Report No. 4 (2016) - “Don’t be soft”

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”Don't be soft” The New Turkey's Attitude in Handling Domestic

and Foreign Policies

Written By Federico De Renzi & Francesco Ventura

April 2016

Report No

04

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Updated at April 6, 2016

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Summary

Introduction – A lot of problem with all neighbors ..................4

Turkey’s Domestic Policy ..........................................................10

Failure in regional policy and its consequences .....................10

Home Extreme Makeover .........................................................10

A Peace to end all Peace ..........................................................16

“War at home, war in the world”.Turkey-Kurdish relations

in the Mesopotamian cauldron .................................................24

The PYD/YPG and the peace process stand-off in Turkey ............27

Fog of war in Rojava ...............................................................29

Russian shadows ......................................................................33

The bastion of NATO...once more? ..........................................38

References ...................................................................................39

About the Authors ......................................................................43

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

4

“Don’t be soft”

The New Turkey's attitude in handling

Domestic and Foreign Policies

Introduction – A lot of problem with all neighbors

Not so long ago Turkey’s Foreign Policy constantly brought in the

public discourse as a paradigm of how a formerly isolationist country

could transform itself in a regional power, and how a modern, military-

dominated “Secular Republic” could turn into an Islamic state and

become an example for others. Defined by the then iconic phrase of

“Zero Problems with the Neighbors,” Turkey aimed to both improve

relations with its “brothers” and emerge as the dominant regional

power. It was a classic case of enhancing soft power through

democratization and economic reforms at home, coupled with shrewd

diplomacy aimed at establishing Ankara as a mediator in the region’s

conflicts. The AKP government however feigned modesty about its

standing in the Islamic world. “We are not presenting ourselves as a

model,” Erdoğan told an audience of Turkish journalists in 2011.

“Maybe we are a source of inspiration or a successful example in some

areas”. Yet Turkey’s experience with Islamist politics—no longer

simply an experiment—was widely cited both inside and outside the

Muslim world. By 2012, however, the AKP had also exposed serious

democratic shortcomings both home and in its backyard.

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So this innovative policy

seems now to lie in ruins. It is

most certainly the victim of the

unpredictable turnabout in the

Arab Spring, especially in Syria;

hubris; and miscalculations in

domestic and foreign policy.

With the feeble exception of

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, Turkey’s

relations with almost all of its neighbors have soured. At the same time,

tensions with the United States, European Union, and especially Russia

have all dramatically increased. If Ankara has any sway today, it is mostly

because of its geography — which gives it proximity to Syria and the

refugee calamity — and its willingness to use strong-arm tactics in

diplomatic transactions. The Syrian civil war with the worsening

situation regarding the downing of the Russian plane, the changing

nature of the fight in cooperation with the US against the Daesh, and

the possibility of reactivating relations with the European Union over

the flux yrian refugees were major foreign policy and security issues. In

the last quarter of 2015 there are still some major political problems

ahead of Turkey. How did Turkey’s international ambitions fall apart?

It’s a question with multiple answers. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s

grandiose ideas of his role in the world, his desire to transform Turkey

into an all-powerful presidential system, and the collapse of the Kurdish

Kurdistan regional government

Source: Bill Trips

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

6

peace process, itself a consequence of the Syrian civil war, have all

contributed to damaging Ankara’s once-promising foreign policy.1

In the wake of the so-called Arab Spring, Turkey initially saw itself

the leader in a “New Age” of Islamic states. With Syria collapsing into

a full-scale civil war, however, Ankara soon engaged in an

interventionist policy, as the personal relationship between al-Asad and

Erdoğan, who had reportedly holidayed with one another in the hot

summer of 2010, soon soured. To be sure, the ‘Zero Problems with

Neighbors’ foreign policy was soon suspended by a series of continuing

foreign policy mishaps. Turkey’s support and funding of Islamism

elements in Syria, including groups like Jabhat al-Nursa, and their

ambivalent attitude towards Daesh, fanned the sectarian divisions that

had already opened up across the Middle East. In retrospect, the Syrian

Kurds’ victory in Kobane proved to be the deathblow for Turkey’s

domestic peace process with its Kurdish population. At the time,

Erdoğan was harshly critical of the American intervention in Kobane

as he and his party perceive the PYD to be a greater scourge than the

Daesh.2 In February 2015, he repudiated the agreement his lieutenants

had negotiated with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party and the

PKK. New documents suggest that the breaking point was his fear that

1 Kubilay Yado Arin, (2013). “The AKP’s Foreign Policy, Turkey’s Reorientation from the West to the East?”. Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.

2 Karaveli Halil, (October 8,2014). “Kobani and the Future of Turkish Democracy. Why the Military May Get the Upper Hand”. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-10-08/kobani-and-future-turkish-democracy

April 2016

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Syrian Kurds would duplicate the Iraqi Kurdish experiment of creating

an autonomous region on Turkey’s Southern border. Erdoğan correctly

understood that the Kobane siege represented a possible turning point

for the Kurds’ fortunes in the region, and chose not to cooperate with

them, but instead to suppress the protests and to halt the flux of

volunteers trying to reach the city in order to relieve the siege. The

Kurdish domestic resistance undermined Erdoğan’s domestic and

international position, the Turkish President found his hands tied even

further in Syria by the Russian intervention on behalf of Al-Asad. In a

careless move, Turkish fighters in November 2015 shot down a Russian

bomber that had briefly intruded into Turkish airspace, an action that

triggered a rash of

costly economic,

political, and military

actions in retaliation

by Russian President

Vladimir Putin, and

Erdoğan had

misjudged him.

While Turkey has shown a “humane” approach to the influx of Syrian

refugees, Ankara’s recent statements appear as if they are using the

refugee crisis to their political advantage as seen with the recent EU-

Turkey Deal. With talk of a declaration of semi-autonomy by Rojava,

many are querying what the AKP’s next move will be and whether there

will be an offensive into Syria. What is readily apparent, though, is that

Rojava

Source: Wikipedia

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

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Ankara’s growing intransigence is contributing to the current domestic

destabilization inside Turkey. A migration flow from Syria has been

rising. According to the official reports, around 2,700,000 refugees and

migrants are in Turkey. The US and EU financial assistance isn’t enough

at the moment. Simultaneously the government is considering new

military operations against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê), which has resumed its armed

campaign with demands of autonomy along its Iraq and Syria borders.

This decision could alienate the people living in those regions even

more. On the other hand, the PKK is not likely to give up the campaign

because of the same reason and wants to bring security forces face to

face with civilians in towns, rather than militants in the mountains. If

the government cannot find an innovative solution to break the

stalemate, the problem is likely to continue in the last part of 2016 as

well, since the Turkish society is very much divided over the Syrian and

Kurdish policies of the government. AKP leaders claim that

membership in the European Union is their strategic priority. Yet the

AKP has demonstrated growing self-confidence by expanding Turkey’s

reach and diplomatic relations beyond the West. The EU’s reluctance

to embrace Turkey formally and the European economic crisis have

also led the AKP to look to the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia

as areas where it can exert soft power—what Turkish Foreign Minister

Ahmet Davutoğlu called Turkey’s “Strategic Depth (Stratejik

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Derinlik)”. Analysts dubbed the activist Turkish foreign policy “Neo-

Ottomanism”.3

3 Taşpınar Ömer, (October 7, 2008). “Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism”. Carnegie Papers No. 10 (September 2008), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cmec10_taspinar_final.pdf

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

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Turkey’s Domestic Policy

Federico De Renzi

Failure in regional policy and its consequences

Turkey is heavily affected by a number of “threats” resulting in a deep

domestic political crisis. This crisis seems to be driven mainly by

questionable political decisions and personal attitudes of the Turkish

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma

Partisi), Justice and Development Party. 2015 and the beginning of 2016

have been quite a problematic period for Turkey, both in domestic and

international politics. Two general elections, the changing mood of the

Kurdish problem and the spillover of Syrian civil war in the form of

both jihadi and separatist terrorism are still the major problems Turkey

has.

Home Extreme Makeover

It is well known that between 2002 and 2006, the first AKP

government passed a series of constitutional reforms to harmonize

Turkey’s judicial system, civil-military relations, and human rights

practices with European norms. Through its extremely effective

popular network and with governmental institutions in its hands, the

party made healthcare and housing credits more accessible, distributed

free food, increased grants for students, improved and renewed the

infrastructure of poorer urban districts, and made minority rights for

Kurds and non-Muslims a priority. Reforms were not confined to

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politics. The party also managed to get the Turkish economy back on

track after the economic crisis of 2001 by following International

Monetary Fund guidelines. Between 2002 and 2011, the Turkish

economy grew by an average rate of 7.5 percent annually. Lower

inflation and interest rates led to a major increase in domestic

consumption. And the Turkish economy began to attract

unprecedented foreign direct investments, thanks to a disciplined

privatization program. The average per capita income rose from

US$2,800 in 2001 to around US$10,000 in 2011, exceeding annual

income of some of the new EU members. Yet even as the AKP adopted

a more liberal order, Kemalist and secular elements of the Turkish

society grew increasingly suspicious that it had a hidden Islamic agenda.

They feared that the AKP was exploiting the EU membership process

to diminish the military’s political and social role and, eventually, the

Kemalist and secular legacy.

Tensions between the AKP and the military climaxed after Erdoğan

announced he would nominate Foreign

Minister Abdullah Gül for the

presidency. The presidency is a

prestigious though ceremonial post—but

also the last bastion of secularism in the

eyes of the military and the opposition.

On April 27, 2007, the generals staged the

country’s first “e-coup”. They posted a

warning on the military’s website that “if

Abdullah Gül

Source: Wikipedia

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

12

necessary, the Turkish Armed Forces will not hesitate to make their

position and stance abundantly clear as the absolute defenders of

secularism”. Given Turkey’s history of military interventions, the note

was a thinly veiled threat that a more conventional coup might be in the

offing. In a sign of the AKP’s growing self-confidence, Erdoğan did not

back off. He instead decided to defy the generals by calling early

elections. They balked, for instance, at AKP measures to increase the

ratio of civilians to military officers on the National Security Council,

elect a civilian to head the National Security Council, remove military

representatives from the boards of the Council of Higher Education

and the Radio and Television High Council, and grant broadcasting and

cultural rights to Kurds. Internal divisions deepened between 2006 and

2008. The AKP had long wanted to lift the ban on headscarves in

universities and in public offices, in order to end the discrimination

against graduates of Islamic high schools the AKP had strong popular

support for both steps. More than 50 percent of Turkish women

covered their heads. Party leaders preferred to promote reform by

building a national consensus rather than by challenging the secularist

establishment head-on. But secularists remained wary. They pointed to

Erdoğan’s brief attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004, his

appointment of religious conservatives to bureaucratic positions, and

AKP attempts to discourage the sale of alcohol.

The AKP won a landslide victory in mid-2007 with almost 47 percent

of the votes—compared with 34 percent in 2002 when it came to

power. The election was a public rebuke to the generals. The AKP

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crowned its victory when parliament elected Gül to the presidency. But

the military shadow still loomed over Turkey. The top brass stayed away

from the inauguration. And in 2008, Turkey’s chief prosecutor tried to

have the AKP closed on grounds that it pursued an Islamism agenda to

subvert the secular republic. The party survived this “constitutional

coup” attempt by a whisker. The court voted against closure by just one

vote. Between 2008 and 2011, the AKP consolidated its gains. Despite

the political turbulence, Turkey weathered the global financial crisis of

2008 with quite a remarkable success. The economy continued double-

digit growth rates in 2009, after a brief recession. By 2012, Turkey’s

unemployment rate and budget deficit were at record lows. In June

2011, the AKP won its third consecutive electoral victory with nearly

50 percent of the vote. The country’s global stature also reached new

heights. As uprisings shook the Middle East, reformers in Egypt,

Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia often cited Turkey and the

AKP as models.

AKP also consolidated its supremacy over the military—a first since

the creation of the modern state. On July 29, 2011, the military’s chief

of staff resigned after a disagreement with Erdoğan about staff

promotions. The same day, the heads of the army, navy, and air force

requested early retirement. By early 2012, half of all Turkish admirals

and one out of ten active-duty generals were in jail for plotting against

the government. It was a paradigm shift for a country that had

experienced three military coups and constant military meddling for

almost a century. The judiciary launched the case in 2007, shortly after

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

14

AKP’s second electoral victory, claiming that Ergenekon had planned a

coup. The prosecutor accused hundreds of military officials, journalists,

and political activists of involvement. Leaked documents claimed the

Ergenekon network was tied to several bombings and assassinations,

which were intended to create chaos and justify a military coup. AKP

critics contended that the Erdoğan government used the case to silence

its secular opponents. The AKP responded that it did not control the

judiciary—which had even tried to ban the party as recently as 2008.

Opposition fears were reflected in the court case against Ergenekon, a

shadowy organization with possible ties to the military.

The AKP has done nothing

formal to alter women’s rights.

On the contrary, by pushing for

EU membership and

harmonizing Turkish laws with

European standards, the AKP

has eliminated some of the legal

obstacles that discriminate against women in the labor market and civil

code. But the AKP is also an extremely conservative and almost

patriarchal political party. Erdoğan’s understandings of family values

and gender equality are not progressive. In 2011, the AKP changed the

legislation dealing with dress codes in public universities and legalized

hejab (türban). The restrictive dress code for civil servants, however,

remains formally in place.

Source: Vox Europe

April 2016

15

Recent developments have witnessed Turkey’s star begin to fade,

with the state slipping slowly into authoritarian rule. Its once-vibrant

tourist industry is in tatters, particularly since a series of terrorist attacks

and policy blunders have seen Turkey becoming isolated, both

regionally and internationally. The once bright star now better

resembles a typical Middle Eastern Mukhabarat country than possible

EU member, with an oppressive state apparatus and weak institutional

framework dominating the modern Turkish state.4 It increasingly

cracked down on its critics, especially those in the media. Economic

instability and a questionable foreign policy have a negative impact on

the foreign image of President Erdoğan as a leader of the country.

Turkey’s relations with Russia have become very cold, despite the fact

that Russia is still an important market for the Turkish economy.

Besides curbed trade routes to its South and East due to serious

problems in Syria and Iraq and also with Iran and Egypt, Turkey is likely

to suffer from its trade with Russia, especially in tourism and

construction sectors, because of the Syria situation. The government

could try to close the gap, especially in construction and finance sectors

by attracting Gulf capital but that might not be enough. Turkey needs

to get more foreign investment but there are security and court

independence problems affecting that. Moreover Turkey has

complicated relationships with the US and the EU. Recent

developments have shown that Erdoğan had adopted the course on the

4 Edelman Eric, Cornell Svante Lobel Aaron, and Karaveli Halil, (October 2015). “Turkey Transformed: The Origins and Evolution of Authoritarianism and Islamization under the AKP”. Bipartisan Policy Center. Retrieved from http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/BPC-Turkey-Transformed.pdf

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

16

rapprochement with the US, NATO and EU. Nonetheless, it is too

early to say anything about a success in this field.

Since the Gezi protests and the corruption charges against top

officials in the government in 2013, there has been a decisive push

towards authoritarianism. The centralization of authority has given

more powers to the security apparatus within the Turkish state. The

government has strongly opposed the internal dissident movements

fearing stability problems; this has led to a significant reduction in the

independence of the Judiciary. As such, there has been a continuing

politicization of judicial decisions, with more and journalists facing

arrests and imprisonment. The seizing of independent media outlets by

court-appointed trustees, moreover, has also done little to promote

economic and political stability for foreign investors. Meanwhile, purges

of ‘Gulenist’ elements within the police and security forces by the

Courts of Peace have left the Turkish security apparatus weakened and

lacking much-needed experience and capabilities.

A Peace to end all Peace

After a decade in power, Erdoğan had also failed to follow through

on promises of a new constitution and reforms that would address

pivotal issues facing the country—the Kurdish question, human rights,

and freedom of expression. Because of mounting Kurdish terrorism

and Erdoğan’s populist instincts, the more power Erdoğan won at the

polls, the less interested he appeared in taking those steps. The status

of Turkey’s Kurdish population has been the AKP’s Achilles’ heel for

years. Kurdish aspirations have been thwarted largely by legal and

April 2016

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political obstacles that are the remnants of the 1982 constitution written

under Kenan Evren’s military rule. Despite the AKP’s public

commitment to deal with Kurdish expectations, Erdoğan has not spent

the political capital needed to expand the limited political space for

Turkey’s ethnic groups. He now seems to have resorted to the classic

Turkish mantra that there can be no democratization when the country

is facing terrorism. As a result, violence has only grown in the Kurdish

southeast. Back in March 2013 the Peace process began with covert

talks between the AKP government and the jailed historical leader of

the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, who in the later part of his life apparently

had decided to change himself from terrorist to peacemaker. Hence

Öcalan, from his prison cell, exhorted his guerrilla fighters to renounce

their armed revolution against

Turkey in exchange of actual

political reforms, including regional

and local autonomies for the

Kurdish populated areas.

Accordingly, the PKK’s armed

militants would leave Turkey for

Iraqi Kurdistan, with the silent help

of the KRG, and the cease-fire would allow the government to make

key legal changes and constitutional amendments.5 However, tensions

between PKK and the Islamist Kurds erupted and as the latter

5 Gunter Michael M., (2014). “The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process Stalled in Neutral”. Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 1. Retrieved from http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_16_1_2014_gunter.pdf

Abdullah Öcalan in ‘93

Source: Adnkronos

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

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complained of being abandoned by the government to the PKK’s

mercy.

The civil war in Syria worsened the situation, since the PKK’s

political base identifies with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the

main armed Kurdish group in northern Syria that fights Daesh.

Unsurprisingly, the secular PYD quickly became an ally of both the

West and Russia. However, the PKK did not keep this promise. Its

armed militants did cease their fire, but they never fully left Turkey.

Also, thanks to the government’s desire to avoid any conflict, the PKK

began imposing its own law and order in certain southeastern provinces,

collecting taxes, setting up political judicial courts, and establishing

checkpoints. Ankara became worried about an empowered Kurdish

movement, as it sees it as a terrorist organization. It must be stressed,

however, that the PKK does not represent all Kurds, as KRG’s

President Massoud Barzani himself has repeatedly pointed out.

However, Erdoğan’s political vision does indeed complicate the scene

by adding a personal problem: the grudge against the HDP for blocking

the presidential system. That is probably why Erdoğan is now not only

taking measures against the PKK, but also pushing for the

imprisonment of Kurdish and other key figures of the opposition. The

PKK/HDP’s response was to condemn the AKP as the supporter of

the jihadists in Syria, especially Daesh. The AKP took great pains to

explain that it condemns Daesh as a terror group, but many, including

the PKK/HDP, were not convinced. The effects of these repressions

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were demonstrated by the recent spate of bombings in Ankara and

Istanbul.

President Erdoğan's months-long (or, better, years-long) war against

the PKK has become almost ridiculously destructive and bloody deadly,

and the violence has spilled over into western Turkey. The PKK cannot

be eliminated only militarily and no negotiated settlement with the

organization is a suicide. With security efforts focused on dissidents –

especially given the broadening definition of what constitutes a

‘terrorist’ – there has been a lack of internal security when it has come

to capturing potential PKK and Daesh terrorists. The bombings in

February and March apparently committed by TAK (a splinter faction

of the PKK) have shown that the government’s war against the PKK

can and will be brought to the major cities of western Turkey. The

attacks in Ankara Ulus Bus Station (despite US Embassy warnings of

an upcoming attack) are another telling example of recent intelligence

failures. On top of this, there has been virtually no one brought to

account for these attacks. In this context of impasse, AKP is trying to

manage a crisis that becomes harder to control everyday.6

The growing casualty toll among security forces is but one dimension

of the crisis. During the last week of March, 21 soldiers and police were

6 Bozarslan Mahmut, (April 5, 2016). “Sur insansızlaştırılıyor mu? (Is Sur being depopulated?)”. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2016/04/turkey-pkk-clashes-ankara-pledges-urban-renewal.html. English version “How Turkey seeks to kill two birds with one stone in Diyarbakir”. Al-Monitor http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/turkey-pkk-clashes-ankara-pledges-urban-renewal.html.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

20

killed in the urban warfare raging in the southeast. Most of them were

killed by PKK-made roadside bombs, in booby-trapped buildings, by

vehicle-borne bomb attacks and by sniper fire. According to official

figures, fatalities among security forces since July 2015 have reached

420. The local population of major towns and densely populated

districts of the southwest, above all Diyarbakır, is suffering the military

and social effects of a not-yet-declared civil war. Between July and

November, then again since December 2015, armed clashes raged

inside the ancient walls of the district of Sur, the historic heart of

Diyarbakir in mainly

Kurdish southeast

Turkey. Using heavy

weapons and tanks, the

Turkish forces battled to

regain control of

residential

neighborhoods, where

young militants of the

PKK opposed the

effective and deadly

tactics of the guerrilla

warfare. In the western

part of the country, not

anymore safe from the

effects of the shadow war, the government and intelligence forces, for

their part, have stubbornly refused to accept the blame, despite the fact

Main Battle Tank M60A3 in Nisêbîn for “police operations”

Source: Twitter

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that the government appears helpless to safeguard their citizens from

further attacks. More recently, however, the shooting down of a Russian

jet has seen Russia and Turkey pursue the start of a possible ‘hot’ war,

with no end in sight to the seething animosity that has developed

between the two. A growing Kurdish proto-state – which Moscow now

supports – adds another dangerous dimension to the rivalry. Yet the

AKP had almost no problems in Turkey’s relations with the United

States. The AKP even decided to host NATO radar installations needed

for the new US missile-defense system against Iran.

The current strategy of Erdoğan’s and his allies includes: a tough

confrontation with PKK and the Kurds, both inside and outside the

country; playing the pivot to the US, NATO, and EU in the Turkish

policy over the Syrian crisis, and the cooling of the relations with Russia

and its allies (i.e. Iran). It’s a tactical approach set by the domestic

situation in Turkey and Erdoğan’s determination to maintain as much

power as he can after his personal victories at the elections. Strategic

developments will depend on number of foreign and domestic factors

including the ongoing standoff between the US and Russia in the

Ukraine, in the Middle East, and in the Caucasus, and the economic

situation in Turkey. The nation’s economy, which had languished for

decades, was radically transformed by a comprehensive neo-liberal

economic agenda that heralded robust economic growth. This growth,

in step with continued political reform, eventually saw Turkey

mentioned as an unlikely candidate for EU membership.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

22

Turkey remains deeply polarized, with its opposition parties ever

more concerned about creeping authoritarianism and Islamism.

Opponents call the government a civilian dictatorship and deplore its

use of the judicial system to neuter the military, the opposition media,

and rival political parties. So it appears that under the AKP, Turkey is

still not a “liberal democracy”, despite the pattern of multiparty

elections. Compared to the lost decade of the 1990s, however, it has

become a more multifaceted democracy, with elections, public opinion,

opposition parties, parliament, the media, and civil society all exerting

more power. For the first time in the Republic’s history, Turkey’s

performance is also totally in civilian hands. The military, once

empowered to check civilian politics, is no longer strong enough either

to step in or to threaten to take action. And the party with Islamic roots

has undertaken more reforms required for EU entry than any of

Turkey’s secular parties.

However, many Turks (and Kurds), if not the majority, still support

the government’s agenda, especially in the country’s conservative and

still heavily rural heartland. In the western regions of Turkey, however,

the story is different, with people asking how many bombings occur

before someone is held accountable. Furthermore, as the conflict in the

country’s East reached new levels with government-led military

operations occurring on a daily basis, many Kurds and Turks alike are

fleeing the fighting.7 Internal displacement is now at record levels. Aside

7 Yavuz, M. H. and Özcan, N. A. (2015). “Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question”. Middle East Policy, 22: 73–87.

April 2016

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from this, Turkey is also looking more and more like a Middle Eastern

state; the shrinking presence of NGOs, critical media, and “civil

society” are in stark contrast to its “western oriented” and “liberal”

society only a few years ago. Furthermore, as the government pursues

its push for an executive presidential system in the ensuing chaos

(despite deep polarization between the political parties and civil society

on this issue), many are asking whether such a move is pushing Turkey

to the brink.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

24

“War at home, war in the world”

Turkey-Kurdish relations in the Mesopotamian cauldron

Francesco Ventura

The President of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was

in Washington D.C. to attend the Nuclear Security Summit on Tuesday

March 29 to Friday April 1. Erdoğan's visit has become a pitiless picture

of Turkey's international standing and a useful index of Turkey-

American relations.

Erdoğan's wish was to enjoy a formal meeting with US President

Barack Obama, but he was told he would meet only the Vice President

Joe Biden. Erdoğan's frustration for not meeting Obama erupted the

first time at Washington’s high-end St. Regis Hotel, during an off-the-

record dinner. In front of some of the most high-profile academics and

former US officials, Erdoğan vigorously blamed the White House's

support to the Kurdish People's Protection Units, YPG, in Syria. The

YPG are linked to the Democratic Union Party, PYD, that is seen by

Turkey as the mere Syrian wing of the Kurdistan's Workers Party, PKK.

The latter is considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the

European Union and the United States. The Turkish President’s speech

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was fundamentally based on one assumption: Washington needs Turkey

for its grand strategy, and Obama should not take Turkey for granted8.

Erdoğan clearly wanted to use the summit to debate with Obama his

policy in Syria, and particularly the Kurdish situation. Given that it was

hardly possible, Erdoğan used public events to blame American policy

towards the Kurds.

On Thursday, an Erdoğan speech was planned at the Washington-

based think tank Brookings Institution. There, a small group of

protesters gathered standing in front of the think tank building, holding

a large sign reading “Erdoğan: war criminal on the loose”, chanting

“baby-killer”, and waving Kurdish flags and other pro-Kurd signs. The

Turkish security officials' reaction was initially hilarious, shouting in the

face of protesters in order to silence them. Then, the situation became

serious. Turkish officials chased, scolded, kicked and intimidated

journalists and protesters, forcing Washington D.C. officers to get

between them. There were also confrontations between Turkish

security and D.C. police, because Turks wanted officers to remove

protesters, but policemen refused9. Then, Brookings President Strob

Talbott threatened a Turkish official to cancel Erdoğan's speech

8 Hudson, J. (2016, March 30). “Erdogan Uses Closed-Door Meeting to Blast Obama Administration”. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/srNegT.

9 Dreazen, Y., McLeary, P., Francis, D. (2016, March 31). “Chaos Outside of Turkish President Erdogan’s Washington’Speech”. Retrieved from Foreign Policy, https://goo.gl/KvlRnj.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

26

because of the Turkish security agents’ behavior towards Brookings's

guests10.

Finally, Erdoğan managed to discuss with Obama during a brief

bilateral meeting on the sidelines of a dinner at the White House.

However, the aforementioned events are clear signals of distance

between Ankara and Washington, and of Kurdish question's weight on

Turkish foreign relations. Turkey is blamed by Western countries for

journalists' clampdown and Kurdish cities curfews, in addition to

Ankara's ambiguity towards the Daesh.

Obama extended condolences to the Turkish President for people

killed and injured in the terrorist attack in Diyarbakır that occurred 31

March, and reaffirmed the American support for Turkey's security and

mutual struggle against terrorism. Notwithstanding the words for the

occasion, Washington and Ankara remain very polarized on who are

terrorists. Erdoğan considers the Kurdish-Syrian militias as affiliated to

the PKK, therefore terrorists to fight and destroy. Obama sees Turkish

repression of the PKK within national territory as licit, however in Syria

he formally considers the Daesh, not the PYD, as the main terrorist

group to fight. Moreover, Syrian Kurds are the most important boots

on the ground against Daesh. Therefore, Turkey wants to bomb the

YPG in Syria, while the United States support them. This difference

marks the distance between the two NATO allies.

10 Dreazen, Y. (2016, April 1). Exclusive: Brookings Threatened To Cancel Speech by Turkish Leader. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/9F2w3p.

April 2016

27

The PYD/YPG and the peace process stand-off in Turkey

Many are the causes for the standoff in the “resolution process”, as

the Turkey-PKK peace negotiation is called in Turkey, started in 2009

and then stopped in summer 2015. The PYD/YPG successes on

battleground in Syrian conflict is one of them. The PYD is an

organization that was established in 2003 by a decision of the PKK

leader, Abdullah Öcalan. Along with Turkish PKK, Iranian PJAK and

Iraqi PÇDK, Syrian PYD constitutes the Group of Communities in

Kurdistan, KCK, founded by the PKK to put into practice Öcalan's

political project of a trans-border democratic confederalism.

In autumn 2014, Daesh jihadists put under siege Kobane, a little town

along the Syrian-Turkish border, mostly inhabited by Kurds. On that

occasion, Turkey opposed those Turkish Kurds who wanted to go to

Kobane to support and help the YPG and YPJ (Women's Protection

Units) against the Daesh11. By contrast, Ankara helped Iraqi Kurdish

Peshmerga to enter in Syria through Turkish territory in order to

mitigate the PYD and PKK presence. Peshmerga are the military forces

of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, guided by the

nationalist conservative Kurdistan Democratic Party, PDK, that is

Turkey's ally.

11 Letsch, C., Traynor, I. (2014, October 8). “Kobani: anger grows as Turkey stops Kurds from aiding militias in Syria”. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/mkJ0nY.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

28

During the siege of Kobane, Öcalan himself said if Kobane had

fallen, even the peace process would be interrupted. Kobane didn't fall.

However, Turkey was globally perceived as the historical enemy of the

Kurds. Furthermore, Kobane became the symbol of Kurdish resistance

in front of a two-headed enemy: the Daesh and Turkey. Ankara wanted

to use Kobane as a battlefield to make the PKK/PYD recognize that

the Kurds needed Turkey in

Syria12. This strategy failed, because

the YPG and YPJ fought back

Daesh militias and imposed

themselves as the main fighting

group against the Daesh.

Movements of solidarity with

Kobane resistance spread all

around Western countries, making

Kurdish militias the heroes

opposing the brutal cut-throats of

self-declared Caliphate of the

Daesh.

This narrative was clearly counterproductive for Turkish interests.

Erdoğan has always said the PYD/YPG and the PKK are terrorists,

and there is no ‘good terrorists versus bad terrorists’, but only terrorists.

However, for Turkey it is unacceptable that PYD militias could expand

12 Cagaptay, S. (2014, October 8). “Turkey and the Battle for Kobane”. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/UL4DfV.

Posters in support of the Kurdish resistance in

Kobane

Source Public Seminar

April 2016

29

their leadership over the whole Rojava, as the Kurds call cantons of

northern Syria.

It is the YPG's success that pushed Ankara to put the peace-process

with the PKK on standby. The Kurds in Syria were galvanized by

victories that made stronger the PKK wing, hostile to dialogue with

Turkish government. Syrian Kurds obtained US support against Daesh,

so the PKK/PYD thought the time had arrived to achieve their goal of

a Kurdish homeland by armed conflict. Consequently, Ankara

suspended peace talks with the PKK, and started to shell the Kurds in

Syria in order to weaken them.

Fog of war in Rojava

Seeing its strategy to prevent a PKK/PYD hegemony in northern

Syria failing, Turkey started to shell the Kurds beyond the border.

Ankara tried to convince its NATO allies (read: United States) to stop

supporting the Kurds in Syria. At the beginning of the war in the Arab

State, Turkey proposed to establish a no-fly zone in northern Syrian

regions in order to train the Free Syrian Army against Syrian President

Bashar al-Asad and to fit out refugees camps. Ankara's unofficial

purpose was clearly to prevent the Kurds to take power in those regions.

However, the Turkish request was never accepted and, furthermore, the

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

30

United States began to support militarily YPG, supplying arms and

ammunitions13.

Turkey's irritability on this topic is very understandable. Ankara sees

the Daesh as a threat; however, it sees a PKK/PYD-led autonomous

Rojava as a vital threat to its existence, for the following reasons:

1) an autonomous Rojava prevents Turkey to reach the Middle East,

given that Syria is considered by Turkey its door to the region. The

YPG don't want Turkey to be involved in the region, although the

PYD supports the PKK operations in Turkey;

2) the YPG fight against Turkmen and other Turkey's allies in Syria.

What seems very unacceptable to Turkey is that the PYD/YPG don't

limit their operations to Kurdish areas, but also in regions and towns

where the Kurds are a small minority, like Manbij in the Aleppo

Governorate, that the PYD/YPG still consider “historically

Kurdish”, basing their argument on notions on Middle Ages and

Salah al-Din14;

3) given that many Arabs and Turkmen have fled, Kurdish militias

are altering the demographic composition. They don't allow the

Arabs and Turkmen to go back home, but they don't even allow

opposing Kurdish factions, as Iraqi peshmerga, entering into Rojava;

13 Rogin, J., Lake, E. (2015, October 15). “U.S. Airdrop in Syria Ends Up Arming the Kurds”. Bloomberg View. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/nh3LrE.

14 Balanche, F. (2016, January 5). “The Die Is Cast: The Kurds Cross The Euphrates”. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/KAOwrh.

April 2016

31

4) the Kurds affiliated to the KCK have trans-border political goals,

so Turkey perceive their operations in Syria as a direct threat to

Turkish territorial integrity;

5) the PYD supports the PKK in Turkey, and Ankara fears that they

can carry their military capacity and experience acquired in Syria into

Turkey, in addition to transferring weapons. This is a controversy

that directly involves the United States, given that American weapons

provided to the YPG can then be used in Turkey by the PKK;

6) an autonomous Rojava can become a safe haven for external

powers eager to hit Turkey, i.e. Russia, after Ankara and Moscow

have ended at loggerheads;

7) Rojava can become a fertile bastion for Kurdish activity and a safe

haven for the PKK itself. PKK/PYD members could directly plan

strikes to Turkey from here, which would be a terrible outcome for

Turkey.

The PYD aims to ensure territorial continuity between its Afrin

canton, in the West, and the rest of Rojava, in the East. However, the

slice of territory between Euphrates and Afrin is populated mostly by

Arabs and Turkmen. Turkey refuses to let the Kurds control the entire

border and has warned it will attack them if they cross the Euphrates,

considering it a red line.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

32

At the end of last

December, the

Democratic Forces of

Syria, an alliance of

PYD and some Arab

militias, seized the

Tishrin Dam, West of

Euphrates15. The

move pushed Turkey

to intervene in some

way. Although the villages around the dam are out of Turkish artillery

range, Ankara could try to hit the Kurds in other ways. However, it is a

political conundrum for Turkey, because that portion of Syria is the

main corridor used by jihadists to go to and from Europe. If Turkey hit

the Kurds which are fighting back Daesh jihadists, Ankara will be seen

as a friend of terrorists. On the other hand, Turkey could insist on the

conviction that the PYD is affiliated to the PKK, which is an

organization considered by both the European Union and NATO as

terrorist. In any case, a Turkish military intervention in Syria could

broaden the conflict globally. Therefore, Ankara has to ponder how to

hit its Kurdish enemy in Syria and ensure its territory, without

provoking a war with other powers.

15 Ibid.

April 2016

33

The United States will have to choose either to care about Turkish

vital interests or to support the Kurds against the Daesh in that piece

of land. Perhaps, the way out has been provided by the PYD itself. On

Thursday 17 March, Syrian Kurds unilaterally declared the “Federation

of Northern Syria” that unites three Kurdish majority areas into one

entity16. The Syrian regime, Russia, Turkey and the United States along

with many other Syrian fighting factions reacted to it, considering it out

of discussion, because no single part can unilaterally decide to affect

Syria's territorial integrity17.

Perhaps, Washington will be forced to restrain Kurdish ambitions

and, by doing so, will try to reassure Turkey's concerns. If that will not

happen, Turkey could seriously think to increase its war against the

PKK and PYD, even beyond the border, somehow.

Russian shadows

As mentioned before, one of the biggest threats hidden behind

Turkey-Kurdish warfare is the Russian support to the Kurds. After

Turkey downed a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 on 24 November 2015, Ankara

and Moscow have become rivals on many different topics. Indeed,

Turkey and Russia had already had different geopolitical interests, so

16 Middle East Eye (2016, March 17). Syrian Kurds declare new federation in bid for recognition. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/5rVUZx.

17 Sheikho, K. (2016, April 1). “Who opposes Syrian Kurdish self-rule?”. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/Z9pbqj.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

34

the shooting down of the Russian jet was the occasion to freeze their

relations.

Already last October, Russia invited the Syrian Kurds to open an

office in Moscow, in order to coordinate Russian operations to target

the Daesh with the PYD and the Syrian government18. However, after

the downing of the Russian SU-24 fighter bomber, Moscow increased

its support to the PYD/YPG, and last February, it promised to protect

Kurdish fighters in Syria in case of a ground offensive by Turkey; a

move that would directly lead to the “big war” between Russia and

NATO19.

In December, the co-leader of the Turkish left-wing pro-Kurdish

Peoples' Democratic Party, HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, was welcomed

in Moscow by Russian Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov. On that

occasion, Demirtaş announced that the HDP would have opened an

office in Moscow. Russia stated that it would have supported a seat for

PYD at the Geneva talks (the negotiating table for the Syrian war),

although the American opposition to that stopped the Syrian Kurds

from being represented at the negotiations in Geneva.

All these events show how the Turkey-Kurdish conflict interrelates

with other international topics. The Russian involvement in the Kurdish

fight against Turkey could have some unpleasant outcomes in other

18 Stratfor (2015, December 23). Why a Pro-Kurdish Russia Infuriates Turkey. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/ZGVnyX.

19 Meyer, H., Kravchenko, S. (2016, February 18). “Kurds Warn Turkey of ‘Big War’ With Russia If Troops Enter Syria”. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/ZfMIfj.

April 2016

35

regions. The two main regions where the confrontation between Turkey

and Russia could spill over are the Black Sea and Caucasus.

Since the rupture of the relations between Ankara and Moscow, a

rapprochement between Turkey and Ukraine has begun. Last January,

in Davos, the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and the Turkish

Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu discussed common threats.

Davutoğlu flew to Kyiv in February, and along with the Ukrainian

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, announced that the free trade talks

would be resumed, and that Turkey would lend Ukraine US$50 million

at low interest. Later, the two countries' navies conducted maneuvers in

the Black Sea, with special attention to the Russian threat20.

On March 9-10, Poroshenko paid a visit to Ankara for a high-level

strategic cooperation council meeting as the guest of President Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan. The Ukrainian President was accompanied by Chief

of the General Staff Viktor Muzhenko, who met with his Turkish

counterpart Hulusi Akar, and Crimean Tatar representative Abdülcemil

Kırımoğlu and Rıfat Çubarov, the head of the World Crimean Tatars

Congress, given that Turkey considers itself as the protector of Tatars

in Crimea21. The high-level strategic cooperation council was summed

20 Varfolomeyev, O. (2016). “Ukraine, Turkey May Forge Anti-Russian Alliance in Black Sea”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13(50). Retrieved from http://goo.gl/01w15Y.

21 Hürriyet Daily News (2016, March 9). “Turkey, Ukraine boost ties amid growing

tensions with Russia”. Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/4LkHBM.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

36

up with a condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine. The

declaration even called for joint steps to “de-occupy Crimea”22.

More worrying is the situation in Caucasus. On one hand, like in the

past, Turkey may decide to revive the Chechen guerrilla against Russia

as a response to Moscow's support to Kurdish fighters. On the other

hand, more problematic is the unresolved dispute between Armenia and

Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Turkey backs the Turkic Republic of Azerbaijan, where were

developed critical projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and

a railway connecting Baku and Kars, in Turkey23.

22 Varfolomeyev, O. (2016). “Ukraine, Turkey May Forge Anti-Russian Alliance in Black

Sea”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13(50). Retrieved from http://goo.gl/01w15Y.

23 Mankoff, J. (2016, January 6). Best of Enemies: The Russia-Turkey Confrontation beyond Syria.

Retrieved from http://goo.gl/zyD0gU.

Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia

Source: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

April 2016

37

Russia is the historic protector of the Armenians, which are

Christians. In Armenia, Moscow maintains significant military facilities,

and as its engagement in Syria intensified, also began to reinforce its

military bases in the Caucasian country24. Since last December, Russia

has been continuing to reinforce its military contingent in Armenia,

which has supposedly asked Russia to deploy its troops to the Turkey

border, as it fears an armed attack on the country25.

On 2 April, an Azeri helicopter was shot down by the Armenian

Army in Nagorno-Karabakh. As the director of the Regional Studies

Centre in the Armenian capital Yerevan Richard Giragosian said,

Turkey and Russia will likely be “limited to being secondary factors and

marginal actors”26 at this stage. However, commenting the news,

Erdoğan said Ankara will support Azerbaijan to the end27.

The event is a clear signal of the way the Kurdish issue might affect

other Turkish foreign policy topics. And heavily.

24 Melvin, N. (2016, March 4). Middle East Conflict Risks Overspill into the Caucasus. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/a0dc3D.

25 World Bulletin (2015, December 14). “Russia continues military buildup around Turkey”. World Bulletin. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/0xZhV8.

26 Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2016, April 4). Karabakh Crisis Mounts. Retrieved from https://goo.gl/sxcVFO.

27 World Bulletin (2016, April 4). “Turkey to back Azerbaijan ‘to the end’”. World Bulletin. Retrieved from http://goo.gl/J1SsBY.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

38

The bastion of NATO...once more?

To sum up, the Kurdish question is negatively affecting Turkish

foreign policy. Ankara is blamed by Washington for its policy against

Syrian Kurds and Kurds crackdown at home. At the same time Kurdish

rebellion is backed by Moscow, with serious possible outcomes in the

Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea region.

Nevertheless, Turkey remains an important NATO ally, especially for

containing Russian foreign policy, which is still the main reason of the

Atlantic Alliance existence. Both the European Union and NATO

should consider that a destabilisation of Turkey would reverberate on

fragile Balkans, already stressed by migrant pressure. And from here to

the rest of Europe. Perhaps Erdoğan might be part of the problem and

not the solution, notwithstanding a stabilised Turkey is a geopolitical

necessity for all.

Turkey was the main bastion of NATO against Russia during the

Cold War. Is it still its fate nowadays? What is sure is that a war in

Turkey will mean a 'big war' in the region. So, paraphrasing the famous

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's motto, which is impressed on Turkish Foreign

Ministry website, “peace at home, peace in the world”, new Turkish

political course seems to conform to another motto: war at home, war

in the world. And that is not a good news.

April 2016

39

References

Balanche, F. (2016, January 5). The Die Is Cast: The Kurds Cross

The Euphrates, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

http://goo.gl/KAOwrh.

Bozarslan Mahmut, (April 5, 2016). “Sur insansızlaştırılıyor mu? (Is

Sur being depopulated?)”. Al-Monitor. Retrieved from

http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/originals/2016/04/turkey-

pkk-clashes-ankara-pledges-urban-renewal.html.

Cagaptay, S. (2014, October 8). Turkey and the Battle for Kobane,

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://goo.gl/UL4DfV.

Dreazen, Y. (2016, April 1). Exclusive: Brookings Threatened To

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https://goo.gl/9F2w3p.

Dreazen, Y., McLeary, P., Francis, D. (2016, March 31). Chaos

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Edelman Eric, Cornell Svante Lobel Aaron, and Karaveli Halil,

(October 2015). “Turkey Transformed: The Origins and Evolution

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content/uploads/2015/10/BPC-Turkey-Transformed.pdf.

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Gunter Michael M., (2014). “The Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process

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_gunter.pdf.

Hudson, J. (2016, March 30). Erdogan Uses Closed-Door Meeting to

Blast Obama Administration, Foreign Policy, https://goo.gl/srNegT.

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amid growing tensions with Russia. Hürriyet Daily News,

http://goo.gl/4LkHBM.

Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2016, April 4). Karabakh Crisis

Mounts, IWPR, https://goo.gl/sxcVFO.

Karaveli Halil, (October 8,2014). “Kobani and the Future of Turkish

Democracy. Why the Military May Get the Upper Hand”. Foreign

Affairs. Retrieved from

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2014-10-

08/kobani-and-future-turkish-democracy.

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Verlag.

Letsch, C., Traynor, I. (2014, October 8). Kobani: anger grows as

Turkey stops Kurds from aiding militias in Syria, The Guardian,

http://goo.gl/mkJ0nY.

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Mankoff, J. (2016, January 6). Best of Enemies: The Russia-Turkey

Confrontation beyond Syria, CSIS, http://goo.gl/zyD0gU.

Melvin, N. (2016, March 4). Middle East Conflict Risks Overspill into the

Caucasus, SIPRI, http://goo.gl/a0dc3D.

Meyer, H., Kravchenko, S. (2016, February 18). Kurds Warn Turkey

of 'Big War' With Russia If Troops Enter Syria, Bloomberg,

http://goo.gl/ZfMIfj.

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bid for recognition, Middle East Eye, http://goo.gl/5rVUZx.

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Varfolomeyev, O. (2016). Ukraine, Turkey May Forge Anti-Russian

Alliance in Black Sea. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 13(50),

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April 2016

43

About the Authors

Federico De Renzi

Advisory Board of Mediterranean Affairs. Turkologist, MA in

Turkish Language and Literature at Sapienza University of Rome. Since

2005, he worked as a political analyst and expert for the Turkic and

Islamic world with the Italian Journal of Geopolitics "Limes" and other

scientific journals. He was Former Lecturer of Altaic and Turkish

Studies at Sapienza University of Rome and several other universities

and academic institutions. It has often been guest on Radio RAI Radio1

(Oggi2000, Tra Cielo e Terra, Voci del Mattino), Radio Vaticana and

many other radios, interviewed on issues such as ethnic minorities in

Central Asia. He currently organizes conferences and seminars with

several universities and scientific institutions (Roma Tre University, La

Civiltà Cattolica) on issues related to Islam and Turkey and he is

involved in specific projects on the political and cultural history of

Turkey, Central, and Eastern Eurasia.

Francesco Ventura

MA in International Relations and European Studies at University of

Florence, won 2014 èStoria award and published “La nuova geopolitica

turca e il caso del controllo del bacino del Tigri e dell’Eufrate” (Gorizia,

LEG, 2014). Cooperates with think tanks and journals as Il Nodo di

Gordio, Limes, and the London-based King’s College EUCERS and

some online news magazines as Altitude and Remocontro.

The New Turkey's attitude in handling Domestic and Foreign Policies

44

Ed. Mediterranean Affairs©

www.mediterraneanaffairs.com

Cover image source: The Guardian

April 2016

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