Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502

502-�

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Report of the Committee on

Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection

William G. Connell, ChairParsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., MA [SE]

William A. Eppich, SecretaryThe Protectowire Company, Inc., MA [M]

Ian E. Barry, IEB Consulting Ltd., United Kingdom [M] Rep. Isolatek International Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc., GA [SE] Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network, United Kingdom [M] Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd. Carmen W. Daecher, The Daecher Consulting Group, Inc., PA [SE] Rep. American Society of Safety Engineers R. G. Irvine, MTA Bridges and Tunnels, NY [U] Joseph Kroboth, III, Washington County, MD [E] David J. LeBlanc, Tyco Fire & Building Products, RI [M] Roger Lichtenwald, American Warming and Ventilating, OH [M] Colin Macedo, HNTB Corporation, WA [SE] Igor Y. Maevski, Jacobs Engineering, NY [SE] John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department, WA [E] Dharam Pal, Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, NJ [U] Maurice M. Pilette, Mechanical Designs Ltd., MA [SE] Jesus M. Rohena, US Department of Transportation, DC [E] Rene van den Bosch, Promat BV The Netherlands, The Netherlands [M]

Alternates

Francis J. Brennan, Seattle Fire Department, WA [E] (Alt. to John Nelsen)Russell P. Fleming, National Fire Sprinkler Association, NY [M] (Alt. to Alan Brinson) Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association, Ltd. William H. Lampkin, American Warming and Ventilating, OH [M] (Alt. to Roger Lichtenwald)

Nonvoting

Arthur L. Elliott, Sacramento, CA (Member Emeritus)George E. Ralph, Southport, ME (Member Emeritus)

Staff Liaison: James D. Lake

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on fire prevention and fire protection measures to reduce loss of life and property damage for road tunnels, air-right structures, bridges, and limited access highways. Excluded from this scope is the protection for facilities for the storage, repair, and parking of motor vehicles.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Report of the Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection is presented for adoption.

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection and proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, 2004 edition. NFPA 502-200� is published in Volume 8 of the 2006 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, which consists of �7 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502

_______________________________________________________________ 502-� Log #� Final Action: Accept in Principle (Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Counsel at Law Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels. 7.4 Fire Detection. 7.4.� At least two systems to detect, identify, or locate a fire in a tunnel including one manual means shall be provided. The expected performance of such systems including details of the: ● delay between ignition occurring and an alarm being initiated ● heat release rate of the fire which is required to trigger an alarm determined. The accuracy of the detected location for a fire and the actual location of a fire for a range of credible scenarios be documented and used in the formulation of emergency response plans, emergency ventilation, emergency evacuation and fire suppression system plans. 7.�0 Fire sprinklers suppression systems. Where it can be shown by engineer-ing analysis that the level of safety can be equal or exceeded by the use of fixed fire suppression systems as part of an integrated approach to the manage-ment of safety, such systems shall be permitted in accordance with an engineer-ing installation, inspection and maintenance schedule using the design parame-ters for a particular tunnel which demonstrates the level of performance provid-ed by the suppression systems will be maintained. Where sprinklers are installed in road tunnels, the sprinkler system shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in accordance with NFPA �3. 7.�2.5 The drainage collection system shall drain to a storage tank or transfer pumping station of sufficient capacity to receive, as a minimum, the simultane-ous rate of flow from two fire hoses in accordance with Chapter 9 and the con-tribution from the operation of any fixed fire suppression system, without caus-ing flooding on the roadway. 7.�7.3.3 Tenable environment. A tenable environment shall be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and in all emergency exits and cross passageways while those portions of the tunnel that are involved in an emergency shall be managed so as to best ensure the tenable environment can be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and all emergency exits and cross passageways by managing the ventilation system and any fire suppression systems so as to min-imize fire growth, minimize the discharge of noxious combustion products, and contain all, and where applicable dilute, combustion products so as enhance tenability of the environment. �0.� General. Emergency ventilation systems and tunnel operating procedures shall be developed to maximize the use of the road tunnel ventilation system for the control of fire growth, the removal and control of smoke and heated gases that result from fire emergencies within the tunnel. �0.2.2 In all cases, the desired goal shall be to provide an evacuation path for motorists who are exiting from the tunnel, to control fire growth rate and to facilitate fire fighting operations. �0.2.3 In tunnels with bidirectional traffic where motorists can be on both sides of the fire site, the following objectives shall be met: (�) fire growth rate shall be minimized; (2) smoke stratification shall not be disturbed (3) longitu-dinal air velocity shall be kept at low magnitudes (4) smoke extraction through ceiling openings or high openings along the tunnel wall(s) is effective and shall be considered. �0.2.4 In tunnels with unidirectional traffic where motorists are likely to be located upstream of the fire site, the following objectives shall be met: (�) Longitudinal systems (a) minimize fire growth rate; (a) (b) prevent back layering by producing a longitudinal air velocity that was greater than the critical velocity of direction of traffic flow; (b) (c) avoid disruption of the smoke layering initially by not operating jet fans that are located near the fire site. Operate fans that are farthest away from the site first. (2) Transverse or reversible semi transverse systems. (a) maximize the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone manage the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone so as to minimize the fire growth rate in the area that contains the fire and minimize the amount of inside air that is introduced by transverse systems. (b) create a longitudinal air flow in the direction of the traffic flow by operat-ing the upstream ventilation zone(s) in maximum supply and the down stream ventilation zone(s) in maximum of the exhaust. �0.4 Design objectives. The design objectives of the emergency ventilation system shall be to minimize fire growth rate, control, extract, or to control and extract, smoke and heated gases as follows: (�) A stream of non contaminated air is provided to motorists in a path of egress away from the fire (see Annex B). (2) Longitudinal air flow rates are produced by the back layering of smoke in a path of egress away from the fire (see Annex C). �0.5.� The design fire size [heat-release rate produced by a vehicle(s)] shall be used to design the emergency ventilation system. �0.5.�.� Consideration should be given to using different design fire sizes for different design questions. The design fire for structural integrity may be a dif-ferent design fire to that used for emergency evacuation. Because the rate of

growth of a fire is critical to the tenability of a tunnel and users ability to escape criteria including rate of growth of a fire may be considered as part of the engineering design process for the tunnel. Chapter �3 Control of hazardous materials �3.�.3 In developing such regulations the following shall be addressed: (1) availability of a suitable alternate route(s) that meets federal requirements as prescribed in US Department of Transportation (49 CFR �77.825) and US Department of Transportation (49 CFR Part 397 Subpart C). (2) US Department of Transportation (49 CFR Subtitle B Parts �00-�99). Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterized as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (e.g. Flour and margarine - Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture - Hubberback, Tyres - Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilizing current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revise a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: ● Detection ● Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) ● Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimizing fire develop-ment - and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) ● Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) In this context this proposal is to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See committee actions on 502-36 (Log 4), 502-44 (Log 5), 502-46 (Log 6), 502-55 (Log 7), 502-84 (Log 8), 502-86 (Log 9), 502-87 (Log �0), and 502-88 (Log ��). Committee Statement: This proposal was covered by many other proposals that the committee acted on individually. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Needs work on the grammar and punctuation to be easily understood. Language is too wordy. _______________________________________________________________ 502-2 Log #CP� Final Action: Accept (Chapter 3 Definitions (GOT)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Adopt the following definitions from the NFPA Glossary of Terms for the following terms: Alteration (secondary) NFPA 502, 2004 ed. For road tunnels, bridges and limited access highways , a modification, replacement, or other physical change to an existing facility. Communications (secondary) NFPA 502, 2004 ed. For road tunnels, bridges and limited access highways , radio, telephone, and messaging throughout the facility and particularly at the central supervising sta-tion and command post. Dry Standpipe (preferred) NFPA �4, 2003 ed A standpipe system designed to have piping contain water only when the sys-tem is being utilized. Point of Safety (secondary) NFPA 502, 2004 ed. For road tunnels, bridges and limited access highways , an exit enclosure that leads to a public way or safe location outside the structure, or an at-grade point beyond any enclosing structure, or another area that affords adequate protection for motorists. Delete the definition for Power Substation Substantiation: Adds delimiting phrase to make definition specific to tunnels.

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-3 Log #�4 Final Action: Accept (Chapter 3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc. Recommendation: Revise this chapter as follows: Chapter 3 Definitions 3.1 General. The definitions contained in this chapter shall apply to the terms used in this standard. Where terms are not included, common usage of the terms shall apply. 3.2 NFPA Official Definitions. 3.2.1* Approved. Acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. 3.2.2* Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ). An organization, office, or indi-vidual responsible for enforcing the requirements of a code or standard, or for approving equipment, materials, an installation, or a procedure. 3.2.3 Labeled. Equipment or materials to which has been attached a label, symbol, or other identifying mark of an organization that is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and concerned with product evaluation, that main-tains periodic inspection of production of labeled equipment or materials, and by whose labeling the manufacturer indicates compliance with appropriate standards or performance in a specified manner. 3.2.4* Listed. Equipment, materials, or services included in a list published by an organization that is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction and con-cerned with evaluation of products or services, that maintains periodic inspec-tion of production of listed equipment or materials or periodic evaluation of services, and whose listing states that either the equipment, material, or service meets appropriate designated standards or has been tested and found suitable for a specified purpose. 3.2.5 Shall. Indicates a mandatory requirement. 3.2.6 Should. Indicates a recommendation or that which is advised but not required. 3.2.7 Standard. A document, the main text of which contains only mandatory provisions using the word “shall” to indicate requirements and which is in a form generally suitable for mandatory reference by another standard or code or for adoption into law. Nonmandatory provisions shall be located in an appendix or annex, footnote, or fine-print note and are not to be considered a part of the requirements of a standard. 3.3 General Definitions. 3.3.1 Agency. The organization legally established and authorized to operate a facility. 3.3.2 Alteration. A modification, replacement, or other physical change to an existing facility. 3.3.3 Alternative Fuel. A motor vehicle fuel other than gasoline and diesel. 3.3.4 Ancillary Facility(ies). A structure(s) usually used to house or contain operating, maintenance, or support equipment and functions. 3.3.5* Backlayering. The reversal of movement of smoke and hot gases coun-ter to the direction of the ventilation airflow. 3.3.6 Bridge. A structure spanning and providing a highway across an obstacle such as a waterway, railroad, or another highway. 3.3.7* Building. Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy. 3.3.8 Central Supervising Station (CSS). A dedicated operations center where the agency controls and coordinates the facility operations and from which communication is maintained with the agency’s supervisory and operating per-sonnel and with participating agencies where required. 3.3.8.1 Alternate Central Supervising Station. A prearranged location that is equipped, or that can quickly be equipped, to function as the central supervis-ing station in the event the central supervising station is inoperative, untenable, or inaccessible for any reason. 3.3.9 Combustible. Capable of undergoing combustion. 3.3.10 Command Post. The location at the scene of an emergency where the incident commander is located and where command, coordination, control, and communications are centralized. [ 402: 3.3] 3.3.11 Communications. Radio, telephone, and messenger services throughout the facility and particularly at the central supervising station and command post. 3.3.12 Control Valve. A valve controlling flow to water-based fire protection systems. Control valves do not include hose valves, inspector’s test valves, drain valves, trim valves for dry pipe, preaction and deluge valves, check valves, or relief valves. [ 25: 3.3] 3.3.13 Critical Velocity. The minimum steady-state velocity of the ventilation airflow moving toward the fire, within a tunnel or passageway, that is required to prevent backlayering at the fire site. 3.3.14 Deluge System. An open fixed fire suppression system activated either manually or automatically. 3.3.1 5 Design Fire. A fire’s heat-release rate, in megawatts, designated in con-junction with the authority having jurisdiction as the design fire size. 3.3.1 6 Dry Standpipe. A standpipe system that is designed to contain water only while the system is being used. 3.3.1 7 Dynamic Vehicle Envelope. The space within the tunnel roadway that is allocated for maximum vehicle movement.

3.3.1 8 Emergency Response Plan. A plan developed by an agency, with the cooperation of all participating agencies, that details specific actions to be per-formed by all personnel who are expected to respond during an emergency. 3.3.1 9 * Engineering Analysis. An analysis that evaluates all factors that affect the fire safety of a facility or a component of a facility. 3.3. 20 Facility. A limited access highway, road tunnel, bridge, or elevated highway. 3.3. 21 Fire Apparatus. A vehicle designed to be used under emergency condi-tions to transport personnel and equipment, and to support the suppression of fires and mitigation of other hazardous situations. [ 1901: 3.3] 3.3.2 2 Fire Department Connection. A connection through which the fire department can pump supplemental water into the sprinkler system, standpipe, or other system, furnishing water for fire extinguishment to supplement exist-ing water supplies. 3.3.2 3 Fire Emergency. The existence of, or threat of, fire or the development of smoke or fumes, or any combination thereof, that demands immediate action to correct or alleviate the condition or situation. 3.3. 24 Fire Growth Rate. Rate of change of the fire’s heat release. 3.3. 25 Fire Heat Release Rate. The rate at which heat energy is generated by burning expressed as Btu/sec or megawatts (MW). 3.3. 26 Fire Suppression. The application of an extinguishing agent to a fire at such level that open flaming is arrested, however a deep-seated fire will require additional steps to assure total extinguishment. 3.3. 27 Fixed Fire Protection System. 3.3. 28 Fixed Fire Suppression System. A system attached to the tunnel that is able to spread an extinguishing agent in whole or part of the tunnel. 3.3.2 9 Highway. Any paved facility on which motor vehicles travel. 3.3.2 9 .1* Depressed Highway. An uncovered, below-grade highway or boat section where walls rise to the grade surface and where emergency response access is usually limited. 3.3.2 9 .2 Elevated Highway. A highway that is constructed on a structure that is above the surface but that does not cross over an obstacle as in the case of a bridge. 3.3.2 9 .3 Limited Access Highway. A highway where preference is given to through-traffic by providing access connections that use only selected public roads and by prohibiting crossings at grade and at direct private driveways. 3.3. 30 Hose Connection. A combination of equipment provided for the con-nection of a hose to a standpipe system that includes a hose valve with a threaded outlet. 3.3. 31 Hose Valve. The valve to an individual hose connection. 3.3. 32 Incident Commander. The person who is responsible for all decisions relating to the management of the incident and is in charge of the incident site. [ 472: 3.3] 3.3. 33 Length of Tunnel. The length from face of portal to face of portal that is measured using the centerline alignment along the tunnel roadway. 3.3. 34 Motorist. A motor vehicle occupant, including the driver and passenger(s). 3.3. 35 Noncombustible Material. A substance that will not ignite and burn when subjected to a fire. [ 220: 2.�] 3.3. 36 Participating Agency. A public, quasi-public, or private agency that has agreed to cooperate with and assist the authority during an emergency. 3.3. 37 * Point of Safety. An enclosed fire exit that leads to a public way or safe location outside the structure; or an at-grade point beyond any enclosing structure; or another area that affords adequate protection for motorists. 3.3.3 8 Portable Fire Extinguisher. A portable device, carried or on wheels and operated by hand, containing an extinguishing agent that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing fire. [ 10: 3.3] 3.3.3 9 Portal. The interface between a tunnel and the atmosphere through which vehicles pass; a connection point to an adjacent facility. 3.3. 40 Power Substation. An arrangement of electric equipment that does not generate electricity but receives and converts or transforms generated energy to usable electric energy. 3.3. 41 Queue. A line of stored vehicles. 3.3. 42 Replace-in-Kind. Where applied to equipment and facilities, to furnish with new parts or equipment of the same type but not necessarily of identical design. 3.3. 43 Road Tunnel. An enclosed roadway for motor vehicle traffic with vehi-cle access that is limited to portals. 3.3. 44 Roadway. The volume of space that is located above the pavement sur-face through which motor vehicles travel. 3.3.45 Self Rescue. People leaving the hazardous area or dangerous situation without any professional (fire fighters, rescue personnel, etc.) help. 3.3.46 Sprinkler System. A fixed fire suppression system designed to be acti-vated by the fire itself so as to dispense water in the areas where it is needed to ensure rapid suppression of the fire. 3.3. 47 Structure. That which is built or constructed and limited to buildings and non-building structures as defined herein. [ 5000: 3.3] 3.3. 47 .1* Air-Right Structure. A structure other than a skywalk bridge that is built over a roadway using the roadway’s air rights. [ 5000: 3.3] 3.3.48 Tenable Environment. An environment that supports human life for a specific period of time. 3.3.49 Water Mist System. A high pressure fixed fire suppression system that is operated by propelling very small droplets of water with high momentum. Substantiation: Chapter 3 Definitions is currently incomplete. Committee Meeting Action: Accept

502-4

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Committee Statement: These definitions are accepted and the committee will further review them at the ROC stage. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-4 Log #59 Final Action: Accept (3.3.8 Central Supervising Station (CSS)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 3.3.8 Central Supervising Station (CSS). Operations Control Center (OCC). A dedicated operations center where the agency controls and coordi-nates the facility operations and from which communication is maintained with the agency’s supervisory and operating personnel and with participating agen-cies where required. Substantiation: This change is proposed to eliminate confusion between the facility being addressed in NFPA 502 and Central Station, Supervising Station and Proprietary Supervising Station as defined in NFPA 72. The NFPA �30 Technical Committee has approved a similar proposal to make the same change to that standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-5 Log #60 Final Action: Accept (3.3.8.1 Alternate Central Supervising Station) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 3.3.8.� Alternate Central Supervising Station. A prearranged location that is equipped, or that can quickly be equipped, to function as the central supervis-ing station in the event the central supervising station is inoperative, untenable, or inaccessible for any reason. Substantiation: The NFPA �30 TC recently approved a corresponding change to that standard. The rationale was that the focus should be on the functionality of alternative sites as opposed to defining a specific location. See related pro-posal to modify �2.3(8). Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-6 Log #6� Final Action: Accept (3.3.11 Communications) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 3.3.11 Communications. Radio, telephone, and messenger services throughout the facility and particularly at the operations control center central supervising station and command post. Substantiation: The NFPA �30 TC recently approved a corresponding change to that standard. See related proposal to modify 3.3.8. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Replace the word “messenger” with messaging”. _______________________________________________________________ 502-7 Log #77 Final Action: Accept (3.3.12 Control Valve) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 3.3.12 Control Valve. A valve controlling flow to water-based fire protection systems. Control valves do not include hose valves, inspector’s test valves, drain valves, trim valves for dry pipe, preaction and deluge valves, check valves, or relief valves. [25:3.3] Substantiation: This term is not used anywhere in the body of the standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-8 Log #68 Final Action: Accept (3.3.26 Incident Commander) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 3.3.26 Incident Commander. The individual in overall command of an emergency incident [�56�:3.3]. The person who is responsible for all decisions

relating to the management of the incident and is in charge of the incident site. [472:3.3] Substantiation: Given that paragraph 12.7.1 of this standard requires that emergency incidents be managed in accordance with NFPA �56� it makes more sense to rely on the definition from NFPA �56� rather than NFPA 472. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-9 Log #78 Final Action: Accept (3.3.36 Replace-in-Kind) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 3.3.36 Replace-in-Kind. Where applied to equipment and facilities, to fur-nish with new parts or equipment of the same type but not necessarily of iden-tical design. Substantiation: This term is not used anywhere in the body of the standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�0 Log #�20 Final Action: Accept in Principle (4.1 and Table A.10.5.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Gary L. English, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.�.� Fire protection shall consider the maximum probable fire based upon use(s) of the facility. This will include multiple vehicle accidents with fire and fully involved fire of all contents of vehicle(s) specifically to include hazardous materials (dangerous goods). Relocate Table A.�0.5.� to Chapter 4 under a new 4.�.�, i.e., Table 4.�.2 and make the table a minimum standard. Substantiation: The location of the table for Fire Data for Typical Vehicles (A.10.5.1) means that it “is not part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only.” NFPA 502 pg �7, 2004 edi-tion. This effectively nullifies the table as a requirement thereby allowing own-ers/designers to ignore the material. The fire data table calculates the fire load created by a single vehicle. Real world experience has shown that multiple vehicle fires are likely (e.g., Mount Blanc). Even if the tunnel is restricted to cars only, and or prohibits hazardous materials, the multiple vehicle fire data for the allowed vehicles needs to be included in the minimum design fire. The fire data table seriously understates the probably fire size. The ‘worst’ fire in the design is based roughly on a 150 gallon flammable liquid spill, yet the Tanker category should reflect the likely fire load resulting from a fire of the contents of a tanker. Rough calculations show that a 4,000 gallon gasoline spill may result in a 2,000 MW fire. Other tests (Runehammer) have strongly indicated that even ordinary com-bustibles can create fires of approximately 200 MW. This is almost �0 times the fire data shown in the table (20-30 MW). Many of the systems in the tunnel and other structures are based upon the current fire data table. Ventilation, CCTV, communication, egress, standpipes and water supplies, electrical systems and concrete and steel protection are based upon fire data which needs revision. Using an updated fire data table will allow designers and tunnel operators to decid`e what risks are acceptable and design and operate accordingly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Do not move or revise the sections or the Annex at this time. Instead a Task Group has been established with the express intent of collecting the current data on vehicle fires for inclusion at the ROC stage. Committee Statement: The technical committee recognizes that there is exten-sive research and published information regarding reviewing upwards the data on vehicle fire size. It is critical that information be as complete as possible and formatted to be easily understood and compared. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�� Log #87 Final Action: Reject (4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.2 Safeguards During Construction. During the course of construction or alteration of any facility addressed in this standard, the provisions of NFPA 24� shall apply , except as modified in this standard . 4.2.1 A standpipe system, either temporary or permanent in nature, shall be installed in tunnels under construction before the tunnel has exceeded a length of 6� m (200 ft) beyond any access shaft or portal and shall be extended as tun-nel work progresses. 4.2.2 Permanent and temporary standpipes shall conform to NFPA �4 4.2.3 Temporary standpipes, which might be used by contractors to furnish

502-5

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 water for construction purposes, shall be equipped with hose outlets and valves with 63.5 mm (2½ in.) hose thread conforming to NFPA �963. 4.2.4 Reducers or adapters shall be provided and attached for connection of the contractor’s hose. 4.2.5 Reducers or adapters shall be readily removable through the use of a fire fighter’s hose spanner wrench. Substantiation: The standpipe requirements in NFPA 241 are based on con-ventional structures rather than tunnels. This language is adapted from NFPA �30. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Provisions during construction are beyond the scope of NFPA 502. The committee will be submitting proposals to NFPA 24� to address special hazards in bridge and tunnel and limited access highway con-struction. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�2 Log #�05 Final Action: Accept (4.3.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 4.3.3 Bridges and Elevated Highways. Fire protection for bridges and ele-vated highways shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 6. 4.3.3.2 Fire protection for bridges and elevated highways shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 6. Substantiation: A related proposal moves 4.3.3.� to Chapter 6 making the sub-paragraph numbering of 4.3.3 unnecessary. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�3 Log #9� Final Action: Accept (4.3.3.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 4.3.3.1* Critical structural members shall be protected from collision and high-temperature exposure that can result in dangerous weakening or complete collapse of the bridge or elevated highway. Substantiation: A related proposal would make protection of bridge structures a new specific requirement in Chapter 6. This text was moved from 4.3.3.1 to a new 6.�0 of this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�4 Log #8� Final Action: Accept (4.3.4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 4.3.4.2 Additional requirements for fire protection of depressed highways are described in Chapter 8. Substantiation: There are no additional requirements for fire protection for depressed highways in Chapter 8. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�5 Log #85 Final Action: Accept (4.3.6.1 through 4.3.6.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 4.3.6.1 The limits that an air-right structure imposes on the emergency acces-sibility and function of the roadway that is located beneath the structure shall be assessed. 4.3.6.2 Where an air-right structure encloses both sides of a roadway, it shall be considered a road tunnel for fire protection purposes and shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 7. 4.3.6.3 Where an air-right structure does not fully enclose the roadway on both sides, the decision to consider it as a road tunnel shall be made by the authority having jurisdiction after an engineering analysis in accordance with 4.3.�. Substantiation: Moved from Chapter 4 to Chapter 8 as these are specific to roadways beneath air-right structures. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J.

_______________________________________________________________ 502-�6 Log #73 Final Action: Accept in Principle (4.3.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.3.7* Ancillary Facilities. All related ancillary facilities that support the operation of limited access highways, depressed highways, bridges and elevat-ed highways, and road tunnels shall be protected as required by all applicable NFPA standards and local building codes except as modified in this standard. Substantiation: Propose to move this amended text into Chapter 4 – general requirements as the same language is repeated across several chapters as spe-cific requirements. Additionally, the current text as it appears in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 creates a conflict within the standard as there are specific construction and fire protection requirements for the Operations Control Center (OCC), which is by definition an “ancillary facility”, contained in Chapter �2 of this standard that exceed those found in the building code and/or other NFPA stan-dards for these types of occupancies. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle 4.3.7* Ancillary Facilities. All related ancillary facilities that support the opera-tion of limited access highways, depressed highways, bridges and elevated highways, and road tunnels shall be protected as required by all applicable NFPA standards and applicable building codes except as modified in this stan-dard. Delete A.5.5, A.6.7 and A.7.�3 Language from the current A.5.5 will be the new A.4.3.7. Committee Statement: Broadens the reference to the building code from one that is local to one that may be state or other. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�7 Log #69 Final Action: Accept (4.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.4 Emergency Response Plan. 4.4.1 A designated authority shall carry out a complete and coordinated pro-gram of fire protection that shall include written preplanned emergency response procedures and standard operating procedures. 4.4.2 Emergency traffic-control procedures shall be established to regulate traf-fic during an emergency. 4.4.3 Emergency procedures and the development of an emergency response plan shall be completed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 12. Substantiation: The following text was extracted from 5.6 with similar text also found in 6.9 and 7.16. Given that essentially the same requirements are found in each chapter specific to a certain roadway configuration it makes more sense to apply the emergency planning requirements globally through Chapter 4. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�8 Log #82 Final Action: Accept (4.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.5 Emergency Communications . Emergency communications, where required by the authority having jurisdiction, shall be provided by the installa-tion of outdoor-type telephone boxes, coded alarm telegraph stations, radio transmitters, or other approved devices that shall meet the following require-ments: (�) They shall be made conspicuous by means of indicating lights or other approved markers. (2) They shall be identified by a readily visible number plate or other approved device. (3) They shall be posted with instructions for use by motorists. (4) They shall be located in approved locations so that motorists can park vehicles clear of the travel lanes. (5) Emergency communication devices shall be protected from physical dam-age from vehicle impact. (6) Emergency communication devices shall be connected to a staffed or monitored facility. Substantiation: Emergency communications should be a general requirement that is applied as determined by the authority having jurisdiction. This text is adapted from Section 5.2. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J.

502-6

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Sub-paragraph 4.5 (4). In most tunnels this requirement of “approved locations so that motorists can park vehicles clear of lanes” cannot be attained. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�9 Log #88 Final Action: Accept (4.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 4.7 Signage. Signs, mile markers, or other approved location reference mark-ers shall be installed along the highway to allow motorists to provide authori-ties with accurate locations for accident or emergency areas. Substantiation: Proposal would make signage a new general requirement in Chapter 4. This text was moved from Section 5.3 and Section 6.3 of this stan-dard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-20 Log #83 Final Action: Accept (5.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 5.2 Emergency Communications. Emergency communications, where required by the authority having jurisdiction, shall be provided by the installa-tion of outdoor type telephone boxes, coded alarm telegraph stations, radio transmitters, or other approved devices that shall meet the following require-ments: (�) They shall be made conspicuous by means of indicating lights or other approved markers. (2) They shall be identified by a readily visible number plate or other approved device. (3) They shall be posted with instructions for use by motorists. (4) They shall be located in approved locations so that motorists can park vehicles clear of the travel lanes. (5) Emergency communication devices shall be protected from physical dam-age from vehicle impact. (56) Emergency communication devices shall be connected to a staffed or monitored facility. Substantiation: Emergency communications should be a general requirement that is applied as determined by the authority having jurisdiction. This text is added as new Section 4.5 in a separate proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-2� Log #89 Final Action: Accept (5.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text 5.3 Signage. Signs, mile markers, or other approved location reference mark-ers shall be installed along the highway to allow motorists to provide authori-ties with accurate locations for accident or emergency areas. Substantiation: A related proposal would make signage a new general require-ment in Chapter 4. This text was moved from Section 5.3 to a new Section 4.7 of this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-22 Log #74 Final Action: Accept (5.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 5.5* Ancillary Facilities. All related ancillary facilities that support the oper-ation of limited access highways shall be protected as required by all applicable NFPA standards and local building codes and shall not be subject to the provi-sions of this standard. Substantiation: Propose to delete this text in favor of adding amended text into Chapter 4 – General Requirements as the same language is repeated across several chapters as specific requirements. Additionally, the current text as it appears in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 creates a conflict within the standard as there are specific construction and fire protection requirements for the Operations Control Center (OCC), which is by definition an “ancillary facility”, contained in Chapter �2 of this standard that exceed those found in the building code and/or other NFPA standards for these types of occupancies.

Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-23 Log #70 Final Action: Accept (5.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 5.6 Emergency Response Plan. 5.6.1 A designated authority shall carry out a complete and coordinated pro-gram of fire protection that shall include written preplanned emergency response procedures and standard operating procedures. 5.6.2 Emergency traffic-control procedures shall be established to regulate traf-fic during an emergency. 5.6.3 Emergency procedures and the development of an emergency response plan shall be completed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 12. Substantiation: The following text was extracted from Section 5.6 with simi-lar text also found in Section 6.9 and 7.�6. Move to Chapter 4 - General Requirements as these same requirements apply to all roadway configurations covered by this standard. See proposal to add new Section 4.4 Emergency Response Plan. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-24 Log #��2 Final Action: Reject (5.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 5.7 Fire Hydrants and Water Supply. Fire hydrants and water supply sys-tems for limited access highways shall be provided in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 9. Substantiation: Specifies that fire hydrants are required for limited access highways. This was not in previous NFPA 502 standards. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposed requirements are too broad and may be more appropriately covered in Annex I regarding responding apparatus. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Negative: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Negative: NELSEN, J.: While I appreciate the position that this proposal is too broad as expressed in the Committee Statement I am still concerned that the standard is silent with respect to water supplies for fire fighting. _______________________________________________________________ 502-25 Log #84 Final Action: Accept (6.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 6.2 Emergency Communications. Emergency communications, where required by the authority having jurisdiction, shall be provided by the installa-tion of outdoor type telephone boxes, coded alarm telegraph stations, radio transmitters, or other approved devices that shall meet the following require-ments: (�) They shall be made conspicuous by means of indicating lights or other approved markers. (2) They shall be identified by a readily visible number plate or other approved device. (3) They shall be posted with instructions for use by motorists. (4) They shall be located in approved locations so that motorists can park vehicles clear of the travel lanes. Substantiation: Emergency communications should be a general requirement that is applied as determined by the authority having jurisdiction. This text is added as new Section 4.5 in a separate proposal. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-26 Log #90 Final Action: Accept (6.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 6.3 Signage. Signs, mile markers, or other approved location reference mark-ers shall be installed along the highway to allow motorists to provide authori-ties with accurate locations for accident or emergency areas. Substantiation: A related proposal would make signage a new general require-ment in Chapter 4. This text was moved from Section 6.3 to a new Section 4.7 of this standard.

502-7

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-27 Log #��3 Final Action: Accept (6.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 6.5* Standpipe and Water Supply . Where the distance from an acceptable water supply source as defined in 9.2.3 to any point on the bridge or elevated highway exceeds �20 m (400 ft), the bridge or elevated highway shall be pro-vided with a standpipe system in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 9. Substantiation: Specifies that a standpipe system is required for bridges AND elevated highways. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-28 Log #75 Final Action: Accept (6.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 6.7* Ancillary Facilities. All related ancillary facilities that support the oper-ation of limited access highways shall be protected as required by all applicable NFPA standards and local building codes and shall not be subject to the provi-sions of this standard. Substantiation: Propose to delete this text in favor of adding amended text into Chapter 4 – General Requirements as the same language is repeated across several chapters as specific requirements. Additionally, the current text as it appears in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 creates a conflict within the standard as there are specific construction and fire protection requirements for the Operations Control Center (OCC), which is by definition an “ancillary facility”, contained in Chapter �2 of this standard that exceed those found in the building code and/or other NFPA standards for these types of occupancies. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-29 Log #79 Final Action: Accept in Principle (6.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 6.8 Control of Hazardous Materials. Where required by the authority hav-ing jurisdiction , control of hazardous materials shall be in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 13. Substantiation: The current text appears to apply hazardous materials restric-tions to all elevated roadways and bridges. It would seem more appropriate to leave that determination to individual jurisdictions. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Do not revise 6.8, instead revise �3.�.� as follows: The authority having jurisdiction shall adopt rules and regulations that apply to the transportation of hazardous materials. Committee Statement: This revision is more appropriate within Chapter�3. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J.

_______________________________________________________________ 502-30 Log #7� Final Action: Accept (6.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 6.9 Emergency Response Plan. 6.9.1 A designated authority shall carry out a complete and coordinated pro-gram of fire protection that shall include written preplanned emergency response procedures and standard operating procedures. 6.9.2 Emergency procedures and the development of an emergency response plan shall be completed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 12. Substantiation: The following text was extracted from Section 5.6 with simi-lar text also found in Section 6.9 and 7.�6. Move to Chapter 4 - General Requirements as these same requirements apply to all roadway configurations covered by this standard. See proposal to add new Section 4.4 Emergency Response Plan. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-3� Log #92 Final Action: Accept (6.10) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 6.10 Protection of Structure 6.10.1* Critical structural members shall be protected from collision and high-temperature exposure that can result in dangerous weakening or complete col-lapse of the bridge or elevated highway. Substantiation: Proposal would make protection of bridge structures a new specific requirement in Chapter 6. This text was moved from 4.3.3.1 to a new Section 6.�0 of this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Committee Statement: Current Annex A.4.3.3.� is the Annex for this para-graph. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-32 Log #�5 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.2 Road Tunnel Fire Protection Requirements Length . For the pur-pose of this standard, tunnel length shall dictate the minimum fire protection requirements, as follows: (�) Category X - Where tunnel length is less than 90 m (300 ft), the provi-sions of this standard shall not apply. (2) Category A - Where tunnel length is 90m (300 ft) or greater, standpipe systems and traffic control systems shall be installed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 9 and Section 7.6, respectively. (3) Category B - Where tunnel length equals or exceeds 240 m (800 ft) and where the maximum distance from any point within the tunnel to a point of safety exceeds �20 m (400 ft), all provisions of this standard shall apply. (4) Category C - Where the tunnel length equals or exceeds 300 m (1000 ft), all provisions of this standard shall apply. The requirements outlined above are shown in Table 7.2.1. See Table 7.2.1 Road Tunnel Fire Protection Requirements on the following page.

502-8

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502

Table 7.2.1 Road Tunnel Fire Protection Requirements

Tunnel Categories X A B CNotes

Fire Protection Systems NFPA 502 Sections 7.2(1) 7.2(2) 7.2(3) 7.2(4)

Fire

Det

ectio

n

Manual Fire Alarm Boxes 7.4.�.� ¤ ¤

CCTV 7.4.�.27.4.�.3.6 ¤ ¤

Automatic Fire Detectors 7.4.�.3 ¤ ¤

Fire Control Panel 7.4.2 ¤ ¤

Com

mun

icat

ions Radio 7.5.�

7.5.2 ¤ ¤

Telephone 7.5 ¤ ¤

Traf

fic C

ontr

ol Stop traffic approaching tunnel portal 7.6.� ¤

Stop traffic from enter-ing tunnels direct approaches

7.6.2 ¤ ¤

Fire

Pro

tect

ion

Fire Apparatus 7.7 + + +Not mandatory to be at tunnel, however they must be near to minimize response time.

Fire Standpipe 7.8 ¤ ¤ ¤Water Supply 9.2 ¤ ¤ ¤Fire Department Connections 9.3 ¤ ¤ ¤

Hose Connections 9.4 ¤ ¤ ¤

Fire Pumps 9.5 + + + If required must follow Section 9.5

Portable Fire Extinguisher 7.9 ¤ ¤Fixed Fire Suppression System 7.�0 + + + If installed must follow Section

7.�0.

Emergency Ventilation 7.�� # #Section �0.� allows engineer-ing analysis to determine requirements.

Drainage System 7.�2 ¤ ¤Hydrocarbon Detector 7.�2.7 ¤ ¤

Egr

ess

Emergency Egress 7.�7 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Exit Identification 7.�7.2 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Tenable Environment 7.�7.3.3 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Emergency Exits 7.�7.6 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Cross Passageways 7.�7.7 ¤ ¤ ¤

Legend: ¤ Mandatory Requirement + Not Mandatory Requirement – See Notes # Conditionally Mandatory – See Notes

502-9

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Substantiation: Section 7.2 on Tunnel Length is the section that defines the requirements for the application of this standard to road tunnels based on tun-nel length. It has been a difficult section to interpret, understand and apply. This proposed version includes a matrix which clarifies the specific require-ments of the section and provides the user with a better understanding of the requirements of this standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle

Chapter 7 Road Tunnels

7.2 Application. For the purpose of this standard, tunnel length shall dictate the minimum fire protection requirements, as follows:(�) X - Where tunnel length is less than 90 m (300 ft), the provisions of this standard shall not apply.(2) A - Where tunnel length is 90m (300 ft) or greater, standpipe systems and traffic control systems shall be installed inaccordance with the requirements of Chapter 9 and Section 7.6, respectively.(3) B - Where tunnel length equals or exceeds 240 m (800 ft) and where the maximum distance from any point withinthe tunnel to a point of safety exceeds �20 m (400 ft), all provisions of this standard shall apply.(4) C - Where the tunnel length equals or exceeds 300 m (1,000 ft), all provi-sions of this standard shall apply unless noted otherwise in this document. (5) D – Where the tunnel length equals or exceeds 1,000 m (3,280 ft), all provi-sions of this standard shall apply.

The requirements noted above are shown in Table 7.2.1.

See Committee Action Table 7.2.� Road Tunnel Fire Protection Reference on the following page.

Committee Statement: The revision includes a reference to a longer tunnel and introduces the concept of urban and rural tunnels which is necessary for the consideration of the impact of tunnel traffic volume and congestion on the overall safety systems. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Table 7.2.� may need some additional work. Do not under-stand the Rural Tunnel/Urban Tunnel Table.

Tunnel Location

Tunnel Length (ft)300 800 1,000 3,000

Ruraltunnel

Urban tunnel

2,000

1,000

4,000

2,000

X A B C D

502-�0

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502

Table 7.2.1 Road Tunnel Fire Protection Reference

Tunnel Categories X A B C DNotes

Fire Protection Systems NFPA 502 Sections 7.2(1) 7.2(2) 7.2(3) 7.2(4) 7.2(5)

Fire

Det

ectio

n Manual Fire Alarm Boxes 7.4.�.� ¤ ¤ ¤

CCTV 7.4.�.27.4.�.3.6 ¤ ¤ ¤

Automatic Fire Detectors 7.4.�.3 ¤ ¤ ¤Fire Control Panel 7.4.2 ¤ ¤ ¤

Com

Radio 7.5.�7.5.2 ¤ ¤ ¤

Telephone 7.5 ¤ ¤ ¤

Traf

fic C

ontr

ol Stop traffic approach-ing tunnel portal 7.6.� ¤

Stop traffic from entering tunnels direct approaches

7.6.2 ¤ ¤ ¤

Fire

Pro

tect

ion

Fire Apparatus 7.7 + + + + Not mandatory to be at tunnel, however they must be near to minimize response time.

Fire Standpipe 7.8 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Water Supply 9.2 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Fire Department Connections 9.3 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Hose Connections 9.4 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Fire Pumps 9.5 + + + ¤ If required must follow Section 9.5Portable Fire Extinguisher 7.9 ¤ ¤ ¤Fixed Fire Suppression System 7.�0 + + + + If installed must follow Section 7.�0.Emergency Ventilation 7.�� # # # Section �0.� allows engineering analysis to determine

requirements.Drainage System 7.�2 ¤ ¤ ¤Hydrocarbon Detector 7.�2.7 ¤ ¤ ¤

Egr

ess

Emergency Egress 7.�7 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Exit Identification 7.�7.2 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Tenable Environment 7.�7.3.3 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Emergency Exits 7.�7.6 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Cross Passageways 7.�7.7 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Ele

ctri

cal Emergency Lighting ��.6 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Power ��.4 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤Redundant Power ?? ¤Security Plan ��.7 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Emergency Response Plan 12.3 ¤ ¤ ¤ ¤

Legend: ¤ Mandatory Requirement + Not Mandatory Requirement – See Notes # Conditionally Mandatory – See Notes

502-32 (Log #15) Committee Action

502-��

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ 502-33 Log #CP9 Final Action: Accept (7.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation:

Revise 7.3 as follows.7.3 Protection of Structural Elements7.3.1 Regardless of tunnel length, all primary structural concrete and steel ele-ments shall be protected in accordance with this standard in order to:

(�) Maintain life safety and provide a tenable environment(2) Mitigate structural damage and prevent progressive structural

collapse(3) Minimize economic impact

7.3.2 The structure shall be capable of withstanding the Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) time / temperature curve, or other curve that is acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

The time/temperature development is shown in the table below:

TIME (MINUTES) TEMP ºC (ºF)

0 20 68

3 890 �634

5 ��40 2084

�0 �200 2�92

30 �300 2372

60 �350 2462

90 �300 2372

�20 �200 2�92

After �20 minute period of fire exposure, the following failure criteria shall be satisfied:

(�)Tunnels with cast in-situ concrete structural elements shall be protected such that:

(a) The temperature of the concrete surface does not exceed 380ºC (7�6ºF).(b) The temperature of the steel reinforcement within the concrete (assuming a minimum cover of 25mm (� in) does not exceed 250ºC (482ºF).

(2)Tunnels with pre-cast, high-strength concrete elements shall be protected such that explosive spalling is prevented.

(3) Steel or cast iron tunnel linings shall be protected such that the lining tem-perature shall not exceed 300ºC (572ºF)

7.3.3 Structural fire protection material shall satisfy the following performance criteria:

(�) It shall be non-combustible in accordance with ASTM E 136 or equal international standard.

(2) It shall have a minimum melting temperature of �350ºC (2462ºF)

(3) It shall not produce toxic smoke or fumes under fire exposure in accordance with ASTM E 84 or equal inter-national standard

(4) It shall meet the fire protection requirements with <5% humidity by weight and also when fully saturated with water in accordance with RWS Fire Test Procedure �998-CVB-R��6� (Rev �).

ANNEX A

A.7.3 Any fire protection material should satisfy the following performance criteria:

(�) Be resistant to freezing and thawing(2) Withstand dynamic suction and pressure loads (3) Withstand both hot and cold thermal shock from

fire exposure and hose streams(4) Meet all applicable Health and Safety Standards(5) Not itself become a hazard during a fire(6) Be resistant to water ingress

The time/temperature development is shown in the graph above.

The RWS fire curve is representative of actual tunnel fires for various combus-tible, not necessarily being hazardous materials or flammable liquids.This fire curve was initially developed during extensive testing conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Transport (RijksWaterStaat, RWS) in cooperation with TNO, in the late �970’s and later proven in full scale fire tests in the Runehamar tunnel tests in Norway in September 2003, conducted as part of the EU funded research project UPTUN, in association with SP laboratories from Sweden and SINTEF/NBL laboratories from Norway.

Four tests were carried out on fire loads of non-hazardous materials using tim-ber/plastic, furniture, mattresses and cardboard cartons with plastic cups.

All tests produced time/temperature developments in line with the RWS curve as shown in the graph below.

Figure A.7.3(a)

Figure A.7.3(b)

Tem

pera

ture

(°C

)

1400

1200

1000

0 30 60

Time (min)

RWS, RijksWaterStaat, NL

90 120

800

600

400

200

0

1200

13001300

1200

1140

890

20

1350

Tem

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ture

(°C

)

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Time (min)

Gas temperature

800

600

400

200

0

T1 +10 mT2 0 m

T3 0 mT4 0m

502-�2

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502

All fires produced heat release rates of between 70MW for cardboard cartons and plastic cups and 203MW for timber/plastic pallets.

Test nr Time from ignition to peak HRR

(min)

Linear fire growth rate (R-linear regression coef-ficient) (MW/min)

Peak HRR

(MW)

Estimated from laboratory tests (no target - inclusive target)

(MW)� �8.5 20.5 (0.997) 200 (average) �86-2�7

2 �4.3 29.0 (0.99�) �58 (average) �67-�953 �0.4 �7.0 (0.998) �24.9 -4 7.7 5 - 70 MW: �7.7 (0.996) 70.5 79-95

The RWS requirements are adopted internationally as a realistic design fire curve that is representative of typical tunnel fires

The level of fire resistance of structures and equipment must be proven by test-ing or reference to previous testing.

Fire test reports are based on the following requirements:�. Concrete slabs used for the application of fire protection materials

for fire testing purposes have dimensions of at least �400x�400 mm and a nominal thickness of �50 mm.

2. The exposed surface will be approximately �200x�200 mm.3. The fire protection material must be fixed to the concrete slab using

the same fixation material (anchors, wire mesh, etc) as will be used during the actual installation in the tunnel.

4. In the case of board protection, minimum one joint in between two panels must be created, in view to judge if any thermal leaks will occur in the case of a real fire in the tunnel.

5. In case of spray materials, the number of applications (amount of layers) must be registered when preparing the test specimen. This amount of layers must be respected while applying the spray mate-rial in a real tunnel.

6. Temperature recordings by thermocouples located:a. At the interface in between the concrete and the fire pro-

tection materialb. At the bottom of the reinforcementc. On the non-exposed face of the concrete slab

The installation of fire protection materials should be done with anchors having the following properties:

�. The diameter should be limited to maximum M6, in order to reduce the heat sink effect through the steel anchor into the concrete. It is reported that thicker anchors can create a local spalling effect of the concrete. This local effect is only tempo-rary because the spalling will spread all over the surface once a small part of the concrete is directly exposed to fire.

2. The use of stainless steel anchors is recommended. Types that can be used are A4, 3�6, �.440� and �.457�. In some countries even higher requirements are applied, such as 1.4529.

3. If necessary a washer must be used to avoid a pull through effect when the system is exposed to dynamic loads

4. The anchors should be suitable for use in the tension zone of

concrete (cracked concrete)5. The anchors should be suitable for use under dynamic loads

Substantiation: Recent research and experience has indicated that the design fires that are currently being used to evaluate structural fire resistivity are not indicative of the potential fires in these facilities. The RWS curve is an inter-nationally recognized and accepted curve that provides a more challenging test that is more closely representative of the fires that could be experienced in road tunnels or on bridges. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Need to define where temperature reading is taken from in Table. In other words “flame temperature” or “ceiling temperature above the fire” etc.? Graphics to be added in Annex need to be made more legible with the ability to distinguish one curve from the other. 7.3.3 - Will this limit use to a single proprietary pre-cast product?

_______________________________________________________________ 502-34 Log #�2� Final Action: Reject (7.3, A.7.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Gary L. English, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.3 Protection of Concrete and Steel Structures. Regardless of tunnel length, all primary structural concrete and steel elements shall undergo a fire engineer-ing analysis to ensure that the tunnel structure can withstand the anticipated fire severity based on the type of traffic to be permitted. 7.3.� The structural lining passive fire protection system shall be low-mainte-nance, durable under normal service conditions, and have high light reflec-tance. 7.3.2 The passive fire protection system shall withstand standard operating pressure differentials (ventilation and traffic loads). 7.3.3 The passive fire protection system shall withstand thermal cycling due to hot (fire) and cold (hydrant) application. 7.3.4 The passive fire protection system shall be structurally stable under fire. 7.3.5 The passive fire protection system shall be resistant to water ingress and road spray. 7.3.6 The passive fire protection system shall be durable to detergent, high pressure washers and mechanical brush cleaning processes. A.7.3 Concrete and steel structural elements shall should be have a 4 hour fire resistance resistant rating in accordance with the time/temperature curve , for example, ANSI/UL �709 , with the fire duration design dependent on the perceived severity of the fire . Concrete and steel structural elements with a minimum fire resistance rating of 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL �709 should be permitted where the anticipated design fire size is 20 MW or less and flammable liquids in bulk (hazardous) cargo are prohibited from the tunnel. Structural tunnel lining constructed of cast in-situ and pre-cast concrete Tunnels with cast in-situ concrete structural elements should shall be protected such that the temperature of the concrete surface does not exceed 380°C (7�6°F) and explosive spalling does not occur during or after the defined fire exposure conditions. Active steel reinforcement contained in structural concrete tunnel linings shall be protected such that the temperature of the steel should not exceed 250°C (482°F) T he temperature of the steel reinforcement within the concrete [assuming a minimum cover of 25 mm (� in.)] should not exceed 250°C (482°F) under the same fire exposure conditions. Tunnels with pre-cast (high strength) concrete elements should be protected

Figure A.7.3(c)

Tem

pera

ture

(°C

)

1400

1200

1000

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Time (min)

800

600

400

200

0

TStandard

THydrocarbon

TRWS

TRABT/ZTV

Tgas, T1, +10m

502-�3

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 such that explosive spalling is eliminated under the defined fire exposure con-ditions. Tunnels with steel or cast iron linings should shall be similarly protected depending on the design fire size. Substantiation: We seek to update NFPA 502 to reflect the ongoing changes in European tunnel fire protection standards with the goal of creating an interna-tionally accepted code. The amendments to Section 7.3 were based on current standards employed in Europe as well as on recent research work undertaken by UPTUN. If substanti-ation, such as current European specifications, is required, we can provide it upon request. This information was provided by Ross Dimmock, Technical Director of UGC International, a division of Degussa Construction Chemicals. He also consulted with Professor Gabriel Alexander Khoury, UPTUN scientific Manager. The changes made to the first and second paragraphs of Annex A, Section 7.3, are also based on current best practice in Europe. Duration of design fires is normally two hours. A requirement of four hours seems onerous by interna-tional standards. In addition, if this clause were to be made more specific, a suggestion is to split the anticipated fire size/type of traffic into three catego-ries: �) Up to 50 MW (cars), 2) 50 to �50 MW (buses and trucks), and 3) +�50 MW (trucks with hydrocarbon goods). Passive fire protection systems could then be designed in accordance with the UL �709 time/temperature curve, with differing fire duration requirements based on the anticipated fire size/type of traffic. In regards to the changes made to the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of Annex A, Section 7.3, we believe that there should be no discrepancy between cast in-situ and pre-cast concrete tunnel linings, regardless of the physical properties of the concrete. Both types have to remain structural load-bearing structures during a fire. With respect to steel reinforcement, 25 mm (� in.) of cover is prescriptive, and we believe that there should be a performance criteri-on of max 250°C (482°F) regardless of concrete cover. Again, these suggestions are based on fire experience and standards from Europe. If further specific substantiation is required, it can be provided upon request. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Delete this proposal. The noted proposer did not propose this. Committee Statement: See Proposal 502-35 (Log #�29). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-35 Log #�29 Final Action: Reject (7.3, A.7.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Christine Mawby, Degussa Admixtures, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Section 7.3 Protection of Concrete and Steel Structures. Regardless of tunnel length, all primary structural concrete and steel elements shall undergo a fire engineering analysis to ensure that the tunnel structure can withstand the antici-pated fire severity based on the type of traffic to be permitted. 7.3.� The structural lining passive fire protection system shall be low-mainte-nance, durable under normal service conditions, and have high light reflec-tance. 7.3.2 The passive fire protection system shall withstand standard operating pressure differentials (ventilation and traffic loads). 7.3.3 The passive fire protection system shall withstand thermal cycling due to hot (fire)) and cold (hydrant) application. 7.3.4 The passive fire protection system shall be structurally stable under fire. 7.3.5 The passive fire protection system shall be resistant to water ingress and road spray. 7.3.6 The passive fire protection system shall be durable to detergent, high pressure washers and mechanical brush cleaning processes . Annex A Section A.7.3. Concrete and steel structural elements shall should be have a 4-hour fire resistance resistant rating in accordance with the time/temperature curve, for example, ANSI/UL �709, with the fire duration design dependent on the per-ceived severity of the fire . Concrete and steel structural elements with a minimum fire resistance rating of 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL �709 should resistance rating of 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL �709 should be permitted where the antici-pated design fire size is 20 MW or less and flammable liquids in bulk (hazard-ous) cargo are prohibited for the tunnel. Structural tunnel lining constructed of cast in-situ and precast concrete Tunnels with cast in situ concrete structural elements should shall be protected such that the temperature of the concrete surface does not exceed 380°C (7�6°F) and explosive spalling does not occur during or after the defined fire exposure conditions. Active steel reinforcement contained in structural concrete tunnel linings shall be protected such that the temperature of the steel should not exceed 250°C (482°F) The temperature of the steel reinforcement within the concrete [assum-ing a minimum cover of 25 mm (� in.)] should not exceed 250°C (482°F) under the same fire exposure conditions. Tunnels with precast (high strength) concrete elements should be protected

such that explosive spalling is eliminated under the defined fire exposure con-ditions. Tunnels with steel or cast iron linings should shall be similarly protected depending on the design fire size. Substantiation: We seek to update NFPA 502 to reflect the ongoing changes in European tunnel fire protection standards with the goal of creating an interna-tionally accepted code. The amendments to Section 7.3 were based on current standards employed in Europe as well as on recent research work undertaken by UPTUN. If substanti-ation, such as current European specifications, is required, we can provide it upon request. This information was provided by Ross Dimmock, Technical Director of UGC International, a division of Degussa Construction Chemicals. The changes made to the first and second paragraphs of Annex A, Section 7.3, are also based on current best practice in Europe. Duration of design fires is normally two hours. A requirement of four hours seems onerous by interna-tional standards. In addition, if this clause were to be made more specific, a suggestion is to split the anticipated fire size/type of traffic into three catego-ries: �) Up to 50 MW (cars), 2) 50 to �50 MW (buses and trucks), and 3) +�50 MW (trucks with hydrocarbon goods). Passive fire protection systems could then be designed in accordance with the UL �709 time/temperature curve, with differing fire duration requirements based on the anticipated fire size/type of traffic. In regards to the changes made to the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of Annex A, Section 7.3, we believe that there should be no discrepancy between cast in-situ and precast concrete tunnel linings, regardless of the physical prop-erties of the concrete. Both types have to remain structural load-bearing struc-tures during a fire. With respect to steel reinforcement, 25 mm (� in.) of cover is prescriptive, and we believe that there should be a a performance criterion of max 250°C (482°F) regardless of concrete cover. Again, these suggestions are based on fire experience and standards from Europe. If further specific substantiation is required, it can be provided upon request. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The language of this proposal is not enforceable. The committee is refining the way the standard addresses the issue of struc-tural integrity. See 502-3� (Log #92). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-36 Log #4 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.4 Fire Detection 7.4.� At least two systems to detect, identify, or locate a fire in a tunnel including one manual means shall be provided. The expected performance of such systems including details of the: �. Delay between ignition occurring and an alarm being initiated 2. Heat release rate of the fire which is required to trigger an alarm determined. The accuracy of the detected location for a fire and the actual location of a fire for a range of credible scenarios be documented and used in the formula-tion of emergency response plans, emergency ventilation, emergency evacua-tion and fire suppression system plans. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?)

502-�4

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhances NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise the language as follows: Add new sections: 7.4.�.� For systems other than manual systems, the performance of such sys-tems shall include details of the heat release rate or other fire signature required to initiate alarm. A.7.4.�.� The accuracy of the detected location for a fire and the actual loca-tion of a fire for a range of credible scenarios should be documented and used in the formulation of emergency response plans, emergency ventilation, emer-gency evacuation and fire suppression system plans. The analysis should also address the delay expected between ignition occurring and an alarm being initiated. Renumber the rest of the section accordingly. Committee Statement: The changed language addresses editorial restructuring of the language and clarifies the details of alarm initiation. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J._______________________________________________________________ 502-37 Log #CP2 Final Action: Accept (7.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise 7.4.� as follows: At least two systems to detect, identify, or locate a fire in a tunnel shall be provided, including one manual means meeting the requirements of 7.4.1.2 and either a CCTV system in accordance with 7.4.�.3 or an automatic fire detection system in accordance with 7.4.�.4. Substantiation: Clarifies the requirements for the types of fire detection sys-tems needed other than the manual system. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-38 Log #80 Final Action: Accept (7.4.11) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.4.1.1 Manual Double-Action Fire Alarm Boxes. Substantiation: NFPA 72 does not contain any definition and/or requirements for a “Manual Double-Action Fire Alarm Box”. The term is not used through-out the rest of this section of the standard. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-39 Log #CP�8 Final Action: Accept (7.6.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise Section 7.6.� to read as follows: Tunnels 90 m to 300 m in length shall be provided with a means to stop approaching traffic. Substantiation: The intent of the standard is not to require a fire alarm system in tunnels less than 800 ft in length. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-40 Log #�7 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.6.2(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Where it is not possible to provide such means in all traffic conditions the tun-nel shall be protected by a fixed fire suppression system. Substantiation: In cities tunnels can end in a large traffic system that is prone to traffic jams in busy periods. This backs into the tunnel and can lead to crash-es when vehicles suddenly have to stop. Longitudinal smoke ventilation cannot be used and rescue vehicles cannot access the tunnel. Only fire suppression can prevent fire spread to other vehicles. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise proposal as follows: 7.6.2

(3) Means shall be provided downstream of the fire site to expedite the flow of vehicles from the tunnel so that no traffic is queued downstream of the fire site. (a) Where it is not possible to provide such means in all traffic conditions the tunnel shall be protected by a fixed fire fighting system. (b) Where it is not possible to provide such means, under all traffic conditions, the tunnel shall be protected by a fixed fire-fighting system or other suitable means to establish a tenable environment to permit safe evacuation and emer-gency services access. Committee Statement: Agree with the submitter and further clarifies the requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Article 7.6.2(3)(a) can be deleted because the same is repeated in “b” below it. _______________________________________________________________ 502-4� Log #58 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.6.3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new 7.6.3: Long tunnels shall be provided with directional sound notification appliances to direct vehicles and pedestrians from stranded/stalled vehicles, to the safe exit. Substantiation: During emergencies vehicles (or pedestrians) may continue into an unsafe direction. Directional sounders provide powerful directional sound to lead them to safety. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add as a new A.7.�7 For tunnels in excess of 300 m consideration may be given to providing directional sound notification appliances to pedestrians from stranded/stalled vehicles, to the safe exit. Committee Statement: At this point the committee has not seen sufficient documentation to require these appliances in all tunnels. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-42 Log #CP�7 Final Action: Accept (7.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Delete 7.7. Substantiation: No requirement, and it is not necessary. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-43 Log #��4 Final Action: Accept (7.8) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.8 Standpipe , Fire Hydrants and Water Supply. Standpipe , fire hydrants and water supply system in road tunnels shall be provided in accordance comply with the requirements of Chapter 9. Substantiation: Specifies that a standpipe system AND fire hydrants are required for road tunnels. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-44 Log #5 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.10) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.�0 Fire sprinklers suppression systems Where it can be shown by engineering analysis that the level of safety can be equal or exceeded by the use of fixed fire suppression systems as part of an integrated approach to the management of safety, such systems shall be permit-ted in accordance with an engineering installation, inspection and maintenance schedule using the design parameters for a particular tunnel which demon-strates the level of performance provided by the suppression systems will be maintained. Where sprinklers are installed in road tunnels, the sprinkler system shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in accordance with NFPA �3.

502-�5

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise proposed language as follows: 7.�0* Fixed Fire Fighting Systems. 7.�0.� Where it can be shown by engineering analysis that the level of safety can be equal or exceeded by the use of fixed fire fighting systems as part of an integrated approach to the management of safety, such systems shall be permit-ted in accordance with an engineering installation, inspection and maintenance schedule using the design parameters for a particular tunnel which demon-strates that the level of performance provided by the fire fighting systems will be maintained. 7.�0.2 Where fixed fire fighting systems are installed in road tunnels, the fixed fire fighting system shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in accordance with NFPA ��, NFPA �3, NFPA �5, NFPA �6, NFPA �8, NFPA 25 and NFPA 750. Committee Statement: Agree with the submitter, editorial change to break out the requirements. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-45 Log #�3 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.10, Annex A and Annex D) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.10* Fire Sprinkler Fixed Fire Suppression (Fixed Fire Fighting) Systems . Where sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are installed in road tunnels, the sprinkler fixed fire suppression system shall be installed, inspected, and maintained in accordance with NFPA ��, NFPA �3 , NFPA �5, NFPA �6 and NFPA�8 . Annex A Explanatory Material A.7.10 For additional information on sprinkler fixed fire suppression system in road tunnels, see Annex D. Annex D Sprinkler Fixed Fire Suppression Systems in Road Tunnels This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. D.1 General. This annex provides considerations for the potential incorpora-tion of sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems in road tunnels. D.2 Expanded Definitions. D.2.1 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems. [Expanded definition will be inserted.] D.2. 2 Sprinkler System. For fire protection purposes, an integrated system of underground and overhead piping designed in accordance with fire protection engineering standards. The installation includes one or more automatic water supplies. The portion of the sprinkler system aboveground is a network of spe-cially sized or hydraulically designed piping installed in a building, structure, or area, generally overhead, and to which sprinklers are attached in a systemat-ic pattern. The valve controlling each system riser is located in the system riser or its supply piping. Each sprinkler system riser includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The system is usually activated by heat from a fire and discharges water over the fire area. [The above paragraph will be modified.]

D.2. 3 Deluge System. A sprinkler fixed fire suppression system (fixed fire-fighting) system employing open sprinkler nozzles attached to a piping system connected to a water supply through a deluge valve. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping system and discharges from all sprinkler nozzles attached thereto in a specific zone . [The above paragraph will be improved.] D.2.4 Water Mist System. [Expanded definition will be inserted.] D.2.5 Foam System. [Expanded definition will be inserted.] D.3 Background. The World Road Association (PIARC) addressed the subject of sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s in road tunnels in the reports pre-sented at the World Road Congresses held in Sydney (�983), Brussels (�987), and Montreal (�995). In addition, The subject of fixed fire suppression or fixed fire fighting systems (sprinklers) were addressed in PIARC’s technical reports titled Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels (�999) and Systems and Equipment for Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels (2003) and Road Tunnels: An Assessment of Fixed Fire Fighting Systems (2007). No European country currently uses sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems (fixed fire-fighting systems) on a regular basis. In some tunnels in Europe, sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s have been used for special purposes. In Japan, sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s are used in long or heavily trafficked tunnels. In the United States, only a few tunnels carrying hazardous cargo have some form of sprinkler fixed fire suppression system. Sprinkler Fixed fire suppression systems are not installed in road tunnels in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In Japan, sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are required in all tunnels lon-ger than �0,000 m (32,808 ft) and in shorter tunnels longer than 3000 m (9843 ft) with heavy traffic. In Norway two tunnels are equipped with dry water-based sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems. In both the 800 m (2625 ft) Válreng tunnel and the 3200 m (�0,500 ft) Fløyfjell tunnel, the sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems were designed to protect the lining material (polyure-thane and ethaphome). In Sweden, sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are used only in the Tegelbacken tunnel. [The above paragraph on world experience will be updated.] There are three five United States road tunnels that have been equipped with sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems: the Battery Street Tunnel in Seattle, Washington ; the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route � tunnel in Boston, MA, and the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island and Mt. Baker Ridge tunnels in Seattle, WA and the I-5 tunnel in Seattle, Washington . The decision to provide sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s in these tunnels was motivated solely by the fact that these tunnels were planned will to be operated to allow the une-scorted passage of vehicles carrying hazardous materials as cargo . See Table D�.�. See Table D.�.� on the following page The reason why most countries do not use sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems in tunnels is that most fires start in the motor room or in the compart-ment, and sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are of no use until the fire is open. Sprinkler Fixed fire suppression systems can be used, however, to cool down vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e., to dimin-ish the fire area and property damage), and to stop secondary fires in lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are effective in cooling down the area around the fire, so that fire fighting can be more effective. D.3.1 Currently, the use and effectiveness of sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems in road tunnels are not universally accepted. Although it is acknowl-edged that sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are highly regarded by fire protection professionals and fire departments in certain types of structures, there is much evidence to suggest that sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems are not only ineffective in controlling a fuel fire but can actually contribute to the spread of the fire. Furthermore, it is believed that road tunnel conditions cannot exploit sprinkler fixed fire suppression system ’s strengths and could turn most of their advantages into disadvantages. D.3.2 The major concerns expressed by tunnel designers and engineers world-wide (authorities) regarding fire fixed fire suppression system use and effec-tiveness include the following: �) Typically fires in road tunnels usually occur inside vehicles or inside pas-senger or engine compartments designed to be waterproof from above; there-fore, sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s would not have an extinguishing effect. 2) If any delay occurs between ignition and sprinkler fixed fire suppression system activation, a thin water spray on a very hot fire will produce large quan-tities of superheated steam without material suppressing the fire. This steam has the potential to be more damaging than smoke. 3) Tunnels are very long and narrow, often sloped laterally and longitudinal-ly, vigorously ventilated, and never subdivided, so heat normally will not be localized over a fire. 4) Because of stratification of the hot gas plume along the tunnel ceiling, a number of the activated fixed fire suppression systems would not, in all proba-bility, be located over the fire. A large number of the activated fixed fire sup-pression systems would be located away from the fire scene, producing a cool-ing effect that would tend to draw this stratified layer of smoke down toward the roadway level, thus impeding the rescue and firefighting effort.

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5) Water spraying from the ceiling of a subaqueous tunnel could suggest tun-nel failure and induce panic in motorists. 6) The use of sprinkler fixed fire suppression system s could cause the delamination of the smoke layer and induce turbulence and mixing of the air and smoke, thus further threatening the safety of persons in the tunnel. 7) Testing of a fire sprinkler fixed fire suppression system system on a peri-odic basis to determine its state of readiness is impractical and costly. D.3.3 Because of the concerns detailed in D.3.2, the use of sprinkler fixed fire suppression systems in road tunnels generally is not recommended. However, three recently commissioned U.S. road tunnels have been equipped with sprin-kler systems: the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route � tunnel in Boston, MA, and the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island and Mt. Baker Ridge tunnels in Seattle, WA. The decision to provide sprinklers in these tunnels will allow the unescorted passage of vehicles carrying hazardous materials as cargo. D.4 Recommendations. D.4.1 Application. The installation of sprinkler fixed fire suppression system systems should be considered applicable only where the passage of hazardous cargo is considered. However, even in these cases, the tunnel operator and the local fire department or authority having jurisdiction should consider the advantages and disadvantages of such systems as they apply to a particular tun-nel installation. D.4.2 Extinguishing Agent. AFFF (aqueous film-forming foam) systems should be considered for in-tunnel sprinkler fixed fire suppression system sys-tems in lieu of water-only systems. Water-only sprinkler fixed fire suppression system systems pose significant concerns where applied to roadway tunnels. The high water demand rate needs to be available from the local supply, and in-tunnel drainage piping, storage, and pumping systems all become much larg-er. Additionally, after deluge, the possibility of vapor explosion is dangerously increased. The strong cooling effect of a water-only system reduces the ability of the smoke to stratify at the ceiling, where it can be contained more easily by the tunnel ventilation system, and instead causes the smoke to spread over the cross section of the incident area. [The above paragraph will be updated.] D.4.3 Sprinkler Fixed Fire Suppression System. To help ensure against acci-dental discharge, the sprinkler fixed fire suppression system should be designed as a manually activated deluge system. The sprinkler fixed fire suppression system piping should be arranged using interval zoning so that the discharge can be focused on the area of incident without necessitating discharge for the entire length of the tunnel. Each zone should be equipped with its own propor-tioning valve set to control the appropriate water/foam mixture percentage. Sprinkler Fixed fire suppression system heads should provide an open deluge nozzles and be spaced so that coverage extends to roadway shoulders and, if applicable, maintenance/patrol walkways. The system should be designed with enough water and /or foam capacity to allow operation of at least two zones adjacent to the incident zone if the fire occurs in a “border” area. Zone length should be based on activation time as determined by the authorities having jurisdiction. Piping should be designed to allow drainage through heads nozzles after flow is stopped. D.4.4 System Control. It can be assumed that a full-time, attended control room is available for any tunnel facility in which safe passage necessitates the need for sprinkler fixed fire suppression system protection. Therefore, consid-eration should be given to human interaction in the sprinkler fixed fire suppres-sion system control and activation design to ensure against false alarm and accidental discharge. Any automatic mode of operation should include a dis-

charge delay to allow incident verification and assessment of in-tunnel condi-tions by trained operators. D.4.4.1 An integrated graphic display of the sprinkler fixed fire suppression system zones, fire detection system zones, tunnel ventilation system limits, and emergency access and egress locations should be provided at the control room to allow tunnel operators and responding emergency personnel to make initial response decisions. Substantiation: Annex D is out of date and requires a complete rewrite . Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise proposal as follows: A.7.�0 For additional information on fixed fire fighting systems in road tun-nels, see Annex D. D.2 Definitions. D.2.1 Fixed Fire Fighting Systems. Equipment permanently attached to a road tunnel which when operated has the intended effect of reducing the heat release and fire growth rates by being able to spread an extinguishing agent in whole or part of the tunnel using a network of pipes and nozzles. Examples of fixed fire suppression systems include sprinkler systems and deluge systems,. D.2.2 Sprinkler System. A fixed fire-fighting system designed to be activated by the fire itself so as to dispense water in the areas where it is needed to ensure rapid suppression of the fire. The sprinkler system is activated automati-cally nozzle by nozzle. The activation of a particular nozzle relies on the ther-mo-fusible bulb attached to it. Sprinkler systems are divided into three main types, namely the “wet” system, the “dry” system and the “alternate wet and dry” system. Once activated the system cannot be shutdown as long as water is being delivered to the system. For fire protection purposes, an integrated system of underground and overhead piping designed in accordance with fire protection engineering standards. The installation includes one or more automatic water supplies. The portion of the sprinkler system aboveground is a network of specially sized or hydraulically designed piping installed in a building, structure, or area, generally overhead, and to which sprinklers are attached in a systematic pattern. The valve control-ling each system riser is located in the system riser or its supply piping. Each sprinkler system riser includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The system is usually activated by heat from a fire and dis-charges water over the fire area. D.2.3 Deluge System. A fixed fire fighting system employing open nozzles attached to a piping system connected to a water supply through a deluge valve. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping system and discharg-es from all nozzles attached thereto in a specific zone. D.3 Background. The World Road Association (PIARC) addressed the subject of fixed fire fighting systems in road tunnels in the reports presented at the World Road Congresses held in Sydney (�983), Brussels (�987), and Montreal (�995). In addition, the subject of fixed fire suppression or fixed fire fighting systems (sprinklers) were addressed in PIARC’s technical reports titled Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels (1999) and Systems and Equipment for Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels (2003) and Road Tunnels: An Assessment of Fixed Fire Fighting Systems (2007). The reason why most countries were reluctant to use fixed fire fighting systems in road tunnels is that most fires start in the motor compartment of a vehicle, and fixed fire fighting systems are of limited use in suppressing the fire until the fire is out in the open. Fixed fire fighting systems can be used, however, to cool down vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e., to diminish the fire area and property damage), and to stop secondary fires in tun-

Table D1.1 Road Tunnel Fixed Fire Suppression Systems in the United States

Tunnel Location RouteOpened

toTraffic

LengthMeters(feet)

Bores/Lanes

Fixed FireSuppression

SystemType

SystemZones

Battery Street SeattleWashington

Battery Street �952 67�

(2,200) 2/4 DelugeWater ?

Mercer island SeattleWashington I-90 �989-�990 9�4

(3,000) 3/8 DelugeFoam 37

Mt. Baker Ridge SeattleWashington I-90 �989-�990 �,067

(3,500) 3/8 DelugeFoam 74

CANA Northbound BostonMassachusetts US � �990 470

(�,540) �/3 DelugeFoam �5

CANA Southbound BostonMassachusetts US � �990 275

(900) �/3 DelugeFoam 9

I-5 Tunnel SeattleWashington I-5 0000 000

(000) 0/0 DelugeFoam 0

Proposal 502-45 (Log #13)

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 nel lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that fixed fire fighting sys-tems have been extremely effective in cooling down the area around the fire, so that fire fighting can be performed more effectively. D.3.3 Because of the concerns detailed in D.3.2, the use of fixed fire fighting systems in road tunnels generally was not recommended in the past. However, there has been a change in that philosophy in recent years. There are now numerous countries that have, in recent years, installed fixed fire fighting sys-tems in road tunnels. This list of countries is led by Japan and Australia. In Australia deluge type fixed fire fighting systems are installed in all urban road tunnels while in Japan, fixed fire fighting systems are installed in long or heav-ily trafficked tunnels. In the United States there are currently five tunnels with some form of fixed fire fighting systems installed. Other counties that have installed or are about to install fixed fire fighting systems in road tunnels are: Austria, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. Committee Statement: This information even further updates the information in Annex D. See Committee Action on Logs 502-�43 (Log #35), 502-�44 (Log #36), 502-�45 (Log #37), 502-�46 (Log #38) and 502-�42 (Log #39) for revisions to D.4. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-46 Log #6 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.12.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.�2.5 The drainage collection system shall drain to a storage tank or transfer pumping station of sufficient capacity to receive, as a minimum, the simultane-ous rate of flow from two fire hoses in accordance with Chapter 9 and the con-tribution from the operation of any fixed fire suppression system , without causing flooding on the roadway. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 502-44 (Log #5). Committee Statement: Committee Action on Proposal 502-44 (Log #5) addresses this issue. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-47 Log #CP�2 Final Action: Accept (7.12.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise text as follows: 7.�2.5* The drainage collection system shall drain to a storage tank or trans-fer pumping station of sufficient capacity to receive, as a minimum, the simul-taneous rate of flow from two fire hoses in accordance with Chapter 9 and the contribution from the operation of any fixed fire fighting system , without causing flooding on the roadway.

Substantiation: Requires the consideration of the contribution of water from fixed fire fighting systems to the drainage system. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-48 Log #76 Final Action: Accept (7.13) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 7.13* Ancillary Facilities. All related ancillary facilities that support the operation of limited access highways shall be protected as required by all appli-cable NFPA standards and local building codes and shall not be subject to the provisions of this standard. Substantiation: Propose to delete this text in favor of adding amended text into Chapter 4 – General Requirements as the same language is repeated across several chapters as specific requirements. Additionally, the current text as it appears in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 creates a conflict within the standard as there are specific construction and fire protection requirements for the Operations Control Center (OCC), which is by definition an “ancillary facility”, contained in Chapter �2 of this standard that exceed those found in the building code and/or other NFPA standards for these types of occupancies. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-49 Log #72 Final Action: Accept (7.16) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 7.16 Emergency Response Plan. 7.16.1 A designated authority shall carry out a complete and coordinated pro-gram of fire protection that shall include written preplanned emergency response procedures and standard operating procedures. 7.16.2 Emergency procedures and the development of an emergency response plan shall be completed in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 12. Substantiation: The following text was extracted from Section 5.6 with simi-lar text also found in Section 6.9 and 7.�6. Move to Chapter 4 - General Requirements as these same requirements apply to all roadway configurations covered by this standard. See proposal to add new Section 4.4 Emergency Response Plan. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-50 Log #�06 Final Action: Accept (7.17, 7.17.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17 Emergency Means of Egress. 7.17.1 General. Emergency The means of egress requirements for all road tunnels and those roadways beneath air-right structures that the authority hav-ing jurisdiction determines are similar to a road tunnel shall be in accordance with NFPA �0�, Chapter 7 except as modified by this standard. 7.�7.2 through 7.�7.7. Substantiation: Change in paragraph title proposed to make application more global than just the exit portion of the means of egress. Additionally, compli-ance with NFPA �0�, Chapter 7 - Means of Egress should be addressed up front in this general charging statement. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-5� Log #94 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17 Emergency Means of Egress. 7.17.1 General. Emergency The means of egress requirements for all road tun-nels and those roadways beneath air-right structures that the authority having jurisdiction determines are similar to a road tunnel shall be in accordance with NFPA �0�, Chapter 7 except as modified by this standard. 7.�7.2 through 7.�7.7. Substantiation: Change in paragraph title proposed to make application more

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 global than just the exit portion of the means of egress. Additionally, compli-ance with NFPA �0�, Chapter 7 - Means of Egress should be addressed up front in this general charging statement. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Proposal 502-50 (Log #�06). Committee Statement: See Proposal 502-50 (Log #�06). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-52 Log #95 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.�7.2 Identification. Emergency exits and cross passageways shall be marked in accordance with Section 7.�0 of NFPA �0�. 7.�7.2* Tenable Environment. A tenable environment shall be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and in all means of egress. emergency exits and cross passageways. Substantiation: Move to existing text of 7.�7.2 to 7.�7.6 - Emergency Exits. Replace with text from 7.17.3.3. The requirements for identification of emer-gency exits seem more approximately location with the rest of the requirements for emergency exits. Also, the requirements for tenable environments within the means of egress seem more appropriately addresses in the general section. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Move the text and revise proposed language as follows: A tenable environment shall be provided in the means of egress during the evacuation phase. Committee Statement: The revised language provides better guidance on establishing the tenable environment along the means of egress and the time frame for which the tenable environment must be maintained. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-53 Log #4� Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.2.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jesus M. Rohena, FHWA Recommendation: Add new text to read: The distance between exits or crosspassages shall be clearly marked with reflectorized or lighted signs that show the distance to the nearest exit or cross-passage on the tunnels walls. Substantiation: During an emergency people need to find their way to the exits or crosspassages as fast as they can. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Renumber the paragraph 7.�7.�.� and revise. 7.�7.�.�* Reflectorized or lighted directional signs indicating the distance to the two nearest emergency exits shall be provided on the side walls at distances of no more than 25 m. A.7.�7.�.� Consideration should be given to the height of the sign above the walking surface (i.e. raised walkways or curbed walkways) as it effects the vis-ibility during a fire emergency. Committee Statement: Proposal 502-52 (Log #95) renumbered this section. The revised language provides specific guidance for the information of the signs and their location. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-54 Log #�04 Final Action: Accept (7.17.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 7.�7.3 Maintenance. The means of egress shall be maintained in accordance with NFPA �. Substantiation: The requirement to maintain the means of egress should be applied more globally than just focusing on the exit portion of the means of egress. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-55 Log #7 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.3.3)

_______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels 7.�7.3.3 Tenable environment A tenable environment shall be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and in all emergency exits and cross passage-ways while those portions of the tunnel that are involved in an emergency shall be managed so as to best ensure the tenable environment can be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and all emer-gency exits and cross passageways by managing the ventilation system and any fire suppression systems so as to minimize fire growth, minimize the discharge of noxious combustion products, and contain all, and where applicable dilute, combustions products so as enhance tenability of the environment. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Committee Action on Proposal 502-52 (Log #95) addresses the submitter’s concern. Committee Statement: Committee Action on Proposal 502-52 (Log #95) addresses the submitter’s concern. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Abstain: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Abstention: MAEVSKI, I.: The proposal is similar to log # 8; 9; �0; �� Rejected by the Committee due to insufficient material in support of the recent research of interrelationship between fire growth and ventilation. The proposal calls “ … by managing the ventilation system … so as to mini-mize fire growth…” The author refers to the studies in the UK Heriot_Watt University, which con-cluded that supply ventilation increases the fire heat release rate. Any ventila-tion increases the oxygen supply that increases the fire growth and possibly HRR. The proposed change to the standard may create an incorrect interpretation that Ventilation system is not required as it increases the fire growth rate. However this will contradict to Chapter 10 “Emergency Ventilation” requirements. _______________________________________________________________ 502-56 Log #�6 Final Action: Accept (7.17.3.3, A.7.17.3.3 and Annex B)

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc. Recommendation: Revise these sections as follows: Chapter 7 Road Tunnels

7.17.3.3* Tenable Environment. A tenable environment shall be provided in those portions of the tunnel that are not involved in an emergency and in all emergency exits and cross passageways.

Annex A Explanatory Material

A.7.17.3.3 For additional information on tenable environment in road tunnels, see Annex B. Some factors that should be considered in maintaining a tenable environment for periods of short duration can be defined as follows:

�) Air temperatures as follows: maximum of 60°C (�40°F) for a few seconds, averaging 49°C (�20°F) or less for the first 6 minutes of the exposure and decreasing thereafter.

2) Air carbon monoxide (CO) content as follows: a. maximum of 2000 ppm for a few seconds, b. averaging �500 ppm or less for the first 6 minutes of the

exposure, c. averaging 800 ppm or less for the first �5 minutes of the

exposure, d. averaging 50 ppm or less for the remainder of the expo-

sure.

3) These values should be adjusted for altitudes above 984 m (3000 ft).

4) CO generated during smoke conditions that does not exceed 800 ppm based on a 30-minute evacuation period. CO concentrations should decrease as the evacuation period increases.

5) Smoke obscuration levels that are continuously maintained below the point at which a sign illuminated at 80 lx (7.5 fc) or equivalent brightness for internally illuminated signs is discernible at 30 m (�00 ft), and doors and walls that are discernible at �0 m (33 ft).

6) Radiation heat flux as follows: maximum of 6305 W/m2 (2000 Btu/ft2/hr) for a few seconds, averaging �576 W/m2 (500 Btu/ft2/hr) or less for the first 6 minutes of the exposure, averaging 946 W/m2 (300 Btu/ft2/hr) for the remainder of the exposure.

7) Air velocities in the enclosed tunnel should be greater than or equal to 0.82 m/sec (150 ft/min) and less than or equal to 12 m/sec (2200 ft/min).

8) Noise levels as follows: maximum of ��5 dB for a few seconds, maximum of 92 dB for the remainder of the exposure.

Annex B Tenable Environment

This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for infor-mational purposes only.

B. 1 General. The purpose of this annex is to provide guidelines for the evaluation of tenability within the tunnel evacuation paths. Current technology is capable of analyzing and evaluating all unique conditions of each path to provide proper ventilation for pre-identi-fied emergency conditions. The same ventilating devices might or might not serve both normal operating conditions and pre-identified emergency requirements. The goals of the ventilation system, in addition to addressing fire and smoke emergencies, are to assist in the containment and purging of hazardous gases and aerosols such as those that could result from a chemical/biological release.

B.2 Environmental Conditions. Some factors that should be considered in maintain-ing a tenable environment for periods of short duration are defined in B.2.� through B.2.5.

B.2.1 Heat Effects. Exposure to heat can lead to life threat three basic ways:�) Hyperthermia2) Body surface burns3) Respiratory tract burns

For use in the modeling of life threat due to heat exposure in fires, it is neces-sary to consider only two criteria—the threshold of burning of the skin and the exposure at which hyperthermia is sufficient to cause mental deterioration and thereby threaten survival.

Note that thermal burns to the respiratory tract from inhalation of air containing less than �0 percent by volume of water vapor do not occur in the absence of bums to the skin or the face; thus, tenability limits with regard to skin burns normally are lower than for burns to the respiratory tract. However, thermal burns to the respiratory tract can occur upon inhalation of air above 60°C (�40°F) that is saturated with water vapor.

The tenability limit for exposure of skin to radiant heat is approximately 2.5 kW/m2. Below this incident heat flux level, exposure can be tolerated for 30 minutes or longer without significantly affecting the time available for escape. Above this

threshold value, the time to burning of skin due to radiant heat decreases rapidly according to equation (1).

tIrad = 4q -�.36 (�)

where:t = time in minutesq = radiant heat flux in kW/m2

As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of radiant heat over a period of time. The fraction equivalent dose (FED) of radiant heat accumulated per minute is the reciprocal of tIrad .

Radiant heat tends to be directional, producing localized heating of particular areas of skin even though the air temperature in contact with other parts of the body might be relatively low. Skin temperature depends on the balance between the rate of heat applied lo the skin surface and the removal of heat subcutaneously by the blood. Thus, there is a threshold radiant flux below which significant heating of the skin is prevented but above which rapid heating occurs.

Based on the preceding information, it is estimated that the uncertainty associated with the use of equation (1) is ± 25 percent. Moreover, an irradiance of 2.5 kW/m2 would correspond to a source surface temperature of approximately 200°C, which is most likely to be exceeded near the fire, where conditions are changing rapidly.

Calculation of the time to incapacitation under condition of exposure to con-vected heat from air containing less than �0 percent by volume of water vapor can be made using either equation (2) or equation (3).

As with toxic gases, an exposed occupant can be considered to accumulate a dose of convected heat over a period of time. The FED of convected heat accumu-lated per minute is the reciprocal of tIconv.

Convected heat accumulated per minute depends on the extent to which an exposed occupant is clothed and the nature of the clothing. For fully clothed sub-jects, equation (2) is suggested:

tlconv = (4.�*�08)T--3..6� (2)

where:tIconv = time in minutes T = temperature in °C

For unclothed or lightly clothed subjects, it might be more appropriate to use equation (3):

tlconv = (5.0*�07)T--3.4 (3)

where:itcmiv = time in minutes T = temperature in °C

Equations (2) and (3) are empirical fits to human data. It is estimated that the uncertainty is ± 25 percent

Thermal tolerance data for unprotected human skin suggest a limit of about �20°C (248°F) for convected heat, above which there is, within minutes, onset of considerable pain along with the production of burns. Depending on the length of exposure, convective heat below this temperature can also cause hyperthermia.

The body of an exposed occupant can be regarded as acquiring a “dose” of heat over a period of time. A short exposure to a high radiant heat flux or temperature gen-erally is less tolerable than a longer exposure to a lower temperature or heat flux. A methodology based on additive FEDs similar to that used with toxic gases can be applied. Providing that the temperature in the fire is stable or increasing, the total fractional effective dose of heat acquired during an exposure can be calculated using equation (4):

t2FED = ∑ (1/tIrad + �/tIconv) ∆t (4)

t1

Note �: In areas within an occupancy where the radiant flux to the skin is under 2.5 kW/m2, the first term in equation (4) is to be set at zero.

Note 2: The uncertainty associated with the use of this last equation would be dependent on the uncertainties with the use of the three earlier equations.

502-20

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 The time at which the FED accumulated sum exceeds an incapacitating thresh-

old value of 0.3 represents the time available for escape for the chosen radiant and convective heat exposures.

As an example, consider the following:�) Evacuees lightly clothed,2) Zero radiant heat flux,3) Time to FED reduced by 25 percent to allow for uncertainties in equa-

tions (2) and (3),4) Exposure temperature is constant,5) FED not to exceed 0.3.

Equation (3) and (4) can be manipulated to provide:

texp = (�.�25 x �07)T-3.4

where:texp is the time of exposure in minutes to reach a FED of 0.3

This gives the following results:

Maximum Exposure Time Exposure Temperature without Incapacitation

(°C) (°F) (minutes)

80 �76 3.875 �67 4.770 �58 6.065 �49 7.760 �40 �0.�55 �3� �3.650 �22 �8.845 ��3 26.940 �04 40.2

B.2.2 Air Carbon Monoxide Content. Air carbon monoxide (CO) content is as fol-lows:

�) Maximum of 2000 ppm for a few seconds2) Averaging ��50 ppm or less for the first 6 minutes of the exposure3) Averaging 450 ppm or less for the first �5 minutes of the exposure4) Averaging 225 ppm or less for the first 30 minutes of the exposure5) Averaging 50 ppm or less for the remainder of the exposure

These values should be adjusted for altitudes above 984 m (3000 ft).

B.2.3 Smoke Obscuration Levels. Smoke obscuration levels should be continu-ously maintained below the point at which a sign internally illuminated at 80 lx (7.5 ft-candles) is discernible at 30 m (�00 ft) and doors and walls are discernible at �0 m (33 ft).

B.2.4 Air Velocities. Air velocities in the enclosed tramway should be greater than or equal to 0.76 m/s (150 fpm) and less than or equal to 11.0 m/s (2200 fpm).

B.2.5 Noise Levels. Noise levels should be a maximum of ��5 dBa for a few sec-onds and a maximum of 92 dBa for the remainder of the exposure.

B.3 Geometric Considerations. Some factors that should be considered in establish-ing a tenable environment in evacuation paths are as follows.

1) The evacuation path requires a height clear of smoke of at least 2.0 m (6.56 ft). The current precision of modeling methods is within 25 percent. Therefore, in modeling methods a height of at least 2.5 m (8.2 ft) should be maintained above any point along the surface of the evacua-tion pathway.

2) The application of tenability criteria at the perimeter of a fire is imprac-tical. The zone of tenability should be defined to apply outside a bound-ary away from the perimeter of the fire. This distance will be dependent on the fire heat release rate and could be as much as 30 m (�00 ft).

B.4 Time Considerations. The project should develop a time-of-tenability crite-rion for evacuation paths with the approval of the authority having jurisdiction. Some factors that should be considered in establishing this criterion are as follows:

�) The time for fire to ignite and become established2) The time for fire to be noticed and reported3) The time for the entity receiving the fire report to confirm existence of

fire and initiate response4) The time for all people who can self-rescue to evacuate to a point of

safety5) The time for emergency personnel to arrive at the station platform6) The time for emergency personnel to search, locate, and evacuate all

those who can not self-rescue7) The time for fire fighters to begin to suppress the fire

If a project does not establish a time-of-tenability criterion, the system should be designed to maintain the tenable conditions indefinitely.

Substantiation: Currently Section 7.�7.33 Tenable Environment refers to Annex A (A.7.�7.33) and Section �0.4 Design Objectives refers to Annex B Temp and Velocity Criteria . Annex B also addresses the tenable environment. It is therefore proposed that all of this information be combined into one annex (Annex B Tenable Environment ) and rewritten based on work previously done by the NFPA �30 committee on elements of tenable environment. These proposed changes would result in Section 7.�7.33 Tenable Environment referring to Annex A (A.7.�7.33) which in turn will refer to Annex B Tenable Environment . Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Abstain: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Abstention: MAEVSKI, I.: To my opinion the action should be APR. I recognize that the proposal contains a lot of valid suggestions, however not all of them could be applied to road tunnels and are valid for NFPA 502. The proposal contains such language as “air velocities in the enclosed tramway..”; “the time for emergency personnel to arrive at the station platform..” that are not applicable to NFPA 502 and Road Tunnels. I will provide the revised language to this proposal, but cannot vote to Accept the way it is spelled out now. _______________________________________________________________ 502-57 Log #96 Final Action: Reject (7.17.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: Doors to the emergency exits in the means of egress, except cross passage-way doors , shall open in the direction of exit travel and comply with both the following criteria : (�) Open fully when a force not exceeding 222 N (50 lb) is applied to the latch side of the door. (2) Be adequate to withstand positive and negative pressures caused by pass-ing vehicles. Substantiation: A similar change was recently approved by the NFPA �30 TC regarding doors in the means of egress. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Creates a blanket exception for cross-passage doors. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-58 Log #97 Final Action: Accept (7.17.4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17.4.2 Horizontal sliding doors Doors to cross passageways shall be per-mitted to open in either direction in cross passageways. Substantiation: The proposed change to 7.�7.4.� captures the allowance for doors to swing in both directions in cross passageways. The additional text regarding horizontal sliding doors modifies NFPA �0� to allow these types of doors in the means of egress. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-59 Log #CP4 Final Action: Accept (7.17.4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add a new paragraph. Horizontal sliding doors shall have a sign identifying them as horizontal slid-ing doors and indicating the direction to open. Substantiation: Provides specific guidance on the operation of the doors. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-60 Log #98 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.4.3)

502-2�

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17.4.3 Doors shall be listed fire doors with a minimum � ½ -hour rating and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80. Substantiation: NFPA 101 requires a one and one-half hour fire resistance rated door when used in conjunction with 2-hour resistance rated construction. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Doors shall be listed fire doors with a minimum � ½ -hour rating in accordance with X.X.X, and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80. Committee Statement: The revised language identifies the specific fire tests that are applicable for the rating of these doors. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-6� Log #CP�� Final Action: Accept (7.17.4.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Cross passage doors and exit doors immediately adjacent to the roadway shall be � ½ hour rated doors tested in accordance with 7.3 and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80. Substantiation: The design fire size in 7.3 requires testing for doors to the same criteria. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-62 Log #99 Final Action: Accept (7.17.4.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17.4.4 Doors shall be equipped with hardware in accordance with NFPA �0�. Substantiation: The proposed revision to 7.�7.� already addresses compliance with NFPA �0�. Renumber remaining paragraphs accordingly. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-63 Log #42 Final Action: Reject (7.17.4.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jesus M. Rohena, FHWA Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: The force required to open the doors fully when applied to the latch side shall be as low as possible, but shall not exceed 222 N (50 Lb) 88.8 N (20 Lb). Substantiation: The force required to open the doors fully when applied to the latch side shall be as low as possible, but shall not exceed 20 lb to be consis-tent with the weight of the fire extinguishers. Elderly persons and others might not be able to operate a door rated to 50 lb. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Forces are not in correlation with other NFPA stan-dards. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-64 Log #�00 Final Action: Reject (7.17.4.5.6) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 7.17.4.5 The force required to open the doors fully when applied to the latch side shall be as low as possible, but shall not exceed 222 N (50 lb). 7.�7.4.6 Doors and hardware shall be designed to withstand positive and neg-ative pressures created by passing vehicles. Substantiation: This text moved in related proposal to modify 7.�7.4.�. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-57 (Log #96). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-65 Log #�0� Final Action: Accept (7.17.5)

_______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 7.�7.5 Maintenance. Emergency exits, cross passageways, and walkways shall be maintained to allow for their intended use. Substantiation: This text moved in related proposal to add new 7.�7.3 under general requirements for means of egress. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-66 Log #�02 Final Action: Accept (7.17.6.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 7.�7.6.2* Emergency exits shall conform to NFPA �0�, Chapter 7. Substantiation: The proposed revision to 7.�7.� already addresses compliance with NFPA �0�. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-67 Log #67 Final Action: Accept in Principle (7.17.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 7.17.7 Cross Passageways. Where tunnels are divided by a minimum of 2-hour fire-rated construction or where tunnels are in twin bores, cross passage-ways between the tunnels shall be permitted to be utilized in lieu of emergency exits. The following requirements shall be met: (�) Cross passageways shall not be farther than 200 m (656 ft) apart. (2) Openings in cross passageways shall be protected with self-closing fire door assemblies having a minimum of a � ½ -hour rating and shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 80. (3) An emergency egress walkway with a minimum clear width of � m (3.6 ft) shall be provided on each side of the cross passageways. (a) Walkways shall be protected from oncoming traffic by either a curb or a change in elevation or barrier. (b) Walkways shall be continuous the entire length of the tunnel, terminating at surface grade. (c) Raised walkways in tunnels shall have guards in accordance with 7.2.2.4 of NFPA �0�. (d) Intermediate rails shall not be required for walkway guards. (4) Where portals of the tunnel are below surface grade, surface grade shall be made accessible by a stair, vehicle ramp, or pedestrian ramp. Substantiation: NFPA 101 requires a one and one-half hour fire resistance rated door when used in conjunction with 2-hour resistance rated construction. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Accept the changes, but delete subparagraph (2). Committee Statement: The revised language identified has been addressed in 502-60 (Log #98) and is deleted here because the requirement is redundant. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-68 Log #40 Final Action: Reject (7.17.7.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jesus M. Rohena, FHWA Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: The distance between exits or crosspassages shall be established based on an engineering analysis using a computer software to model the evacuation of the tunnel during an incident. In no case that distance shall be more than the dis-tance provided in this standard. Substantiation: The distance between exits should be based on an analysis of the time required to evacuate the tunnel based on the specific characteristics of each tunnel. Since each tunnel could be different, the distance must be estab-lished after a good evacuation analysis is performed for the tunnel under con-sideration. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The proposal does not introduce the criteria to be used to establish the need for spacing less than currently identified. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-69 Log #CP5 Final Action: Accept (7.17.7(3))

502-22

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise the measurement “� m” to “�.�2 m”. Substantiation: More accurate conversion. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-70 Log #86 Final Action: Accept (8.2.1 through 8.2.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 8.2.1 The limits that an air-right structure imposes on the emergency accessi-bility and function of the roadway that is located beneath the structure shall be assessed. 8.2.2 Where an air-right structure encloses both sides of a roadway, it shall be considered a road tunnel for fire protection purposes and shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 7. 8.2.3 Where an air-right structure does not fully enclose the roadway on both sides, the decision to consider it as a road tunnel shall be made by the authority having jurisdiction after an engineering analysis in accordance with 4.3.�. Substantiation: Moved from Chapter 4 as these are specific to roadways beneath air-right structures. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-7� Log #�8 Final Action: Accept in Principle (8.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Where there is a risk that a fire could burn for more than 4 hours the fire rat-ing must be increased or the tunnel must be fitted with a fixed fire suppression system. Substantiation: Fires in the Mont Blanc and other tunnels burned for much longer than 4 hours. If the fire service is able to access the fire in its early stag-es the fire will be under control well within four hours. If access is impossible the fire will burn much longer until it runs out of fuel. A fire suppression sys-tem will prevent fire growth and enable access. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Do not change 8.4.�, instead add the following language: 8.4.�.�* An engineering analysis shall be prepared to determine acceptable risk to include possible collapse scenarios of the air–right structure(s). A.8.4.�.� Acceptable risks could be modified by increasing fire resistance and /or installing a fixed fire fighting system. Committee Statement: Proposal 502-86 (Log #9) changes 8.4.�, this change further requires analysis based on that change. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-72 Log #CP�0 Final Action: Accept (8.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise text of 8.4.� to read as follows: All structural elements that support air-right structures over roadways and all components that provide separation between air-right structures and roadways shall have a minimum 2 hour fire resistance in accordance with 7.3. Substantiation: Correlation with changes in 502-33 (Log #CP9). Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-73 Log #�9 Final Action: Accept in Principle (8.4.2)

_______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: 20 MW or less and trucks and flammable liquids in bulk. Substantiation: Fire tests in the Runehamer tunnel and heat release rate calcu-lations in the Mont Blanc tunnel have proven that a truck carrying a regular cargo can produce many times more than 20 MW in a tunnel fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log #�20). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log #�20). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-74 Log #��5 Final Action: Accept (8.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 8.9 Standpipe, Fire Hydrants and Water Supply. Where the roadway beneath air-right structure length is 90 m (300 ft) or greater, fire hydrants, standpipe and water supply systems shall be provided in accordance with the require-ments of Chapter 9. Substantiation: Specifies that a standpipe system and fire hydrants are required for roadways beneath air-right structures. This was not in previous NFPA 502 standards. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-75 Log #��� Final Action: Accept in Part (9.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 9.1 Standpipe Systems 9.1.1 Standpipe systems for road tunnels, bridges, depressed highways, ele-vated highways, roadways beneath air-right structures, and limited access high-ways shall be designed , and installed , inspected, and maintained as Class I systems in accordance with NFPA �4, except as modified by this standard. 9.1.1.1 Standpipe systems shall be inspected and maintained in accordance with NFPA 25. 9.1.2 The required flow rate for the a standpipe system equipped with only 100 mm (2½ in.) hose connections shall not be required to exceed 1920 L/min (500 gpm) in accordance with NFPA �4, unless approved by the authority having jurisdiction. 9.1.3 Standpipe systems shall be either wet or dry, depending on the climatic conditions, the fill times, the requirements of the authority having jurisdiction, or any combination thereof. The required flow rate for a standpipe system equipped with only 400 mm (4 in.) suction hose connections shall not be less than 3840 L/min (�000 gpm) at �.4 bar (20 psi) with two hose connections flowing simultaneously, unless approved by the authority having jurisdiction. Substantiation: Inspection and maintenance requirements are found in NFPA 25, not NFPA �4. Standpipe flow rates are covered in detail in NFPA �4. See 2003 NFPA �4 Section 7.�0. This is a related proposal that contains new requirement for a standpipe system having suction hose connections for fire department pumpers when used in lieu of fire hydrants. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part Do not accept the changes to 9.�.3. Committee Statement: The equivalent function can be accomplished by the present requirements. The proposed requirements are above and beyond NFPA �4. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: NFPA �4 allows for many different flow rates. This could put the required flow rate as high as 1250 gpm. My recommendation would be to retain 500 gpm as the minimum required flow rate, which flow rate would also work for combined systems if fixed fire suppression is used together with the standpipe system. The AHJ can then determine if more than (2) hose valves will be used and the designer can modify the criteria as required by the AHJ with �000 or �250 gpm being the limiting gpm for the standpipe system. NELSEN, J.: Given that 9.�.3 of this proposal was discarded when the pro-posal was accepted in part 9.�.2 should be edited by removing the phrase “equipped with only 100 mm (2 1/2 in.) hose connections” as this additional text is redundant. This change does not alter the intent of this requirement. _______________________________________________________________ 502-76 Log #�08 Final Action: Reject

502-23

Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 (9.1.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 9.1.4 Areas Subject to Freezing. 9.1.4.1 Where wet standpipes are required in areas subject to freezing condi-tions, the water shall be heated and circulated. , water shall be supplied to standpipes by the use of approved manually actuated pre-action or deluge valves installed in locations not subject to freezing, such as in underground vaults or other approved locations. 9.1.4.2 All piping and fittings that are exposed to freezing conditions shall be heat-traced and insulated. A pre-action or deluge valve actuation device (such as an electrical switch, push button, manual pull station, etc,) shall be installed at each hose connection location, and be protected from damage in a weather proof enclosure that can be opened without the use of tools or special knowl-edge, or with a standard hydrant wrench, or other approved method. 9.1.4.3 Heat trace material shall be listed for the intended purpose and super-vised for power loss. Access to the pre-action or deluge valves and manual actuation capability at the valve locations shall be provided. 9.1.4.4 A means to indicate that the system is in a tripped condition such as a light beacon or remote monitoring of the system shall be provided. Substantiation: The bulk of the deleted text is already found in NFPA �4. The proposed text provides a more practical and reliable alternative for installations in areas subject to freezing. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee recognizes the intent but preaction and deluge valves are not specific to this application and it does not appear that the language addresses the intent of the proposer. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-77 Log #��6 Final Action: Accept (9.1.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 9.�.5 Wet standpipe systems shall be provided with suitable interconnection and bypass valve arrangements to allow the isolation and repair of any segment without impairing the operation of the remainder of the system. Substantiation: This requirement appears in 2003 NFPA 14 subsection 6.2.2. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-78 Log #��7 Final Action: Accept (9.1.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 9.�.7 Dry standpipe systems shall be provisions for complete draining after use. Substantiation: This requirement appears in 2003 NFPA 14 Section 7.12. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-79 Log #��8 Final Action: Accept (9.1.9) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 9.�.9 Dry standpipes shall be installed in a manner that provides accessibility for inspection and repair. Substantiation: This requirement appears in 2003 NFPA 14 subsection 6.1.1. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-80 Log #��9 Final Action: Accept (9.1.10) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 9.�.�0 Standpipe systems shall be protected from damage by moving vehi-cles. Substantiation: This requirement appears in 2003 NFPA 14 paragraph 6.1.2.1. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6

Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-8� Log #�09 Final Action: Reject (9.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 9.3 Fire Department Connections. 9.3.1 Fire department connections shall be of the threaded two-way or three-way type or shall consist of one 100 mm (4 in.) quick-connect coupling that is readily visible and accessible to a fire department pumper. 9.3.2 Each independent standpipe system shall have a minimum of two fire department connections that are remotely located from each other. 9.3.2.1 Standpipe systems equipped with only 400 mm (4 in.) suction hose con-nections do not require fire department connections. 9.3.3 Fire department connections shall be protected from vehicular damage by means of bollards or other approved barriers. 9.3.4 Wherever possible, f Fire department connection locations shall be coor-dinated with emergency access and response locations and shall be approved by the authority having jurisdiction. Substantiation: Provides clarification on visibility and approved locations of connections. Additionally, addresses large diameter hose connections reflected in a separate proposal in lieu of fire hydrants. Committee Meeting Action: Reject See Committee Action on Proposal 502-75 (Log #���). Committee Statement: Committee Action on Proposal 502-75 (Log #���) rejected this concept. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Negative: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Negative: NELSEN, J.: The Committee Statement indicates that this proposal was rejected based on the Commmittee Action on Log #��� (Accept in Part) which was to discard the reference to 4 in. hose connections. In that regard, this pro-posal should have also been accepted in part by discarding 9.3.2.� which con-tains the reference to 4 inch hose connections while retaining the rest of the proposed amendments rather than being rejected in its entirety. _______________________________________________________________ 502-82 Log #��0 Final Action: Reject (9.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 9.4 Hose Connections. 9.4.� Hose connections shall be spaced so that no location on the protected roadway is more than 45 m (�50 ft) from the hose connection. 9.4.2 Hose connection spacing shall not exceed 85 m (275 ft). 9.4.3 Hose connections shall be located so that they are conspicuous and con-venient but still reasonably protected from damage by errant vehicles or van-dals. 9.4.4 Hose connections shall have 65 mm 2 �/2 in.) external threads in accor-dance with NFPA �963 and the authority having jurisdiction. 9.4.5 Hose connections shall be equipped with caps to protect hose threads. 9.4.� Hose connections shall be spaced so that no location on the protected roadway is more than 45 m (�50 ft) from the hose connection. 9.4.� General. 9.4.�.� Hose connections shall be located so that they are conspicuous and convenient but still reasonably protected from damage by errant vehicles or vandals. 9.4.�.2 Hose connection caps shall have a 3 mm (�/8 in.) hole for pressure relief and be secured with a short length of chain or cable to prevent falling after removal. 9.4.2 Road Tunnels, Depressed Highways, and Roadways Beneath Air Rights Structures. 9.4.2.� Road tunnels, depressed highways, and roadways beneath air rights structures shall be provided with hose connections in accordance with this sec-tion and 9.4.�. 9.4.2.2 Two-way (dual) hose connections with separate hose valves shall be provided at each required hose connection location. 9.4.4 9.4.2.3 Hose connections shall have 65 mm (2 �/2 in.) external threads in accordance with NFPA �963 and the authority having jurisdiction. 9.4.2.4 Hose connection spacing shall not exceed 85 m (275 ft). 9.4.2.5 Hose connections shall be spaced so that no location on the protected roadway is more than 45 m (�50 ft) from the hose connection. 9.4.3 Bridges and Elevated Highways. 9.4.3.�* Bridges and elevated highways shall be provided with hose connec-tions in accordance with this section and 9.4.�. A.9.4.3.� The �00 mm (4 in.) hose connections described in this section are provided in lieu of fire hydrants to allow for safer fire fighter working condi-tions for hose operations and access to hose valves and outlets on elevated structures. 9.4.3.2 Hose connections shall have �00 mm (4 in.) external threads in accor-dance with NFPA �963 and the authority having jurisdiction. 9.4.3.3 The spacing between hose connection outlets shall not exceed �50 m

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 (500 ft) unless approved by the authority having jurisdiction. 9.4.3.4 When median dividers and/or four or more traffic lanes are present, hose connections shall be provided on both sides of the roadway at the required spacing and be arranged on an alternating basis; OR shall be installed in the median dividers at the required spacing. 9.4.3.5 Hose connections shall be oriented parallel to the roadway and face in the direction of oncoming traffic where provided on the side(s) of the roadway. 9.4.3.6 Where hose connection outlets are installed in median dividers, dual outlets shall be required, facing in both directions of travel. 9.4.3.7 Hose connections shall be positioned such that the centerline of each outlet is installed not more than 400 mm (�6 in.) horizontally from the inside edge of the top and not less than 200 mm (8 in.) above the top of the guardrail or edge barrier, and not more than �370 mm (54 in.) above the roadway. 9.4.3.7.� When outlets are installed in median dividers that are more than 800 mm (32 in.) wide, the 400 mm (16 in.) from the inside edge requirement may be exceeded, and the outlets centered in the median divider. 9.4.3.8 Hose connections shall be provided with a cap that is removable with a standard hydrant wrench and be secured to prevent falling after removal with a short length of chain or cable. Substantiation: Provides additional guidance/clarification with respect to hose connection locations for various highway configurations. Committee Meeting Action: Reject See Committee Action on Proposal 502-75 (Log #���). Committee Statement: Committee Action on 502-75 (Log #���) rejected this concept. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Negative: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Negative: NELSEN, J.: The Committee Statement indicates that this proposal was rejected based on the Committee Action on Log ��� (Accept in Part) which was to discard the reference to 4 inch hose connections. In that regard, this pro-posal should have also been accepted in part by discarding A.9.4.3.� and 9.4.3.2 which contain the references to 4 inch hose connections while retaining the rest of the proposed amendments rather than being rejected in its entirety. _______________________________________________________________ 502-83 Log #�07 Final Action: Reject (9.7) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 9.7 Fire Hydrants. 9.7.� Fire hydrants shall be provided in accordance with NFPA �, except as modified by this standard or as approved by the authority having jurisdiction. 9.7.�.� In lieu of fire hydrants; road tunnels, depressed highways, and road-ways beneath air-right structures may be provided with standpipes having both �00 mm (2 �/2 in.) and 400 mm (4 in.) hose connections in accordance with Section 9.4. 9.7.�.�.� The two standpipe systems may be a combined standpipe system meeting the requirements of both systems. 9.7.2 The spacing between hydrants shall not exceed �50 m (500 ft), unless approved by the authority having jurisdiction. 9.7.2.� When median dividers and/or four or more traffic lanes are present, hydrants shall be provided on both sides of the roadway at the required spacing and be arranged on an alternating basis; or shall be installed in the median dividers at the required spacing. 9.7.3 The minimum required flow rate for a fire hydrant shall not be less than 3840 L/min (�000 gpm) at �.4 bar (20 psi) with two hydrants flowing simulta-neously. Substantiation: The standard is currently silent on the subject of fire hydrants on highways. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: There are numerous questions regarding the impact on drainage, and cumulative water supplies that are not addressed in this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �5 Negative: � Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Explanation of Negative: NELSEN, J.: I am still concerned that the standard is silent with respect to water supplies for firefighting. _______________________________________________________________ 502-84 Log #8 Final Action: Reject (10.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter �0 - Emergency Ventilation �0.� General Emergency ventilation systems and tunnel operating procedures shall be developed to maximize the use of the road tunnel ventilation system for the control of fire growth, the removal and control of smoke and heated gases that result from fire emergencies within the tunnel. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not

characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: While the committee recognizes that recent research and experience suggests an interrelationship between fire growth and ventila-tion, there is insufficient material in support of this proposal to accept it at this time. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-85 Log #44 Final Action: Reject (10.1.1.3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jesus M. Rohena, FHWA Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: The tunnel operator shall conduct a real fire test inside the tunnel before opening the tunnel to traveling public to test the emergency ventilation. The fire size used shall be as approved by the authority having jurisdiction. The fire drill shall be conducted in cooperation with the fire department. Substantiation: To effectively test the emergency ventilation systems a real fire shall be conducted in the tunnels. To train the tunnel operator and fire department on the procedures to effectively fight a tunnel fire, and to verify the ventilation system design. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee agrees with the submitter that this exercise should be conducted however, the proposal does not provide sufficient instructions regarding fire size and fire location and test objectives for this to be enforceable. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-86 Log #9 Final Action: Reject (10.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter �0 - Emergency Ventilation �0.2 Smoke Control �0.2.� The emergency ventilation system shall provide a means for control-ling smoke. �0.2.2 In all cases, the desired goal shall be to provide an evacuation path for motorists who are exiting from the tunnel, to control fire growth rate and to facilitate fire fighting operations. �0.2.3 In tunnels with bidirectional traffic where motorists can be on both sides of the fire site, the following objectives shall be met: (�) Fire growth rate shall be minimized; (2) Smoke stratification shall not be disturbed (3) Longitudinal air velocity shall be kept at low magnitudes (4) Smoke extraction through ceiling openings or high openings along the tun-nel walls(s) is effective and shall be considered. �0.2.4 In tunnels with unidirectional traffic where motorists are likely to be located upstream of the fire site, the following objectives shall be met: �. Longitudinal systems

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 (a) Minimize fire growth rate; (a) (b) Prevent backlayering by producing a longitudinal air velocity that was greater than the critical velocity of direction of traffic flow ; (b) (c) Avoid disruption of the smoke layering initially by not operating jet fans that are located near the fire site. Operate fans that are farthest away from the site first. (2) Transverse or reversible semi transverse systems. (a) maximize the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone Manage the exhaust rate in the ventilation zone so as to minimize the fire growth rate in the area that contains the fire and minimize the amount of inside air that is introduced by transverse systems. (b) Create a longitudinal air flow in the direction of the traffic flow by oper-ating the upstream ventilation zone(s) in maximum supply and the down stream ventilation zone(s) in maximum of the exhaust. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: While the committee recognizes that recent research and experience suggests an interrelationship between fire growth and ventila-tion, there is insufficient material in support of this proposal to accept it at this time. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-87 Log #�0 Final Action: Reject (10.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter �0 - Emergency Ventilation �0.4 Design objectives The design objectives of the emergency ventilation system shall be to mini-mize fire growth rate, control, extract, or to control and extract, smoke and heated gases as follows: (�) A stream of non contaminated air is provided to motorists in a path of egress away from the fire (see Annex B). (2) Longitudinal air flow rates are produced by the backlayering of smoke in a path of egress away from the fire (see Annex C). Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation

of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: While the committee recognizes that recent research and experience suggests an interrelationship between fire growth and ventila-tion, there is insufficient material in support of this proposal to accept it at this time. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-88 Log #�� Final Action: Reject (10.5.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter �0 - Emergency Ventilation �0.5.� The design fire size [heat–release rate produced by a vehicle(s)] shall be used to design the emergency ventilation system. �0.5.�.� Consideration should be given to using different design fire sizes for different design questions. The design fire for structural integrity may be a dif-ferent design fire to that used for emergency evacuation. Because the rate of growth of a fire is critical to the tenability of a tunnel and users ability to escape criteria including rate of growth of a fire may be considered as part of the engineering design process for the tunnel. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: While the committee recognizes that recent research and experience suggests an interrelationship between fire growth and ventila-tion, there is insufficient material in support of this proposal to accept it at this time. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-89 Log #93 Final Action: Accept (10.10)

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Add new text to read: 10.10 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Intrusion 10.10.1 General . Prevention of accidental intrusion of flammable and com-bustible liquids due to spills shall be provided in accordance with 10.10.2 through �0.�0.3. 10.10.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for venti-lation of tunnels shall not terminate at grade on any vehicle roadway. 10.10.3 Median and Sidewalk Terminations. Vent and fan shafts shall be per-mitted to terminate in the median strips of divided highways, on sidewalks designed to accept such shafts, or in open space areas provided that the grade level of the median strips, sidewalk, or open space meets the following condi-tions: (�) Is at a higher elevation than the surrounding grade level (2) Is separated from the roadway by a concrete curb at least �52.4 mm (6 in.) in height Substantiation: New text to address potential for flammable or combustible liquids intrusion into tunnels via ventilation system features. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-90 Log #45 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: The electrical systems of long tunnels and of dual level bridges shall be capa-ble of being monitored and controlled at each end. Substantiation: Due to security events or other catastrophic events, a facility monitoring and control room may become untenable thereby making it neces-sary to relocate operational control to the alternative control room. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise proposal and renumber it as a new ��.5.� The electrical systems of tunnels and dual level bridges in excess of �000 m in length shall have redundant facilities for the purpose of monitoring and control. Renumber rest of section accordingly. Committee Statement: Clarifies the submitter’s intent and moves it to the sec-tion on Reliability. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-9� Log #CP7 Final Action: Accept (11.1.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add new text to read: ��.�.3 The fire and life safety electrical systems shall be designed and installed to resist lateral forces induced by earthquakes (seismic forces) in the appropriate seismic zone and continue to function after the event. A.��.�.3, Guidance for seismic protection can be found in the following doc-uments: AISC 325 LRFD Manual of steel construction ASTM 580 Application of ceiling suspension systems for acoustical tile and lay-in panels in areas requiring moderate seisimic restraint IEEE 693-�984 Recommended Practices for Seismic Design of Substations USACE TI 809-04 Seisimic design for buildings UL �598 Luminaires Substantiation: It is necessary to provide protection for these systems installed in earthquake zones. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-92 Log #52 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.1.3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.�.3: The electrical systems shall be designed for concurrent maintenance and operations. Substantiation: There is a need to design the distribution systems so that rou-tine maintenance may be safely performed without a total shutdown of the bridge or tunnel operations. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Renumber as a new ��.5.2 and revise as follows: The electrical systems shall be designed to allow for routine maintenance

without disruption of traffic operation. Renumber the rest of the section accordingly. Committee Statement: Clarifies the operations to run concurrently and places the provision under Reliability. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-93 Log #48 Final Action: Reject (11.1.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.�.4: The electrical systems shall be designed and installed with equipment and materials that do not emit products of combustion into public ways of travel or into manned operational areas. Substantiation: There is a need to recognize limiting smoke and combustion products from electrical equipment into manned operational areas that could otherwise function on alternative services. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: Addressed in proposals 502-99 (Log #�23) and 502-98 (Log #�28). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-94 Log #47 Final Action: Reject (11.1.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.�.5: The electrical systems shall be designed to be operated according to the skill level and personnel of staff actually attending to the facility. Substantiation: Complex electrical systems may be inoperable during a failure of a normal source due to the inability of on-site staff to perform essential interlocking sequences installed on switchgear and generators. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: It is not the intent of NFPA 502 to address the qualifi-cations of those involved in normal tunnel system operations and maintenance. Chapter �2 addresses individuals involved in emergency operations. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-95 Log #46 Final Action: Accept (11.1.6 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.�.6: The electrical single-line diagram shall be posted within the main electrical room, it shall include utility short-circuit duty, all generating sources, all UPS, and interlocking schemes, and other data per IEEE standards for single-line diagrams. Substantiation: During switching operations the single-line diagram needs to be readily available on-site. Short-circuit duty information is needed for assur-ance that field installed equipment meets the duty. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-96 Log #53 Final Action: Accept (11.1.8 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.�.8: Labels, or tags, shall be affixed to switchboards, panelboards, and motor con-trollers indicating the details of electrical inspection: Date, Inspection Organization, and Type of Inspection. Substantiation: Safety and reliability concerns merit that staff have assurance that the electrical equipment is maintained in satisfactory order. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-97 Log #54 Final Action: Accept (11.2.1 (New) )

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.2.�: Labels, or tags, shall be affixed to essential circuit feeders indicating the details of electrical inspection: Date, Inspection Organization, Type of Inspection (Insulation Resistance or Hi-Hot) Substantiation: Safety and reliability concerns merit that staff have assurance that essential feeders are maintained in satisfactory order. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-98 Log #�28 Final Action: Accept (11.3.2.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Add the following text: ��.3.2.� Cables installed in confined spaces shall be low toxicity, low smoke and zero halogen and meet the following: (�) Low toxicity with a toxicity index less than 2.0 when tested to NES (Navel Engineering Standard) 7�3. (2) Low smoke by cables that are listed for —ST� by UL and CSA. (3) Zero halogen by cables that have a halogen content less than 0.2 percent per MIL-C-24643. (4) Low acid gas by cables that have less than 2 percent acid gas content per MIL-C-24643. Substantiation: Section ��.3.2 indicate materials that are low in toxicity, and ��.3.3 indicates no PVC. Low smoke and zero halogen materials are readily available that would be low toxicity and low acid gas, and not PVC. Standard test methods are listed for these properties. Note —ST� was formerly —LS for UL, and UL and CSA have harmonized on the —ST� mark. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-99 Log #�23 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.3.3.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Add the following text: ��.3.3.� Consideration should be given to cables that are low toxicity, low smoke and zero halogen for tunnels, ducts, plenums, and other enclosed spaces. (�) One method of determining low toxicity is by a toxicity index less than 2.0 when tested to NES (Navel Engineering Standard) 7�3. (2) One method of determining low smoke is by cables that are listed for —ST� by UL and CSA. (3) One method of determining zero halogen is by cables that have a halogen content less than 0.2 percent per MIL-C-24643. (4) One method of determining low acid gas is by cables that have less than 2 percent acid gas content per MIL-C-24643. Substantiation: Section ��.3.2 and ��.3.3 indicate a preference for materials that are low in toxicity and not PVC. Low smoke and zero halogen materials are readily available that would be low toxicity and low acid gas, and not PVC. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Move to A.��.3.3. Committee Statement: This is more appropriate as Annex language. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�00 Log #�27 Final Action: Reject (11.3.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Revise text as follows: All insulations shall conform to NFPA 70 and shall be of the moisture-resis-tant and heat-resistant types , such as Type RHW, RHW-2, XHHW or XHHW-2, with temperature ratings that correspond to the conditions of application. Substantiation: The NEC Types which are moisture and heat resistant, and not PVC (since this is not allowed by ��.3.3) from Table 3�0.�3 of the NEC are Type RHW, RHW-2, XHHW or XHHW-2. This makes it clearer which NEC types are suitable. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The requirement is clear regarding moisture-resistant cable, this language would be limiting and does not add to the requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Disagree with rejection. Cable types allowed should be included similar to what was done in Log �24.

_______________________________________________________________ 502-�0� Log #�24 Final Action: Accept (11.3.4.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Add new text as follows: ��.3.4.� All insulated conductors or cables suitable for wet locations shall meet one of the following conditions: (�) Moisture-impervious metal-sheath (2) Type RHW, RHW-2, XHHW or XHHW-2 (3) Of a type listed for wet locations. Substantiation: This proposal might be better in ��.3.5 “Conductors” but is also related to ��.3.4. This is meant to clarify that there are cable types that meet the moisture requirements of 11.3.4 but are not listed in the insulation column of Table 3�0.�3 of the NEC. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�02 Log #�26 Final Action: Reject (11.3.5.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Revise text as follows: Conductors in a raceway or cable shall not be installed exposed or surface mounted in air plenums that carry elevated air temperatures unless conductors or cables are a listed fire resistive cable in accordance with (new) ��.2.� . Substantiation: When retrofitting older tunnels sometimes running conduits or cables in the plenum area is the only options. A listed fire resistive would not be damaged by elevated air temperatures. This is similar wording that NFPA �30 has approved in their ROP and ROC process. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The acceptance of this proposal would require an anal-ysis of the fires and other systems in a tunnel that would impact this installa-tion. The present language would permit arrangements that are not capable of meeting new design fire guidelines in 7.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�03 Log #5� Final Action: Reject (11.3.6 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.3.6: Electrical circuit protective systems (UL FHIT) shall be installed for essential power and control circuits. Substantiation: Circuits designed to UL FHIT Electrical Circuit Protective Systems are designed to function upon fire exposure. Selected circuits for power and control need to operate during fire exposure for complete smoke control. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The acceptance of this proposal would require an anal-ysis of the fires and other systems in a tunnel that would impact this installa-tion. The present language would permit arrangements that are not capable of meeting new design fire guidelines in 7.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: The Committee statements are not clear to me. Also the intent of the proposals needs to be clarified and the proposed inclusion further justi-fied. Recommend that these be revisited at the ROC meeting in Seattle. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�04 Log #�03 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 11.4* Power Source. The power source for all systems shall be of a capacity and configuration commensurate with the purpose of the system. Emergency Power. Road tunnels shall be provided with Class I, Type 60 emergency power in accordance with Article 700 of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code®, and NFPA ��0, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems. 11.4.1 The primary and secondary sources shall be wired to system equipment so that a single event or fire produces a minimum effect on the operation of the overall system. The following systems shall be provided with reliable power for a fire connected to the emergency power system: (�) Emergency Lighting (2) Lighting for means of egress and areas of refuge Traffic control (3) Exit signs (4) Communication

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 (5) Tunnel drainage and fire pump(s) (6) Ventilation during a fire emergency 11.4.2 The emergency power system shall have a capacity and rating sufficient to supply all equipment required to be connected by 11.4.1. 11.4.3 Selective load pickup and load shedding shall be permitted in accor-dance with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code®. Substantiation: The current language does not address the need to conform to NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add (7) Fire detection. Committee Statement: This was missing from the list. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: Add “Fire Protection” (such as deluge valve controls etc.) to the list. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�05 Log #50 Final Action: Accept in Part (11.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new items: (7) security (8) Closed circuit television or video (9) Public address Substantiation: Security needs to be maintained during emergency to prevent unauthorized access to essential operating locations. CCTV and PA needs are vital for safe evacuation operations in emergency. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Part Do not include (9) Public Address. Committee Statement: Public address is considered communications as iden-tified in item (4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�06 Log #�25 Final Action: Reject (11.4.1.2 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Add new text as follows: 11.4.1.2 Fire resistive cable used for the requirements listed in Section 11.4 shall be listed, having a minimum �-hour fire resistive rating in accordance with UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements. Substantiation: Throughout this document there are requirements for the elec-trical system to operate during a fire emergency. General wiring types specified in ��.3.4 only last a few minutes in a fire even when installed in rigid steel conduit. Fire resistive cables, tested in accordance with UL 2�96, are a proven method of fire protection for critical circuit required in NFPA 70, NFPA 72, and NFPA 20. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The acceptance of this proposal would require an anal-ysis of the fires and other systems in a tunnel that would impact this installa-tion. The present language would permit arrangements that are not capable of meeting new design fire guidelines in 7.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: See my Comment on Affirmative for Proposal 502-�03 (Log #5�). _______________________________________________________________ 502-�07 Log #49 Final Action: Reject (11.4.2 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.4.2: Electric fire pump controllers shall be supplied according to the circuiting and equipment recommendations in NEMA ICS 14-2001 Application Guide for Electrical Fire Pump Controllers. Substantiation: Standard circuit arrangements and consistent calculation pro-cedures are necessary to achieve reliable sources for electric fire pump control-lers, as detailed in the NEMA ICS �4-200�. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: This requirement is outside the scope of this commit-tee. It is suggested that this subject be submitted to the TC on the NEC or Fire Pumps. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�08 Log #CP�6 Final Action: Accept (11.4.2 (New) )

_______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add a new ��.4.2. Supply circuits shall remain functioning during a �-hour fire exposure when tested in accordance with the time/temperature curve in 7.3.2. Substantiation: Consistency in fire resistive requirements in tunnel systems. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�09 Log #56 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.5.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.5.5: The reliability of the system shall be verified by a short-circuit and coordina-tion study, for normal circuits and alternative circuits. The initial study shall be verified every 5 years. Substantiation: Problems occur due to improper selection of equipment to withstand fault conditions and isolate faulted circuits while maintaining power to the balance of the system. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add as a new A.��.5: The reliability of the system should be verified by a short-circuit and coordi-nation study, for normal circuits and alternative circuits. The initial study should be verified every 5 years. Committee Statement: This is more appropriate as a suggested study rather than a requirement. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��0 Log #CP�9 Final Action: Accept (11.5.5.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add a new Section ��.5.5.5 Conductors in manholes shall be protected from spillage of flammable liquids or fire fighting products by the installation of manhole covers with sealing and locking capability. Substantiation: Coordination of requirements for spill protection. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��� Log #55 Final Action: Accept in Principle (11.6.8 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new ��.6.8: Exit signs shall comply with NEMA LSD-�3-200�. “Exit Sign Brightness for Visibility and Safety?” Substantiation: NEMA Lighting Systems Division recommends standards of exit sign brightness and visibility based upon research in fire and smoke condi-tions. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle ��.6.8 Externally illuminated exit signs shall be illuminated by not less than 5 foot-candles and employ a contrast ratio of not less than 0.5. ��.6.8.� Internally illuminated exit signs shall produce a minimum luminance of 8.6 cd/m 2 . Committee Statement: The revision takes the recommendations of the NEMA document and makes it enforceable language. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��2 Log #�22 Final Action: Reject (11.6.8 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: James Conrad, Tyco Thermal Control Recommendation: Add a new ��.6.8 as follows: Cables for emergency lighting and power to emergency lighting shall be pro-tected from fire by the use of fire rated cables listed for � hour to UL 2�96 or by a minimum cover of 2 in. of concrete. Substantiation: This clarifies the methods to be used for fire protecting these emergency circuits and their power supply. Note, 2 in. of concrete is listed as a � hour barrier in the NEC. Given some of the commentary in NFPA 502, a 2 hour cable and a thicker concrete may be appropriate. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The acceptance of this proposal would require an anal-ysis of the fires and other systems in a tunnel that would impact this installa-

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 tion. The present language would permit arrangements that are not capable of meeting new design fire guidelines in 7.3. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. Comment on Affirmative: MACEDO, C.: See my Comment on Affirmative for Proposal 502-�03 (Log #5�). _______________________________________________________________ 502-��3 Log #57 Final Action: Accept in Principle (12.2.2 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: R. G. Irvine, Suffern, NY Recommendation: Add new �2.2.2: Extraordinary Incidences. Building protection from airborne chemical, bio-logical, and radiation attacks shall be considered. Substantiation: Due to the September ��, 200� attack, the Federal NIOSH publication 2002-�39 “Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiation Attacks” recommends engineering steps to be implemented in design and operational procedures. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Add a new A.�2.5 as follows Federal NIOSH publication 2002-�39 “Guidance for Protecting Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiation Attacks” rec-ommends engineering steps to be implemented in design and operational pro-cedures for Extraordinary Incidences which include building protection from airborne chemical, biological, and radiation attacks. Committee Statement: The language is better presented in the Annex as a rec-ommendation. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��4 Log #63 Final Action: Accept (12.3(8)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 12.3* Emergency Response Plan. The emergency response plan shall be submitted for acceptance and approval by the authority having jurisdiction and shall include, as a minimum, the following: (8) Purpose and operation of central supervising station operations control center and alternate location(s), as applicable central supervising station. Substantiation: The NFPA �30 TC recently approved a corresponding change to that standard. See related proposal to modify 3.3.8. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��5 Log #62 Final Action: Accept (12.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 12.5 Central Supervising Station (CSS). Operations Control Center (OCC). Subsections �2.5.� through �2.5.8 shall apply where the facility has a central supervising station operations control center for the operation and supervision of the facility. 12.5.1 The CSS OCC shall be staffed by qualified, trained personnel and shall be provided with the essential apparatus and equipment to communicate with, supervise, and coordinate all personnel. 12.5.2 The CSS OCC shall provide the capability to communicate rapidly with participating agencies. 12.5.3 – No change 12.5.4 – No change 12.5.5 CSS OCC personnel shall be thoroughly familiar with the emergency procedure plan and shall be trained to implement it effectively. 12.5.6 An alternate site(s) that can function efficiently during an emergency in the event that the CSS OCC is out of service shall be selected and equipped, or equipment shall be readily available. Alternate location(s) shall be provided in the event the OCC is out of service for any reason and shall be equipped or have equipment readily available to function as required by the operating agen-cy. 12.5.7* The CSS OCC shall be located in an area that is separated from other occupancies by construction that has a 2-hour fire resistance rating. 12.5.8 The CSS OCC shall be protected by fire detection, fire protection, and fire-extinguishing equipment to provide early detection and suppression of fire in the OCC CSS. Substantiation: The NFPA �30 TC recently approved a corresponding change to that standard. See related proposal to modify the definition found in 3.3.8. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6

Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��6 Log #64 Final Action: Accept (12.7.2, 12.7.5) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 12.7.2 When it is necessary to invoke the emergency procedure plan, a com-mand post shall be established by the incident commander for the supervision and coordination of all personnel, equipment, and resources at the scene of the emergency. 12.7.3 The command post shall be located at a site that is convenient for responding personnel, easily identifiable, and suitable for supervising, coordi-nating, and communicating with participating agencies. 12.7.4 Each participating agency shall assign a liaison to the command post. 12.7.5* The command post shall be readily identified and visible at all times. A.12.7.5 Effective use should be made of radio, telephone, and messenger ser-vice to communicate with participating agencies. Substantiation: It is unnecessary to go into detail regarding the implementa-tion of the Incident Management and/or the establishment of a Command Post in this standard as the user is directed to follow NFPA �56�. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��7 Log #65 Final Action: Accept (12.7.8, 12.8.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Delete the following text: 12.8 Auxiliary Command Post. 12.8.1 Where necessary, the incident commander shall establish an auxiliary command post. 12.8.2 Where necessary, a participating agency that is not in command shall establish an auxiliary command post to assist with the supervision and coordi-nation of its personnel and equipment. Substantiation: It is unnecessary to go into detail regarding the implementa-tion of the Incident Management and/or the establishment of a Command Post in this standard as the user is directed to follow NFPA �56�. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��8 Log #CP6 Final Action: Accept (12.9.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise as follows �2.9.2 Qualified personnel shall be thoroughly trained and familiar with in all aspects of the emergency procedure plan i ncluding operation of mechanical, electrical and fire and life safety systems . Substantiation: Clarifies the intent of the standard regarding the level of quali-fications of the operators. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-��9 Log #43 Final Action: Reject (12.9.3.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Jesus M. Rohena, FHWA Recommendation: Add new text to read as follows: The tunnel operator shall conduct a real fire test inside the tunnel to train tun-nel personnel. The fire size used shall be as approved by the authority having jurisdiction. The fire drill shall be conducted in cooperation with the fire department, police and any others responsible to assist during an emergency. Substantiation: To effectively test the procedures of the emergency response plan under real fire conditions. Committee Meeting Action: Reject Committee Statement: The committee action on Proposal 502-85 (Log #44) contains the same guidance necessary for adjusting this proposal. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�20 Log #3 Final Action: Accept in Principle (13.1.3)

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Chapter �3 Control of hazardous materials �3.�.3 In developing such regulations the following shall be addressed: (1) Availability of a suitable alternate route(s) that meets federal requirements as prescribed in US Department of Transportation (49 CFR �77.825) and US Department of Transportation (49 CFR Part 397 Subpart C). (2) US Department of Transportation (49 CFR Subtitle B Parts �00-�99). (3) Fire and accident experience of facilities similar to the facility for which rules and regulations are being adopted. (4) Previous fire and accident experience on the facility in question and adja-cent roads; or, in the case of a new facility, previous fire and accident experi-ence on roads in the area. (5) Anticipated traffic volumes in peak and off-peak periods. (6) Need for inspection of vehicles and cargo and the availability of an approved place to conduct inspections with a minimum of traffic interference. (7) Need and desirability of escort services with due consideration of the extent to which it could disrupt the orderly flow of traffic and create additional haz-ards. (8) Plan developed by an operating agency in a dense urban area, as referenced in Hazardous Material Transportation Regulations at Tunnel and Bridge Facilities. The suitability of such a plan for a given facility shall also be consid-ered. (9) Previous fire, accident and research experience of the vehicles and cargo of the type expected within the tunnel and particularly at goods and vehicles not normally characterized as hazardous may in certain circumstances in confined spaces within tunnels behave as, or equivalent to, hazardous materials in terms of the rate of fire growth, the intensity of the fire and the discharge of noxious materials destruction to infrastructure and threat to users safety. Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Revise proposed language as follows: Revise Chapter �3 title as Regulated and Unregulated Cargoes 13.1 General. 13.1.1* The authority having jurisdiction shall adopt rules, regulations that apply to the transportation of regulated and unregulated cargoes. 13.1.2 Design and planning of the facility shall address the potential risk pre-sented by regulated and unregulated cargoes as permitted by �3.�.�. A.13.1.1 Fire, accident and research experience of the vehicles and cargo of the type expected within the tunnel and particularly of goods and vehicles not nor-mally characterized as hazardous or otherwise regulated. Some types of cargos not normally considered hazardous may in certain circumstances in confined spaces within tunnels behave as, or equivalent to, hazardous materials in terms of the rate of fire growth, the intensity of the fire and the discharge of noxious materials destruction to infrastructure and threat to users safety. Do not change �3.�.3 Committee Statement: The committee agrees with the submitter and further feels that the subject of regulated and unregulated cargoes should be separated out.

Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�2� Log #66 Final Action: Accept (13.1.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: John Nelsen, Seattle Fire Department Recommendation: Revise text to read: 13.1.3* In developing such regulations, the following shall be addressed con-sidered : (1) Availability of a suitable alternative route(s) that meets federal requirements as prescribed in U.S. Department of Transportation (49 CFR �77.825) and U.S. Department of Transportation (49 CFR Part 397 Subpart C). (2) U.S. Department of Transportation (49 CFR Subtitle B Parts �00–�99). (3) Fire and accident experience of facilities similar to the facility for which rules and regulations are being adopted. (4) Previous fire and accident experience on the facility in question and adja-cent roads; or, in the case of a new facility, previous fire and accident experi-ence on roads in the area. (5) Anticipated traffic volumes in peak and off-peak periods. (6) Need for inspection of vehicles and cargo and the availability of an approved place to conduct inspections with a minimum of traffic interference. (7) Need and desirability of escort service with due consideration of the extent to which it could disrupt the orderly flow of traffic and create additional hazards. (8) Plan developed by an operating agency in a dense urban area, as refer-enced in Hazardous Material Transportation Regulations at Tunnel and Bridge Facilities. The suitability of such a plan for a given facility shall also be consid-ered. (�) Population density (2) Type of highway (3) Types and quantities of hazardous materials (4) Emergency response capabilities (5) Results of consultation with affected persons (6) Exposure and other risk factors (7) Terrain considerations (8) Continuity of routes (9) Alternative routes (�0) Effects on commerce (��) Delays in transportation (�2) Climatic conditions (�3) Congestion and accident history A.13.1.3 (i) Population density. The population potentially exposed to a hazardous material release shall be estimated from the density of the residents, employees, motorists, and other persons in the area, using census tract maps or other rea-sonable means for determining the population within a potential impact zone along a designated highway route. The impact zone is the potential range of effects in the event of a release. Special populations such as schools, hospitals, prisons, and senior citizen homes shall, among other things, be considered when determining the potential risk to the populations along a highway routing. Consideration shall be given to the amount of time during which an area will experience a heavy population density. (ii) Type of highway. The characteristics of each alternative hazardous material highway routing designation shall be compared. Vehicle weight and size limits, underpass and bridge clearances, roadway geometrics, number of lanes, degree of access control, and median and shoulder structures are examples of charac-teristics which should be considered. (iii) Types and quantities of hazardous materials. An examination shall be made of the type and quantity of hazardous materials normally transported along highway routes which are included in a proposed hazardous material routing designation, and consideration shall be given to the relative impact zone and risks of each type and quantity. (iv) Emergency response capabilities. In consultation with the proper fire, law enforcement, and highway safety agencies, consideration shall be given to the emergency response capabilities which may be needed as a result of a haz-ardous material routing designation. The analysis of the emergency response capabilities shall be based upon the proximity of the emergency response facili-ties and their capabilities to contain and suppress hazardous material releases within the impact zones. (v) Results of consultation with affected persons. Consideration shall be given to the comments and concerns of all affected persons and entities provid-ed during public hearings and consultations conducted in accordance with this section. (vi) Exposure and other risk factors. The exposure and risk factors associated with any hazardous material routing designations shall be defined. The distance to sensitive areas shall be considered. Sensitive areas include, but are not limit-ed to, homes and commercial buildings; special populations in hospitals, schools, handicapped facilities, prisons and stadiums; water sources such as streams and lakes; and natural areas such as parks, wetlands, and wildlife reserves. (vii) Terrain considerations. Topography along and adjacent to the proposed hazardous material routing designation that may affect the potential severity of an accident, the dispersion of the hazardous material upon release and the con-

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 trol and clean up of hazardous material if released shall be considered. (viii) Continuity of routes. Adjacent jurisdictions shall be consulted to ensure routing continuity for hazardous material across common borders. Deviations from the most direct route shall be minimized. (ix) Alternative routes. Consideration shall be given to the alternative routes to, or resulting from, any hazardous material route designation. Alternative routes shall be examined, reviewed, or evaluated to the extent necessary to demonstrate that the most probable alternative routing resulting from a routing designation is safer than the current routing. (x) Effects on commerce. Any hazardous material routing designation made in accordance with this section shall not create an unreasonable burden upon interstate or intrastate commerce. Substantiation: Given the international application of this standard it is inap-propriate to require compliance with U.S. Department of Transportation requirements. Additionally, 49 CFR has been reorganized making some of these code cites incorrect. The proposed text, including the annex language is adapted from 49 CFR 379.7.�. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�22 Log #�2 Final Action: Accept (A.1.6.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arthur G. Bendelius, A&G Consultants, Inc. Recommendation: Revise text to read: Annex A Explanatory Material A.1.6.1 SI units have been converted by multiplying the English unit value by the conversion factor and rounding the result to the appropriate number of sig-nificant digits (see Table A.1.6.1) . See ANSI SI �0 IEEE/ASTM SI �0 - 2002 . Table A.1.6.1 Conversion Factors � inch (in.) = 25.4 0 millimeters (mm) � foot (ft) = 0.304 800 6 meter (m) 1 square foot (ft 2) = 0.092 903 04 square meter (m2) � foot per minute (fpm) = 0.005 08 meter per second (m/sec) 1 foot per second squared (ft/sec2) = 0.304 8 meter per second squared (m/sec 2 ) � cubic foot per minute (ft3 /min) = 0.000 47� 947 2 cubic meter per second (m3 /sec) � gallon per minute (gpm) = 0.063 090 20 liter per second (L/sec) � pound (lb) = 0.453 592 37 kilogram (kg) � pound per cubic foot (lb/ft 3 ) = �6.0�8 46 kilograms per cubic meter (kg/m 3 ) 1 inch water gauge (in. wg) = 0.249 089 kilopascal (kPa)1 pound per square inch (psi) = 6.894 757 kilopascals (kPa) � degree Fahrenheit (°F) = (°F -32)/�.8 degrees Celsius (°C) � degree Rankine (°r) = �/�.8 Kelvin (K) � Btu per second (Btu/sec) = �.055 055 853 6 mega watts (MW) � Btu per second (Btu/sec) = 0.00� 055 853 megawatts (MW) � Btu per pound degree Rankine (Btu/lb°r) = 4.�86 8 joules per kilogram Kelvin (J/kg K) � footcandle (fc) = �0.763 9� lux (lx) � pound-force (lbf) = 4.448 222 newtons (N)

� gallon gal = 3.7854��784 liters L

� cubic foot per minute per lane foot (ft3 /min/lf) = 0.00� 55 cubic meters per second per lane meter (m

3/sec/lm)

1 Btu per hour square foot (Btu/(h ft2

) = 3.154 591 watts per square meter (W/m2

) Substantiation: Section A.�.6.� of Annex A on SI Units is incorrect, incom-plete and does not follow the current SI Standard. The latest version of IEEE/ASTM SI �0 TM American National Standard for Use of the International System of Units (SI): The Modern Metric System is the 2002 Edition. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�23 Log #2� Final Action: Accept in Principle (A.10.5.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: The risk to tunnel occupants and emergency services is also affected by how quickly peak heat release and peak temperature are reached. Fire tests have shown that in the case of a heavy goods truck the peak figures can be reached within �0 minutes. Substantiation: It is the speed of fire development which traps people in tun-nels. Once the power output has reached �00 MW the fire service is unable to enter the tunnel and those who have not already left it will die. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log #�20). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log

#�20). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�24 Log #20 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Table A.10.5.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Heat release rate for Heavy goods truck should be changed to �00-200 MW in the table and the maximum temperature should be changed to �300°C. Substantiation: The current figures have been proven by fire tests, such as those carried out in Runehamer, Norway to be well below the true figures. Designers using the incorrect figures in the current edition of the standard will not build a structure capable of withstanding a heavy goods truck fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log #�20). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�0 (Log #�20). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�25 Log #CP8 Final Action: Accept (A.11.7.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add: The following documents should be consulted for developing the security plan. NFPA 730: Guide for Premises Security NFPA 73�: Standard for the Installation of Electronic Premises Security Systems NFPA �600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs 2004 Edition Substantiation: New documents provide additional guidance as needed. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�26 Log #2 Final Action: Accept in Principle (Annex D) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Arnold Dix, Wheelers Hill Recommendation: Annex D Sprinklers Fixed Fire Suppression Systems in Road Tunnels This annex is not a part of the requirements of this NFPA document but is included for informational purposes only. D.� General. This annex provides considerations for the potential incorporation of Fixed Fire Suppression systems in road tunnels. D.2 Definitions. D 2.1 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems: Equipment permanently attached to a tunnel which when operated has the intended effect of reducing the heat release and fire growth rates. Examples of Fixed Fire Suppression systems include, Sprinkler Systems, Deluge Systems, and Mist Systems

D.2.2 Sprinkler System. For fire protection purposes, an integrated system of underground and overhead piping designed in accordance with fire protection engineering standards. The installation includes one or more automatic water supplies. The portion of the sprinkler system aboveground is a network of specially sized or hydraulically designed piping installed in a building, structure, or area, generally overhead, and to which sprinklers are attached in a systematic pattern. The valve controlling each system riser is located in the system riser or its supply piping. Each sprinkler system riser includes a device for actuating an alarm when the system is in operation. The system is usually activated by heat from a fire and discharges water over the fire area.

D.2.2 Deluge System. A sprinkler system employing open sprinklers attached to a piping system connected to a water supply through a valve. When this valve opens, water flows into the piping system and discharges from all sprinklers attached thereto.

D.3 Background. The World Road Association (PIARC) addressed the subject

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 of sprinklers in road tunnels in the reports presented at the World Road Congresses held in Sydney (�983), Brussels (�987), and Montreal (�995).

Fixed Fire suppression systems may be used as a component of an integrated fire engineering approach to protecting infrastructure and to reduce the rate of fire growth and heat release rates.

No European country currently uses sprinklers on a regular basis. Catastrophic road fires have encouraged re-evaluation of these systems for use in future tunnels in Europe.

In some tunnels in Europe, sprinklers have been used for special purposes. In Australia Deluge systems are used on all urban road tunnels while in Japan, sprinklers are used in long or heavily trafficked tunnels. In the United States, only a few tunnels carrying hazardous cargo have some form of sprinkler system.

Sprinklers are not installed in road tunnels in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. In Japan, sprinkler systems are required in all tunnels longer than 10,000 m (32,808 ft) and in shorter tunnels longer than 3000 m (9843 ft) with heavy traffic. In Norway two tunnels are equipped with dry water-based sprinkler systems. In both the 800 m (2625 ft) Válreng tunnel and the 3200 m (�0,500 ft) Fløyfjell tunnel, the sprinkler systems were designed to protect the lining material (polyurethane and ethaphome). In Sweden, sprinkler systems are used only in the Tegelbacken tunnel. There are three United States road tunnels that have been equipped with sprinkler systems: the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route � tunnel in Boston, MA, and the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island and Mt. Baker Ridge tunnels in Seattle, WA. The decision to provide sprinklers in these tunnels was motivated solely by the fact that these tunnels will be operated to allow the unescorted passage of vehicles carrying hazardous materials as cargo.

Traditionally the reason why most countries do not use sprinklers and deluge systems in tunnels is that most fires start in the motor room or in the compartment, and sprinklers where considered are of no use until the fire is open. Sprinklers and deluge systems can be used, however, to cool down vehicles, and all fixed fire suppression systems can be used to reduce the likelihood of to stop the fire from spreading to other vehicles (i.e., to diminish the fire area and property damage), and to stop secondary fires in lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that sprinklers and deluge are effective in cooling down the area around the fire, so that fire fighting can be more effective.

D.3.� Currently, the use and effectiveness of fixed suppression systems sprinklers in road tunnels are not universally accepted. Although it is acknowledged that sprinklers are highly regarded by fire protection professionals and fire departments in certain types of structures, there is much evidence to suggest that for developed fires sprinklers are not only ineffective in controlling a fuel fire but can actually contribute to the spread of the fire. Furthermore, it is argued believed that road tunnel conditions cannot exploit sprinkler system strengths and could turn most of their advantages into disadvantages.

D.3.2 The major concerns expressed by tunnel designers and engineers worldwide (authorities) regarding fixed fire suppression systems fire sprinkler use and effectiveness include the following: (�) Typically fires in road tunnels usually occur inside vehicles or inside passenger or engine compartments designed to be waterproof from above; therefore, sprinklers and deluge systems would not have an extinguishing effect. (2) If any delay occurs between ignition and sprinkler or deluge activation, a thin water spray on a very hot fire will produce large quantities of superheated steam without material suppressing the fire. This steam has the potential to be more damaging to people than smoke. (3) Tunnels are very long and narrow, often sloped laterally and longitudinally, vigorously ventilated, and never subdivided, so heat normally will not be localized over a fire and thereby compromise automatic sprinkler operation.. (4) Because of stratification of the hot gas plume along the tunnel ceiling, a number of the activated sprinklers would not, in all probability, be located over the fire. A large number of the activated sprinklers would be located away from the fire scene, producing a cooling effect that would tend to draw this stratified layer of smoke down toward the roadway level, thus impeding the rescue and fire-fighting effort. (5) Water spraying from the ceiling of a subaqueous tunnel could suggest tunnel failure and induce panic in motorists. (6) The use of deluge systems and sprinklers could cause the delamination of the smoke layer and induce turbulence and mixing of the air and smoke, thus further threatening the safety of persons in the tunnel. (7) Testing of a fire suppression systems sprinkler system on a periodic basis

to determine its state of readiness is impractical and costly.

D.3.3 Because of the concerns detailed in D.3.2, the use of sprinklers in road tunnels generally is not recommended. However, three recently commissioned U.S. road tunnels have been equipped with sprinkler systems: the Central Artery North Area (CANA) Route � tunnel in Boston, MA, and the I-90 First Hill Mercer Island and Mt. Baker Ridge tunnels in Seattle, WA. The decision to provide sprinklers in these tunnels will allow the unescorted passage of vehicles carrying hazardous materials as cargo.

D.4 Recommendations. D.4.� Application. The installation of fixed suppression systems sprinkler systems should be considered applicable as part of a systematic fire engineering assessment of the design, operation and maintenance of a tunnel. only where the passage of hazardous cargo is considered. However, even in these cases, The tunnel owner, operator and the local fire department or authority having jurisdiction should consider the advantages and disadvantages of such systems as they apply to a particular tunnel installation.

D.4.2 Extinguishing Agent. AFFF (aqueous film-forming foam) systems should be considered for in-tunnel fixed fire suppression sprinkler systems in lieu of water-only systems. Water-only sprinkler systems pose significant concerns where applied to roadway tunnels. The have high water demand rates needs to be available from the local supply, and in-tunnel drainage piping, storage, and pumping systems all become much larger. Additionally, after operation deluge, the possibility of vapor explosion may be dangerously increased in some circumstances. The strong cooling effect of a water-only system reduces the ability of the smoke to stratify at the ceiling, where it can be contained more easily by the tunnel ventilation system, and instead causes the smoke to spread over the cross section of the incident area.

D.4.3 Sprinkler System. To help ensure against accidental discharge, the sprinkler system should be designed as a manually activated deluge system. The sprinkler system piping should be arranged using interval zoning so that the discharge can be focused on the area of incident without necessitating discharge for the entire length of the tunnel. Each zone should be equipped with its own proportioning valve set to control the appropriate water/foam mixture percentage. Sprinkler heads should provide an open deluge and be spaced so that coverage extends to roadway shoulders and, if applicable, maintenance/patrol walkways. The system should be designed with enough water and foam capacity to allow operation of at least two zones adjacent to the incident zone if the fire occurs in a “border” area. Zone length should be based on activation time as determined by the authorities having jurisdiction. Piping should be designed to allow drainage through heads after flow is stopped.

D.4.4 System Control. It can be assumed that a full-time, attended control room is available for any tunnel facility in which safe passage necessitates the need for sprinkler system protection. Therefore, consideration should be given to human interaction in the sprinkler system control and activation design to ensure against false alarm and accidental discharge. Any automatic mode of operation should include a discharge delay to allow incident verification and assessment of in-tunnel conditions by trained operators.

D.4.4.� An integrated graphic display of the sprinkler system zones, fire detection system zones, tunnel ventilation system limits, and emergency access and egress locations should be provided at the control room to allow tunnel operators and responding emergency personnel to make initial response decisions. *

Substantiation: Recent road tunnel fires suggest that goods traditionally not characterised as ‘hazardous’ may constitute a greater risk to tunnel users and tunnel structures than expected. (eg. Flour and margarine – Mont Blanc, paint - Gothard, furniture – Hubberback, Tyres – Frejus). Furthermore recent investigations suggest vehicle fires within tunnels are more likely to develop rapidly than expected, degrade the tenability of an envi-ronment more quickly than originally calculated, burn for longer and at higher temperatures and resist intervention of fire fighting authorities. In short recent tunnel fires suggests that utilising current techniques in response to incidents may result in larger fires, more rapidly developing than expected which burn hotter and last longer than anticipated. This information has resulted in significant research being conducted around the world within the European Union and Asia. Such is the nature of this research that PIARC is currently engaged in an ongoing assessment of its approach to managing tunnel fires and has embarked upon a priority project on fixed fire suppression systems. Japan is seriously considering full automation of its fixed fire suppression systems. In recent tunnels such as the Mont Blanc tunnel refurbishment having incorporated radical ventilation strategies to man-age tenability of environment through sophisticated smoke management and

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 ventilation control. In such circumstances it is timely for NFPA 502 to revisit a number of its provisions with respect to fires in road tunnels. In particular a broad reconsideration of the importance of: • Detection • Ventilation (and its effect on tenability of environment) • Fixed fire suppression systems (and their role in minimising fire develop-ment – and their performance limitations from a tenability perspective) • Hazardous goods (what is hazardous in the context of a confined space being a road tunnel?) This proposal is part of a group of proposals to amend several provisions of the existing NFPA 502 to enhance NFPA 502’s delivery of both human safety and structural integrity in road tunnels from a fire. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�29 (Log #24). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�29 (Log #24). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�27 Log #22 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Netherlands . Fire suppression systems have recently been installed in tunnels in Austria (Mona Lisa tunnel in Linz), Netherlands (Roermond tunnels) and Spain (Vielha tunnel). Substantiation: Recent installations of fire suppression systems in tunnels show that in Europe the consensus about the benefits of fire suppression in tun-nels has changed. By the time the next edition of NFPA 502 is published this list will be longer and it would be useful to keep it as current as possible at the time of printing. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�28 Log #23 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Delete the following text: The reason why most countries do not use sprinklers in tunnels is that most fires start in the motor room or in the compartment, and sprinklers are of no use until the fire is open. Substantiation: This is not the reason that sprinklers have not been installed. On the few recent occasions when sprinklers or other fire suppression systems have been considered and then rejected the primary reason given has been cost. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Propsoal 502-�29 (Log #24). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Proposal 502-�29 (Log #24). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�29 Log #24 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Delete the following text: Currently...disabvantages Substantiation: The current text is incorrect and should be deleted in its entirety. Fire texts in several countries have proven that sprinklers and other water-based fire suppression systems can control fires in tunnels and do not merely cause fire spread. The evidence from these tests is supported by over 40 years of field experience in Japan. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle Do not delete language, instead revise as follows. D.3.� In the past, the use and effectiveness of fixed fire fighting systems in road tunnels were not universally accepted. It is now acknowledged that fixed fire fighting systems that are highly regarded by fire protection professionals and fire fighters, can be ineffective in controlling a fuel road tunnel fire by actually limiting the spread of the fire. One of the reasons why most countries were reluctant to use fixed fire fight-ing systems in road tunnels is that most fires start in the motor compartment of a vehicle, and fixed fire fighting systems are of limited use in suppressing the

fire until the fire is out in the open. Fixed fire fighting systems can be used, however, to cool down vehicles, to stop the fire from spreading to other vehi-cles (i.e., to diminish the fire area and property damage), and to stop secondary fires in tunnel lining materials. Experiences from Japan show that fixed fire fighting systems have been extremely effective in cooling down the area around the fire, so that fire fighting can be performed more effectively. Committee Statement: Revised text is indicative of recent practices and research. Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�30 Log #25 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...regarding fire sprinkler use and effectiveness used to include the follow-ing: Substantiation: The international consensus on the benefits of fire suppression systems in tunnels has changed. The main concern is now economic. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�3� Log #CP�3 Final Action: Accept (D.3.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise D.3.2 as follows: D.3.2 The major concerns expressed by tunnel designers and engineers world-wide (authorities) regarding fixed fire fighting system use and effectiveness in road tunnels used to include the following: (�) Typically fires in road tunnels usually occur inside vehicles or inside pas-senger or engine compartments designed to be waterproof from above; there-fore, fixed fire fighting systems might not have an extinguishing effect. It is now recognized that the purpose of a fixed fire fighting fire suppression system is to prevent fire spread to other vehicles so that the fire does not grow to a size that cannot be attacked by the fire service. (2) If any delay occurs between ignition and fixed fire fighting system activa-tion, a thin water spray on a very hot fire could produce large quantities of superheated steam without material suppressing the fire. Fire tests have now shown this concern not to be valid. A properly designed fixed fire fighting system suppresses the fire and cools the tunnel environment. Since a heavy goods vehicle fire only needs �0 minutes to exceed �00 MW and �200°C, which are fatal conditions, it is important to operate the fire suppres-sion system as soon as possible. (3) Tunnels are very long and narrow, often sloped laterally and longitudinally, vigorously ventilated, and never subdivided, so heat normally will not be local-ized over a fire. Nevertheless advances in fire detection technology have now made it possible to pinpoint the location of a fire in a tunnel with sufficient accuracy to operate a zoned fixed fire fighting system. (4) Because of stratification of the hot gas plume along the tunnel ceiling, a number of the activated sprinklers would not, in all probability, be located over the fire. A large number of the activated sprinklers would be located away from the fire scene, producing a cooling effect that would tend to draw this stratified layer of smoke down toward the roadway level, thus impeding the rescue and fire fighting effort. Independent laboratories have commented that they do not observe smoke stratification. Any activated fixed fire fighting system, not over the fire, would cool the tunnel to help rescue services to intervene. Zoned systems are released by a detection system that is accurate even with forced ventilation. (5) Water spraying from the ceiling of a subaqueous tunnel could suggest tun-nel failure and induce panic in motorists This was a theoretical concern not borne out in practice. In the event of fire motorists are likely to recognize water spraying from nozzles as a fire safety measure. Behavioral studies have shown that people do not panic in a fire, even when they are unable to see.

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 (6) The use of sprinklers could cause the delamination of the smoke layer and induce turbulence and mixing of the air and smoke, thus further threatening the safety of persons in the tunnel. This has been shown not to be a valid concern. Fire tests have demonstrated that smoke does not usually form a layer at the top of the tunnel but quickly fills the cross-section. Normal air movement in the tunnel accelerates this pro-cess. A fixed fire fighting fire suppression system reduces temperatures and the risk of fire spread to other vehicles. (7) Testing of a fixed fire fighting system on a periodic basis to determine its state of readiness could be impractical and costly. Inspection can be performed when other facilities are inspected. A full discharge test is normally only performed at system commissioning. During routine testing the system can be configured to discharge flow to the drainage system. Substantiation: The revisions to D.3.2 address the previous statements in the Annex regarding concerns over sprinklers in tunnels as a result of recent prac-tices and research. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�32 Log #26 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(1)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: “...therefore, sprinklers would might not have an extinguishing effect. It is now recognized that the purpose of a fire suppression system is to prevent fire spread to other vehicles so that the fire does not grow to a size that cannot be tackled by the fire service. Substantiation: The existing text does not tally with recent decisions to fit fire suppression systems in some important tunnels in Austria, France, Spain and The Netherlands, and the serious consideration given to fire suppression sys-tems in major new tunnel projects in the United Kingdom. Sprinklers have extinguished fires inside engine compartments. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Propsal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�33 Log #27 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: If any substantial delay occurs between ignition and sprin-kler activation, a thin water spray on a very hot fire will could produce large quantities of superheated steam without materiall y suppressing the fire. This steam has the potential to be more damaging than smoke. Substantiation: There is no evidence that fire suppression systems produce large quantities of superheated steam. The revisions make clear that this was a concern expressed in the past. Further revisions to the text in my following proposal will make clear that this concern is now known not to be valid. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Propsal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�34 Log #28 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(2)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Add text to read as follows: Fire tests have now shown this concern not to be valid. A properly design fire suppression system suppresses the fire and cools the tunnel environment. Since a heavy goods vehicle fire only needs �0 minutes to exceed �00 MW and �200°C, which are fatal conditions, it is important to operate the fire suppres-sion system as soon as possible. Substantiation: Rather than deleting the current invalid text it may be more helpful to include text to show why it is now known to be wrong. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle

See Committee Action on Committee Propsoal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�35 Log #29 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(3)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...localized over a fire. Nevertheless advances in fire detection technology have now made it possible to pinpoint the location of a fire in a tunnel with sufficient accuracy to operate a zoned fire suppression system. Substantiation: While the first sprinklers to activate may not be directly above the fire, sprinklers there would soon follow. Laser linear heat detectors react to radiation and correctly locate a fire even with a high ventilation velocity. This system has been installed in the Mona Lisa road tunnel in Austria and Betuwe train tunnels in The Netherlands. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�36 Log #30 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(4)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Delete the following text: Because....effort Substantiation: This entire section should be deleted. Independent laboratories have commented that they do not observe smoke stratification. Any activated sprinklers not over the fire would cool the tunnel to help rescue services to intervene. Zoned systems are released by an electronic detection system that is accurate even with forced ventilation. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�37 Log #3� Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(5)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Delete the following text: Water spraying from the ceiling of a subaqueous tunnel could suggest tunnel failure and induce panic in motorists. Substantiation: This was a theoretical concern not borne out in practice. In the event of fire motorists are likely to recognize water spraying from nozzles as a fire safety measure. Behavioral studies have shown that people do not panic in a fire, even when they are unable to see. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�38 Log #32 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(6)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...tunnel. This has been shown not to be a valid concern. Fire tests have dem-onstrated that smoke does not usually form a layer at the top of the tunnel but quickly fills the cross-section. Normal air movement in the tunnel accelerates this process. A fire suppression system reduces temperatures and the risk of fire spread to other vehicles. Substantiation: In recent years there have been several fire tests run in real tunnels. Video clips show that the tunnel fills with smoke. Stratification is not evident. While a fire suppression system will not improve visibility near the

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 fire it will not make it worse either. Away from the fire visibility can improve because less smoke is produced. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�39 Log #33 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.2(7)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: “...state of readiness is could be impractical and costly. Inspection can be per-formed when other facilities are inspected. A full discharge test is normally only performed at system commissioning. Extinguishing section valves can be trimmed with other valves so that they can be remotely tripped and their dis-charge sent to drain. Substantiation: The change to the current text is needed to clarify that this was a concern. There is no evidence that it is impractical or costly to test a fire suppression system. Huge chemical sites with hundreds of deluge valves per-form remote trip tests on each valve every week. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�40 Log #34 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.3.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: Because of the concerns detailed in D.3.2, the use of sprinklers in road tun-nels generally is not recommended. However, three recently commissioned At least three U.S. road tunnels have been equipped. Substantiation: Fire suppression systems are not recommended in all tunnels on economic rather than technical grounds. In Europe awareness is growing that the concerns listed in D.3.2 are not genuine. They are not the reason used to reject fire suppression in tunnels. System cost against that of alternative measures is now the area of discussion. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�3� (Log #CP�3). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�4� Log #CP�4 Final Action: Accept (D.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Revise D.4 as follows: D.4.� Application. The installation of fixed fire fighting systems should be considered where an engineering analysis demonstrates that the level of safety can be equal or exceeded by the use of fixed fire systems and is a part of an integrated approach to the management of safety. The tunnel operator and the local fire department or authority having jurisdiction should consider the advantages and disadvantages of such systems as they apply to a particular tun-nel installation. D.4.2 Fixed Fire Fighting System. To help ensure against accidental dis-charge, the fixed fire fighting system can be designed as a manually activated deluge system with an automatic release after a time delay. To prevent develop-ment of a major fire the time delay should not exceed 3 minutes. The sprinkler system piping should be arranged using interval zoning so that the discharge can be focused on the area of incident without necessitating discharge for the entire length of the tunnel. Each zone should be equipped with its own propor-tioning valve set to control the appropriate water/foam mixture percentage. Sprinkler heads should provide an open deluge and be spaced so that coverage extends to roadway shoulders and, if applicable, maintenance/patrol walkways. The system should be designed with enough water and foam capacity to allow operation of at least two zones adjacent to the incident zone if the fire occurs in a “border” area. Zone length should be based on activation time as determined by the authorities having jurisdiction. Piping should be designed to allow drain-age through heads after flow is stopped. D.4.3 System Control. It can be assumed that a full-time, attended control room is available for any tunnel facility in which safe passage necessitates the

need for fixed fire fighting system protection. Therefore, consideration should be given to human interaction in the fixed fire fighting system control and acti-vation design to ensure against false alarm and accidental discharge. Any auto-matic mode of operation can include a discharge delay to allow incident verifi-cation and assessment of in tunnel conditions by trained operators. Substantiation: Updates the statements in the Annex. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�42 Log #39 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.4.1) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: The installation of sprinkler fire suppression systems should be considered applicable only where the passage of hazardous cargo is considered, permitted, where the response time of the fire service is likely to be longer than �0 minutes or where a protracted closure of the tunnel due to fire is unacceptable. However, even in In these cases Substantiation: These are the reasons being applied to justify the fitting of fire suppression systems in tunnels. Heavy goods truck fires can grow to more than �00 MW and over �200°C in �0 minutes. At that point the fire service is unable to approach the fire to fight it. Anyone still in the tunnel will die and the tunnel will suffer severe damage. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�43 Log #35 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: should can be considered for in-tunnel sprinkler systems in lieu of water-only systems . systems, where there is a need to extinguish rather than control fuel spill fires. Water only sprinkler systems pose significant concerns where applied to roadway tunnels. The high water demand rate for the fire suppres-sion system needs to be available. Substantiation: Foam systems are fitted in The Netherlands in tunnels which carry LPG tankers. The concern is that a liquid spill fire could cause a BLEVE and tunnel collapse. A foam system will extinguish liquid spill fires. The com-ments about water demand also apply to foam systems. The concerns about sprinklers are invalid. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�44 Log #36 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.4.2) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Delete the following text: Additionally, after deluge, the possibility of vapour explosion is dangerously increased. The strong cooling effect of a water only system reduces the ability of the smoke to stratify at the ceiling, where it can be contained more easily by the tunnel ventilation system, and instead causes the smoke to spread evenly over the cross section of the incident area. Substantiation: A deluge system prevents fire spread and reduces tempera-tures. If it extinguishes fire it will then cool hot surfaces so that the fire does not reignite. This is the same as the action of the fire service. Laboratories that have run tunnel fire tests report that smoke does not usually stratify at the ceil-ing. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________

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Report on Proposals A2007 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 502 502-�45 Log #37 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.4.3) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows: To help ensure against accidental discharge, the sprinkler fire suppression system should can be designed as a manually activated deluge system . system with an automatic release after a time delay. To prevent development of a major fire the time delay should not exceed 3 minutes. Substantiation: It may only take �0 minutes for a fire to develop to the point where the fire service can no longer intervene. If the operator delays activation of the system people in the tunnel will be exposed to fatal conditions. An auto-matic release after a short time delay is therefor needed. This is now the approach in Japan. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�46 Log #38 Final Action: Accept in Principle (D.4.4) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Alan Brinson, European Fire Sprinkler Network / Rep. International Fire Sprinkler Association Recommendation: Any automatic mode of operation should can include a dis-charge delay. Substantiation: In some cases automatic operation without a delay may be better than, for example, allowing a major liquid fuel fire to burn unchecked. Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Committee Statement: See Committee Action on Committee Proposal 502-�4� (Log #CP�4). Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________

502-�47 Log #CP�5 Final Action: Accept (Annex J (new)) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: New Annex J – Motorist Education The tunnel operator should consider implementing a program to educate the motorist and professional drivers for assist the public how to properly react and in case of emergencies in the tunnel. Consideration should be given to radio and TV ads, brochures, etc. A suggested brochure is shown below.

Substantiation: Driver education as to the appropriate actions in the event of a tunnel emergency is an important part of tunnel safety plan. This annex mate-rial provides information on establishing such a program as well as distribution of the material. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J. _______________________________________________________________ 502-�48 Log #CP3 Final Action: Accept (Annex K) _______________________________________________________________ Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection, Recommendation: Add the table shown on the following 3 pages as a sepa-rate Annex K - Organizations involved in Tunnel Regulations and Research & Development. Substantiation: This information regarding other international organizations and there standards is helpful when considering future actions. Committee Meeting Action: Accept Number Eligible to Vote: 17 Ballot Results: Affirmative: �6 Ballot Not Returned: � Kroboth, III, J.

REMEMBER FIRE AND SMOKE KILLS —

SAVE YOUR LIFE NOT YOUR CAR!

Be Safe Entering a Tunnel

� Listen to the radio for traf-fic updates.

� Turn on your headlights and take off your sunglasses.

� Obey all traffic lights, signs, and pavement markings.

� Do not stop, except in an emergency.

� Keep a safe distance from the vehicle in front.

� Never enter into a tunnel that has smoke coming out of it.

� Never drive a burning or smoking vehicle into a tunnel.

Be Safe in Traffic Congestion in a Tunnel

� Keep your distance, even if traffic is moving slowly.

� Listen to traffic updates on the radio.

� Follow the instructions given by tunnel officials and/or variable message signs.

� Note the location of fire extinguishers and emergency exits.

Be Safe if There Is a Fire in the Tunnel

� If your vehicle is on fire, drive out of the tunnel if possible.

� If that is not possible, stop and turn the engine off, and leave the vehicle immediately.

� Leave the keys and all personal belongings.

� Locate an emergency phone in the tunnel and call for help.

� Put out the fire using a fire extinguisher located on the tunnel wall.

� If there is no fire extinguisher, locate the nearest emergency exit and leave.

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Proposal 502-148 (Log #LCP3)

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Proposal 502-148 (Log #LCP3)

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Proposal 502-148 (Log #LCP3)

FORM FOR COMMENTS ON NFPA REPORT ON PROPOSALS 2007 ANNUAL REVISION CYCLE

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5/25/2006 iv

Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) Sequence of Events Leading to Issuance of an NFPA Committee Document

Step 1 Call for Proposals

▼ Proposed new Document or new edition of an existing Document is entered into one of two yearly revision cycles, and a Call for Proposals is published.

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The process of public input and review does not end with the publication of the ROP and ROC. Following the completion of the Proposal and Comment periods, there is yet a further opportunity for debate and discussion through the Technical Report Sessions that take place at the NFPA Annual Meeting.

The Technical Report Session provides an opportunity for the final Technical Committee Report (i.e., the ROP and ROC) on each proposed new or revised code or standard to be presented to the NFPA membership for the debate and consideration of motions to amend the Report. The specific rules for the types of motions that can be made and who can make them are set forth in NFPA’s rules which should always be consulted by those wishing to bring an issue before the membership at a Technical Report Session. The following presents some of the main features of how a Report is handled.

What Amending Motions are Allowed. The Technical Committee Reports contain many Proposals and Comments that the Technical Committee has rejected or revised in whole or in part. Actions of the Technical Committee published in the ROP may also eventually be rejected or revised by the Technical Committee during the development of its ROC. The motions allowed by NFPA rules provide the opportunity to propose amendments to the text of a proposed code or standard based on these published Proposals, Comments and Committee actions. Thus, the list of allowable motions include motions to accept Proposals and Comments in whole or in part as submitted or as modified by a Technical Committee action. Motions are also available to reject an accepted Comment in whole or part. In addition, Motions can be made to return an entire Technical Committee Report or a portion of the Report to the Technical Committee for further study.

The NFPA Annual Meeting, also known as the World SafetyConference and Exposition®, takes place in June of each year. A second Fall membership meeting was discontinued in 2004, so the NFPA Technical Report Session now runs once each yearat the Annual Meeting in June.

Who Can Make Amending Motions. Those authorized to make these motions is also regulated by NFPA rules. In many cases, the maker of the motion is limited by NFPA rules to the original submitter of the Proposal or Comment or his or her duly authorized representative. In other cases, such as a Motion to Reject an accepted Comment, or to Return a Technical Committee Report or a portion of a Technical Committee Report for Further Study, anyone can make these motions. For a complete explanation, NFPA rules should be consulted.

The filing of a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. Before making an allowable motion at a Technical Report Session, the intended maker of the motion must file, in advance of the session, and within the published deadline, a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. A Motions Committee appointed by the Standards Council then reviews all notices and certifies all amending motions that are proper. The Motions Committee can also, in consultation with the makers of the motions, clarify the intent of the motions and, in certain circumstances, combine motions that are dependent on each other together so that they can be made in one single motion. A Motions Committee report is then made available in advance of the meeting listing all certified motions. Only these Certified Amending Motions, together with certain allowable Follow-Up Motions (that is, motions that have become necessary as a result of previous successful amending motions) will be allowed at the Technical Report Session.

Consent Documents. Often there are codes and standards up for consideration by the membership that will be non-controversial and no proper Notices of Intent to Make a Motion will be filed. These “Consent Documents” will bypass the Technical Report Session and head straight to the Standards Council for issuance. The remaining Documents are then forwarded to the Technical Report Session for consideration of the NFPA membership.

Important Note: The filing of a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion is a new requirement that takes effect beginning with those Documents scheduled for the Fall 2005 revision cycle that reports to the June 2006 Annual Meeting Technical Report Session. The filing of a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion will not, therefore, be required in order to make a motion at the June 2005 Annual Meeting Technical Report Session. For updates on the transition to the new Notice requirement and related new rules effective for the Fall 2005 revision cycle and the June 2006 Annual Meeting, check the NFPA website.

Action on Motions at the Technical Report Session. In order to actually make a Certified Amending Motion at the Technical Report Session, the maker of the motion must sign in at least an hour before the session begins. In this way a final list of motions can be set in advance of the session. At the session, each proposed Document up for consideration is presented by a motion to adopt the Technical Committee Report on the Document. Following each such motion, the presiding officer in charge of the session opens the floor to motions on the Document from the final list of Certified Amending Motions followed by any permissible Follow-Up Motions. Debate and voting on each motion proceeds in accordance with NFPA rules. NFPA membership is not required in order to make or speak to a motion, but voting is limited to NFPA members who have joined at least 180 days prior to the session and have registered for the meeting. At the close of debate on each motion, voting takes place, and the motion requires a majority vote to carry. In order to amend a Technical Committee Report, successful amending motions must be confirmed by the responsible Technical Committee, which conducts a written ballot on all successful amending motions following the meeting and prior to the Document being forwarded to the Standards Council for issuance.

Standards Council Issuance

One of the primary responsibilities of the NFPA Standards Council, as the overseer of the NFPA codes and standards development process, is to act as the official issuer of all NFPA codes and standards. When it convenes to issue NFPA documents it also hears any appeals related to the Document. Appeals are an important part of assuring that all NFPA rules have been followed and that due process and fairness have been upheld throughout the codes and standards development process. The Council considers appeals both in writing and through the conduct of hearings at which all interested parties can participate. It decides appeals based on the entire record of the process as well as all submissions on the appeal. After deciding all appeals related to a Document before it, the Council, if appropriate, proceeds to issue the Document as an official NFPA code or standard. Subject only to limited review by the NFPA Board of Directors, the Decision of the Standards Council is final, and the new NFPA code or standard becomes effective twenty days after Standards Council issuance. The illustration on page 9 provides an overview of the entire process, which takes approximately two full years to complete.