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DOCUMENT RESUME
ED 452 581 EA 030 929
AUTHOR Gereluk, DianneTITLE The Charter School Collapse: A Case
Study.PUB DATE 2000-04-00NOTE 27p.; Paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American
Educational Research Association (New Orleans, LA, April24-28,
2000) .-
PUB TYPE Reports Descriptive (141) Speeches/Meeting Papers
(150)EDRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage.DESCRIPTORS Accountability;
Budgeting; *Charter Schools; Educational
Change; *Educational Legislation; Educational Policy;Elementary
Secondary Education; Foreign Countries; *PolicyAnalysis; *Politics
of Education; *School Closing; StateAid; *State Regulation
IDENTIFIERS *Alberta
ABSTRACTMany Canadian provinces are looking to Alberta for
guidance
about charter schools. This case study examines the closure of
one charterschool to identify the obstacles other schools may face.
This study usescritical policy analysis and the "politics of
interpretation" to examine thepolitical context of educational
policy issues. While linear models of policyanalysis fail to allow
for feedback, the approach used here includes aconsideration of
implicit and explicit rules and values, the interests ofdiverse
groups, and the assumptions embodied in contrasting
educationalparadigms. Alberta's political climate, coupled with
budget austerity duringhard economic times, created pressures for
reform driven by key stakeholdersfrom the Ministry of Education and
the community. There were no organizedparental groups participating
in the push toward charter schools, andlegislation enabling pilot
programs was advanced before substantialopposition emerged. A lack
of clear regulations and changing governmentpronouncements
complicated the efforts of early applicants. Factors that ledto the
demise of one of Alberta's first charter schools include
confusionregarding the stated purpose of the charter mandate, a
lack of training forcharter board members, poor external
monitoring, and an absence of fiscalaccountability. The closure of
this school shows how confusion stemming fromAlberta's political
context, a lack of clear regulations, and inadequatefinancial
assistance contribute to the instability of the
charter-schoolmovement in Canada. (Contains 43
references.)(TEJ)
Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be madefrom
the original document.
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THE CHARTER SCHOOL COLLAPSE: A CASE STUDY
Dianne GerelukUniversity of Calgary
1776-6 Ave. N.W.Calgary, Alberta
CanadaT2N OW2
(403) 266-6870Email: [email protected]
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Canadian charter schools are a recent educational reform
phenomenon. Only approved in the
province of Alberta, these charter schools are in the formative
stages and much knowledge about them
is tentative. Many other provinces such as British Columbia,
Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick
are now looking to Alberta for policy recommendations with
regard to charter schools. From these
charter schools, Canadian policy analysts and educators hope to
learn from the early successes and
failures for further consideration. This paper will critically
analyze one of the first Alberta charter
schools which attained great media exposure in its initial
success and its eventual school closure two
years later.
In order to accurately portray the rise and fall of one
particular charter school, we must first set
the conditions in which Alberta charter schools were created.
From there, we can examine the internal
tensions and weaknesses that lead to the closure of one charter
school. Much can be learned from this
one school, for while its closure was contentious and volatile,
it is not necessarily unique. Other
Canadian charter schools face the same potential problems and
obstacles in their daily operations.
THE UNTOLD STORY: POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS IN THECHARTER SCHOOL
MOVEMENT
Alberta charter schools have many, often overwhelming, internal
obstacles to overcome. The
portrayal of internal turmoil, that I will explicate later,
could lead one to assume that the stakeholders
have created their own problems, and to some extent, they have.
However, this does not paint an
entirely accurate picture. In order to more accurately examine
the difficulties charter schools face
through the discourse of choice, I must also look at the larger
context surrounding this reform
movement.
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It is not that easy to simply relay the story of the political
context of charter schools.
Government documentation outlining the rationale and policy
directives for charter schools is sparse.
Legislative house discussion is limited as most of the charter
policies have been developed through
regulations, and to complicate matters further, few key people
who were involved in the
implementation of charter schools are willing to be interviewed.
Finally, the speed of implementing
this educational reform movement leaves little for interest
groups in which to respond. As a result,
I have tried to put pieces of the puzzle together, taking bits
and pieces that relate to charter schools and
placing them in some chronological order. This story is
speculative and tentative as it is difficult to
provide the chronology of Alberta charter schools without an
abundance of evidence. As such, I tell
this story as a possibility, attempting to bring key factors
together.
Looking at four major themes that play a role in the
implementation of charter schools
including: the political and economic climate in Alberta; the
key political figures and advocates of
charter schools; the house debates in the legislative assembly;
and the implementation of charter
schools, I map the territory in which charter schools in Canada
have been built. In the first section,
I highlight a theoretical framework using critical policy
analysis and the "politics of interpretation"
(Peters & Marshall, 1996). This framework emphasizes the
importance of examining the political
context surrounding educational policy issues. The second
section will then examine the four themes
that have emerged in the Alberta charter school context.
POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION
In exploring the charter school policy implementation in
Alberta, many facts and circumstances
still need to be unearthed. Bits and pieces appear, but the
story is sketchy and somewhat unattainable.
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Furthermore, I am conscious of the fact that how I choose to
portray this speculative analysis is value-
laden and politically-loaded. One may assert that all policy
analysis is not politically neutral; however,
to acknowledge that it exists reminds the reader that research
is always perspectival and should be read
with that in mind. The acknowledgment that policy analysis is
partial is reiterated by a number of
authors in educational policy analysis who emphasize the
importance and recognition of the inherent
political and value-based research recent policy analysis
entails (Goodson, 1986; Prunty; 1985;
Mitchell, 1982; Peters & Marshall , 1996).
Central to analysing policies as "texts" is the notion of a
"politics of interpretation" (Peters
&Marshall, 1996). Politics of interpretation acknowledges
that policy analysis is not politically
neutral. Recognizing this, this form of policy analysis examines
the underlying values, norms, and
interests that underlie policy initiatives with the intent to
give "new light" and meaning toward social
change (Mitchell, 1982). Thus, it is arguable to suggest that
such implicit "rules" comprise of the
political and social context surrounding policy.
Critical policy analysis differs from previous forms of social
policy research. Traditional types
of social policy research often followed similar procedures for
policy analysis. The first step of policy
analysis often identified the problem - often defined as problem
specification or problem orientation.
This located the problem within the policy context to illustrate
"official" values and interests within
the dominant discourse. The second phase would then entail the
development and structuring of
alternative approaches. During this period, parameters would be
explored as to the possibilities of
implementation and development of the policy. The third step
often analysed the ratification and
acceptance of proposals into policy. Stage four examined policy
implementation with the final stage
being evaluation of the policy. However, this form of policy
analysis has often been criticized for
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being too linear, not allowing for feedback and interpretation
throughout the process. What appears
to be neglected is the ability to "undergo considerable shifts
in meaning" (Peters & Marshall. 1996,
p. 141). They further state:
In the field of policy analysis defining the problem is both an
interpretive andinherently politically loaded activity.
Practitioners are frequently confronted with thedilemma of serious
incompatibilities between rival accounts or interpretations of
whatconstitutes 'the problem'. Discrepancies are often most
serious, in some casesunresolvable, when practitioners are faced
with interpretations of a problem proposedby policy-makers on the
one hand and those of recipient populations on the other.
(1996, p. 142)
To combat this problem, Peters and Marshall (1996) take a
critical stance to analysing policy
through a process of "evaluative context". Evaluative context
takes into the policy context by
considering the rules and values, explicit and implicit, and the
diverse interest groups that define
concepts and policies. _Evaluative context then looks at
"identifying the rules" by examining the
dominant discourse and how it is played out in the articulation
of policy directives. The third
consideration looks at the larger community of interests and
wider socio-political context and the
interplay between policy and those interest groups. The fourth
area analyses the "paradigm context"
iniaoffin intiliny of Allowing llio whilionA liolween
olincepiA
underlying assumptions. The last consideration creates a cycle
by reflecting and reconsidering the
original problem for further interpretation. This allows for
further insight within the policy analysis.
In the following section, I intend to use elements of critical
policy analysis and politics of
interpretation to provide a possible reading of the political
undercurrents in the Alberta charter school
movement. The following reading may shift in meaning and the
problem may be redefined as more
information is made available to the public. Perhaps it is a
beginning, the opening of a door to
understand the complexities surrounding the charter school
movement and the problematic nature it
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encounters both externally and internally.
1) The political and economic climate prior to charter
schools
Alberta has been governed traditionally by right-wing political
parties. Although Liberal
parties have had brief moments of power (with the first
provincial government being Liberal led by
Alex Rutherford), for the most part, the province has only seen
two major parties, the Social Credit
party elected in 1935 until 1971, and the Conservative Party
since that time. The apparent low-
turnover of governmental power may suggest that Albertans are
receptive to many right-wing fiscal
and social reforms recently introduced (Mansell, 1997). The
apparent lack of strong opposition to such
policy initiatives may further create a conducive climate for
massive, reforms with little resistance.
To understand the massive budgetary cuts of the 1990's, I must
first briefly step back in time
to set the stage for "Klein's Revolution" (Taft, 1997). With the
changeover in government in 1971
from Social Credit to the Conservatives, premier Lougheed
attempted to diversify the province's Gross
Domestic Product. Realizing the potential volatility of relying
mainly on the agricultural and
petroleum sectors, Lougheed sought other economic opportunities
to attract more business and
migration to Alberta. Some of the policies were as follow:
significant increase in resource revenue
was spent; lower property tax; smaller business corporate tax;
and, a reduction in taxes for motor fuels
and personal income taxes (Bruce, Kneebone, & McKenzie,
1997). This strategy increased the real
per capita revenues in the province. Furthermore, the government
was still running fiscal surpluses.
The 1980's took a drastic turn with the introduction of the
National Energy program, equalizing
provinces' wealth, and in turn, demanding transfers out of
Alberta to the Federal Government. By
1986, Alberta took another financial hit with the drastic fall
in grain and oil prices. In that year,
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Alberta would change from projecting a fiscal surplus to a
fiscal deficit that would continue until 1995.
By 1993, the government would run up a deficit of almost $3.4
billion with the possibility of
continuing that figure to $6.5 billion by 1996/97 (Mansell,
1997). This deficit would be seen by the
government as an economic crisis. Others suggest that this was
just another "scare-tactic" by right-
wing advocates to push for more fiscal restraint and public
sector downsizing (Taft, 1997).
With the election of Klein in 1993, significant fiscal changes
would soon follow. In the spring
session with the new premier, the budget called for dramatic
changes to provincial spending. A
general twenty per cent cut across all public sectors was
proposed. Fundamental restructuring of all
public sectors to reduce spending would occur. Within a four
year period, Klein set forth to eliminate
the $3.4 billion deficit. Along the way, "sacred" social
programmes such as health, education, and
social services, would feel the brunt of the fiscal restraints
and restructuring policies by taking
significant cutbacks. Klein projected this fiscal plan, asking
that all Albertans make a small sacrifice
for the betterment of the province. This would be contested by
Taft who argued that much of the "...
debt servicing was rising [as] a result of massive business
subsidies, high interest rates, and declining
petroleum revenues (Taft, 1997, p. 62). According to Taft,
Albertans would sacrifice public services
in order to maintain private interests. Since the election of
premier Ralph Klein, " ... not a month has
gone by without a major government budgetary announcement or
restructuring initiative" (Bruce,
Kneebone, & McKenzie, 1997, p. 5). This would prove
significant when analysing the political context
and strategy perhaps used in establishing charter schools.
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2) Stakeholders
As major budgetary cuts were being made, restructuring efforts
were occurring in every
department. Major plans to decentralize and devolve the local
school board authority was occurring.
The Speech from the Throne of February 10, 1994 would be a
defining speech in restructuring
education (Alberta Hansard, 1994a, p. 1). It was Klein's second
year in power, and in the second year
of a four year plan to balance its budget, he would target four
public sector areas: health, education,
advanced education, and social services (Alberta Hansard, 1994a,
p.1). The next four months would
prove to have rigorous debate in the Assembly over Bill 19 that
brought in major amendments to the
School Act, one of which was to establish charter schools.
To understand this development of proposing charter schools for
Alberta, I have tried to step
back for a moment and examine who the key stakeholders were. I
have already mentioned premier
Ralph Klein who set a mandate to balance the budget by 1996/97.
This would have major
implications for public education on how they would be governed,
financed, and taxed. It appears that
under this public sector restructuring, many proposals or
alternatives would be considered that would
fit with the fiscal policy in place. Charter schools could be
set to fit in with the fiscal plan by creating
site-based management, remove the middle layer of bureaucracy,
and reduce expenditures by only
giving per pupil grants without any capital funding.
During 1993/94, the Minister of Education was Halvar Jonson and
Deputy Minister was Reno
Bosetti. Both were key players in the development of charter
schools. After the June 1993 election,
the Minister began investigating the concept of charter schools
from the literature that was available
in the United States. By August 17, 1993 at an Education
Officials Meeting, minutes show that the
Minister requested the Deputy Minister to study the concept of
charter schools (Bosetti, 1998c). In
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September of 1993, the Policy and Planning Branch of Alberta
Education produced a document
entitled Charter Schools: Provisions for Choice in Public
Schools (1993). Within another two months,
charter schools would be added to the discussion for the
proposed Education Roundtables. By January
1994, The Minister of Education announced his intent to
introduce charter school legislation. This
announcement would soon be followed with another public
document, Charter Schools Information
Update: "What can we do while we are waiting for our details?
"(1994c); that would provide
suggestions for interested groups who were considering making a
charter school application. The
intentions made by the Minister of Education through memos and
information documents show clear
indications that charter schools would be implemented before the
proposed legislation was even
brought to the Legislative Assembly.
Other vested advocates of charter schools are more difficult to
locate in looking at who
provided the catalyst for charter school legislation. Joe
Freedman, a prominent alternatives-in-
education Alberta advocate, wrote a critique on the failing
attempts to provide quality public education
(Freedman, 1993). He later wrote a book on charter schools in
1995 advocating their potential in
reviving the quality of education. This project would be
financially supported by the Donner Canadian
Foundation, an organization that is a strong advocate of charter
schools. In his acknowledgments,
Freedman also expressed his gratitude for the contributions of
Honourable Halvar Jonson and known
United States charter school advocate, Ted Kolderie for their
assistance (Freedman, 1995, p. 4).
Freedman was an instrumental player in Alberta charter reform
and later creating public awareness to
the movement.
What is interesting to note, is the lack of any organized parent
groups that were advocating the
establishment of charter schools. There was a perception that
many parents were dissatisfied with
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public education due to a variety of reasons such as: funding
cuts; larger class sizes, and; the
appearance of more violence in public schools. Despite these
frustrations, there was not any
organized lobby group that advocated for charter schools. It was
not until the introduction of the
concept of charter schools that parents began to examine this
potential educational alternative. This
is significant because many believe that the Alberta charter
school movement was a grassroot
movement, instigated by parents, to combat the dissatisfaction
of public education. However, from
the documentation that I have collected, it appears that the
charter school concept was initiated by a
few government officials who may have thought that it fit in
with their educational and fiscal policy.
3) House Debate
Bill 19 would alter much of the former School Act, including
section 24.2 that allowed for the
establishment of charter schools in Alberta. There has been much
speculation that major reforms were
done both swiftly and deeply in order that opponents would not
have time to mobilize their efforts and
challenge the government (Bruce, Kneebone, & McKenzie,
1997). This would be a major strategy
used by Sir Roger Douglas, who was brought in to Alberta for
consultation on the conservative reform
agenda. Douglas argued that it was important to "...implement
reform in quantum leaps. Moving step
by step lets vested interests mobilise. Big packages neutralise
them. Speed is essential... Once you
start the momentum rolling never let it stop (Douglas, 1990 as
cited in Sullivan, 1997, p. 253). This
would prove to be an effective strategy as the limited time for
debate given in the House and the
enormity of the reforms often appeared to overwhelm the
opposition. Many members grappled with
Bill 19 on both sides of the Assembly, unclear of the policy
implications it would have for not only
charter schools, but public education as well. From the
introduction of Bill 19 in January of 1994 to
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May of 1994, members of the legislature attempted to analyse
this major Bill given the short amount
of time allotted.
Many concerns were brought to the legislature with regards to
charter schools. The Liberal
Education.Critic could not understand the difference between
community schools developing a charter
outlining their purpose with charter schools (Alberta Hansard,
1994a, p. 619). Other members had
concerns that charter schools could bypass their local school
jurisdiction and apply directly to the
Minister for charter school status. For many of the opposition,
this both lessened the role of elected
school trustees, and gave considerable power to the Minister
(Alberta Hansard, 1994b, pp. 1139-1140).
It was clear from the Minister of Education, that his vision of
charter schools was of an
experimental nature. Repeatedly, Jonson answered that charter
schools would be an experimental,
pilot project that would be evaluated at a later date. This was
clearly stated during question period
when Jonson stated, "I think it's very important to note in
terms of the announced plan that we would
propose to pilot a number of chartered schools and evaluate them
so we do not repeat the mistake that
is often made in education of introducing an innovation without
adequate follow up" (Alberta Hansard,
1994a, p. 9). While the intention was clear from the Minister of
Education that only a limited number
of charter schools would be piloted and evaluated, opposition
still remained concerned that the concept
of charter schools had either not been thoroughly thought out by
the government, or if they were
withholding their "true" intentions from the legislative
assembly. This was stated by Bruseker, a
member of the Legislative Assembly:
I have some difficulty with the proposed outline for charter
schools. I've not heard aclear answer from the Premier, I've not
heard a clear answer from the Minister ofEducation as to what it is
that's being proposed, even in the case of pilot schools. Iguess if
we're going to go with a pilot program, the question is: what are
you piloting?You've got to have some idea of where you're going,
because if you try to be the pilot
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of a plane and you don't know where you're going, the end result
is that you're goingto crash. I'm afraid that's what's going to
happen... I guess what I'm saying is that ifyou're going to have
charter schools, tell us how you're going to measure it, tell us
howyou're going to evaluate it before you begin, rather than simply
saying, 'Let's do it andsee what happens.' That's what I'm asking
for. I'll leave that as food for thought forthe members
opposite.
(Alberta Hansard, 1994c, pp. 1644-1645)
Despite calls from the opposition to more clearly define the
concept of charter schools within Bill 19,
very few amendments were considered by the government. In fact,
the government invoked closure
of all three readings after very little debate. Even after nine
pages of amendments to the entirety of Bill
19, closure was invoked the next day after only three hours of
house debate (Alberta Hansard, 1994c,
p. 2119).
Much of the charter school concept would not be discussed in the
Legislative Assembly. With
the exception of one section in Bill 19 that allowed the
province to establish charter schools, all other
details would be discussed in regulations. This meant that the
legislative assembly would not have the
opportunity for input or debate. Furthermore, it would also
display the unconventional manner in
which a major policy document could escape public criticism. It
appears that the charter school
concept, consciously or unconsciously, would be kept away from
public exposure by writing up much
of the policy behind caucus doors.
4) Implementation of charter schools
Despite comforting words by the Minister of Education who stated
that "we do not repeat the
mistake that is often made in education of introducing an
innovation without adequate follow-up"
(Alberta Hansard, 1994a, p. 9), it appears that that is exactly
what occurred after the passage of Bill
19. Although the government had assured the House that
regulations would be in place by fall of 1994,
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no regulations were developed by the spring of 1995 (Alberta
Hansard, 1995a, p. 618). This would
prove difficult for charter school applicants who were
attempting to write an application without the
regulations in place. As a result, many of the applicants worked
on their charter applications before
the regulations were developed. By June, 1995, regulations would
finally be released with charter
school applicants having only two months to set up their charter
school.
To complicate the story of implementing charter schools in
Alberta the government had
allocated one main person within Alberta Education, Ron Babiuk,
to develop the vision of Alberta
charter schools. Unlike many of the United State's Education
departments where often there is an
entire department devoted to charter schools (Nathan, 1996),
Babiuk did not have a department to
work on charter schools. Furthermore, no university within
Alberta had created a policy institute to
develop research to help support charter schools. These two
support systems, often key in most states
in the United States, were not prevalent in the Alberta context.
It appeared that the charter school
vision was left to one person in Alberta Education to develop
charter school policy. This would prove
to be a serious flaw in the consistency in policy and
development of charter schools. In the winter of
1995/96, Babiuk had an untimely death. With his death, a clear
vision of Alberta charter schools
appeared to be lost with the person. The government quickly
needed to find a replacement and hired
another person who would be given a 0.4 position to continue to
develop charter schools in Alberta.
This would appear to be insufficient for many charter schools to
receive the required support and
assistance from Alberta Education to start-up charter schools
relatively smooth.
From the passage of charter schools in the spring of 1994 to the
spring of 1998, one also notes
the changes of position in the Ministry of Education, giving
uncertainty to the government's vision of
charter schools. While Jonson had pushed for the establishment
of charter schools through Bill 19,
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it is unclear whether the proceeding Minister of Education, Gary
Mar, held the same vision. Very little
has been said by Mar as to where he believed charter schools
were going. At one point, Mar has been
reported as saying that, "They're testing grounds for innovative
teaching methods that can later be
applied to a public-school model" (Kalef, 1998, p.14). With the
change of portfolios within the
Minister of Education in the last year, charter schools must
again wait and see whether they will be
supported by the new Minister.
This makes some charter school individuals nervous as they feel
that much time and energy
was not expended only to have their charter assimilated back
into mainstream public schools (Personal
Fieldnotes, 03/21/98). At another time, Alberta Education has
stated that if charter schools meet their
requirements then they would be renewed for another contract
period (Personal Fieldnotes, 03/21/98).
These discrepancies have proved to be very frustrating for many
charter schools, unclear of their
future. At a provincial charter school meeting (Personal
Fieldnotes, 05/09/98), many charter school
representatives stated that they hoped the government would
evaluate and reflect on Alberta charter
schools, providing a clear vision for the future. To date, no
public announcement has been made as
to the government's vision is for charter schools and their
renewal for the future.
I now turn to one charter school, to see how the various factors
contributed to the internal
volatility and eventual closure of one charter school.
AN INSIDE LOOK AT ONE SCHOOL
Much can be said about this particular charter school in
Alberta. At the height of media
exposure in 1996, articles from across the country highlighted
the early successes of this school. It had
reached full capacity in the first year. Students were ranked
consistently in the top percentile of
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standardized provincial test scores in the province, and plans
to create satellite schools basedon this
model were considered by the administration throughout the
suburbs of the city. This school was
considered to be the exemplary pilot project for all charter
schools in Canada. Yet, within two and half
years, it came to a crashing halt, with the closure of the
school by the Minister of Education. What
lead to the demise of this charter school? Could it happen to
others?
Factors leading to the demise of this particular charter school
can be pointed to: 1) confusion
over the stated purpose of the charter mandate; 2) lack of
training of charter board members; 3) lack
of a regular external monitoring process to guide and assist the
troubled charter school, and; 4) absence
of fiscal accountability. Each of these factors will be
explicated in further detail to better portray the
obstacles and challenges the charter school faced.
1) Confusion over the stated purpose of the charter mandate
Providing an innovative educational program to enhance student
learning, and being held
accountable through performance-based measures appear to be the
two prevalent agendas of the charter
school movement (Alberta Education, 1996a). All evaluations and
assessments are based upon these
two criteria for charter renewal. Although charter schools
strive for success in these areas, one charter
school was led astray by the numerous interpretations of the
stated charter school mandate. One
teacher noted the difficulty of implementing a cohesive
educational mandate on a continual basis,
"...we are all coming to the understanding of differentiation.
How it happens in a school very much
depends on how a school makes it happen. (Teacher, October 3,
1997)." Yet, another teacher pointed
out that instilling an educational program that was different
from mainstream schools was difficult for
parents to accept:
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A lot of times, the change that often parents are asking is
basing it ontheir own education. And they are saying well you know
, give meworksheets and we can do this. But when you are giving
studentsworksheets, they do serve a purpose, but it's not the
entire teaching.And a lot of times you need the extra work, but we
don't want to dodrill and practice, and drill and kill things. So
there are a lot of timeswhere parents will go and will be asking
some of those things.
While teachers appeared to have a vision of the educational
mandate set forth by the charter,
parents often have differing priorities than the stated
educational mandate. One parent who sent their
children to this charter school was looking for something
different. She wanted her children:
... To be with a group of children who are arriving at the
school tobasically be looked after, and cared for who are fed
before they cometo school, who are dressed properly, who don't have
behavior problemsdue to a lack of discipline or input from the
parents or control orwhatever.
For this particular parent, the educational mandate was not of
paramount concern. She was forthright
in her opinion to make certain that her children were with other
children that were properly cared for
and disciplined. For her, the charter school was a site where
certain "undesirable" students would be
weeded out through the admission process.
When I discussed the educational mandate with the administrator,
he too had a vision of the
school:
I think that the methodology that we employ is called
differentiation, aneducation buzz word. What that means is
basically is methodologiesthat challenge every student at all
levels according to ability groups...We use a teacher facilitator
approach within a critical thinkingenvironment as opposed to a
teacher-centered approach in a teacherdirected environment.
Despite the administrator's attempt to provide a cohesive
educational program, he too had difficulties
with the competing agendas within the school:
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I think in our first year, I had fifty separate requests for
differing typesof programs related to the instructional program
that goes on in theclassrooms. So for example, teams at noon,
activities, science clubs, soon so forth. Fifty separate requests
is a lot. And to me, that is gettingpulled in too many directions.
And unless you manage your growththrough a clear set of objectives
that everyone has to agree to. It canspread your energies in too
many directions, and cause you to not dowell. Our core purpose, our
objectives is to get better results with kids,and to provide
leadership in an innovative educational purpose. Thatis our
purpose. Anything that detracts from that, we really
don'tquestion.
Despite attempts to maintain a strong educational mandate,
divisions became apparent by the winter
of 1998. Lobby groups among parents, charter board members,
staff and administration were clear.
Memoranda were distributed publicly to sway opinion within the
school. Town hall meetings were
called to resolve the divisive tensions, but to no avail. The
tensions had exacerbated to breaking point,
which halted negotiations and any hope of compromise. The
educational mandate flittered away with
the increasing clash of values.
Internal conflicts may contribute to the ineffectiveness of
charter schools in developing
innovative educational programs (Smith, 1995). Personal agendas
attempt to "name" and interpret the
educational mission of the charter school (Knoblauch &
Brannon, 1993). This particular charter school
had considerable conflict as parents, teachers, administrator,
and charter board members appeared to
have different interpretations of the educational mandate of the
school (Sheppard, 1998). This created
a disunified educational vision and weakened the effectiveness
of the program. Henig (1996) suggests
that despite the attempt to create a unified educational vision
through a charter mandate, individual
interests often fragment a collective vision. This was such the
case in this charter school where
stakeholders vied for power, each trying to project a "louder"
voice. Individuals tried to gain influence
and position with the charter school hierarchy to instil their
values. Instead of creating an atmosphere
16
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that "empowers" individuals, charter schools may exacerbate
power differentials (Ball, 1994). As a
result, a provincially appointed trustee recommended to the
Minister of Education that the school be
closed at the end of the 1998 school year (Marshall &
Stewart, 1998).
2) Lack of training for charter board members
The lack of training for charter board members appear to be a
consistent problem in most
charter schools across Alberta. At the time of the charter
school closure, few attempts to provide
workshops, seminars, or inservices for charter board members
were available. A provincial charter
school association was just being founded, and little attention
had been given to the need for training.
Some superintendents assigned to charter schools had made
attempts to provide training sessions and
workshops for charter board members, but this was inconsistent
from school to school. Little to no
training was provided for the charter board members at this
particular charter school.
Charter board members were cognizant of their lack of experience
and expertise in managing
a school. One charter board member states the biggest hindrance
was the lack of knowledge and
experience on the board:
The first was that you are dealing with a combination of
parentvolunteers and educational professionals. The parent
volunteers whogive their time and energy, and the level of
commitment andunderstanding, wasn't perhaps sufficient in and of
itself to carry thisthing through the approval process and we
needed to go through.
While volunteers were appreciated for the countless number of
hours they gave to try to make the
charter school successful, this did not necessarily balance out
the defined roles and responsibilities of
the charter board. Ambiguously defined roles often led to
internal conflicts among charter board
members and also with administration:
17
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I think other people on the board, see themselves because they
areboard members, having some authority to intrude on the
administrationissues. To get involved with the administration of
the school. Now,personally and philosophically 1 have a real
difference of opinion.
Yet, other charter board members felt that they had a
responsibility to scrutinize the administration of
the school, as to felt that the daily operation of the school
was not being fulfilled:
We have support staff who were not provided contracts.
Currently,they don't have contracts. That is something that we are
working with.And then, something that - there's communication. We
were under theunderstanding that at the board there are contracts,
and if they are not,we defer to the CBE [Calgary Board of
Education]. As a board, yourely on that, and accepted that. And
then, upon further review by theboard it appears that they didn't
have contracts. They weren't beingpaid overtime.... As a result,
some board members have been doingsome of the tasks because we
didn't want a band-aid solution.
What happens which I am sure you are aware of, is the board is
beingperceived of doing something that is not supported by
administration.For example, the review of administration which is
totally withinbusiness practice of any organization. Bad feelings
come up and youstart getting people who are second guessing you.
Why are they doingthis to us? Why? Why? Why? And we say because we
want to improveto make this work. We are probably getting a bit
killed right now withrumors.
Perhaps more charter board members would have hesitated having
known the amount of difficulty an
ambiguously defined charter would create. An understanding of
the tremendous undertaking of
establishing and managing a school many have lead others to
reconsider.
Many of the charter board members stated that had they had
someone to consult with and give
advise, this would have alleviated many of the mistakes that
occurred in the school. Others sought
moral support from other charter school individuals to share
ways in developing a stable school setting.
From the perspective of charter board members, there was no
vehicle to seek guidance. Consequently,
18
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this charter school floundered in their daily operations of the
school.
3) Lack of a Regular External Monitoring Process
Underlying any successful reform measures often lies a solid
support mechanism in which to
give strength to a movement. This appears to be one of the main
weaknesses found in the Alberta
charter school movement. This has been reiterated since charter
schools were first introduced in the
Legislative Assembly up the present date. "Vague and ambiguous
regulations are causing problems
for Alberta's charter schools and the public schools boards that
monitor them, according to board
officials and parents" (Thomson, 1998, A7). The lack of clarity
in charter school policy set by the
provincial government appears to have caused a ripple effect
that reverberates from the ministry down
to individual stakeholders in charter schools. It is further
exacerbated by a lack of technical and
financial support that is often seen in the United States. In
many of the states corporate and private
donations are often given towards capital funds for new charter
schools. Other states may have a
university that creates a policy institute for the sole purpose
of developing research on charter schools.
For Alberta, little or no external support is given to the
struggling charter school. Monitoring appears
to be insufficient to maintain the level of contact and support
that the charter school often requires
(Kalef, 1998).
The feeling of isolation appears to be common among charter
school stakeholders where they
receive little or no support from the local school board, the
under-staffed personnel at Alberta
Education, the superintendents, and the local universities. One
charter board member states her
frustration:
... The handbook doesn't tell the whole truth about the amount
of time
19
21
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and effort - perhaps Alberta Education could set up some sort
ofgroupthat could come and help parents understand what they are
walking intobecause it is one thing to have a group of parents, or
educators sayingthat I am going to change the face of education, or
a group of parentssaying I want my kids in this school and not to
know. I mean I havelearnt so much in the last two years it's
amazing. It is not just from theeducational side, it is from the
legal side, the accounting side, how thebudgets work, how you need
to recruit things, how you need to pass thebudget, how you just
can't take money from here because you feel likeit. I think it is
really important that parents know that. You can't gointo something
like this without - you can't be experts about everything.
Once or twice a year an external monitor comes into a charter
school for one or two days to observe
the daily operations of schools. This, coupled with inconsistent
superintendency support, provides
little continued support for on-going problems and dilemmas.
Only when the situation is in crisis, as
this charter school was, does there appear to be a concerted
effort to bring in external monitors to try
and save the school. This, however, is a band-aid solution that
did not work in this case. Continued
external support and monitoring may have helped to prevent the
closure of the school had they noticed
the numerous problems that they were encountering.
4) Lack of Fiscal Accountability
The last factor that ultimately sealed the fate of this charter
school was the lack of fiscal accountability.
As has been mentioned earlier, charter school are evaluated on
their alternative educational mandate,
outcomes-based results, and their fiscal accountability (Alberta
Education, 1996a). This particular
charter school had numerous fiscal irregularities during their
two year period. Contracts were not
signed by support staff or the administration (Field notes,
October 30, 1997). Projects were initiated
by various committees with little coordination among
administration and the charter board that were
not well thought through:
20
22
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They [administration] wanted to last year - raise money for
portables,and had we not said no, we would have ended up with
portables in asite that we are not permanent in. Another thing is
the playground. Wehad a group of parents who were very proactive
and took the bull by thehorns, and just went ahead and did it. In
their presentation to us - weraised some concerns about grants.
Well if we take this grant, can wego back and get it again, and we
can't. Well, can we take theplayground with us, and we're not sure.
And we said let's just wait aminute here and think about it. But
they got an okay and so theyproceeded. And that's fine, but the
thing is we - that was just $35,000.And we're talking about
hundreds of thousands, you don't want toscrew up.
Despite attempts to be.fiscally responsible, this charter board
member realized the potential closure
of the charter school due to its fiscal difficulties:
One of the things that has come out of a lot of the reports, is
that thefailure of charter schools is finance. It is not the
program, it is thebusiness part of it. If you are not fiscally
responsible in any business,you go bankrupt. And I guess that is
where we are trying to educatecustomers that we have to be
responsible, we have to follow the rules,we have to comply to
legislation, and that's the bottom line. That iswhere you need the
dedication.
However, the priority to run a fiscally fit school appeared to
be somewhat at odds with the
administration. For him, the educational needs needed to be
balanced with a corporate vision:
Typically, I think where we could get really side-tracked, which
is oneof our worries, is the product which is the child and the
educationalprocess, guaranteeing that you run the business side of
the school in ahighly excellent and efficient manner may not
necessarily give in to theproduct of the child. And I think we need
to work in those areas tomake sure that we are acting
responsibility in the business area and yetour thrust and our focus
and our time and our energy, innovativethought areas and
educational areas, we get pulled into the businessarea. And we are
trying to resist. And unfortunately, educators do havea lot of
knowledge about how things are done, but we also don't haveany
knowledge about the accounting and the levels of
accountability...My view is that the kid is at the top. And when
you have businesspeople and accountants and lawyers, all skilled
people, we have themcoming from that culture and top-down
management. When we read
21
23
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the legislation the ultimate responsibility is the boards. And
you haveconflicting philosophical thrusts which really need to be
worked out.We are in the midst of that kind of thing right now.
Budgetary conflicts were apparent in all areas of the school in
terms of payroll, facility, projects, and
accounting procedures. Financial decisions were often not taken
to the charter board to be approved
and informed. Accounting procedures became sketchy and
incomplete when an external audit was
done. As a result, a forensic audit was initiated to review all
fiscal practices at the school (Marshall,
1998).
UNCERTAINTY IN A UNCERTAIN MOVEMENT
In reviewing the external political conditions of the Alberta
charter school movement and
looking critically at the factors that contributed to the
closure of one Alberta charter school, it appears
that one should not be surprised at the instability of the
movement. Despite the Minister of
Education's stated intention of creating more innovation within
public education, I suspect that he did
not expect the number of unintended ripple effects that charter
schools would create. Policy analysts
assume that there will inevitably be unintended consequences.
Furthermore, the more elaborate the
intention, the more room there is for unintended results
(Wildaysky, 1987). Wildaysky opens up the
notion of intention when he poses a number of questions: "What
do rational actors intend to do? Move
toward their goals. But in what direction? How can we be
goal-directed if we don't know what our
goal is until we get there?" (Wildasky, 1987, p. 135). It is the
proverbial tail wagging the dog. One
may begin to wonder whether charter schools were well researched
by the government. As one charter
school parent states, "There were lots of things that weren't
done. Whose fault was that? I think there
was a trail of responsibility that goes back to the ministry...
It was just an idea, a half-baked idea. A
22
24
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good idea, but it was never thought through" (Kalef, 1998, p.
16). Perhaps she is right in saying that
the government did not follow through with an initial policy
directive with thorough development and
analysis of the concept. I speculate that this is a possible
interpretation of the Alberta charter school
movement. As has happened many times in educational government
initiatives, the story rings similar
with charter schools. The government learned of a new
educational reform occurring in both New
Zealand and the United States. It appears that they briefly
scanned some literature on the notion.
Seeing that charter schools could fit in with their major
educational and fiscal reforms, they decided
to investigate the reform further and introduce it into the
legislature. House debate provided little
discussion on the matter as a result of the numerous and
tremendous other educational amendments
occurring at the same time. Passage was granted for charter
schools, and was then left for a few
government officials to further develop charter school policy in
regulations. Due to a lack of
personnel, time, and funding, regulations did not come out until
a year later, and when it did it was
arguably very sketchy and ambiguous. As a result, the charter
school movement has been left to
charter school stakeholders to fend for themselves, unsupported
by little or any government assistance.
Lack of a clear vision on the government's part exacerbates the
instability of the charter school
movement.
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Alberta Education. (1995a). Accountability in education: Policy
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