disposition of cases."

They invoke the following grounds in support of theirpresent motion:

1. The case of Cagang u. Sandiganbayan,S which waspromulgated on July 31,2018, is inapplicable to thepresent case because when a doctrine of theSupreme Court is overruled and a different view issubsequently adopted, the new doctrine should beprospectively applied.v

2. The waiver of a constitutional right cannot just bepresumed and the prosecution must satisfactorilyprove that they voluntarily waived, with sufficientawareness of the relevant circumstances andconsequences, their right to speedy disposition ofcases." and,

3. They suffered "financial, economic and socialprejudice" due to the delay in the termination of thepreliminary investigation of this case."

Relying on the case of People v. Jabinal,9 the accused-movants argue that when the Supreme Court promulgated itsDecision in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, 10 "indeterminate[inordinate] delay had already set in" in this case;!! hence, theruling of the Supreme Court in Cagang which was promulgatedon July 31, 2018, can no longer be "retroactively applied" to thepresent case because a new doctrine set by the Supreme Courtshould only be applied prospectively; unlike in Cagang, there

4 p. 341, Id5 G.R.Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,20186 p. 331, Id7 p. 331, Id8 p. 331, Id955 seRA 607 (1974)10 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201811 p. 334, Id

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was no fact-finding investigation conducted in this case becauseas early as April 23, 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman wasalready provided with complete copies of all the documentsrelated to this case; 12 and, the Office of the Ombudsman "slept onthe case and allowed a very long period of 4 years and 11months to issue [the] Order dated March 10, 201413 requiringthe respondents (Accused herein) to submit their Counter-Affidavit[s]. "14

Accused-movants Manilla, et al., further allege that there isno proof that they waived their constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases. IS They advert to the ruling in RemulZa v.Sandiganbayan,16 that they are not required to follow-up on theprosecution of their case because it is the prosecution's [Office ofthe Ombudsman] responsibility to expedite the same within thebounds of reasonable timeliness. To bolster their argument, theyinvoke a portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice AlfredoBenj amin S. Caguioa in the case of Cagang v.Sandiganbayan, 17 which reads:

12 p. 335, Id13 Emphasis supplied by the accused-movants14 p. 335, Id15 p. 338, Id16 G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017\7 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 201818 Emphasis supplied in the original text

Considering that the Constitution, unlike itsU.S. counterpart imposes upon the State thepositive duty to ensure the speedy disposition of alljudicial, quasi-judicial or administrativeproceedings, waiver of the right to speedydisposition should not be implied solely from therespondent's silence. To be sure, the duty toexpedite the proceedings under the Constitutiondoes not pertain to the respondent, but to the State.To fault the respondent for the State's inability tocomply with such positive duty on the basis of meresilence is, in my view, the height of injustice. 18

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Also, the accused-rnovants submit that the fact that theycould have filed a motion for early resolution of their case isimmaterial. According to them, the eight-year delay incurred bythe Office of the Ombudsman in this case is already an "affront toa reasonable dispensation of justice and such delay could only beperpetrated in a vexatious, capricious and oppressive manner. "19

Lastly, the accused-movants assert that they "sufferedfinancial, economic and social prejudice" due to the purporteddelay in the termination of the preliminary investigation of thiscase. They allege that they were suspended from holding publicoffice for nine (9) months. Thus, the "moral impact" caused bytheir suspension to the individual members of their families is'(beyond measure. "20

In its "Opposition (To the Motion for Reconsideration filed byaccused Renato P. Manilla, Fernando R. Balbin, Porferio E.Calderon, Jr., Elizer R. Balbin and Alfredo G.Lim)" dated January23,2019,21 the prosecution contends that (1) the present motionof the accused-movants fails to cite new and substantialarguments; hence, the same must be denied outright.e? (2) theCourt correctly applied the pronouncement of the Supreme Courtin Cagang;23 and, (3) the accused-rnovants are deemed to havewaived their right to speedy disposition of cases.P'

The prosecution recounts that the case of Cagang waspromulgated on July 31, 2018, and the issue of inordinate delayin this case was only raised by the accused -rnovants sometimeon October 2018.25 It explains that the above-mentioned case isapplicable to the present case because when the accused-movants filed their motion to quash, wherein the issue of

19 p. 340, Id20 p. 341, Id21 pp. 355-360, Id22 p. 356, Id23 p. 356, Id24 p. 357, Id25 p. 357, Id

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inordinate delay was raised, Cagang was already dulypromulgated by the Supreme Court.v=

Moreover, the prosecution insists that the accused-movantshad waived their right to speedy disposition of cases when theyfailed to invoke it during the preliminary investigation of thiscase. It stresses the fact that the accused-movants did not file amotion invoking their right to speedy disposition of cases with theOffice of the Ombudsman nor did they seek a reconsideration ofthe Office of the Ombudsman's adverse resolution findingprobable cause against them for violation of Section 3 (e) ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, where they could have "readilyinterposed the perceived inordinate delay and invoked the olddoctrine of the Supreme Court in People v. Sandiganbayan(Fifth Division).27"

Finally, the prosecution submits that the accused-movantsfailed to support their "bare allegation" that they "sufferedfinancial, economic and social disadvantage" because of thealleged delay in this case. According to the prosecution,jurisprudence requires that prejudice must be "specific and real,"and it does not encompass simple inconveniences, such as thehiring of services of a counsel, which naturally arise from acriminal indictment.v"

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The Court finds the subject motion unmeritorious.

To be sure, in its assailed Resolution promulgated onNovember 29, 2018, the Court applied settled jurisprudence andrejected a mere mathematical reckoning of the time spent in thepreliminary investigation of this case. Therein, the Courtexamined the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding the

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/P26 pp. 356-357, Id27 712 seRA 359 (2013); p. 356, id28 p. 357, Id

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said preliminary investigation vis-a-vis the four-fold factors andfound that there was no inordinate delay in this case, to wit:

Jurisprudence teaches that although theConstitution guarantees the right to speedy dispositionof cases, such speedy disposition is a relative andflexible concept. The determination of the existence ofinordinate delay is never made through a meremathematical reckoning of the time involved butthrough the examination of the peculiar facts andcircumstances surrounding each case.s?

In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court hasconsistently emphasized the need for courts dealingwith "speedy disposition cases," to approach the saidcases on an ad hoc basis and weigh the conduct of boththe prosecution and the accused/respondent vis-a-visthe Ell length of delay; {2] reason for the delay; {3]accused/respondent's assertion or non-assertion ofhis/her right to speedy trial; and, [4] prejudicecaused to the accused/respondent resulting fromthe delay.3o Notably, none of the above-mentionedelements is either a necessary or sufficient condition tohold the existence of inordinate delay.>!

In other words, the said factors must beconsidered and related together with other relevantcircumstances and courts must still engage in a difficultand sensitive balancing process.e? Thus, the Courtcannot mechanically apply the cases invoked by theaccused-movants to the present case without a closescrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances.r>

29 Cagang v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,2018; See alsoPeople v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 232197-98, April 16,2018; Remulla v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. No. 218040, April 17, 2017; Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SeRA 135 (2008), Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan442 seRA 294 (2004), Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 360 seRA 478 (2001)30 Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018; See also People v.Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. No. 232197-98, April 16, 2018; Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.218040, April 17, 2017; Emphasis supplied31 Id; p6, Resolution; p. 316, Record \l'\...321d r .~

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surrounding the preliminary investigation of the presentcase.

The records of this case shows that the formalcomplaint was filed by the Field Investigation Office(FIO) Regional Office No. VI of the Office of theOmbudsman on May 6, 2014.33 Thus, the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases lasted for four (4) years andone (1) month, counted from the filing of the formalcomplaint by the FIO up to the date of filing>' of thepresent Information with the Court.e>

Plainly, the amount of time spent by the Office ofthe Ombudsman in the resolution of the preliminaryinvestigation of this case cannot be consideredunreasonable, oppressive, vexatious and inordinatetaking into consideration the number of respondentsinvolved in this case, each of whom was given theopportunity to answer the allegations against him/her;the period during which the complaint, which involvedthree {3] separate contracts for lease of heavy equipmententered into by the Sipalay City government and DKJocson Construction, and the counter-affidavits of therespondents, together with their attachments wereexamined and reviewed; the complexities of the issuespresented; the time poured into the review of thefindings of the Commission on Audit in its Memorandumdated April 14, 2009; the time dedicated to the researchof pertinent laws and applicable jurisprudence; and, thelevels of review that the case had to go through. Thefollowing pronouncement of the Supreme Court inCagang IS also worth quoting://

1033 p. 7, Id34 June 29, 2018; p. 4, Record3S pp. 6-7, Resolution; pp. 316-317, Record36 p. 7, Resolution; p. 317, Record


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Moreover, the Court finds the accused-movants' insistencethat it took the Office of the Ombudsman eight (8) years toresolve the complaint against them bereft of merit.

In its assailed Resolution promulgated on November 29,2018, the Court held that the preliminary investigation before theOffice of the Ombudsman commenced only on May 6, 2014, orwhen the Field Investigation Office (FIO)Regional Office No. VI ofthe Office of the Ombudsman, filed the formal complaint. 37 Thus,the preliminary investigation in this case lasted only for four (4)years and one (1) month, counted from the filing of the formalcomplaint by the FIO up to the date of the filing of the hereinInformation with the Court, or three (3) years and nine (9)months, counted from the date of the filing of the formalcomplaint by the FIO up to the date of the Resolutionw of theOffice of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against therespondents (now accused-rnovants] for violation of Section 3 (e)ofR.A. No. 3019, viz:

In the relatively recent case of Cagang v.Sandtganbayan,39 the Supreme Court ruled that forpurposes of determining the existence of inordinatedelay, a case is deemed to have commenced from thefiling of a formal complaint and the subsequent conductof the preliminary investigation. Thus, the reckoningperiod used by the accused-movants.w which was thedate Virginia Palanca-Santiago, Assistant Ombudsmanfor the Visayas, required Atty. Viola P. Villanueva, StateAuditor V of the Commission on Audit, to submit areport and recommendation regarding the subjecttransaction, should be excluded in determiningwhether or not there has been a violation of theaccused-movants' constitutional right to speedydispositionofcases"/?

o37 p. 7, Record38 p. 12, Record39 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201840 February 6, 2009


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The records of this case shows that the formalcomplaint was filed by the Field Investigation Office(FIO) Regional Office No. VI of the Office of theOmbudsman on May 6, 2014.41 Thus, the preliminaryinvestigation of these cases lasted for four (4) years andone (1) month, counted from the filing of the formalcomplaint by the FIO up to the date of filing+? of thepresent Information with the Court.s>

On another point, the Court finds the case of People v.Jabinal44 inapplicable to the present case.

To begin with, the factual backdrop in Jabinal issubstantially different from the present case. Notably, the said

. case discussed nothing about a violation of the accused'sconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Moreover, theSupreme Court found that the accused therein was validlyappointed as a secret agent by the Provincial Government ofBatangas in 1962, and, as a confidential agent by the ProvincialCommander of Batangas in 1964. When he committed the crimecharged against him, the prevailing doctrines providing for theexemption from the requirement of the issuance of a license topossess firearms to validly appointed "agents" were the cases ofPeople v. Macarandanq= (1959) and People v. Lucero= (1958).The case of People v. Mapa"? (1967), or the ruling whichoverturned Macarandang and Lucero, was promulgated three (3)years after the accused had already consummated thequestioned act. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the accusedmay properly rely on its ruling in Macarandang and Lucerobecause he acted on the faith thereof.

Indeed, contrary to the claim of the accused-movants, theCourt did not retroactively apply the case of Cagang v.

41 p. 7, Id42June 29, 2018; p. 4, Record43pp. 6-7, Resolution; pp. 316-317, Record4455 SCRA607 (1974)45106 Phil. 713 (1959)46103 Phil. 500 (1958)4720 SCRA 1164 (1967)

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Sandiganbayan,48 to the present case. It must be rememberedthat the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in the said caseon July 31, 2018. Unlike the accused in Jabinal, who relied onthe rulings of the Supreme Court in Macarandang and Luceroduring trial, the issue of inordinate delay in this case was raisedby the accused-movants in their "Motion. to Quash Information,Defer Arraignment and Hold Further Proceedings" dated October1, 2018.49 This motion was submitted for resolution on October26,2018.50

Plainly, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cagang wasalready in effect when the accused-movants filed their motion toquash and asserted their constitutional right to speedydisposition of cases; hence, it was only then that the Courtpassed upon the said issue guided by prevailing jurisprudence.

Moreover, the accused-movants' invocation of the dissentingopinion of Justice Caguioa in Cagang is a clear repudiation oftheir claim that the said case, in its entirety, is inapplicable tothe present case.

At any rate, even if the pronouncement in Cagang were tobe discounted, the ruling of the Supreme Court en banc in thecase of Dela Pefta v. Sandiganbayan,51 which was promulgatedin 2001, provides that a respondent's silence and/ or failure toassert his/her right to speedy disposition of cases before theOffice of the Ombudsman amounts to the respondent's waiver ofthe said right. This ruling was neither abandoned nor overturnedin the cases relied upon by the accused-movants.s? In its assailedResolution promulgated on November 29, 2018, the Court cited aportion of the ruling therein, to wit:

21Moreover, it is worthy to note that it was only on

December 1999, after the case was set for

~48 G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201849 pp. 266-271, Id50 p. 326, Id51360 SCRA478 (2001)52 See Section 4 (3), Article VIII, 1987 Consitution

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arraignment, that petitioners raised the issue of thedelay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. Asstated by them in their Motion to Quash/Dismiss,"[o]ther than the counter-affidavits, [they] did nothing."Also, in their petition, they averred: "Aside from themotion for extension of time to fi le counter-affidavits, petitioners in the present case did notfile nor send any letter-queries addressed to theOffice of the Ombudsman for Mindanao whichconducted the pre liminary investigation. " They·slept on their right - a situation amounting tolaches. The matter could have taken a differentdimension if during all those four years, theyshowed signs of asserting their right to a speedydisposition of their cases or at least made someovert acts, like filing a motion for early resolution,to show that they were not waiving that right.53Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiverof such right.>' As aptly stated in Alvizo, the petitionertherein was "insensitive to the implications andcontingencies" of the projected criminal prosecutionposed against him "by not taking any step whatsoever toaccelerate the disposition of the matter, which inactionconduces to the perception that the supervening delayseems to have been without his objection, [and] henceimpliedly with his acquiescence. "55

Just like the petitioners in Dela Peiia, the accused-movants are invoking their right to speedy disposition of casesonly now, or after their arraignment has been set. Thus, theirfailure to invoke the said right at the earliest opportunity, despitehaving been aware that there was a pending preliminaryinvestigation against them, amounted to an implied acquiescenceto the time spent by the Office of the Ombudsman in theresolution of the complaint against them, as held by the Court inits challenged Resolution promulgated on November 29, 2018, towit: ~- ,

~ Footnote omitted _ ,J55 pp. 487-488, Dela Peiia v. Sandiganb~l SeRA478 (2001); p. 9, Resolution; p. 319, Record


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Moreover, the Court observes that it is only now,or after the accused-movants have been scheduled forarraignment, that they are minded to invoke theirconstitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Areview of the records of this case reveals that none ofthe herein accused-movants sought a reconsiderationof the Office of the Ombudsman's adverse Resolutiondated February 13, 2018, finding probable causeagainst them for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.3019.56

Again, inCagang, the Supreme Court ruled thatthe above-mentioned ruling squarely applies to caseswherein the accused was fully aware that a preliminaryinvestigation against him/her has not yet been fullyterminated despite a considerable length of tirne.>?Moreover, the High Tribunal pronounced in the saidcase that a respondent/ accused must timely raisehisyber constitutional right to speedy disposition ofcases. Otherwise, he/she is deemed to have waived thesame:

The right to speedy disposition of cases,however, is invoked by a respondent to any typeof proceeding once delay has already becomeprejudicial to the respondent. The invocation ofthe constitutional right does not require a threatto the right to liberty. Loss of employment orcompensation may already be considered assufficient to invoke the right. Thus, waiver of theright does not necessarily require that therespondent has already been subjected to therigors of criminal prosecution. The failure of therespondent to invoke the right even when [he] orshe has already suffered or will suffer the

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consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiverof that right.58

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition ofcases or right to speedy trial must be timelyraised. The respondent or the accused must filethe appropriate motion upon the lapse of thestatutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, theyare deemed to have waived their right to speedydisposition of cases. 59

Applying the above-mentioned rulings to thepresent cases, the Court is of the view that theaccused-movants' failure to seek a reconsideration ofthe adverse resolution of the Office of the Ombudsmanand raise the issue of inordinate delay at the earliestopportunity amounted to an implicit acquiescence ontheir part to the time spent by the Office of theOmbudsman in the resolution of the complaint againstthern.v?

Lastly, the mere fact that the accused-rnovants weresuspended from holding public office does not necessarily provethat they were prejudiced by the purported delay in this case.Jurisprudence instructs that prejudice should be assessed in thelight of the following interests of the accused: [11 to preventoppressive pre-trial incarceration; [21 to minimize anxiety andconcerns of the accused to trial; and, [3] to limit the possibilitythat his/her defense will be impaired.s!

In this case, the accused-rnovants are out on bail; hence,there is no pre-trial incarceration to speak of. Also, the supposed"financial, economic and social disadvantage" suffered by theaccused-rnovants and the alleged "moral impact" suffered by the

/lJo58 p. 33, Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 201859 p. 40, Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31,201860 pp. 9-11, Resolution; pp. 319-321, Record61 See Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 442 SeRA 294 (2004)


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individual members of their families, which were allegedly causedby the pendency of the preliminary investigation with the Officeof the Ombudsman, are but natural, although unwelcome,inconveniences arising from the filing of the complaint againstthem. Finally, the accused-movants have not even alleged thatthe supposed delay has impaired their defenses.

In sum, the Court finds that the accused-movants failed toraise any new or substantial matter that would warrant areconsideration of its assailed Resolution promulgated onNovember 29,2018.

WHEREFORE, accused Renato P. Manilla, Fernando R.Balbin, Porferio E. Calderon, Jr., Elizer R. Balbin and Alfredo G.Lim's "Motion. for Reconsideration" dated January 7, 2019,62 isDENIED for lack of merit and for being pro-forma.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila

~ROM~E-Presiding JusticeChairperson

WE CONCUR:

LlTO R. FERNANDEZociate Justice

/'~~~E~T~.~F~E~RN~.At2~

Associate Justice

62 pp. 331-342, Record

REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYANsb.judiciary.gov.ph/RESOLUTIONS/2019/C_Crim_SB-18-CRM... · 2019-03-04 · REPUBLIC OFTHE PHILIPPINES SANDIGANBAYAN QUEZONCITY SPECIAL THIRD

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