DISASTER RESPONSE AND RECOVERY WORKING GROUP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: COVID-19 Response Disaster Response and Recovery Working Group Presented to the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committee of the Federal Communications Commission October 29, 2020
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
DISASTERRESPONSEANDRECOVERYWORKINGGROUP
REPORTANDRECOMMENDATIONS:COVID-19Response
Disaster Response and Recovery Working Group
Presented to the Broadband Deployment Advisory Committeeof the Federal Communications Commission
3 Background 73.1 COVID-19 in the U.S. 73.2 Societal Impacts of the Pandemic 7
3.2.1 Remote Work 93.2.2 Distance Learning 103.2.3 Telehealth 113.2.4 Other Societal Impacts 11
3.3 Local Jurisdiction Impacts of the Pandemic 123.3.1 Stay at Home Orders and Access Restrictions 123.3.2 Effect on Municipal Workforces and Processes 133.3.3 Work with Critical Infrastructure Owners/Operators 14
4 Broadband User Preparedness and Response 264.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions 264.2 Pandemic Response 27
4.2.1 Transitioning to Work-from-Home 274.2.2 Deciding If, How, and When to Return to Work 284.2.3 Remote Learning 304.2.4 Communication with Stakeholders 31
4.3 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to End-Users 324.3.1 TakeStepstoImproveBroadbandAvailability 324.3.2 TakeStepstoImproveBroadbandAdoption 334.3.3 ImplementDistanceEducationBestPractices 34
ii
4.3.4 ImplementVirtualWorkforceBestPractices 355 Municipal Permitting Preparedness and Response 35
5.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions 355.2 Pandemic Response 375.3 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to Municipal Permitting 375.3.1Establish Non-Emergency Permitting Practices that can Transition to Emergency Situations 375.3.2 Identify Necessary Staff and Resources to Transition to Emergency Permitting Processes 385.3.3Foster Good Relationships and Communications with Other Stakeholders 385.3.4 Implement Steps Prior to the Pandemic or Related Emergency 38
6 Provider Perspectives and Detail 396.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions 39
6.1.1 Network Overview 396.1.2 Sector Coordinating Mechanisms 406.1.3 Pandemic and Business Continuity Planning 40
6.2 Pandemic Response 416.2.1 Network Engineering and Optimization 416.2.2 Capital Investment 416.2.3 Field Work 436.2.3.1 Necessary Field Operations 436.2.3.2 Travel and Access Issues 436.2.3.3 Minimal Touch Installation and Maintenance Procedures 446.2.4 Shift to Telework for Non-Essential Personnel 456.2.5 Protective Measures for Essential Office and Field Staff 466.2.5.1 Physical Protective Measures 466.2.5.2 Alternative Scheduling and Logistics 466.2.6 Retail Activities 476.2.7 Coordination Efforts 476.2.8 Service Provider Community Support 48
6.3 Transition to the “New Normal” 486.4 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to Provider Resilience 49
6.4.1 Consider Additional Expedited Use of Special Temporary Authorizations 496.4.2 Use Pandemic Response Funds Flexibly to Address Availability and Adoption Issues 506.4.3 Provide More Effective Coordination and Communications with Respect to Access Letters 506.4.4 Continue Collaboration and Coordination Between Providers and Federal Stakeholders 50
iii
6.4.5 Implement More Effective Use of ESF#2 Communications 506.4.6 Update Emergency and Disaster Response Plans and Activities 506.4.7 Continue Sound Traffic Engineering Practices to Manage Network Traffic 50
7 Use of Future Technology and Innovations 518 Conclusion 53
2 Introduction 2.1 Working Group Formation and Organization InAugust2018,theFCCsoughtnominationsforthenewDisasterResponseandRecoveryWorkingGroup.2DRRWGmemberswereannouncedbytheFCCinNovember2018,3andthegroup’sinitialreportwasapprovedbytheBDAConMarch27,2020.4ThisreportrespondedtotheFCC’schargesforrecommendationsonmeasurestoenhancetheresiliencyofbroadbandcommunicationsinfrastructurebeforeadisasteroccurs,responsestrategiestominimizeanydisaster’simpactonbroadbandcommunicationsservices,actionsthatcanbetakentomorequicklyrestorebroadbandcommunicationsinfrastructureduringdisasterrecovery,andbestpracticesforcoordinationamongwirelessproviders,backhaulproviders,andpowercompaniesduringandafterdisasters.Adifferentkindofdisasterthananyseeninperhapsacentury,however,strucktheUnitedStatesinearly2020.WhiletheFirstDRRWGReportrecognizedthat“notwoemergenciesordisastersarethesame,”consistentwithchargesfocusedonphysicalnetworkinfrastructureandservicerestoration,itfocusedprimarilyandlogicallyondisasterssuchas“hurricanes,...tornadoes,earthquakes,and
2.2 FCC Charges to the Working Group InApril2020,ChairmanPaiannouncednewchargesfortheDRRWGtoconsider:“Specifically,theWorkingGroupwillassisttheBDACindocumentingthevariousstrategiesandsolutionsthatstakeholdersaredevelopingandimplementinginrealtimetoaddressthedeployment-relatedchallengespresentedbytheCOVID-19pandemic.ItwillalsoenabletheBDACtoreportonbestpracticesandlessonslearnedfromtheresponsetoCOVID-19tohelpwiththeongoingresponsetothepandemic,andtoassiststakeholders,includingtheCommission,inpreparingforandrespondingtoanycomparablefuturecrises.”8TheWorkingGroupwastaskedwithconsideringandreportingonfivecharges:
2.3 Relationship to Previous Working Group Recommendations TheBDACapprovedtheinitialReportandRecommendationsoftheDRRWGonMarch27,2020.Inthatreport,basedonthechargesgiven,theDRRWGfocusedondisastersthataffectthephysicalbroadbandinfrastructure.TheinitialreportwascompletedduringtheearlydaysoftheCOVID-19pandemicinthe
3 Background 3.1 COVID-19 in the U.S. OnDecember31,2019,theChinaCountryOfficeoftheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)wasinformedofcasesofpneumoniawithunknowncauseinWuhanCityintheHubeiProvinceofChina.15OverthenextseveralweeksthediseasecontinuedtospreadinandaroundWuhan,whileadditionalcasesweredetectedinThailand,Japan,andSouthKorea.TheCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention(CDC)reportedthefirstcaseintheUnitedStatesonJanuary21.OnJanuary31,WHOdeclaredaGlobalHealthEmergency,afterwhichmanycountriesbeganrestrictingglobalairtravel.OnMarch11,theWHOdeclaredthedisease,bythendesignatedCOVID-19,apandemic.OnMarch13,theU.S.declaredCOVID-19anationalemergency.Bythen,manyschoolsandbusinessesbeganplanningforandtransitioningtoworkfromhomeanddistanceeducation.Overthenextseveralmonths,statesenactedvariousprotectivemeasuressuchaslimitinggatherings,encouragingtelework,andclosingnon-essentialbusinesses,particularlythosethatrequiredcloseinteractionsamongemployeesandcustomers.NewCOVID-19infectionsintheU.S.increasedthroughearlyApril,peakingatjustover32,000newcasesperdaybeforedroppingbacktoaround20,000perdaybyearlyJune.Newcaseratespickedupinmid-Juneuntilhittingasecondpeakjustunder70,000newcasesperdayinlateJuly.JohnsHopkinsUniversityreported,asofSeptember23,2020,therehadbeenover6millionconfirmedcasesresultinginover200,000deathsintheU.S.16 3.2 Societal Impacts of the Pandemic Unliketraditionaldisasterssuchashurricanes,floods,orfireswhichhaveaspanofdaysorweeks,theCOVID-19pandemichasalreadyspannedmonthsandthereisnocleartimeframeyetforthepandemictoend.Accordingly,Americansocietycouldnotsimplywaitfor“thestormtoclearorthefloodwaterstorecede”andreturntonormal.Instead,schools,governments,employers,andothersneededtorapidlyadapttothechallengesposedbythepandemic.Similarly,andunlikeahurricane,providerscouldnot
Availabilityisapersistentandfoundationalconcernthat,asdiscussedelsewhereinthisreport,likelyrequiressomecombinationoffederal,state,andlocalgovernmentalinitiativesandprivatesectoreffortstoovercome—especiallyinareaswheredistanceanddensitypresentsignificantandexpensivechallengestoboththebusinesscaseforinvestmentinnetworksandthesustaineddeliveryofuniversalservice.Meanwhile,non-adoption—baseduponcurrentmappingdataanddefinitionsofbroadband—affectsmanymoreAmericansthanavailability(measuredattheFCC’scurrentminimumbroadbandmetric).19Adoptionisitselfacomplexissuewithmultiplefacetsthatlikelyrequirediscreteandtailoredsolutions,includingaddressingalackofinterestorperceivedpurposeforbroadbandoraninabilitytoaffordservice.Evenasthesolutionstoeachchallengemustbetailored,thisdivide,whetheravailabilityoradoption-driven,largelyhasthesameimpactonpeoplewholackthesameabilitytowork,study,andmanagehealthcareneedsonline.3.2.1 Remote Work Theresponsetothepandemicinducedamassivesurgeoftelework.20Whilemanycompaniesandworkershadpreviouslyadoptedteleworktovaryingdegrees,thisrapidandsustainedsurgecausedmanyorganizationsandindividualstostruggletoimplementteleworkinginchallenginglogisticalenvironmentalcircumstances.Astheadagegoes,necessityisthemotherofinvention;acrosstheeconomy,companieslargeandsmallandgovernmentalentitiesatalllevelsfoundthatinpractice,theycouldbroadlyengagelarge-scaleandlong-termteleworkeffectively.Thisteleworkshifthasalreadyhadsomeradical,disruptive,andunforeseensocietalimpacts.Theabilityofalargesegmentoftheworkforcetoworkremotelylessenedtheeconomicdownturn,relativetowhatitwouldotherwisehavebeen.Work-from-homehassubstantiallyreducedautomobiletrafficandpublictransportuseinmanyareas.Althoughteleworkhadthedesiredeffectofreducingpopulationdensityinofficebuildings,thisreductionhadsecondorderimpactstolocalservicebusinessessurroundingthoseoffices.Whileteleworkwasaboontosomeworkersandemployers,manyoccupationsandbusinessesbytheirnaturerequirein-person,on-sitepresence,includingmanufacturing,services,healthcare,emergencyservices,andnationalsecurity.21Theinabilityofmanyworkerstoworkremotelymayultimatelyresult
forreligiousceremoniessuchasweddingsandfunerals.Lessconnectedpopulations,suchasseniors26andthedisabled,27whomaystrugglewithisolationinnormaltimes,wereatheightenedriskduringthispandemic.3.3 Local Jurisdiction Impacts of the Pandemic Localgovernmentsareresponsibleforavarietyofessentialservicesthatremainvitalduringapandemic.Inadditiontotheseessentialgovernmentfunctions,localgovernmentsalsofacilitateservicesandindustriessuchascommunications,financial,manufacturing,construction,transportation,andenergy.Inresponsetothepandemic,manylocalgovernmentstransitionedtoteleworkandlimitedaccesstogovernmentbuildingsbyvisitorsandnon-essentialstaff.Inadjustingtothesechanges,localgovernmentshaveworkedhardtobalancetheimperativetoprotectthepublichealthandsafetywiththeneedtoensurethatmunicipalservicesandprocessescontinuetotheextentreasonablypossibleunderthecircumstances.3.3.1 Stay at Home Orders and Access Restrictions Justasthepandemicrequiredmanybusinessestoclose,itrequiredmanygovernmentbuildingstoclosetheirdoorstovisitorsandtotransitionnon-essentialgovernmentemployeestotelework.Thetransitionrequiredstateandlocalgovernmentstoquicklyestablishnewpoliciesandprocedures,includingteleworkpolicies,remoteaccess,andcybersecurityprotocols,toensureessentialservicesremainedavailable.Forexample,tocontinuetodobusiness,localgovernmentcouncilsandboardsneededtofigureouthowtoconductmeetingsincompliancewithopenmeetingsrequirements.Thisisparticularlyimportantbecausemanyexistinglocalrequirementscouldnotbealteredorimplementedtoaddressthepandemicwithoutactionbythecouncilorboard.Inaddition,thewidespreadclosuresandstayathomeordershadeconomicconsequencesthatimpactedstateandlocalgovernmentbudgets.Manygovernmentagencieswereormaybeforcedtofurloughorlayoffstaff.Withrespecttobroadbanddeployment,stayathomeordersrequiredthetransitionofin-personactivities,includingpermitting,payment,meetings,andinspections,toremoteorsociallydistantprocesses.Whereonlinepermittingandpaymentprocessesalreadyexisted,thistransitiongenerallyrequiredlittleaction,providedthatgovernmentnetworksandemployees’broadbandservicesweresufficienttoaccessandutilizetheonlinesystem.Wheresuchsystemsdidnotexist,localgovernmentseitherimplementedonlineprocessesororganizedanotherpermittingsystem,asdescribedbelow.Acrossallgovernmentagencies,acriticalfactoristheabilityforstafftosecurelyaccessthenetworkandhavesufficientbroadbandaccessathometocompletenecessarytasks.
3.3.2 Effect on Municipal Workforces and Processes Duringthepandemic,manymunicipalitieswerefacedwithavarietyofnewchallengesinadditiontoadaptingtoteleworkandotherworkplacechangesnecessitatedbythepandemic.Forexamples,municipalitiesoftenwereattheforefrontof:
3.3.3 Work with Critical Infrastructure Owners/Operators Fromtheoutsetofthepandemic,stateandlocalgovernmentsworkedwithcriticalinfrastructureownersandoperatorstoensurebroadbandservicesremainedavailabletoresidents,necessaryupgradescouldbeaccomplished,andservicescouldbeextendedasneeded.Nationalmunicipalorganizations,includingtheNationalLeagueofCitiesandtheNationalAssociationofTelecommunicationsOfficersandAdvisors,workedwithprovidersandtheirassociationstodiscusschallengesinrespondingtothepandemic.Stakeholdersidentifiedandworkedtoresolvedeploymentissues,including:
3.4 Impact to Networks and Infrastructure WhilethetransitionofsomanyAmericanstoremotework,distanceeducation,andtelemedicinedrovesignificantshiftsindemandfornetworkcapacity,U.S.serviceproviders’networksheldupwell.Asnotedbelow,independentthirdparties(suchasSamKnowsandothers)wereconsistentintheirresultsthatU.S.broadbandnetworksperformedwelldespitesignificantincreasesindemandandmarkedshiftsinusagepatterns.Asdetailedinthesectionsthatfollow,severalfactorsunderpinnedthehighperformanceofU.S.networks:
4 Broadband User Preparedness and Response InitsfirstchargetotheDRRWG,theCommissionaskedforreviewandrecommendationswithrespectto“[t]hechallengesassociatedwithshelter-in-placeandstayathomeenvironments.”IntheCommission’ssecondcharge,theWorkingGroupwastaskedwithidentifying“[u]sefulresponsestoamassteleworkingscenario,includinganystepsthatcanbetakeninadvancetoprepare.”IndecidinghowtoaddresstheCommission’sfivecharges,theWorkingGroupdecidedtopairthesefirstandsecondchargestogether,giventhatbothimplicatedthe“enduserexperience.”Morespecifically,takentogether,thesefirsttwochargesrequireconsiderationofhowrequirementstostayathomeaffectedbroadbandusers,whatlessonscanbelearnedfromtheseuserexperiences,andwhatrecommendationsmighthelpbroadbandusersinteractmeaningfullywithwork,school,andotheraspectsofsocietyinthefaceofsuchlimitationsinthefuture. 4.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions Therelativelysuddenonsetofthepandemichadvaryingimplicationsandimpactsamongbroadbandusersofallkinds—individuals,enterprises,andgovernments.Forexample,ashifttoteleworkingcouldbemorecomplicatedforindividualsthanitmighthaveinitiallyappearedforanumberofreasons.Someworkershadspaceintheirhomeforadedicatedhomeofficeorlearningarea,whileothersinsmallerspacesneededtocarveoutworkspaceatkitchentablesorincornersofbedrooms.Importantlyforthisreportspecifically,broadbandconnectivitytothehome—andthendistributionofbroadbandconnectivitywithinthehome,typicallyviaWi-Fi—variedincapabilityandreliability.Moreover,giventhesimultaneousshutdownofcommerce,schools,andgovernment,manyhomelocationsneededtosupportsimultaneousbroadbandconnectionsforconcurrentusersperformingmultiplefunctions.Furthercomplicatingmatterswasthatsomeusersdecidedtomigratefromtheirusualhomelocationstosecondaryhomes,shiftingtheirrequirementsandconnectivityneedstoanout-of-the-ordinary,seasonallocation.Anadditionalcomplicationstillwasthat,insomecases,abroadbandconnectionmayhavebeenavailable,buttheusercouldnotaffordtosubscribedespiteneedingtodosoforworkorotherreasons.
27
Enterprisesfacedtheirownpreparednesschallenges.Insomecases,organizationsmaynothavehadlaptopsorotherdevicesforemployeestouseathome—ortheymaynothaveaddresseduseofpersonalhomecomputersforworkpurposes,implicatingcomplexitiesrelatedtoaccesstoproprietaryinformationorevenpublicrecordsaccessforgovernmentworkers.Moreover,employersmaynothavebeenpreparedtosupportwidespreadremoteaccessbytheirworkforceintheformofVPN,remotesecuritytokens,andotherremotenetworkandcapacityissues.Similarconsiderationsariseinconnectionwithpreparationforremotelearning.Concernsabouttheavailabilityofhigh-speedbroadband,theabilitytopayforserviceplans,accesstothedevicesneededtolearnremotely,and/orgeneraldigitalliteracy,allpresentchallengesintransitiontoalearn-from-homeenvironment.Moreover,aswithteleworking,schoolsmaynothavebeenpreparedinallcasesforthestrainsthatawholesalemigrationinaveryshortperiodtoremotelearningcanplaceonavailablebandwidthfortheschoolsystemitself,cybersecuritypractices,andinternalnetworksystemsandITinfrastructure.4.2 Pandemic Response 4.2.1 Transitioning to Work-from-Home Thework-from-homedecision-makingprocessvariesacrossdifferentgovernmentsandbusinesses.ManycompaniesmadedecisionstotransitiontoworkfromhomeinthefirstfewweeksofMarchandquicklytransitionedtheirworkforceinamatterofdays.Toreachthisdecision,organizationalleadersconsidered:
evenwell-patchedhomesystemslackenterprise-levelfirewallsandothercyberthreatdetectionandmitigationsystems.Inadditiontothesetechnicalrisks,thenewteleworkenvironmentopenedupnewsocialengineeringopportunitiesasbadactorssentphishingemails,setupfakewebsites,andevenmadephonecallsmasqueradingascompanyleaders,ITandhumanresourcespersonnel,orCOVID-19-relatedcharitableorganizations.Tominimizetheserisks,manyenterprisesadoptedarangeofbestpractices,64including(1)adoptedlayeredsecuritycontrolssuchasmulti-factorauthenticationanddata-at-restencryptionfordevicesoutsideofcorporatecontrol;(2)conductedtelework-specifictrainingonbestpracticestomitigatecyberthreatsandremoteworkrisks;and(3)carefullybalancedoperationalneedsandenterprisecapacitywithappropriatesecureconnectionssuchasVPNs,portals,andcloudservicesforendusers.COVID-19createdarangeofuniquechallengestothepublicsafetycommunity,particularlyintermsofworkingremotelyorfromhometoenablesocialdistancinginordinarilydenselyspacedEmergencyCommunicationsCenters(ECCs).65E-9-1-1calltakingandcommunicationwithfirstrespondersrequirespriorityaccesstonetworkresourcestoensurereliableconnectivitywithoutdelayevenduringtimesofpossiblecongestion.ThereareexamplesofECCsthathaveproactivelytakenstepstoutilizeprioritizedpublicsafetynetworkstoenabletheirstafftoreceive9-1-1callsfromremotelocationstherebyfreeingupspaceintheECC66andprovidingasaferenvironmentwhilestilldeliveringanessentialemergencyservice.TofurtherassistECCsinadaptingtothepandemicenvironment,DHS/CISAreleasedasetofguidelinestosupportpublicsafetypartnersacrossalllevelsofgovernmentindevelopingplansandactionsregardinggovernance,procedures,staffing,andcleaninganddisinfectinginresponsetoapandemic.674.2.2 Deciding If, How, and When to Return to Work Manybusinesseshaveannouncedcriteriaforif,how,andwhentheywillallowemployeestoreturnphysicallytotheofficeduringtheCOVID-19emergency,andtheCDChasissuedguidelinesonthis
such,ifpossible,schoolsmayconsiderupgradingITinfrastructurebyeitheraddingmoreresources(e.g.bandwidth,VPNconnections,servers,etc.)ormovingtoacloud-basedenvironmentthatmorereadilysupportsdynamicsizingtomeeteverchangingdemands.Regardless,bandwidthneedsshouldbeassessedregularly.Ofcourse,broadbandavailabilityandadoptionareimportantaswelltomakeforsuccessfulremotelearning.Forsomeavailabilityissues,partiesmadeeffortstostanduppublicWi-Fihotspotsforstudentsinneed,requiringstudentstodrivetoparkinglotsoutsideoflibrariesorschoolstoperformschoolwork,whichwasnotaneffectivelong-termsolutiontodigitallearning.Asinthecaseofteleworking,deployingbroadbandtomoreAmericanhouseholds,andincreasingbroadbandadoptionbyhouseholdswhereitisavailable,mustbeseenasanessentialpartofacomprehensivestrategyforremotelearningduringapandemic.Finally,muchasinthecontextofteleworking,thenumberofteachersandstudentssuddenlyteachingandlearningathomehasraisedseveralcybersecurityvulnerabilitiestoschooldistrictsandeducationalinstitutions.Lawenforcementagencieshavewarnedthatschoolnetworksarewidelyconsideredtobethemostvulnerabletoattackofanylargenetworks.Specifically,inthelastfewmonthsduringthepandemic,theFederalBureauofInvestigationissuedwarningsaboutransomware,72unwantedintrusionbyoutsidersondistancelearningsessions,73studentdataprivacyconcerns74andotheroverallsecurityconcernsduetotheamountofstudentsensitivedataheldbyeducationalinstitutionsandthelackofdefensemechanismsinplacetowardoffattacks.75Notonlycanmoredevicesintroducemoresecurityrisks,butschoolsoftensetuptotunnelalltrafficbackfromstudentsandteachersthroughtheschoolnetworkbeforeitgoestotheinternet—soevenwheresuchcapabilitiesexist,theymaynotberobustenoughtoaccommodatealloftheincreaseddatatraversingtheVPNs.ItisimportanttonotethatCISAspecificallyadvisestouseasplitVPNtunneltoreducethisrisk.764.2.4 Communication with Stakeholders Goodemergencymanagementincludestimelycommunicationwithkeystakeholders—inthiscase,employees,students,orotherstakeholders.Organizationsshouldhaveanemergencycommunicationsplanthatprovidesguidelines,contactinformation,andproceduresforhowinformationshouldbe
Becauseofthelong-termnatureoftheCOVID-19pandemic,communicationscanbetailoredtothemediumthatwillbemosteffectiveinreachingallstakeholders,butthecommunicationgenerallyshouldbefrequentwithsimplemessagesandupdatesandallowfortwo-waydialogue.Surveysandassessmentscanbesenttostakeholderstoconfirmthattheinformationiscommunicatedcorrectlyandthateverystakeholderreceivesandunderstandsit;thesurveyscanhelptoaddressanygapsinthecommunicationprocesses.Effectivecommunicationsmustalsoguidetowardcrediblesources,suchastheCDCorstateorlocalhealthofficials,foraccurateuptodateinformationonthepandemic.Stakeholdersarealsohelpedmosteffectivelywhentheorganizationcanserveasacommunicationfacilitatorfornon-work-relatedissuesthataffectemployeewell-beingandproductivity,likelocalresourcesforfoodsupplies,childcare,ormedicalfacilities,etc.794.3 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to End-Users 4.3.1 Take Steps to Improve Broadband Availability Expandingtheavailabilityofhigh-qualitybroadbandserviceataffordablerateshasbeenanationalgoalformanyyears.Overthepastdecade,theFCChasupdatedallfourofitsuniversalserviceprogramstoreorientthemforabroadbandfocusandhasdistributedbillionsofdollarstohelpmakethebusinesscasefornetworkinvestmentandtherebyconnectandkeepconnectedmillionsofAmericans.Similarly,theU.S.DepartmentofAgriculture(USDA)hasdistributedbillionsofdollarsovermanyyearstofinancetheconstructionofbroadband-capablenetworksinsomeofthemostruralpartsoftheUnitedStatesthroughitsvarioustelecommunicationsprograms,includingtheReConnectinitiativecreatedinthepastfewyears.Evenwiththisprogress,however,thepandemichasshownthattoomanyAmericansstilldonothavethebroadbandtheyneedtoworkandlearnathome.
EvenastheFCCpreparestoconductitsfirstRuralDigitalOpportunityFundauctionlaterthisyearandtheUSDAcontinuestoawardloansandgrantsthroughReConnectandotherprograms,itisclearthatthesemechanismswillnotreachalloftheAmericansinneedofbroadbandconnectivity–andwaitingdecadestoobtainbroadbanddoesnotoffersignificantpromiseforthoseinneedofbetterservicenow.TheFiberBroadbandAssociationcoststudyfoundthatitwouldcost$70billionoveradecadetoreachthemajority(90%)oftheU.S.householdswithfiber.80Evenassumingamixoflesscostlybroadbanddeploymenttechnologies,morefundingisclearlyneededtocompletethejobinatimelyandeffectivemanner.ThemostobviousandimmediatemeansofinfusingthenecessarycapitaltoaddresstheseavailabilitychallengesisforCongresstoappropriatetheadditionalfundsneededtodeploybroadbandinunservedareasinatimelymanner.Avarietyofproposalshavebeenintroducedtomakesubstantialamountsoffundingavailable,upwardsof$80to$100billion,includingproposalswithbipartisanandbicameralsupport.ActiononproposalssuchasthesewillbecriticaltohelpdeployandsustainbroadbandnetworksinruralareaswheretodatetheeconomicsoflowdensityandlongdistanceshaveprecludingensuringAmericanshaveequitableaccesstoonlineopportunities.4.3.2 Take Steps to Improve Broadband Adoption Whilebroadbandinternetadoptionhasgrownsteadilyoverthelasttwodecades,thepandemichighlightedasignificantsegmentofthepopulationthatdoesnot,andmaybeunableto,subscribetobroadbandevenwhereitisavailable.TheeconomiccrisisarisingoutoftheCOVID-19pandemic,withahighofover20millionAmericansunemployedasofApril,hasonlyexacerbatedsuchconcerns.ThePewResearchCenterrecentlyestimatedthat10%ofU.S.adultsstilldonotusetheinternet,81findingthatinternetnon-adoptionislinkedtodemographicvariablesincludingage,educationalattainment,householdincome,andcommunitytype.Importantly,thismetrichasbeenheadingsteadilydownwardovertime,fallingfrom48%in2000,downto10%in2019,andfallingacrossdemographicvariables.AccordingtoanApril2019reportfromtheNationalTelecommunicationsandInformationAdministration(NTIA),22%ofU.S.households,approximately28millionhouseholds,stilldonotusetheinternetfromhome.Closingthebroadbandadoptiongapmustbeviewedasacriticalcomponentofachievinguniversalbroadband.Pairedwiththeeffortsofserviceproviders,agovernmentfocusonpromotingbroadbandadoptioncandramaticallyincreasethenumberofhouseholdsacrossthecountryparticipatingintheeducational,healthcare,civic,andcommercialopportunitiesmadeavailablebyinternetaccess–functionsthatareparticularlyimportantwhenteleworkandremotelearningareprevalentinthefaceofthepandemic.Studieshaveshownthatthereareavarietyofreasonswhysomeonedoesnotsubscribetoalreadyavailablebroadbandservice—including,inroughlyequalpart:alackofrelevance,digitalliteracy,orthecostofserviceoracomputingdevice.82Accordingly,aspolicymakersformulateprogramstopromotebroadbandadoption,arobustvarietyofprogramsandapproachesshouldbeconsidered,
5 Municipal Permitting Preparedness and Response 5.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions Takingintoaccountdifferentsizesofandresourcesavailabletolocalgovernments,thefollowingconsiderationsandactionsmayhelplocalgovernmentsprepareforapandemicorsimilaremergencythatrequiresamassteleworkingscenario:
5.3 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to Municipal Permitting TheWorkingGrouprecommendsthefollowingbestpracticesforstate,local,andterritorialgovernmentsandtribestoaddressbroadbandpermittingchallenges,includingthosecausedbythephysicalclosureofmunicipaloffices,ashifttoteleworkformunicipalemployees,andothercomplicationsarisingfromapandemicandsimilaremergencies.86TheWorkingGrouprecognizesthatavarietyoffactors,includingthesizeofandresourcesavailabletoamunicipality,willimpacteachjurisdiction’sabilitytoimplementthesebestpracticesandthatsomesuggestionswillbeinfeasibleorineffectiveinsomecommunities.Forexample,onlinepermittingmaynotbeafeasibleoreffectivesolutionforacommunitythatlacksreliablebroadbandatitsmunicipalofficesand/oratemployees’homes.5.3.1 Establish Non-Emergency Permitting Practices that can Transition to Emergency
5.3.3 Foster Good Relationships and Communications with Other Stakeholders Preexistingrelationshipswithapplicantsandclearcommunicationregardinganychangestothepermittingprocessesduringanemergencycaneasethechallengesduringanemergency.Forexample:
effect;oftenthesetypesofprovisionsarenottriggeredbypandemicsandsimilaremergencies.5.3.4 Implement Steps Prior to the Pandemic or Related Emergency ThePre-IncidentPreparednessandActionssetforthinsection5.1aboveprovidesuggestionsforactionsthatcanbetakeninadvancetoprepareforteleworkandmunicipalbuildingclosures.
39
6 Provider Perspectives and Detail 6.1 Pre-Incident Preparedness and Actions 6.1.1 Network Overview Networkprovidershaveinvestedanenormousamountofcapitalandtechnicalexpertisebuildingflexibleandresilientnetworks.Atthebackbonelevel,providerscontinuallymonitortheirnetworksfromvirtualNetworkOperationsCenters.Mostprovidershavetremendousflexibilitytoaddcapacity,modifypaths,andadjusttrafficbasedonutilization,continuallyrefiningapproachesminute-by-minuteastrafficpatternschange.CDNsoperatedbynetworkprovidersandplatformoperatorsmovehugeamountsoftrafficandcachecontentclosertothe“edge”andthefinalusers,avoidingpotentialbottlenecksonthecoreinternet.Similartocorenetworks,CDNoperatorsconstantlymonitorforpotentialbottlenecks,movingtraffictolesscongestedroutesorincreasingcapacityoncommonlyusedroutes.CableISPsdeployavarietyofnetworktopologiesincludingfiber,coaxialcable,andfixedwirelessconnectionstothehome.Traditionalcablesystemsarebasedonahybridfibercoaxialnetwork(HFC),thattransportssignalsoverfiberintosubscriberareastofiber“nodes.”Atthefibernodeallsignalsareconvertedfromlightenergytoelectricityandthencarriedashortdistancetothesubscriber’shomeovercoaxialcable.Cableoperatorscontinuallyadjusttheirnetworkstogainadditionalbandwidthadvantagesthroughvarioustechniquessuchasnodesplitting,whichdecreasesthenumberofsubscribersbeingservedfromasinglenodebycreatingmultipleservicegroupsinsteadofonelargergroup.Cableoperatorsarealsodrivingfiberdeeperintoneighborhoodsandphysicallyclosertosubscribers,decreasingtheamountofcoaxialcablerequiredandreducingoreliminatinganyamplifiersinthesignalpath.CommunicationsbetweensubscribersandthenetworkoccurusingcablemodemsandaprotocolreferredtoasDOCSIS(DataOverCableServiceInterfaceSpecification).Fixedwirelessnetworksoperateinasimilarfashiontoafiberortraditionalwirednetworkatbackhaul/middlemilelevelinthatconnectionsarepointtopoint.Usingmicrowaveandpinpointedwirelesstechnology,wirelessISPscantransmithighspeedbroadbandsignalsfromfiberbackendstofixedpointswithintheirnetworksanduseadditionalpoint-to-pointwirelessconnectionstoextendtransmissiontoreachlastmileconnectionpoints.Lastmileservicescanbeprovisionedinasimilarwayorviapoint-to-multipointconnections,whereinbroadbandsignalscanbetransmittedtonumerousenduserpointsfromonelastmileradio.Smallerruralwirelineprovidershavemadeeffortsoverthepastdecadetoincreasecapacityintheirlastmilenetworks,typicallyintheformoffiberwhereverpossible,alongwithcarefulmanagementofbackhaul/middlemileandtransitcapacity.Inmostcases,providersaredeployingGigabit-CapablePassiveOpticalNetworkfiber-to-the-premise(FTTP)networkswithdedicatedfiberbetweencentrallylocatedOpticalLineTerminationsandtheOpticalNetworkTerminationsateachcustomerpremiseinordertominimizetheneedforfieldelectronics.Asof2019,forexample,NTCAmembersreportedthatnearly64%oftheircustomerswereservedviaFTTPconnections,while32%wereservedviaDSL,2%bycablemodemtechnology,and2%viafixedwireless;nearlythreeyearsearlier,reportsindicatedthat41%ofcustomerswereservedviaFTTP,45%byDSL,12%bycablemodems,and1%viafixed
6.2.3 Field Work 6.2.3.1 Necessary Field Operations Asprovidersofadesignated“lifeline”criticalinfrastructure,communicationsprovidershavealwaysunderstoodtheneedtokeepmaintenanceandrepairfieldcrewsworkingduringtimesofdisastertoprovidetheresilient,stable,andreliablecommunicationsonwhichAmericansrely.TheCOVID-19responsewasnodifferent,exceptthenormalchallengesofdisasterresponsewerecomplicatedbytheindefinitedurationofthepandemicandtheneedtoalsobuildoutcapacityupgradesmadenecessarybytheeventitself.Providersfrommajornationaloperatorstosmallruraloperatorsreportedincreasesinfieldactivityinthewakeofthepandemicforseveralreasons.Ascustomersmovedtoworkandlearnfromhome,thosethatlackedbroadbandorrequiredadditionalcapacityneededserviceinstalledorupgradedrapidly.Businesscustomersoftenrequiredupgradestosupporttheenterprisesideofemployeevirtualconnectivity.Providersalsobuiltoutcorenetworkcapacitynecessarytosupportthedemandshiftsoftheirresidentialandenterprisecustomers.Finally,withlesstrafficonroadsasresidentsremainedincreasinglyatorclosetohome,providersleveragedtheopportunitytoundertakeoutsideplantnetworkconstructionprojects.Incarryingoutfieldwork,providersreportedtakingarangeofsafetyprecautionsasdetailedinthefollowingsections,includingdispatchingtechniciansfromhometominimizecontactsatgaragesorservicedepots;eliminatingorlimitingtechnicianentryintocustomerpremiseswherepossible;minimizingnon-essentialpersonnelincompanyfacilitiestoincreasesocialdistancing;andprovidingPPEtofieldpersonnel.6.2.3.2 Travel and Access Issues Duringtheearlyphasesofthepandemic,asmanystateswereinstitutingmandatory“StayatHome”guidance,manyprovidersreportedconcernsregardingtheirabilitytomovefieldcrewstoconductnecessarywork.Sincethisissueaffectedarangeofcriticalinfrastructuresectors,DHS,throughCISA,issuedguidancetostateandlocalauthoritieson“EssentialCriticalInfrastructureWorkers.”97TheCommunicationsSectorCoordinatingCouncil(CSCC),thepublic-privatepartnershiporganizationthatcoordinateswiththeDHS,workedwithCISAtoensurethatkeycommunicationsemployeeswerecategorizedasessentialworkers.CISA’sNCChasproducedofficiallettersaskingState,Local,Tribal,andTerritorial(SLTT)governmentstoprovideanexemptionforcommunicationscriticalinfrastructureoperationswithregardtoanyrestrictionsimposedduringadisasteroremergencysinceHurricaneKatrina.SupplementaltotheCISAguidance,NCCissuedthesenon-bindingrequestletterstofurtherfacilitatetravelandaccessbycommunicationssectorworkers.OnMay26,2020,FCCChairmanPaiandCISADirectorKrebssentalettertoall56stateandterritorygovernorsencouragingthemtoprovide
Mostcommunicationssectorentitiesfollowedoneorbothoftheseinstallation/repairparadigms,butwithsomespecificmodifications.Mostfixedwirelessinstallationandrepairproceduresdonotrequirein-personcontactasinstallationoccursonarooforoutsidelocationandoftenapplicableequipmentisgenerallynothousedinsideahomeorfacility,sotechnicianscouldinstalloroftenmakenetworkrepairs/maintenanceasnormalwithouttheneedforin-personinteraction.Manyprovidersinitiallyseverelylimitedorcurtailedaltogetherentryintocustomerpremises,especiallyinlightofconcernsaboutsufficientaccesstoPPE.Asofmid-April,forexample,25%ofNTCAmembersreportedceasingentryintocustomerpremisesforinstallationactivity,and20%reportedthesameforrepairactivityaswell.Othersadoptedpoliciesonlytoenterintheeventofservice-affectingvoiceorbroadbandservices(ascomparedtovideooutages,forexample).6.2.4 Shift to Telework for Non-Essential Personnel AsthepandemicspreadacrosstheU.S.inMarch,manynetworkprovidersrapidlytransitionedtheirworkforcestomaximizeremoteworkwhereverpossible.Transitioningemployeestoworkfromhomewherepossiblereducedpopulationdensityinofficelocationstoallowgreatersocialdistancingforthoseemployeeswhocontinuedtoworkfromofficeandfieldlocations.Additionally,manyprovidersrestrictedtravelandlimitedin-personmeetings,contributingtothisvirtualizedremoteworkoperationalenvironment.Robustcybersecuritypracticesforthesedispersedworkforceswerecriticalinmaintainingtheconfidentiality,integrity,andavailabilityofproviderinternalandexternalnetworks.AsCISAandothersnotedtheuptickofCOVID-19-relatedcyberattacks,99trainingforremoteemployeesstressedtheneedtomaintain“cybersituationalawareness”andencouragedemployeestoidentifysuspiciouscyberactivityandreferittotheirITsecurityteamsforinvestigation.Providersleveragedlayeredsecuritycontrolssuchasmulti-factorauthenticationanddata-at-restencryptionfordevicesoutsideofcorporatefacilities(e.g.,desktopcomputersnormallyincompanyfacilities).Finally,intherapidtransitiontolarge-scaletelework,companiestieredtheirfunctionstoensurethemostsecureconnectionsareavailableforthosewhorequirethem,conservinginitiallylimitedcorporateVPNconnectionswhennecessaryandleveragingITresourcesviaportalsand/orcloudapplications.SomeprovidersfurtherreducedstrainonVPNresourcesbydivertingnon-securetrafficoutsideoftheVPN,atechniqueknownassplittunneling.
6.2.5 Protective Measures for Essential Office and Field Staff 6.2.5.1 Physical Protective Measures Manyprovidereffortsregardingprotectivemeasuresarediscussedinmoredetailelsewhereinthereport,butthissectionprovidesarecapofkeyprotectivemeasuresputinplacebyproviders.Forallworkers:
ProvidersreportedconcernswithacquiringbasicPPE(handsanitizer,disinfectantwipes,masks,gloves)earlyinthepandemic.SmallruralwirelineprovidersinparticularreportedsignificantconcernswithobtainingsufficientaccesstoPPEandsanitizing/cleaningresources.6.2.5.2 Alternative Scheduling and Logistics Providersacrossindustrysegmentstookstepstoensureemployeesafetythroughalternativeschedulingandlogisticalchangestohelpkeepemployeessaferthroughsocialdistancing.Insomecases,communicationprovidersupdatedpoliciestoallowfieldoperationsstafftokeepacompanyvehicleattheirhomeratherthanpickitupanddropitoffeachdayatthejobsite.Crewsneededtoarriveinmultiplevehiclesratherthanthesamevehicletolimittransmissionofthevirus.Providersstaggeredshiftsforconstructionandinstallationcrewstominimizeoverlapwithotheremployeesandensurefewerpeopleatajobsitesimultaneously.Thiswasaccomplishedbyaddingmoreshiftsorspreadingshiftsouttostartearlierandendlater.Officestaffacrossallindustrysegmentsalsoreportedstaggeringworkschedulestofacilitatesocialdistancing.Forcommercialinstalls,coordinatingwithbuildingmanagementwascriticaltoensureavoidingothertenantsofthebuildingandminimizing
rangingfromPersonalProtectiveEquipmentsectorneedstoconsolidatingresourcesfor“ReturntoNormal”planning. 6.2.8 Service Provider Community Support DuringtheCOVID-19pandemic,inadditiontoallofthesignificanteffortsdocumentedthroughoutthisreporttoensuretheirnetworkscouldsupporttheircustomersandkeeptheiremployeessafe,allindustrysegmentstookadditionaleffortstohelpnationalresiliencyinthefaceoftheglobalemergency.Notably,onMarch13,2020,inresponsetothepandemicandanychallengesconsumersmayface,FCCChairmanAjitPaiaskedbroadbandandserviceproviderstosigntheKeepAmericansConnectedPledgeinordertoensureAmericansremainconnectedduringtheseunprecedentedtimes.ThepledgewaslaterextendedtoJune30,2020withmorethan800companiessigningon.100Manyentitiesreportedgoing“aboveandbeyond”thepledgetohelpkeepthecommunitiesinwhichtheyliveandserveconnectedandsafeduringthepandemic.101Amongotherthings,providerswaivedlatefeesanddisconnectnotices;providedfreeservices,freeupgradesandincreasedspeeds;establishedneededcommunityhotspots;establishedteleworksolutions;andacceleratedconstructionandinstallationprojectstoconnectnewand/orcriticalbusinessesincludingremoteandnewhealthlocations.Indeed,allindustrysegmentsreportvoluntarilydoingevenmorebeyondensuringneededcommunicationsservicesduringthepandemic.Entitiesreport,forexample,establishingtechnicalroadmapsforbroadbandprovidersandschooldistrictsastheyswitchedtoremotelearning,fundingcommunityeducationalcampaignsaboutthehealthimpactsofCOVID-19,andevensteppingintofeedthefoodinsecureandestablishprocessesforcheck-insonelderlyandothervulnerablepopulationsintheircommunities.Otherproviderstookstepstosupportpublicsafetyofficialsandemergency/frontlinepersonnel,deliveringneededphonechargersorotherdevicestofrontlineworkersandhospitalpatientsordonatingandsupplyingcriticalprotectiveequipment,likefaceshieldsandotherdonatedsuppliesformedicalstaff. 6.3 Transition to the “New Normal” Evenasthepandemiccontinuestorepresentapublichealthandeconomiccrisis,providershavestartedtoexaminehowtomovefromadisasterresponseandrecoveryoperatingstatustoa“newnormal”intermsofoperationsandreturningemployeestotheworkplace–bothduringthepandemicitselfandthereafterintermsofnewpracticesandproceduresthatreflectlessonslearnedand/orefficienciesgained.Withsucheffortsinmind,onJuly1,2020,theCSCCreleasedadocumententitled“ReturntoNormal:GuidanceandResourcesforCommunicationsProviders.”102Thestatedpurposeofthereportisto“provideguidancetoonlineresourcesavailabletoassistcommunicationsprovidersestablishandimplementaplanastheyconsiderreturningtotheworkplacefollowingCOVID-19closures...includ[ing]stateandfederalgovernmentrecommendations,industrybestpractices,articles,and
TheCSCCguidancealsoprovidesasampleframeworkfordecision-making,showinghowconfirmationofcertaincriticaldecisionpointsforeachofsixdifferentworkstreams–government,healthandsafety,facilities,ecosystem,businessreadiness,andemployeereadiness–shouldbeobtainedbeforemovingtoworkplacere-entry.Inaddition,providersareconsideringhowtoapply“lessonslearned”fromthisperiodinamoreregularcourseofoperationsmovingforward.Asoneexample,ratherthanrequiringfieldoperationsstafftoreporttoacentralizedlocationpriortodispatchingforcustomerservicecallssuchasinstallationsandrepairs,anumberofprovidersreportmigratingtoa“dispatchfromhome”model.Whileoriginallyimplementedoutofadesiretolimitinteractionsbetweenstaffduringthepandemic,providersarefindingthistobeanefficientpracticethatsavestraveltimefortechniciansandmaximizesemployeeresources.Providersaresimilarlyevaluatingwhetherotheroperationalchangesdrivenbythepandemic—suchasincreasedwork-from-homecapabilitiesforcustomerservicerepresentativesorotherofficepersonnel—canandwillbesustainedmovingforwardaspartof“normalized”operations. 6.4 Recommendations/Best Practices Related to Provider Resilience 6.4.1 Consider Additional Expedited Use of Special Temporary Authorizations TheFCCshouldcontinuetolookatSpecialTemporaryAuthorizationsthatcanbeexpeditedtosupportnetworkdeploymentsinspectrumthatmightonlybeavailableinlimitedareas,foralimitedtime,orcontainotherrestrictionsinordertohelpkeepAmericansconnected.
50
6.4.2 Use Pandemic Response Funds Flexibly to Address Availability and Adoption Issues
TheFCCandotherfederalagenciesthathavefundingsourcesavailableforapandemicresponseshouldusesuchfundsflexiblytoaddresstherootissuesofavailabilityandadoptionnotedinthisreport. 6.4.3 Provide More Effective Coordination and Communications with Respect to Access
Letters Accesslettersarevitalforcriticalinfrastructureproviders’teamstocarryouttheirdutiesandservicesduringdisastersandpandemicswhenrestrictionsexistthatcouldimpedesuchwork.Assuch,theWorkingGrouprecommendsfutureDHSengagementwithSLTTpersonnelonaccessletterqualificationsandrelatedrightsforcriticalinfrastructureprovidersthroughsuchprogramsordocumentsastheInteroperabilityCommunicationsTechnicalAssistanceProgram,theNationalEmergencyCommunicationsPlan,andFEMA’sNationalResponseFramework.SLTTgovernmentshouldclearlycommunicatetoproviderstheexpectationsandacceptableuseofaccesslettersfromtheNCC.6.4.4 Continue Collaboration and Coordination Between Providers and Federal
Stakeholders ThesupportthecommunicationssectorreceivedfromDHSandCISAthroughtheNCCgreatlyfacilitatedsectorresponseactions.DHS/CISAshouldcontinuesupportingthecommunicationssectorthroughtheNCC,andtheNCCshouldcontinuetocoordinateoncommunicationssectorpreparednessandresponsewiththeCommission’sPublicSafetyandHomelandSecurityBureau(PSHSB).ClosecoordinationbetweenNCCandPSHSBisimportantandshouldcontinueaswell. 6.4.5 Implement More Effective Use of ESF#2 Communications State,tribal,andterritorialgovernmentsshouldofficiallyactivateESF#2communicationstocoordinateanyneedswithinthestate,tribe,orterritory.Thisactivationcouldbedonevirtuallyandatalimitedactivationlevelthatfollowsnormalbusinesshoursbutestablishesapointofcontactandprocessforcoordinatingcommunicationneedsbeingaddressedduetothepandemic.Thisisespeciallyhelpfultoaddressothercommunicationneedsthatmightariseduetoadifferentdisasterthatoccursduringthepandemic.6.4.6 Update Emergency and Disaster Response Plans and Activities Communicationsprovidersshouldupdateemergencyanddisasterresponseactivitiestorespondtoconcurrentseasonalweatherandpandemiceventstoaccountforpandemic-relatedfactors(e.g.,shelteringforworkers,PPEavailability,socialdistancing,etc.).6.4.7 Continue Sound Traffic Engineering Practices to Manage Network Traffic Communicationsprovidersshouldestablishorcontinuetrafficengineeringpracticestoeffectivelymanagenetworktrafficasnecessaryonacase-by-casebasis.Companiesshouldreviewtheseproceduresasapandemiccausesashiftinusagehabitsbothfortime-of-dayandthroughputneeds.
51
7 Use of Future Technology and Innovations InitsthefifthchargetotheDRRWG,theFCCaskedtheWorkingGrouptoevaluate“[w]aysthattechnologycouldbeusedtomitigate[thechallengesidentifiedinothercharges,suchasmassteleworking]andothersimilarchallengesinthefuture.”Asnotedintheintroductionofthisreport,andascontemplatedintheverywordingofthischargeitself,thisfifthchargeisinextricablylinkedwiththeotherchargesdiscussedinsections4through6ofthisreportasthosesectionsdescribevariouswaysinwhichendusers,enterprises,governments,andserviceprovidersleveragedtechnology.Thefollowingareexampleswherefurtheranalysisandinvestigationcouldbeconducted.Somearealreadyunderinvestigationbyotherworkinggroupsorentities,suchastheFCCTechnologicalAdvisoryCouncil,theCSRIC,theDHSInformationCommunicationTechnologySupplyChainRiskManagementTaskForce(DHSICTSCRMTF),andNTIA,orintheDepartmentofCommerce’ssupplychainproceedings.